The Lawfare Podcast

Episode: Lawfare Live: The U.S. Strike on Venezuela and Capture of Nicolás Maduro
Date: January 5, 2026
Host: Benjamin Wittes (Editor in Chief, Lawfare)
Panel: Scott R. Anderson (Senior Editor), Dana Stuster (Foreign Policy Editor), Lauren Voss (Public Service Fellow)

Episode Overview

This episode, recorded live on January 4, 2026, delves into the U.S. military operation in Venezuela, resulting in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro. The panel unpacks the operation's geopolitical context, explores the administration's shifting rationales—from drug trafficking to oil interests—analyzes the legal underpinnings and precedents for the raid, and discusses the implications for U.S. domestic and foreign policy.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Background: What Happened in Venezuela?

[02:28–04:11]

• Dana Stuster explains that on Friday, the U.S. conducted a military operation to seize Maduro. The Trump administration initially described it as a law enforcement operation but later suggested the U.S. is running Venezuela, before Secretary of State Rubio walked that back, clarifying instead a policy of “influence through leverage” rather than direct occupation.
• The administration threatens further strikes if new Venezuelan leadership doesn't cooperate, hinting at regime change ambitions.

“The Trump administration in a press conference yesterday said that the United States is now running Venezuela... That was walked back today by the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio...”
—Dana Stuster [02:53]

2. Stated Justifications: Drugs, Terrorism & Oil

[04:11–06:56]

• Multiple rationales from the administration:
  • Law enforcement (Maduro indicted for trafficking), though the timing appears suspect.
  • National security threat via narcotrafficking labelled as “terrorism.”
  • Open acknowledgment of strategic oil interests; intention to let American oil companies redevelop Venezuela’s oil resources.
  • A continuation of the “Trump corollary”—the U.S. claiming a sphere-of-influence approach in the Western Hemisphere.

“It was shocking to see this stated so baldly; this very... colonial throwback to ‘we need to get in and get the oil.’”
—Dana Stuster [05:18]

3. Legal Authority: International & Domestic Dimensions

[06:56–12:14]

A. International Law

• Scott R. Anderson: The administration invokes Article 51 of the UN Charter (self-defense) by framing narcotics trafficking and Trenda Aragua’s actions as armed attacks. This is an unprecedented and widely criticized expansion of self-defense doctrine.
• Precedent: U.S. invasion of Panama (Noriega) is cited, but treating drug trafficking as an armed attack has no real international buy-in.
• UN Charter strictly limits use of force, so this rationale is dubious.

“Nobody’s ever really realistically thought about treating narcotics trafficking as the equivalent of throwing a bomb at a country.”
—Scott R. Anderson [07:36]

B. Domestic Law

• U.S. executive branch contends the President has broad powers, limiting Congressional checks except in the case of major wars (Korea/Vietnam-level).
• The first wave is framed as law enforcement support, but any second wave (territorial control, targeted strikes) must be justified under self-defense or national interest.
• The administration hints at—while avoiding—full “occupation” language to skirt the need for Congressional authorization.

“They do seem a little more hesitant about ground operations... Secretary Rubio... said, ‘we are not occupying this country. That’s why we don’t need congressional authorization.’”
—Scott R. Anderson [11:44]

4. The Confusion of Policy & Legal Narratives

[12:14–19:28]

• Mixed messaging: President says "we're running Venezuela," but Secretary Rubio insists U.S. has no troops there.
• Panel discusses that administration may use “law enforcement” as a legal gloss on an essentially coercive use of force.
• The law enforcement narrative doesn't erase constitutional or war powers constraints.

“The law enforcement angle of this is actually mostly a distraction from the core legal frameworks.”
—Scott R. Anderson [18:46]

5. Immunity & Indictment: The Legal Path for Maduro

[19:58–23:25]

• Maduro’s SDNY indictment, recently updated, includes trafficking and weapons charges connected to FARC and Trenda Aragua.
• Issue of head-of-state immunity: Since the U.S. (since 2019) does not recognize Maduro’s presidency, official immunity is unlikely to apply—following the Precedent set by the Noriega prosecution in Panama.

“[Maduro] has not been recognized as the lawful head of state of Venezuela since 2019... therefore does not receive any immunity for this.”
—Scott R. Anderson [22:01]

6. Policy Objectives: Oil, Influence, or Regime Change?

[25:17–29:36]

• Wittes and panel puzzle over U.S. objectives: Is it about resources, democracy promotion, or both?
• Dana emphasizes the administration’s open focus on oil, regional hegemony, and weakening international norms against intervention.
• Comparison to U.S. criticisms of China’s and Russia’s territorial assertiveness.

“Clearly, the Trump administration is not too concerned about the UN Charter... the United States is staking out a claim here, saying that... legitimate business connections between China and, say, Venezuela... are going to be at threat.”
—Dana Stuster [27:11]

7. Domestic Fallout: Immigration & Enemy Combatant Questions

[29:36–33:07]

• Lauren Voss points out the domestic extension of these arguments:
  • Deportations and arrests of Venezuelans and Trenda Aragua affiliates in the U.S.
  • If the admin formally claims a state of war, it invites the potential use of military force domestically and posits the specter of “enemy combatants” inside the U.S.
  • Cites possible (but not current) invocation of the Alien Enemies Act for broad detentions/deportations.

“If we say that we are in an armed conflict with Venezuela... could you use the military on American streets...that is the way that the path would go.”
—Lauren Voss [31:23]

8. Are We at War? Defining Armed Conflict

[33:16–39:10]

• Uncertainty whether the U.S. is technically “at war” with Venezuela under either domestic or international law.
• Scott points out that most violence has been one-sided; traditionally, a “prolonged exchange” is needed for legal “armed conflict.”
• Panel agrees the legal and policy boundaries are blurred, leading to uncertainty on how the government regards the conflict.

“You’re in such a weird environment when the President says, we’re running Venezuela now and it’s because of the oil.”
—Benjamin Wittes [37:16]

9. International Legitimacy & Diplomatic Fallout

[39:10–44:39]

• Administration’s public statements don’t align: President is unreliable, Secretary of State is more careful.
• Offer of “gilded exile” in Turkey to Maduro signals possible exit ramps rather than sustained escalation; micro-targeting Maduro himself may indicate a desire for a face-saving de-escalation soon.
• U.S. inconsistency complicates international support; some European partners muted, others uneasy.
• Panel notes possible shifts toward maintaining status quo with Maduro gone but regime intact (“regime change without regime change”).

“Maybe, you know, we’re going to do a regime change without actually redoing regime change. We’ll still get the outcome that we want, but we’re not going to go in and occupy and destroy the institutions.”
—Dana Stuster [42:53]

10. What Happens Next? Signs of Escalation or De-escalation

[44:39–51:18]

• Lauren: Military forces serve as deterrence; their movement will signal either de-escalation or further confrontation. Progress tied to American demands (oil access, policy concessions) will dictate drawdown.
• Dana: Watching for gestures from the new Venezuelan leadership that suggest U.S. leverage is working versus international backlash/rallying to Maduro.
• Scott: Focus on “two governments” dilemma—the U.S.-recognized national assembly and the de facto Rodriguez regime. Any consolidation, especially regarding oil concessions or elections, will illuminate U.S. endgame.

“That sort of bifurcation isn’t really sustainable in the long run, especially if your goal is to try and get kind of oil concessions. The real question now becomes how do they reconcile those two and what does that tell us about where this is going to go?”
—Scott R. Anderson [49:17]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On official rationale:
  “It was shocking to see this stated so baldly; this very... colonial throwback to ‘we need to get in and get the oil.’”
  —Dana Stuster [05:18]

• On U.S. precedent:
  “Nobody’s ever really realistically thought about treating narcotics trafficking as the equivalent of throwing a bomb at a country.”
  —Scott R. Anderson [07:36]

• On international messaging:
  “The President is possibly the least reliable narrator in the entire executive branch. So he’s not good at sticking to his talking points.”
  —Scott R. Anderson [39:10]

• On legal implications for Venezuelans in the U.S.:
  “If we say that we are in an armed conflict with Venezuela ... could you use the military on American streets ... that is the way that the path would go.”
  —Lauren Voss [31:23]

• On regime change strategy:
  “Maybe, you know, we’re going to do a regime change without actually redoing regime change. We’ll still get the outcome that we want, but we’re not going to go in and occupy and destroy the institutions.”
  —Dana Stuster [42:53]

Key Timestamps

• [01:35] Opening setup—motivation and strategic objectives
• [02:53] What happened on the ground in Venezuela?
• [04:53] Administration's rationales: drugs, oil, and strategic dominance
• [06:56] Legal discussion—precedents, self-defense, and constitutional constraints
• [19:58] Discussion of the indictment, immunity, and next steps for Maduro
• [25:17] Policy goals—oil vs. democracy, spheres of influence
• [29:36] Domestic spillover: immigration and enemy combatants
• [33:16] Are we technically “at war” per US/international law?
• [39:10] Messaging confusion within the administration and possible exit ramps
• [44:39] Signs to watch for escalation or de-escalation in deployment and policy

Closing Thoughts

The panel concludes there's deep uncertainty about U.S. intentions and legal footing in Venezuela. Official narratives shift by the day, suggesting no cohesive long-term policy. The operation’s legacy may hinge on whether further military escalation occurs or if the U.S. seeks a diplomatic off-ramp after removing Maduro, possibly reshaping the regional order and international law norms in the process. The situation demands close watching—of both Venezuelan regime movements and American military deployments—to decipher the administration’s true objectives and the legal precedents being set.