← The Long Game with Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer
The Long Game with Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer
America Doesn’t Understand Iran And It Shows (with Danny Citrinowicz)
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Narrator/Transition Voice
Today
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Danny Sintrinowitz
we killed the guy, Ali Khamenei, fierce enemy of the state of Israel, of the of the US but he's the guy that's actually preventing the Iranian system from acquiring a nuclear bomb. People may think that he pushed this system, but after 2003 actually prevent that because he was afraid to quote the threshold. So the overall assessment, I would say that operationally we're doing very good. Strategically, we're not getting close to our target. And even more than that, if this war will end today and the 40 kilos with Iran, then we have a mountain to climb to prevent the Iranians to think or to rush into a nuclear bomb. Assuming that this is what Mujtaba will want to do.
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Jake Sullivan
Welcome back to the long game. I'm Jake Sullivan.
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John Finer
And I'm John Finer. So every now and then on the Internet, an expert meets his or her moment and the Iran war has been no exception. But we were lucky to be joined last week by Kareem Sajapour, who had studied Iran for his entire career and shared keen insights into what is happening inside Iran and how its leaders and people might be experiencing this conflict. This Week we have another such expert, Danny Sintrinowitz, who who has provided perhaps the sharpest analysis anywhere of how the government of Israel, the US And Iran are conducting this war. We were aware of Danny's work and have crossed paths with him in our previous lives. But it was through reading and often finding ourselves nodding along to his meticulously crafted posts on X over recent weeks that we came to view him as one of this conflict's indispensable guides. To understate it, Danny knows what he's talking about. He spent 25 years working for the IDF Intelligence Unit and was its top analyst on Iran from 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, until roughly the end of the Obama administration in 2016. This makes him an expert on at least two of the protagonists in this war. And his writing has revealed that he does pretty damn well at understanding perhaps the most confounding actor, the Trump administration. So we are grateful for his willingness to join us. Danny, welcome to the long game.
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Danny Sintrinowitz
Thank you for having me.
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Jake Sullivan
Danny, really appreciate you joining us. Where are you coming to us from today?
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Danny Sintrinowitz
I'm in Rokhovot, 40 minutes away from Tel Aviv, a place that in the last was very attractive to the Iranian missiles, unfortunately. But now I hope that everything will stay quiet, but I hope that we won't be another target of the Iranian missiles.
- [03:54]
Jake Sullivan
Well, we will hope that you stay safe, your loved ones stay safe, and we'll send our thoughts to you for that. As you know very well from your time in, in the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence unit as the top Iran guy, and having seen conflicts over time with Iranian proxies, the beginning of every wartime policy meeting with the senior leadership either in Israel or in the United States, you get a situation report, a sit rep from the intel community to set the table for the discussion. You've been in those rooms, you've given those briefings. So if you were in the room right now with the senior leaders either of Israel or the United States, and they turned to you for an update, what key points would you make about where this war stands at this point, almost two weeks in, I think that
- [04:43]
Danny Sintrinowitz
definitely on the operational side, Israel and the US have an amazing achievement. I think that the combination of the IDF and CENTCOM and they know what they're doing about Iran, I think the combination of that really hammering Iran in a way that the Iranians are observing a lot of damages, especially on the strategic sides, especially on the missiles and everything related to the, the foundation of the regime itself, the adjacent the Basij, but and this is a big. But if that. If this is the target of this campaign, I think that we are achieving almost 100% of it. But if the target is a regime change, we are not close to that. I think that the regime assumes that the worst is behind it. In their mind, actually, they have some sort of leverage, given what they're doing in the last two weeks, especially making sure that everybody will suffer from the war. Another part that I think is more alarming is the fact that if this war was to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb, I think there are two main problems in that regard. One is the 440 kilos for 60%. I think it will be very hard to find a way to take it out from Ispahan. And the other thing is the fact that actually in the beginning of the campaign, we killed the guy, Ali Khamenei, first enemy of the state of Israel, of the U.S. but he's the guy that's actually preventing the Iranian system from acquiring a nuclear bomb. People may think that he pushed this system, but after 2003, actually prevent that because he was afraid to cross the threshold. So the overall assessment, I would say that operationally we're doing very good. Strategically, we're not getting close to our target. And even more than that, if this war will end today and the 40 kilos with Iran, then we have a mountain to climb to prevent the Iranians to think or to rush into a nuclear bomb, assuming that this is what Mujtaba will want to do.
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John Finer
So, Danny, we're going to dig into a lot of that over the course of the next 45 minutes or so. But just to sharpen maybe your last point. If the war ended today, as you said, do you believe this will have left Iran more or less likely to pursue and ultimately perhaps acquire a nuclear weapon in the medium term?
- [06:53]
Danny Sintrinowitz
Unfortunately, more. And I'll try just to explain that. First, you have Mujtoba, that actually is a puppet of the ahgc. He was controlled by the Odyssey. He was pushed by the Odyssey. And I think he was elected only because his father was eliminated by Israel. Iran is not a monarchy. He had many people against him, but, you know, when his father died like that, then they have to, like, show some continuity in that regard. The other thing is the fact that you have to remember that when was the last time that Iran wanted to reach a bomb? It was just after the Iran Iraqi war, when Khamenei, the new leader, like Mushtaqa now, thought that he's looking for the ultimate card Because Iran, like today, actually the deterrence was shattered because of the fact they built all the missiles on the proxies, everything related to the threshold state that they had. But the problem is that it didn't work. Now they will have to think of something else. They cannot be in a situation that every eight, nine months Israel or the US will attack them. This is why they will need the ultimate card. And I suspect without Ali Khamenei and without the fatwa, when they have to have the ultimate card and they have the professional knowledge for that, nobody can elapse the knowledge that they have on the nuclear, then I think there is a good chance that at least they will have the discussion of reaching a bomb. So unfortunately, I think that the war that was prevented or meant to prevent from reaching a bomb eventually might push them beyond the Rubicon. And to have that bomb.
- [08:19]
John Finer
Just for our listeners background, you're referring to a fatwa issued by the late Supreme Leader some time ago that basically declared Iran would not pursue a nuclear weapon.
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Danny Sintrinowitz
Exactly.
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Jake Sullivan
And also for context, Danny is referring to 440kg of highly enriched uranium, uranium enriched to 60%, which if further enriched just fairly marginally would go to weapons grade, which is 90% enriched uranium. Iran has this stockpile. It is sitting right now underneath Isfahan, which is one of the nuclear facilities that the US and Israel bombed in the 12 day war last year. But they destroyed everything above ground. They could not get to the tunnels underneath. And that is where that stockpile sits.
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John Finer
At least we think.
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Jake Sullivan
At least we think. At least we think. And that's what Iran would use with the centrifuges. It still has, and as Danny said, the scientific know how it still has to try to race to a bomb if it were to choose to do so. Danny, I'm struck by that assessment, which is sobering operational and tactical achievements, but strategically perhaps in an even more difficult position than before. So as the US And Israel look at it today, as Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump look at the situation today, do you believe that their objectives and their strategies are diverging at this point and if so, in what ways?
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Danny Sintrinowitz
Definitely. Operationally, everything I think was ready before in a very good way. Strategically, I don't think we had the same thing. What we had is Netanyahu telling President Trump we know what Khamenei is going to be on Saturday and we can kill them. And they decide to do so. Nobody actually ever thought or think about the implication of that. This is, I think, a major flaw in the preparation. But even More than that, there was a misconception about the Iranian regime. Yes, they are weak, probably in the weakest point since 1979, but still they're strong, they're resilient. We're talking about the country of 100 million people size, almost the size of Western Europe. So thinking that from bombing from the air, you'll change the regime. This was something that I think really inconceivable. Now we're turning back to the relations between the US And Israel. For Israel, we'll continue this war until President Trump will tell us to stop. For us, the most important thing for Netanyahu is preventing Iran from being a strategic threat to the State of Israel. So if we need to hammer the missiles and the nuclear or the fuel depots near Tehran, we will do that. Because for us, it doesn't matter. It's going to be chaos, civil war or whatever, as long as it won't pose a threat to the State of Israel. From the US Standpoint, and especially the Gulf states, the issue is also the day after, what will happen then. They don't want to see a failed state. They want to see a situation where you have refugees on the Gulf states borders. So I think that we differentiate and this is why we saw everything happen when Israel attacked the fuel depots and Tehran near Tehran. The US doesn't want to see an infrastructure being destroyed by Israel, and Israel couldn't care less about that. The bottom line of things, that Israel will continue this war as long as President Trump will allow it to continue.
- [11:35]
Jake Sullivan
Can I just put a fine point on this? You just said that, and I've heard you say this before, and it was very striking to me that the Prime Minister and the Israeli government kind of couldn't care less if there were chaos or a failed state in Iran. Obviously, from the US Perspective and of course from the neighbor's perspective, that poses a huge series of challenges. Can you describe a little more the Israeli calculus on that? That a totally failed state in Iran, a coup, a civil war, basically any form of chaos is just fine. From their perspective, is that mainly because that just leaves an adversary weakened and distracted and they don't have to suffer the consequences, or is there something more going on?
- [12:17]
Danny Sintrinowitz
I think it's going back to the 12 Day War. I think at the end of the war, Netanyahu said the problem has solved. Yes, we suffered, but existential threat, we're able to move it now. What we discovered or what Netanyahu discovered, that this regime is not going anywhere. And on top of that, he has the capacity, unfortunately, like we'll have now, if the war will end today, he will have the capacity to rebuild the new missiles capabilities. So Netanyahu understood that the problem is not with the missiles and not with the nuclear. The problem is in the regime. Because as long as this regime is there, we'll have to mow the loan again and again and again. Now he had an amazing opportunity. President Trump, for the first time, a US President that was willing to attack Iran, not only like some sort of a minor attack, go the whole way. So he thought that this would be the best way to use that in order to make sure that we'll hammer the regime so the regime will be occupied with chaos, with civil war, whatever. He won't have the time, the opportunity, the resources to rebuild its capacity and threat Israel. So I think everything goes back to there. Yes, Israel hoping for a western Iranian country that will interact with Israel. Yeah, we're hoping, but we are not doing that in order to fulfill this goal. We are doing that to make sure they won't pose a threat to us. If it's chaos, civil war, a Western regime. Excellent. But this is where we are right now.
- [13:49]
John Finer
Danny, maybe just turning back to the Iranian side for a second. Obviously, it is not lost on them that their two adversaries in this conflict may be on different pages when it comes to objectives. You have President Trump saying in recent days that the war is very complete and will be over soon. Maybe not this week. You have Prime Minister Netanyahu tweeting, as I think you were referencing, that the worst is still to come for the Iranian regime and the people should rise up and overthrow their government. In a kind of a long statement yesterday, what does that divergence do to Iranian strategy and Iranian tactics in this war? And then, you know, you said that if, if the President of the United States calls up the Prime Minister of Israel, the war will be over, Israel will stop. But what about the Iranian side? They get a vote in whether this ends? Will they stop fighting if the bombs stop falling on them?
- [14:41]
Danny Sintrinowitz
We have to remember that Iran was prepared for this war. They knew after the end of the 12 day war that sometime in the near future they will encounter, they thought only Israel, but didn't know what will happen. This is why they were prepared for that. So when Khamenei was decapitated, when we attack the missile depots, whatever, they already were prepared. Yes. It was a shocking event for them to lose in Khamenei. So the thing is that they lost a very dominant leader but also lost the way that actually decision making happen in Iran until Khamenei's death. But they managed to overcome it in a way that they had a preplan to make sure that everybody will suffer the consequences of the war. This is why in the beginning we knew they're going to attack the Gulf states, Hormuz, Straits. We said that from the get go it was obvious. This is something extremely important to remember because what we're seeing now, it's not madness coming from the Iranians, it's a preplanned objective that they had understanding that they are the weaker side. And there for them winning is by not losing. They have four people that are controlling Laudani, Ali Baf. I can mention all the, of course of the positions, the commander of the irgc, Vahdi and the commander of Khatim Albiya. They're doing the utmost to make sure that they will have enough ability towards the near future to attack Israel and the Gulf states. They will close their move Straits if someone will go there, they will attack it. And the end of the day they're hoping that the pressure that will accumulate from that actually will lead to the end of the war. I think that for them, they understood they don't end this war. That goes without saying they need to stop, but they understand that they have to change the conditions. Meaning that they cannot fight Israel or the US every eight or nine a month. So if they will assume that even if Trump will say I'm stopping, they will assume that continuing, for example, launching missiles on Israel or allowing Hezbollah and the Houthis to continue the war, regardless of what Iran is going to do, they will do that. But I think what we have to assume that even if President Trump will decide to call it off unilaterally, the Iranians will continue whether it's going to be something using the missiles, whether through the proxies, they want to create the strategic surroundings that will prevent us and Israel to attack them again. This is what they're trying to do. So I think that we have to assume that things will be very tense even after US will end this war.
- [17:05]
Jake Sullivan
So if you're President Trump and your team is telling you, hey, even if you decide to stop, say next week and declare victory, the Iranians are gonna keep finding ways to strike, whether it's directly against the Gulf states or through their proxies against Israel, the Gulf states, the US And President Trump says, fine, I'll keep going until they agree to stop. Is there a world in which through some kind of Indirect diplomacy. There's a kind of mutual stand down where the Americans say we're done, the Israelis follow along and the Iranians say, okay, we're stopping for now, even if later they start up again in these other more indirect ways. Or do you think actually the Iranians do feel they need to continue for a period of time even after the US stops?
- [17:58]
Danny Sintrinowitz
I think there is a wall, theoretically. But practically I think they will try to highlight the fact that it's not like the 12 Day War when President Trump stays stopped and everybody stopped. Even if they will launch the last salvo of missiles, even if they will continue another day, they will do something that in their mind creating some sort of a deterrence equation between them and Israel and the US they'll have to do something because they can't accept the fact that they are negotiating. In their mind, they're negotiating the second time and the second time while they're negotiating one Israel. Now Israel and the US are bombing them, attacking them. So they have to reshape it. Yes, there are wall for mediations from the Omanis and whatever, but we have to remember that there is a zero trust in the Iranian view on everything that the US Is doing, especially this administration after what happened. So I think that we have to assume that it would be very hard to reach some sort of a comprehensive agreement. It would be very hard to make things stop immediately. But I think that if things continue as it is, we have to assume that it will continue for some time even after the US will decide to stop. And I think that it also connected to the fact that there is, like I said, total misunderstanding and misadministration regarding Iran and how the Iranian thinks a view of life and I think of life, of negotiation, of nuclear whatever. And I think this is another element that actually preventing from the US to achieve its strategic goals in Iran.
- [19:27]
Jake Sullivan
What do you think is the core of the misunderstanding that this administration has of the Iranian side?
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Danny Sintrinowitz
I think the main core is the fact that they actually don't know Iran, how Iran think, how Iran view things. I think when you have Iraqi coming to Wykoff and explaining to him they're going to forego enrichment, accumulation and Wytkov thinking that he can build 30 or 40 bombs. I think they were so misunderstanding about the motives of the Iranians that the negotiation was dead from the get go because of the fact that they actually don't know Iran. They really thought that if you topple the or you kill Khamenei, the regime will be toppled. They thought that There would be a Delta Rodriguez in Iran that can actually work through it. They actually thought that if you'll bring the carrier to the Gulf, the Iranians will capitulate. If you'll start the war, the Iranians will capitulate. It's not going to go like that. And that is actually causing the administration to be in a very strategic and problematic junction. Or you can stop the war today. And we said probably the Iranians will continue. And even if not, then Iran will build its capacity. Goes with that saying, or you continue until then. When you're trying to topple this regime, then you have to have boots on the ground. You have to continue this campaign for the time being, for months, despite the fact that Israel and the US have their operational superiority in so many ways strategically. I'm not sure it's accumulating to that effect, actually. I'm sure it's not. So there is a strict injunction that they have to choose what to do. And I don't think that either way actually serve the U.S. interests.
- [21:05]
John Finer
It must drive you a bit crazy to watch these misperceptions influence policy. You're somebody who spent your career, an expert trying to make sure people like us, who are more generalists but involved in decision making on these topics at least understood the factual underpinnings of the circumstances. How do you feel on a personal level watching kind of a failure of analysis by people who should know better if they were listening to people like you?
- [21:31]
Danny Sintrinowitz
It's driving me crazy because actually I know the American intel community. I was a liaison officer for the DIA for three years in Washington. I know Senco very well. They are amazing in their professionality. But the thing is that it's not trickling down to what I see from illustration. But don't go far away. I don't think that also in Israel, when the Prime Minister calling people to go to the streets, we all know that it's not going to happen. I knew that it cannot be the target of the campaign because I asked one simple question. What will happen when people won't go to the streets? They will continue until when? And now people are saying, yeah, we need to think about it. Maybe we're mistaken. The thing is that being an expert, it's not something that is nice to have when you have the expert, you have to listen to them. Now again, the decision making can do whatever they want. It's their prerogative. They be elected, they were elected by the people and so forth. But eventually we have to look at it from the Israeli Civilian. Eight months after, we again walk up to an alarm that we are not working, nobody's going to school, we cannot leave Israel because there are no flights. And now they're telling us again, existential threat, like they told us eight months ago. So the problem is, it's not theoretical, academic discussion of what is Iran is or whatever. It's practical. If you cannot reach the target that you're putting on the table because you don't know Iran, you'll get the prices of barrel of oil over $100. You will get billions of shekels being thrown for this war without achieving the real targets. And even more than that, negotiation was, I think was the best way to prevent Iran from reaching its ability on the nuclear side. They have the capacity, like Jack said, to rebuild. They need a very small compound with IR8s. Actually they developed that after the US decided to leave the JCPOA. And then they can enrich that in weeks. So to close it out. I think that, I hope that now they will listen to experts because at the end of the day, Iran is a very unique country. The history, the resilience. And I think there are ways that you can improve your ability to reach your goals, but you cannot do that by misunderstanding them. There are no kinetic solutions to all the problems that we have. We have to say that again. Sometimes you have to have diplomacy, I'm not even talking about Israel, that they will think, yeah, we'll solve the Iranian issue, we'll have normalization. It won't solve your Palestinian problem. It won't solve the problem that people in the Gulf see Israel as much stronger than it is and it's threatening them. I don't say like Iran, but threatening them as well. So we have to assume that as well. But it's hopeless. When you hear the declarations, you're saying, I don't know how we're going to get out of it with a positive mind.
- [24:14]
Jake Sullivan
So, Danny, there was a report in the American press that intelligence analysis from the major American intelligence agencies, including the Defense Intelligence Agency that you were the liaison to, that they were assessing and putting their assessment before the President that regime change was unlikely and that taking out the Supreme Leader was not going to produce some new regime in Iran. Do you think the same thing was being said by the Israeli intelligence community to the Prime Minister before this started?
- [24:45]
Danny Sintrinowitz
I don't know. I have to say the truth. I don't know what's being said. But my sense, I hope that it was said. The problem in Israel, that the decision making in Israel has changed dramatically since the 7th of October, even before that. But definitely on the 7th of October we have Netanyahu, that he's a very dominant figure, but actually he's the one that controlling the shots. We don't have checks and balances. The cabinet is actually, well, it's written on paper, but they have no influence. You have Netanyahu and Ron Dermer that I don't know whether involved or not. Nobody knows where he is right now and they are deciding for everything. And the problem with the army is the fact that after the 7th of October, you cannot be seen as someone that is trying to push back on everything kinetics. Because after 7th of October, the notion in Israel is I couldn't care less about the intentions. Talk me about the capabilities. We can see that in Lebanon, we are seeing that in Syria, we can see that in Iran. And the problem is like we're seeing now with Hezbollah, that nobody's saying, look, we have to think about other means, not only kinetically, because on 7th of October there's no way to speak about anything but the F35 and the tanks and whatever. So this is a problem that we're having. So for your important question, Jake, I don't know. I hope that it was actually conveyed, but I have some doubts in that regard because even when people thought about it, I'm not sure they said that because at the end of the day it's like a group thinking and sometimes you're afraid to speak your mind in terms of what will happen for your promotions or whatever. So I hope that someone said that, but my sense is maybe nobody mentioned it.
- [26:37]
Narrator/Transition Voice
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- [27:00]
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Danny Sintrinowitz
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- [28:13]
John Finer
Danny, we've talked a bit about how we got here and also some of the ways in which this war could end. We should probably also spend a little bit of time on how it could escalate, which is another possibility in the coming days. There are a number of scenarios that are being either leaked or put out publicly that the United States or Israel could arm a proxy group of some kind to go fight the regime. That the Gulf states might actually enter the war directly themselves on the offensive side. They're obviously in the war because they're absorbing a lot of blows from Iran. Or that the US or Israel could put troops on the ground to try to achieve some of their objectives either on the energy front or to maybe go after this highly enriched uranium that we've been discussing. Which of these escalatory scenarios gives you the most concern or do you think we are most likely to see?
- [29:05]
Danny Sintrinowitz
What makes me concerned is the ability or everything related to attacking the infrastructure in Iran. I think that will lead immediately to the response by the Iranians attacking infrastructure in the Gulf. That will.
- [29:19]
John Finer
You mean civilian.
- [29:21]
Danny Sintrinowitz
Yeah, civilian infrastructure, mainly energy sector, but also everything related to desalination. Sorry, desalination.
- [29:28]
John Finer
Capacity for drinking water.
- [29:29]
Danny Sintrinowitz
Yeah, the Gulf has. And I think that this can really can go in a way that's going to definitely very hard to control if that would be the scenario or the decision by the US and Israel because then we'll see escalation, then we'll see the Gulf being in flames and everything related to Iran attacking the oil depots. So I think that this is one element. I think we should all be thinking whether it's the best way to do so. Regarding the proxies, I think with the Kurds and everything. And this shows that there was no pre planning, strategic pre planning of this campaign. Because when you look at Iran in general, yes, there are ethnic minorities, but majority of them want to stay under the Iranian umbrella. They're not looking for independence. And even more than that, I think that the Turks and the Kurdish elements within Iraq, I think they were highly worried from this giving arms to the Iranian Kurdish elements. So I don't think this is something that will work. And I think that is something actually highlight the fact that there was no preplanning everything related to the boots on the ground. Again, it can happen. I hope it won't happen because I don't think the value of it. And I think it's still low probability comparing to the ability of Israel and the US to attack the civilian infrastructure in Iran. Something that will escalate, it will turn Iran to a failed state. And the implication of that will be enormous, not only on the Middle east, but even more than that, one dog
- [31:04]
Jake Sullivan
that hasn't barked so far is the Houthis. The Houthis are Iran's terrorist allies in Yemen, controlling much of the territory of Yemen. And We've seen since October 7th their capability to to hold the Red Sea at risk, to strike Israel directly. We've seen in the past their ability to strike targets in the Gulf. They have both ballistic missiles and drones, just like Iran does. And yet we haven't really seen them get engaged here. Do you have an explanation for why and do you expect that that could be a potential vector of escalation in this war?
- [31:37]
Danny Sintrinowitz
Yeah, very interesting development. One thing that worked best for the Iranians, the fact that unlike the 12 Day War, they managed to operate the proxies. You have Hezbollah in Lebanon that actually causing us major problems because of the fact that still have capacity and the ability to dismantle the organization kinetically like Achad said, is actually non existent. And of course we have the Shiite Iraqis, especially Katab, Hezbollah, Nujabad, that actually working not only against the US presence in Iraq and especially northern side of Iraq, the Kurdish province, but also attacking Kuwait, attacking Jordan. So I think this is something that also we have to remember that even if the war in Iran will end, I'm not sure the war in Lebanon or in Iraq will end. And this is a genie outside the bottle. It will very hard to push him back. Now regarding the Houthis, very interesting. I have to say that my assumption was they will enter from the beginning. But I think there are two options for this behavior. One is the Iranian thinking about the longer game. It's an attrition war. This is why eventually we'll will put them in or push them into the war. Once we believe that now Israel maybe it's much more weaker, we can exhaust the Israeli public by another barrage of missiles coming from Yemen. And of course we can block the Bab El Manda Strait as we are blocking Hormuz Straits. And actually it will have significant effect only when it comes in the second or third phase of the war. So if according to this way of thinking, so definitely we'll see them very close entering the war. Now, there is another aspect that the Houthis are finding it very hard to enter the war because they're having something very good right now in Yemen because of what everything had happened between the Saudis and Iraqis on the southern part of Yemen and the stc, the Southern Transition Council. So definitely they are more relaxed. Nobody is threatening them from the south. And if they'll get now to war, then they're going to weaken themselves. So we don't know exactly where we stand. My assessment is that definitely the Iranians want them to get into the war. And I think that if the war will escalate in the end of the day, we'll see them intervening. If that will escalate, especially for the infrastructure, if they'll assume that the regime is in a very problematic situation, then I think that eventually they will enter. We have to remember also they have obligations to Hezbollah that actually helped to build their capacity. So in that regard, they're not there yet. But I assume that if the war will continue, eventually we'll find them intervening in the war itself.
- [34:06]
John Finer
Danny, I assume the answer to this question is no. Certainly hope the answer to this question is no. But is there any scenario you can envision in which this conflict goes nuclear in some way?
- [34:18]
Danny Sintrinowitz
Well, I don't think so. I don't think it's also no nuclear and everything related to the World War three. I think that China and Russia will help behind the scene to the Iranians. And I think that if this regime will prevail in a way, then they will be much more closer to it. I think they don't want to lose the Islamic Republic. I think for them it's a great advantage. They understand that now. So I think in the day after we'll see much more close ties between North Korea, China and Russia and everything related to Iran. But during the war, they don't want to sacrifice their interest for Iran. We have Putin maybe will get a huge present by lifting sanctions on its oil. He's now the mediator, like the grown up in terms of how Trump sees. So I think that for them, they will help them behind the scene. I have no doubt that they gave him intelligence information. This is what the Russians are doing all the time. Same thing goes to the Chinese. I think that for them, they wish that this regime will prevail. It's anti American, anti West. It's best for them. But they want to have peace and calm. Returning back to the Middle east, to the Gulf, because everything related to the old barrel, the price of oil barrel for them. So the bottom line things that I don't think it will happen and on top of that. But we have to pay a closer look to the connection between Iran, Russia and China and North Korea in the day after the war. Assuming that this regime actually will stay.
- [35:37]
Jake Sullivan
Steve Wyckoff says we should take Russia's word that they're not helping the Iranians in any way in this war. Do you take Russia's word for that?
- [35:44]
Danny Sintrinowitz
I wouldn't buy anything from the Russians. You have to remember that they already had a lot of information of them in the past. OPUM trying to help the Iranians also with intel material on Israel during the 12 Day War, everything related to them trying to help the Houthis in the fight against the U.S. so for them, listen if you are. But Mr. Witkoff, I have the highest esteem for him from the fact that he released our hostages. He gave Israel a huge service because I don't think that if it was other guy, I don't think Netanyahu would have done the extra mile to release the host. But eventually I think one guy cannot handle all those negotiations, cannot understand things from the Russia to the Iranian event because of the fact, like you said in Iran, it's driving me crazy. We talked about that the negotiation. I think the Iranians offer them much more than they were willing to give on jcpoa. No accumulation of nuclear material. It's pushing them way back for their ability to retrief some material. This is something that I think lost because of the misunderstanding of Mr. Witkoff. So again I have the highest esteem for him. But I think in terms of Iran, and I'll talk about 30 or 40 bombs, it's not connected to reality. And actually what the Iranians have, I don't want to give advantage to give good words about the Iranian regime. It's a bad regime that undermining the situation. The spirit of the Middle east threatening the state of Israel and I hope it will be toppled. But eventually you have to understand that in the negotiation side they were willing to give something substantial on the nuclear. The fact that we lost that did not make it harder on the kinetic side to prevent Iran from rushing into a bomb.
- [37:20]
Jake Sullivan
Just to put a fine point on this, because I think this is not fully appreciated, although it's starting to get more out into the press now. Your view is that Iran actually put on the table an offer on the nuclear file that went even further than the Iran nuclear deal and that the US Side sort of misunderstood what was on offer and that's Partly why we ended up where we have ended up.
- [37:42]
Danny Sintrinowitz
It was obvious from the beginning what are the red lines of the Supreme Leader. He demanded the right to enrich. He didn't want to dismantle the enriched capacity, but he was willing to show a lot of compromises in terms of the inspection regime, everything related of diluting the material, the 440 kilos and of course everything related to the future accumulation of Van Richard. Now of course its statement he had to, you know, I'm not sure it will be like JCPOA, 180 pages. But I think that negotiation, you had to have negotiation with them. But assuming that this is what actually they brought to the table, this is what the Omani Foreign Minister is saying. So I think this was something very interesting because actually it's blocking the way to have faithful material to reach a nuclear bomb. You have to say that. And if you have an expectant regime and if there's no sunset clause, eventually it will save face program. We have to remember one thing about the Iranian nuclear program. Regardless of yes or no bomb for them is a pillar of the regime. They couldn't let go, especially Ali Khamenei, even if they spin for nothing the centrifuges. He just want to see that spinning because for him it was a testimony for the technology advancement of Iran. So I think that if you go that way, then let them spin, let dilute the material. Yes, you have to leave some sanctions, you will strengthen this regime. But if the major threat that is coming from this regime is nuclear, then you're blocking it. And they don't have any motivation to continue doing so. And even they have motivation, they won't have the FISA material to do so. So I think this is an element that we missed in the negotiation. Unfortunately, again, it's not that the Iranians would have given the missiles and the proxies, but unfortunately, or fortunately, whatever, this is not an extensive threat to the State of Israel. We are suffering from the missile and from the proxies, but we can live with it. I hope that eventually we find a solution for it, but eventually nuclear. This is the thing. And unfortunately I think that we had opportunity. I think the Iranians show flexibility that didn't show in JCPOA again until the right turn reach. And unfortunately we missed that.
- [39:51]
John Finer
Danny, both of our countries are at war with Iran. But our circumstances, yours and ours, are quite different. At any moment there could be sirens that go off. You'd have to end this interview and go to a shelter of some kind that's not likely to happen on the east coast of the United States where, where Jake and I are. But I wonder how concerned Americans should be about another asymmetric option that Iran has, which is to resume terrorist plots against the west, against Americans overseas, against Americans in our homeland. How much do you think that is on the table either during the conflict or in the years to come, given what's happened?
- [40:28]
Danny Sintrinowitz
I think definitely, I think that the retaliation for the killing of, decapitation of Khamenei, we haven't seen that yet. And by the way, I'm talking about two options. One is the lone Louvre, like actually we saw in no look at Karachi in Pakistan, what happened, attacking the US Consulate. This is something that we have to be very wary of because Khamenei wasn't only a political leader in Iran, he was a spiritual leader for he thought the whole Shia community all over the world, not all of that, but majority of it. So I think that this is something that we have to pay a closer look. Second, we have to remember that there are Shia communities that are being controlled by Iran all over the world. We saw that in Australia in the plot that run by the Iranian embassy back then. We see that in Africa, we see that in Latin America. And actually, of course there are Shiite elements, extreme elements also in the US So I think that we have to be very careful what will happen because as I mentioned, even if this war will end tomorrow, the Iranians still have the capacity or to operate some sort of sleeper cell that they have all over the world against U.S. interests. And we saw that after Soleimani being killed, there was a plot in Ethiopia, in South Africa, attacking the US Embassy's ambassadors over there. And so I think that we have to be looking that very closely. And on top of that, I'll say one important thing. I think that we have to look at what we're saying. Everything related to the soft power activity of Iran all over the world, the mosques, the academia, all of that is extremely important because this is actually the platform that allow Iran at the end of the day to use those elements to conduct those terrorist attacks. So definitely we have to be very careful. This war, even if it will end kinetically in the Middle East, I'm afraid it won't end in terms of the friction between Israel, Iran and the U.S.
- [42:15]
Jake Sullivan
so, Danny, we'll get you out of here on this. You've described a scenario in which at the end of this, Iran is both going to retain some capacity and probably greater motivation to go nuclear. You've described a scenario in which the regime is unlikely to crack and entirely fall apart. Zooming out to the region as a whole, can you tell us where you expect things to land after this war ends in terms of Israel's relationships with the other players with the countries in the Gulf and how they those countries are likely to react to the changed circumstances on the other side of this war, however it ends.
- [42:52]
Danny Sintrinowitz
I think that this war will have a significant effect on how the Gulf states are looking at this world. I think they will have to think hard and clear about the US presence in those countries. It made them a target. I think they don't feel that the US made the effort to actually protect them 100%. This is one element. And the second thing goes to the relations with Iran. I'm not saying they're going to disconnect the relations because Iran is there. Definitely this regime will be there and I think they will have to interact with it in some way or form. But I think they will have to think hard and clear on that. I don't think there will be some sort of reassessing the connection regarding Israel, maybe behind the scene, maybe everything related to the defense, some sort of defense initiatives on the air defense and things like that, maybe that. But we have to remember one thing about those countries. They got into a war that wasn't theirs. The war was Israel initiating together with the US and they are thinking the long range, middle range ballistic missile is not their threat. And I think that for them they are very angry about that. Of course, maybe now they're hoping that US and Israel will finish the job because I don't think they want to find themselves with regime that controlled by the irgc. But the problem that they have, they don't want to see also chaos. I don't think there are good options for the Gulf states, unfortunately. But everything related to Israel, I think that not only they're blaming Israel for this war, everything Israel is doing in the west bank and Gaza, it is something that is not acceptable for them, especially from the Saudis. They want to lead the Sunni world. MBS and the last thing about that is the fact that even if Iran would be weak and Israel will be stronger, I think that for them after the attack in Qatar, they find it very hard to cooperate with Israel, especially not behind the scenes, but actually publicly. So the bottom line, I don't think that this war actually will change dramatically the relations between Israel and the Gulf states. Maybe behind the scenes, maybe everything related that we can help them better cope with. Everything that Iran has, maybe that can happen, but I think that everything that publicly and normalization, I don't think it will happen. And we have to remember for Israel, not everything starts and ends with Iran. There's no Iranian boogeyman behind every Israel security problem that we have. The west bank, the situation with Jordan, Egypt has no connection to Iran. So even if we'll topple the Iranian regime, hopefully then nothing will change in that regard. Maybe on the contrary, maybe things will escalate. So I think that for Israel, maybe hoping, I don't think we'll see nothing positive in terms of our relationship integration in the region from the gold states, a lot of thinking what to do the day after. I think they will change the strategy completely. And for Iran, I think that for them the ARGC will push forward and I think that we'll see rearmament of Iran, working with China and Russia in that regard. I don't think we'll see positive developments towards the future. They still have a mountain to climb in terms of everything related to the public. They don't have money. They have to think hard and clear how they're going to mitigate the problems that they have with the Iranian public. But I wouldn't underestimate this regime and its ability to survive.
- [45:56]
John Finer
Danny, I think both Jake and I probably wish you were still in your old chair, but we're also grateful that you're not because you can share this sort of insight and wisdom with the wider world and because we could have you as our guest today, which was a treat. So thank you again for being here and for comments that we're going to be thinking about, I think for quite some time.
- [46:18]
Danny Sintrinowitz
Thank you for having me. I really appreciate it.
- [46:20]
Jake Sullivan
Thank you. Danny, stay safe out there and we'll look forward to continuing to follow your commentary and we'll put the link to your X account in the show notes so that everyone else can follow along as well.
- [46:30]
Danny Sintrinowitz
Thank you.
- [46:30]
Jake Sullivan
Thanks a lot and stay safe.
- [46:31]
Danny Sintrinowitz
Thank you.
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- [48:23]
Jake Sullivan
So John, there is a lot to unpack in that conversation we just had with Danny. And I guess I would start with what I would call a very bleak strategic assessment of how this is all going to play out. Essentially, I heard him say, one the regime will emerge from this war probably even harder line than it was coming into the war, more implacable, and that it's unlikely that we'll see any form of regime change, certainly not positive regime change. Two that this regime will be more likely to actually seek a nuclear weapon than they were before the war kicked off, and that they will retain the capability to do so. 3 that actually, as much as we talk about when is Trump going to end the war, Danny thinks there's a reasonable chance that the Iranians will say we're not quite done yet, which could complicate efforts even if President Trump reaches a decision to end the war to actually get it to wind down. Four, that there are still a lot of different vectors for escalation that could unfold in the coming days and weeks, including attacks on civilian infrastructure like both energy and desalinization. And finally that the US And Israel basically, as he described it, started the war because they had a target of opportunity to take out the supreme Leader. They did, and then the rest of their strategy was, okay, let's see what happens next. And all of these things have unfolded that were predicted at the beginning, but for which we don't have good answers. And so we're kind of in a strategic cul de sac right now. And Danny didn't really see a way out of that cul de sac, given the realities of points one through four. So did I sum that up fairly well? I probably missed a couple things because of. There was a lot the breadth and. And depth of what he was offering. But. But. But quite bleak, I think.
- [50:31]
John Finer
You had five points. I would add a sixth or maybe a new first, which is maybe more evidence for an argument we've been making, which is it's not clear this was at all necessary in the first place.
- [50:43]
Jake Sullivan
Oh, wait, okay, right, sorry.
- [50:45]
John Finer
Because not only does he believe that there was a actually very good deal on the table, maybe even no enrichment deal for a period of time, which was a red line for Trump, and we had thought a red line for Iran, but that deal was fundamentally misunderstood by the US Negotiating team because they were not drawing on the wisdom of experts like Danny, of which the US Government also has many at its disposal, but not part of this. And so that we ended up in this strategic cul de sac and didn't have to start this in the first place to achieve perhaps greater objectives through diplomacy was a big takeaway for me.
- [51:23]
Jake Sullivan
Yeah, no, absolutely. That should go right to the top of the list. And when I was pressing him on this point, what was going through my mind is if the American people fully understood that there was actually a diplomatic solution here on the table that, for the long term, could put Iran's nuclear program in a box, and that a big part of the reason we didn't go down that road was because our team didn't understand what was on offer. That is just an absolutely shocking development. And then when you add it to those other points, we are now in a situation where it is more likely Iran's nuclear ambitions are more dangerous than they were before. I mean, this just really adds up to an incredibly sorry state of affairs. And I did not enter this conversation expecting that strength of perspective on his part about what was possible and what was missed in the opportunity to do diplomacy before this thing kicked off.
- [52:33]
John Finer
So, in the spirit of the quote that's often attributed to John McCain about how it's always darkest before it gets completely black or something like that, there is a scenario that came up in the conversation with Danny that we're going to dig into a bit deeper here, which is the possibility of US Boots on the ground for a particular purpose. And we're going to do this, as we've done in the past, through a red team, blue team debate, where each of us is going to take the side of an advisor to President Trump making the case for One course of action. Do you want to tee up the scenario that we're going to talk about here?
- [53:13]
Danny Sintrinowitz
I will.
- [53:14]
Jake Sullivan
And the scenario is slightly complicated because we don't know exactly all the facts. So we're going to, I would say, stipulate a few things for purposes of this exercise, but also highlight where the unknowns are. So we talked to Danny about Iran's continuing nuclear capability. And the main feature of that is a stockpile of uranium that is enriched to 60%. Now, for our listeners, as I pointed out in the episode, it does not take much to further enrich that stockpile to 90%, which is weapons grade uranium. And to situate our listeners, Iran has about 440 kilograms, a little less than 1,000 pounds of this 60% enriched uranium in a stockpile that we believe, much of which is in the tunnels under Isfahan, not reachable by American bombs, even by the Massive Ordnance Penetrator that was reportedly used to take out Fordo. So it's sitting underground there. And the only way for us to get at it would be to send people in on the ground, either the United States or Israel or a joint operation between the two of us. Now, some of this 60% enriched uranium may be at Fordo, buried really so far deep that maybe even the Iranians couldn't dig it out for, you know, for a really long time. Some of it could have been destroyed in the bombings for all we know. But we're going to stipulate for our purposes that the bulk of what is reachable by either us or Israel or Iran is under Esfahan, and that if we could go secure that enriched uranium, it would set the uranium program back quite a bit, perhaps on the order of a year, so that they would go from weeks to months. If they were to put some centrifuges together and take that 60% enriched uranium and go to 90%, they could do it now in weeks to months. This would push them out, say beyond a year of breakout time before they could produce one weapons worth of weapons grade uranium. So if Iran retains that material and the war ends, then they're a lot closer to a bomb because they've got the centrifuges, they've got the stockpile and they got the experts. And that's why we're teeing up for President Trump in this Red Team, Blue Team exercise an option to go in on the ground with special forces and air cover to get that material and either take it out of the country or neutralize it on site so that we have essentially pushed the Iranian program very far back. Let me pause there, John. Did I get that basically right? Is there anything you would add in terms of the overall assumptions or assessments before we dig into the arguments for and against actually conducting such an.
- [56:21]
John Finer
I think you did. I think you may have previewed a little bit of your argument in the setup, but that's the introductory.
- [56:27]
Jake Sullivan
I've got to argue the hardest part. So putting a thumb on the scale is not the worst thing. Okay, so. But they're going to be sitting around actually saying, should we do this? And in fact, we've seen some reporting, by the way.
- [56:38]
John Finer
The reason we know that is because they cannot keep anything under wraps. And this has already been out in the press.
- [56:43]
Jake Sullivan
Right out in the press. But it's because if they don't do it, then people are going to say, wait a second, you haven't actually resolved the nuclear issue at all. This would give them some answer to that question. So basically I'm going to make three points on behalf of conducting such an operation. And the operation that I would advocate for is one that would chiefly rely on Israeli Defense Force commandos on the ground with American support. So American enabling support, air cover and other forms of logistical support, but the Israelis actually conducting the actual operation first. Essentially I refer back to my whole setup that in fact we can put a lot of time on the clock, really set back Iran's capacity to race for a bomb, particularly in light of the fact that they may be more inclined to race for a bomb by disposing of this material and that if we don't, that they are not that far away from, if they were to choose to take the decision of trying to break out, which would force us again to go in militarily to try to stop them. So this actually would make a material meaningful difference in terms of Iran's overall capability to sneak out or break out to acquire a nuclear weapon. That's point one. And we do not have a good answer to the American people or the people of the world about our ability to constrain Iran's nuclear ambitions if we leave this stockpile available to them. And there is reporting to suggest they've already dug in to a certain extent so they could go in to get it. That's point one. Point two, this operation is actually achievable. It is risky, yes, but no significant operation to achieve a major national security objective is without risk. And we believe that we can bring the risk down to a manageable level. Why? Chiefly because we own the skies, so Iran cannot threaten our ability to put aircraft overhead and essentially protect a perimeter around Esfahan, around this facility, so that the commandos can go in and do their work and that scientific experts who go with them to handle this material can go in and do their work. If Iranian forces tried to approach, our aircraft could essentially pummel them and keep them at bay. We can provide all the necessary logistics and other forms of support because we own the skies. And that makes this operation far more doable than it would have been if Iran still had its air defenses intact or in previous iterations of the United States. Because I know you're going to bring up Jimmy Carter and Operation Eagle Claw and how badly things went there. We did not have complete mastery of the skies and the ability to execute like this. Furthermore, the actual operation to take out the material is itself very risky. And if we wanted to downblend it on site, yes, it's quite time consuming. But we believe that we can set the conditions for that small geography to essentially own the space for the requisite amount of time to make that happen. And then my third argument goes back to the point that Danny made, which is we're being briefed by our intelligence community, as Israel is being briefed by its intelligence community, that the assassination of the Supreme Leader, Khamenei and the elevation of his son actually creates a circumstance in which the political winds are likely blowing in favor of them racing for a bomb. So we will face a circumstance at the end of this, if we don't do this, of an Iranian government more determined to get a weapon than they were before, more determined to take advantage of this stockpile. So if we don't do this, given what we just heard from Danny, we are in a particularly problematic position. And so for those reasons, we should go ahead and execute this operation. It could be that there is loss of life in this operation, but I think it would be a perfectly credible thing for the President, for you, Mr. President, to go before the American people, look them in the eye and say, this was a worthy effort, and I believe it's achievable. And if achieved, would very much abate, reduce, set back the Iranian nuclear threat in a material way. And in that sense, it gives you an answer to the question, what was this war all about? And what did we achieve in this war? It would be something very meaningful to the United States of America. And remember, every president going back multiple presidents, has said that we will prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. You, Mr. President, would be the one who would actually do it. And this would put an exclamation point.
- [61:31]
John Finer
Well played. I'm gonna. I didn't feel like your heart was totally in it, but it was. Given the argument that you had to make. It was.
- [61:37]
Jake Sullivan
I can't say it was totally in it. You know, and I certainly allied it over a lot of things you're about to say.
- [61:45]
John Finer
I may raise a few. Okay.
- [61:47]
Jake Sullivan
A bit nervous about what you're gonna come back with here.
- [61:49]
John Finer
Look again. Each of us inhabiting a role as a Trump advisor. Not exactly how I would make the argument to a president I worked for, but here goes. Okay.
- [61:57]
Danny Sintrinowitz
Okay.
- [61:58]
John Finer
Mr. President, I'm going to say something to you that no one has ever said to an American president before. You have won the Iran war. You killed Supreme Leader Khamenei, a world historic villain. And don't let anybody argue that Israel actually pulled the trigger. You and I both know that they wouldn't have and never did do that with anyone else in the White House. So this is about you. The regime has been defanged. Its military capacity is a fraction of what it once was. Think about it, Mr. President. Who was the last American president to definitively win any war? Not Joe Biden. Not Barack Obama. Certainly not George W. Bush. Maybe Bill Clinton. And Kosovo. But that wasn't a direct threat to the United States. It was more of a humanitarian thing. Most Americans had no idea what Kosovo even was. Iran is different. Our enemy since 1979. And everyone knows that. All you have to do to be able to celebrate this victory is land the plane. Just stop right where we are now before we do something that snatches defeat from the jaws of victory. That is how this can go, right? But I gotta warn you, despite the very compelling argument you've just heard, this can also still go horribly wrong if you follow the course of action that was just recommended. Mr. President, I know how much you admire the military that you inherited. The one that we both know was totally woke up and broken and in disarray until you, through sheer force of will, turn it into the finest fighting force on the planet. You've ordered them to do some very hard things during your first year in office. Totally obliterate, maybe now, twice, Iran's nuclear program. Grab Maduro out of Caracas with Special Forces just over a couple months ago. But I need to tell you, Mr. President, that this stuff is not as easy as they have made it look. And if you order troops into Iran to seize highly enriched uranium, which we think, but may not really know, is in these bombed out tunnels deep underground at Isfahan, when Iran already knows that we are coming. You've seen the same press reports I have. It will be one of the most challenging military operations any president has ever asked our military to conduct. And while I take your other advisor's point that we own the skies, we own the skies in Vietnam, we own the skies in Iraq. It did not prevent massive failures operationally on the ground. Mr. President, I literally don't have time to list all of the things that could go wrong here. You've seen Black Hawk Down, Mr. President, where the US army goes in to grab one bad guy in Somalia, which was a lot less well defended than Iran, and 18 US soldiers end up getting killed. Nobody even made a movie about the operation. Your first advisor just referenced Operation Eagle Claw, the failed secret mission Jimmy Carter ordered into Iran to rescue our hostages in 1980. That one basically ended. Ended his presidency. Mr. President. Not pretty. So if a bunch of service members get killed or God forbid, taken captive by Iran during this operation, this goes from a victory celebration to a full fledged crisis that will lead to a lot of pressure on you, on us, to escalate even more. Exactly the kind of indefinite war in the Middle east that you said many times was stupid and you were right. And by the way, do not be fooled by this idea of allowing the Israelis to do this for us, because it would take away all your risk. Just imagine if some of them get taken hostage. Israel will never stop fighting, never stop this war until those people are home. And Steve and Jared have told you exactly how hard it is to negotiate with the Iranians. Imagine if they had Israeli soldiers in their custody when we were trying to negotiate the end of this conflict, let alone if they had Americans. So if this gets out of control, Mr. President, the consequences are going to extend far beyond the Middle East. Indeed, you know, just in the confines of this room, they already are. We've had to pull more of our Thaad missile defense batteries out of South Korea, where, by the way, they protect against countries that actually have nuclear weapons, principally North Korea, unlike Iran. And Russia absolutely loves the high oil prices that are basically bailing out their economy right now. We cannot let that continue. Because if countries can't buy gas from the Middle east from Qatar, even some of our friends in Europe might start start looking back to Moscow for help. And, you know, you've seen the markets teetering on the brink, to say the least. Any more of that and we are going to start to feel real pain here in the United States from this conflict. Just as important, Mr. President, if this mission succeeds, yes, it will change the calculus a bit on how much time it would take Iran to get a nuclear weapon. But remember, we have already told the country that you totally obliterated Iran's nuclear program last summer. And objectively like that was awesome. We should stick with that message. Yes, it would be good to get a thousand pounds of highly enriched uranium out of Iran. But the truth is, even if we don't want to say it out loud, none of this actually changes the fact that in order to deal with the program over the long term, we need a diplomatic solution, we need a negotiation, we need a deal. The problem is, Mr. President, Iran already knows how to enrich uranium. And so no matter how many scientists we kill or how much material we remove, if they choose to go down this path, it will be hard to stop them. And you had the right instinct about this, in fact, all along, the only way to stop this is with a better deal. Not some weak Obama like jcpoa, but a strong, formidable TCPOA that restores the most important thing we lost when the old deal went away. International monitors inside Iran who will watch the program and make sure that it doesn't advance. And that reduces the program to a very low level man. Imagine if we had a year to make decisions about whether to take military action against Iran because their program was so reduced. It would be like 2017 all over again. How great would that be? So let's do what a wise president once said at a different phase of this war and take the win. Mr. President, in fact, if you side with me, we can get working on a victory parade. Maybe just before you head to Beijing later this month to see President Xi. You'd have the wind at your back. And Elon and some of our team have actually made a video of what that victory parade could look like. If somebody could just press play to
- [68:08]
Jake Sullivan
show you to get a sense of
- [68:09]
John Finer
what could be on offer here. I'll leave it at that.
- [68:12]
Jake Sullivan
Oh, man.
- [68:13]
John Finer
All right.
- [68:14]
Jake Sullivan
By the way, that was just exceptional role play, I have to say. Also some decent substantive arguments to go along with it.
- [68:21]
John Finer
Probably I have the stronger material to work from.
- [68:25]
Jake Sullivan
We're both. We are both very much sympathetic, I think, to a lot of the arguments you laid out. In fact, for those listeners who have not brushed up on Operation Eagle Claw, it was an effort involving US Special Forces to go rescue the hostages in 1980 that ended up with them landing in the desert at a place called Desert One in Iran and having two US aircraft crash into one another, into one another, not even getting fired upon by Iranian forces and a number of US Service members killed and the whole thing scotched and them coming home. So if that's not an advertisement for the problematic nature of this, I don't know what it is. I think if I had my heart fully in it and went full finer in my MAGA presentation to the President, I do think one point I would make is that a lot of the bedwetters said you could never go in and grab Maduro, and in the middle of hostile capital, the middle of a presidential compound, and pull him and his wife out of his bedroom and get out without a single American casualty. These are the same people telling you that you can't strike a coup de grace here. And if you declare victory at the end of this war and Iran sitting on a huge stockpile of highly enriched uranium, man, you're going to bleed out. Getting that uranium would be the absolute exclamation point on this war. And our guys are ready, and the Israelites, Israelis are ready to go do it. So let's go. I would bet our military is not arguing for this because they probably see the downside more than the upside. I would bet there are some voices in the Israeli system that are probably arguing for it. So it will be interesting, as Trump has to face these competing impulses, to see if he decides to proceed on this operation, or for that matter, on an operation to seize the oil terminals at Carg island, which is another thing that we've been watching, or some other Special Forces operation, as he thinks about what's in the bag of tricks to do something to change the dynamic as it's playing out right now.
- [70:35]
John Finer
And to be clear, I feel like I very much gilded the lily about how clean a victory this is or how easy the argument is going to be that this is a clean win. Even if they stopped now, and I did not, they will make that case,
- [70:47]
Jake Sullivan
and I did not. If I had built that into my initial argument, I'd say right now, if this war ends today, 50 50. History is not gonna say totally clean win for Trump, but if you did this, it would absolutely put you over the top, brother. So, anyway, next time we present to President Trump. I've taken a bunch of notes about how to craft my argument.
- [71:10]
John Finer
You maggot out the first time we did this, too. I think. I just think.
- [71:13]
Jake Sullivan
No, no. You know where I really, I think, brought my A game to a Red team, Blue team was as an Iranian hardliner.
- [71:19]
John Finer
Oh, that's right.
- [71:20]
Jake Sullivan
I forgot about that there. I've got. I don't know what this says, Jake, but you're Mag. I'm the Iranian hardliner somehow in all of this. Okay, well that's where we are. We'll see where we are next week and how things evolve, whether they escalate, whether they start heading towards a denouement, or whether we're in for an extended open ended campaign here. All of which are possible. But for today, that's what we got.
- [71:50]
John Finer
Well, that's all for today. We'll be back next week with a new episode of the Long Game.
- [71:54]
Jake Sullivan
In the meantime, send us your questions and comments@longgameoxmedia.com and find us on substack@staytuned.substack.com the links are in the show notes.
- [72:13]
John Finer
That's it for this episode of the Long Game.
- [72:15]
Jake Sullivan
If you like the show, please follow, share with friends and leave a review. It really helps listeners.
- [72:21]
John Finer
Find us for updates and more analysis in your inbox. Join the community@staytuned.substack.com the long game is
- [72:28]
Jake Sullivan
a Vox Media Podcast Network Production Executive Producer Tamara Sepper Lead Editorial Producer Jennifer Indig Deputy Editor Celine Rohr Senior Producer
- [72:39]
John Finer
Matthew Billy Video Producers Nat Weiner and
- [72:42]
Jake Sullivan
Adam Harris Supervising Producer Jake Kaplan Associate Producer Claudia Hernandez Marketing Manager Leanna Greenway
- [72:50]
John Finer
Music is by Nat Wiener we're your hosts John Finer and Jake Sullivan.
- [72:55]
Jake Sullivan
Thanks for listening.
- [73:02]
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