Can Iran’s Regime Survive?

Summary

Podcast Summary: The Long Game with Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer

Episode: Can Iran’s Regime Survive?
Date: January 15, 2026

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Episode Overview

In this timely episode, co-hosts Jake Sullivan (President Biden’s former National Security Advisor) and Jon Finer (former Principal Deputy National Security Advisor) tackle one of the most urgent national security questions of 2026: Can Iran’s regime survive the unprecedented, widespread protests and international pressure it currently faces? Drawing on their decades of policy experience—including time spent in the Situation Room and direct negotiation with Iran—they dissect the roots of the latest Iranian uprising, compare it to previous revolutionary moments, and debate the perils and possibilities of U.S. intervention at a crossroads moment for the regime, the region, and U.S. foreign policy.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Context: How Did We Get Here?

Timeline of Protests and Regime Crisis

• Origins: Protests began in late December 2025, initially over economic misery—especially out-of-control inflation.
• Unique Features: This time, the movement is broader, more cross-cutting, and includes not just reform-minded students or urban elites, but the merchant class (“bazaaris”), ethnic minorities, and young people nationwide.
• Layered Grievances: Besides economic hardship, protests are spurred by:
  • Decades of government repression
  • Strategic setbacks for the regime (e.g., military defeats, isolation)
  • Environmental disaster in Tehran: drying water, land subsidence, threats of evacuating the population
  • Continuing abuse and control over women (e.g., the legacy of Mahsa Amini’s death)
  • Exhaustion with the regime’s costly foreign “adventures,” especially funding regional proxies
  • Collective demand for dignity and freedom
• Regime Response:
  • Severe, indiscriminate crackdown—estimates of over 12,000 killed, a figure higher than the 1978-79 revolution.
  • Shutting down the Internet to <1% of capacity, throttling phone service, deploying mass threats against families of protesters.
  • Messaging from officials including threats of charging protesters with “war against God” (which carries the death penalty).

“The numbers today suggest that upwards of 12,000 people may have been killed, which…would be more than were killed in the Iranian revolution back in 78 and 79. A shocking human toll and seemingly rising as we go as the regime mobilizes every tool at its disposal to crack down on people in the streets.” – Jake Sullivan [09:05]

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2. The Dilemma: Should the U.S. Intervene?

Trump Administration’s Public Posture

• President Trump has signaled that “help is on the way,” with White House spokespeople suggesting military options are imminent.
• U.S. has also announced new tariffs on countries doing business with Iran, especially targeting China.

The Debate: Military Action Pro vs. Con

Segment: "Red Team Blue Team" Exercise
Jake and Jon role-play advisors arguing for and against intervention, mirroring Situation Room deliberations.
[Timestamps: 40:06–51:03]

Case FOR Military Action (Jon Finer):

• The U.S. cannot risk repeating Bush Sr.’s 1991 mistake, when encouragement led to mass slaughter of Shi’a in Iraq with no protection (45:25).
• Trump has already created expectations; credibility and deterrence are on the line.
• Limited, disciplined military strikes (focusing on regime security forces, command/control, and preventing retaliation) could tip the scales and persuade security forces to abandon repression.
• U.S. would align itself with the Iranian people’s struggle for freedom.
• Because of earlier U.S./Israeli strikes, Iranian retaliation or defense will be less potent than in the past.

“If the regime is teetering, a push from you, a military push from you, will help topple them. … This would put you squarely on the side of the Iranian people. … The risk … will never be lower than it is today.” – Jon Finer [41:21–45:25]

Case AGAINST Military Action (Jake Sullivan):

• U.S. military options can't reliably stop or protect protesters—regime will likely still have capacity to repress.
• If the regime falls, the result might not be democracy, but chaos—splintered opposition, possible ethnic/separatist conflict, or a hardline replacement (reminding listeners of Libya or Syria).
• U.S. military engagement would risk escalation, possibly drawing in regional war, endanger American assets and bases.
• The perceived “success” of threats may be more valuable than the unclear aftermath of military attack; Trump’s unpredictability can itself be leveraged.
• U.S. can extract concessions from a weakened regime through diplomacy, pressure, not bombs.

“Let’s say the regime does crack. … This opposition is splintered, it’s basically leaderless. … And there are some pretty tough customers in Iran... So no guarantee we don’t get utter chaos in Iran. … And that may seem better today than the thugs currently in charge… But, man, this would still be a massive headache and we would own it.” – Jake Sullivan [48:18–49:00]

Notable Tone: The debate is sharp and realistic, reflecting the real policy divides in Washington, past national traumas, and the quirkiness of Trump’s unpredictability.

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3. Historical Parallels & Lessons

[Timestamps: 17:00–39:43]

Key Moments

• 1953: CIA-backed coup ousts democratic leader Mossadegh, installs the Shah (absolute monarch).
• 1979: Shah’s repressive rule replaced by Ayatollah Khomeini, paving the way for theocratic clerical rule via Islamic Republic.
• 2009 Green Movement: Obama’s cautious public support, policymakers fearing overt U.S. endorsement would discredit protestors; Obama later called this restraint a mistake.
• Recent Lessons:
  • Overthrow in Egypt due to army refusal to crack down vs. Syria’s regime survival due to loyal security forces.
  • Previous U.S. failures to predict revolutionary moments—U.S. lacks an embassy or deep intelligence today, making real-time assessment extremely challenging.

“It is very hard to get good information about what is happening right now on the ground in Iran... There are wildly divergent numbers when it comes to protesters… rumors about regime figures departing the country… is very difficult.” – John Finer [11:13]

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4. Military Scenarios: What Could Happen?

[Timestamps: 55:16–61:02]

• Menu of Options:

  1. Strikes on domestic security forces (to disrupt crackdown).
  2. Strikes to neuter Iranian retaliation capability (missiles, bases, naval assets).
  3. Hitting other “strategic” targets (nuclear facilities, major weapons).
  4. Direct attack on regime leadership (Supreme Leader, clerics—extremely high risk, reminiscent of Iraq 2003’s failed decapitation attempt).
  5. Attacks on Iran’s economic infrastructure (oil, banks—though less likely, as Trump values oil price stability).

• Risks:

  • Unpredictable Iranian retaliation (against U.S. bases, Israel, Gulf allies).
  • Potential for spiraling escalation if initial strikes don’t break regime and repression continues (trap of owning the aftermath).
  • Legal and diplomatic blowback—current White House appears less sensitive to these hurdles.

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5. What To Watch For

[Timestamps: 67:13–70:16]

• US military action: If, when, and what kind (targets, objectives).
• Regime Cohesion: Signs security forces fracture or leadership flees, as happened in ’53 and ’79.
• Emergence of Opposition Leaders: None currently—possible return of former Shah’s son or others, but unstructured so far.
• Israel’s reaction: Will they act, especially if attacked?
• US/China dynamics: Will Trump follow through on tariffs? Impact on world markets?
• Ethnic tensions: Will minority communities push for autonomy or secession if regime control loosens?
• Internet/Information: Will regime succeed in isolating population? Has Trump’s prior defunding of circumvention efforts backfired?

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Notable Quotes & Moments

• “Greenland is down in brown cow territory. Not so great in terms of what the president at least has put on the table as a threat.” – Jake Sullivan on Americans’ support for invading Greenland [04:38]
• “The water situation is wild… they’re also openly discussing whether they need to actually move the capital city, a city of upwards of 10 million people, to a less arid part of the country.” – John Finer [10:32]
• “Iran’s president said in November that they may have to evacuate part of the city [Tehran] if it didn’t rain soon.” – Jake Sullivan [08:19]
• “When the Iranian revolution took place…it was 70 rials to the US dollar. … When these protests kicked off, it was 1,450,000 rials to one US dollar.” – Jake Sullivan on Iran’s currency collapse [16:23]
• “We were having a hard time wrapping our arms around what was actually happening in ‘78 and ‘79. … Today, the United States of America has no embassy presence in Iran.” – Jake Sullivan [27:01]
• “Pahlavi… his name has come up a lot more over the course of the last few weeks” – Jake Sullivan on talk of restoring monarchy [30:05]
• “President Obama said he should not have listened to the folks who made this issue too complicated by suggesting somehow it was going to boomerang ... When you see people out in the streets claiming their rights… you should stand with them.” – Jake Sullivan [36:14]
• “It’s a wild card. It’s hard to tell.” – Jake Sullivan, summing up risks of escalation and unpredictable outcomes [54:58]
• “Does a leader of the opposition or group of leaders emerge… that does not appear to be forthcoming at the moment, but something to watch for.” – Jake Sullivan [68:35]

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Tone, Language, and Style

• The discussion is urgent but rigorous, seasoned by humor and insider anecdotes (example: “Greenland is down in brown cow territory”).
• Both hosts are candid about the enormous uncertainties facing policymakers and repeatedly counsel humility in predicting outcomes.
• They are self-reflective about past U.S. policy errors, especially the limits of American knowledge and the unintended consequences of intervention.

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Important Segments and Timestamps

• Introduction to the crisis in Iran: [01:24–07:14]
• Background on 2025/26 protest movement: [05:42–09:05]
• Regime crackdown and methods: [11:13–13:54]
• Trump administration’s stance and policy options: [14:01–14:52]
• History: 1953, 1979, and regime succession: [17:00–24:19]
• Case studies: Revolution prediction failures: [26:06–33:04]
• Obama-era Green Revolution policy debate: [33:10–37:31]
• Red Team/Blue Team military debate: [40:06–51:03]
• Military options and risks for US: [55:16–61:02]
• Regional reactions and Gulf countries’ fears: [51:18–53:01]
• What to watch in coming hours/days: [67:13–70:16]
• Security forces as the key variable: [70:48–72:21]

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Summary Conclusion

Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer’s conversation provides deep insight not just into the immediate crisis—but into the broader mechanics and tragedies of revolution, the fraught challenge of US intervention, and the hard-earned humility of policymakers who know the risks of getting it wrong. The fate of Iran’s regime, they argue, will likely turn not on Washington’s rhetoric or even its bombs, but on the loyalty of Iran’s security forces and the unpredictable will of millions of Iranians demanding change. Their final word: events are unfolding quickly—stay tuned.

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For further questions, comments, or to join the discussion:
Email: [e-mail]
Substack: staytuned.substack.com

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Hosts: Jake Sullivan & Jon Finer | Podcast Network: Vox Media
Executive Producer: Tamara Sepper
Senior Producer: Matthew Bay

Note: All times in MM:SS format based on the transcript provided.

Transcript

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[John Finer]

The big open question is whether this set of protests that are currently is the end or the beginning of the end of this third phase of sort of modern governance when it comes to Iran, the end of clerical rule.

[Jake Sullivan]

Welcome to the Vox Media Podcast Network. This is the latest episode of the Long Game.

I'm Jake Sullivan.

[John Finer]

And I'm John Finer.

[Jake Sullivan]

So, Jon, today we are obviously going to focus on Iran, the widespread protest movement across the country, the information blackout.

That'S making it very difficult to see the full picture.

The reports of a horrif brutal crackdown.

With thousands of casualties and we're going.

[John Finer]

To have a bit of a debate about what the United States should do. President Trump's obviously said quite a lot about what the United States may do will do. But the decision as of today, when we're recording has still apparently not been made or at least not been acted upon. So we'll discuss what the best way forward is.

[Jake Sullivan]

And just to reinforce, we are recording on Wednesday afternoon, tbd, exactly when this pod will drop. But we are watching things minute by.

Minute, hour by hour, as are many other people.

But before we get into all of Iran, first, John, this morning you were.

Up on Capitol Hill testifying before Congress on the US China AI competition.

How was that?

[John Finer]

Lucky me. Yes. I spent three hours with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, actually, in what turned out to be a very substantive line of questions. It was me and my predecessor as Deputy National Security Advisor, Matt Pottinger, and an economist named Oren Cass answering questions about the US China AI competition with an eye towards, I think, maybe imposing more restrictions on chips, which we've obviously talked about a fair bit in this podcast.

[Jake Sullivan]

Thank you for taking the message of.

This podcast to our elected representatives on Capitol Hill.

I know one elected representative, my wife.

Maggie Goodlander, who wishes at least for a day. She was on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. She had a whole set of tough questions ask you, but I guess she can do that over a glass of wine.

[John Finer]

I don't know if I'm glad or disappointed that Maggie didn't get to interrogate me. She certainly has done it a fair number of times outside of the context of Capitol Hill. So look forward to being able to appear before her one of these days.

[Jake Sullivan]

She looks forward to that as well.

The other thing that is happening today that's just wrapped up actually a little.

While ago, is representatives from Denmark and Greenland meeting with senior White House officials.

On Donald Trump's continued insistence that the.

United States take Greenland.

And we'll have more to say on that in the weeks ahead because that.

Is not an issue that's going away. I will just point one thing out.

I saw a poll that said only.

8% of Americans 8 support military action to take Greenland.

So I asked Gemini, what are other.

Things that only 8% of Americans support? And it gave me quite an interesting list.

It pointed out that 8% of Americans.

Believe that Elvis is still alive, 8% of Americans think the moon landing was faked.

And this is my favorite.

Roughly 8% of Americans believe chocolate milk comes from brown cows.

So Greenland is down in.

Invading Greenland is down in brown cow territory. Not so great in terms of what the president at least has put on the table as a threat.

[John Finer]

Yeah. And I love that. Although I think in terms of the likelihood that one of those things ends up being what actually happens in the world, Greenland might be considerably higher than 8%. I think those others may be even lower than 8%. So for better or for worse, fair enough.

[Jake Sullivan]

All right. From the somewhat amusing, although still deadly serious issue of whether or not the.

United States is going to break the NATO alliance over this obsession with, quote, unquote, taking Greenland, we should turn to the actual deadly serious, literally deadly issue of the brutal crackdown on protesters in Iran, the threat by the President of the United States to take military action against Iran, and everything that hangs in the balance as a result of that. John, do you wanna kick us off with the way you see things as they stand today, Wednesday afternoon?

[John Finer]

Sure. Well, this really began or emerged toward the end of last year, late December 2025, when Iranians started to go out in the street. And we'll talk about the various origins of this protest in more detail, but to demonstrate against their government. And unlike previous iterations of Iranian protests, which we'll also describe a bit, this one had some unique characteristics. And then it was almost entirely, at least initially, focused on economic concerns that the Iranian people had. It was led by, in many cases, what is called bazaaris, B A Z A A R bazaaris. So merchants in the Iranian markets who are very upset about the state of the Iranian economy, in particular about issues like inflation, which Iran has suffered from in no small part due to economic pressure placed on Iran by the United States and other Western countries. And so people had had enough and went out into the streets, starting with protests about economic issues. But as is often the case, these things tend to evolve. And this one has. So I don't know if you want to talk a bit about where this went from there.

[Jake Sullivan]

Well, where it went from there is it turned out that across Iranian society, in every province of Iran, from every pillar of the society, young people, as.

You said, the merchant class, ethnic minorities, you name it, and people poured out into the streets.

And yes, the immediate trigger was the.

Economic crisis, but there were a number of other factors at play here as well, including the strategic context, which is.

Iran having been exposed through the loss.

Of the axis of resistance, through the direct strikes by Israel and the United States and Iran, that regime being exposed is not really being able to defend its own territory and national security.

And then there have also been a very kind of deep seated argument within.

The protest movement, a cry for dignity.

For freedom, building on protests that took place while you and I were in.

The job in the Biden administration, the women Life freedom protests that were sparked by the killing of a woman named.

Mahsa Amini by the morality police in.

Prison because she wasn't wearing a veil. So this broader social, cultural context is very real.

And then there's one more element that has been a feature here that I think has been a little bit understated, which is that you have such gross.

Mismanagement by the regime in every respect. And one in particular stands out, which is the capital city, Tehran, is literally running out of water to the point where Iran's president said in November that they may have to Evacuate part of the city if it didn't rain soon.

So you have this gross mismanagement, this.

Economic crisis, this broader strategic context, and.

Then of course, the social and cultural.

Triggers of a people who have been repressed and oppressed for a very long time saying we want dignity, we want freedom, and particularly for women, we want autonomy over our bodies, over our choices.

And that led to this very broad.

Based protest movement that built on the.

Initial protest by the merchants and then.

A severe and brutal crackdown. The numbers today suggest that upwards of 12,000 people may have been killed, which one observer pointed out, if true, would.

Be more than were killed in the.

Iranian revolution back in 78 and 79.

A shocking human toll and seemingly rising as we go as the regime mobilizes every tool at its disposal to crack.

Down on people in the streets.

[John Finer]

So I think that's very well described and maybe just a few reactions. One is that these drivers are in many ways related to each other. Just as in the United States, you sometimes have people complaining, I would argue, often without perfect or full information, that money that's spent overseas is in some ways taking away from a benefit government should be providing to people here at home. The Iranian people seem to acutely feel that Iran's various adventures overseas. And you know, we talked about and people are familiar with the fact that Iran sponsors a number of destabilizing terrorist and other proxy organizations in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, in Yemen and in other parts of the region. And I think the Iranian people, it is not lost on them that funds that go to those organizations have not only brought a military reaction by Israel, by the United States against Iran in the last year, but also our resources that could be going to make their quality of life better. And instead their quality of life is getting worse. So that has clearly been a somewhat new driver of all of this. The water situation is wild because at least as I've read it, not only are they talking about possibly having to evacuate parts of Tehran, they are also openly discussing whether they need to actually move the capital city, a city of upwards of 10 million people, to a less arid part of the country. Now, we have seen some other countries. I could only think of a couple off the top of my head that have actually moved their capitals for various reasons in the not so distant past. One that I think we both are familiar with is in Burma. The capital city actually moved from a city called Rangoon to a city called Nepetab at that is not a small undertaking. And for Iran to even contemplate that suggests the quality of life must be incredibly low. So there's a number of things going on here, but the most salient one for the purposes of this discussion is this violent repression. I was just going to read one of the text messages that Iranian officials have been sending to the population there. And this stuff all, of course, gets reported in the press, but this was, you know, a few nights ago when people were out in the streets. The Iranian regime texted its own population. Moms, dads, hold onto your children. Uncles, aunts, make calls, tell this girl or that boy that if they go out to protest and if they get hurt, if a bullet is fired and something happens to them, you can't complain later. All manner of threats along these lines being issued to try to get people to go home, stop protesting. And then beyond just these threats, as you said, there are now significant numbers of people being killed. One thing I will say, it is very hard to get good information about what is happening right now on the ground in Iran. The Internet has been shut down. There are very few foreign reporters who are operating inside Iran in the current moment. So there are wildly divergent numbers when it comes to protesters, when it comes to people in the street. There have been some rumors about regime figures departing the country that were later dispelled. So one of the problems we've got, everybody's got, probably the administration has, to some extent, we'll get to that in more detail, is a perfectly clear picture of what is happening. I think is very difficult.

[Jake Sullivan]

Yes, as you point out, the regime.

Has remained totally defiant. That's a quite bracing message you just read. It really shows the face of this regime.

The supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has said protesters could be tried for the crime.

Of war with God, which carries a death sentence.

As you point out, the Iranian regime has flipped the kill switch on the Internet. Internet access is down to 1% of normal. The regime is also throttling electricity, throttling landline and mobile phones that has come in and out.

People have been occasionally able to make calls overseas, but frequently the phones are shut down.

All of this is trying to make.

It more difficult for protesters to organize to get out in the street.

And the regime is basically signaling they.

Will do what is necessary to crack down.

And notably, even some of the more reform minded elements of the government, like the current president, are said basically to.

Be on board with this comprehensive crackdown.

All of this has led the Trump administration and President Trump himself to threaten.

Military action in response to the regime using force against the protesters. Most recently, what President Trump said is help is on the way.

His spokespeople have said military options are on the table. Senior level White House meetings just in.

The last 24 hours have focused on those military options.

There have been reports in the press.

That military action could be imminent in.

The next hours or days. And what exactly that military action looks like and what the puts and takes.

Of it are, is something we'll come to in a minute. The other step President Trump has taken as an ounce, a 25% tariff on countries doing business with Iran.

One of the big countries doing business.

With Iran, China, a major purchaser of Iranian oil.

Will they actually get hit with a new tariff?

Will other countries? Trump has said that on social media. It remains to be seen what actually ends up happening.

And just to round things out on this point about moving Tehran, John, part of the reason they have to move it is not just because they're running out of water, but the city is literally sinking. I learned this new word reading up on this. It's called land subsidence because the Iranians have pumped out so much groundwater, the earth beneath the city is collapsing, and the city is sinking 10 inches per year. So I can't think of a better.

Metaphor for this regime. Basically, because of gross mismanagement, because of its venality, because of its oppression, the capital of Tehran is becoming dried out and shriveled up and is literally sinking into the ground.

That sort of sounds light.

[John Finer]

And by the way, this is a country that, as we've seen in the past, has earthquakes and other seismic events that you'd imagine could only exacerbate this, that have been very deadly and destabilizing in the past. One of the things they tried to do to get a handle on this, just to show how inept their response has been, is at the end of a year in which they had, I think, more than 50% inflation, you can imagine how that would go down in the United States. They offered a $7 a month subsidy to their population. And you've seen the results of all that. But as you say, people didn't think.

[Jake Sullivan]

$7 a month was going to solve.

[John Finer]

Their economic problems, didn't keep them out of the streets. And as you've seen, the regime is sinking, the city is sinking. And now the big question is, what happens next?

[Jake Sullivan]

Yeah, a number that's quite striking on the inflation front. When the Iranian revolution took place, it was 70 Iranian rials, the Iranian currency to one US dollar. That was in 1979 when these protests kicked off. It was 1,450,000 riyals to one US dollar. That kind of sums up the shocking state of affairs with the Iranian economy and the Iranian currency.

So before we go forward to what is going to come next and how.

To think about the implications and consequences.

Of that, I do think it's worth, John, taking one look back at how we got here in the broader historical.

Sweep, basically the modern history of Iran.

How this regime came to be, and.

Whether we are approaching another historic turning point in Iran.

So do you want to take a.

Minute to kind of walk through the.

History of the last, call it 75.

Years, how we ended up with the Islamic Republic, this revolutionary clerical government in Iran.

[John Finer]

I will start, and I think the first significant date to focus on, and we will do this briefly, but I think it's actually pretty interesting and important, is 1953. So maybe going back one year or so before that, there's a democratically elected leader of Iran, a man named Mohammad Mosaddegh. He is perceived in geopolitical terms at the height of the Cold War, as being close to Moscow. He was actually Time magazine's Man of the year in 1952, and not in a good way. They occasionally name people they consider to be villains, and he was one of them because he was so close to Moscow and because he had made what ended up being a fateful decision for him to nationalize what was called the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, big Western oil company, actually British oil company that was operating most of Iran's oil reserves. By the way, if any of this gives you flashbacks to Venezuela, which we talked about the week before, that shouldn't be surprising. Obviously, another country too close to U.S. and Western adversaries and that had nationalized oil assets 75 years later. So 1953 comes around. And the reason, by the way, that we know a lot about this is actually in a somewhat ironic twist. The Trump administration, during its first term in 2017, actually published US government archives from this period. A lot of historians had worked on this, so there was a lot known publicly. But the bulk of the information that the US government had was actually published in 2017. The United States, working in concert with the British and in concert with the Iranian opposition, actually conspired to topple the democratically elected leader of Iran, Mohamed Mossadegh. There's a lot of dispute about what exactly the United States did, whether our role was just a nudge or essential to getting Mossadegh out. But pretty clear now from the documentary evidence that we helped, that we gave Him a push, and then in comes what I would consider to basically be the second phase of governance in the modern era of Iran, which is the Shah. Do you want to talk a bit about him?

[Jake Sullivan]

Right. So the Shah was actually the constitutional monarch, even while Mosaddegh was prime minister. But after the CIA and the Brits.

Toppled Mosaddegh, by the way, it took him two tries. They failed the first time. So it was two coups, one failed. Then they get rid of him.

They make the Shah the absolute ruler of Iran. He is Western oriented, he is modernizing in the sense of trying to replicate.

The modernity of the West.

But he is fricking brutal and uses.

His secret police to crack down on any dissent in the country and ran basically a police state.

And over the 50s, 60s, 70s, his.

Grip on power began to loosen as a very disparate opposition started to coalesce to basically try to get rid of him and began pouring out into the streets in huge numbers in 1977, 78.

Ultimately leading to him fleeing the country.

At the beginning of 1979.

And everyone at that point basically rallied behind Ayatollah Khomeini, who had been in.

Exile in Paris for 15 years and came back triumphantly once the Shah was toppled.

But even those who weren't necessarily looking.

For a theocratic regime in Iran, the.

Same merchants who are out on the street now, the same students who are out on the street now, they looked at Khomeini as just somebody who could.

Be a uniting figure for the entire opposition, lead to the ouster of the Shah, and then things could get sorted from there. Well, what ended up happening is Khomeini consolidated power. And what you got is the theocratic clerical regime that we have been contending with, known as the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979.

[John Finer]

As you say, they've been in place ever since. Many of the founding fathers of Iran were quite Young in 1979, so some of them still very much on the scene to this day. And the big open question is whether the. This set of protests that are currently underway is the end or the beginning of the end of this third phase of sort of modern governance when it comes to Iran. The end of clerical rule, the end of this system that they call velayati faqi, which is interesting. We have a concept called the separation of church and state. In the United States, they have the opposite concept. This concept, Vilayat de Faki, basically says that you cannot detach, disentangle religion from governance. Iran is basically the only country on earth that has this as part of its modern governance structure. And one of the big mantras on the ground, two of them among the protesters are one, death to Khamenei, who is the modern heir to Khomenei, Khomeini, who you mentioned. And two, is end of velayatifaki, end of this rule by clerics, and implicitly install a more modern government for Iran. One interesting historical footnote, and then, you know, we should talk about where we think this, this, this might go is there was an ambassador in place in, in Iran, a United states ambassador in 1979. And it goes to this issue that we should talk about, which is how hard it is to predict what is happening. His last name was Sullivan. I don't think he's a relative of yours. William Sullivan.

[Jake Sullivan]

Distant cousin, I'm sure.

[John Finer]

Distant cousin, probably from back in the old country. And he wrote this very famous cable. Now, a cable for those who are not steeped in all this is essentially a diplomatic from an ambassador that tells people back home what is happening. It's a bit antiquated because these days you can get on the phone, you can send emails, you can send text messages, but these longer written missives can become a part of the historical record. And he wrote one that has become known as the thinking the unthinkable cable, which he wrote at the end of 1978, a couple months before the revolution toppled the Shah in 1979, in which he laid out all the reasons why, why it was probably unlikely that this would work, that the revolution or the people in the streets would topple the government, and that the United States strategy should be predicated on the fact that it probably will not succeed. But. And then his very last paragraph, he says if they put all the different pieces together effectively, if they essentially run the gauntlet and are able to succeed, we will have to think the unthinkable, which is the end of the Shah and a very different Iran for American purposes going forward. And so the big question that we're wrestling with right now is are we in another period where we have to start thinking the unthinkable about this regime going away?

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[Jake Sullivan]

You mentioned it's so difficult for the.

United States of America, I would say for the west in general, but particularly for the US to really understand what is happening in terms of revolutionary dynamics in Iran.

And that is very true today.

It was very true in the run up to the 1979 revolution.

That thinking, the unthinkable cable you referenced was From November of 1978, mere weeks before the Shah fell and long after. I think if you talk to opposition in Iran over the course of 1978, they felt this was inevitable. And in fact In August of 1978, there was a CIA assessment that concluded, quote, Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a pre revolutionary situation. So that's as these protests are unfolding on the ground. So we were having a hard time wrapping our arms around what was actually.

Happening in 78 and 79.

And that's when we had a massive.

Embassy presence on the ground and tons.

Of diplomats, tons of agency personnel there in the country. Today, the United States of America has.

No embassy presence in Iran.

Nobody on the ground. So we're trying to piece together and puzzle through what's going on with this protest movement. What's going on with the solidity or.

Fragility of the regime?

What are the dynamics? Who are the players? We're trying to do all that from.

Entirely over the horizon.

And just as one story about the kind of fundamental hollowness of the muscle.

In the United States for understanding Iran.

I was part of the team that went for the very first secret talks.

With the Iranians over The nuclear program. Back in 2012, it was just three.

Of us, and we flew to Oman.

To meet with a group of Iranians.

And we needed an interpreter. Except for the US government did not have a Farsi interpreter in 2012.

Not a Farsi interpreter.

We had people who could speak Farsi, but they weren't practiced in how you.

Actually interpreted diplomatic conversation.

We brought one of those folks with.

Us, and she did the best that she possibly could.

But it's just a. I think that is a tangible reminder that our ability as a government to really be able.

To say with any confidence, this is what's happening on the street. This is what's happening in the hallways of power there is quite constrained.

It was constrained in 79 when we were there.

It's even probably more constrained now.

And frankly, social media tells a very.

Confusing story as well, especially with the blackout.

So you're gonna hear stories, as you mentioned, the jets are spinning up, people are fleeing, the regime leaders are fleeing. Others will say, oh, no, the protests are dying down. We have to take all of that.

With a grain of salt.

And the only way to really get.

A picture is to try to have a composite of a lot of different.

And diverse sources, and then it's going.

To be fundamentally incomplete.

And the other reason, I think, John, it was important for us to talk about that history is because two things happened in both 53 and 79 that are worth our listeners looking for now.

The first is the security services flipped.

In 53, they backed the CIA coup. In 79, they stopped following through on.

The Shah's orders to shoot people. So far, the security services haven't flipped.

And the second is, in both 53 and 79, there was a single leader of the opposition who could come in and take over. It was the Shah in 53, it.

Was Khomeini in 79.

Today, there isn't such a leader, or so it seems. Although some people are suggesting it should be the Shah's son, Pahlavi, who should be brought back from his longstanding exile.

In the United States and run Iran.

Very hard to tell how serious that.

Is, how we should look at that.

But it is interesting that unlike previous.

Protest movements in the last 10 years, his name has come up a lot more over the course of the last few weeks.

[John Finer]

So I'll say something about Pahlavi, but I do just want to react to your first story, because I remember when you were headed off for those secret talks. I remember the meeting that we had in the White House to sort of plan for that I was still working in the White House then you were at the State Department. I remember Tom Donil and the National Security Advisor saying something to the effect of these are the highest level conversations that the United States will have had with Iran for at that point, 40 years. And a remarkable thing. I remember thinking, man, I hope he makes it back okay.

[Jake Sullivan]

But you also are probably thinking, wait, this guy, this guy's the highest level.

[John Finer]

We'Ve had maybe both of those things. I was being, for the podcast purpose, being more charitable. But no, it was a big deal. It was a big unknown at the time. And maybe just to put an even finer point on it, as far as I know, unless it's happened in this administration, the United States has not sent a senior level diplomat to Iran basically since the revolution.

[Jake Sullivan]

I think Witkoff wanted to go right. Didn't he talk about going to Tehran? Didn't. Didn't go, as far as I know. Well, it's actually, I think in the 80s, didn't we have some people show up in the whole Iran contrast?

[John Finer]

There may have been a visit in the 80s after the hostage crisis abated, but it has been decades since an American senior official has shown up in Iran. We hadn't talked on the phone at senior levels in decades, even when you went off for your trip. And then everything that flowed from that, including conversations between presidents, including a intense negotiation on the nuclear program at the level of Secretary of State and Foreign Ministry, but it was kicked off by your visit. The other thing I'd say is it's not just the US Government that has a hard time predicting what's going to happen inside Iran pre revolution. And our friend and colleague Karim Sajapour has written about this. The leading American scholar of Iran laid out what he thought of as the options if the Shah were to fall. And they basically included a left wing group of progressive military officers, a more right wing hunter. But whatever the option, he said the idea that a future Iran will necessarily be antithetical to American interests is not something we should fear. And so wrong, wrong and wrong. Karim himself, who's somebody I think everybody should look up and read if you haven't, has kind of put his cards on the table in terms of where this could go. And some very interesting articles, but I don't think we can have any confidence at all that anybody really has a perfect read or, or even a probable read on where this is headed.

[Jake Sullivan]

Yes, humility has got to be the order of the day both for characterizing what is actually happening right now and what might come next.

Just we need to have humility in.

Iran, as we do whenever you're talking.

About these revolutionary situations.

Now, John, the shadow of the Obama.

Administration'S experience with Iran and with a previous iteration of a protest movement, the Green Revolution, is being cast over the current situation to a certain extent, because.

Part of what Trump is going out there and saying is, I'm going to.

Go defend these protesters in a way that Barack Obama refused to do.

Do you want to talk for a minute?

We were both in the administration back then when the Green Revolution happened, about the Obama administration's response and how it looks in hindsight.

[John Finer]

So just to clarify, this was a few months before I joined the administration. I only say that for accuracy.

[Jake Sullivan]

Okay.

[John Finer]

You weren't there, so I cannot be blamed for anything that may or may not have happened at that time.

[Jake Sullivan]

I was at the State Department.

[John Finer]

Yeah, you were at the State Department. So 2009, I think it was summer of 2009, another iteration of these periodic protests flare up came known as the Green Movement, sort of a pro democracy movement that was flourishing in Iran at that time. And there was a big debate, debate that took place inside the White House, in the State Department, in the Obama administration, about less maybe, what the United States should do. Although you should talk about one thing that the United States did do during that time, but more at that point, what the United States should say. Because there were a number of, in particular, I think, experts on Iranian politics who sort of cautioned the president not to go too far in embracing, or at least according to President Obama's retelling, cautioned him not to go too far in embracing this movement, because it could make it seem as if, as by the way, the regime was trying to portray it, that this was essentially an American project, that the Americans had ginned this up, that the Americans were behind it, they were sponsoring it, and that it would discredit or even taint the demonstrators if he wrapped his arms around them too tightly. And as a result, his comments were extreme for a guy who was a very pro democracy person and believes in civil rights and human rights were very tepid compared to what people may have expected, at least in the early days of that struggle. And so maybe you can describe, because you were there in a bit more detail if you want, what actually took place.

[Jake Sullivan]

Yeah, look, I wasn't in the room as President Obama was weighing what he.

Was gonna say and not say, but I was at the State Department and.

Was in kind of the broader policy conversation. And there was a lot of Critics who said he's pulling his punches because he's so interest.

Interested in nuclear diplomacy.

And I think that's not accurate. He was pulling his punches for the reason you said, because he was hearing from his Iran experts in the U.S. government that if he went and threw his arms around the protesters, it would make their lives worse, not better. It would allow the regime to paint.

Them basically as the stooges of Great Satan.

And so he decided to be more cautious in his public comments. And it's interesting that. But not too long ago, a few years ago, he publicly said he thinks that that was a mistake, that in fact he should have just done the thing. I think he sort of had an.

Instinct to do, which is when you see people out in the streets claiming their rights, claiming their freedom, claiming their dignity, you should stand with them.

And he said he should not have.

Listened to the folks who made this issue kind of too complicated by suggesting somehow it was going to boomerang around on the protesters.

And I'll say that when we faced a similar situation in the Biden administration.

These protests around women, life and freedom after the brutal killing of Mahsa Amini, we definitely took a lesson from the Green Revolution. We did not listen to anyone who said, hey, if you speak out on this, you're gonna hurt the protesters. President Biden himself went out and said, I wanna speak clearly and passionately on the issue.

And he told us, do everything you.

Can to get the Internet back up and running there. Let's license those virtual private network can evade regime surveillance. Let's try to get Starlink terminals into Iran, et cetera. Let's put some sanctions on the people involved in the crackdown. And that was definitely a learning experience, the Green Revolution. And Biden certainly took away from that, that it was a mistake not to speak out more fully, as did President Obama.

And now you've got President Trump going even further and saying help is on the way and very much publicly floating.

That the US Will take military action to respond to this regime crackdown on the protesters in Iran.

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[Jake Sullivan]

I think, John, that really brings us to the main event, which is this question of whether the US should or should not take military action. What is the debate happening inside the US Government? A debate that, if you believe the.

Press, seems to be getting resolved in favor of action, but nonetheless a debate.

That has been unfolding with people on both sides of it.

So maybe what makes sense is for you and me to start by doing.

A Red team Blue Team exercise.

One of us in the position of.

A Trump advisor saying, Mr. President, you must take military action, one of us saying, Mr. President, don't use military action, potentially use other tools to support the protesters.

And then after walking through that to show our listeners more than just tell.

Them the kinds of considerations at play, we can talk a little bit further about what we might expect and then what might come next. I don't know how that sounds to you.

[John Finer]

Sounds good to me. And does it make sense to you if I take the pro side when it comes to military action and you argue against that?

[Jake Sullivan]

Sounds like plan, as in the Red team Blue Team exercise that we do on this podcast.

For those of you who are first.

Time listeners, this is not necessarily the case that we believe it is the case we are making in a rigorous way as part of the kind of.

Exercise you would see in the Situation Room to make sure that we we fully ventilated both sides of a given policy decision.

So John, go ahead and make the case as an advisor to the President.

That the United States should take military action in Iran.

[John Finer]

Great. All right, so I would start off by saying, Mr. President, and this is a good thing you already have inserted yourself into this situation in a way that gives you some ownership over the outcome. Because not only did you say, and I think, Jake, the line that you cited was help is on the way, you also said the United States is locked and loaded, which really does suggest military action, not just some ineffable form of help. So you own this. And there's the Obama precedent, which we'll talk about, that you really want to avoid. Don't want to be like him. But there's another precedent that is worth bearing in mind, which goes back to 1991, when President George H.W. bush, at the end of the first Iraq War, when he had formed a big coalition and driven Iraq out of Kuwait, Iraq had invaded Kuwait, and the United States and our allies pushed them out. George H.W. bush, Mr. President, who I know you don't like, you don't like his family, don't want to be like him either. He made what is considered to be one, I think, significant mistake in a presidency that was marked by pretty good foreign policy, which is he said to the Iraqi Shia, basically that they should rise up and overthrow their government, overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein. He said there's another way for the bloodshed to stop. People need to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside. What happened was the Shia of Iraq did rise up, did try to overthrow their government, and were absolutely crushed by Saddam Hussein. Estimates are between 30,000 and 60,000 people were killed. And the United States was to some extent blamed for that, for having encouraged it and not intervened in any way to help them. And if anything, Mr. President, you're even more on the hook because you actually pledged you would do something about this. President Bush just encouraged it. Second, don't get backed down by these people talking about false analogies. Not everything has to be the invasion of Iraq, which I know you hate. You don't have to have some grand ambition for remolding or nation building in Iran. As long as you are clear and disciplined, which is obviously a huge strength of yours, you can pull this off in a way that is constructive and successful. If the regime is teetering, a push from you, a military push from you, will help topple them. So you should focus not on a broad military campaign against the entire Iranian apparatus, but on the domestic security forces that are cracking down on their own people, on their ammunition depots, on their command and control, and. And importantly on their ability to retaliate against us. Because you want to try as much as possible to take that off the table, so we can't be hurt in the process. And keep your goals limited. You never said regime change. You never said you would take out Khamenei. You said you would send help to the people of Iran, and you can do that by focusing on the people who are hurting them. Third, the whole game at this point, and Jake, you just alluded to this, is convincing the security forces not to fight the people. People. One thing that is making it very uncomfortable for the security forces to fight the people is the possibility of US Military action against those security forces. That is a deterrent. It is a way to dissuade them from continuing to crack down. And you should play that card, because then they will be squeezed between a grassroots uprising by their own people and the hammer that you can bring down on them from the outside. It increases the likelihood that they will quit and stop defending the regime. Fourth, unlike other times when military action was contemplated by the United States, this would put you squarely on the side of the Iranian people. When you bombed the nuclear program. There may have been very good national security rationales for that, but it was not something that was broadly supported by the people of Iran or really something that much of the world felt comfortable defending. Here you are putting yourself squarely on the side of goodness and right. The people who are trying to overthrow the shackles of this oppressive regime. And you can be with them, which is a rare opportunity in the international stage, and you should seize it. Fifth, the risk to the United States for doing this will never be lower than it is today. Because of what you did last summer, because of what the Israelis have done to Iran's missile program and its air defenses, you should be able to conduct this operation at a lower level of risk than would otherwise be the case. Whatever it is you decide to do, whether it's airstrikes or missile strikes, you will be able to do it without them being able to stop you. And their retaliation will be less than it would have otherwise been, not zero risk. I don't want to give you that impression, Mr. President. And then finally back to Obama. Do not let this be like Obama's red line was in Syria. You've talked about this at great length. President Obama said that President Assad of Syria must go. When the people of Syria started to rise up, he said that the United States would take military action if Assad ever used chemical weapons. Or at least he said it would be a red line if Assad ever used chemical weapons against his own people and he did not do anything about militarily, either of those things. If you don't act here, you are going to be Obama Part 2 When it comes to Iran. And people will remember that. That.

[Jake Sullivan]

Mr. President, my colleague made a game.

Case for why you should take military action.

But I want to start with the fact that in this case, you've said your military action is there to help the protesters, protect the protesters. And in terms of actually being able to protect the protesters and stop the.

Regime from cracking down, your military options just aren't very good.

You could do a strike on Iranian.

Military facilities, but that's not going to stop the crackdown and the regime killing of protesters. They're going to keep going.

You could try to take out the Supreme Leader. And let's say you succeed, you're not likely to get an Iranian, Delsey Rodriguez in his place. You're likely to get another hard man, probably from the irgc who's just as.

Determined to crack down on the protesters.

And also, we could get bad intel. We could take a shot at the.

Supreme Leader and miss.

If we took a shot at the leader and missed, that would look really bad for you. You could have sustained military action over many days or weeks. But frankly, Mr. President, we're not really.

Set up right now for that. First of all, we have no carrier in the region.

We moved our carrier from the Middle.

East to Venezuela to deal with the Maduro situation, and the rest of our carriers are either in maintenance or in the Asia Pacific.

Second. Second, a lot of our friends in the region don't want us to use.

Their bases to launch these attacks.

So you got tools. You got Tomahawks and you got planes that can fly a really long way.

All the way from the United States if necessary.

But if you're looking to do a sustained military campaign to try to protect the protesters, we're gonna have to build.

Up a lot more than we built up.

And by the way, let's say you did succeed. Let's say the regime does crack. We could be looking at the next Libya or Syria. This opposition is splintered. It's basically leaderless. This Shah's son business, he's not riding.

In on a horse.

And there are some pretty tough customers in Iran. Balochi, separatists, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs who might want to actually literally split the country. So no guarantee we don't get utter chaos in Iran. And that may seem better today than the thugs currently in charge. And the thugs currently in charge are.

About as bad as it gets, both for the Iranian people. And for us. But, man, this would still be a massive headache and we would own it.

And it could spill over into a.

Bunch of other countries, into Iraq, into the Gulf, into other places.

Also, Mr. President, let's not forget, something.

Could go wrong with the military. Operation Maduro went great, but it was damn risky.

We almost lost a helicopter, we almost lost a pilot to the Houthi air.

Defenses when we were bombing Yemen. You've already kicked butt.

You snatched Maduro in a brilliant op.

You totally decimated Iran's nuclear program. I don't know if right now you need to press your luck. Iran's a big win for you.

Now, I take this point about the.

Obama red line, but you're Donald Trump.

You're not Barack Obama. And unpredictability is part of your game. So you could say I threatened it. I got the regime to back off some executions. I got them to think twice. I got them to come to the table and make a bunch of offers to the United States. My threats really worked, and I could bomb them anytime I want. So you can retain all of the.

Capacity to be who you are, which.

Is a guy who people know will use military force when you feel you need to, but also a guy who's willing to adjust course to get what.

The United States needs when the United States needs it.

And that brings me to the last.

Point, which is I think you can get what you need from this regime.

They want to talk, they want a.

Deal, they want to make concessions. We've got them in a tight spot.

So let's get them to make us.

A bunch of concessions before we go in and start bombing and maybe drive them up a tree where they can't do much. And those are the reasons why I think right now military action is likely to just create more headaches for you rather than less.

At the end of the day, you take some strikes, the crackdown continues, the regime stays in place. It kind of looks like you didn't succeed. And then if you keep going until you knock the regime out altogether, you've bought a massive number of question marks.

That you just don't need right now, especially when Iran is already such a huge success story for you, given that you have taken out the major threat to the United States of America, which is their nuclear program.

So, John, there's the argument on one side and the other. Do you want to. Anything you want to say further in the exercise, or do you want to kind of shift now? Now that we've really tried to lay out the arguments in an advocacy kind.

Of way as the president will be.

Hearing them from people who feel strong.

Convictions on both sides of this issue.

Kind of talk through how you see.

This, what you think people should be.

Looking for, what we might expect to see in the next literally hours or.

Days when it comes to the question of military action in Iran.

[John Finer]

So I think we should do that. The one thing I think we should add into the mix, and maybe it's an argument on your side, I'm not totally sure, is that at least according to reports, a number of countries in the region are going to the Trump administration and making the case saying don't not do this, which I think there's a particularly, I think clear explanation for. But it's countries that might surprise some people. Countries that are not particularly fond of Iran, like Saudi Arabia, may also be countries that have a better relationship with Iran, like Oman or like Qatar. But I will say all these countries are in the Gulf. And one thing that is somewhat predictable about Gulf foreign policy is they tend not to have a lot of sympathy or empathy for popular uprisings against autocracies and maybe for reasons quite close to home. So they don't want the precedent of the United States being on the side of that. I think they also don't love the idea of the Iranian regime falling and being replaced by something that is totally unpredictable. They tend to be a devil, you know, kind of analysis. And so they apparently are going to the Trump administration, at least according to published reports, and saying maybe don't go ahead with this.

[Jake Sullivan]

Yeah, I mentioned briefly in my lay.

Down that the Gulf countries probably wouldn't allow us to use their bases to do this strike. But this broader point that they're actually advocating, hey, Mr. President, don't do it, I think is an important one.

One other argument I don't didn't address that you raised and I think is a reasonable argument on the side of.

Military action, which is that unlike two years ago, before 24 and 25, Iran is very weakened militarily and their options to defend or to counterattack are far less than had been the presumption before the exchanges between Israel and Iran while we were in office and then before the 12 day war last year.

But on the other hand, Iran still.

Does have a ton of short range.

Ballistic missiles that are in range of.

Our various bases and facilities across the Gulf. We have people in Iraq, we have people in Syria, we have people in Bahrain, in Qatar, in Kuwait, in uae, in Saudi. And while they're moving some of those.

Folks out, you might say that the.

Risks that arise decides on a significant military response that puts US People at.

Risk is lower today than one might.

Have thought a few years ago.

But it's not zero. And it's something that the administration will.

Certainly be taking into account as they think about conducting this action, particularly since.

Some of the air defenses that they.

Had moved into the region for the 12 day war, they've now moved back out of the region, back to Korea, back to other places. So actually, our ability to defend ourselves today is not the same as it was last summer when we dropped the bombs on their nuclear facilities.

[John Finer]

Really important point that I hope they are taking into account, and I hope if they do go ahead, they have done the needful to reestablish our ability to, at a minimum, defend our own forces before going ahead with a strike, because it's likely that Iran will at least try to retaliate in a significant way. They're making all kinds of threats, but they will try. All right, so they may try to.

[Jake Sullivan]

Do something like last time that's more.

Symbolic as opposed to very serious.

It's a wild card. It's hard to tell. The last time we were messaging them.

We'Re not coming for the regime, we're just coming for the military facilities, for the nuclear facilities.

And they kind of answered by saying, we need to show we're responding, but.

We'Re not going to do too much.

It is more of a wildcard in.

The context where they may feel the regime is under threat.

And the question I guess I would put to you, John, I laid out some of the potential military options, but I think it'd be helpful for our listeners if you took a minute, if you were sitting there talking to the.

Joint Chiefs, talking to centcom, talking to our intelligence professionals, how would you think about this question of the menu of military options available to the president and what we might see in the way of military action here in the period ahead?

[John Finer]

So I think there are four sort of levels to think about when it comes to possible retaliatory options. One is, what is the bare minimum that you need to do to make good on the commitment you made to actually provide help to the demonstrators? So that's the domestic security apparatus, their weapons, their command and control headquarters, maybe even their leadership. That is one. A second to me would be okay. If you do that, they will potentially retaliate against the United States. So we should go after targets that could be used from which they could retaliate. So that's their missile program. You mentioned they have hundreds of Short range missiles and launchers. So you'd want to do that to take their retaliation off the table. Then you go to maybe some naval.

[Jake Sullivan]

Assets as well in that area.

[John Finer]

Naval assets? Well, because they're just across the Gulf. Then you go to the bigger ticket questions. Are there other strategic targets in Iran that just because you happen to be taking military action, you're worried about, and in the context of doing these other things, it's no greater risk to hit those as well. And so you want to take those off the table. And those are any number of possibilities from if we believe that they are reconstituting their nuclear program to other weapon systems that don't implicate retaliation, maybe don't implicate their repression of their own people, but that are things we don't really want them to have. And we have this sort of free shot because we're already taking the risk of military action to take those out. And then to me, the fourth category is the biggest open question, which is do they just go for the regime writ large, whether that means Khamenei, the other political leadership? Because one thing they have not done in the course of the bombing campaign last summer is gone after essentially Iran's political civilian leadership. They went after military leaders, they went after nuclear scientists, which they tied very directly obviously to the nuclear threat against the United States. But they did not go after political civilian leadership or the clerical leadership, really, Khamenei and I don't know if that stuff's on the table or not, but that would obviously be the most disruptive, biggest ticket, highest risk, strikes they could take.

[Jake Sullivan]

One thing we talked about last week.

In the context of Maduro is these terrorists we go after have had all.

These decades of doing operational security to try to avoid getting targeted by the.

US which makes it more difficult.

Some of these leaders are less good at that. Maduro was obviously less good at that.

He got snatched out of his bed.

The IRGC generals that Israel took out weren't very good at it. A lot of them just got killed in their home. One has to wonder whether the Supreme Leader and the people around him have finally gotten the message that they are personally at risk and whether they're doing something different now than they did before the 12 Day War, or even something different now than before the Maduro capture in terms of moving around or trying to cloak their location and so forth. So it's a big question to me, just how good a bead do we have on the regime leadership if the.

President were to order a strike against them, how confident would we be that we could take them out?

You might remember another Iraq illusion back to the past in the opening days.

Of the Iraq war in 2003, we.

Thought we were getting Saddam as part.

Of that shock and awe in Baghdad in the first 24, 48 hours. And we missed him. We had to go hunt him down in a spider hole in Tikrit, I think it was. But that's a big question for me.

And then, then the category you didn't put on the table that I think.

They'Ve got to be debating is what about oil targets or economic targets.

You could imagine them saying to the regime, we're going to hit banks or we're going to hit revenue generating facilities of the irgc, or we're even going to hit oil. If you do not, and we will.

Expand our strikes, we'll hit one thing and then say we'll do more if you do not comply with our demands to stop cracking down.

Putting the economic squeeze on, I think is possible. Now, I have not seen that actually.

In the floating of targets so far.

And there are reasons to think President.

Trump cares a lot about oil prices, may not want to spook the oil.

Markets, but I at least think we.

Have to put it on the table as a possibility.

And beyond that, in the Venezuela case, part of the strategy of squeeze on the regime was a bit of a blockade on their oil sector. One has to ask whether at a moment when Iran is actually exporting nearly a seven year high in barrels of oil, whether the administration is going to try to do something to really reduce.

Their ability to sell oil, and in doing so put an even further economic vise around Iran. That's something I think we also have to watch for in this context.

But I think that lays out and the questions you asked about both what a given action would achieve and what.

The possible counter reaction would be. That's exactly what they've got to be working through right now.

[John Finer]

By the way, it's worth pointing out, if we submitted you and I or our policy team in the NSC when we were there, that list of targets to the lawyers who scrub these things for whether they are all completely comporting with the letter of the law in terms of international law, domestic law, there are certain of those that they would have scrubbed right off the list. Probably the economic targets, probably some of the regime civilian targets, this administration does not seem to care one lick about that, which is why it hasn't been a significant focus of our analysis. But it's probably worth at least pointing that out. And I have to say what feels like the biggest risk here, and you put it squarely on the table in your arguments to the, your fictitious argument to President Trump is that they do this, it changes nothing. And then you are faced with this horrific dilemma of whether to look like you failed because the protest has been crushed, or to double down and do something even more substantial and even more significant. And that is an escalatory spiral. You just don't know where it is ends. And the more we end up owning. You and I have both argued against the idea that we should be owning politically, militarily, in any way, Venezuela, just because Trump decided to intervene there. This is an even harder governance proposition. It's much further from the United States. It is not something this administration should want, or I think does want to take on. But the further you go down that road towards forcing an outcome, the more tempting it is going to be. And these slippery slopes can become real if you aren't disciplined. And discipline is not their strong suit.

[Jake Sullivan]

Yeah, it's hard to see exactly how they slip through that particular dilemma. Namely that you take some strikes.

It doesn't stop the repression. The regime stays intact. And now you're faced with, do you have to keep taking strikes until somehow you've ended the regime or allowed the protesters to pour out into the streets unmolested?

Very difficult to get through that unless you're really, really cynical and what you.

Think is we're gonna drop some bombs.

Say we were supporting the protests.

[John Finer]

Check the box.

[Jake Sullivan]

Kind of hope that the protests die.

Down, and then cut a deal with.

[John Finer]

The regime there looked briefly like there might be a sort of an off ramp here. Candidly does not look to me anymore like there is much of an off ramp. But the Iranians apparently reached out, or somebody reached out to somebody. And there was a conversation between Steve Witkoff, at least has been reported, and Abbas Arachi, the Iranian foreign minister, I think to see if there was a way to negotiate in the way that you laid out in your argument, a way out of military action. Now, Abbas is somebody who was in Oman with you when you did the negotiations. He was the deputy to Javad Zarif when I worked for John Kerry and we did the Iran nuclear deal. He is, I will characterize him, you can tell me if you disagree. Extremely shrewd, smart, soft spoken, sober, and extremely hard line and connected to the security establishment inside Iran, which is why he has survived through various regimes and governments inside Iran over the years. I thought if he actually Got into a real conversation that could have a real outcome with Witkoff or whoever. Maybe they would find their way off the hook. But try Trump sort of definitively shut that down. Over the last couple days, all diplomatic conversations are canceled, and every signal that we are seeing suggests that military action is likely in the next, call it, few days.

[Jake Sullivan]

You know, John, one other possibility that.

We have to consider in the very, very cynical bucket is that President Trump looks at the situation, gets some reports that, in fact the protests are dying down. And you and I have talked about the fact that, that there's a lot of information coming out of Iran in every direction, and we don't know what is actually happening. But there are some reports that there are fewer people on the street because of the sheer scale of the brutality and repression.

So he sees the protest dying down, he hears that there's some delays in executions, and he says, well, it sounds.

Like the killing's over and the executions may not happen or will happen later. This is my threat of military force works.

This was in a way, part of.

What I was saying in the Red.

Team, Blue Team as an argument that could be used.

But in fact, this may possibly be what Trump does.

I think he's gone so far down the road of signaling military action and.

So far down the road of even signaling the movement of military assets that this would be quite a striking thing to do.

But one cannot rule out that possibility.

Because we are dealing with a very unpredictable problem.

[John Finer]

President, look, as you say, because the threats have been pretty specific and pretty concrete, he will need a pretext, but in situations like this, to pluck some moment or some minor de escalation and attribute that to why you're not taking action. For a president like Trump who believes at least he can create his own truth and his own explanations for things, and at least his followers will buy them. Not impartially possible. So it's not an off ramp in the sense of that we traditionally think of them, but he could create his own off ramp if he decides he doesn't want to do this. And I think then the big question is, are people going to basically accept that, or are there going to be a lot of angry people, including in particular, probably the people of Iran, but also people in the United States who have been quite excited about the possibility that Trump might do what United States presidents have not done in the past and take action on behalf of the Iranian people? I don't think that's a majority view in the United States, but it's a very motivated very vocal minority who are looking to President Trump for action, and we'll see how this plays out.

[Jake Sullivan]

So we're looking closely at the possibility.

Of military action in the coming hours and days. But we, of course, cannot rule out the possibility that President Trump zigs when everyone else thinks he's zagging.

So what to watch for? I'll put a few things on the.

Table for our listeners. Obviously, what military action, what targets? Assuming that the US does proceed, it's Donald Trump. There's still a chance he doesn't.

But in the event that he takes action, what are the targets and what.

Is the stated objective of hitting those targets? That's one thing to watch. And we've talked through some of the options available to the president. I think a second one which we haven't talked about is what does Israel do in light of all of this?

Right now they're standing back and saying.

The US Is carrying the ball on this.

Does that change unless Iran, if Iran.

[John Finer]

Reacts, because they are seeing.

[Jake Sullivan]

Yes, exactly.

I was going to say unless Iran reacts and it reacts against them, or do they then see an opportunity following.

A set of US Strikes to possibly hit their own targets in the ballistic and nuclear space or otherwise? So I think we have to watch the Israeli equation.

A third question for me is do.

Cracks in the regime appear or cracks.

Between regime leaders and the security forces?

We have not seen that yet. We have seen a united front, but.

That is a factor to watch, which.

Was critical in both 53 and 79.

Another is, does a leader of the opposition or group of leaders emerge that give the opposition a feeling that is.

Less formless than it feels right now?

Now, I'm skeptical on the Pahlavi front, but others have suggested maybe he could end up assuming that mantle. We have to watch that. That's the son of the shah. Is there someone else actually inside the.

Country, not him, who could end up emerging as an opposition leader, who could catalyze and galvanize more unity in the opposition? That does not appear to be forthcoming at the moment, but something to watch for.

And then, of course, there's the question of what the US does in terms.

Of its pressure on other countries like China.

Do they actually follow through on imposing.

Tariffs on China and other countries?

Do they follow through on downward pressure.

On oil sales that would have an.

Impact in other areas of the world.

On our relationship with China, for example.

And then what happens with the Internet? I want to make one point here.

That I think is is important a.

Lot of the way that people get.

Access to the Internet in Iran is they get access either to Starlink terminals, which the regime is trying to crack.

Down on, or they find ways to.

Get virtual private networks that can somehow.

Connect, which is difficult right at the.

Moment when they've throttled the entire Internet. But at various points, it gives people protection to get online.

The Biden administration put a lot of money into groups that were supplying the.

Tools of Internet access to Iran. Last year, the Trump administration, administration slashed that funding.

So this is one of those things that when it happened, a lot of people came out and said, you're gonna.

Be sorry you did this. And today I think the Trump administration probably is sorry it did that, because now they're looking to try to get Internet access to the protesters at a time when the regime is really cracking down.

So that's my list of to watch as the next few days unfold in the aftermath of strikes.

That question of regime cohesion, regime unity, is a very important one. And a related question is, do some.

Of these pressures around ethnic minority groups, groups who might think about an alternative theory of the cohesion of Iran as.

A country, do they become more prominent in this debate? I think that's something we have to watch as well.

What's on your list?

[John Finer]

So I'm just going to focus on one element of your list because I think it's by far the most important, and that is, what do the security forces do? And we have two models for this from the not so distant past. There's the Syria model, where there was an uprising, in this case became a very heavily armed uprising against President Assad. His security forces stuck with him. The United States in various ways, tried to help the opposition. And for many years, more than a decade, he was able to hang on to power by crushing that uprising in the most brutal way imaginable. There's a second model, though, which took place in Egypt, and people will remember at the kind of height of the Arab Spring, the tar here square protest. Now, in this case, it was not an armed uprising, at least not a heavily armed uprising. The United States actually, for the most part, was trying to advise our ally Egypt, on how to navigate this, on what concessions to make to the demonstrators. And the government of Mubarak was. Was one step behind always the demands in the streets. And even though that uprising was not armed, and the United States in that case did not really push Mubarak until the end, when President Obama did say that he should step down, that uprising was able to succeed in a relatively short period of time. So one question I have is in large part by the way, because the security forces refused to crush it and essentially stood back, did not want to be on one side or the other. For now, it looks like the Iranian security forces are every bit with the regime. The big question I have is, does that hold?

[Jake Sullivan]

Does that hold? Does that hold?

And by the way, and this will be my concluding comment, the regime may emerge on the other side of this particular episode for all the reasons that we've discussed. But but given all of the pressures.

We described at the outset, it is definitely the case that with each successive wave of uprising and each successive conclusion of venality and corruption and oppression and mismanagement, this regime is not healthy and.

Is not looking like it is in.

It for the very long haul. And then there's of course the question of the Supreme Leader himself, who is old.

And we will face at some point.

Here, one way or the other, a succession issue. And I think that too will crystallize the fact that whatever happens in the coming days, the direction of travel for this particular regime in Iran is not.

[John Finer]

Trending well for them, not long for this world. All right, all right.

[Jake Sullivan]

Well, we could be doing a update pod here in two hours or six hours or 12 hours, depending on what happens in the real world. But for now I think we'll leave it at that and we will watch.

Like everyone else to see what comes next in this very fast moving situation.

[John Finer]

Yep, we'll be paying close attention and look forward to discussing this again soon. But quite a couple of weeks of well, that's all for today. We'll be back next week, if not sooner, with a new episode of the Long Game.

[Jake Sullivan]

In the meantime, send us your questions and [e-mail] and find us here on.

[e-mail] as always, the links are in the show notes.

[John Finer]

That's it for this episode of the Long Game.

[Jake Sullivan]

If you like the show, please follow, Share with friends and leave a review. It really helps listeners find us for.

[John Finer]

Updates and more analysis in your inbox. Join the [e-mail] the long game is.

[Jake Sullivan]

A Vox Media Podcast Network Production Executive Producer Tamara Sepper Lead Editorial Producer Jennifer Indig Deputy Editor Celine Rohr Senior Producer.

[John Finer]

Matthew Bay Video Producers Nat Wiener and.

[Jake Sullivan]

Adam Harris Supervising Producer Jake Kaplan Associate.

Producer Claudia Hernandez Marketing Manager Leanna Greenway.

[John Finer]

Music is by Nat Wiener. We're your hosts, John Finer and Jake Sullivan.

[Jake Sullivan]

Thanks for listening.

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