← The Long Game with Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer
The Long Game with Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer
Why Zelensky Fired His War Chiefs & Where Trump's Iran War Goes Next
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- [00:00]
Ryan Reynolds
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- [01:01]
John Finer
The Ukrainians have now surpassed the United States military and basically every other military on the planet in terms of doctrine for how to fight and integrate these autonomous systems on the battlefield. And we should be learning from them how they do that. Welcome back to the Long Game. I'm John Finer.
- [01:23]
Jake Sullivan
And I'm Jake Sullivan. And today it's just me and you, Jon. No guest, just mano a mano.
- [01:31]
John Finer
Lonely here out in Internet world, but we'll make it work.
- [01:35]
Jake Sullivan
So today we're gonna cover developments on two files that we have discussed repeatedly over the course of the Long Game podcast. One on Ukraine, the other on Iran. On Ukraine, there have been some significant developments in the past few weeks given the firing first of the defense minister and then of the chief of staff of the military. We'll talk about the implications of that and also what's going on in the war generally. And then second, Iran. Obviously there are developments every day, new things to talk about and we thought this would be a moment for us, not just to cover what's happened over the last several days, but also to revisit the options memo that we did a few weeks ago. Because once again, President Trump has got to be turning to his people to say, what the heck are my options for actually getting out of the mess that have put myself in and I will preview by saying all of the options are pretty bad because the choice of getting into this mess in the first place was pretty bad. But John and I will go through that and talk to you about how we think this conversation may be unfolding in the White House and at the Pentagon as they try to figure out what comes next. But before we dive into all that, John, I am mourning the end of the World Cup. It is always sad to wake up and not have great soccer on the great spectacle that we saw for the past month. You know, it's interesting, the vibes going into the World cup just weren't really great. It felt like there was lots of controversy, lots of questions about enthusiasm, but frankly, as soon as the game started, it was like a switch of positivity and delight flipped on the soccer was great. The scenes from American cities were great. The videos of foreign visitors discovering all kinds of curious and wonderful things about America were great. And man, was it, I think just a tremendous production and really enjoyable to be a part of. How are you feeling now in the dismal world of no more World cup soccer?
- [03:42]
John Finer
Yeah, so it was a great month. I think we each got to go to some games, which was a lot of fun. I think I watched, God, I don't even know how many dozen games with friends, with my family, with my dad, my siblings, which was a ton of fun. Exactly. Get the results, maybe, that either of us were looking for. The US Team didn't make it quite as far. I'm a bit of an undercover England fan and was sad that they went down in the semifinals. But now, actually for me, you enter this month of August that has a lot of downsides. The last month of the summer coming up and no meaningful sports other than Major League Baseball. And the one bright light for me is now the Red Sox are on a 14 game winning streak, having started the season in a pretty dismal fashion. So I'm trying to find this silver lining where I can. And that's it for now.
- [04:31]
Jake Sullivan
I do recall that when we recorded the episode with Franklin Foer, who had written an update to his book How Soccer Explains the World, you and Frank and me each gave our predictions for who would win the World cup, but I don't remember who predicted. What do you remember?
- [04:49]
John Finer
I don't exactly remember either, to be honest. I usually just predict England because I don't like a misalignment between my desires and the outcome. And it's just too hard to pick the United States given how far they are from being competitive at that level. So I think I did say England.
- [05:04]
Jake Sullivan
Probably you did. And Frank said France. Who did Jake say? Oh, I think it might have been Spain.
- [05:09]
John Finer
Yeah, it might have been Spain. Might have been Spain.
- [05:11]
Jake Sullivan
I've gotten a lot of predictions wrong on this podcast from the start, but on the most consequential, the most important geopolitical prediction, who wins the World Cup? Well, I got that one right. So I have to take at least one second to bask in the glow. They were damn good, Spain, damn good. I mean, they just efficient, team oriented, not the most exciting to watch, but clinical in a way.
- [05:39]
John Finer
So you're not going to lose a World cup giving up one goal in the entire tournament, that's for sure.
- [05:44]
Jake Sullivan
Entire tournament, yeah. All right. Well, since the soccer is over on television in the stadiums, it probably should be over on our podcast for little while. So we will now move on to talk about the first topic, which is Ukraine, and a series of developments there that caught our attention and I think are worth some time reflecting on. So, John, do you want to set the table on this and give us some of your initial thoughts? Sure.
- [06:15]
John Finer
The headline for me in some ways is that Ukraine has politics. Ukraine is a democratic country, a flawed democracy like many others, but a democratic country in which the leadership, even during times, times of war, faces a series of complicated political decisions. And that's a bit of what has confronted President Zelensky over the last few days and even weeks at a time when the war is going very well on the battlefield. We've talked about that over a number of episodes. There are internal, interpersonal, political dimensions to governance there that have grown quite complicated for him in, you know, the starkest case, sort of a standoff between the commander in chief of the Ukrainian army, a guy named Syrsky, who was in that role when we were still in government, and the minister of defense of the Ukrainian government, a man named Fedorov, who we both have had some exposure to, both of which one of the other one fired. And ultimately what Zelenskyy decided to do was to relieve both of them of their duties along with Ukraine's sitting prime minister. So in the context of a pretty significant reshuffle, those three roles are probably the most important that are now under new occupancy. And now we will see how Zelenskyy manages the aftermath of this, because at least one of those figures, Mr. Fedorov has got quite a political following inside Ukraine and there have been demonstrations in the streets in response to his firing that have Led Zelenskyy to reach back out to him, talk to him maybe about a different title, different role somewhere within the national security establishment of Ukraine, although no announcements on that front yet. But what is happening here that you see sort of driving these decisions? We have seen Zelenskyy relieve significant officials of their duties before, during the course of this war, but this is a pretty big set of changes.
- [08:12]
Jake Sullivan
Yeah, to have both the Defense Minister and the chod, what they call the chod, basically the. The commander, the overall commander of Ukrainian forces, the top uniformed military officer in the Ukrainian army, fired basically within a week of one another. While the war is going pretty well. That's a striking thing. I think three things are going on, and I don't know exactly how to assign the weights among them, but I'll put them all on the table. The first is kind of what's above the waterline, which is an open debate between the civilian defense minister and the uniformed chief military officer over exactly how this war should be fought. Fedorov, the defense minister, 35, was previously the minister of digital transformation. He's young, he's dynamic, and he's very focused on advanced technology. He is in many ways the architect of the drone program. That has been central to a lot of the gains that Ukraine has been making on the battlefield in the last few months. And he believes deeply in evolving the very nature of warfare from the more traditional Soviet style that Ukraine started this war with into more of what it has become here in 20. Syrsky, much more old school, 60 years old. You've got a generational difference. Someone who was at the heart of defending Kyiv when this war kicked off. He was the guy who stood there stoutly with his forces to fend off the Russian invaders and save the capital. He's been kind of driving this more traditional form of bland warfare, defending this long front line, several hundred miles long front line, trying to hold cities at great human cost. And so you had a real debate between the two of them, and frankly, that debate got untenable because the two really couldn't work together. So Zelenskyy had to choose. And he went. At first, he went by backing Syrsky, the military guy, over Fedorov firing the defense minister. That brings me to the second thing that I think is going on here, which is a bit below the waterline, and that is President Zelenskyy has been an incredible leader in this war over many years under enormous pressure of all kinds, both domestically and obviously pressure, day in, day out from Russia, and the pressure of trying to hold together a coalition of countries supporting him. But he has had one kind of consistent issue that I think has undermined his ability to provide the kind of leadership that he has sought to provide over the course of this war. And that is he doesn't like characters becoming larger than life within the Ukrainian system. Two years ago, he fired the previous commander in chief, Zaluzhny, moved him out to be the ambassador to London, to the UK because he was concerned that Zaluzhny was getting too politically powerful and could potentially challenge him. He took the head of their intelligence services, Budanov, and actually brought him in to be his chief of staff. So, you know, bring him in close because he was concerned about how he was gaining political popularity. And that made him nervous after, like,
- [11:26]
John Finer
years of rumors that he might be fired. Budanov, he ultimately decided to pull him.
- [11:32]
John Marco Cerese
Exactly.
- [11:33]
John Finer
Kick him out.
- [11:33]
Jake Sullivan
Yeah. Make him kind of directly in his office and responsive and reporting directly to him. And then Fedorov was gaining this enormous following, this enormous standing both within Ukraine and globally. And I think Zelenskyy looked at that and made him a little nervous. And in fact, when he fired Fedorov, you saw an outpouring massive protests in cities across Ukraine, more than a dozen cities, a serious backlash to the point where I think Zelenskyy had to take two steps that he probably wasn't expecting to take. One was saying Fedorov should come back into the government in some form, and the second, that he had to fire Syrsky. When he originally fired Fedorov, he said I had to choose one or the other. And by the end of this, he's chosen both to go as opposed to neither, and now is trying to coax Fedorov to come back in. In some role other than being defense minister, which leads me, and I'm sorry, to go on for so long. And then I'll stop to the third factor here that I think is present and that we should absolutely put a spotlight on, and that is the question of procurement and corruption in the Ukrainian military. One of the things that Fedorov really taking aim at in his public comments and some of his actions within the ministry was trying to reduce the level of corruption associated with military contracts. And I think this probably created a set of opponents and enemies throughout that entire defense enterprise. And when you start collecting enemies, you create certain vulnerabilities for yourself. So I don't know how much to put on that third one, but I think it is a factor for sure. And so when you add those three things, up a big fight over exactly how to fight this war and what role technology should play in it versus traditional tactics. Zelenskyy's own concern about figures rising with their own independent power bases, and then disputes over the nature of military contracting and the constant specter of corruption in Ukraine. That, to me, is the mix of factors that we should be looking at to understand what is happening here. And underlying all of it is the point you made at the outset, which is Ukraine's a democracy, and in democracies you get fights over personnel, you get debates and disputes, you get public backlash and push back. And that has to have some impact on an elected leader like Swinsky. 1, 2, 3.
- [14:13]
John Marco Cerese
I'm standup comedian John Marco Cerese.
- [14:16]
Jake Sullivan
And I'm actor penis model Russell Daniels.
- [14:19]
John Marco Cerese
The Downside is our podcast where we bring on guests to talk about how miserable their lives are because, let's face it, things are not getting better. Every episode we talk about what's wrong with our lives, our guests lives, the world, but in a fun way. Bottom line is you're gonna walk away feeling better about your life. We've had so many cool guests. Caleb Huron, Busy Phillips, Stavros Halkias, Laverne Cox, Hasan Piker, Alana Glaser. I promise you're going to have a good time. Now on the Vox Media podcast network,
- [14:51]
Jake Sullivan
this is the Downside.
- [14:55]
Esteed Hernton
There's a civil war happening in the Democratic Party. And if there's one place that that's playing out most clearly, it's in Michigan.
- [15:02]
Ryan Reynolds
A crucial Senate primary battle in Michigan
- [15:04]
Jake Sullivan
that could determine control of Congress in November. Congresswoman Haley Stevens and Abdul El Sayed, a progressive Democrat and a moderate Democrat.
- [15:12]
Esteed Hernton
In the end, it all comes down to the dreaded E word, electability. But in Michigan, one candidate is trying to turn the electability concept on its head.
- [15:23]
Unidentified Guest (possibly a political analyst or commentator)
If we think that voters walk around asking, where do I sit? On some theoretical left right spectrum, then in theory, the bulk of the voters are somewhere in the middle. The problem, though, is that that model hasn't really accurately predicted our politics for a very long time. If Michiganders wanted moderate, why would they have elected Donald Trump twice?
- [15:42]
Esteed Hernton
Dr. Abdul El Sayed is making the progressive case for America first, and he's trying to settle the Democrats ideological battle in the process.
- [15:50]
Unidentified Guest (possibly a political analyst or commentator)
This is about the many versus the money.
- [15:52]
Esteed Hernton
I'm Esteed Hernton, and this is America. Actually, catch us Every Saturday on YouTube or wherever you get your podcast.
- [16:05]
John Finer
You know, it must have been particularly painful on some level for Zelenskyy to relieve Syrsky who was his hand selected overall commander of the Ukrainian army, replacing Zaluzhny with somebody who he had a closer personal relationship with and who I think by most accounts still has his confidence, but he felt like he had to because of all the reasons that you've described. And maybe it's worth just pausing for a minute on the two individuals who are replacing these two key figures in the war, because they're interesting aspects of their careers as well. And one of the things I wondered in reading about them, and I'll say a word or two about each of them, is whether Zelenskyy runs the risk of just replicating the problem that he had between kind of a new school and an old school figure in modern warfare between Fedorov and Syrsky. He's replaced Fedorov with a man named Kamara, who was at one point the commander of probably Ukraine's most elite special forces unit, or one of them, a unit of the sbu, the intelligence service called the Alpha unit, then ultimately the head overall of the SBU and somebody who Zelenskyy himself has described as having unprecedented experience with technological combat operations, an innovator, a pioneer in the use of drones and other autonomous systems. So replacing one innovator, Fedorov, with another innovator, Kamara, and he has replaced Syrsky with a man named Drapati, who is a tank commander. So, you know, in some ways one of the most old school forms of combat on the battlefield. A 26 year veteran of the Ukrainian armed forces and somebody whose main claim to fame inside Ukraine, and actually you can look online and find this video on YouTube is a video of him smashing an armored infantry vehicle through Russian barricades to prevent essentially the Russian encirclement and takeover of mariupol back in 2014, long before Russia again assaulted that city and ultimately took it over. And it's quite a shocking video actually when you see it. But very early in the current war he was already a well known sort of war hero, for that seems to be very brave action, but an old school sort of war fighter. And so who knows what relationship these two have to each other. I certainly don't have that information. But you do wonder whether Zelenskyy, either wisely or sporting, I think the same sort of challenges, has paired again, a more technologically oriented modern warfare proponent and an old school tank warrior in these two key roles.
- [18:49]
Jake Sullivan
Yeah, I do think the question on Drapati and that video is really remarkable. So we'll make sure that we put it up for people to take a look. A has a huge amount of credibility because of that and also because of his continued service from 2014 to today. But B is a generational change from Syrsky is considerably younger. I think he's in his mid-40s and so is the next generation, and therefore his contemporaries. A lot of the people that he'd be closest with are folks who probably are moving from the old school towards the new school. So maybe he's not quite at the Syrsky level of old school, even though he's steeped in this history of being a tank or armored personnel carrier commander. So it'll be interesting to see how he plays things. And obviously he's going to have to balance what is within the Ukrainian armed forces a series of different stakeholders, some of whom were much more aligned with Syrskiy's view of the world and many, many of whom chafed under Syrski's command because they thought that the fundamental mode of war fighting had to evolve considerably here. So it will be interesting to see how these two go at it. It will also be interesting to see if Fedorov agrees to come back in. He basically, to Zelenskyy's first entreaty to return to government, said, I'll only come back if I'm defense minister. That doesn't at the moment look likely because someone else has been given that job. But Zelenskyy's trying to get him to come back into some larger technology position that could give him a lot of sway over the question of how exactly Ukraine prosecutes this conflict on a going forward basis. So we will have to watch that closely in the period ahead. But I think, John, it would be worth us spending a minute just reflecting on this evolution of drone warfare in Ukraine and what it has meant for the changing nature of the battlefield and also for Ukraine's changing fortunes with respect to their capacity both to resist Russia and to bring the fight to Russia in a way that was more difficult for them in earlier phases of the war. Do you want to reflect on that as somebody who personally put a lot of time and energy into this back before it was headline news that this drone program was central to the way in which Ukraine would defend itself?
- [21:19]
John Finer
Yeah, we talked about this a bit with Tim Snyder when he was on, and I think it's worth fleshing out here, just given that this dynamic is now kind of front and center in the personnel decisions Ukraine is making, not just how it's fighting on the battlefield, but we essentially identified a Few potentially fatal problems with Ukraine's war effort as far back as 2022 and early 2023, which were they were struggling on the battlefield even when they were extremely well resourced with the sort of traditional tools of warfare. Significant numbers of armored vehicles, significant numbers of artillery rounds, significant numbers of short and medium range rockets and other munitions. They were just running into all kinds of problems moving forward against Russian encampments and lines, Russian fortified positions, and the counteroffensive that we planned with them and resourced for them, that ultimately was a pretty significant military failure, illustrated this in spades. And so they weren't making progress on the battlefield. And we identified really two fundamental problems that were holding them back. One is they always had a munitions gap with the Russians. The Russians always had more of every significant munition than Ukraine had. So you had kind of two armies that fought basically the same way, one of which had more stuff than the other. And Russia also had more people in its army and to draw from in its population than Ukraine had. So if the two sides were going to fight the same way and one had more stuff and more people over time, Ukraine was just fated to lose this conflict. And so the question was, is there a different way to fight this war? And could we help them develop that different way to fight this war? Because otherwise it was hard to project them being able to hold out much longer against this just larger, more massive foe. So you should pick this up here because it was really your directive to our government that launched the effort to try to find a solution to these problems.
- [23:27]
Jake Sullivan
Well, as you said, we were playing around with this even as early as 2022 and beginning to put some resources and funding into supporting the buildup of new technologies, including drones, for Ukraine to use. But it was really after that failed counteroffensive in 2023 that you and I basically became obsessed with the idea that Ukraine needed a technological edge in order
- [23:51]
John Finer
to win the war.
- [23:52]
Jake Sullivan
So in the fall of 23, we actually convened the cabinet in the Situation Room to kickstart what we called the Ukraine technology spread. And the purpose of it was to provide Ukraine with funding and components for its own drone and missile development. And we brought industry leaders into the White House and we tasked our team, you'll remember this, to convene the US Government every day on this. That was our concept of the tech sprint. And there were people in our government who pushed back on it. There were some officials in the Pentagon who didn't want to spend money on Ukraine's drone industry. We actually ended up having to put a hold on their Ukraine spending plan overall until they agreed to back the Tech Sprint. Frankly, there was an active debate inside the Ukrainian government as to whether to prioritize this effort. There were some. And as we see playing out today, the debate between the old school and the new school. Back then there were those who kind of said, ah, the drone thing, I don't know about that. We really want to focus on more traditional capabilities. And then, of course, there were real proponents within the Ukrainian government champions who have helped propel this effort forward. But we kept at it. We sent our teams to Kiev to meet with Ukraine's brilliant drone manufacturers directly. We poured in funding and components. We briefed Zelensky many times. And by the end of 24, just before we left office, we'd invested more than a billion and a half dollars into Ukraine's drone industry. And I think you and I would were both astonished by the pace of progress and by what we were able to do to support them. Now they have done the incredible creativity, entrepreneurship, innovation, testing, deployment, all the things. This is Ukraine's success. But I think the US Government can be proud of the role it played in helping support that as a key supporting actor. And in my view, it's just vital that the US and Europe keep providing Ukraine with the funding and components that they need to scale their industry even further, because this is ultimately how Ukraine can win this war. And so I think you and I both have a bias in favor of the new school here in a big way. A bias that we really kind of gained from watching the traditional methods founder on the fields of the counteroffensive. And so I hope that Ukraine continues down the track that has brought it a considerable degree of success here. And I guess my question to you, John, is reflecting on the experience you've seen over the last three years and now, looking at this debate and this personnel fight, what's your level of confidence that we are going to kind of continue to see the refinement and improvement of this particular set of capabilities such that it can lead Ukraine to a victory?
- [26:46]
John Finer
Well, it's working for now. And to be honest, that's a lot more than we expected to be able to say. When this kicked off, I think there was a lot of uncertainty about how successful this would ultimately be and what it would lead to. And as you said, the Ukrainians get a lot of credit for turning this concept and those resources into the reality that we're now seeing on the battlefield. I think, by the way, though, it's Also important to point out that this is not some act of charity on the part of the US Government. There is like hard nosed self interest behind this one, because Ukraine is really the front lines of a Russian onslaught that could ultimately go a lot further than Ukraine, which the Ukrainians are not reluctant to point out, but they're right about that. But two other reasons I think kind of bolster the argument that not only were we right to invest in this, but we have to keep investing in it. One is the Ukrainians have now surpassed the United States military and basically every other military on the planet in terms of doctrine for how to fight and integrate these autonomous systems on the battlefield. And we should be learning from them how they do that. We should be bringing over their field commanders to the United States and debriefing them about what works and what doesn't work against a highly capable adversary. And I worry, and I feel a bit that if we had done more of that over the last year, we would have been more successful than we've ultimately been in the Iran conflict. Going up against some of the very same capabilities that the Ukrainians have been fighting against. That's one. And second is more of a forward looking thing. Ukraine is ultimately going to have one of the largest arms industries on earth. And I remember there's a moment I'll just never forget having gone through a drone factory with one of the entrepreneurs that established one of these companies who we had supported and funded. Where as we were walking out, he said something to me along the lines of when the war is over, do you think there's going to be a market for this sort of thing? I remember thinking, oh my. Not only is there going to be a market, there's going to be a massive market and we are going to have a real strong interest in who ultimately gets access to what they are able to produce and who doesn't. They are going to become a massive exporter of this technology. And the closer we are to them, the more we will have some influence over who ultimately can become a buyer of this and who can't. And as a country that has a strong military, but that is not very effective at dealing with these capabilities. We have a very keen interest in where this technology gets proliferated. Another reason I think, to stay close to the Ukrainians on this stuff.
- [29:22]
Jake Sullivan
You know what you could have said to him when he asked you, when the war is over, will there be a market for this? To say, no, not when the war's over, while the war's still going on. There will be a market for this because, in fact, Ukraine has managed to scale production to such a degree that it actually can be an exporter, a provider of this capability, even while it is defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity and taking the fight to Russia. And the Pentagon has gone to Ukraine just in the last few days to say, we want to work with you on this, we want to procure. Other countries have obviously been very interested in that. And for certain of these cases, capabilities, as we saw in the opening weeks of the Iran war, countries in the Gulf are saying, you guys have learned how to defend effectively against these Iranian drones which were used on the battlefield in Ukraine. Now we need your help to do so here too. So this isn't even a question of the future, it's a question of the present. And Ukraine already being not just a security provider, being a bulwark against Russian aggression directly, but also increasingly being a security provider by supplying capabilities and know how and learning to democracies, including our own, that will make a difference in our ability to fight and deter conflict.
- [30:40]
John Finer
So I suspect we will revisit all of this, including, by the way, the personnel discussion we had at the beginning, which, you know, I don't think is, is necessarily over. As you said. Fedorov may come back. There may be some other shoes to drop. One interesting dimension I just wanted to add as we kind of wrap and maybe shift here is Ukraine is fighting this war in a context in which they have not had an election now in many years under their constitution, they cannot hold an election during a time of martial law being declared during a time of war. And so they have used that as a valid reason not to conduct a presidential election since the war began. But if you look at recent polls of who the most popular political figures are in Ukraine, the names are very familiar from the discussion that we just held. At the top of the list of one recent poll that I saw is still Valeri Zaluzhny, the initial overall commander at roughly 70%. Fedorov now coming in at 65% approval rating. The recently dismissed Minister of Defense, Budanov, who was rumored to be on the chopping block and is now Zelenskyy, is effectively chief of staff, close advisor at 62%, Zelenskyy at 59%. So below those others, but still quite high by the standards of most democratically elected leaders. And so just in the background of all of these personnel machinations is probably these people all sizing each other up and Zelenskyy sizing up potential opponents in some future election again, God willing, when this war is finally over.
- [32:15]
Jake Sullivan
And certainly both Zaluzhny and Budanov had played footsie with the idea of ultimately running for president. We probably haven't seen that yet from Fedorov, but the way he's been operating in few days, calling these press conferences, taking to social media, he definitely has some political bones in his body, there's no doubt about it, and some genuine political skill. So I think you're right to point that out, and that's a dynamic worth watching. We will return to Ukraine to talk about the larger dynamics on the battlefield and what the prospects are for the evolution of this war through the rest of this year into next year and beyond. And, you know, we had a great conversation with Michael Kaufman. I think we should find more guests, and there is no shortage of good ones on this in the coming weeks.
- [33:11]
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- [33:14]
John Finer
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- [33:15]
Jake Sullivan
They've got answers. Hey, Meta, what's the capital of perfect Lima? How do you say where's the restroom in Spanish?
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Mint Mobile / Midi Health Advertiser
Donde estalbano? Hey, Meta, Is a hot dog a sandwich? Technically, no. Spiritually, yes.
- [33:31]
Jake Sullivan
Hey, Meta, what should I do with my life?
- [33:34]
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- [33:47]
Jake Sullivan
Now we should turn to Iran.
- [33:49]
John Finer
Yes. From one complicated conflict to another that we thought had been winding down and now seems very much not to be. The memorandum of understanding that the United States and Iran seem to have reached several weeks ago feels effectively all but dead at this point. The war has resumed at a relatively lower grade, but there is still US Bombardment of Iran, Iranian attacks on US Navy and international commercial vessels trying to transit the strait. The strait is effectively closed to virtually all commercial traffic at this point. And President Trump is yet again threatening all manner of escalation against Iran. You add to that mix now we have the Houthis, who have been relatively quiet, I think unexpectedly quiet during the course of this conflict, now saying no longer will talk, they will no longer tolerate. Saudi Arabia commercial traffic through the Bab El Manda, haven't fired on ships yet, but they have said that the Bab El Manda, where Saudi Arabia exports on the order of 5 million barrels a day of oil throughout this conflict, is effectively closed, which could even exacerbate the energy shock that this conflict has produced. And then you have reports that Iran may have moved some of its nuclear equipment, including advanced centrifuges, to an underground facility at Pickaxe Mountain, which we've talked about before on this conflict. All of this trending in a very bad direction, which you should add your two cents to. And then we should talk a little bit about what is available to the administration at this point to actually do. None of which I expect is going to feel particularly satisfying to people because the problem of continuing a war you should not have entered into in the first place, and it did not go well as the options get worse, not better, over time.
- [35:43]
Jake Sullivan
I think you laid it out very well in terms of the update since we last covered this in the state of play as we see it now. Now, the only thing I would add is that we've had US Service members killed in Jordan and in Iraq, three US Service members killed in an airstrike by the Iranians against a base in Jordan, which raises questions as we continue to flow personnel and capabilities into the region to keep up this tempo of daily strikes against Iran, whether in fact we can adequately protect them again against Iranian strikes, whether Iran is getting better at targeting, whether our ability to mount air defense is getting depleted, frankly, whether other countries, Russia, maybe even China, are supplying intelligence or know how to Iran to target us in a better way. There's a lot of questions for me just around the vulnerability of our personnel in the region that have been raised by this strike in Jordan. And the fact that service members have been killed led President Trump to say we're going to escalate our response accordingly. And of course, he's also gone back to Truth Social once more to re raise the possibility of widespread attacks on civilian infrastructure in Iran, which has been a threat he's periodically deployed and never kind of fully followed through on, but also something for us to watch. So what I think would be worth us spending the time for this episode on is to try to talk our listeners through how it is to sit in the White House or in the national security enterprise of the US Government and look at the current situation and say, what are our options? What can we do now?
- [37:38]
John Finer
Now?
- [37:38]
Jake Sullivan
And I'm sure there's a lot of conversations happening about how to take the situation from where it is today to some kind of more durable resolution. And you and I a few weeks ago did an options memo exercise on this in which we laid out three options. One was basically just declare victory and go home. One was escalate by either introducing ground troops or expanding the nature and scale of targets in Iran. And the third was basically try to do a deal, deal, negotiate some agreement with Iran as a way out of this. So those are the three options we presented. They went basically down the path of Option three, they negotiated an mou. That MOU fell apart on a real difference of perspective on what Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz would actually look like. So that MOU has fallen apart. But basically we're back, as I see it, John, to these same three options. That memo, how the options look today are different, but the basic categories of options haven't really changed very much. Am I right about that, or are there other options that could get added to the memo now as the President kind of grapples with the fact that he's stuck in this situation and needs to find a way out?
- [38:57]
John Finer
Yeah, I think often when leaders are presented with options, all of which are pretty unfavorable, they. They send their teams back to sort of shake the trees and see what else they can come up with. And it's possible there are more creative minds at work than ours doing this. On behalf of the President, candidly, I actually hope that that is the case. But having looked at this hard, it does strike me that basically the options are the same. The likely outcome of any of them is probably worse than it was a few weeks ago when we first went through them. But that I don't think there's anything new under the sun and available to him here, unless you've got something up your sleeve.
- [39:39]
Jake Sullivan
I guess implied in your comment that the President will look at bad options and say, go back and get me more, is just the almost structural existence of a fourth option, which is just kind of keep doing what we're doing and hope that it produces a different result. I think someone said something about definition of insanity. But leaving that aside, the fourth option is we're 11 days of strikes as of the time we're recording this, and counter strikes just keep going, just keep bombing and hope that something gives that changes the nature of the options before the President. The default is that we strike, they strike, we strike, they strike. But to actually drive to an outcome, it. These kind of broad three categories seem to be what's available to the President. So then the question is, as we talked through it last time, both of us really alighted on the third option. We said, negotiate an outcome and get it and then do it. And then that's your way out of this misadventure, this misbegotten war. Do you think that that option is. You made the point that all the options are a bit worse now than they were a few weeks ago. Do you think that option is really available to the President? Is Iran so dug in its heels that there isn't really a deal available. That's question one. Question two is, do you think the option of just kind of declare we're done and kind of walk away looks better today than it did a few weeks ago, or is it equally unpalatable for the reasons that we had kind of laid out before?
- [41:24]
John Finer
So I guess I always think there is a deal available, and the question is on what terms? And is it better than essentially what you just described as option four, which is continuing to kind of muddle along? I think the difference between the deal available now and the deal available when the president made the MoU is that there was some ambiguity when the MoU was reached. Actually a fair bit of ambiguity, because it's clear that there was not a meeting of the minds between the two sides over how the strait would be administered going forward. There is currently very little ambiguity about that question. Iran is not, I don't think, going to reach an agreement in which its control, dominance over the strait is not in some way ratified almost explicitly at this point. And that doesn't mean necessarily that Iran is going to require the US to explicitly agree to a toll or a fee. But it does mean that those questions are going to be left to a later time for Iran to determine, maybe Iran in conjunction with Oman. That was the structure that was reached before, and we now know what that's going to look like, which is Iran essentially treating this formerly internationally traversable waterway as essentially its internal property. And that's a terrible outcome. I mean, that's a terrible outcome for the United States. It's a terrible outcome for the rest of the world. I don't think there is a deal without that outcome. Unless the United States would like to find some other way to funnel a massive amount of funding to Iran, that makes it financially more attractive than monetizing the strait. But I think basically that's unlikely at this point. Trump does not seem to want to do massive US Funding or sanctions relief under the current, current circumstances with Iran. And so the deal probably looks something like the mou, with a lot more clarity that Iran is going to be in control of the strait for the foreseeable future. And that's a tough pill for the administration to swallow, unless I'm missing something.
- [43:30]
Jake Sullivan
So I guess if I were sitting in the Situation Room, kind of listening to that presentation of what the MOU would be be, I would at least want to offer the devil's advocate position and say, well, Mr. President, if you're essentially going to negotiate a document where you have ratified that Iran has unambiguous control over the strait. Isn't that a worse outcome than basically just walking away? Because you're also going to get that de facto, but you won't have ratified it, which preserves you some options in the future. And you certainly don't have to pay for it with sanctions relief and other things as you would under any negotiated solution. So in just presenting the option of declare victory and go home, I guess the argument would be we can hit pickaxe mountain. And by the way, it's interesting, the president has been kind of raising the possibility of doing that net try to render it inaccessible to the Iranians and then basically say, look, we've set their nuclear program back years and we've shown we can hold it at risk. So we have, in a way, put it in the box. So you'd say that. Then you'd say, as long as Iran's letting ships through the strait, what do we care what exactly happens in terms of insurance or fees or this kind of thing? The flow of oil will happen. That's the rest of the world's problem as far as we're concerned. The strait's going to be open. You get Iran to pull the Houthis back, so you kind of resolve that issue, if that's possible. And you essentially say we're going to now reduce our overall presence in the Middle east because we don't have to be there as much. And it's a kind of story of saying we're turning the page on this whole thing. I see immediate problems with this argument, but you have to imagine some people inside the Trump administration are making this to the president and that the arguments they have to Marshall comparing this option to the MoU option, given where we are now, those arguments may be a bit stronger. They still may not outweigh a negotiated deal. The deal may still be the best option. But you could see how in the dynamic of this conversation, the rationale I just laid out could get some heads nodding around the table.
- [45:56]
Ryan Reynolds
Table.
- [45:57]
Jake Sullivan
I'm just trying to picture how this conversation would actually go and I'd be interested in your reaction to that. And then also you're going to have someone at the table who's saying, let me play devil's advocate. It's time to ratchet this thing up. It's time for you to finally follow through on those truth social posts and really bring the pain. And you got to think that there's at least a voice in that system that is putting that option before the president, and certainly in his mind he considers it an option since he keeps floating it publicly. So that's kind of how I see this dynamic unfolding in the room. But curious whether you have any reaction to or any difference of view on those first two options now as compared to kind of when we last looked at them and said they both seem pretty damn unpalatable.
- [46:47]
John Finer
Yeah, look, I think it's a much closer, closer call now between doing the best deal available, which is what I think we both basically said he should do the last time, and what he ultimately, I think did, and walking away. In some ways, those two options have converged in the sense that even the best deal available ultimately seems to leave Iran in control of the strait. And I think you could make an argument that walking away at least doesn't have the United States paying or the outcome in which Iran continues to control the strait. The argument in part for doing the deal the last time was maybe you get to a next phase where you're dealing with the nuclear problem. It's now pretty clear that that next phase of Iran making a bunch of nuclear concessions is not going to happen. Basically, the best deal available at this point is something very narrow, focused to some extent on getting the two sides to stop shooting at each other, more or less a ceasefire with some happy talk around reopening the strait. But reopening under new management or under current management, it's not clear to me anymore that that is meaningfully better than declare victory and step away. Because our ability to extract anything additional from Iran in a negotiation, an agreement is pretty limited. And because at least the walk away option doesn't have the United States on top of all of this, offering additional sanctions relief or financial incentives to Iran.
- [48:17]
Mint Mobile / Midi Health Advertiser
Wrong.
- [48:18]
John Finer
Am I wrong about that?
- [48:19]
Jake Sullivan
First of all, I agree with everything you just laid out, and that's kind of where I land, too. But then, of course, what you and I would do is say, okay, what are we missing? So what premise could we have wrong? And the main premise upon which we've built this analysis in this options memo is that Iran's not going to fold on the straight, right? They're not going to say, okay, actually, it's international water security.
- [48:43]
John Marco Cerese
Again,
- [48:46]
Jake Sullivan
could that be wrong? The only way that could be wrong is if there was a pathway to increased American military pressure on Iran that had them say, okay, now we got to quit. I want to at least just state that because we got to essentially Red Team our own options memo here. That does not seem very plausible to me given what's going on on. But is it Possible we're missing something on that. Could Iran be under more pressure than we are perceiving right now and might cut a better deal than we would anticipate? My answer to that question coming into this was no. I think going out will be no. But for purposes of rigor in this exercise, I think it's important to face the question square.
- [49:32]
John Finer
So we've had guests on this podcast who I think would be on opposite sides of this question. I think someone like H.R. mcMaster would say, say, not to put words in his mouth, but he basically did say this when he came in, that more pressure is ultimately going to lead at some point to regime collapse or capitulation. We've also had on this podcast Danny Sintrinowitz, who continues to be more right than wrong in his analysis in public, but continues to make the argument that they are not going to make meaningful concessions to the United States. I come down closer to Danny than to HR As I think is not a surprise to you or anyone else. But we have heard versions of those two arguments. To my mind, the best way ultimately to get to an outcome in which the strait is as close to open as possible may actually involve something that would be more likely to occur in a walkaway scenario, which is that a consortium of other countries negotiates with Iran on a more open strait in the future, just remove the United States where there's too much antagonism, too much ill will, too much conflict from the equation and allow a group of European countries, maybe some Gulf countries, maybe some of the Asian customers of Gulf hydrocarbons products, to basically reach an arrangement that is going to involve probably trade incentives and investment in Iran and all a lot of things that people that want to isolate Iran and we've been in this category don't want to see. But ultimately that to me is the path to reopening or re normalizing flow of traffic through the strait. A negotiation that involves other countries that are more willing to offer Iran incentives and more able to politically than the United States is. And maybe us taking a bit of a step back, having declared quote, unquote victory, is the best path to reaching that. So maybe another argument for the walk away that not one that will be palatable to the current administration.
- [51:28]
Jake Sullivan
I see you moving on this question in the options memo, which is why we do the exercise in the first place, because as you play through it, you can see the puts and takes for each of the different options. So it'll be worth watching. I think this question of whether there are indicators that our assumptions about Iranian staying power are off in some way, we can look for that. But I think you and I both come down closer to Danny than to the view that this regime's going to capitulate or collapse anytime soon. So I think that we can bring this to a close. And both of these issues, Ukraine and Iran obviously are hardy perennials on this podcast, and we'll be back to both of them among many, many other issues as we go forward. But unless you've got anything further to add, John, that brings us to a close for today.
- [52:19]
John Finer
Well, that's all for today. We'll be back next week with a new episode of the Long Game.
- [52:24]
Jake Sullivan
Subscribe to our YouTube channel and follow the audio feed so you never miss an episode. For additional content, episode transcripts and exclusive podcast segments, subscribe to to the Long Game on Substack or join the Long Game plus on Apple Podcasts. Head to the Long Game substack.com or subscribe to the Long Game plus on Apple PodcastS. You will find the links in the show Notes.
- [52:56]
John Finer
That's it for this episode of the Long Game.
- [52:59]
Jake Sullivan
If you like the show, please follow, Share with friends and leave a review. It really helps listeners find us. The Long Game is a Vox Media Podcast Network production Executive Producer Tamara Sepper Senior Producer Matthew Billy video producers Nat
- [53:14]
John Finer
Weiner and Adam Harris Supervising Producer Jake Kaplan Associate Producer Claudia Hernandez Marketing Manager Leanna Greenway Music is by Nat Wiener. We're your hosts, John Don Feiner and Jake Sullivan. Thanks for listening.