Alex Zurdin (2:39)

You guys jumped the gun. I had a big Lebowski tie in for my comments. Now I can't do it because it seems tired that you already did the first reference in the first two minutes of the conversation.

Scott R. Anderson (2:50)

I can only hope that this rug ends better than that rug did. Unfortunately, I don't know who I would go to replace that one, but, I mean, Tyler, I guess be on my rug, but yeah, fair enough.

Tyler McBrien (2:59)

I'm thinking more of a parasite reference that I'm just going to stay here long enough and slowly push you out.

Scott R. Anderson (3:04)

And just crawl under the table and.

Alex Zurdin (3:06)

Stay and I won't notice adverse possession. Yeah. Not as great as. Not as frequent as it used to be.

Tyler McBrien (3:14)

Foreign.

Scott R. Anderson (3:19)

Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Rational Security. I am your host, Scott R. Andersen. Thrilled to be back with you for the podcast where we invite you to join members of the lawfare team as we try to make sense of the week's big national security news stories. I am thrilled to be joined by two said colleagues. First, we have, of course, returning for his umpteenth appearance.

Alex Zurdin (3:38)

I don't really know.

Scott R. Anderson (3:39)

At this point, we have law firm managing editor Tyler McBrien Squatting in my office, using my elegantly appointed furnishings and electronic devices to record in optimum comfort while I am banished here to my freezing cold basement at home with a sick kid. So, Tyler, thank you for coming back on the podcast. I hope you enjoy the next hour more than I do.

Tyler McBrien (3:59)

Oh, I will. I'm in your office. What could be bad?

Scott R. Anderson (4:02)

Looks so comfy. I miss it. Honestly, I do. Thrilled to be joined as well for another repeat appearance. Here on Rational Security, we have Lawfair contributing editor and general sanctions and economic policy maven Alex Zurdin. Alex, thank you for coming back on the podcast. It's been a while. We're excited to have you back on.

Alex Zurdin (4:16)

Yeah, thanks so much for the invite. Excited to be back.

Scott R. Anderson (4:19)

Well, we have a lot that is in the news this week, a couple of stories we wanted to bump to the top, especially because we have Alex here to dig into some sanctions and economic policy angles and related stories to dig into so let's go ahead and get started. Our first topic for today is Finding the Road to Damascus. Former dictator Bashar Al Assad fled Syria one year ago this week, bringing a precipitous end to the country's more than decade long civil war. In the years since, has the country been able to make progress towards the optimistic future many hoped would follow Assad's ouster? And what obstacles still lie in its path? Topic 2 Civilizational self Confidence Scheme the Trump administration has undergone the once per term statutorily mandated ritual of releasing its national security strategy. It claims an intent to stay the course on many key bipartisan pillars of US Foreign policy, but mixes in heavy doses of isolationism, ethnonationalism and criminal criticism of Europe for losing its quote unquote civilizational self confidence. How seriously should we take this document and what does it tell us about the likely trajectory of U.S. foreign policy? And topic three I think we all saw this title coming, but I could not resist a diamond in the rough question mark. JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon has announced a 10 year initiative to invest $1.5 trillion in US companies critical to national security and economic resilience. I should say U.S. national Security and economic resilience. Is this an attempt by Dimon to repair his sometimes frosty relationship with the Trump administration by complimenting its Americ first strategy or an initiative that more genuinely strikes at the intersection of market logic and US national security? So for our first topic, Alex, I want to come to you first on this one. A year ago or so, I think less than a year ago still at this point you and I wrote a piece looking at what at the time, in the aftermath of Assad's ouster was one of maybe three or four huge buckets of big problems that was facing the Syrian government, or at that point wasn't even really government. The post Assad reality that Syrians were waking up to at the point where he left the country. And that's a reality that's more or less perseveres today. We have western quadrant of the country more or less in control of what at one point was Hayatir Al Sham, Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist group now has been largely delisted now integrated with certain other elements and forces to create a transitional government that's still more or less in place. We still have big swaths of the country that are control of the Syrian Democratic Forces about, you know, kind of the eastern third of the country and big swaths to the country where the degree of control that Anyone has over them is I think a little bit questionable at this point. So it's still a difficult reality. But we have seen that regime that set itself up really make huge strides in securing international legitimacy on everything from being delisted from most sanctions regimes, having a lot of the sanctions issues we flagged as being real concerns in that article about a year ago, lift and alleviated, which is what we more or less recommended at the time, as I recall. I think we actually were not that ambitious because we weren't sure that was realistic, but nonetheless they appear to have done it, which is good. And things like, you know, the really momentous and frankly for people who've worked on Syria policy and followed Syria as I have and other people have for years, like really kind of mind blowing visit of the CENTCOM commander to Syria earlier this year in full dress whites, walking around with, you know, the former head of hts, a terrorist group. Pretty, pretty unreal stuff. So I want to turn it over to you, Alex, first from your lens, both from the economic statecraft lens that is your specialty, but also from the broader lens, because you are somebody who has worked, particularly in Afghanistan, but in other countries that have gone through these difficult transitional periods and worked on related issues. Talk to us about how you think Syria is faring. What are you still worried about, what progress has it made and what is still out? There is big obstacles that friends of Syria need to look forward to to make their way towards that brighter future.

Alex Zurdin (8:02)

The transition over the past year is nothing short of remarkable. I think we should all and can all acknowledge that. I don't think we, a year ago or a little more than a year ago would have thought that Syria would be in the place that it's in right now, even remember, and I don't think we've talked about this previously. As late as October and November of 2024, the United States was discussing with the United Arab Emirates about sanctions relief, not for these interim authorities, for the Al Shara led government, but actually for the former government led by the dictator Bashar Al Assad. And so no one saw this coming, I think at a collective level from the blob here in D.C. from foreign capitals or even in the region. And yet here we are a year later and we have had this incredible sea change of policy and changes in how the US Government approaches the country of Syria. The government of Syria and as you mentioned, Scott, the leader, Ahmed Al Shara, former un, US Internationally designated terrorist, who not just had a welcome visit by the leader of the commander of centcom, but then was an invited guest of President Trump in the White House just recently. And, you know, and so what we've seen here is this incredible transformation and rehabilitation of this, again, former terrorist leader, former insurgent who had been captured by U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. Scott, something you've been very close to over the years as well, and this incredible transformation. So I think we need to acknowledge that, and I think that's widely acknowledged. And so there is this phenomenal change that has occurred. And for the Syrian people, the amount of freedom and ability to express themselves and not live under the fear and oppression and brutality by the Assad regime is nothing short of remarkable. With that, though, I think while this optimism exists, I do have some areas of skepticism, both on the economic as well as the political and social fronts. And so the economic scorecard I'll start with that is a bit mixed right now. Scott, you walked through some of the changes that had happened as we discussed previously, the restrictive economic measures, most notably sanctions, but export controls, foreign terrorist organization designation, state sponsorship of terrorism, finding the gray listing of Syria on the International Intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force list. There are all these prohibitions against interacting with Syria, its economy and its government. Many of those, as you mentioned, have been lifted. I think there was a major transformation through President Trump's May 13 speech in Riyadh that fundamentally shifted US government policy, broke this logjam that existed for about six months preceding the president's speech and transitioning from the Biden administration to the Trump administration about what the outlook would be for Syria. And then the hard work started. There wasn't enough for really any interagency coordination before the president's speech. And since then, there's been really commendable catch up by the interagency from State, Treasury, Commerce and the National Security Council to coordinate a whole of government strategy to withdraw some of these and many of these restrictive economic measures. So where we are right now, there was a executive order border 14312, ending the National Emergencies that gave rise to some, but not all of the sanctions against Syria. There was some limited forbearance on economic export controls, so it's administered by the Commerce Department that came through in September. And there was the removal of HTS as a foreign terrorist organization by Secretary Rubio in the State Department, which was a major step in July and and then. But we still have other things in place. Most notably, and I think most presciently Right now, the Caesar act is a statutory scheme implemented by Congress in 2019 reauthorized last year in 2024 after the fall of the Assad regime that imposes very harsh secondary sanctions against both Syria as well as those who interact with the Syrian economy. And now under the current NDAA draft, there is a provision to actually rescind that, which is a major, major achievement for those who were supporting its rescission. I think some stakeholders and some factions within Syria, particularly the Druze and Alawite community, those who are concerned about potential backsliding by the Alshara administration and have other various concerns, as well as some who are more sympathetic to a more decentralized, weaker Syrian state. And some within the kind of pro Israel camp are also seeking to, to oppose the rescission of the Caesar Act. But there's a good chance it'll be voted on and move forward. So that's very major transformation that we've seen over the past just year and past several months on the economic front. The challenge now is though the hard work now starts. So the structural factors impacting Syria are profound. Pronounced Syria has been in war for civil war for almost a decade and a half. It's a very moribund economy. It really, really just was a conflict in war economy that was trading in large part off of Captagon, which is an amphetamine narcotic. And that was a major source of revenue for the Assad regime including as well as foreign assistance from places like Russia and Iran. Those sources of funding have dried up. So you need to revamp an economy. You need to reinvest in infrastructure. Billions of dollars are needed to rehabilitate the country. There's still issues with power, with basic infrastructure, sanitation. And so there is the need for incredible rebuilding of the country. And the work is very, very preliminary in that and not much has actually happened over the past year. In fact though, I think the economic conditions in Syria really people haven't seen it in a day to day level by most publicly available reporting. And actually what we've seen is the transformation from a very consolidated Assad family, Assad regime and crony economy, a kleptocratic regime. We're starting to see indications of a very closely held, centralized, tightly controlled economy and administration by President Alshara. There's been public reporting, including a really good Reuters investigation earlier this summer, that his brother Hazam is actually his older brother Hazam is de facto controlling and running the economy and and ensuring that significant industries, significant businesses have interests and control by either the Alshara family or their associates. And so that's another aspect that has to be considered on the positive side of the ledger though, the World bank, the IMF have done visits, there's a mid level U.S. treasury Department delegation as well to Syria this year. And so we have some of the support from international financial institutions, the international community as well as private sector investments. Visa, mastercard have expressed interest in signed Memorandum of understanding. Binance, the cryptocurrency Exchange Convicted by US authorities who pled guilty by US authorities in 2023 for various sanctions and money laundering related offenses, has also established a presence in the country. And so some positive indications about that economic rehabilitation are starting to take root as well.

Tyler McBrien (15:29)

Yeah, that's super helpful. I mean, I haven't been following as closely these internal dynamics, but the whole time you were speaking, Alex, I kept thinking like if that's not complicated enough, if that's not enough of a set of challenges internally only. I mean, it's not like Syria is trying to rebuild in a very calm or boring neighborhood, if you want to put it that way. So Scott, I'm actually curious if you've been following many of the regional dynamics, especially vis a vis Israel. I know in the early days of the about a year ago, Israel was taking the opportunity to push their security border into, you know, farther afield now that the Assad regime was falling. But yeah, what is the current state of the regional dynamics that Syria is dealing with?

Scott R. Anderson (16:18)

Yeah, it is really complicated. I mean, you have to bear in mind the collapse of the Assad regime really was precipitated in a way that, as Alex said, I don't think anyone fully anticipated, including the people who did it, the Israelis who pursued a super aggressive military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Very effective one. One which I was on the podcast very skeptical of and I will say I may have had good reasons for it at the time, but it was very effective at really severing the line of support that was flowing to Lebanon, to Hezbollah, through Syria, from Iran, cutting off Hezbollah at the end of that. And Hezbollah was one of the big drivers of regional influence, one of the big security pillars for Iranians ability to act through proxies was actually a reverse point of influence for the Assad regime in Syria because providing a lot of expertise and support, gutting that along with being pressure on the direct military campaign against Iran itself really has had just dramatic effects in Syria and does appear to be combined probably, if we're being completely honest, with the fact that Russia has been focused on Ukraine for the last three years instead of Syria, where it really was quite active for many Years prior to that, during the first Trump administration and the very end of the Obama administration. It really was amazing to see this house of cards completely topple so quickly. But since then, it has been really challenging. I mean, I think you can kind of bundle the challenges in kind of three buckets, maybe four buckets. But one I think Alex has covered with the west is actually kind of ironically, the new governments or the new regime, because they haven't officially been recognized and probably won't be anytime soon by any governments, as far as I'm aware. But the new regime, the former HTS led regiment, their best partners right now are the west, the United States, which seems to be poised to set up a military base in Syria and have a military presence there at the invitation of the current regime. Close allies in the West. That's why they've been driving a lot of this desanctioning, which is so essential to Syria rebuilding itself. Its biggest problem, though, have been its two closest geographic neighbors, at least two of its closest geographic neighbors, Israel and then Turkey. Israel has really been keeping up pressure on the Syria regime. Netanyahu is very open. He does not trust this regime a lick. Israel has actually occupied big stretches. Not that big, big, but not in minuscule, not diminutive stretches of southern Syria, creating essentially a new Golan Heights situation. Bear in mind the Golan Heights Israel effectively annexed during the first Trump administration, or at least officially finalized the annexation of. Now they've gotten control of another part of southern Syria, and they have hit the regime, or I should say has struck Syria generally, I think something like 600 times, according to some counts I've seen in the media since Al Sharra took power. Now, some of those strikes were early on against just general tanks, planes, arms depots. I think then the justification early on was, we don't know what the heck's gonna happen. We don't want these major stories of major arms to fall into the hands of a more malicious group than the Assad regime, which was malicious enough. So we're gonna hit those. I think there was a tolerance for that among the United States, among other allies. But now it's become much more targeted against the Shah government and the Shah regime and military elements associated with it, which are a little decentralized. And that has been a problem for the Shah regime that they're wrestling with. They have seen cases of sectarian viol violence in various directions under their governance, and particularly towards this Druze minority, which is a minority group that the Israelis have a very close historical relationship with. And at this point have basically said, we are going to take steps to protect this minority that lives in Syria. That's a justification for its presence in southern Syria, the justification for lots of military action. And the government has not given no signs, Netanyahu government, I should say no signs of backing down from that whatsoever. The one thing that might cause it to back down is that it's really becoming a pain point, I think, for the Trump administration between this and Gaza. My sense is that they were able to rule Netanyahu enough on the Gaza plan that they were willing to tolerate some degree of adventurism in Syria as a bit of a trade off for that. But I don't know how far that tolerance actually goes. And ultimately this will be a bigger issue, particularly if the Syrian regime can talk to allies in the Gulf and other places that have the ear of the Trump administration and on whom the Trump administration is really reliant for success in Gaza, something it really seems to want. On the other side of that, you have the Turks. The Turks have a better relationship with this regime, certainly, than Israel does, more than they. And the Gulf states, I think, have a reasonably good relationship, I think can be seen as some of its main backers in certain ways, or at least relationships. But there you have this challenge of you have this SDF component, the Syrian Democratic Forces, which is essentially the other Syrian state. They have been a largely autonomous part of Syria, in control of big swaths of Syria that they want to maintain substantial autonomy for. And we've seen a lot of negotiations, and so far, both sides are verbally committed to the idea that we're still one country and we're going to find a way to join into one framework. But that level of autonomy the SDF wants is a real point of contention with the Turks, who view the SDF as an extension of their own domestic Kurdish insurgency. The SDF is primarily based on kind of the Kurdish population of the country, and therefore is not really willing or interested in tolerating that much support from them. And so that's going to put a lot of pressure potentially on the sdf, but also on the HTS regime to say, okay, how do we actually bridge this gap? How do we get the SDF the autonomy it needs, autonomy it wants? We can bring them into some sort of confederation structure, but without going too far across the line in a way that Turkey's not going to accept. And it's not clear that Damascus, that the new government there, the union government, really wants to accept too much SDF autonomy, either that would be inviting a potentially difficult situation. Then again, that model is what exists in Iraq, where you have a Kurdistan Regional Government that is substantially autonomous, has its own armed military forces. Less true now post2017, when there was a little minor civil war with Baghdad at the time, but still substantially true. And certainly it was very true for more than a decade prior to that. So you don't really know where this model's going to go. The Iraqis, by the way, if anybody's wondering, because they do obviously share what might be the biggest border with Syria. I think Turkey's border is probably bigger, but regardless, they have a substantial border. You know, interestingly, while there is this big KRG Kurdistan Regional Government that is also Kurdish, like the sdf, they have a difficult relationship with the sdf. And I think the Iraqis, as far as I can tell, like, seem to be essentially be saying we're pro stability. They're not actively involved. They obviously have their own problems. And the collapse of the Iranian presence in the region, which has really followed Israeli military action the last year, I think has given them a window to focus on domestic issues. So they, as far as I can tell from watching this at a reasonably high level, haven't been as engaged on this particular issue set. But it is a really difficult set of challenges, and that intersects with all of these domestic challenges because Syria is a super diverse country and involves identities and political groups that break across all those borders. So, yeah, it is a really complicated picture. So, Tyler, let me throw it back at you with a question then. So the real question, I think the wild card in all of this, and Alex, I'd welcome your thoughts on this, too, is the Trump administration. Alex, you mentioned that May speech that President Trump gave where up until that point they had essentially given a lot of temporary sanctions relief. Nobody was 100% clear how far they would go. And it's worth noting there was far from unity in the Republican caucus, in the MEGA Caucus, about how to approach this question. A lot of people on the political right have expressed skepticism of this new government, less so since the Trump administration has clearly embraced it. But prior to that, I faced a lot of skepticism. And generally, there has been strong opposition on the right to sanctions relief in any way that might enable or embolden terrorist groups. That's been actually kind of like a big touchstone of kind of conservative foreign policy. Not always just conservative. A lot of Democrats in Congress express the same views for a long, long time. This bucks that pretty aggressively. So I guess, how do we explain the political dynamics around that for the Trump administration, How sustainable are they? I at least have been thinking of this as kind of like the Gaza situation, a situation where Trump's effectiveness is largely because he knows he controls his domestic political constituency enough that he can buck what a lot of them may choose to be them foreign policy, if left to their own preferences, and say, nope, we're going to take this in a different direction. I know you guys are going to go along with me. And so far that seemed to be true. But it hasn't been a great political two months for Trump. So I'm wondering if there's a window to that and whether that might actually, while it might be good for other policy fronts, might be bad for Syria policy. I'm not sure about that. What do you think, Tyler? And then, Alex, I want to come to you on that point, too.

Tyler McBrien (24:53)

Yeah, it's a good question. I mean, I think you're right in that the Trump factor can open up new lanes of what were previously closed off or commonly held assumptions about U.S. foreign policy across the aisle for generations before that. I mean, I keep thinking about how, Alex, what you said at the beginning of how quickly things have changed in just a year or what a year ago, you know, unfathomable, is now happening. And, you know, the fact that there's still like tweets up from the US Embassy of Syria with wanted posters with Jelani's face and like a $10 million reward. But Trump has a short memory. He is, as we've talked about many times before, he's can be quickly fall into someone's thrall if they look the part. I mean, he called Syria's leader a young attractive fellow or a tough guy or some combination of that. And then finally, if he sees a financial incentive there for some sort of development, then he's willing to cast aside other ideological considerations for, I think, a bottom line or for the sake of development and deal making. So I think that opens up all of these possibilities for US Engagement with Syria. But all of that is premised on, like you were saying, Trump's capital. And it was, I think, extremely strong for most of the year among his base, but maybe waning due to domestic issues. We see him now for the first time in a long time, I think, giving a speech this week in Pennsylvania to address domestic economic issues, which some see as a sign that he's been, you know, off on his own adventures, neglecting the home front. So whether he will have either the capital to push for the Syria policy that he wants or even the attention and capacity to pay attention to Syria as we are approaching a midterm year and prices are rising domestically, I think remains to be seen. I'm not sure. Alex, I'd be curious your thoughts as well.

Alex Zurdin (26:54)

Certainly a couple of thoughts on it. I think we generally agree. So I don't think there's a ton of daylight, but just from a slightly different perspective, I think the president has handled Syria policy to date pretty masterfully. And I think there's a couple reasons potentially behind this. One, there wasn't a huge Syria constituency. I think over the past several years. There were some members of Congress in particular who cared a lot about it and particularly we saw with the renewal of the Caesar act law in 2024 again after the Assad regime fell. But it isn't a major political issue within the United States. There isn't the same domestic constituencies. 2 President Trump, I think to your point, has a tremendous amount of political power and capital, especially in foreign policy that we've seen this year that he deployed on Syria. And so he was given a tremendous amount of deference by his caucus to really settle a interagency, intergovernmental, cross branch debate about U.S. posture with respect to Syria in his May 13 speech. Again, there was no coordination. There was not the usual rollouts that we would have seen with such a major transformative announcement of completely changing US government policy after 46 years of the most draconian, restrictive economic measures that a government could impose, we had done towards Syria. And then in one speech the president changes that. So we're dealing with the after effects of that, but only in this current moment, in this current environment. And the president's, I think, unique characteristics and then the structural factors too. I mean, we have a very limited National Security Council. The number of people who would normally be involved with coordinating policy just fundamentally are not there. You have a secretary of state who's also the national security advisor and then personality politics as well. You have Ambassador Barak in Turkey who was appointed the special envoy from Syria, has it seems from all accounts an outsized interest in this issue set both within Lebanon and Syria, and has been doggedly involved in the engagement with Alshara and in this portfolio. So there's a confluence of very unique circumstances that I think inform how the Trump administration has and President Trump personally has engaged with Syria to date. The issues will be what happens if there is backsliding, if there is greater political strife within Syria, if these economic gains have not been achieved in relatively short order, what then and what is the policy, what is the strategy? What, what is the attention span of both the president himself personally as well as his national security team?

Tyler McBrien (29:30)

Yeah, I wanted to throw even one more thing that I wanted to mention earlier about what we thought was possible versus not a year ago, I mean, a year ago, the thought of true accountability for the Assad regime in terms of their torture regime, the extent of the prison system, the detentions, but now a year later, not only is it possible, there was recently another trove of documents, I believe obtained by a German investigative reporting outlet, but has been reported in the English press and the Washington Post of just, I think, thousands of photos of Syrians who were detained, tortured, killed by the Assad regime. So in thinking about all of these, all the things on the agenda, I think transitional justice also needs to be there. There were a lot of prosecutions, I believe, in years past in Germany, perhaps Belgium, under universal jurisdiction. But true accountability in Syria seems to be necessary for the, for the country to move on. And again, there's just, so there's just such this confluence of priorities and factors that it just, yeah, it's a challenging situation.

Scott R. Anderson (30:36)

Well, and this really underscores, I think, a little bit of the difficult position the Trump administration has put itself in because lifting sanctions definitely requires political will. I think there's a lot of credit for that, particularly frankly, again, for the president, where his constituency, I think probably includes elements of Congress and other places that are going to be loud as opposing that, but haven't been because he has unique political influence over them. That, again, may or may not be sustainable in the near future, but at least for the moment in the last year has been in place. But in a way, that's the easy step because everything that comes here, all the building, the cultivating nation building, that's the really hard part. I mean, Alex, you and I both spent a formative chunk, at least in my case, probably for your as well. I suspect part of our careers in and working in a country that had gone through nation building efforts led by the United States with a lot of support from the international community. And they were, at least in my experience, I will say, flawed enterprises in lots and millions of ways, but also made some progress on a lot of fronts that were really important. But they're expensive, they take a lot of political will, they take a lot of people. And we've seen again, usaid, the agency that inherited a lot of capacity in this regard, and a lot of the regards you want here really get slashed. Every other agency with specialty and disability is under immense pressure, personnel wise, expertise wise, funding wise from this administration, they have really substantially trimmed their toolkit they have to use in situations like this in a way that I fear is really going to bite them in the end. Now, maybe there's enough European partners and others who can step in, interested in, do this. Maybe the Gulf states can step in, maybe there's enough of an international community active through the United nations, what have you. There may be other people who can step in and help do that. So maybe they'll be able to do it better again, because I don't think the US Efforts were perfect by any stretch of the imagination. But US Leadership can make a difference in here. And just as in Gaza, where we're seeing us really play a central and important role in and then facing a lot of challenges because it just didn't have the toolkit it might want that it had, frankly, a year ago. I think we're about to see the same thing in Syria. That's going to be a little difficult.

Alex Zurdin (32:27)

Yeah, I'm just really concerned about this prioritization question. I think we're looking at from very similar angles in that yes, Syria is going to require a lot and Gaza and Sudan and Ukraine. And so if we're speaking of key constituencies, alternatives such as the European Union, UK in one level and then the Gulf partners in another, their priorities are stretched incredibly thin. And so I don't think that Syria will rank above those priorities in the long term. And there's enough attention by this, the Trump administration to sustain engagement in Syria over the medium term, which is absolutely necessary. We've got World bank reports, UN reporting about the incredible need we're talking. So the, the World bank put out a really worthwhile and I think very credible report. The cost of reconstruction is going to be at least 240 billion with a B dollars that is nearly 10 times the current GDP of Syria under more, I think, favorable scenarios about their current economic outputs. And so that's going to require just incredible amount of money. And I don't know how that will compare with, with again, Gaza, Sudan, Ukraine in particular as well.

Scott R. Anderson (33:43)

Well, and that ties into one of the big domestic sticking points that it's worth bearing in mind in Syria, which is access to Syria's natural resources. Because one of the things that reasons why the SDF still has so much influence is still such a kind of going concern is because they control the oil wealth, a substantial portion of it. And why do they control the oil wealth in part is because US Troops have been helping them Maintain it initially against the Islamic State. That was the original logic of having those troops do it. But President Trump quite expressly, that was actually why he was dissuaded from withdrawing those troops from Syria twice during his first term, at least according to him. He said it was because, well, they're there to protect the oil wealth. And it seems like that's the justification mechanism. So that is a big bargaining point the United States has in this, but could be a really painful, difficult one to deal with. And it seems like the time is coming. We know the Trump administration has reduced the US Military presence in the rest of Syria. Not in Damascus and other areas dealing with the new government there, but in the rest of Syria. They've more than halved it or at least state an intent to do so. It was about 2,000 at the end of the Biden administration. They said we're going to try and get it under 1000 by the end of the year. I don't know if they're there yet or not. If they want to reduce military commitments, which Trump seems like he's wanted to do for a decade. And this oil wealth is a sticking point to national unity. Well, but is the SDF really going to give it up? And if not, you need a lot of sustained, engaged diplomacy to try and bring these two sides together. I fear, and I don't know who's in a position to do that and whether you get there. So lots of flashpoints and difficult points all around. An incredibly optimistic story. I was speaking this past weekend with some former colleagues of mine at a holiday party, worked on Syria policy for years who are Syrian American, had gotten to take their family there in the past year and visit family I don't think they'd seen for a very, very long time. It's amazing. It's something I think everybody has to hope for the best for Syrians who've been through so much. But it's not an easy road even from here. So something we all have to keep an eye on.

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Scott R. Anderson (41:43)

With that question of what the Trump administration strategy is, let us go to the bigger picture of what is the Trump administration strategy, period or question mark. I guess it is because it's a question. And now we have an answer. Because Congress has required for the last many years, actually not sure how long the tradition has been in that every presidential term, every president during each of their terms in office has to produce a national security strategy, a document that says, here is our strategy for securing US national security. I think there are some more specific requirements that I actually wanted to dig up the statute that lays it out. Then I have to go find it. The Trump administration did so relatively ahead of schedule. I think the Biden administration took all the way till 20, 22 or 23 to finally release their strategy. And they're not alone in that. But it is a very odd document. It begins, I should say, interestingly, as kind of a series of questions and kind of addressing, I guess, the methodological question about how one conceives of what is national security and strategy and how one should approach it. And then finally, about halfway through, gets into a national security strategy that itself is very interesting and unorthodox in a lot of different ways. I definitely have some ways that jumped out at me, but I don't want to jump right into those. I want to hear from you guys. Tyler, let me start with you. What really jumped out at you from this national security strategy as a real point of interest, whether in the specifics or in kind of the meta level at which these things exist and influence, you know, national politics?

Tyler McBrien (43:05)

Yeah. I mean, all the way down. There has been a lot of ink spilled already about how weird it is not only in content, but also form. And it was like you said, it. It starts with these. These questions of what is. I almost expected it to start like Merriam Webster's dictionary defines strategy as.

Scott R. Anderson (43:24)

Because I had that thought. I was like, man, this is so term paper.

Alex Zurdin (43:28)

Exactly.

Scott R. Anderson (43:28)

It was a lot of filler.

Tyler McBrien (43:30)

Yeah. I don't know if they thought that Congress statutorily requires a word count or a page count or they were trying to anyway. But it was surprising and it wasn't. And it wasn't surprising in a way that a lot of what is said in here, we've heard Trump administration officials saying since January or before. I think what is shocking is that just seeing it in, you know, with the National Security Strategy cover page. But I want to. There's so much that we can dig into, but I want to zero in on one thing that actually Lawfare Editor in Chief Ben Wittes pointed out in his column yesterday, which is the line which was very definitively said, let me just make sure I get it right, that basically border security is the primary element of national security, which I thought was quite a. It was quite bracing to read that. You know, if you recall, all the way back in February, I think it was. J.D. vance was speak. Vice President J.D. vance was speaking at CPAC and said much, much the same for both Europe and the US that mass migration is the biggest existential threat, it's the biggest national security threat, et cetera. And so that in itself is.

Tyler McBrien (44:40)

Enough to give you pause. But that coupled with this, what I read as this great replacement theory, inflected language of civilizational collapse and the threat that migration has on civilizational collapse and tying that to national security, it gets into this sort of blood and soil territory that I don't feel great about, but I think that's just what I've been stuck on. Clearly, Ben was stuck on it as well, but that's where I'd want to start. But again, there's just so much in here that we could pick apart. But I'll lay that out as my first thing.

Scott R. Anderson (45:18)

Alex, how about you? Because there is a real thread here about economic policy is a major theme, not really like, broken out independently, but really woven throughout. Not surprising because of this administration's focus on trade, on tariffs. Not surprising because AI is such a dominant issue and obviously has global economic ramifications. But I'm curious what jumps out at you, particularly from your issue set. I mean, what is good, bad, ugly, unusual about this strategy and what it seems to be saying in these areas?

Alex Zurdin (45:47)

I think it's also a very fair question. The one thing that really came to mind as the overarching puzzle that I've had or the way I've approached this document so far is how much weight to actually put into the document. How useful is this going to be as a roadmap strategy for how this administration, how President Trump himself will approach foreign policy and national security in this term? And I ask that because, Scott, you raised a great point about the role of economics. It is injected throughout this document. And I think just one example that was just so acute even this week, I think makes a very fine point of it. So there are about four pages about economic competition with China and how we're going to need to work both unilaterally but especially multilaterally with allies and partners, treaty allies and partners. This is the exact language from the strategy to counter China and to provide alternatives and alternative economic designs and create increased economic cooperation to counter China. That's the gist of it. And then this same week, the president just announced a major deal to sell H200 Nvidia chips to China, which will give a technological advantage to to China in a way that has been widely, you know, thought there was a bipartisan consensus about this issue set. But, you know, there is an economic driver The President touted the economic benefits that the revenue generated as, as the sole animating or is the animating purpose for this? And I think it just really lays bare the tensions with how much to read into this document as anything that is durable versus what we've all seen with our own eyes for the past year about the transactional nature and the very idiosyncratic nature. And I say that very neutrally about how the President approaches these issues and how he directs his administration to approach these issues. And so I'm left with more questions and answers. We talk about the questions of the introduction to the document, but was this document fully read by the President? Is this something that he how is this going to be used going forward? And how is this being delegated and instructed to departments and agencies, to political appointees to effect or is this one of many other guidance and reference documents that will be inform how this administration approaches foreign policy, national security, or to the initial question to ask is this just a answering the mail exercise to throw in some rhetorical talking points to respond to Congress, but really has no effect beyond this week's news cycle? And then we move on. And I don't have a good answer on that.

Scott R. Anderson (48:29)

Yeah, Alex, you perfectly anticipated my general take on these documents. I think maybe because we were both cynical former civil servants that have lived through some of these inverse applications. I think these documents are really interesting artifacts because they give a hint of how the people who write them view the world. And you don't always know who writes them. That's what's actually really interesting about it. And that's actually, I think, a big question of this one. The last, the Biden one we knew was Jake Sullivan. There was really clear reporting about it. He was directly involved. Part of the reason it took so long. He's a very busy guy. And maybe that's a good reason National Security Advisor shouldn't be that directly involved in writing what is essentially a book report. But that's fine. He took it seriously. It obviously reflected his views and you knew it because it reflected his private writings. He read his foreign affairs pieces, stuff like that. It really lined up with the way Jake saw the world. Who the hell wrote this thing? I have no idea. It's not Marco Rubio, I'll tell you that right now. Parts of this are very Marco Rubio. The fact that the Western Hemisphere is priority number one, that's a real Marco Rubio sort of vibe. I'm not even sure he was necessarily like, oh, it's absolutely number one. Above all, but it's a region he really cares about. He's engaged in. I think a lot of elements there really do follow policies that he's supportive of. Other elements throughout. I mean, in some ways it signals relative stability on Taiwan, although much more caged about what the US Interests are there much more about actual economic interests that are fleeting, not about commonality of democratic values, which is something that most administrations have emphasized. It signals kind of stability on Ukraine, but very passing stability on Ukraine clearly is saying, well, we need to get peace there. And that's the main driver. Not necessarily defending Ukraine from Russian aggression, but all those little continuity points, they're all caveated with so much complete weirdness. The part that really jumps out at me and internal tensions, incompatibility. The part that really jumps out at me is that the document spends so much time talking about sovereignty and the importance of sovereignty and that we're going to defer to other countries. And they say we believe in regional balance of power. Countries shouldn't dictate to each other. And then it spends the entire Europe section talking about, again, this quote, civilizational self confidence, the fact that Europe lacks civilizational self confidence. And then they say we need to support governments in European countries that reinforce the civilizational self confidence of Europe. So like, which we all take to be like right wing parties in Germany and elsewhere. And by the way, Europe is rapidly becoming less European and that means they may not be as interested in NATO and other stuff in the near future. What does that mean exactly? Well, it means they mean they're not gonna be less white, which isn't usually the identity most people bring to national identities alone. But clearly that's what they think is the driving of the NATO alliance, which I'm sure Turkey will be surprised to hear. But regardless, it's like really, really bizarre document, thought of incompatibilities. But the thing that really jumped out to me, and I'd be curious if you all picked up on that this, because I think it actually, really is indicative of whatever community is that actually got to write this thing where the center of gravity is in the Trump world is there's two words, three words I should say that don't appear in this document once or no iteration or kind of mutation of them. That was central. It was literally in dozens of times in the Biden national security strategy and in the first Trump administration National security Strategy. That's major power competition. They literally don't say it once, twice. They reference superpower competition, which is a very funny thing to say because it Makes me think of Spider man and Superman dueling it out in the Middle east section about what had happened in the past, not about a reality that's, you know, with us today. Instead, it talks about, oh, we need to have regional balance of power, and that it's inevitable. Powerful countries will want to have influence and will have outsized influence, and we all just need to accept that. But the real question is to get a balance of power within regions, within things. To me, it reads a lot like spheres of influence, which is really, really compelling. Remember, like, the defining strategy of the Biden administration and of the first Trump administration was Russia and China are trying to change the global order. And we need to contest that and maintain the global order remains rules based and one where all of us and our allies are on the same page. The first Trump administration actually was really strong on that. It was really vocal about that, although it was, again, completely ignored by the first Trump administration in terms of actual policy. So a good example about why these things may ultimately be meaningless. This completely moves away from that. And that's really telling you about a really different worldview than what has steered U.S. policy for the last several years, I think decade, really at this point, if not longer. And it's a viewpoint that a lot of people think is dead wrong because they think major power competition is a reality. So. And one we have to confront, not one you can count on being able to carve out different respective corners of the world to manage. But it makes a lot of sense for a Trump administration that cares about stuff at home, because what are its top priorities? Western Hemisphere, immigration, trade? It's all stuff that matters at the home front. And that's really what they're emphasizing here. Again, I don't know if Marco Rubio necessarily buys that. I don't know if J.D. vance does. But I think this does say is that there's enough people in the orbit around the President and that have input into the president, particularly in this administration, where the president is so personally central that they knew they had to give them, those people a bone to get this across the President's desk and with his signature and to get them bought into their general leadership of the foreign policy apparatus. And these are the bones they threw them. That's kind of indicative and maybe a little concerning, again, depending on how you feel about these things.

Tyler McBrien (53:39)

Yeah, I mean, speaking of who else maybe didn't write it? I mean, I've seen some people speculating that Elbridge Colby has been sidelined in this writing effort because the focus mostly is on the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. So the Western Hemisphere, a lot of focus on Europe, but vis a vis Asia, there is a focus on avoiding direct confrontation with China. Economic stakes, that's about it. There isn't this same pivot to Asia focus. There isn't the same China watchers were clearly not really foregrounded in the drafting of this, including someone like an Elbridge Colby. And so I think it's almost more interesting to ask who didn't write this, who's seemingly maybe on the outs ideologically within Trump's inner circle.

Scott R. Anderson (54:27)

What's really interesting in the Asia section, actually, if you look at it, is that the other thing it doesn't say in here, it never names Asian allies. It doesn't talk about the Philippines and Japan. It talks about Taiwan. It does mention Taiwan. Hard to avoid that one. And then it talks about the first, second and third island change. This was like a concept, I think, going back to John Foster Dulles, if I recall correctly, about how to set up basing arrangements in the Pacific to provide essentially concentric rings from at the time. Then perceived communist aggression coming out of communist China and the Soviet Union were seen as being on the same page at that point. It's this very geostrategically chessboard vocabulary, which is so weird in a public facing document that talks about the importance of the alliances and you don't name the allies. It's just such an odd. It's such an odd document. The chapters just don't line up. So it is like a weird coterie of authors who have input into this thing. And I do think that's a sign that it's one of these consensus documents that everybody was getting a slice of for maybe instrumental reasons. Not that it really holds together in a way that we're supposed to be taken too seriously, except insofar as it reflects the thinking of the people behind it.

Tyler McBrien (55:30)

And I'll say, I think another element of.

Tyler McBrien (55:34)

These internal contradictions and the incoherent, confused nature is something that I think the Trump administration tries to do in other areas, which is to simultaneously put forth this image of America as the most powerful and strongest, while also putting forth an image of it having been hobbled by the past four years of the past administration because of all of these. So it's this confusing mix that there's this acknowledgement that we're not in the unipolar moment anymore and that the US can't be the hegemon, global hegemon. And then at the same time, though still do have some of the chest thumping and most powerful military kind of language, which are inherently at odds. And that's I think partly this incoherent, overarching voice.

Scott R. Anderson (56:22)

Well, when it comes to securing US national security, the Trump administration may not have to do it alone. They got some potential buy in, some potential help coming down the road in one form or another from none other than JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon, somebody who has really become, in a really interesting way, a very vocal actor about international affairs and global security really over the last four or five years. And JPMorgan Chase too notably doing a lot more in this particular space as an organization. Specifically, Dimon announced a 10 year initiative to invest $1.5 trillion in US companies critical to national security and economic resilience. When asked whether this was an effort to get in good with the Trump administration, because it sounds a lot like a lot of the domestic investment and America first sort of stuff that we see a lot of tech companies doing and other companies doing, diamond said no, no, no, this is going to be driven strictly by economic interest. Like this is just an investment plan, but that's a place we see opportunity. And by the way, that opportunity reinforces U.S. interests, national interests in various regards and help might have virtuous, I'm paraphrasing, but might have virtuous effects for other investments that are in the United States because they are also content US national security. He's essentially said it really was institutional interest driven, whether you believe it or not. And notably, diamond is somebody who to his credit, in my view, has not really played the suck up the Trump game. He is publicly said, oh yeah, we didn't give any money towards that ballroom that he's trying to build. We refused and when asked he said, well, you know, we have all these ethics rules we have to comply with. We weren't sure we could make it square with those, which I think is I took as a little bit of a backhanded comment on what exactly the Trump administration was trying to do. And they've had a chilly relationship, him and Trump, over the years. So Alex, I want to come to you. I mean this is really so squarely in your issue set. Talk to us about what is happening. I give flesh and more details to the program. So that's very high level summary that we know of. And what do you think is driving and how significant a move is this?

Alex Zurdin (58:14)

So I think this was a very, very smart and savvy move by JP Morgan and Jamie Dimon in particular. So the overall architecture of what we've seen from public reporting in JPM's JP Morgan's press releases is they announced a 1.5 trillion with the T10 Year Initiative to support defense resiliency, a broad bucket of investments in the United States. And they also have pledged up to 10 billion of their own money, their own equity, their own capital for direct equity investments as well. And so this is a strategic vision that the JP Morgan has put forward. And what made news, so that was announced actually in October, says this isn't the newsiest part of it. What was most interesting this week in particular was the creation of a board of incredibly senior former U.S. government officials, as well as business officials, business people, including Jeff Bezos, and a former Berkshire Hathaway acolyte of Warren Buffett, to take a more sustained role and advisory role. And then with the Buffett acolyte, actually a management role in this fund and in this initiative. So they brought in former Secretary Robert Gates, they brought in former Secretary Condoleezza Rice, former Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, again Jeff Bezos, and really a who's who of American capitalism and American public policy, defense, national security, to inform how they're gonna approach it. So I think that's a very smart move, both for the announcement of this initiative that is very consistent with the Trump administration's one, focus on large, shiny announcements, two, on deal making, three, on investment in the United States, and four, having this very prestigious group that's going to inform how they conduct their investments. So we don't know what their official roles will be, how this governance will work. They'll have periodic meetings. That was the initial rollout. But this is a major marker that JP Morgan has put forward to distinguish itself and I think raise the bar from other leading US Financial institutions, other industrial players in this element. So we did see in the National Security Strategy about the importance of domestic revitalization, particularly industrial revitalization, the criticality of revamping the US Industrial defense industrial base, and as part of that, the broader industrial base, which is a necessary requirement for it. And so I think this is an important and very savvy announcement by jpm. So we'll see. And then they've made at least one small investment, about $75 million deal to take a stake in a mining company called Purpetura Resources in Idaho. And so for focusing on a critical mineral called antimony. So that's what we know so far.

Tyler McBrien (61:04)

I don't have too much to say on this, but what I'm not going to do is suggest that this is a distraction from the House subpoena for Epstein documents. I would never suggest such a thing. But Scott, I'm curious your take on this.

Scott R. Anderson (61:18)

Yeah, I think it's a really interesting development. I mean I think Dimon has a lot of credibility in this space. And look, the people he's putting on this board, they're not Trump people. They're not the people Trump would choose to put on here. I read this much more as an effort to have a kind of more conventional.

Scott R. Anderson (61:35)

Counterweight'S, not quite weight, but a more conventional alternative center of influence in this space. To say we're going to lead this initiative, we're going to steer what we think is key to US national security. That's probably going to overlap with a lot what this administration believes. Probably going to overlap a lot with what the Biden administration believes too. And whatever any future Democratic administration will believe too. There is more consensus around that than typical partisan politics will usually acknowledge. Particularly when you're talking about core infrastructure, elements of it, critical minerals, critical infrastructure. People get what that is. And everybody agrees there's a need for investment here. But it is really giving those other people maybe a little bit of a seat at the table in an interesting way. This sort of big top down driver could be really influential. And you think about when people are catering for influence or companies are catering for influence or seeking investment, if they're really the people driving this are the Trump administration and people ideologically associated with the Trump administration, that's going to lead to one particular perspective, angle and set of investments. And this seems inclined to counterweight that with what I think is probably best described as a more conventional right of center internationalist sort of perspective, at least based off the people we know who are involved so far. And I think that's they're not alone in that effort. I mean in some ways that's kind of how you can frame what Bezos is trying to do with the Washington Post editorial page in a very clumsy and ham handed and frankly not very effective way. Or I shouldn't say maybe Bezos not individually but the people he's put in charge of the Washington Post because what's the whole idea there? We're going to try and re center, we're going to talk about markets and individual liberty, which sounds like it's shifting over to a kind of right of center Trump oriented editorial board. And in a way it has, it has shifted in that sort of direction. You've had people like Marc Thiessen, their columnists saying expressly, oh yeah, we're a right wing editorial board now. But it's a different sort of right wing. It's not the sort of right wing that's really mega e right wing. It's a more conventional right wing that's again, markets individual liberty, in the case of a lot of people involved with here, a sense of US Internationalism. So that's interesting. I think it's really interesting to see that sort of effort. And it is, I think in some ways a sign that there is a desire in certain circles to see that sort of counterweight to the mega influence. It's telling that's not coming in the political realm. Like this isn't members of Congress. Instead, it's like industry. But it also kind of makes sense to a certain extent. They have the most independent weight. And right now, particularly, you know, shortly after a presidential election still and leading up to another election, like Republican politicians, they're not going to see as much land to break out and do something independent of the administration. In little ways they might, but not in, like, big ways. So industry is where it kind of has to start. So, yeah, I think it's really interesting and could be a kind of significant development. I'm just kind of curious where they end up, what they kind of doing start doing to differentiate themselves and what the impact of having a big player in this space, if it really is as active and well funded as it states it intends to be, how much of a counterweight that might actually be. I'm genuinely curious, Alex. I don't know if you have a sense of that.

Alex Zurdin (64:34)

Yeah. So I think one other way to look at this, though, is also, if what you're saying is correct, then this is a way to kind of pre. But any pressure from the Trump administration to take other actions to be less tolerable or less palatable to the bank. And so here they're putting down a marker saying we're already committing to this general proposition of that's consistent again with the new national security strategy that, you know, came out after this announcement. But the general gist of what the Trump administration has been doing in terms of domestic investment, in terms of greater public investment in private markets. I mean, what do we see this year? We saw the government convert a grant to intel into an equity stake and take, you know, have very, you know, very deliberate ownership in a major publicly traded company. And it's done very well for them this year. And we saw investment in MP Materials, a mining company out west. We've seen greater use of government in the free market, capitalist market. And so I think this also allows the bank itself to create more space that it doesn't get pulled in inadvertently or by the Trump administration. They can point to this initiative and there are things that may flow through it eventually that are more aligned with the Trump administration's outlook and priorities. However, they've already created an independent basis, or they could say, look, we. We would love to do that, but we're already committed on these other initiatives that are aligned with what you want to do. And so it gives them, again, more flexibility, more. More space to operate. So I see that as well.

Scott R. Anderson (66:07)

Well, I guess potentially, if that's the logic, and that makes a lot of sense to me, it also provides an avenue for other people to channel those sorts of funds through, because, in theory, they're bringing in other people, other funds, other investors to bring money into here. So if people who are feeling under a lot of pressure to say, oh, we want to channel a bunch of money towards, you know, particular national security vehicles under. From the administration, other places, this could be a vehicle for doing that, not just for the bank itself, but for other entities as well. Yeah, really interesting. Well, folks, we are about at time this week, but this would not be rational security if we did not leave with some object lessons to ponder over in the week to come. Tyler, what did you bring for us this week?

Tyler McBrien (66:46)

Well, since it's almost the holidays, I come with a good gift idea. I bought this gift for myself a few weeks ago, and it's been so great to flip through. It is a sort of a coffee table book. I would probably categorize it as it's called Lost in Photographing the Last Days of Our Architectural Treasures. It actually came out in 2023, it looks like, but I only just learned about it. Basically, it's this amazing book of the archive of the Historic American Building Survey, which is a much larger archive of just documenting America's architectural heritage, which in itself is amazing. But this book specifically focuses on every single photo in here is no longer standing. So it's all buildings from small, like beautiful old homes to the original Penn Station, which is a huge tragedy that it's gone and everything in between. So it's. It's just, It's. It's a bittersweet experience reading it, you know, just seeing these beautiful things that are all gone. But it does a great job of documenting how this New Deal program got it started and just how they were able to document all of these architectural treasures. It's just a great book. Highly recommend it.

Scott R. Anderson (68:03)

Cool. No, I'm excited. I gotta check that out. I'm a big fan of architecture photography. It's a hobby of mine at one point, like 15 years ago. I like to untilton. I'm curious about this. So for my object lesson. This is of course the holiday season. That means my wife and I are back to our favorite annual tradition of watching every single terrible holiday movie you can possibly find on Netflix and other streaming channels. It's really a fantastic way to burn some free time on your holiday evenings. Holiday season evenings. They're all terrible. They're all like irredeemable. But there's a huge cottage industry of them. Occasionally you stumble upon one that's like really charming and good. I have yet to do that. I would say this season there are amazing subgenre of Canadian holiday films where it's just two moderately good looking people sitting down in dull lighting having polite civil conversation with each other for like a full 90 minutes. And that's the whole movie. It's kind of extraordinary. But I have enjoyed two of them that we ended up watching just over the last week, which I'll recommend to people to check out in the time to come. Both on Netflix. One is a movie called A Merry Little Xmas that brings back none other than childhood heartthrob Alicia Silverstone back on the silver screen. Haven't seen her in a very long time. Going through an awkward kind of divorce situation. Really interesting. I would not say it's a great movie, but it was entertaining, it was charming. It's fun to see Alicia Silverstone back on the screen. Melissa Joan Hart makes an appearance as well. It's really got a lot of throwback people. Alvin from the Cosby show is in the movie. It's like a real throwback to a bunch of 80s and 90s old standbys. Recommend that. The other one I watched I actually did kind of like was Jingle Bell Heist. It's like a heist movie set during Christmas. It's really more of a heist movie than a Christmas movie, if I'm being completely honest. But it's kind of charming. It's British. There's British people with an American woman as the lead about them trying to take revenge on an employer. It's kind of predictable, every twist you'll see coming a mile away. But it's pretty to look at. It's kind of exciting and kind of enjoyable and I enjoyed it. So check those two out and just generally consider the whole genre. The oeuvre of bad holiday movies around this time of year because I really enjoy it. It's one of my favorite little traditions, so it's worth checking out. Put away your snobbery for just one month of the year. Alex, how about you?

Alex Zurdin (70:01)

So I'm still a newbie for the object lessons, but here's a shot. So I want to recommend a book called the World for Money, Power and the Traders who Barter the Earth's Resources by Javier Blas and Jack Farshi. It was published in 2021, but I think it has renewed importance over the past few weeks as a economic statecraft and sanctions nerd. The U.S. treasury Department designated Lukoil and Rosneft in October. These were major, major designations against two key pillars of the Russian economy and Russian energy sector. And there's now an ongoing dispute, ongoing saga about the attempts by an oil trading firm called Gunvor to purchase certain assets of Lukoil. And so the book is about the origins and history of commodity trading around the world. It's a fascinating history about the things that we don't think about as much, but that run our everyday lives from basic commodities, oil, natural gas, minerals, and especially in this era that we were talking about, of renewed investment in the United States, about critical minerals, even things that are readily available, but just the difficulty and complexity of moving things from their origin sites to how they are economically valuable and utilized. It is really fascinating. There's a cast of characters, there's presidential pardons in the late in the late last hours of presidential administrations, there's high politics, low politics, lots of intrigue, and so really recommend it if you haven't read it yet. It's called the World for Sale.

Tyler McBrien (71:33)

I think you definitely have the hang of the object lesson. That sounds fascinating with that, that brings.

Scott R. Anderson (71:39)

Us to the end of this week's episode. Browser security is of course a production of Lawfare, so be sure to Visit us@lawfaremedia.org for our show page for links to past episodes, for our written work and the written work of other Lawfare contributors, and for information on Lawfair's other phenomenal podcast series. While you're at it, be sure to follow Lawfair on social media, be sure to leave a rating or review wherever you might be listening, and sign up to become a material supporter of Lawfare on Patreon for ad free version of this podcast and other special benefits. For more information, visit loveformedia.org support our audio engineer producer this week was me of me, and her music, as always, was performed by Sophia Yan. We were once again edited by the wonderful Jen Patchett. On behalf of my guest, Tyler and Alex, I am Scott R. Andersen. We will talk to you next week. Until then, goodbye.

Scott R. Anderson (72:30)

Dear Career ladder, you've had your moment. You're linear and one dimensional. Ambition doesn't just go up anymore.

Aramco Advertiser (72:40)

It zigs and zags and squiggles.

Scott R. Anderson (72:42)

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