← The Long Game with Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer
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Kurt Campbell
a lot of Trump foreign policy is that they have basically relegated experts to the ash bin of history. They're not consulting experts who understand issues about Central Europe, about Iran for sure. And it is also the case that there are not very many people around the President that really understand the to and fro of Asia, let alone China. So if you're trying to prepare the President, what you're really doing is trying to get him to take the diplomatic Hippocratic oath to do no harm.
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Jake Sullivan
Welcome back to the long game. I'm Jake Sullivan.
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John Finer
And I'm John Finer. It's the eve of the US China Summit in Beijing and we are joined by the person who has probably had more occasions to prepare American President to engage Chinese leaders than anyone. Kurt Campbell has been the top Asia hand at the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon, and most recently served as Deputy Secretary of State. Jake and I have both worked with Kurt on and off for a long time. I think we've both traveled to China with him. I know we've both learned a lot from him an unnamed colleague of ours calls Kurt the goat of Asia diplomacy. And I will say up front, it isn't Kurt who says that, by the way, in case you were wondering. But it's true, and it's not a particularly close call. What's also true is there's no colleague we've had who's more creative, more effective, more generous, and I think you'll find more fun. So, Kurt Campbell, welcome to the long game.
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Kurt Campbell
John, that's very gracious. Thank you. It's great to see both you and Jake. It's like a reunion. I feel a little bit better already.
- [03:11]
Jake Sullivan
Well, it's always good to see your face, Kurt, hear your voice. And we're looking forward to talking about the issue of the day, which is Donald Trump has landed in Beijing. He's soon to begin his summit with Xi Jinping. This is the first visit by a US President to China in almost a decade since President Trump himself last visited in 2017. So I think it would probably be most useful to start by asking you to take us inside. Xi Jinping's thinking, how does he see the US Right now? How does he see President Trump? How does he see the US China relationship? Just curious where he's coming from as this thing kicks off. We're recording on Wednesday, really, later tonight, US Time, the festivities will begin. And people will be listening to this over the course of this summit, but set the stage for us.
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Kurt Campbell
Well, first of all, the interesting thing about the Chinese, the leadership in President Xi, is that they do have a framework for how they see the United States. And I think beginning in the late knots, their strategic thinkers and ideology advisors. Advisors basically came to the conclusion that inexorably, the United States was in a hurtling decline. And they would point to various sort of indicators in the United States. I think in many respects, some of those assessments picked up speed during the latter part of President Trump's first term. But it was also the case that, frankly, when you both were at the White House and President Trump, Biden with his team, decided to put in place a rather constructive set of strategies associated with domestic investment, working with allies and partners. It gave the Chinese some pause. They thought, wow, there are more cards left to play. The United States is maneuvering more effectively than we had anticipated. I would say, I think more recent indicators of, you know, another kind of quicksand, war in the Middle East. Other challenges that President Trump is facing has caused them to have more confidence in this assessment that the United States is indeed on the way out. So President Xi comes to this meeting with quite a lot of confidence. You both know this. They believe that China is in the ascendance. They recognize that President Trump is dangerous, potentially, he's unpredictable. But I think they also believe during this second term that they can manipulate him. They were very off balance through much of the first term. This second term, they have a game plan in which they treat the President with great respect personally. But every blunderbuss trade tariff initiative that the President takes, they have a response immediately, a scalpel like response to underscore American vulnerabilities in this very complex competition between the United States and China.
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John Finer
Kurt, can you just say a little more about what evidence the Chinese would marshal to make the case for American decline? If they're speaking internally and actually increasingly externally, expressing these thoughts, like, what are they pointing to? What are they thinking about?
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Kurt Campbell
I would just underscore. Probably the most important advisor to President Xi on how to see the world in the United States is not someone from the Foreign Ministry. Jake's counterpart is still influential. Wang Yi is a foreign minister and state counselor, but he listens a lot to one of the men who sits with him on the Standing Committee, this sort of opaque, secretive group that rules China. It's really President Xi who rules China, but they are around him. His name is Wang Huning. He's an ideologist. He has studied in the United states. In the 1990s, he actually wrote a book called America versus America. And what he tends to do is look at a variety of factors. Participation in elections, evidence of violence in the United states, uprisings like January 6th. They focus more on issues associated with social kind of cohesion, and also issues associated with economic performance and the like. They see a lot of evidence that their main mission, which is to catch up and surpass us in technology and manufacturing, is bearing, you know, kind of very productive fruit. And they see that path being quite successful. They look at the United States and they see it, you know, the infrastructure crumbling, difficulty in managing the most basic governing functions. They would look at the doge effect on the United that took place in the United States as inexplicable. And in fact, the largest thing, John, is that, you know, rarely we're living in an international system that the United States helped build and worked with allies on for decades. Systems come and go, but rarely is the dominant system basically attacked from within, from the leading nation that designed it. So the Chinese are watching that. There was a wonderful cover of the Economist a couple of weeks ago saying, just stand by while your main enemy commits error after error. So the Chinese believe that the United States is doing many things that frankly are undermining its power both domestically and internationally. And their goal more than anything else is to not stop that process.
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Jake Sullivan
You know, Kurt, it's really quite striking. Our friend and former colleague Julian Goertz pointed out that China's Minister of State Security, Chen Yuxin, wrote a long essay on national security in China at the end of last year, a few months ago, and this was his assessment of the United States, quote, its democracy is mutating, its economy decaying, its society fracturing at an accelerated pace. Abroad, its credibility is really going bankrupt, its hegemony is crumbling and its myth is collapsing. He said that publicly. But you can imagine, as you just pointed out, that Wang Huning and others around Xi are telling Xi in preparation for this summit and just more generally, hey, this is America. It's on its way out, it's on its way down, China's on its way up. And I think for our listeners to understand that that's the backbone backdrop from Beijing's perspective about where this goes is really important. So I guess let's flip it though, to the other side of the table. And Donald Trump is coming into this summit with his own perspective and trying to achieve certain things. Let's say you were on Air Force One flying in with Donald Trump as you have done with previous leaders from the United States. What would you be telling him that he should be trying to get out of this? What would your advice to President Trump be and what do you think he is going into this trying to achieve?
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Kurt Campbell
Let's just remember this. Let's say you're a staffer on Air Force One. Right now, President Trump is surrounded by a group of the wealthiest investors and businessmen on the planet and he's hobnobbing with them up in the front cabinet. I would be the staffer lurking in the background hoping just for a few, seriously, this is how it goes. Hoping for a few minutes to get him briefed up and wondering if he's looked at the briefing papers. What you have to remember, Jake, I don't need to tell you and John this. The scarcest resource is not our precision munitions. It's not where our fleet is. It's the time and attention of the senior most people. And that starts with the President of the United States. It is well known that remarkably little preparation has gone on in advance of this trip. The president has dispatched Secretary Besant and the USTR to China for some last minute sort of, you know, 11th hour negotiations. So you have to just understand they are absolutely preoccupied with what's going on in Iran. So there hasn't been the time to prepare. So if you're a staffer, you're thinking, how do I use my 10 or 15 minutes to get ready? I think more than anything else, if you're a staffer, what you're worried about right now is the President making decisions on the fly. And if you note the way the President talks about decision making, it's about how he's feeling on that day, how he's reading the room, I think that's dangerous. I think what's worrisome about a lot of Trump foreign policy is that they have basically relegated experts to the ash bend of history. They're not consulting experts who understand issues about Central Europe, about Iran, for sure. And it is also the case that there are not very many people around the President that really understand the to and fro of Asia, let alone China. So if you're trying to prepare the President, what you're really doing is trying to get him to take the diplomatic Hippocratic oath to do no harm. I think the Chinese want very much to trade a few things for what President Trump wants. It's very clear President Trump wants to sell short term agricultural and ranching products. Those are communities that are hard hit that he needs in the election upcoming. He'd like some progress on fentanyl. Jake, you achieved that already. But he'd like to build on that. He'd like to sell Boeing jets. All of this is unexceptional. I think that makes sense. Interestingly, the President is interested in Chinese investment in the United States, something that most Republicans have opposed now for decades. So he's got a few things that he'd like to get. I think what the Chinese want is probably easing of some of the tariffs and economic steps. What to watch for is when President Trump leaves that China has lower tariff packages than some of our closest allies and partners. That will be problematic. But. But what the Chinese also want is basically free rein to be able to purchase the technology from the United States that they wish. The President has already made that clear, that that's his intention. The Chinese want some more reassurances on that. I think the President will likely provide that. But then the last thing is I think they want to see what business they can do with President Trump on Taiwan. We know from previous meetings and comments that President Trump believes that large nations that have a little bit more control over their immediate neighborhood. I worry that he's prepared to say, and do some things on Taiwan that will send a signal that the strong bipartisan support from the United States over decades has eroded on Taiwan. And that could create real questions, not just on the island, which is thriving technologically, diplomatically, frankly, democratically, but it will send shockwaves through Asia. Guys in Japan, South Korea, Austria. Is the United States still a reliable ally and partner? So I would say, just as President Trump has done minimal preparations, I can promise you, Jake, that the Chinese have come to these meetings with just an enormous amount of preparation. They've got a plan. They're going to seek to play it out.
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John Finer
You also wrote an article this week, to your point, about the actual interaction between the two leaders in the room that described the summit as a form of what you called single combat, a kind of mano a mano version of great power competition. What you just described sounds almost like one prize fighter having trained for months to get in shape for the fight, and the other sort of showing up without a lot of advance preparation, as you described it. How worried should we be about the actual interaction between the two leaders in the room? These things, as you know better than anybody, tend to be determined in advance, relatively rote. Often the United States is trying to draw the Chinese into moving beyond their talking points and usually are often failing. Feels like this could be a different sort of interaction, at least that's what you seem to be indicating.
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Kurt Campbell
I don't think President Biden gets the credit for this, but the most successful modern recent summit was the one that took place in San Francisco, which Jake had the responsibility of preparing for. All I can tell you is that.
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Jake Sullivan
And you, too, Kurt, I think you played a not insignificant role in preparing for.
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Kurt Campbell
No, but, guys, the expectation, writing yourself
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John Finer
out of the story here.
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Kurt Campbell
Yeah, that's what's. Yeah, the preparation is unbelievable. The amount of time. How many steps does a leader take across the room before he reaches his handout? How long is each session going to last? What are the topics in order? These are the things that are expected in a summit between the United States.
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Jake Sullivan
The choreography of the walk and talk. Right, of course, Exactly. Not just how they sit at the table, how they stand, who stands on
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Kurt Campbell
which side when they walk together, who leads, who is approaching, who is standing. It's extraordinarily intricate and choreographed, as Jake has just indicated. And the truth is, we were successful largely in San Francisco because of that preparation. I think. I think President Trump is improvisational. He is comfortable winging it. And you can do that in certain meetings in certain times. But I will say, my own experience is that Asia favors the well prepared, the plotting, the carefully choreographed. And so, yes, I am anxious about how this can play out. And I think the President is particularly susceptible to pomp and circumstance. And there's no country, maybe other than in the Gulf, better that knowing how to play those cards than China. So, yes, that's what's going to happen as he goes in. There's going to be a well prepared interlocutor. The question really will be the hierarchy of issues that are addressed. I think everyone expected a couple of weeks ago that at the top of the list would be technology, some trade issues, perhaps some issues associated with new institutions created. Jake and John, I think inevitably the dominant issue that initially will be discussed will be Iran. President Xi will ask him, what's your game plan? Where do you want to take this? And then President Trump, I fully expect, will try to press China to be more actively engaged. And here I just want to say something that is kind of painful. The Chinese have had an opportunity to observe us as a great power now for decades. One of the things that we've taught them more than anything else is to be wary of the Middle East. And so we've asked them in the past to get involved in some of the issues in the Middle east and South Asia. They are smart enough now to understand quicksand when they see it. And so I do not expect the Chinese to be volunteering to be helping the United States out of their recent challenges in the Gulf. So I think those issues will likely not be, from the American perspective, particularly gratifying, and then they'll move on to other issues. I think what we worry about is anything that would look like the United States and China are resurrecting or rebuilding or building anew, a kind of G2, where the United States and China, as two great powers, sit astride Asia and make decisions about technology, about security, above the heads of our allies and partners. That would be particularly worrying in Delhi, in Tokyo, and elsewhere. So these are all the things that China will try to subtly sort of symbolize. And I just hope that the US Side is prepared for some of these gambits and will be careful with American power and interests.
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Jake Sullivan
It's interesting on the G2 point, President Trump has actually used that phrase before in talking about diplomacy with China.
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Kurt Campbell
Right. In tweets.
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Jake Sullivan
Yeah, yeah. And it fits with his national security strategy, the structure of which basically says, there are big countries and there's everyone else. And I, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, can get together as the leaders of two of the big countries and kind of dictate to everyone else. So I do worry that a certain vibe like that will emerge from this summit, and we'll have to see if that's something that Chinese leadership reinforces.
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Kurt Campbell
The only thing I would just say, he doesn't say two of the big countries. He says the two biggest countries, the two heavyweights. He relishes this idea. Again, mano a mana Hector against Achilles in the arena.
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Jake Sullivan
Yeah, absolutely. Now we are two heavyweights. We may not both be heavyweights when it comes to hospitality. You mentioned that the Chinese are as good as anyone in the world at doing that. John and I, on this podcast previously have talked about how the United States is not particularly good at hosting. We frequently forget to even give our guests cups of water, let alone do the pomp and circumstance. You've had some personal experience with this because you believe that hospitality is absolutely vital to effectively hosting foreign leaders and giving them meals and making sure that we are reflecting to them and especially to their peoples, the respect that we want to show for them. Can you just talk for a minute? I know it's not directly on point with the substance that we'll keep digging into to about the role of optics, of hospitality, of pageantry in these big summits and how you see that playing into the diplomacy.
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Kurt Campbell
To our listeners, this is exactly the kind of gambit that the Chinese are gonna pull on Trump. They're gonna go.
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Jake Sullivan
Right?
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Kurt Campbell
It seems like a very innocent question, but this is Jake going after me, guys, just so you know, because during the beginning, it's not. It is. It's okay. It's fine. But see, I prepared for it. I prepared for it during the grand strategy of the crudite during the Biden administration. At the beginning of our administration, we were in the midst of COVID and so there were careful steps that we took to make sure that the virus didn't spread in the White House. So we were masked, we tested every day, and we were just very careful with the health of the president. The hard thing is that when Asians come to visit, they expect a meal of some sort, some kind of offering. If you come into a visitor's home to feel welcome and without a meal, they feel, and this ranges in every culture across Asia, that this is not a welcome meeting and that it's kind of meant to be almost a slap in the face. And so I had the unenviable task of occasionally have to going in and make the argument about why we needed to have a meal what we would often end up with is our two leaders sitting 25ft away, masked with giant sandwiches or hamburgers in front of them, which they never touched, but at least were there to show the symbolic welcome that we were providing. I mean, I have to say it, at the time, I was so in it that it was life and death. As I look back on it, it is, in truth, ridiculous, but it is true. When we would host friends or guests to the White House, we'd have to go out and buy our own waters or donuts or things to be able to host folks, it is a bit of a challenge. We can't do the kinds of things that we once were able to do. The Chinese will be laying it on thick with Trump, and he loves that stuff. He's gonna eat it up. And I think their hope is by. By basically layering him with these sorts of things, the Chinese will be able to get more in private settings. I would simply say, Jake and John, that this is actually a reversal of the traditional pattern between the United States and China diplomacy in the 90s and 2000s. We would often trade protocol because the Chinese cared deeply that they would have all the 21 gun salute and things that other leaders were expecting, and we would trade that, that for substance. We've now reversed course, and the Chinese are going to try to play that same trick on us.
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John Finer
You said something earlier about Iran and how prominent it would be on the agenda, which obviously wasn't the intention when this summit was first conceived. In fact, it was delayed in large part because I think the Trump administration was hoping it could get past the war in Iran before sending the President off to Beijing. But obviously that didn't happen. The war is still going on in a slightly different form. There's been a lot of debate in the media and elsewhere about how the Chinese see the Iran war. Is it this moment of strategic opportunity for them? Do they hate it because it causes instability and higher commodity prices? How do you think they are interpreting this particular event, and how will they try to use it to their advantage?
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Kurt Campbell
As is often the case, the Chinese do study operations, military and political, very closely. And. And in any major engagement like this, it's a mixed bag for the Chinese. On the one hand, they look at, just as they looked at the first Gulf War, at the activity of precision munitions. It caused them to rethink their own military. When it is understood in the next couple of years, as we really watch what took place in Iran, both the strategies used by the United States and Israel in the. The Things that the Iranians used against the United States, Israel and Gulf partners. There will be a couple of lessons learned. The first is the first real application of AI, and that has been revolutionary. But it is also the case that the active use of less expensive munitions and how that creates challenges for defensive systems in particular. So the Chinese are watching that. They also, frankly, are watching the United States getting bogged down again and being isolated from its allies. They note that the clarion call from Trump for help has been greeted from our allies and partners with silence. If anything, it's created more tensions with our closest, closest allies and partners, both in Europe and in Asia. So those are the things that they find somewhat reassuring on the downside. And I think they see President Trump basically floundering politically in the United States. He does not come to China from a strong position. I listened to a report this morning. We've rarely seen a president this far underwater, not just among independents and Democrats, but increasingly Republicans on issues that matter to him, like the management of the economy. So on that front, they're probably reassuring.
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Jake Sullivan
And, Kurt, the Chinese will be watching that closely. They'll be focused on his standing domestically very much.
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Kurt Campbell
They will study President Trump carefully, his political standing, his allies and partners, who advises him on Asia. One of the things that's interesting is that the dominant player in the formulation and execution of strategy towards China is not from the national security environment, not the national security advisor. The role that you played, Jake, is the centerpiece of our strategy. It is the Secretary of Treasury. Frankly, that's never happened before. It's unusual. So it puts a different kind of sort of tent on the summit. But just back to just very quickly on Iran. The thing that folks need to keep in mind, however, is that the longer this closure of the straits goes on, the more it hurts the global economy. We talk a lot about what it means in the United States, and there are some modest implications that are negative. But it has cascading negative effects. Jake and John, across Asia, huge issues with diesel fuel, with jet fuel, with a huge problem associated with fertilizers, plastics. It is having cascading effects through Indonesia, the Philippines. We're gonna see political problems shortly. And even though China has substantial reserves which they are utilizing, they too are worried about secondary and tertiary effects. So even though they may be in some way politically gratified by the United States embarked on another challenging war, if you read Kagan's piece, it's more damaging than anything that the United States has faced in the last several years, last several decades. So they can be reassured by that. But they're also concerned if it continues into the distance, then it will have huge commercial consequences across Asia that will affect China. So I think on the one hand, you know, a little pain has been great for the United States. They don't want that to spread to China and the other countries of Asia.
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John Finer
Kurt, if they could snap their fingers and end it, they would.
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Kurt Campbell
I mean, they'd like the United States to continue to struggle in some way. I mean, I think the key is going to be, and you guys have focused on this, this is will the Straits and the Gulf emerge with some sort of toll system at the end of this? Now, the Trump team will go to great lengths to say that, look, we didn't impose this. This has come from Gulf countries and it's for safety and health or whatever. But the Chinese actually will be concerned by that because it'll put a surcharge on a lot of oil and other products coming from the Gulf. Remember, it's China and Asia that are most reliant on these supplies. So they will be nervous about new mechanisms that will add a tax to what they're purchasing. At the same time, they don't want this to go on for very much longer. We do believe that on a couple of occasions they have quietly weighed in to the Iranians to support diplomacy. I would expect that they would probably at some point soon say, hey guys, it's time to start kind of winding this down. But they will do that not as a favor to the United States because it is in their own strategic interests. In the end, the truth is, despite China's arrival in the Gulf more recently, its influence and leverage during this period is surprisingly limited.
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Jake Sullivan
But you do think at some point they will put some pressure on Iran to come to the table in a more serious way.
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Kurt Campbell
We both know what China's pressure looks like. It'll probably be more on the order of encouragement. I think the real issue is going to be, and this is something we're going to track closely, we know that China has provided dual use capabilities to Russia for the last several years as they undertake their brutal war against Ukraine. China has quietly provided a lot of the wherewithal that Iran has used for drones and for missiles. Will those supplies continue and increase in the period ahead? My expectation is that they probably will, but they will do it in such a way as they would argue these are just dual use capabilities. It's just normal business as usual. The question really is going to be, will the Chinese tolerate new mechanisms again that put a tax on oil and other resources coming from the Gulf. In the end, they might not be able to resist that. And the United States is desperately, I don't need to tell you guys this, looking for some manner to provide Iran with some kind of resources that doesn't look like the United States has completely caved. But no matter what happens at the summit, the Chinese are not going to indicate that they're going to act at the behest of the Trump administration. If they act, it will be in the future on their own accord.
- [33:06]
Jake Sullivan
Foreign.
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Kurt Campbell
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- [34:42]
Jake Sullivan
So we certainly do not want to let this podcast episode get bogged down too much in the Middle East. So we're going to pivot back to Asia. Did you see what I I did there Kurt? I got the pivotation. Good. Okay, excellent. Yeah, yeah. Taiwan. Not a small topic. So there have really been two things that analysts and commentators have been focused on as we head into this summit with respect to Taiwan. The first is whether President Trump would change America's policy with respect to Taiwan independence. Currently our policy is we do not support Taiwan independence. The Chinese would like and asked us during the Biden administration to change that to a stronger formula of we oppose Taiwan independence. May not sound like a big deal to some folks, but that would be a significant change from Beijing's perspective and Maybe most importantly, from Taipei's perspective, it would send a clear message to them, quite negative one. So that's one whether they put that request to President Trump and what he does about that, what he says about the status of Taiwan. The second is about arms sales to Taiwan and whether President Trump would agree, either explicitly or implicitly, to delay, defer, punt on arms sales, whether he would agree to a more formal consultation mechanism with Beijing on arms sales. So those seem to be the two things people are really looking for. What do you expect over the next 48 hours on this and then even beyond this summit? What do you expect with respect to US policy towards Taiwan over the rest of 2026?
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Kurt Campbell
We were talking about choreography. So an important part of choreography in advance of a meeting like this between President Trump and President Xi, normal American diplomacy would involve intensive briefings with all of our allies and partners and people up on Capitol Hill. I will tell you the most remarkable thing. Like you guys, I talked to some of the senior people around the President in the White House and elsewhere. You know, they don't want to tell you that they talk to Democrats, but even they sometimes stoop so low as to do that. None of them actually know what's going to happen. Like, I've talked to two different people, very senior, who had diametrically different expectations about trade and investment in Taiwan, because the truth is, they don't know. It's been left to the President. And I just don't think I can tell you guys enough. The team around the President has unbelievable confidence in his ability to manage in these situations. Quite remarkable. But they've seen him escape like Houdini, from political situations that would be impossible for others. But I will say that surrounding choreography of diplomacy in advance of this meeting has not occurred. None of our allies have a clue what's happening. And the truth is, look, we try to be careful about this. Jake, one of the things you and John led was very robust unofficial dialogue block between the United States and Taiwan. All of that has basically not occurred during the Trump administration. So the folks in Taiwan are anxious because they haven't had the kind of preliminary diplomacy that gives them any sense of what might be on the table. And so just the first step is anxiety provoking. And you are right, those are two of the things that have been discussed. And most of the senior Trump guys say, hey, what's the difference? Don't oppose, don't support, opposed, tomato, tomahto. And so they'll argue that this is just semantic ridiculousness and that you guys Gotta get a life. And I've had people, senior people in the administration repeat that to me, not really understanding the potential significance that go well beyond the words. I think we've already begun to see, Jake, on the second issue, some discussion between President Trump and President Xi that President Trump has discussed. I think he's indicating he's prepared to work more closely with President Xi on security issues with Taiwan. That will be unnerving. But watch for a couple of other things. If I could just suggest, Jake, I think the president, the Chinese would love President Trump to say something maybe somewhat critical about President Lai in Taiwan or indicating it's time for Taiwan to really start thinking about sitting down with China. Or you can even imagine President Trump indicating that she's a good, strong leader. This is a good opportunity for engagement. And he'll kind of play it more along the lines of peacemaker. Those are all things to look for. The question will be what is uttered in private and what is done in public. But I can assure you, no matter what, what the Chinese are gonna play this up in their readouts from the summit. I will say that the Trump administration, when it comes to China policy is in enormous tent. You've got the softest, let's just do business. We can make a lot of money. Our families can make a lot of money. Senior folks in the administration, including the president, and you've got folks who also believe that China is an existential threat to the states and they kind of coexist and try to muddle through and fight each other bureaucratically. In the end, it very much appears as if the former group is in the ascendance right now. Let's do deals, let's try to work together. And boy, Taiwan is kind of a thorn. What can we do to perhaps ease some of those concerns? And so if you match it with what the Chinese did three weeks ago with the hosting of the KMT president, just unusual, laying it on, working close together. This is the other side of the pincer movement. Get the United States to express anxiety of some sorts about Taiwan or somehow that the United States and China are making common purpose more in the Indo Pacific. I don't need to take tell either of you. As remarkable as Taiwan's achievements are, they are built on the expectation of a rock solid American commitment. And if that is called into question, I think you will very soon see a collapse in confidence in Taiwan that could have major implications. So all this talk about whether China's prepared to do military damage and go in, they think they can Accomplish some of these things, frankly, through subtle diplomacy with trust, Trump. And at the same time, I will also say, guys, the president goes to China, not only vulnerable with respect to Iran. That has not gone well, but remember, a huge amount of the military capability that is being utilized in this heightened state in the Gulf comes from the Indo Pacific. So our deterrent capabilities, our allied support has been diminished and it has called into question quietly the quality of our deterrence around the region.
- [42:21]
John Finer
So, Kurt, you raised the question of American commitment to Taiwan. I think the other big question is American capacity, even military capacity. John Culver, who is a former colleague of ours, gave an interview, former senior intelligence official in the US Government this week in which he said the following. Today, it's hard to point to an area other than submarines and undersea warfare and say the United States States still has an advantage. I don't think we have an advantage in missile space, cyber reconnaissance, et cetera. I think they're leading us in some categories such as air to air missiles, surface to air missiles, counter space capabilities, and electronic warfare. You read that. You hear that? He concludes, by the way, by saying we don't have anywhere near the inventory we would need for a China fight in the aftermath of the Iran war. And you kind of think we're doing, are we doomed from a capacity perspective, leaving aside the commitment question?
- [43:17]
Kurt Campbell
So, John, I saw that interview as well, and I thought that was an important part of it. But there was another part of it that, frankly, I found was even more chilling and concerning. We often comfort ourselves by making the point that China has not fought a war of any kind since 1978, 1979, when it didn't go very well in the jungles of Southeast Asia when they stood against Vietnam, they probably lost. And we comfort ourselves by saying that, look, we've had constant engagements of.
- [43:51]
John Finer
I've heard you make this argument yourself.
- [43:53]
Kurt Campbell
I know, I know. I once said to Jake that we're a Marshall people and Marshall people. He's been making fun of me ever since. But what Culver points out is that we really have not fought a peer competitor, really, since the Second World War. And so there's more of an equivalence between the United States and China. We both, both would be facing into the abyss with less experience if we looked at this kind of conflict. All three of us have seen a number of briefings and participated in war games which basically look at scenarios that develop. Most of those war games are chilling. We run out of ammunition quickly. Our dominant levers of power projection are vulnerable, like aircraft carriers, Some of our forward bases are immediately removed through the use of Chinese precision munitions. In fact, what becomes clear is our big sort of card in this very challenging scenario is our submarine force. And that's one of the reasons why, frankly, I was proud of working with both of you. We worked on programs to bring unprecedented new resources to our commitments to build more submarines. And we worked on Aukus to bring in Australia and Great Britain into this larger set of challenges. It really is in submarine undersea capabilities, UAV long range capabilities, that the United States still has some enduring capacities.
- [45:31]
Jake Sullivan
You mentioned earlier in our discussion China's access to American technology. And one of the centerpieces of our approach to China and the Biden administration was to impose the small yard high fence doctrine, export controls on very advanced semiconductors and the equipment used to make them. The Trump administration came in and I think a little bit surprisingly, because I thought they would continue and build on them, actually relaxed the restrictions and also have been very lax in enforcement the restrictions that are still on the books. On the other hand, China has taken this interesting position of sort of saying, we don't really want your chips anyway. And it's hard to tell how much. That's a. You can't fire me. I quit. How much of that's gamesmanship? How much? Actually, China's trying to get the United States to say no. Really, please take them. Can you unpack this for us?
- [46:23]
Kurt Campbell
And we're gonna do that, by the way. We're right exactly. To buy our chips.
- [46:28]
Jake Sullivan
All right, so unpack for us. What is the dynamic here, especially on the Chinese side? What are they thinking about access to American chips at this point, given their deep desire to indigenize to put Chinese AI capability on a Chinese tech stack as opposed to an American tech stack, but also recognizing that there's a huge compute gap right now and the US has an advantage. So talk us through how you see this issue right now.
- [46:54]
Kurt Campbell
So, Jake, if I can flip, just fling one more bouquet to you guys. The area where we had a very clear strategy with strong bipartisan support was not only investment in our own capabilities in AI and semiconductors, but working with allies and partners on an allied infrastructure and being careful about husbanding those capabilities and restricting them from going to China. I think that was the right approach. I think almost everyone on Capitol Hill believes in that. Even today, a few people around President Trump have a very different philosophy. They believe that we should continue to sell chips to China and addict China somehow to our tech stack. The truth is that completely ignores and misunderstands President Xi's long term strategy, Jake, which you know well and John, to move towards self reliance and dominance across not just semiconductors, but in robotics, synthetic biology. He has a major plan of action which has been implemented in a methodical way over the course of the time that he's been in office. And so when you say China here, you got to unpack that a little bit. What President Xi is saying to Chinese companies is, look, you got to rely on our own capabilities. And those companies are saying they're not quite good enough yet, boss, we need to be able to continue to rely on the United States. And so there is both an internal dialogue between President Xi and his companies and one with the United States. And so what's going to happen is as, as we've finally said, okay, you can have the chips, and then China says, well, President Xi says we don't really want them because we don't need them. We have our own chips. So we're gonna beg them to take our chips, which will allow them to advance ahead of us or to compete with us, but only a small enough number so that President Xi can still basically necessitate that their own chip producers become more capable over the course of the next couple of years. It's a terrible approach. And so the Chinese, as you know, Jake, they're constantly keeping score. Well, this one's for you, this one's for us. This one they're gonna count as a favor to us. Okay, we're gonna buy some chips for you and allow us to catch up with you. Okay. Are you satisfied?
- [49:27]
John Finer
Like they're soybeans or something?
- [49:29]
Kurt Campbell
Yeah.
- [49:30]
John Finer
So one of the threads I'm picking up through your answers on Taiwan, on technology, just now, on your allusion to the possibility of a big investment announcement, is that the president, president who really kicked off in many ways the era of intense strategic competition between the United States and China, at least explicitly kicked it off. And then who was followed by a president who we worked for, Joe Biden, who in many ways intensified that competition and got some criticism for it, got some praise for it, is now himself, Donald Trump, maybe dialing back this ultra competitive approach. Do you believe that we are now on a sort of downslope of competition with China that peaked in a different moment, or do you think that this is just a blip and that we revert back ultimately to a fundamentally competitive relationship?
- [50:22]
Kurt Campbell
Look, I think the dominant inherent qualities of the U. S. China relationship are competitive. That is the reading of the strategic environment. We're not Choosing that. That is the world. World that, frankly, we have been thrust into. And so I believe those norms and that dominant paradigm will return. President Trump has been deeply unpredictable. He has seen China at times as a close partner again, as Jake has indicated at G2, and other times a menacing enemy. I think this time his truer instincts are to cut deals, to make money, to be greeted as a fellow authoritarian standing astride the global stage. I think that's where he is right now. The challenge will be how durable will that be domestically. One of the only areas, and I mean only areas where you see a sort of a quiet, careful Republican backlash on the Hill is on technology, is on Taiwan. This is an area where there has been broad bipartisan support, support that backs, frankly, what President Biden and Jake, you and John, did in our strategy in the Indo Pacific. And so people on the Hill are uncomfortable with some of the elements of what we're seeing between President Trump and President Xi. And the challenge here is that this is not alone. In a larger context, our allies and partners are much more worried than they were. They're considering other options. The thing that I think all of us are proud of is the relationship we built with India. It's not easy, but deeply important. That relationship is, frankly, in the gutter right now, has really fallen on some hard times. And so the larger corresponding elements of this strategy are also in disrepair. It's not just technology. It's not just on issues associated with Taiwan. It's the larger framing of a strategy that has enjoyed bipartisan support now for a couple of decades. All of that, frankly, is at risk. And so the honest question, John, is no one really knows what to expect from President Trump on a visit like this. And frankly, we should be anxious about the fact that he goes to Beijing with so much personal attitude to be able to make decisions like in solo combat, that may not, frankly, be in the best interests of Troy.
- [53:04]
Jake Sullivan
Yeah, you finished your piece by saying it's possible one of the two leaders, maybe Donald Trump, will end up getting dragged behind the chariot, which let's hope that does not happen.
- [53:14]
Kurt Campbell
Let's hope Americans not.
- [53:16]
Jake Sullivan
I mean, honestly, we have a thousand other questions for you, Kurt, but I think that summing up with that larger strategic view prompted by John's question, really valuable. I think it'd be good for us to bring you back on at some point later this year. Talk about a few things, one of them being India, which you just mentioned, because I think that the big bet that we made on that relationship is now very much in the balance, given things that have happened over the last year.
- [53:40]
Kurt Campbell
The truth is what some of this discussion reveals, and this is always a challenge of Democrats. I just wanna say this, is that we're terrible about explaining the things that we have done effectively on the global stage. And it's not a Biden issue, it's an historic issue. But frankly, the Indo Pacific strategy, what we did within India, a careful diplomacy which you orchestrated with China, that bore an enormous amount of fruit, the fact that President Trump has departed from so many of those time tested and frankly successful avenues of diplomacy is concerning. And we should be clear about how effective that bipartisan approach that you guys helped orchestrate was.
- [54:27]
Jake Sullivan
Well, because we're so uncomfortable talking about positive things, we're now gonna just end the podcast very abruptly. No, I'm just kidding. I'm just kidding. No, you're totally right about that. We got to talk India. We also didn't mention the possibility of AI diplomacy, which we kicked off and didn't get very far on in the Biden administration. Could that go somewhere? And then there are these issues around Chinese investment in the US that you referred to. So a lot else to talk about. This summit will be one milestone in a series of milestones over the course of the rest of this year, including very likely at least one, if not two trips by President Xi to the United States, both for a bilateral summit and for the G20. So we have to put this in the larger context of the relationship of the strategic backdrop, as you have done over the course of this conversation. And we're really grateful to you for it.
- [55:20]
Kurt Campbell
And if you guys ask me, I'll always come on. I love the podcast. I'm here for the long game. Thanks.
- [55:39]
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- [57:37]
Jake Sullivan
Man, it's nostalgic to have someone like Kurt on because, because we were in the diplomatic trenches with him across two administrations and it's just a reminder of all the work we did, including as he said at the end, a lot of really good work that we're rightfully very proud of.
- [57:55]
John Finer
It's interesting because he is somebody who, both in government and actually outside of government, has devoted his entire life and career, professional life, to fostering better understanding between Asia and the United States. United States, obviously, with America's interest at the forefront of that thinking. But not many people have that kind of longitudinal, long game perspective that Kurt brings. He was doing this in the Clinton administration, he was doing this in the Obama administration, he was doing this in the Biden administration. He's done it in the private sector and it shows. And the nice thing about somebody like Kurt is he talked about in the summit. You never know what Donald Trump is going to do. When you ask Kurt Campbell a question, you never quite know what he's going to say. He's unpredict in his own way too, which makes him a fun guest.
- [58:44]
Jake Sullivan
One thing that he said near the top of the conversation that kind of rang in my ears throughout it was Hippocratic oath basically said do no harm. And what struck me over the course of the conversation is probably the best thing for us to root for over the next two days is not a whole lot happens in this summit that essentially they go, they have the pageantry, maybe there's a few deals here and there, but no significant muscle movements because the way things are postured with, with China in a very strong position, President Trump not with the wind at his back, but rather facing real headwinds. If there is going to be real news out of the summit, it's not likely to be news that advances America's interests. So it struck me that maybe we just should be rooting for the very basic element of the Hippocratic oath. Let's just hope there is no harm here. So My scorecard basically, or jotting list for the next few days is will we see some movement on policy towards Taiwan? Will we see some movement on US Semiconductor export control restrictions? Will we see a big announcement? We didn't get into this deeply, although he referred to it. On Chinese investment in the United States, including in the electric vehicle sector. What exactly are the two sides going to posture and present on the Iran question question? Will there be the launch of a dialogue on AI risk as has been previewed in some places, especially given what we've seen with Mythos and these cyber capabilities that has got the attention of both policymakers in Washington and Beijing. So that's kind of my, I'm assuming movement on purchase commitments, some kind of trade related understandings, extensions of previous agreements and the like. But for me those, those are the questions that remain pretty open as this thing kicks off. And I would also add, yes, this summit will end, but the US China relationship will not end and US China diplomacy will not end. It will just keep going, rolling into the next summit or the next encounter. So all of these questions are going to remain very live. They don't just expire when Donald Trump gets on the plane to come home. We have to see this as just a continuous element of diplomacy, of which this is one episode with multiple episodes yet to come. So is my tick list about right or what would you add to it?
- [61:16]
John Finer
It is. And I would say he said two things actually that struck me that I hadn't maybe been as focused on. One is this question of almost like Rumsfeld's unknown unknowns, what is gonna happen when the two leaders actually enter the room and start talking, which is often dominant, but in this case maybe not. So it could be one of the things on the list goes further than we expect. It could be some other thing that's not even on the list that enters the chat, so to speak, and so be watching for that. The other thing he said is that he believes actually that Iran is going to be not just a topic of discussion, but maybe in some ways a central or the central topic of discussion between the two leaders, just given how salient that issue is globally right now. And maybe that's a good opportunity for us to do just a quick update on where that stands. I had not expected necessarily for the two legs leaders to get into that in depth. Maybe they will, maybe they won't. I do wonder though, whether anything that comes out of this summit could give wind in the sails to the Trump administration's pretty feverish attempt right now. To get out of the situation that they're in. You could almost imagine a situation in which President Trump says something different about Iran coming out of a conversation with Xi Jinping because he hears something different about Iran from President Xi. So I'll be watching pretty closely on that. But otherwise, separate from the summit, that issue feels well and truly stuck right now.
- [62:45]
Jake Sullivan
Yeah. So how do you size it up? Just take a minute. What's your. We obviously spent a lot of time on this last week. Basically, the news only gets stuckier. As opposed to the opening for some progress. I was evincing some qualified optimism last week. You were evincing more pessimism. The pessimistic side of the case is definitely the winning side at the moment and seems to be for the foreseeable future. So just talk about what do you see as being the dynamic and is there any way out of this?
- [63:19]
John Finer
I think the real question at this point is what does the United States do to change the current dynamic? Iran seems comfortable sitting back with the strait closed without intense conflict going on right now. They're not being bombed to the extent they were before. There's some minor skirmishing and allowing this pain, actually, that Kurt described quite well, that starting if you're the United States at the periphery among our partners and allies in kind of far flung parts of the world, but moving ever closer to the center and to us and allowing that pain to be felt until we actually make the sort of concessions that Iran is looking for. That's their strategy. And the question is, does President Trump have the patience for a sort of test of wills, allowing this to play out over time, or does he do something to try to shake things up, the way he did with Project Freedom, but just for a day, the way he tried to do with diplomacy, even sending the vice president of the United States to Pakistan, but that also didn't change course. And then what options does he really have, short of, I hate to say it, putting more on the table for the Iranians to try to induce them into a deal. He sort of oscillates between maximum pressure, full blockade, threat of conflict, combat, and maximum diplomacy, but without putting enough on the table diplomatically to actually lure them into some sort of resolution here. And at some point, he's going to have to pick one of these options and stick with it if he wants to change the current situation.
- [64:53]
Jake Sullivan
I had moved to a slightly more optimistic place last week, in part because I saw in the US Proposal the most recent US Diplomatic offer to Iran, a really big move. And that Big move was abandoning the absolute zero position on enrichment. Remember, for a long time the US Was saying Iran has to give up its nuclear program forever. In total, 0, 0, 0, no enrichment
- [65:21]
John Finer
in Iran, dismantle all its facilities, et cetera.
- [65:23]
Jake Sullivan
Exactly. So the most recent proposal basically says moratorium for a period of time. Now, there was some ambiguity about what happens after that period of time, but to me, that was a significant conceptual shift. And I think, think having made that shift, there is now a constellation of elements that could be pulled together into a proposal that I think could work. It probably would involve real ambiguity over the exact status of the Strait of Hormuz, which would be a negative for the world. But that's a negative that President Trump basically bought when he launched this war. And it would involve a lot of sanctions relief to your point about having to put things on the table. And it would involve real compromise on the nuclear file, not the kind of maximalist demands we'd been making before. And so I have kind of thought eventually Donald Trump will come around to that view because all of his alternatives are considerably worse. And it's really a question of when that happens and how much pain we all collectively endure before that happens. My view on that basically hasn't changed. Changed. But the fact that oil prices aren't sky, they're going up but not going to 150. The fact that the market hasn't reacted so dramatically, this doom loop that we talked about last week of market expectations and therefore how it impacts Trump's thinking, that kind of causes this thing to drag. But at the end of it, it's hard for me to see, even if he goes back to bombing or Project Freedom or anything else at the end of it, all this ending without the United States of America making a significant set of compromises with Iran at the negotiating table. And from my perspective, the sooner President Trump realizes that and just does that deal, as opposed to waiting to do it later, the better. But it's unclear as to whether he will come around to that or not. Last point I will make. I also wonder if coming out of Beijing, he will kind of recast the whole Iran quest question, even if nothing has been agreed with China or nothing has changed material on the ground. But use something about the summit as a way to say, oh, I see this differently now we've got a new plan and now we can do a deal. I think that's something for us to watch for. Hard to tell.
- [67:45]
John Finer
China begged me to end the war, so ready to do that? Yeah. It all brings me Back actually to Kurt's Hippocratic Oath point a bit, because the deal you just described, which I think would be a mostly defensible rational way for this conflict to end, has one kind of fatal problem in portraying it as a victory, which is that deal was available without the war that President Trump launched and all the damage that that did to our relationships, to the economy, et cetera. And to then have gone through that whole exercise, caused all the harm in violation of the diplomatic Hippocratic Oath theory, and then reached the same agreement or aversion thereof, is something that should not be overlooked when ultimately the conclusion of this conflict is analyzed. If and what happens.
- [68:36]
Jake Sullivan
And John, just on this point, he might have said a week or two or three ago, incorrectly, it turns out. Well, one thing I did achieve here was the destruction of Iran's military capabilities. So, yeah, at least I got something out of it. But we have this report in the New York Times. The Washington Post confirmed by others that the intelligence assessment is that Iran retains 70% of its missiles, 70% of its missile launchers, 90% of the positions along the Strait of Hormuz that they have been firing from, and they now have access to nearly all of their underground bunkers. So very detailed reporting coming out that suggests even, even that more limited, more temporary success, quote, unquote, success that the Trump administration had been touting, isn't there. So you're right that it's going to be even harder to say, well, what the hell did we get out of this? Having gone into it. But nonetheless, we are where we are. And so President Trump now has to stare at the options he has bought himself by launching this misbegotten war in the first place. And next week, on the backside of this summit, we'll spend some time reviewing, viewing what happened in the summit, of course, and where that leaves the US China relationship. But we will return to the subject of Iran as well to see where we are.
- [69:56]
John Finer
The journalistic revelations that give a kind of tale of the tape of the war over the last week have been devastating. Less damage to Iran than we thought, more damage to the United States and our military facilities than we thought, more depletion of our own munitions and other resources. And by the way, an intelligence analysis from our CIA that suggests Iran can hold hold out for several more months without changing course substantially, and maybe even more so. Tough strategic predicament. And we'll be paying close attention, as we always do.
- [70:27]
Jake Sullivan
Not a pretty picture, so we'll leave it on that note. Well, that's all for today. We'll be back next week with a new episode of the Long Game.
- [70:36]
John Finer
We'd love to hear from you. Send us your questions and comments@longgameoxmedia.com and
- [70:42]
Jake Sullivan
subscribe to our feed so you never miss an episode. The links are in the show Notes.
- [70:52]
John Finer
That's it for this episode of the Long Game.
- [70:55]
Jake Sullivan
If you like the show, please follow, share with friends and leave a review. It really helps listeners find us for
- [71:01]
John Finer
updates and more analysis in your inbox. Join the community@staytuned.substack.com the long game is
- [71:08]
Jake Sullivan
a Vox Media Podcast Network Production Executive Producer Tamara Sepper Lead Editorial Producer Jennifer Indig Deputy Editor Celine Rohr Senior Producer
- [71:18]
John Finer
Matthew Billy Video Producers Nat Weiner and
- [71:21]
Jake Sullivan
Adam Harris Supervising Producer Jake Kaplan Associate Producer Claudia Hernandez Marketing Manager Leanna Greenway
- [71:29]
John Finer
Music is by Nat Weiner we're your
- [71:32]
Jake Sullivan
hosts John Finer and Jake Sullivan. Thanks for listening.
- [71:35]
Kurt Campbell
Foreign.
- [71:41]
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