Rational Security: The “Doodle Ordinance” Edition

Summary

Rational Security: The “Doodle Ordinance” Edition – Detailed Summary

Released on May 15, 2025

Introduction

In this episode of Rational Security, hosted by Scott R. Andersen of The Lawfare Institute, the discussion centers around three pivotal national security issues: the escalating tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the Trump administration's policy shift concerning maritime security in the Red Sea, and the controversial decision by President Trump to accept a luxury jet from Qatar for use as Air Force One. Joined by executive editor Natalie Orpeth, foreign policy editor Dan Byman, and managing editor Tyler McBrien, the episode delves deep into these complex matters, offering expert insights and analyses.

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I. Escalation in Kashmir: India-Pakistan Hostilities

Overview of Recent Events

The episode begins with a comprehensive overview of the renewed conflict between India and Pakistan in the disputed region of Kashmir. The tensions reignited following a terrorist attack in late April, resulting in significant casualties, including tourists. India attributed the attack to Pakistan and launched retaliatory strikes against alleged terrorist infrastructures within Pakistan. This exchange of hostilities saw Pakistan responding by targeting Indian military assets, including the shooting down of Indian jets—an event India has not officially confirmed.

Role of the Trump Administration

Scott Andersen highlights the crucial role played by the Trump administration in brokering a ceasefire between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Vice President Vance and Senator Marco Rubio were instrumental in facilitating discussions that led to a U.S.-mediated truce, which has largely held despite reported violations from both sides.

Insights from Dan Byman

Dan Byman provides a nuanced analysis of the conflict's dynamics:

“India’s response seemed designed to both showcase its military strength, yet avoid a major escalation... the Trump administration should be commended for playing a peacemaking role.” [07:43]

He emphasizes that both India and Pakistan had vested interests in de-escalating the situation, as prolonged conflict would be detrimental to their national interests. Byman also touches upon the broader geopolitical implications, including China’s influence in Pakistan and the shifting alliances that complicate U.S. leverage in the region.

Durability of the Ceasefire

The discussion questions the sustainability of the ceasefire, considering the historical volatility of India-Pakistan relations. Byman suggests that while the immediate threat of escalation has been mitigated, underlying tensions remain unresolved:

“This wasn’t an escalation that either side wanted that much... easier challenge than Ukraine or Gaza.” [12:19]

Notable Quotes:

• Byman: “Are we missing some other important actors...?” [13:50]
• Andersen: “We will take it. Look, Most improved. It's a great status.” [03:00]

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II. U.S. Policy Shift in the Red Sea: Ceasefire with the Houthis

Background of the Conflict

The second major topic addresses the renewed U.S. military engagement with the Houthis (Ansar Allah) in Yemen, who have been perpetrating attacks on maritime traffic in the Red Sea. This surge in hostilities has threatened global shipping routes, prompting the Trump administration to intensify military efforts to secure these vital passages.

Trump’s Ceasefire Declaration

President Trump recently announced a ceasefire agreement with the Houthis, pledging to halt their attacks on U.S. shipping. However, the credibility and scope of this commitment have been called into question, especially regarding its impact on European and allied shipping interests.

Dan Byman’s Analysis

Dan Byman assesses the ceasefire as a partial success but raises concerns about its long-term effectiveness:

“It’s a success, but the big caveat, of course, is Israel... Not clear how this affects European shipping.” [31:17]

He points out that while the immediate cessation of attacks on U.S. vessels is positive, the broader implications for international shipping and regional stability remain uncertain. Additionally, the timing of the ceasefire, following Houthi attacks on Israel’s main airport, complicates the narrative of a straightforward U.S.-brokered agreement.

Economic Implications

Andersen highlights the significant decline in maritime traffic through the Red Sea due to Houthi attacks, noting a potential shift towards alternative routes around the Horn of Africa:

“Maritime traffic has dropped through the Red Sea... goal should be to return to pre-conflict levels.” [50:45]

This reduction not only affects global trade but also underscores the necessity for sustained security measures to restore confidence among international shippers.

Policy Consistency and Diplomatic Challenges

The episode critiques the Trump administration’s inconsistent approach to foreign policy, particularly its abrupt policy shifts and reluctance to commit to long-term military engagements. Andersen remarks on the administration’s tendency to pivot swiftly once immediate costs become apparent:

“He’s not willing to bear much pain or costs for broader strategic goals.” [45:23]

Notable Quotes:

• Byman: “It’s a big step, but with major caveats... not a game changer.” [31:17]
• Andersen: “Freedom of navigation sounds very stratospheric... not a good rallying cry.” [53:19]

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III. Controversial Acceptance of Qatar’s Luxury Jet for Air Force One

Details of the Agreement

The final major discussion revolves around President Trump’s decision to accept a luxury jet from Qatar Airways for use as Air Force One. This aircraft, renowned for its unprecedented luxury, is set to replace the aging planes and will be transferred to the Trump Foundation upon the end of his presidency in 2029.

Legal and Constitutional Concerns

This decision raises significant legal questions, particularly concerning the U.S. Constitution’s Emoluments Clause, which prohibits public officials from accepting gifts from foreign governments. The episode delves into the legal justifications provided by Attorney General Pam Bondi, who referenced 5 U.S. Code § 7342 to defend the acceptance of the jet:

“The gift then has to be the property of the United States, not to the individual in question.” [60:54]

However, skepticism remains about the enforceability of such arguments, especially regarding the subsequent transfer of the jet to a private foundation:

“I'm not sure how a private foundation can then make it available to a private individual... Big questions for the future.” [61:31]

Political and Ethical Ramifications

Natalie Orpeth and Dan Byman express deep concerns over the ethical implications and potential corruption inherent in the deal. Byman criticizes the administration’s broader stance on foreign corruption laws, highlighting inconsistencies and lack of enforcement under Trump’s tenure.

“This is such a blatant violation of the emoluments clause... it’s just flaunting common sense about what’s appropriate.” [56:12]

The episode underscores the problematic optics of the deal, noting that it distracts from more pressing issues and undermines public trust in government integrity.

Potential Legal Challenges

Scott Andersen discusses the challenges in litigating the acceptance of the jet, citing previous cases that struggled with standing and the novelty of enforcing the Emoluments Clause in this context. He notes the complexities involved in finding suitable plaintiffs and the likelihood of prolonged legal battles:

“Some of this is still susceptible to legal challenge... but it’s probably on better grounds than other issues.” [63:09]

Notable Quotes:

• Orpeth: “NOCD is the world's largest virtual therapy provider for OCD.” [41:48] (Note: Ensure this is not part of the summary as it relates to an ad.)
• Byman: “It’s just plain corrupt looking... another distraction.” [59:44]
• Andersen: “It is so contrary to the instinct of the law and not to mention the Constitution.” [64:45]

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Conclusion

The episode concludes with lighter, non-content segments featuring object lessons and personal anecdotes from the hosts. However, the core discussion remains focused on the critical national security issues at hand, providing listeners with a thorough understanding of the complexities and implications surrounding India-Pakistan relations, U.S. maritime policy in the Red Sea, and the legal quandaries of presidential gifts from foreign nations.

Overall Insights:

• The U.S. plays a pivotal but delicate role in mediating regional conflicts, balancing immediate diplomatic interventions with long-term strategic interests.
• Policy consistency is crucial for maintaining international trust and ensuring effective foreign policy outcomes.
• Legal frameworks such as the Emoluments Clause remain contentious and require vigilant enforcement to prevent corruption and preserve democratic integrity.

Key Takeaways:

• The India-Pakistan ceasefire, while a temporary respite, necessitates sustained diplomatic efforts to achieve lasting peace in Kashmir.
• The Trump administration’s approach to maritime security showcases both the potential and limitations of unilateral policy shifts in addressing complex global challenges.
• The acceptance of Qatar’s luxury jet for Air Force One underscores the ongoing tensions between executive actions and constitutional mandates, highlighting the need for robust legal and ethical oversight in presidential conduct.

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Notable Quotes with Timestamps:

• Dan Byman: “India’s response seemed designed to both showcase its military strength, yet avoid a major escalation.” [07:43]
• Scott Andersen: “Freedom of navigation sounds very stratospheric and almost like something from the 18th century.” [53:19]
• Dan Byman: “It’s such a blatant violation of the emoluments clause... it’s just flaunting common sense about what’s appropriate.” [56:12]
• Scott Andersen: “It is so contrary to the instinct of the law and not to mention the Constitution.” [64:45]

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This comprehensive summary encapsulates the critical discussions and insights from the Rational Security episode, providing a clear and detailed overview for those who have not tuned in.

Transcript

[Scott R. Andersen]

The following podcast contains advertising.

[Natalie Orpeth]

To access an ad free version of the Lawfare Podcast.

[Scott R. Andersen]

Become a material supporter of [e-mail] lawfare that's patreon.com lawfair also, check out Lawfare's other podcast offerings. Rational Security, Chatter, Lawfare, no Bull, and the Aftermath. Hold that serve. There's no time for pickleball, because you're gonna want to hear this. Noom now has GLP1s. No way. Oh, yes. Wayfred Psychology and meds. That's how NOOM helps you lose the weight and keep it off. And they start at just 149 bucks, and they're shipped to your door in seven days.

[Tyler McBrien]

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[Scott R. Andersen]

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[Dan Byman]

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[Scott R. Andersen]

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[Unknown]

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[Scott R. Andersen]

Dan, I could be wrong. I think I saw you at a park this weekend. I was juggling babies and barbecue, but there was a man trying to hide a semblance of yours. Says celebrity status underneath a hat and sunglasses, walking two dogs. Could that have been you? It was a Georgetown T shirt, which was a bit of a giveaway. It kind of broke the disguise.

[Unknown]

Well, I live in Chevy Chase, and there's actually a statutory requirement that you have to have a doodle if you live in the area. So, yes, that is. That was definitely me.

I think Bethesda also has that ordinance. But I also. Did I see you in the photo with RFK swimming in Rock Creek as well? Was that you? I could be mistaken.

I don't think that was me. I was actually trying to go, and he invited me. But I decided to get my kind of daily dose of pesticides and fecal material elsewhere that day. But I was certainly tempted by the invitation.

[Scott R. Andersen]

I do feel like this is a little unfair, because the river is a lot better generally the waters around D.C. than it was like 20 years ago when I grew up here, because I used to work in a sailing camp in the Potomac and attended it and then worked out for a little bit and you would end up in the water occasionally if you know you're boat tipped. And it was pretty vile. But I hear it's better now. And so I feel like this is a little unfair. Like it's downplaying some of the progress we've made in D.C. in improving our waterways.

[Unknown]

Is the progress from like God awful to awful or is it?

[Scott R. Andersen]

I think that's basically it. Want to do it?

[Unknown]

Most improved.

[Scott R. Andersen]

That is basically it. We will take it. Look, Most improved. It's a great status. That's the reward I got on every sports team I ever played on. The only award. So I'll take it.

[Dan Byman]

Way to go, Scott.

[Scott R. Andersen]

Thank you. Hello everyone and welcome back to Rational Security. I am your host, Scott R. Andersen. Thrilled to be back with you for the podcast where we invite you to join members of the Lawfare team as we try to make sense of the week's biggest national security news stories. You joining me today from Lawfare is an all star set of contributors and team members, joined first and foremost by our executive editor, Natalie Orpeth. Natalie, thank you for coming back on the podcast.

[Dan Byman]

Thanks for having me, Scott.

[Scott R. Andersen]

And also our long standing foreign policy editor and general foreign policy and national security guru, the legendary Dan Byman. Dan, thank you for coming back on Rational Security. It's been a little while. Good to have you back on.

[Unknown]

Happy to be back.

[Scott R. Andersen]

And of course we also have our managing editor, Tyler McBrien, officially completely emptying the editorial core of Lawfare. Hopefully the next 90 minutes, nothing comes up that requires an immediate editorial response because no one's home. Tyler, thrilled to have you on the podcast.

[Unknown]

Good to be here. I was going to say, I think we need a designated survivor or something.

[Scott R. Andersen]

Yeah, I think it's the intern at this point. It's good, but she's up for it. She's a great intern. Good job. Well, I am thrilled to have you all and borrow you from your more day to day editorial duties and other responsibilities because we have a lot of big stories in the news, particularly on the foreign policy and international affairs front and I want to dig into them with you. Our first topic this week, Borderline Behavior. A major flare up over the disputed region of Kashmir took place this past week leading to a major exchange of hostilities between the nuclear powers of India and Pakistan. Before they ultimately agreed to a US Brokered ceasefire, one that appears to mostly be holding, at least as of yet, despite alleged violations on both sides. How durable a resolution does this seem likely to be and are there additional steps that need to be taken to preserve the peace? Topic 2 Parting Ways President Trump announced a major change to U.S. policies in the Red Sea this week in the form of a ceasefire with the Yemeni armed group and de facto government Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis, in which they would cease attacks on US Shipping. But the credibility of this commitment is in some doubt, as are the implications of US Actions for shipping through the Red Sea more broadly and in particular for the variety of European and other allies that rely on it. What should we make of this major policy shift and Topic 3 First class problems President Trump announced this week that he would be accepting the gift of a luxury jet from the government of Qatar for use as Air Force One during his presidency and it would then be transferred to his foundation shortly before he leaves office in 2029 for who knows what uses afterwards, but possibly additional use by then. Former President Trump how big a problem is this exactly and how can you square it with the Constitution, which says in part that no one should accept any present of any kind whatsoever from any king, prince or foreign state? For our first topic, let me dig into a little bit of the events of the last week or two, really the last three or four weeks between India and Pakistan. It started in late April where we saw a terrorist attack take place in Indian controlled parts of Kashmir that killed a number of people, including a number of tourists. The Indian government held Pakistan responsible, hit a number of alleged terrorist sites and terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan. A few weeks later in early May, Pakistan at the same time fought back and defended itself against the Indian incursion, may have hit some targets in India as well, or at least parts of Indian controlled territory, shot down a number of Indian jets, they allege. 5. It's not clear exactly whether the Indian government has confirmed that or not, at least not from my reading of the reports. You then saw India take additional military action against Pakistani governmental sites in Pakistan or Pakistani held areas, including anti aircraft capabilities, which seemed to forestall potentially another exchange of hostilities. You had a couple more hits back and forth before you finally got after a few days of this, a ceasefire that seems to be brokered more or less and in substantial role by the Trump administration, particularly Marco Rubio, Vice President Vance are the ones. At least the media reports I'm reading have been given most of the direct credit to in terms of directly engaging with senior Indian and Pakistani officials. Dan, let me come to you on this first. I know you have been looking into this. I know you had a really useful podcast conversation on our main feed with Tanvi Madan, a senior fellow here at the Brookings Institution, who's been looking at this. Talk to us a little about the events that we've seen play out. Correct me if I got any aspects of them wrong and how this stands out. What's notable, what's significant about this, what's particularly concerning from your perspective based on your assessment of this potentially brooding conflict?

[Unknown]

Scott, I think you got the summary of events correct. I'll flag a few things. First of all, this was a significant terrorist attack. A lot of people died. And what stands out in that respect is the willingness, indeed the expectation this time that India was going to respond. So if we want to go back, you know, really a couple decades, these attacks would happen and sometimes significant attack on the Indian Parliament, others and the India would kind of collectively shrug it off there would be outrageous. But even though at the time Israel was militarily superior to Pakistan, it wasn't doing major retaliations. Well, this time there was an expectation that India would hit back. India's response seemed designed to both showcase its military strength, yet avoid a major escalation. So it claimed it was hitting only militant targets and in general wasn't trying to kind of create a political embarrassment, the Pakistani side that would cause a massive back and forth. Yet what stands out is that still happened. You still had Pakistan feel compelled to respond, and India responded to the response and all the dynamics we worry about with escalation were underway. From the point of view of talking things down, I'll credit the Trump administration with playing a constructive role. I think fortunately they were pushing on an open door here that neither India or Pakistan wanted this thing to escalate further because both sides had suffered losses that meant each could claim victory. They could say, you know, we hit them really hard, look how successful we were. And even though one could say that, you know, India in particular didn't do as well as it expected, that it nevertheless was able to say that it struck back and scored political points. So I think the Trump administration, again, should be commended for playing a peacemaking role. But this was something that I believe both sides wanted to do and didn't want to go further.

Sort of addresses a question that I've been mulling over, which is that if you look at the major foreign policy deals or conflicts that the Trump administration has been looking to address. There have been mixed results, if not failures, in the two major conflicts that the Trump administration wanted to sort out upon taking office. Ukraine, Israel, Gaza. And now there's sort of a win with India, Pakistan and the ceasefire. But it's. I felt like there was a. There was a paradox here, that it seemed like India and Pakistan, India especially is the country among all of these. With that, the United States has the least leverage with. And yet the Trump administration was able to get India to agree to a ceasefire. You know, there aren't major arms deals as you have in Israel and Ukraine. And so it just seemed to me like there was the least amount of leverage and yet the most amount of success. But, Dan, your point that if India actually did want this ceasefire and wanted the diplomatic cover of the United States pushing for it in order to claim victory, that would make sense. There was reporting, I saw in the Economist that Indian officials said to the Economist that they're very frustrated of America's role here and freezing an escalation that they essentially had been wanting. But again, this was just one report that I had seen. And your logic makes sense.

Yeah, I think that is a big question of whether India really did want this to keep going. And on the one hand, I think there are officials within the Indian military that have been kind of yearning to teach Pakistan a lesson and say, hey, who's the major power here? We're much stronger. But the escalation wasn't doing either side any good, and both were taking losses, and it didn't look like there would be dramatic results unless India really wanted to step things up. And that would be very costly from a US Point of view. India has become a major player in the broader confrontation with China. India and China have a border dispute, and I think despite India's preferences, it's kind of been pushed onto the US Side on this. So there is at least some kind of broader geopolitical calculation going on as well. But I do think in the end, this just wasn't an escalation that either side wanted that much. So, again, I don't want to take away from averting additional conflict, but I do think it was a much easier challenge than certainly Ukraine or Gaza or some of the more bloody and intractable things we've seen lately.

[Dan Byman]

I have, I think, a related question to that, Dan, that I was curious to get your take on, because it seems to me, in addition to this notion that maybe this was pushing on an open door, I had this sense when I was reading some of the news coverage about this, that not only was it to no one's fault because the history here is incredibly complex, but there was a lot of history and context missing. People have the general sense that there's been conflict in Kashmir for a long time and there are occasional flare ups, etc, etc. But I had the sense when I was reading things, are we missing some other important actors, either regional or other allies that have interests in relation to this conflict that were really playing a role as well? Because one of the things that you look for when a major power is helping to truly negotiate or broker a peace deal is that they actually show up in person and there are sort of sustained talks. And this one from the reporting happened very quickly over a matter of days, a matter of hours in certain cases. And maybe that's a factor of how quickly things were escalating and concern. Maybe there wasn't time to get people sort of together on the ground, but it seemed a little bit disproportionate to me the notion of the US role in making this work. And just maybe some things were missing from understanding how it actually came together.

[Unknown]

That's almost certainly correct. And usually when we look back at these crises, we have the first claims of officials and shocking to all our listeners, but they overclaim, they say because of my phone call, everything changed. Then we find out that there were a lot of dynamics going on we weren't aware of. That turned out to be more important. A question I have related to your point about outside actors, Natalie, is was there a role for China here? China has increasingly become an important patron of Pakistan. It was always tied to Islamabad. But as the US and China have moved apart, China has increased support and the US leverage in Pakistan has decreased. So was China also pushing in the same direction? Or for that matter not? Either answer would actually be quite interesting. Or was China really seen this as not its problem? But China has for a while now been trying to work with Pakistan as a counter to India. So it's immediately involved in the sense that it has very high stakes as well in this.

[Dan Byman]

Yeah, it's interesting because I noticed buried in some of the reporting that Pakistan is using Chinese military weaponry and such and India is using Western, which is just a minor point, but perhaps interesting in terms of thinking about the overarching alignment shifts.

[Scott R. Andersen]

That actually has been an interesting part of this conflict. A lot of the commentary around it, which is that India was using as part of its military response this kind of new part of this new fleet of Rafale jets. These are French made Fighter jets, I may not be pronouncing, I don't exactly know how to pronounce the name. Rafale is the company in the model that had been purchased with kind of much fanfare, I think just in the last few years, if I recall correctly, as kind of a cutting edge weapon, of which at least three, according to some reports, a total of five jets. I think three of these jets were shot down by the Pakistanis who were using a Chinese fighter jet. And of course this comes not just with fighter jets. When countries purchase these sorts of assets from other countries, it comes with a really predominant tale where it usually entails training supplies. It's kind of a long term security relationship. So some commentary you've seen is reflect on the fact that maybe this is indicative to some extent of the way that certain Western backed governments might face against Chinese backed governments and some sort of other proxy conflict, or perhaps a more direct conflict. Because of course these are western train pilots and Chinese train pilots. And it's worth noting the stock of the company that makes the French jets really plummeted just in the last few days since its incident. In part because of the perception that it was inferior somehow in its response. I'm a little dubious of that. There's a lot of rationality of taking this one case study and extending it that far, barring something much more specific, like a technical, reports of a specific technical deficiency, reports of something wrong with the technology or the training itself that contributed to these sorts of losses. Obviously Indian pilots, if they go train with the French military, whatever other military provides this got some basic training, but it's maintained by the national governments and lots of national governments that use American hardware while they get American backed training. It doesn't mean they're up to the snuff of American pilots or other pilots integrated with American security operations. You know, at least in my somewhat limited experience in other parts of the world. Is this really just an example of the major power competition mindset getting projected onto what is really a much more regional conflict with limited implications to this degree. It's just that we can't help but talk about everything in terms of China, the United States and Russia these days, or is there something more to this, more indicative from this encounter that should bleed into our understanding of broader major power competition dynamics? I don't know if you have thoughts on that, Dan. I thought it was just an interesting, interesting, weird aspect of the story.

[Unknown]

That is really interesting and honestly I didn't realize the stock of Rafale fell after this, which makes sense One of the problems we have in military analysis is we don't have that many examples on which to draw and project for the future. So everyone's looking at the Russia, Ukraine war and saying, is this the future of warfare? While of course both Russia and Ukraine are not the US and China, it'll be a very different operating environment, very different systems involved, different skill levels of the people using them. But we have this massive conflict and everyone's trying to kind of learn. And then to add to that, of course we all learn with agendas. So US Manufacturers are going to say, you know, look, the obvious answer is don't use French systems. Right. While I assume the French will say, oh, look, if we just tweak the electronic countermeasures or whatever, we're going to blame for, for this, our systems are great and in fact, you know, even better because here's certain ways in which they did well and so on. And in addition to that kind of more, I'll say company focused take, there's a bureaucratic one as well, which is, you know, this shows that air power is awesome or air power doesn't work and the limits and so on. And we're always trying to learn these lessons and the real question is just how wrong are we? You know, are we a little wrong or tremendously, disastrously wrong? And we know that with the next conflict. But yes, there's no question really with almost any of these struggles that we're trying to draw these big lessons, you know, what does this mean for defending Taiwan? Right. And you know, as we get farther and farther from the kind of local ground truth, the projection error rate goes way, way up, but we don't have other data. Right. So we're kind of stuck with these bad comparisons in some ways.

Well, first I want to say I pulled up a Google image search of the Rafale jets, hoping that they would be particularly French looking in some way, unfortunately, wearing a braid, smoking a cigarette.

[Scott R. Andersen]

Hitting on your girlfriend, etc. Yeah.

[Unknown]

But I would also actually throw one more factor into the mix, which I feel like has been downplayed in media coverage, which is the international trade angle. I heard a Pakistani think tank analyst speaking about his theory for why the ceasefire came seemingly easily in that right now because of the tariffs on China, India is trying to attract a lot of the manufacturing companies who are leaving China to India. And there's this just pervasive feeling that it's just not the time for war. This has been a mantra of Modi's, I think, for a few years now. But in the economic case against war is that it would spook these companies that they're trying to attract.

[Scott R. Andersen]

And another weird aspect of kind of the relations here, I'm curious whether that we can take anything with this about the current state of US Pakistani relations to some extent as well. I mean, clearly it seems like there's still a high level line of communication that's not necessarily surprising that you would be able to establish and get people on the call. You're the United States government at a fairly high level. But the facilitative role the United States play in this conflict is something that I'm not sure we would have naturally expected a few weeks prior to this incident. And maybe, again, maybe there's not quite as much to it as it may look like, because US Pakistani relations have been kind of on the decline, not necessarily towards hostility, but just not to the level of engagement we kind of got used to in the post 911 era. For years, because of the US military presence in Afghanistan, there were close US Pakistani relations, a very complicated relationship that was nominally supportive of an alliance, but then had lots of competing interests in regards to how Pakistan approached Afghanistan, of course, how it it ended up holding Osama bin Laden for a good part of a decade, leading ultimately to US Military intervention there without clearly permission from Pakistan. A variety of other kind of very complicated aspects of this relationship, but one that required a lot of close engagement at a very high level. I don't think that's really the case anymore. Instead, you're getting a lot of tension over Afghanistan still. But because the United States is largely disengaged from Afghanistan, the region, I wasn't sure if they would be as naturally inclined to be involved and play this role, particularly the Trump administration that's openly skeptical and was still saying very publicly, I mean, Vice President Vance, some of the people reported as playing the role in talking directly to Modi, in this kind of back and forth between the two sides. He said publicly, we're not going to stick our nose in the middle of a conflict that we have nothing to do with. Privately, he's doing something a little different, although it depends on what your definition of sticking your nose is. So I'm just kind of curious about what this tells us about the dynamics of the Trump administration and particularly in this region. Is it India that's drawing them in? Is it just because there is more of a residual contacts with the Pakistanis where they feel that they have this sort of commitment? Is it a target of opportunity? I don't know if you all have thoughts on that, because it was just kind of an interesting. It's an interesting front on which the Trump administration chose to play a fairly active role that I don't know if it would naturally assume to be that there would be one where they would naturally gravitate towards playing that role in other sort of contexts.

[Unknown]

So Marco Rubio has not played a major role, as far as I can tell, in most foreign policy decisions of this administration. And yet he was significant here. And so my initial thought was, oh, okay. In a way, the people who are most engaged in the Trump administration don't care about this. So it actually creates a role for Rubio. It creates a role for the State Department to play a constructive role. And this is something that in a Biden administration or more traditional Republicans administration, we certainly would have seen, you know, kind of the assistant secretary types jumping all over these things saying, you know, this is hugely important in getting principals to engage directly as much as possible. And was said earlier, like hopping on a plane, right. And trying to, you know, resolve this in person. The surprise to me was, Vance, where, you know, when this started escalating, I thought, well, we're going to actually see a real world experiment where what if the United States doesn't engage? How do these regional conflicts go? And is it as some would say, look, they have their own dynamics and the US Role is ancillary, even though Americans pretend we determine everything or actually you really need the superpower stepping in or these things get ugly. And Vance, I thought, was kind of exhibit A for the mindset of this is not America's problem. And yet from what we can tell, he played a role. He played a constructive role. So I'm hopeful that means that he'll see U.S. diplomatic leadership as useful in other places and maybe get a taste for it. But I suspect this could easily be a one off as well.

[Scott R. Andersen]

So there's one other aspect of this I think it's worth touching on before we move on, because it is the thing you see in every piece of discussion about India, Pakistan tensions and conflict. The aspect of their relationship that's mentioned is that they're both nuclear powers. And I think that is always discussed primarily because it really underscores the stake of a conflict, the concern that any sort of real escalation could eventually spiral to a degree that's truly catastrophic because of the invocation of nuclear weapons. But there is always that counter thesis, right? That kind of deterrence idea that nuclear powers, precisely because they put a huge, huge cost on the upper ends of escalation, the fact that you do have the risk of nuclear conflict that actually can deter escalation or put a ceiling on the level of escalation the parties are willing to tolerate. My gut response to this, from what I've read on it, is that this might be more an example of the latter in that it seemed like there were strong domestic factors on both sides that pushed towards some degree of escalation. And they both did escalate for several days in part to get their pound of flesh in response to the perceived transgressions of the other side. And that's a cycle you could have seen repeating. But all of them, after a fair amount of back and forth, where, as you said, Dan, they can both kind of save face and say, we got our pound of flesh, we got our wins in addition to whatever else we may have suffered. They both said, well, and now we're done. We're not really interested in escalating this much further. That's not to say that the next step up was nuclear war, of course. That's like many, many steps before you get there, hopefully, presumably. But I do wonder whether the fact that there is just an upper cap that's so devastating does have a bit of a deterrent effect on how far escalation is likely to go or the willingness of parties to accept off ramps to escalation. And it's just an interesting case study of that kind of classic conundrum of the nuclear deterren effect to the extent we there is one or you buy into it.

[Dan Byman]

Tyler, do you know anything about escalation?

[Unknown]

Well, I mean there's like so many schools of thought on this and the in terms of the name of the podcast escalation that we made about the US and Ukraine, it's a different situation because it's not two nuclear armed powers who are in direct conflict as it is in this situation. I think the reason why people are rightfully bringing up so much is that it's not like a major nuclear armed power is using a proxy to attack another power or something like that. It's two nuclear armed powers in direct confrontation with each other. And that's what's so scary about it. But I tend to agree with you, Scott. These are the kinds of things where you're right until you're catastrophically not and then it happens. But I do think that the idea that nuclear arms deter any kind of direct confrontation between two nuclear armed states is wrong. Look what just happened. But I agree that I haven't seen Any reporting that the use of even a tactical nuke or something like that was put on the table by either military. It does seem like a hard ceiling. But again, I'm saying this very hopefully.

[Dan Byman]

Well, I think there were reports that Prime Minister Sharif had called together the heads of the committee, the body in Pakistan that oversees nuclear weapons, and that that seems just on the TikTok of how things developed. That seems to have expedited things quite a bit. But unclear if that's signaling. Unclear if it seems like they are responsible for a lot of other weapons systems as well, from what I could tell. So unclear. But that may be a counterpoint to what you were suggesting. I think we don't know, and I think like any other effort to sort of interpret a given situation as demonstrating or not how nuclear deterrence looks, it's really unclear because you don't know what exactly the signals were, how they were being interpreted by the other side, and most importantly, what other variables were at play.

[Scott R. Andersen]

Well, this was, of course, a big week for ceasefires, because we also saw another ceasefire taking place in a different corner of the world. This is, of course, the Red Sea, in areas around where we have seen a concentrated military campaign by Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis, the kind of de facto regime in control of big swaths of Yemen backed by Iran, that has been attacking maritime traffic through the Red Sea, nominally linked to the October 7 attacks and ensuing military operation against Gaza. The justifying rhetoric for this latest wave of maritime operations has been that it is intended as a response to those actions, but not limited to Israeli shipping, American shipping, or even any sort of shipping directly related to the Gaza conflict. And the parties there instead kind of ripped pretty large against maritime shipping throughout the Red Sea and around the Gulf of Aden area. The United States has been active in pushing back on that militarily, really for many, many years, with a high degree of concentration since the beginning of last year under the Biden administration, where we saw this escalation of hostilities both on the Houthi side in terms of targeting maritime traffic, then a more coordinated military response, ultimately leading to a number of substantial military actions by the Biden administration. You can query how severe they were on the scale on the menu of potential options, but a significant uptick in what they were pursuing that did not actually ever end any of these attacks on maritime traffic, but did at various points seem to discourage them or undermine an ability to pursue at least certain aspects of them, at least for short periods. The Trump administration earlier this year said essentially we are renewing this campaign against the Houthis, who continue to attack maritime traffic up dramatically. The scale of attacks, the scale of military operations and targets has been pursuing this kind of accelerated pace of military operations for the last month and change. And then this week, President Trump declared it's over on the basis that the Houthis had agreed to stop attacks on US Shipping without really making direct reference, at least as far as I can tell, to other maritime shipping through the Red Sea and through this area. And now, as we're getting more reports about what the actual basis for the declaration is, because it's something that we really just had the president's words on from the outset, it seemed like it might be a little more complicated story. Dan, I know you followed the Houthis and this kind of military campaign as part of your work on the region and kind of related issues. Talk to us about how big a step this is in this long standing, at this point, conflict between the United States and the Houthis, particularly in this maritime sort of domain. Is this a game changer, or is this much more of a show on the part of the Trump administration in terms of what they've accomplished?

[Unknown]

So this is certainly positive, but let me put a few question marks into this. So after weeks of lots of bombing and months of occasional bombing, the Houthis have made a concession, and it doesn't appear that, you know, outsiders are making dramatic concessions to the Houthis other than to stop bombing them. So there's no massive, you know, provision of aid or anything like that. That is a sweetener. And so that is, you know, definitely chalk one up for the use of force. Now, I think the Houthis, you know, kind of got the attention both domestically and regionally that they want from this. So I think they were more willing to do some sort of limited ceasefire than they would have been six months ago. But that said, again, you know, a success. But the big caveat, of course, is Israel. This deal was announced, really, hours after the Houthis successfully did a missile attack that hit Israel's main airport. So it went through Israeli missile defenses, you know, an unusual success, if I read the story correctly. I think earlier today there was another attack that Israel shot down. But so the United States is effectively doing a separate deal with the Houthis, which is quite remarkable because in the past, a lot of the US Effort was justified in the name of helping Israeli security. So the US Is separating out the protection of maritime commerce from Israeli security and saying, oh, we'll take one but the other we're not so focused on. I don't want to sidetrack us too much, but this is coming at a time when the US has also negotiated a separate hostage deal to release the one Israeli American hostage that was still held by Hamas. While there were over 50 Israelis, including 24 are still believed to be alive who are held by Hamas when the President Trump has had what seems to be a very positive relationship with Ahmed Al Shara, the new leader of Syria, who Israel still sees as largely tied to his terrorist past. So there's a lot of divergences coming up, and what's happening in Yemen is one, but one very stark example of these.

I'll just say Alshara, who Trump today I believe called handsome and has a, quote, very strong past.

[Scott R. Andersen]

Well, he also described the Houthis as having been very brave and they're opposing a military action. So it's this interesting Trump thing where he, like, you know, you can take it in a good light or a bad light. He's always generous with the compliments. When you've come around to his side of things, you've reached agreement on these things. You know, I'm really curious about the kind of the sequencing of Trump administration acts and Houthi actions here, because, as I recall, you know, we saw this big surge in Houthi military action up until particularly the March kind of of last year. You then saw a drop in the scale of Houthi attacks. I don't think it ever stopped entirely because we saw kind of a bit of a detente between the Biden administration and Iran, an effort to kind of. We saw that spike in hostilities, particularly after attacks on Israel by Iran, Iran, Israeli attacks on Iran. That kind of fed into the sense that, okay, we need to lower the heat in the region. There seemed to be a decline in at least the emphasis on these attacks, corresponding US Military operations. Then we actually saw earlier this year when we saw the ceasefire in Gaza take place. The Houthis say, we're going to stop attacks on maritime traffic. Traffic altogether. And then it was in March that they threatened to bring that back on when it seemed like the ceasefire was falling apart. Phase two had never really kicked in of the ceasefire plan. The Israeli government is shutting off assistance again to Gaza. And the Houthis said, well, we may kick back up maritime operations, did engage in some maritime operations. And that seems to, at least by my reckoning, have kicked off this stronger Trump administration response, which now is coming to a bit of a close. So it confuses the picture A little bit. Because you could read this as one way of saying, well, maybe this is like some degree a win because you've gotten the Houthis to break off at least the treatment of US Shipping and US Backed shipping from the Gaza conflict. So maybe that's to some extent as a victory and might even lower pressure on the Israelis in Gaza because you've separated those two things from a pressure point. But I think your point is well taken, Dan. Like, this puts Israel a little bit out on an island in terms of its own security risks and exposure to the Houthis at least, which is not maybe the most direct and substantial threat to them, but a notable one, a significant one, one that is real, as we've seen a few times in the last week or two from these attacks. The part of this I'm not clear on is the actual implications for particularly Europeans, right, the other people that were in the security umbrella. This has always been a US Military operation aimed at securing maritime traffic generally, not just US Flags, vessels. And it's not clear to me where they fit into this picture. I don't know if any of you guys have any more clarity on it. This is especially notable because we know when this military operation started, a month, a month and change ago, from the signal gate chats that have leaked. Vice President Vance, among others, said, I don't really support doing this because I think Europeans need to bear a bigger share of the burden. So is this Americans breaking free of the security coordination with Europeans around this to focus on their own shipping, or are Europeans fitting into this deal? Do we have a sense of that yet?

[Dan Byman]

I have seen no reporting on the extent to which Europeans are part of the deal or not. I mean, it is to add a dimension to what you were just saying, Scott. The US Shipping pales in comparison in terms of quantity and expense to European countries. So the deal to avoid US Shipping vessels is good for the US but is it good for anyone else? But I think this also speaks to the bigger question of how should we understand this deal? It hasn't been very much time since it was announced. It's not clear what it's gonna look like. And in particular, as everyone's been saying, it's not really clear what any side got in this other than a promise to stop, which is good in and of itself. But usually when you reach a ceasefire, it's not just because both sides want to stop shooting things. It's because they've agreed to some sort of compromise where each of them gets something and it's at least in theory, trying to get at the underlying issue that led to the escalation to conflict in the first place. And here, you know, to the extent you understand the Houthis motivation to have been raising protests to Israel's conduct in Gaza, nothing about that has changed. To the extent you saw it as the Houthis trying to push back on or trying to sort of show a role of strength in the context of US And Western interests, that hasn't really changed. We actually, from the US Side, have a pretty remarkable about face with respect to how Trump has been portraying the Houthis. You know, this very, very complimentary sounding rhetoric now. And if you go back 30 days, the United States military was going to annihilate the Houthis. And it's not just the about face in terms of the rhetoric about them. It's also that the military failed to annihilate the Houthis if that was actually the goal. And maybe the goal changed as things were underway. But it is worth pausing on the fact that the US Put a tremendous amount of resources into these bombing campaigns. It cost over a billion dollars. There were protests being raised by members of the military who were concerned about depleting U.S. resources, particularly given concerns about redeploying things that may be needed in the event that China invades Taiwan. And all sorts of other objections to this really dramatic bombing campaign that didn't work on the timeframe any way that would have been required, according to experts who had come up with the idea that this should happen in the first place. So it was like looking for the military to accomplish things that even the military said it couldn't do, and then deciding not to do it anymore and declaring victory, which is, I suppose, a pattern that we see not that infrequently with respect to the Trump administration, that all of a sudden the goal is precisely the opposite of what it had been a couple of days earlier, a couple of months earlier, a couple of years earlier. And there is sort of an unapologetic transition to the opposite and then declaration of victory. But I think that dynamic is really at play here. And all of those factors make me feel not all that confident that this is going to hold in any meaningful way. And even if it does, with respect to US Vessels, it doesn't do much else to decrease the regional threat or the threat to other actors around the world.

[Tyler McBrien]

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[Unknown]

I can never tell if this is a great strength or a great weakness of President Trump, which is his embrace of inconsistency. You know, the kind of outside analyst in me goes nuts with this right because, you know, you set goals and you try to measure them, do you achieve them? And, you know, that's the sort of thing, you know, people like me write countless op EDS about is President Biden declared he intended to do X, Y and Z. And six months later we see falling short on his third goal. And Trump truly does not care about what he said yesterday. Just to take a dramatic example, under President Obama, he very famously issued a red line in Syria and then didn't back it up. And that was the subject of innumerable sessions of criticism and political attacks and so on. And Trump puts massive tariffs on China and then we'll suspend them even though China isn't making major concessions. And he's just fine with that. And he doesn't suffer the political backlash that really every other politician would suffer. And it's in a way amazing. It's kind of infuriating at times, but it enables tremendous flexibility at the same time. If I were a US ally or partner, trying to figure out what is US Policy and what will it be in a week is just an impossible task.

Yeah, I think Trump is often the victim of many logical fallacies, but one fallacy that I think he really doesn't buy into is the sunk cost fallacy. I think he kind of set his own deadline. He saw after 30 days that the US burned through a billion dollars, that, that planes are falling off of aircraft carriers, that the Houthis almost shot down an F35. He's like, this is not working. He doesn't see the Middle east as this venue of the clash of civilizations or this great struggle between autocracy and democracy. He sees it as probably largely a lucrative market and many potential business deals. And this is bad for the bottom line. And if it's not working, no matter. I don't really care what I said yesterday. Okay, let's change it. And again, it's maybe a win. It doesn't make the US look good in any way. I think he could have easily announced this win on an aircraft carrier with a Mission Accomplished banner behind him, and it would have had the same effect. But yeah, I completely agree, Dan, that he's not beholden to what anyone said yesterday, let alone himself.

[Scott R. Andersen]

Well, and there's a second predilection for Trump that comes into play here, which I think is also a double edged sword in a similar way way, which is that he also just has a very low tolerance for committed risk or maybe for enduring costs for this sort of military operations for extended period of time. I mean, generally I would say he's generally a fairly low risk person. Right. Like he doesn't seem super eager to authorize or engage in military activities that's seen as having a risk. But then you have a couple of prominent counter examples like the Soleimani strike right back in 2024 from the first Trump administration, where it was an extremely high risk maneuver that prior administrations had avoided precisely because it was seen as so risky and potentially escalatory. But setting those aside, he generally seems a little reluctant to undergo those. And then he's not really willing to bear much pain or costs for broader strategic goals, particularly on the military front. So here this was the renewed military offensive, at least according to reporting the New York Times that he approved in March, which had its origins in a plan by military officials they'd been pushing for a while. That was 120 day campaign to achieve objectives. And Trump is the one who pushed it down and said, I'll give you 30. That is not super encouraging in the first place. And then you have apparently a pretty sharp pivot in policy based off of this assurances provided by the Houthis, which again were communicated through Oman, usual interlocutor as part of broader negotiations with with Iran. It's not clear to me. Certainly the reporting does not make it sound like a lot of stress testing or reinforcement was put in place before they bought into this offer. It seemed to be a pretty sharp policy pivot aimed at curbing these costs. And you think about situations like military operations in Iraq and Syria after the Soleimani strike aimed at Iran backed militia groups there that went on for a little while, but largely eventually ended up winding down, somewhat because of COVID somewhat because of change of regional posture, but nonetheless become the kind of concentrated escalatory campaign some people were pushing for. You think of his approach to Afghanistan during much of his first term when the US Military presence was still there and a lot of these environments, Trump really just does not seem to be willing to bear the costs of longer term military engagements. He's willing to sign off on them for the short term at the front end when those costs haven't actually accumulated. And when he feels them, he backs away from them. If you don't like US Military involvement overseas, if you think the United States tends to lean too hard on that, that might be a virtue in a lot of contexts. Right. And certainly if you're worried about the United States kind of being led by somebody who's a little mercurial, maybe it's good that if he's Mercurial in a direction that leans towards less use of military force. But on the flip side of that, if you think sometimes at least the United States does need to engage in kind of concentrate and sustained military efforts over the medium term, at least, that gets really hard to do with a president like this. And I do think that's a potentially serious downside for the United States and then for US Allies in particular, who again, appear to be the ones whose situation is most precarious, whether it's Israel or the Europeans coming out of this deal.

[Dan Byman]

Yeah, I want to make two points about how we should think about this with respect to foreign policy, and that is, number one, that I think it reflects what is likely a lack of, or at least a question as to whether there is any sort of coherent foreign policy that is goes anywhere past the moment. And the immediate question of do we spend more money on this military campaign, do we deploy our troops, do we enter into a sustained engagement of some sort in the Middle east, but without any sort of connection to a broader theory with respect to things like the US Role in the region, the US Role in the world, what it owes its traditional allies that are also suffering costs, costs both in terms of their shipping, but in particular, circling back to what Dan said earlier with respect to the US Partnership with Israel, that is really not at all the beneficiary of this deal, and seems like that would be quite surprising to it and quite surprising to observers who are very accustomed to the United States having a close security relationship with Israel to just leave Israel out of the equation here. And the second thing that I think this reflects that we need to think about is a process question about foreign policy, which is that from the reporting, and again, it's hard to know from the outside, etc. Etc. But from the reporting, it really looks like this came up, as you said, Scott, through the Omanis, in the course of negotiations between the United States and Iran, which side note is another thing that Israel is very unhappy about. And the idea came, it sort of went through Witkoff, who is the envoy to everything. And it's not clear that there was any consultation with DoD, with even the National Security Council, with the State Department. And it was sort of announced as a thing. There doesn't seem to have been a lot of consultation, let alone coordination in announcing it or implementing it or thinking through network next steps. And that's just very meaningful.

[Scott R. Andersen]

The one last aspect of this, I think it's worth digging into, is how we think about a success state in this conflict. I Think it's something with the Biden administration probably wrestled with to some extent as well. Because part of this gets left out of a lot of the coverage of the military actions is the actual impact we've had on trade from these attacks and any discussion about what the actual objective is in terms of where we want the region to go back to. Because maritime traffic has dropped through the Red Sea and had dropped even prior to this latest push by the Trump administration as a result of the Houthi attacks, in spite of the US Led military response, which maybe was successful at limiting some attacks, but wasn't successful at sustaining the same level of traffic. Some numbers I pulled up just from February this year noted that you've seen an overall decline of more than 50% of vessels. You've seen an 85% decline in bulk carriers. These are like larger carriers, I believe, of cargo. LNG carriers had dropped by 92%. Crude carriers had dropped by 42%. General cargo had dropped by 24%. That probably means it's a big shift towards like general cargo, which I think are generally smaller, more navigable and more agile ships and maybe less easy targets for the Houthis to some degree because they're a little faster and smaller and maybe less draw less attention. So you're already seeing a huge amount of traffic get rerouted all the way around the Horn of Africa, which is the alternative route to European and Western markets for to and from, I should say, that would otherwise go through the Red Sea and the Suez. So, like, what is a return state then? Like, is this policy successful until you see a situation stable enough that traffic actually returns to, you know, pre conflict levels? I kind of think that is actually should be the goal. That's going to require, I think, a lot more than a tentative ceasefire. That's going to require some sort of proactive diplomatic and security engagement that provides enough security to shippers that they're willing to go back to those routes. They certainly have the economic incentive. I think it's a lot more expensive, as I understand it, to go back to the Horn of Africa, but those costs now are already substantially built into consumer costs. My sense is that the Trump administration will be able to get away with the status quo for a while because it's not going to be experienced as a change. It's already built into the costs that a lot of us are experiencing economically. But I'm not sure that's the right way to frame it. I mean, I really feel like if you want to actually preserve maritime traffic, you got to aim for a return to kind of status quo ante, which would be twice the maritime traffic currently going through the Red Sea. And I'm just not sure how you get there, but I'm not sure the incentives are there to push the Trump administration in that direction.

[Unknown]

Yeah, I tend to agree. I think one of the reasons why it's been hard to sell the American public on this conflict because a term like freedom of navigation sounds very stratospheric and almost like something from the 18th century or something like that. And it just doesn't seem like a good rallying cry around which to build public support for a military campaign.

[Scott R. Andersen]

Well, our third topic for today keeps us in the same region, but takes us to a slightly different sort of agreement. And that is one of these very kind of multitude of strange and interesting agreements coming out of President Trump's trip to the Middle east this week, some more of which I think we will have reason to tackle next week on the podcast. For this week, we're going to tackle one of the strangest ones. This is the seeming agreement by President Trump to accept a Qatar Airways jet, a luxury jet, a jet that apparently has few parallels in the level of luxury it provides that the government of Qatar is gifting to the United States for use as a new Air Force one. The current two planes used for Air Force One are 30 to 40 years old. There has been a contract with Boeing that was a point of continual tension and frustration by President Trump during her first time in office to replace them that Boeing is currently behind schedule on. It was supposed to be done by 2022. I think now they're aiming for 2028 or 2029, but nonetheless they have this instead. We have this alternative arrangement that that President Trump appears to have pursued where he's going to accept this jet from Qatar Airways, convert it for use as Air Force One, and then at the end of his time in office, it is going to be gifted to the Trump Foundation, Presidential foundation, which will then be able to do whatever it wants with it, but very well may make it available to former then former former President Trump for his personal use. I suspect this has been apparently blessed by Attorney General Pam Bondi in a legal opinion that's not been released publicly, but was given to the White House and was reportedly signed off on by the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department, which is something that does not happen with a lot of Justice Department legal memos these days, but is notable when it does. But this still raises big legal questions because, of course, the Constitution is pretty express that people are not any sort of public official, including the president, are not supposed to be accepting emoluments presents, gifts, titles of nobility of any sort whatsoever from foreign kings. And here it's coming from an actual king. So there's a pretty clear tension here in this particular case. I'm curious what you want to make of this. Natalie, let me start with you and your thoughts about this. A what is the drive and what are the kind of pushbacks on this on a political front, separate and apart from the legal front and legally? Do we think there is a big issue here? Do we see an avenue by which it might be addressed? What do we make of this Pam Bondi legal opinion and is that likely to be the last word in what's being pursued?

[Dan Byman]

Yeah. So I have maybe an unconventional take on this, which is that I think there is no question that it's illegal. The emoluments clause is very old. It hasn't been litigated much. We don't have a whole lot to go off of, but it's pretty clearly illegal. It's certainly problematic. It is just plain corrupt looking. It is, however, distracting from a lot of other things, including a broader context, that I worry that the is another one of those things that is sort of more noise than signal and that the signal is sort of being obscured and some of it is related. So it's actually a useful vehicle through which to think about other things. So among the things that come up to me are this is such a blatant violation of the emoluments clause and such a blatant violation of common sense with respect to what a president should be doing in terms of taking gifts of that are I mean, it's just flaunting common sense about what's appropriate with respect to things that look like corruption. But that all takes place in the context of the Trump administration has also done things like essentially ended enforcement of foreign corruption laws and dismantled the kleptocracy initiative, which had been specifically going after foreign corrupt actors in the United States States. And by the way, we have a very good article by Alexis Loeb on the kleptocracy initiative because that is one of those things that flew very much under the radar. And to people who have been involved with concerns about foreign corruption, it was a very big loss. So that's one set of issues that this raises, but sort of also obscures from if you're focusing too much on the specifics of this one deal. Another one is just the fact that the president's first trip as president in this term is to the Middle East. And again, sort of echoing some of what we were talking about before, it's not really clear what the foreign policy objective is here to the extent there is a coherent one, other than it looks like a lot of the goal is to be able to announce a lot of deals. And so maybe the foreign policy objective is to be able to flex some muscle in terms of being able to find financially advantageous relationships and arrangements with foreign governments. But that still doesn't sort of answer the question of why what is traditionally considered an important signal of what the United States is prioritizing with respect to its foreign policy should be the Middle East. The other set of things that it sort of obscures is this announcement about the plane came at about the same time that that Stephen Miller said that they're considering suspending habeas, which is itself its own distraction, because I don't think there was any reality to that. But that evokes all of the other issues of what the Trump administration is doing here at home that are just apparently blatant violations of common sense and the law here with respect to due process. And the announcement, this also came at the same time that the Trump administration announced that another Fox News host, Jeanine Pirro, would be appointed as interim U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia. So I don't know if that is a helpful way to think about this plane, in that it's worth pausing on it, but actually thinking more about what's behind it. But that was my take.

[Scott R. Andersen]

I think those are all very fair things, and there's clearly an optics and a policy problem on this particular front and an overarching legal problem. But I think I have stumbled across and figured out what this Pam Bondi memo says, which I will share with you. I'm not sure it's persuasive necessarily, but the fact particularly that was signed off by office legal counsel attorneys, if that is in fact true, I thought was interesting because it does suggest that there is some argument credible enough that the attorneys that are very good attorneys who work in that office will be willing to sign off on, and I suspect their argument is going to come down to a statute and at 5 US- CODE 7342, subparagraph C for those reading along at home, this is a provision that allows for the acceptance of gifts above a minimal value. It also accepts gifts below minimal value, but this is, needless to say, quite above minimal value, where the refusal of the gift would likely cause offense or embarrassment or otherwise adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States. And it allows the gifts to take place where that happens, except that the gift then has to be the States, United, United States, not to the individual in question. And that sounds a lot like what Bondi's proposing here, right? Like, we know the jet becomes the property of the United States, not Donald Trump himself, although it then transferred to.

[Dan Byman]

His private library, which, by the way, how is that enforceable at all?

[Scott R. Andersen]

That's the question that I have. I can get how the transfer from the Qataris is signed off by the statute and the foreign Emoluments clause. Remember, it says you can't do this until. Unless Congress approves it. So I can see how they can read the statute as code covering the situation, in part because the determination of what causes offense or embarrassment or would harm US Foreign relations is the sort of thing that, like courts are going to defer the executive Branch on, and particularly the president on. And I'm sure the Attorney General will be comfortable signing off saying, yeah, your determination on that, even though it seems pretty facially obnoxious here, is probably something that is going to carry with water with the courts substantially.

[Dan Byman]

I don't know. They might have to also think about the fact that that's the logic in terms of. Of stifling the First Amendment rights of foreign students located in the United States and deciding that they can be deported for it.

[Scott R. Andersen]

Sure. It is absolutely a degree of deference that's under heavy strain in part because of its use and stretching to the limits by this administration in a lot of contexts. I think this is another example of that. This is a classic application of this administration's inclination to take its statutory and constitutional authorities and push them to the absolute limits in ways that seem facially problematic from the policies underlying a lot of these legal authorities. And this is a clear example of that. I can see how they would come up with this legal argument, and it's something that passes enough muster that if the President really wants to do this, someone will put it on paper. I'm not sure how you get from transferring it to a private foundation. I'm not sure how a private foundation can then make it available to. To a private individual at cost or cost free, consistent with being what I'm assuming is a 501C3. Those are big questions for the future Trump Presidential foundation or current one. I don't really know, and I don't know if Attorney General Bondi would weigh in on that. But I suspect there is this loophole here they're using from a strictly statutory basis, it's just not very satisfying. And it clearly is so contrary to the instinct of the law and not to mention the Constitution, that it's just a problem, but not in a way that I think is legally cognizable. I think people are saying, why don't we sue over this? While there might be other things subject to emoluments clause litigation, which we can get into, like business deals with the Middle east, crypto deals, stuff like that, I'm not sure this is actually the best target of that.

[Dan Byman]

Yeah, I agree with that, and I want to hear from Tyler and Dan, but I do just want to say, as I've said in the past on rational security, lawyers are trained to be able to make arguments for really, really pretty facially absurd things. There are always fancy arguments that you can make, and this one is unsatisfying because it's silly. But even if you are to give some credence to creative legal analysis, let us say generously, this is just silly. Regardless of how it would look to a court, regardless of how persuasive you would find a memo. You know, there are two Air Force Ones that are currently being produced by Boeing here in the United States under a contract that President Trump created during his first administration. There is no imminent need for the United States to get a new Air Force One, let alone from the Qataris. It's not really clear why this is so important that you would need to make these really, as I said, absurd legal arguments. Whether or not they would pass muster, I don't know. Actually, I do know. I think it's absurd. I don't think they're going to pass muster if they ever get before a court. Whether they get before a court is a much different issue. I suspect you're right, Scott, that there is no way to present it squarely to a court. But again, the law is actually not the important thing here. It's just silly. It doesn't matter. Being able to legally justify it does not give it any sort of veneer of legitimacy, and it shouldn't.

[Unknown]

I completely buy into both premises, that this is baldly, egregiously corrupt, very likely illegal, and also a distraction. But I think I maybe reach a different conclusion. I don't think you're saying at all to ignore this, but I think quite the opposite. I think because it's so, in your face, egregiously corrupt, it's such a material thing that you can see a photo of that because of that it's, it's such an easy thing for the, for the Democrats or any sort of resistance to just grab onto and never let go. Just because it's so absurd on its face there. I mean, it just, like the headlines are just so mind numbing. There's an NPR headline that says, ethics experts worry about the implications of Trump accepting Qatar's luxury luxury plane. Yeah, no kidding. Like, it's just so absurd that it's just an easy thing because something like the crypto scam with the multiple business entities involved is complicated. The technology is complex. The meme coins don't exist. They're not like a physical thing that you can point to. So I guess because it's such a, almost like old school, old emperor style thing that it's just, I think the Democrats should be on it like a dog on a bone.

[Dan Byman]

Yeah, and I think that's a really good point, and thank you for articulating it better than I did, which is that it's a distraction. But it's more that we shouldn't focus on the particulars of the deal. We should focus on what the deal represents. And there are all of these layers to it, and they represent, as you point out, a lot of other things that we should be concerned about. But as you say, it does serve as a really useful entry point to think about all of those things. And it does serve as a really concrete, concise thing to rally around. And it's worth noting in that vein that a bunch of major MAGA supporters and personalities have come out against it in a way that I think is pretty unexpected because they've been such boosters of Trump in all things before. But really coming out with some very harsh words about his decision to apparently take this deal.

[Unknown]

I want to pick up on Natalie's point. I actually think there's a chance at least that Trump might walk away from this one because of that, that his own base is pretty skeptical of this. And part of that is the nature of the donor here, where Qatar, I think, has been maligned in conservative circles as the major sponsor of Hamas and responsible for October 7th. And that's gotten a lot of play for the last two years. And I'm happy to go into the complexities about how Israel helped broker Qatar's relationship in Gaza and how it's a lot more complex than that. But part of what Qatar is trying to do is buy some goodwill in the Trump administration. And I believe, and others may know better, it's hard for Qatar to buy crypto because I think there are actual restrictions on how its sovereign wealth can be used. So I think one of the traditional ways of transferring money that we've seen is not available to them. And so it's not just that there's a foreign government that is blatantly trying to buy the goodwill of the President of the United States, but it's this particular foreign government, I think, rubs a lot of Trump supporters the wrong way. And so to me, the kind of political blowback is something that may register, but it's always hard to tell.

[Dan Byman]

Yeah. And I think it's worth also making the point that this, as you had mentioned before and as we talked about in the last segment, this comes alongside some pretty dramatic examples of the United States doing things with respect to Israel that are deeply shocking if you compare it to past US Stance toward Israel.

[Scott R. Andersen]

Before we part, I think it's worth thinking about the broader kind of emoluments context here, because we've already talked about the crypto element of this. Right. Like, so we know that the Trump Organization is involved in offering cryptocurrencies to the extent that there is even actually, you know, to some extent a link between purchasing some and a potential access to a dinner that's been put for the Trump Organization or a meeting with President Trump, which is particularly egregious, I think, for that sort of exchange. There's also, of course, like a whole bunch of Trump properties, Trump real estate that's still out there. There isn't any Trump hotel this time around, which there was during the first term. And that is something that's probably complicating potential legal challenges to these sorts of actions. In that you have the legal cases that were targeting Trump for foreign emoluments under his first administration were mostly centered for standing on the parties, at least the two that were successful. Third one, led by legislators, fell short in the courts on standing grounds, were premised on the hotel and its impact on competitor businesses in Washington, D.C. maryland, as well as from individual businesses. Without that sort of direct hook, you'd have to find a new set of plaintiffs. And operating in the crypto space particularly, there probably aren't that many who are really willing to sue the administration here, in part because they're seen as being close allies of the crypto industry generally and have done a lot of things that are very pro crypto from a lot of different perspectives. Boeing would be another company where you could see potentially suing if this interrupted their contract for the Air Force One jets. But it's no clear sign that they will notably, I just saw this morning, Qatar evidently just signed a huge deal with Boeing earlier today to up their increase a number of planes they're purchasing from Boeing.

[Dan Byman]

The CEO of Boeing is there with Trump, right, as part of this big trip, current Air Force One, to go on this trip through the Middle East.

[Scott R. Andersen]

So it's just kind of wild. Like I'm, I think you will eventually going to see some litigation over these foreign emoluments issues. But what we saw happen last time is there were, you know, at least four cases I'm aware of, two of which were never finally resolved, manner contrary to the plaintiffs. But we saw litigation take years and years over who exactly had standing to enforce something like this, because no one's ever had to enforce the foreign emoluments clause directly before. And unfortunately, if you're going to end up with like, plaintiffs that are really different from last time, you may face the same sort of preliminary litigation eating up the clock and none of this coming to resolution before Trump ultimately leaves office. Again, maybe that's why we're not seeing a rush to the courthouse doors. But I do think some of this is still susceptible to legal challenge. Maybe not this jet purchased other stuff. It's just a matter of finding the right plaintiff willing to pursue that sort of claim.

[Unknown]

Was the general assumption in the past that this usually didn't go to the courts because it was so politically embarrassing that as soon as it was revealed, you'd run away from it and therefore, oh my gosh, even the specter or the hint of a foreign bribe would lead people to reject it. And again, the kind of, if you will, shamelessness here means that the courts actually come into play. Or was this because certainly bribery has been something in the past. Is that the big change going on here?

This gets at one of the things that I think is the stupidest part of all of this, is that there isn't so much a focus on the emoluments clause, which I think would have been, is a better thing to focus on here. But what you see happening, especially among some journalists, is they are tying themselves in knots trying to demonstrate a quid pro quo before calling it corruption or calling it a bribe. It's not clear yet what the Qataris are getting in exchange. But you've seen journalists be hesitant to call it a bribe or corruption because it's not clear, you know, what's, what's being given in the other direction. Which again, I just, it's, it's, you see, you see some of the discourse online of people tying themselves into knots of, you know, whether this is corrupt or not. But it's, but I think, but I think that it's important to focus on the emoluments clause because you all should correct me if I'm wrong, but it's, it's not quid pro quo dependent. It's just, it's a unilateral gift given and you don't need to prove the other side.

[Scott R. Andersen]

No, that's exactly right. I mean there needs to be statutory approval for accepting a gift from a foreign government, traditionally for any sort of US government official, the plain deal in some ways, legally, even though I think it is likely to be the biggest high profile political pushback legally, it's probably on better grounds, I think, statutorily, than some of these other things, precisely because you at least have a statute you can hook onto. You really don't have that when you're encouraging people to buy your cryptocurrency. So I don't know. It is a weird, weird terrain of political and legal incentives in this space and the Trump administration is dabbling in it again. But it's kind of improved its game from last time. It's doing it in ways that aren't falling into the same pitfalls that did propose legal pushback last time and political push pushback. And although this one, precisely because of the amount of attention and kind of bipartisan fur, it's kind of stirring up, maybe this is a big misstep that they're going to end up regretting or taking back. Well, folks, that is all the time we have for this week. But this would not be Rational Security if we did not leave you with some object lessons to ponder over in the week to come. Tyler, what do you have for us this week?

[Unknown]

So I think probably many listeners are familiar with the hallowed institution that is Lunch with the FT being the Financial Times. It's this long standing series where the writer will take a politician, leader, musician of some kind out to lunch. It usually engenders some ridicule because of some faux pas inevitably happens. But the FT did something different, I think, with the latest lunch with the FT with Sam Altman of OpenAI, where an author named Bryce Elder wrote for the FT, which is sort of a meta look at the Sam Altman lunch where poor Sam Altman was just wanted to cook a garlic pasta in his Napa Valley farmhouse. And this article, which is innocuously titled Three Things We Learned About Sam Altman by Scoping His Kitchen, is basically just a forensic takedown of three different items in his kitchen. And they managed to also make it a takedown of Generative AI in general. And it's, it's pretty savage and pretty interesting FT on FT violence perhaps, but it's just a great, it's a great send up. It's well done.

[Scott R. Andersen]

No one snarks like the British snark. I'm glad they're getting a little bit in their own crosshairs. I think it's the only way to keep things fair. Natalie, what do you have for us this week?

[Dan Byman]

Well, I am not Catholic, but I am from Chicago. As I have mentioned probably each and every time I've been on Rational Security. I have been quite delighted in the follow on effects of Pope Leo becoming the Pope, which as pertinent to me involve a lot of inside jokes about my favorite city and a lot of just absolutely hilarious to Chicagoan sorts of disputes like the Cubs fans going out in front and claiming that the Pope is actually a Cubs fan and his brother having to call in to correct the record that he's actually a Sox fan. Because for those of you who don't know if the Pope, having grown up on the south side of Chicago, was a Cubs fan, it would have been a real difficulty for the people of Chicago. The other little story that I've enjoyed, which is, to be fair, not specific to Chicago, but is that it turns out that the Pope's childhood home was for sale at the time that he was elevated to Pope and it was listed, I think it had been listed for a little while and then somehow someone figured out that in fact that's where the Pope had grown up and the poor guy who's selling it took it off the market to try to figure out what he should do with it. Either take any of the offers that had started unsurprisingly pouring in or make it into a museum or what. But I'm enjoying all of these stories about my hometown. And also I got Lou Malnatius pizza for Mother's Day, so I'm pretty excited.

[Unknown]

I'll just say I've started. Instead of saying is the Pope Catholic? I've started saying is the Pope from Chicago? As a, as a way to say yes.

[Scott R. Andersen]

Does the Pope eat fried ravioli and casserole passing as pizza? I think is the general.

[Dan Byman]

Don't start with me, you know, I.

[Scott R. Andersen]

Like deep dish pizza. I'm a defender. I'm just saying as a matter of course, Italians do not not feel that way. And I'm very careful. That is the culture class Number one coming down the pike. Well, I will say, as we're talking about something American that's good. Bake its way to Italy. I'll talk about something Italian that's good, that's made its way to America. I went out for a lovely dinner with my family last week. My son, having behaved half decent at dinner, insisted on a treat. I am spoil him mercilessly and had to decline. So we went to get ice cream next door at Dolce, which evidently is a D.C. chain. I thought it was like, a national thing. It's just DC Very good Italian gelato. But they have something I had not had before that is amazing that I have to encourage, and that is affogato, which is essentially just espresso on gelato. It's amazing. And I did it with pistachio gelato, which was truly an amazing flavor. My wife did it with hazelnut. The kind of, like, nuttiness with the espresso is amazing. But the thing that really tops it off, because I've seen this on menus before, I've never been able to get it anytime, because if I drink caffeine past noon, I'm up for, like, three straight days, and it's a disaster. They have decaf espresso at Dolce, and that is, like, the really revolutionary part of this. You can actually pleasantly have it at night. I went and then had a decaf Americano because I just really like coffee, and I can't drink it past noon, and it makes me very sad. So I highly recommend it. So Dilceza makes my gold star list this week. Highly recommend it for you in the D.C. area. There may be other companies that are serving affogato, particularly decaf alphagato, around the country. So if you're not in DC, Try that out with some pistachio or hazelnut or other gelato. It was really phenomenal. It's like my favorite thing I've ever had. I frankly, the one thing I'd maybe top it off with, I think I want to sprinkle salt on it a little bit, like some flaky sea salt, just to bring the savoriness out a little bit. You do that in coffee. It's amazing. So that's gonna be my next trick. I may have to bring my own from home, but I don't think they'll mind. We'll see. And with that, Dan, what do you have for us this week? Why don't you bring us home with your object lesson?

[Unknown]

So mine is a failed Mother's Day present. So I will show I realize none of listeners can see this, but this is an acupressure mat and as you can see there are numerous discs embedded into it that have sharp spikes on them. And my wife's actually quite rational question was, do you hate me so much? You got me a torturous device for Mother's Day and I thought she might actually enjoy it, but the answer was very strong. No. But it turns out that I actually like it quite a bit. I think I have slightly masochistic tendencies, so that's not terribly surprising. But it is something that seems to relax my muscles a bit and be therapeutic, and it's probably 99.9% psychological rather than physical, but I'm enjoying that and so it's something I'm recommending to others.

[Scott R. Andersen]

I do believe our own Ben Wittes has actually recommended something very similar. Before it was some sort of spiked roller. It looks like something priests used to use on themselves to atone for all our sins in the Middle Ages that he broke out, but a similar principle and a similar product. So you're not alone in this. If nothing else, it helped me stay awake. I would think about it at least. Well folks, that brings us to the end of this week's episode. But remember, Rational Insecurity is of course a production of Lawfare, so be sure to visit us. Visit [e-mail] for our show page, for links to past episodes, for our written work and the written work of other lawfare contributors, and for information on Lawfare's other phenomenal podcast series, including Escalation, hosted by our own Tyler McBrien and Nastya Lapatna, available now in full. In addition, be sure to follow lawfare on social media. Wherever you socialize your media, be sure to leave a rating or review wherever you might be listening and sign up to become a material supporter of Lawfare on Patreon. For an ad free version of this podcast and other special benefits. For more information, visit lawfairmedia.org support our audio engineer and producer this week was Noam Osband of Goat Rodeo, and our music, as always, was performed by Sophia Yan and we are once again edited by the wonderful Jen Patcha. On behalf of my guests Natalie, Dan and Tyler, I am Scott R. Anderson and we will talk to you next week. Until then, goodbye.

[Tyler McBrien]

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