← The Long Game with Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer
The Long Game with Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer
America at 250: A Net Assessment (w/ Robert Kagan)
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- [00:02]
Jake Sullivan
Trying to locate news sources that reliably separate fact from fiction can seem like looking for a needle in a haystack. That's why the Guardian is launching Stateside with Kai Wright and Carter Sherman, a conversation with experts who slow down the news and wrestle with the questions we all have about what's actually happening in the world. Three times a week, hosts Kai and Carter utilize all the reporting resources the Guardian has to discuss the news, international affairs, climate change, culture, sports, lifestyle, fashion and wellness. And the Guardian is not billionaire owned, meaning they're free to report the whole picture without interference. Go to theguardian.com stateside to learn more and listen. Wherever you get your podcasts or watch on YouTube, that's theguardian.com stateside somewhere between the first drive and settling in at the clubhouse, golf becomes more than just a game. Lululemon Golf GE is built for the full range of your day light layers as you head to early tee times, flexible fits move naturally with your swing, Our fabrics wick sweat and block UVs for hours in the sun, and refined cuts carry you well into the 19th hole. Shop golf gear in stores and online@lululemon.com
- [01:23]
Robert Kagan
I think that we are heading moving into it. We're moving into a genuinely multipolar world that looks a lot more like the 19th century than anything, or maybe even the early part of the 20th century, anything we've seen before. And that's a world in which every nation is basically for itself, because nations can no longer rely on the United States to protect them. I know people look at the world and they say, well, there's the United States and there's China and then there's Russia and there's India. I believe in the world we're heading into, it's going to be a much more diffuse world where medium powers become bigger. Iran is about to become a much bigger power in the world, and I think Germany and Japan are going to go in that route too.
- [02:06]
John Finer
Hey everybody, welcome to a special live audience episode of the Long Game podcast where every week we dig into the deeper context and drivers behind the headlines in global affairs. This week it's our pleasure to be coming to you from the Aspen Ideas Festival in Aspen, Colorado. I'm John Finer.
- [02:25]
Jake Sullivan
Jake and I'm Jake Sullivan. And we're excited to be here at the Aspen Ideas Festival for this episode of the Long Game. We've got a great crowd with us and we are thrilled to be joined by an incredible guest, the historian and writer Robert Kagan. Few writers have done more well you can please clap. Yeah. Bob, your fan club is here.
- [02:46]
Robert Kagan
Where am I?
- [02:47]
John Finer
Yeah.
- [02:48]
Jake Sullivan
Can't hold him back. Few writers have done more to shape debates about America's role in the world than Bob Kagan. For four decades, he's argued that peace, prosperity, and democratic progress rest on a foundation that many Americans have taken for granted. American power. At a time when that power and the international order it helped build are under increasing pressure, Bob has become one of the sharpest, most thought provoking interpreters of the current moment. A little bit of background about Bob. He earned a doctorate in American history from American University. He began his career in the Reagan administration, serving as a speechwriter and foreign policy advisor to Secretary of State George Shultz. One thing the three of us share in common is that we all worked in the State Department's policy planning shop. Bob left government in 1988 and never looked back. Unlike John and me, who'd been gluttons for punishment over the years, he's written too many influential books for me to list them all. But I can tell you, I still remember President Obama carrying around his 2010 book, the World America Made. In a recent series of essays that he wrote for the Atlantic, including January's America against the World, he's argued that the international order the United States helped create after World War II is rapidly unraveling and America is squandering its competitive edge. Bob has another very important distinction. He's the husband of one of John and my treasured colleagues, Tori and Nuland. Tori is a legendary diplomat who served most recently as Under Secretary of State. We're both excited to have her listen to the podcast and nervous about her listening to the podcast because she's certainly going to give us her unvarnished feedback.
- [04:26]
John Finer
And like Toria, Bob tells it like it is. He certainly hasn't spared the administrations that Jake and I have worked in, the Biden administration, the Obama administration, from sharp criticism. But it's always grounded in logic and in principle and never in cheap shots. And so, as the US approaches its 250th birthday next week, Jake and I wanted to take a step back and examine the bigger picture. Bob offers a perspective that draws on our country's past to interpret our present and. And our future. So he's the ideal guest for the long game at any time, but especially in this moment. So, Bob Kagan, welcome to the long game.
- [05:02]
Robert Kagan
Well, thank you so much. And I can't do anything after all
- [05:04]
Jake Sullivan
that, but we had more. I cut some down.
- [05:07]
Robert Kagan
Pleasure. Pleasure to be here. Be in front of all of you.
- [05:10]
John Finer
Thank you. So, Bob, on the podcast, we sometimes use a concept drawn from governments and really pioneered by the US Military, of a net assessment, which is essentially an evaluation of relative capacity across a number of key metrics. And we want to start by going through where America stands at nearly 250 years old, across the key areas of national strength and health, starting with our power and influence in the world. But we will also get, of course, to the home front, which you've written about quite a lot. When you look around the world, on one level, you could make the argument that the basic metrics of American power look very good compared to everybody else. Our military is still stronger than anyone's. Our economy, too. We remain the most innovative country on Earth with the deepest capital markets. We have better relationships with more countries than our competitors have, et cetera, et cetera. But if we're being honest, this all feels a bit more fragile than that would indicate and than it has in many decades. And you warned back in 2012 in the world America made that reports of American decline were exaggerated and that maintaining our strength and even supremacy was critical to global order. But what about now? Is American power stagnating? Is it in decline? Are we on some other trajectory?
- [06:24]
Robert Kagan
I was getting ready for these kinds of small questions that you were going to ask, and I thought, if you don't mind, if I could just sort of try to set things in a little bit of a broad historical context, because it's very easy to look at what's going on and think this is an unprecedented situation. And in many ways it is. We have an unprecedented person running the country, and the circumstances are always different. History doesn't repeat itself. But I do think you can see patterns in American foreign policy. And we may have thought that those patterns were over. Not just American policy, foreign policy, but also domestic politics. We may have thought those patterns were over, but now here they are sort of repeating themselves again. So just as a way of maybe beginning this conversation, I just wanted to look at American foreign policy over history on two vectors. There's a million ways to think about American foreign policy. These two vectors are not the only ones, but I think they're really critical and they help explain what's happening right now. The first and in my view, most important vector is the struggle over American identity. What is the United States? And that's always been a contested issue since the very founding. There was the Founders vision, which was of a country based on universal principles. They had a chance to create A country that was built for white Anglo Saxon Protestant men, which is what they were, but they deliberately, deliberately chose not to do that and to make it clear that it didn't matter what your religion was, et cetera, et cetera. Those are the principles of Declaration of Independence that we're about to. About to celebrate. But from the very beginning, from the moment of the Declaration, there have been millions of Americans who didn't accept that, didn't accept the principles of Declaration, didn't accept the principle of human equality. Obviously there was a slave holding part of the country that did not, that explicitly rejected the Declaration and instead looked at the United States as a white Christian country. And we've gone through oscillating periods about that. So, you know, the end of the, you had the Civil War, then you had the end of the 19th century and you had a lot of advancement, and then you had a reaction against that and immigration, which always plays into this in the 1920s and 30s. And then as a result of the Depression and World War II, we moved into a totally liberal phase. If you think about liberal as being sort of more aligned with the Declaration versus a blood and soil nationalism, we very much moved into this liberal period. But it turns out it was temporary. So we are now back to a struggle over our identity. I think this administration, whatever the President himself may think about anything, this administration is definitely engaged in the process of turning the United States into a white Christian country, which is what they believe that it was founded in. And this always affects foreign policy. This is the thing that I think we often lose sight of. These internal battles over American identity play themselves out in foreign policy terms. And this has been true from the beginning. Hamilton and Jefferson had a huge argument about whether to be more supportive of France or more supportive of England. That was entirely rooted in what they wanted to build at home. With Jefferson being on the more radical Democratic side and Hamilton being in the more sort of let's set up, let's try to look more like England, except without a king. So this struggle has gone on and on and on and is happening now. And you can see the effects of the periods where we moved into this conservative way. This conservative approach was also the 20s and 30s, the other vector. And one of the things about that reality is that the reason the United States can do this, that it can play out its identity on the world stage when it chooses to, is that it doesn't really require to do anything else. The United States has been essentially secure since the end of the 19th century. And really not facing the prospect of foreign attack. And therefore everything the United States does in foreign policy to some extent has been voluntary, which is why we can go back and forth like this. And this just gets me to the second vector and then I'm going to shut up. The second vector is an oscillation between periods of high intervention and, and periods of retrenchment. And if you look at American foreign policy, beginning let's say in the 1890s, period of high foreign overseas involvement is followed by a period of rejecting that approach, being regretting that approach, and retrenching, which was then followed by another uptick. And it seems to me that oscillation has been pretty the continuous element of America. And we have been in this mode of when we want to retrench, it's because we don't know why we're doing all the things that we got out there to do. We undertake large projects almost always driven by an ideological concept. Even when we succeed, as In World War I, we wind up regretting it and then retrenching. And this seems to be a constant in American foreign policy. So we're right now just to conclude we're in a double cycle. We've moved into a conservative, anti liberal, anti declaration period in our politics, and we've moved into an unhappiness with the extent of our global involvement at the same time. And Donald Trump is sort of presiding over this, but I can't say that he caused it.
- [11:59]
Jake Sullivan
So, Bob, I want to ask you a question about each aspect, each of those cycles in the double cycle. On the first one, I'll put a plug in for your book the Ghost at the Feast, where you write about a lot of these dynamics before World War II and what it meant for the United States then, and frankly, how it echoes to the present. So to get out of that cycle in the 20s and 30s, it took a depression and a world war. Is there a way out of this cycle without a depression and a world war? Can you give us any hope?
- [12:29]
Robert Kagan
I knew you were going to ask me that question. So normally I would say that the oscillation continues. And I think I would have said that had it not been for the domestic political direction and the sort of victory of anti liberalism in 2016. I would say the country was already beginning to head up that oscillating ladder toward greater concern. Usually what happens is as what happened in the 20s and 30s, Americans have decided they washed their hands of the world, and then as a result of the United States washing its hands of the world the world begins to behave in a way that Americans don't like until finally Americans decide, hey, we gotta do something about it. So I think Americans were already moving in that direction, but now it has been completely stymied. Eventually, I believe we will respond to the growing threats in the world, but if the history is any guide, we will respond too late to avoid the sort of catastrophe that. That then allows us to go back to what you're talking about. So it's hard to imagine snapping back short of much worse disasters ahead.
- [13:44]
Jake Sullivan
Okay, that's very encouraging. I know.
- [13:47]
Robert Kagan
Listen, if you're looking for optimism, everybody should go find another place to.
- [13:52]
John Finer
That's the other panel.
- [13:55]
Jake Sullivan
Okay, so let me take you to this oscillation on the retrenchment piece. And in addition to the oscillation on the nature of American identity, you have been an outspoken critic of the war in Iran. In fact, you were one of the first people to come out and basically say, america fought this war and lost. You have recently wrote a remarkable paragraph that I actually want to read for the audience here about America's broader involvement in the Middle East. And this is a quote from your piece. Even the threat of terrorism from the Middle east region was a consequence of American involvement, not the reason for it. Had the United States not been deeply and consistently involved in the Muslim world since the 1940s, Islamic militants would have little interest in attacking an indifferent nation 5,000 miles and two oceans away. Contrary to much mythology, they have hated us not so much because of, quote, who we are, but because of where we are. In Iran's case, the United States was deeply involved in the politics from the 1950s until the 1979 revolution, including as the main supporter of the brutal regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The surest way of avoiding Islamist terrorist attacks would have been to get out. So can I ask you, Bob, as somebody who has been an advocate for getting in, not just getting out, do you now believe actually the United States, if you were to operationalize that, should pull out of the Middle east in a kind of real military way, shut bases, reduce our presence, reduce our engagement in the domestic politics of those countries? Can you convert that into what your actual idea would be for what the US should do in the years ahead?
- [15:29]
Robert Kagan
Yeah. Let me be clear about what I was trying to do in writing that paragraph. The thing that I find surprising about Americans is that we're constantly shocked that others are reacting to us. Pearl harbor is the same thing. We brought on Pearl Harbor. You know, we took the steps that we knew that if we embargoed Japan, it was very likely that they would start a war. We didn't think they were going to hit Pearl harbor, but we thought there was a real chance of war. And the American people, when polled, by the way, four months before Pearl harbor, said, we're okay with a war with Japan now. They thought the Japanese were little people that they didn't have to worry about. But. So I just want us to be conscious as we wield power that it is going to have an effect. And then the question of whether to be in the Middle east or not, to my mind, has to do with what is your overall goal in the world. And when America was solidly behind the American world order, when we were solidly behind supporting our allies in Europe and Asia, when we took it on as a responsibility to maintain the overall security of our allies. But in a general sense of the world, that's what made that region critical to us, the United States by itself. If the United States is in isolation and not involved in the world, it doesn't need that to be the hegemonic power in the Persian Gulf. It was as a consequence of our overall strategy. So if I thought that the world order that we have held onto rested on our ability to open the strait, for instance, I would say, okay, we have to do whatever is necessary. But at the time when we are actively abandoning any thought of supporting the international system we've supported, as we pull troops out of Europe, at a time when Europe is at war with an aggressive Russia, as we increasingly abandon all of our commitments around the world, the one place we're going to go to war is in the Persian Gulf. That's what makes no sense to me. But in general, I think that Americans have to stop being naive. If we're going to exercise power, we're going to get a reaction. And then we have to. Then we have to decide, is the reaction worth it or is it not worth it? But it has to be for something. And that's what I feel like this was for nothing.
- [18:10]
John Finer
So maybe to put a slightly finer point on it, then, given you're an historian, we can go back a little bit in time. Is that meant to suggest. Was this paragraph meant to suggest. Is your answer meant to suggest that we overreached in the Middle east and in the immediate aftermath of 911 in the global war on terror, in the Iraq war? Or is that a separate question from the one you were trying to answer here?
- [18:34]
Robert Kagan
It's obviously not a separate question, but, you know, at the time. And you know, history is such that you can't wind it backwards from everything. You know, we were all in a state about the perils of the world after 9, 11, and I think that therefore we were sort of less tolerant of existing threats that we knew existed. And Iraq was a preexisting threat. And so I think, you know, in the terms that I was talking about, I think it made sense to do that. And I will say for all the failures of the Iraq war, it did actually remove the person in power. It did lead to regime change. There have been six democratic elections in Iraq. Iraq is no longer a threat to its own people or to the region, which it was before. So I could, you know, we can all, you know, argue about these things. But I don't really regret that decision except for the effect that it has had on the American public's attitude towards the world. And that is a separate issue.
- [19:39]
John Finer
Also came at enormous cost in Iraq. And we don't need to dwell on it, but it's worth not letting that pass. You've also been a student of the U. S Israel relationship, which is another major factor that has kept the United States as invested in the Middle east as we have been. You've been quite critical of Israel under Prime Minister Netanyahu, noting as far back as 2016 that the interests of the US and Israel can sharply diverge at times, which may be more self evident now, but was not, I would say, widely acknowledged back then. You've criticized Israel for intervening in a partisan way in American politics for democratic backsliding at home, for cozying up to authoritarians abroad. So two questions about how the US should view Israel given that. First, given the assault on democratic institutions like courts and the fact that there are still now millions of Palestinians living under occupation without basic rights, is Israel a democracy? That's one easy question, simple question. And second, given the increasingly divergent interests you've noted, is Israel under Netanyahu still a US ally?
- [20:53]
Robert Kagan
Israel was founded on something of a contradiction. It was going to be the Jewish state, which meant obviously it had to privilege Jews in the state, but it was also going to be a liberal democratic government. And I think there's always been a question as to whether those two things were ultimately compatible. And I would say long before, certainly within. I mean, I wrote that in 2016 and I think it was obvious before then that Israel was increasingly becoming more of a Jewish state and less of a liberal democracy. And you know, I don't have an opinion about that. It's just it's just a reality. But I don't think that necessarily had any particular bearing on America's relationship with Israel, except that we had to understand what that relationship was about. You know, we have all kinds of allies who we not necessarily share common, all common values with. Not perfectly, and certainly Israel is at least an imperfect democracy. And so. But in terms of. We tended to. Our discussion of Israel became one in which we began to believe that we had a vital interest in supporting Israel. We started supporting Israel out of a sense of moral obligation. That was the reason for American support for Israel ultimately. And I think that was a noble thing to do after World War II and the Holocaust, et cetera. But we never were supporting Israel for strategic reasons. In fact, much of our strategy in the region came to be about defending the interests of Israel because they were an ally and because we felt an obligation to them. I've always felt about Israel roughly the way I feel about Taiwan. You know, that we have an obligation as a defender of a country that we have their responsibility for, but not that, you know, not that it somehow transcends basic understanding of our interests. And I would say clearly, Israel is not, you know, operating in the interests of the United States because that's not what Israel is supposed to do. It's supposed to operate in the interests of Israel. But those interests are definitely, in my view, Israel's vision for the Middle east has never been a vision that the United States should sign up to, because Israel's attitude is basically the Arab Muslim peoples. We don't want them in democracies. We want them ruled by a strong man who can control them. We fear a public opinion among Arabs and Palestinians, and therefore we don't want to give them that opportunity. And I just don't think that is a sustainable position to take over the long run in the Middle East. And it should never have been America's position.
- [23:42]
Jake Sullivan
I'm stand up comedian John Marco Cerese. And I'm actor penis model Russell Daniels.
- [23:47]
Robert Kagan
The downside is our podcast where we bring on guests to talk about how
- [23:52]
Jake Sullivan
miserable their lives are, because, let's face it, things are not getting better.
- [23:56]
Robert Kagan
Every episode, we talk about what's wrong with our lives.
- [23:59]
Jake Sullivan
Our guests lives, the world, but in a fun way. Bottom line is you're going to walk
- [24:04]
Robert Kagan
away feeling better about your life. We've had so many cool guests.
- [24:08]
Jake Sullivan
Caleb Huron, Busy Phillips, Stavros Halkias, Laverne Cox, Hasan Piker.
- [24:14]
Robert Kagan
Alana Glaser.
- [24:15]
Jake Sullivan
I promise you're going to have a good time now on the Vox Media podcast network. This is the downside. So, Bob, you were in answer to an earlier question, talking about President Trump's indications, early movements that he's going to pull forces out of Europe, reduce the overall commitment to the transatlantic alliance to NATO. You've also talked about how Vladimir Putin is waging a shadow war to test just how strong Article 5 is, that he's probing and poking drones in Poland, more recently in Romania, a campaign of sabotage, the potential that he will escalate in the Baltics or somewhere else. Can you talk for a little, for a minute about how you see that threat, how you see Putin perceiving the way that President Trump is approaching the transatlantic relationship, what you most worry about and how Europe should be interpreting this and how they should respond?
- [25:17]
Robert Kagan
Well, look, I think that you have to be living on another planet not to see that Trump's goal is to pull out of Europe. I mean, they say it every day. I don't know why we, you know, the Europeans obviously have such a powerful interest in that not happening that they are as much in denial as they could possibly be for as long as humanly possible. But I don't think they're, I don't really think they're in denial anymore. So I think that it's clear that the United States is pulling away. You know, I believe it was right after the mistaken drone attack that in Romania that Americans, that the United States pulled forces out of Romania, you know, and so the signals are clear. So if you're Putin, it seems to me it's likely that Putin believes that, that he has a once in a millennium opportunity here to take advantage of a moment that he can't be sure is going to last forever, in which the United States is really pulled away from the Europeans and left them to themselves. At the same time, of course, he's doing very poorly in the war. So then what you're basically asking is what's his next move? Yeah, I think I've always been surprised that, and maybe this was your brilliant policies that prevented this from happening. I've always been surprised that he did not attempt much more seriously to cut off supply routes into Ukraine. Those supply routes are vulnerable. They go across borders. You could threaten the people on the other side of the border. Even if the Romanian drone attack was a mistake, it served its purpose, it seems to me. And so I would anticipate that he, on the one hand, he can still wait for Trump to make the next move on Ukraine, which I think is going to happen at some point. Trump is going to cut Ukraine off entirely, including of intelligence sharing at some point, and Putin may want to just wait for that. But I also think that he wants to weaken European support for the Ukrainians and he's got reason to be optimistic. The Polish politics now is. And the dispute, I don't know whether you've followed the dispute that's going. I know you have, but the dispute that's going on between Poland and Ukraine, which has to do with their ugly history, and particularly in this case, Ukraine's ugly history. But it's just what Putin needs at this moment. And the shadow war, which is, you know, increasingly out of the shadows, is definitely designed to intimidate the Europeans at a time when they are losing their great protector. So the question is, how risk averse does he continue to be? He was relatively risk averse, has been relatively risk averse up until now, but he may not feel that that's in his interest, especially if things are going poorly for him. So I worry about Putin's next move very much.
- [28:08]
John Finer
You mentioned the supply lines to Ukraine as a potential target. Are you not also surprised that Putin has not yet tested Article 5 more than he has in a very direct way, given, let's just say at least lukewarm support for Article 5 that sometimes emanates from the current White House?
- [28:27]
Robert Kagan
You know, I just think, I don't know what his plans are. You know, he obviously had a long term plan for invading Ukraine. So we don't know what his long term plan might be for a Kaliningrad, you know, scenario, for instance, all of which is possible, more deployment of, of intercontinental ballistic missiles, more. You know, there's always been, in the past he's used this. I don't know how available it is to him now. The Russian populations in some of the Baltic states sometimes feel that they're being mistreated. And he can always claim that there is something there to, you know, that he needs to defend the Russian people in these various countries. I think the opportunities are there. It's just, I just don't know whether he feels that he wants to avail himself of them or not.
- [29:15]
John Finer
As dangerous as it remains, and this conversation makes that clear. Russia is today, I think you'd agree, a declining power.
- [29:23]
Robert Kagan
At least it's been declining for 500 years, quite some time.
- [29:28]
John Finer
They can't compete directly with the United States in any meaningful sense, though it can obviously cause a lot of problems and is currently doing that. But for net assessment purposes, just to come back to this concept, the real elephant in the Room is, is China. So I'm wondering how you rate the relative power influence of the world's two strongest nations across the most important metrics at this point.
- [29:51]
Robert Kagan
Look, the reason I was generally sanguine about American decline and why I didn't think it was going to happen was because the structure of international relations established after World War II is very hard for a country like China to deal with. The fact that the United States States had ironclad alliances with the strongest nations surrounding China was a huge obstacle. I know that people are talking, and I think it was one of the premises of your, of the Biden administration that China aimed to ultimately rule the world in some way, or at least its ambitions were global. But it was always very hard for me to imagine how they could exercise global power if they were not even able to exercise hegemony in their own region. That, to me, seemed like a prerequisite. The fact that the United States denied both Russia and China a real sphere of influence was always a huge blow to their ultimate aspirations. So it seems to me China must gain control of its region first, and it is a long way from being able to do that. However, now I think that it is a real prospect given American policy. But then, you know, if we start moving into the world that I think we're moving into, it's not going to be a world of just the United States and China. I think that we are heading, moving into a. We're moving into a genuinely multipolar world that looks a lot more like the 1970s century than anything, or maybe even the early part of the 20th century than anything we've seen before. And that's a world in which every nation is basically for itself because nations can no longer rely on the United States to protect them. I don't think a great power like Japan is going to go easy into that good night of regional Chinese hegemony. So the next challenge is going to be a return to the dynamic that existed before World War II. In those days, it was Japan beating up on China. In this period, it might be China beating on Japan, but that dynamic is going to return. And similarly, in Europe, I believe it is just a matter of time before Germany returns to being something like Germany. And I don't mean that in a negative sense. Germany has been many things over the past century, and it can be a liberal great power, but I think it's going to be a great power. I know people look at the world and they say, well, there's the United States and there's China. And then there's Russia and there's India. I believe in the world we're heading into, it's going to be a much more diffuse world where medium powers become bigger. Iran is about to become a much bigger power in the world and I think Germany and Japan are going to go in that route too.
- [32:41]
Jake Sullivan
Bob, a couple of things off of what you just said. First, on this question of whether China could become a the global leader, maybe not hegemon, but surpass the United States as the overall world's leading power if it can't dominate its own region. If your notion of power rests very heavily on military power, that makes a lot of sense. If, however, the exercise of power has shifted to a certain extent to be more about economics and technology than pure military power, then there maybe is a pathway for them, even if we still have allies in Asia. As one of the foremost historians of power, do you think that these other forms of power have become more relevant in 2026 than they were in 1926, or is this still really, at the end of the day, mostly about the hard power of military projection?
- [33:29]
Robert Kagan
I don't want to poo poo what you're saying. I think it was a question. It's a serious question. But I also want to say I've heard this question before. I mean, after the, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of history. The key attribute of the end of history was they were moving into a period of geo economics in a way from a period of geopolitics. I remember reading in the 1990s about the end of the nation state and how power had become meaningless. And I'm afraid the lessons of the past 30 years have tended to contradict that. So is it going to be different now? What you're saying is somewhat different. I understand, and I can't tell you if the nation that wins the AI race therefore becomes the most powerful, dominates
- [34:11]
Jake Sullivan
all the supply chains, Right, where geopolitics is right there in the middle. But the way it's exercised is through rare earths, not necessarily through missiles.
- [34:19]
Robert Kagan
No, that's true, but I guess I do believe that international politics will still be determined by nations seeking to maintain their sovereignty rather than falling under the sway of greater powers. So whether or not China is making gains in that, if Japan is feeling threatened by China, that is going to raise an unavoidable geopolitical problem for China that it will have to deal with. And if Europe rearms, it's going to have an effect on what Russia does. And so I would be very wary of saying we've moved away from sort of raw military power. I would say, if anything, recent years have demonstrated that raw military power, including something we thought was completely off the books, which was territorial gain. Right. Everybody assumed those days were over because what do you need to have territory for? Because it's all about AI and economics. And yet China's still obsessed with what flag is flying over Taipei. I mean, that makes no sense in the world you're talking about.
- [35:33]
John Finer
We talk about territorial acquisition in America too.
- [35:36]
Robert Kagan
And we talk about territorial acquisition in America. So, yeah, that's why I say, for all of everything you're saying being true, the world still looks like it's behaving much like a 19th century world.
- [35:46]
Jake Sullivan
So one other thing I wanted to pick up on what you said was that it won't be bipolar in whatever sense, it will be multipolar, truly multipolar. I have been one more in the camp of show me the other Poles beyond the US and China. But I think there really is something to what you're saying. The thing that most struck me though about your comment was you focused in on Germany, not the European Union. Now I can understand why. But do you see Germany really exercising its power in the world more as a nation state than as a member state of the European Union?
- [36:19]
Robert Kagan
Look, now we're into the my desire side. My desire is that Germany do this entirely within the eu and as much as possible, that Germany rearm in a way that reassures the other countries of Europe rather than unnerving them. But let's face it, even when the world order was healthy, but Germany was getting too economically dominant for a lot of Europeans, there's a lot of tension in Europe about Germany. I lived in Europe for six years. I was stunned at a degree, don't just scratch very deep to find some old feelings. And you're going to see it between Germany and Poland and whatever. And after all, Germany has the capacity for nationalism and we're seeing that obviously in the strength of the AfD. So while my basic, my obvious preference would be that it do so within the sort of liberal context and somewhat constrained by the eu. And that's always what Germany has wanted was to be constrained. But when countries get serious about the threats they're facing and the EU was born in the American paradise, there would have been no EU if the United States had not solved Europe's security problem by basically keeping Germany and France off each other and allowing Germany to prosper in a way that was not threatening. Now we're going to experiment with going back to the way it used to be, where there is no deus ex machina and Europeans have to deal with it themselves. And Germany once again has to deal with the problem that, as it proved earlier, it's too big for the continent. It will require great statesmanship on the part of Germany to avoid doing it itself. But if you had to, if you made me put my money down and polymarket, I would say it's more likely that Germany will do it leading on its own, preferably with others, than doing it within the context of the eu. And you're seeing that already with weapons decisions that they're making. You know, I think Mertz has been very clear about saying whatever else is going on, we're going to take care of German capabilities because, and I think he even said this, we're the ones who will be called on if something happens in the balts. You know, I think, I think what he means is like not the French and so.
- [38:42]
John Finer
And he may mean not the Americans too, at this point.
- [38:44]
Robert Kagan
No, no, definitely not the Americans. That's the whole point. I mean, Germany is not rearming to make Trump happy. They're rearming because they face a very serious threat to their east and they know the United States is not going to be there for them.
- [38:56]
Jake Sullivan
Bob, do you bet on polymarket?
- [38:57]
Robert Kagan
No, I hate polymarket.
- [38:59]
John Finer
Okay.
- [39:00]
Robert Kagan
But I know people say that all the time, so I decided to say it.
- [39:03]
John Finer
Now we have to put one of those gambling addiction disclaimers video. So if anybody has a problem, we get the 800 number around. So there's a wise aphorism about not making predictions, the folly of doing that, especially about the future. But I'm going to ask you two sort of future oriented, I guess, applications of some of the theories you've been putting on the table. And the first is about China. So we have a president who seems a lot more interested in stability, even collegiality, congeniality with China than he does in competition with China. You've written there are few people who don't think that if Trump could get a trade deal with China that he liked, that he would not be willing to sell out a lot of things, including potentially Taiwan, which you mentioned earlier in this conversation. How concerned are you about PRC military action against Taiwan? Let's just say over the next few years. And is this a vital interest of the United States that we should be willing to defend with force?
- [40:00]
Robert Kagan
By the way, I wrote that before, I think, the debate summit and then. And before Trump on the air flight
- [40:07]
John Finer
back, did they really called this into question?
- [40:09]
Robert Kagan
Totally made it clear that the $14 billion aid package was up for grabs as far as the. And the Chinese have been taking advantage of that ever since because he's the. It's the art of the deal. He's a brilliant negotiator. So I think if you're Xi, it's always been their preference and their expectation that Taiwan would fall naturally under their sway. And I'm sure that, especially given what's. I don't want to say I'm not sure, but I feel generally confident that because of what happened to Russia in Ukraine, if she thinks that because the United States is gradually abandoning Taiwan anyway, that the Taiwanese are ultimately going to have no choice but basically to enter the relationship on China's terms. And, you know, he's obviously playing the KMT card in that regard, that he would prefer to do it that way. Having said that, I also think his calculation has got to be similar to Putin's in the sense that, that he can't know that the United States isn't going to turn around in four years and become the United States again in a way that he does, that he's not going to like, and that maybe he has a window of opportunity. And after all, even before any of this happened, I think there was all this kind of he wants to get it done by 2027. I don't know whether that was ever how serious that ever was, but it certainly is something to consider. And now, given the Trump phenomenon, I would think that he might be even more willing to do it. And in some ways I do think he's going to be more aggressive. And they're already doing. I mean, it's hard to say when they're being more aggressive in the South China Sea than not, because they're always being somewhat aggressive, but I think they're being more aggressive right now. And the thing that he can be sure about is that Trump is not going to play hardball with him on all those little details because Trump really just wants. Does really want just to deal with him. So she has a choice. I guess I would say, on balance, he'll probably would rather see Taiwan fall naturally as a result of American neglect.
- [42:16]
John Finer
And on the vital interest question, again,
- [42:20]
Robert Kagan
it's only a vital interest if we think we have a vital role in global security. I mean, I guess you could say that the chips are a vital, the chip manufacturing is a vital interest, but that's like saying oil is a vital interest. I mean, sure, Anything that you need is a vital interest in theory. But I would say all of our perceptions of what the truth is. Taiwan was never a vital interest of the United States. It was in a necessary interest if we were trying to maintain this global order. But if we're not trying to maintain the global order. Put it this way, would Warren Harding have thought Taiwan was a vital interest of the United States?
- [42:57]
John Finer
I don't know. Enough.
- [42:58]
Jake Sullivan
Not a question I'd consider Warren Harding.
- [43:00]
Robert Kagan
Not a question you've given any thought to?
- [43:01]
John Finer
The president asked. That would say, we'll get back to you. We're going to look into it. We've talked about a number of countries under threat in this conversation. Japan, Germany, Poland. These are all countries that are not nuclear weapons states that are under threat potentially from nuclear weapon states. Do you expect that there will be nuclear proliferation? Leave aside the adversary side of this, which we're trying to deal with very clumsily in Iran, but even among our friends and partners in the years ahead.
- [43:50]
Robert Kagan
Absolutely. I mean, again, you have to look at this from the position of countries. Every nation's number one priority is protecting its own security. For decades, the United States has been protecting these nations security. Now the United States is not a reliable protector. They have to make the decisions necessary to defend their own countries. And I think that the nuclear. We are also entering a period in which nuclear diplomacy, shall we say, is going to be a much bigger factor. And having a nuclear weapon or weapons is going to be regarded as an essential prerequisite to playing in a game where everybody has to defend themselves because they can't rely on anybody else to defend them. So I think we are going to be living in a world of many more nuclear weapons. I know John Mearsheimer thinks that's a wonderful thing, but I think it probably greatly increases the likelihood that they will be used at some point.
- [44:48]
Jake Sullivan
That was the positive part of the program. Okay, good. We've moved. We've moved. Bob, in one of your earlier answers to John, you used a turn of phrase that I thought was really interesting. You said Xi Jinping in part of his calculus around Taiwan has to be will America become America again in four years? Or something along those lines? Let's imagine it does. Let's say you get a president after Trump who wants to reinvest in alliances as a core pillar of American strength, who wants to reengage in international cooperation. Of course the rest of the world is going to sort of say, can we count on that? Because we just saw what happened. So what advice would you give a president who actually wanted to reinvest in alliances after what we've seen for how to do that effectively. And what advice would you give to allies about how they should engage a United States on the back end of the Trump administration?
- [45:35]
Robert Kagan
Yeah, it's the same advice to both in a way, which is we can't go back to the way things were. We're not going to go back to a world in which everybody relies on the United States states for their basic security. So what we're going to need now is to learn how to manage a multipolar world where like minded states can work together and cooperate. And the United States in that situation would still be the strongest of those nations. And if we were well behaved, I think we might be able to work it out so that there is some element of sort of at least trust and cooperation. But I could not advise the Europeans to throw in their lot with the United States again. And simply because I'm not even that optimistic that even if we get, let's say we get our Democratic president of a choice and I'm going to be voting with both hands for Democrats in every election for the foreseeable future, you may have a different view of this than I do. This is not Dean Acheson's Democratic Party. This is not the party that says, oh my gosh, look at the state of the world. America needs to lead again, we need to be out there. I mean, it's very, it's, it's been very divisive in this country for a long time. The Democratic Party has been at least as dubious overall about America's role in the world as the current Republican Party is. In fact, the Republican Party used to be more wedded to the world order than the Democratic Party was in some ways. So that's one problem I don't think we're going to. We're not electing Harry Truman in 2028, assuming we can. And similarly, a lot of things that Trump has done are gonna be hard to reverse the tariffs alone. There's gonna be an income stream that if you cut off that income stream, you've gotta find some other way to get the money. And by the way, again, with all due respect, the Democrats are not exactly averse to some protectionism themselves. And then of course, maga's not going away. And certainly the sentiments about foreign policy that MAGA has represented are different. Definitely not going away. And so that's why I feel like for a real revolution to occur, things are going to have to get a lot worse. But that doesn't mean I don't welcome a change in 28. But I don't think we should even try to go back to the world that was created in unique circumstances after World War II and look instead for a much more cooperative, equal relationship with our partners going forward.
- [48:00]
Jake Sullivan
By the way, even when we inherited much more limited tariffs on China in the Biden administration, it was extremely difficult to change them because so much reliance and vested interests get built up around them. And like you said, you also get revenue, but you also have companies coming in and saying, I now count on these tariffs to keep my jobs in America. So I think this question of what happens to the Trump tariff wall in the future is a very real and live question.
- [48:27]
John Finer
You've been one of the most prescient and persuasive voices sounding the alarm about the health of American democracy. I do want to end on things here at home. You're also an historian, and across the broad swath of 250 years, I guess we're interested in how you rate our current democratic health and maybe more parochially, why you think there aren't more people as outraged as you are and maybe as we are about the current condition of our democracy.
- [48:57]
Robert Kagan
Well, I mean, that's a question I've been asking myself from the beginning, and I don't. And I still, I can come up with. There's a multitude of reasons that you can explain. One of the things I've been struck by is how much a person's reaction to what's going on gets into the almost very personal qualities that people or life experiences, because people who look exactly the same have wound up on completely different sides of this. So I find it's very baffling. But what I don't find baffling is the fundamental movement that we're seeing play out. And it's really wrong to think of this as the failure of our democracy. This is an ongoing, as I mentioned at the outset, that's why, because I tied all this together for you guys, that the struggle of American identity has been ongoing. We've just, just come out of a period in which there was a fundamentally liberal consensus. That consensus is broken down. And what we're seeing are people who are base is a movement that is basically fighting against, I think, what most of us regards as the gains of the civil rights movement over previous decades, because, you know, it has led to a breakdown of privileges for people who are used. And by the way, this doesn't mean economic privileges, because many of the people who feel this way are not economically advantaged at all. But one thing that's been clear to me is that the Trump movement is much more motivated by these, what we call cultural issues, but I'm sorry, which are really racial, religious issues than they are about economic issues. Trump is doing nothing for these people, but what he's doing for them is hating the right enemies. And the enemies he hates are mostly people who of color. And that's what this immigration thing is all about. It isn't about illegal immigration. It's about changing the complexion of this country and trying to turn it back. And as it happens, this is all married up to an individual who is a true megalomaniac. I don't know what a narcissistic personality is, and I don't care. But I do know someone who is trying to maximize his personal power at all times and is riding this attack on our system because it is giving him power. And so, you know, so on the one hand, I see the roots of the historical roots of this are clear. There have been many periods in American history when fundamentally, as I say, anti liberal forces have been in the ascendant. They definitely were ascended in the 1920s and early 30s when the eugenics movement was the most popular thing in America. And so I just think a lot of us thought it was over and that we'd gone past all that, and it turns out that we never really did. So that's the threat. The threat is, it's interesting that we're even gonna have this big celebration about the Declaration of Independence, because Lincoln made the Declaration the founding document. Most Americans have not regarded the Declaration as the founding document. And certainly people who share the views of people in this administration, people like Russell Vaught and others and their sort of intellectual guides do not believe in the Declaration of Independence and are trying to overturn a system that is based on it. I know that's worth cheering.
- [52:23]
Jake Sullivan
So I just want to say you've given us a lot to sit with in that diagnosis. But, you know, listening to it, one way of interpreting that is to say this is about a person as much as it's about structural forces. So how do you kind of net that out?
- [52:40]
Robert Kagan
You mean it's about Trump as opposed to.
- [52:42]
Jake Sullivan
Yeah, yeah. You kind of describe both. But, like, if you had to sort of tell us the extent to which you see this as a kind of once in a blue moon force, this guy. As opposed to it really being a true underlying structural force that's pushing against the Declaration and the kind of core precepts of the American republic.
- [53:06]
Robert Kagan
I mean, that structural force is there and was there to be captured. And he set out to capture it, just to be clear. And he ran on one issue, and that was, Obama is not a real American. Our first black president is not a real American. And he knew exactly what he was doing. That's not. I don't think that qualifies as a dog whistle. Okay, so everybody then knew, and that's how he collected his movement. So in some respect, it's not an accident. You know, he didn't just step into this, but to have a person of Trump's personality that is once in a blue moon. And I think that with absent someone who is as megalomaniacal as Trump is and therefore willing to break everything thing, that movement, the movement that he represents now, is a spent movement. One of the reasons they're doing this right now in such desperation is, of course, they're losing. There is no white majority left in America. There's no white Protestant majority left in America. They're trying to cling to an America that no longer exists. They wouldn't have an opportunity to do that if they didn't have Donald Trump in the White House. I don't even think, you know, if it were Ted Cruz, if it were almost anybody else, it's hard to imagine that we would be at much risk. So it's both. But I don't. But we should not lose sight. And I want to be very clear about this, about the ugliness at the core of us. Okay. We can blame Donald Trump all we want, but this is also us, and we need to face up to it and address it.
- [54:30]
John Finer
Thank you. All right, we'll end on this. And because we need it. What gives you hope?
- [54:37]
Robert Kagan
Hope. You know, I, I. Sports, apparently.
- [54:45]
Jake Sullivan
Are you a Knicks fan?
- [54:46]
Robert Kagan
Pardon?
- [54:47]
Jake Sullivan
Are you a Knicks fan?
- [54:47]
Robert Kagan
I am a Knicks fan. And, and I. From way back. Folks, I just want to say. And, and, and, and it was. And, and it's been two things over the last couple of months that have really struck me. And one was watching New York celebrate, and I thought, my God, thank you. That is the America that I love right there. You look at any picture of cheering New Yorkers, and there weren't three people in a row who have the same skin color. You know, it is the ultimate, you know, melting. It was the ultimate melting pot. And then the other thing is the way Americans have greeted the World Cup.
- [55:27]
Jake Sullivan
Yeah.
- [55:28]
Robert Kagan
Americans go through periods where, where we really hate the rest of the world. In the 1920s really hated it. We just hated everybody. And you could think, looking at the way we're behaving now, that xenophobia was a big part of what we are. And it is. And yet here we are. And you hear these great stories about people in Lawrence, Kansas, who are falling in love with the Algerian don't sell them. They're Muslims. They're falling in love with the Algerian team. And it's sort of like, yes, thank you. This is the America that we love. And so is it possible that this America can ultimately triumph? And by the way, you're not asking me this and the time is out, but I am going to say this is the last thing because it is sort of related to hope. The challenge is going to be the 2026 elections, folks. I have absolute confidence that the Trump administration, if the Democrats look like they're going to win, which I'm sure they will, is going to try to stop that. And that is going to be the moment that when we need that America to come out and defend its principles.
- [56:28]
Jake Sullivan
Bob Kagan, all right.
- [56:31]
John Finer
We will defer to the flashing red light and thank Bob for his time and thank you all for being with us.
- [56:37]
Jake Sullivan
Please give it up for Bob Kagan. Thank you, Bob, for joining us on the Long Group.
- [56:44]
John Finer
Well, that's all for today. Thanks for listening to our live recording with Robert Kagan at the Aspen Ideas Festival. We'll be back next week with a new episode of the Long Game.
- [56:53]
Jake Sullivan
Subscribe to our YouTube channel and follow the audio feed so you never miss an episode.
- [56:58]
John Finer
For additional content, episode transcripts and exclusive podcast segments, subscribe to the Long Game on Substack or join the Long Game plus on Apple Podcasts.
- [57:08]
Jake Sullivan
This week we wrap up our conversation with Bob Kagan with a lightning round where Kagan offers some quick takes on everything from presidents in power to books, baseball, and a few questions he definitely didn't see coming.
- [57:21]
Robert Kagan
I think Wilson's gotten a very raw deal. It's ridiculous to say that Franklin Roosevelt is underrated, but the way he managed American opinion on the foreign policy question and gradually shifted the country out of its isolationist mood into deciding that something needed to be done that is one of the great acts of presidential leadership.
- [57:46]
John Finer
Be on the Lookout, head to thelongame.substack.com or subscribe to the Long Game plus on Apple Podcasts. The links are in the show notes. That's it for this episode of the Long Game.
- [58:02]
Jake Sullivan
If you like the show, please follow, share with friends and leave a review. It really helps listeners find us. The Long Game is a Vox Media
- [58:10]
John Finer
Podcast Network production Executive producer Tamara Sepper
- [58:14]
Jake Sullivan
lead editorial producer Jennifer Indig deputy editor Celine Rohr senior producer Matthew Billy video
- [58:21]
John Finer
producers Nat Wiener and Adam Harris supervising producer, Jake Kaplan associate producer Claudia Hernandez
- [58:28]
Jake Sullivan
marketing manager Leanna Greenway Music is by Nat Weiner.
- [58:33]
John Finer
We're your hosts, John Finer and Jake Sullivan.
- [58:36]
Robert Kagan
Thanks for listening.