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Hi folks. We've got some good news and some bad news. Well, actually we've got a ton of bad news, but we'll keep that for the show. But let's start with the tiny bit of bad news. Daylight saving time is stealing an hour of precious shut eye this coming Sunday. And it's not just that actually. I was just saying I get really annoyed because I was so excited. I got to get up early with Saul and it's dark and it started to get lighter and I said to Saul this morning, I'm like, hey, good news, daylight saving. And as I'm saying it, I realize like oh no, oh it's going to get darker. But there is good news and that is you don't have to suffer through a sleep deprived morning. Our farmer friends at Sunset Lake Saba Day have got your back with perfectly timed sales. Prepare for the upcoming time change with Sunset Lakes highly rated sleep products now 35% off when you check out with the coupon code daylight 26 on all one word daylight number two number six all one word daylight 26. They got products with melatonin that are great for falling asleep and they've also got full spectrum products without the melatonin that have a Seba N and a microdose of thc. Great for staying asleep. Just take a little tincture or a gummy an hour before bedtime, sleep soundly and wake up without any grogginess. I've been doing the goodnight oil for ages. It really helps. Brian was actually complaining that it's too good because his back hurts cuz he does. He falls asleep with seven days I sleep like I was shot in the back of the head in like a crazy position and I was so knocked out I didn't move for eight hours. Really effective and frankly super important these days when there is a lot to keep you up awake at night,
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sleep
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better, feel better and wake up feeling refreshed. Unless you're like Brian in which case your back will be contorted. Head on over to sunsetlake sabadet.com use the code daylight26 daylight26 no spaces to save 35% on all their Saba Day sleep products. The sale ends March 9th at 11:59pm Eastern. See their site for additional terms and conditions. We'll put the link at the YouTube and podcast descriptions now. Time for the show the Majority Report with Sam Seder. It is Tuesday, March 3rd, 2026. My name is Sam Seder. This is the five time award winning Majority Report. We are broadcasting live steps from the industrially ravaged Gowanus Canal in the heartland of America, downtown Brooklyn, usa. On the program today, Anel Shaleen, research fellow at the Middle East Program at Quincy Institute. Then Seamus Malika Fosley Fos Malik of Zali Malik of Sal. All right, freelancer I know I had it before the show of Turbulence Pod and publisher of his newsletter@seamus malakali.com Also on the program today, War Expands US Shut shuts embassies in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, US expands its bombing of Iran, as does Israel. US casualties now at at least 6 and growing as are abandoned reasons why we launched this war. Meanwhile, Trump and Hegseth both hint at boots on the ground. Rubio claims we attacked Iran because Israel was going to and Iran will attack now will attack any ship in the straits of Hormuz. Will Kane says Tim Kane in the membrane.
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Sorry.
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Tim Kane says war powers vote today in the Senate. Key primaries in Texas and North Carolina today, Supreme Court blocks a law prohibiting schools from outing trans students. In California, the DOJ backs off its assault on pro bono law firms. Judge restores lawmaker access to ICE detention facilities in a possible prelude to killing the Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court intercedes in a New York state Supreme Court congressional district Redraw Stock A. Lockalopoulos. What's the name? Malaconopolis Malleus. Dr. Yeah, she's gonna keep her district. Bernie Sanders introduces 4.4 trillion dollar tax on billionaires. That's a 5% wealth tax annually. Graham Platner cracks up another Senate endorsement. Sorry, Chuck Schumer, time to drop out.
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Graham.
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All this and more on today's Majority Report. I'm already exhausted.
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War day Tuesday. Yes, that's what we're, we're crossing out News day. And now it's war day.
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Secretary of WAR Yeah, the, it's obviously like the, the hits keep coming. And Trump and Hegseth, I mean, I don't know. Obviously we're going to be talking to Anel and Seamus about this extensively today. And I do not recall any type of conflict that the US has been involved in from the Iraq war to Kuwait, the invasion, the first Iraq war that took place in Kuwait or even invading Grenada or Clinton bombing Libya or the second Libya bombing where there was an administration that had seemingly put no effort whatsoever into coming up with a reason why they're doing this or coordinating the reason throughout the administration. It's, it really is astonishing. And they can't even agree as to whether we are involved in a war or not. Here is a CNN Compilation of various elements that are behind this non war war, saying it's not a war, even though it's also a war. Clearly a war.
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You bomb presidential headquarters or whatever you
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assassinate the leadership of and then continue to bomb it. I mean, like, I'm not sure what else constitutes war.
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I think we would consider it a war if bomb the White House.
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If Iran killed Trump and then also killed hundreds and bombed a school.
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We're just being. The CO said afterwards and, and contemplating
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boots on the ground, I guess, is really just more about like, like a field trip type of situation. Here is that compilation and we may have casualties. That often happens in war. I don't know if this is technically a war. We didn't start this war, but under President Trump, we are finishing it. This isn't a war. We haven't declared war.
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The Secretary of Defense, who calls himself the Secretary War, said today, this is a war.
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We set the terms of this war from start to finish. Nobody should classify this as war. It is combat operations. War is hell and always will be.
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Strategic strikes are not war.
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They can't seem to get on the right page. And then yesterday in the morning, Marco Rubio came out with one of. I mean, this is, you know, in every conflict or every era, there are statements that are made that end up being sort of linchpins historically with the Iraq war. Paul Wolfowitz testified, one of the neocons, I think he was at the State Department during Bush. Maybe it was the Defense Department, I can't remember. I think it's Defense Department. And he said weapons of mass destruction was really the thing that we could just sort of all agree on because they all have their separate reasons for wanting to invade and occupy Iraq. I'm sure that's the case here. But I think this statement from Rubio, and we will play later in the program, Mike Johnson saying something similar. But this is going to be the one that defines absolutely this conflict. Because in on so many levels, it's both disingenuous. It's also absolutely insane. It's also in many ways incomprehensible and it belies an incredible weakness. Like it's, it really is honestly like, like one of those Escher paintings where you look at and you can't tell what you're looking at because it is so wrong in so many different ways. You have to almost like state like, I'm going to believe it. And then.
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Yes. And you're not even touching on the. How politically insane it is, how toxic politically this statement is. The idea that Israel dragged us into this and they're admitting it.
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Let's play this.
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The second question that been asked is why now? Well, there's two reasons why now. The first is it was abundantly clear, clear that if Iran came under attack by anyone, the United States or Israel or anyone, they were going to respond and respond against the United States. The orders had been delegated down to the field commanders. It was automatic and in fact it bear to be true because in fact, within an hour of the initial attack on the leadership compound, the missile forces in the south and in the north for that matter, had already been activated to launch in fact, those that had already been pre positioned. The third is the assessment that was made that if we stood and waited for that attack to come first before we hit them, we would suffer much higher casualties. And so the President made the very wise decision. We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action. We knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces. And we knew that if we didn't preemptively go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties and perhaps even higher those killed. And then we would all be here answering questions about why we knew that and didn't act.
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So that's an admission that the Israelis dragged us into it and that they wanted to take action against Iran and that they needed U.S. support. Because the reality is is that last summer when the Israelis bombed Iran, Israel did a good job of covering up how the Iranian response was actually significant and hit them pretty hard. So they needed US Support this time. And Rubio just kind of spells out the reasoning right there.
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Well, okay, if we, if we take Rubio at face value, he is both arguing a, that we had no capacity to stop what Israel is doing even though we knew that it would seriously implicate us. Yes, there would be a cost to pay to us and we have no ability to stop Israel from doing that. Two, it says we moved all of
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our aircraft carriers over there for this
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exact purpose of, I mean, of course, but wait, but we're, this is the version where we pretend he's telling the truth. He's also saying at that point that the logic is we punched this guy in the face because we knew that if someone punched him in the face, he would punch us in the face. Or if we punched him in the face, we punched him in the face because we knew if we punched him in the face he would punch us back. So we punched him in the face
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or no, our friend, we punched him in the face. Because our friend was about to punch him in the face. But our friend, it might actually get punched back. So we really stuck up for.
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No, we would get punched back. That's what he said.
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Okay, gotcha.
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And we would get punched back and not know that he was going to punch us back, even though that we predicted this in the first place.
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They say we, but they really mean the Israelis here. Because if the, if US Personnel wasn't in the region, then there wasn't this buildup. That is what they're most concerned about is Iranian missiles breaking through the Iron Dome. And it also hurts Israel's projection of strength. Mearsheimer has spoken about this before. The idea that Israel, because it's such a small nation and doesn't necessarily. And it's a colonial enterprise, needs to show that they are so strong that they can withstand all of this firepower. And Iran is the biggest threat to that. That's why Netanyahu has been trying to drag us into this for 40 years, 30 years. And he successfully lobbied this president who does not have like the constitutional strength and is arrogant and mad enough to resist the Israeli push, which is now, by the way, bipartisan within the context of Israel. Even the Israeli liberals are endorsing the Greater Israel theory. This, he just, this dotard thinks this is an act of strength because big bombs go boom. Even though it's actually a shocking display of weakness because you're being dog walked by Netanyahu.
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Now that, that assumes that what Rubio was saying was true. And it may be it also, but it really does stretch the imagination.
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But why wouldn't it be true? Because admitting that is like the most politically toxic thing that you could possibly do right now within this climate where everybody is sick of Israel and its genocide. Everyone. The pol polling on the war in Iran.
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Toxic to whom?
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To the Republicans.
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Well, but, but, but, but, okay, maybe to some Republicans. But you know, 70% of Republicans still support Israel.
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Yes.
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Rubio, you know, when he's contemplating running for president, maybe in 2028, having the neocons and 70% of the Republican Party behind him, I think he has made his. I mean, there's a reason why J.D. vance all of a sudden has disappeared. Because J.D. vance had picked a different lane for when he's going to run for president. And that one is sort of like
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you're now admitting that it's politically toxic. Why would you have to pick a different.
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No, no, no. It's politically toxic depending on who you are.
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Yeah.
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J.D. vance had picked a lane and that, you know, pretending like we're going to be anti war. Marco Rubio hasn't. From Marco Rubio's perspective, he doesn't see this as politically toxic. I don't think Trump sees it as politically toxic. I think they see it as making sense.
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I mean, listen, they're acutely aware that right now there is a bunch of right wing media apparatus. They've lost Matt Walsh that is saying that this is not popular and why are they dragging us into this and that there's a whole ecosystem of right wing media influencers right now that say that Israel controls our foreign policy. And he just went and said Israel controls our foreign policy.
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I think, I think Donald Trump probably thinks that they're. Matt Walsh aside, that he is got more of loyalty from that Republican base than Matt Walsh or Tucker Carlson or Megyn Kelly for that matter.
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It's just the incoherence of it is also just jarring to me because Trump is just acting like a madman. The Don Row doctrine, we were talking about this two months ago that were supposedly the overarching foreign policy objective of this administration was to retreat from the long forever wars in the Middle East. That's what they said. They were lying. And if you paid attention you would know they were lying. But that we're going to do Western hemispheric dominance now. That's what we're going to be obsessed with. And the only consistency is the desire for blood and lawlessness.
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Flexible thinker. Yeah, that's the problem. You're actually stuck in your way. You're ending the forever war that Iran's doing to us.
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Right. Okay, I guess Iran is in greater Western hemisphere.
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Yes. You're just, you just.
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We need to create a buffer zone for the west by bombing, I think
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in multiple dimensional chess. And you just think in checkers. Because if you look straight through Washington on a plane, it comes out to Iran right through the planet.
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You're right. You're right. I mean it's just, I can't. It's like the way, you know, cats can only see a certain way. That's my femininity. Yeah.
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Because everything I learn about human dynamics, I experienced that Air America when you had a lunatic at the head of, of Air America people. And actually this happened multiple times. There are different camps within the sort of the administration and there are. Right. We know we have like the Miller camp and the Russ Vogt camp. Maybe they are together at times and J.D. vance and Rubio and other. And really all these people are all grifters looking and the one thing they never do when they don't fight on other people's turf. And so like Stephen Miller may have promoted the Don Row doctrine and he had gotten so far. But when Rubio comes in or the neocons come in or Miriam Adelson comes in, Miller backs off and says like it's a mistake but it's not my, it's not in my neighborhood. And I think that wasn't in the room I was, I mean honestly, I think that's like, you know, apparently, I
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mean I heard Trita Parsi say this on American prestige today. Apparently Trump is increasingly listening to fewer and fewer people within the official administration. And who he's listening to on this, these are treat as examples are Tom Cotton not good. Who's the other person? Lindsey Graham of course and Laura Frickin Loomer.
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But that's going to be this week.
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Yes, exactly.
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When he starts going into like also Cuba. Now we're going to do Cuba and then we're going to do somewhere else. It'll be somebody else.
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But the problem is is that this is going to take on a momentum in and of itself and there's going to be a sunk cost fallacy that we saw in Ira that the neocons have already got their hooks into him on this, on this front. Like he doesn't have the consistency or the patience to see anything through. But we know from the nature of regime change, wars like this and actions like this that they take on a momentum of them of their own.
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Well, we're going to talk to an L and to Seamus about this. It's quite, I mean it's quite possible he just says, you know what, actually I'm done with this. Let's everybody come back and we're gonna do something different or we end up getting in a protracted another 25 year war. We'll see. In a moment we'll be talking to Anel Shaleen, a research fellow in the Middle east program at the Quincy Institute. First, a word from our sponsor. I can't even read this without thinking like I want to go back to bed right now, to be honest with you. Cozy earth crafts every piece with care. Soft supportive socks for your steps through the day to breathable comforters that help you rest deeply at night. Every detail is intentional so your everyday feels quietly elevated. I have now cozy earth sheets. I got a cozy earth comforter and it was thin. It's thin,
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I got like a midweight one.
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The duvet thing or the comforter Duvet is the COVID Oh right.
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Never too late to try new ways. Yeah, exactly.
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It.
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We are back. Sam Cedar, Emma Vigland on the Majority Report. It's a pleasure to welcome back to the program Anel Sheline, Research Fellow in the Middle East Program at the Quincy Institute. Anel, thanks so much for joining joining us.
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Thank you for having me.
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I guess the first question there's a lot of questions obviously about this that are really basic like. Why are we doing this? Or even why are why is the administration saying we're doing this? What is their answer to this?
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I it's Hard to even answer that question because they've been all over the place. You know, I coming out today, that pretty shocking statement from Rubio, the idea that we knew Israel was going to attack, and so that would have meant that Iran would have retaliated and hit Americans. So we decided to just go ahead and attack first. You know, I saw analysis on social media that was like, you know, that's like your teenager is going to go crash the car, and so you get drunk and crash the car instead, you know, to make sure your teenager doesn't do it. It's like, just stop your teenager. You know, like, we have such power over the Israeli government, as was evidenced after Israel struck Doha in September. And finally, Trump made clear to Netanyahu that he needed to at least agree to the appearance of a ceasefire. Obviously, that is not actually what happened, but it was very clear that the leverage is there. And all of this argument that Israel is going to do, you know, the US can't really control. No, we provide them with billions of dollars in security assistance every year, and if we actually put our foot down, they have to listen.
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Do you believe that? I mean. No, no, no, not what you just said, but do you believe Rubio, do you think that, that we did that? Because, I mean, we've been building up for over a month, right? Like, we've been getting reports for over a month that we have the largest buildup since the Iraq war, both in terms of naval and air power in the region. At least a month, maybe, maybe two months. But do you believe that, that. That Rubio is being genuine in that explanation?
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I mean, my understanding is that Netanyahu has been pushing for this war. Obviously, we saw the US get involved in June, and then Netanyahu kept pushing for the US to re engage again, and he was clearly pushing on an open door. I think Trump is on a sugar high after the Venezuela operation and thought, you know, unclear why he would be under this impression that Iran would be in any way similar to Venezuela, given that there's no indication that the administration had really been in touch with anyone inside Iran. I mean, that would have been fairly shocking, just given the dynamics there and the history of the relationship. But again, in Venezuela, they had been in touch with Delsey Rodriguez, also Machado. Like, there were various other people waiting in the wings willing to kind of become a US proxy, and that simply did not exist in Iran. Furthermore, just the fact that. Something like getting the US bogged down in another war in the Middle East, I mean, this is precisely what he said he wasn't going to do. And I know it's silly to hold Trump to anything he said he was going to do, but, I mean, how is this. America first? Like, I just don't. In terms of, like, in a midterm year, I.
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Well, that's important. That's important, right? I mean, I think that's important to note, because when we're looking, I think you're absolutely right, that perhaps if the Venezuela operation didn't go the way that it did, and the administration views that as a success because now they have a gun to Rodriguez's head and they're getting. They're coercing her. If that had not happened, I'm not sure Netanyahu would be able to have convinced Trump this much, because it seems as though Netanyahu and the neocons that Trump has been surrounding himself with recently, although that's not been much of a change, sold him on the weakness of the Iranian regime in a way that does not match the reality. Venezuela is a very different story and has a different history than Iran.
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Exactly, Exactly. And this notion that this was just going to be some easy operation, you know, maybe he felt that the assassination of Qasem Soleimani very early in 2020, he also felt that that was successful and there wasn't major. There weren't major consequences that he really experienced as a result. But this is very different. And again, as Sam, back to your question about, like, what, like, what are they saying they're trying to do? They. They keep shifting what. They're saying that sometimes it's regime change. Then you have Bridge Colby coming out and saying, no, it's not regime change. And then you have them lengthening the timeline from, you know, we're just gonna, you know, we'll go 48 hours and then we'll see if they want to come back to the table. And now it's like, no, it's gonna be four to five weeks, and now maybe it's gonna be a ground invasion. You know, Trump being very clear that he doesn't have the yips about putting troops on the ground. I mean, this is. This is crazy. And it's a country of 90 million people. I mean, you know, Iraq was much, is. Is much smaller, was much smaller in 2003. And it's just a completely. And was a complete debacle.
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Okay. I think it's a. I think saying that, like, Trump has just. Just got rolled in some way or is, you know, some amount of crazy and stupid. What is. It's taken for granted, you know, that Netanyahu's wanted to do this for 40 years. But what does Netanyahu think was going to happen? Like, you know, like, you know, I'm not an expert on these things at all, but my understanding about the Iranian government is that there is no we kill Khomeini and it's, and the government collapses. It's that it, it is very, not necessarily decentralized, but institutionalized at this point. And this is not a house of cards. It's actually constructed in a way that is rather durable. What is Netanyahu expect? Like in his fantasy we bought like, does he want American troops on the ground and is okay with a 20 year quagmire for America?
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I mean, I don't think Netanyahu has any qualms about Americans dying in this war. I think that's been his objective from the beginning, is to get the US to take out Iran such that it would no longer pose any sort of threat. Again, the idea that Iran posed an actual threat to Israel when Israel is the nuclear armed state and Iran is not. I've been shocked by the number of people that have said, oh, is this going to go nuclear? Like, no, they don't have nuclear weapons. Like they, it's like what Israel's the nuclear armed power. But I think what Netanyahu is hoping for is regime collapse. He wants the country to fall apart. We've seen this. In addition with the targeting of border areas, in particular the border with Iraq where you have Kurdish militias, theoretically that could come in other ethnic minority groups inside Iran. I think he's banking on the entire country simply falling apart, which would be extremely destabilizing for the whole region. In particular, you think about countries like Saudi Arabia, the uae, Qatar, like all the America's Gulf partners on the other side of the Persian Gulf who've been pushing for this not to happen, who've been pushing very hard for diplomacy. But I think from Netanyahu's perspective, he's not concerned by that. The idea, it's so as someone who grew up with the war on terror model and this idea that you can't have these ungoverned spaces and it's better to have a strong authoritarian government in place than a vacuum. This is just, just, it's just sort of shocking to think that Trump has sort of bought into Netanyahu's thinking, which is that total chaos in Iran is somehow desirable.
A
But wait, wait, I just want to ask you one more question about that. Do the other Gulf states do? Are they like, what is the. I mean, I understand it from, from Netanyahu's perspective, a balkanized Iran, an Iran that is engaged in a civil war, an Iran that is a failed state. I mean, I don't know how you get there other than maybe 10 years of American, you know, boots on the ground in some type of massive war, which just seems to me to be an impossibility to sustain in the way that Iraq was. But if that were to happen, why would that not necessarily be in the interest of, let's say, MBS in Saudi Arabia? Like, I mean, they have always been traditionally rivals, I imagine, like, you know, from their perspective, perhaps a decentralized powers in Iran might be. Might make them ascend more. Is that not the case?
C
So I think that may have been the case a few years ago when the tension with Iran, especially between Saudi Arabia and Iran, was so high. I think that was when you did tend to hear a lot more bellicosity, this sort of rhetoric coming out of Riyadh. But I think more recently, because it has become so clear to the Saudis and the Qataris, the Omanis, that the US Security guarantee, alleged security, is not actually there. And we're actually seeing that now where you have the US Concentrating its defenses and the missile interceptors to protect Israel and not to protect the. These GCC countries that have given Trump personally vast amounts of money as well as invested in the US Economy, enormous amounts of money that, you know, obviously there's a lot of corruption happening there, but there's a. They would have a reasonable assumption that they sort of bought a degree of loyalty and protection as a result. And instead what they're finding is, no, the US Is not going to be there to protect them. And so this is, and this isn't the first time this has happened. You think about the Iranian attack on the upkeep facilities in 2019, which at that was. Which Trump responded to essentially saying, well, you know, they struck the Saudis, they didn't strike us. And it was after that that you then saw MBS initiating this process that resulted in normalization with Tehran in early 2023 that he decided he couldn't count on the US anymore. He was just going to go ahead and cool down these tensions and just try to find a modus vivendi with Tehran. Obviously you had the Qataris and Omanis that have essentially been sort of interlocutors with Iran that have had a closer relationship, but just in general, a regional war, as well as the possibility of just sort of smuggling or Trafficking captagon. Like when I was in Saudi Arabia in December, this is what they were articulating was this. This concern that the US And Israel were going to launch this extreme instability, which is completely incompatible with MBS's Vision 2030, whereby he has his credibility and legitimacy on transforming the Saudi economy, to be clear, in an extremely authoritarian manner, but in hopes of reducing their reliance on oil. Moving towards a post oil economy and as well as employing women has been a significant component of that. But he needs foreign direct investment, he needs tourists, he needs it to be. He needs the region to be stable. The same way Dubai and Abu Dhabi and Doha. These cities depend on this perception of stability which has now been shattered.
A
Iran probably knows that. And that's probably part. I mean, that's probably the weakest point in which they can. Or the point where they can exercise as much.
D
Yeah, yeah. The tourism piece that we saw, we were talking about this before. There were videos of tourists that were saying, how could this happen here? I mean, that their pivot away from oil is going to be they want more stability in the region. For that reason. There was an item in Middle East Eye about how the U.S. is, quote, stonewalling requests from Gulf states to replenish their interceptors. So that fits into what you're saying there. And you also see that they're warming to China. China was part of brokering some of those talks between the Iranians and the Saudis recently. And so they are keeping their options open to a degree. I want to ask you, because you obviously worked in the State Department. We've had you on the show to speak about how you resigned over the genocide in Gaza and the Biden administration not listening to pleas from you and your colleagues to change course. But. And so when we talk about Israel's influence over the State Department, you're somebody that has an intimate knowledge of that. I'm wondering, like, about these Kushner and Witkoff talks, like, on its face. Rubio, as the head of the State Department, should probably be a little bit concerned that the Trump administration and the Israelis seem to relish in the fact that American diplomacy really has no credibility anymore. Because when you have, like, diplomacy and talks fall apart like this, all that's left is militarism. That's music to Bibi Netanyahu's ears. That's music even maybe to Trump's ears. But, like, it undercuts the core function of the State Department.
C
I mean, I don't think anyone in the Trump administration is particularly concerned about the State Department, including Marco Rubio. I mean, you know, the fact that you have Kushner and Witkoff not only leading these negotiations with Iran, but also Gaza, also Ukraine. I mean. Right. In a previous administration, it would have been conducted through State Department channels, and you would have had sort of the capacity there to say nothing, also with the expertise. And just, I mean, one key point there, I think that it's important to highlight, is the fact that Trump could have declared victory with the deal that he got. The fact that you had the Omani foreign minister come on Face the Nation to say Iran has agreed to zero enrichment. This had been a red line.
A
They didn't say zero enrichment, they said zero stockpiling. Right. I mean, so that there would be enrichment. But only it seemed to me that the offer was, we continue to enrich for commercial purposes, you know, using it for nuclear power, but no stockpiling, so we can't build a nuclear weapon.
C
Yes, I think that's right. I think. And that. And that was that. That would have, again, Trump could have said, I got something better than what Obama got, because under the JCPOA, the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran was permitted to retain, I believe, 300 kilos of enriched uranium, and now it was going to be zero. As you said, that they couldn't hold on to any of it. And this, I think, goes back to what you were saying, Emma, about the fact that you had Kushner and Witkoff looking for that specific. The zero enrichment phrase. And it's like, basically, they'd agreed to that. They'd agreed to zero stockpiling. And so there's no capacity. They simply cannot make a weapon. And that Trump could have said, I did it. I did the thing. I got the longer, stronger, better deal. I got what Obama could, and he could have avoided all of this. And the fact that the Omani foreign minister, they don't usually go on media to make this case because clearly Wyckoff and Kushner weren't really getting it. The fact that there was a viable deal here and that the Iranians had crossed their own red line to get there, and instead we have Trump launching these attacks anyway. And specifically, again, whether it was. And the Israelis or the Americans, but hitting a girls school within the first, you know, out the first day of. Of this engagement is. Is horrifying that, you know, we're already to this point in the conflict where, where were, you know, there have already been 10 medical facilities struck which are supposed to be protected, obviously. Schools are supposed to be protected, obviously, civilian infrastructure in General is not a legitimate military target. And yet already we're seeing the both. And again, it's hard to tell sometimes whether it's an Israeli missile or an American missile or who launched it, but targeting the civilian infrastructure in ways that are very reminiscent of Gaza.
D
Yes, yes. And to bolster this point, though, about Wyckoff, like, there was reporting a few months ago that Wyckoff didn't understand Putin and the Russian Ukraine land swap offer that Reuters had reported that, that it seems like, I don't know, statecraft. You're at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, but statecraft should be a thing. Diplomacy is a thing. And just sticking your real estate buddy in and your son in law in to negotiate these deals means like they seem to misunderstand basic tenets of what the negotiations entail.
C
Exactly. And you know, you think about like when under the very painstaking negotiations to get to Obama's nuclear deal, they had nuclear scientists there to sort of hash out the specifics, people whose life is dedicated to understanding these issues and could agree on the very specific terms. Whereas, yeah, here it seemed maybe like they did control F for zero enrichment. And since it wasn't in there, they're like, no.
D
Yeah.
A
Well, they also did stay at a Holiday Inn Express the night. But let me ask you this though. Is it, is it possible that they, that they did understand what was being offered? They had chased the car, they caught the car, and at that point they were like, we're not getting enough resistance from the Iranians. We got to do this.
D
Now
C
I think that is entirely plausible as well, that you had. Trump had made the decision that he wanted to move forward with this. And so negotiations really were just a ploy. Emma, kind of as you were saying, that America's credibility as a negotiator has been significantly eroded, not only in the eyes of Iran, but any other country trying to negotiate with them. And as you pointed out, that is directly in the interests of Netanyahu doesn't want this to end in negotiations. He doesn't want an off ramp. He wants the US to continue to use up our limited interceptors. I mean, that's also a crucial component of this, is America's supply of these very expensive missile interceptors has been significantly reduced by the war in Ukraine as Well as the 12 Day War last summer. And we, we don't have the capacity, which is why, as we were saying earlier, the US Is focusing its attention on defending Israel and not on defending these other Gulf partners, which, Emma, as you pointed out, are very you know, they're looking for other alternatives. We saw after the strike on Doha in September, within eight days, Saudi Arabia signed the defense treaty with Pakistan, a nuclear armed state. There's been talk that they'll also sign something similar with Turkey, maybe also Egypt. And so sort of developing this alternative middle power. I mean, Turkey is a NATO member, but these countries are understandably going to be looking elsewhere because the United States, whether it's on the security front or more broadly, just sorry, I'm a little all over the place, but just Trump's announcement just now that he's going to cut off dealings with Spain because they said that they're going dealings, I assume, like trade, cut off their relationship with Spain because they're not going to allow the US to launch attacks on Iran from Spanish territory. I mean, you know, it's just like the whole world is like, wow, it was maybe have been a little foolish for us to have relied on the United States behaving somewhat sanely, whether in the economic realm or the security realm. Maybe it's time to restructure our global order in a way that doesn't depend on there being a somebody sane and competent in the White House.
A
That would be the most rational reaction to this, frankly. Anel Sheline, research fellow at the Middle East Program at Quincy Institute, thanks so much for your time today. Really appreciate it.
C
Thank you.
D
Thanks, Anel.
A
All right. We're going to take a quick break and we'll come back. Seamus Malikafsali will be joining us, freelance journalist, co host of the Turbulence Pod, publisher of his new newsletter@seamus malakafzali.com we'll be right back after this. We are back. Sam Cedar, Emma Vigland on the Majority Report. Pleasure to welcome to the program. Seamus Mala Kefsali, freelance journalist, co host of the Turbulence Pod and publisher of his own newsletter under his name at Substack. Seamus, welcome to the program.
B
Happy to be on.
A
So we were just talking to Anel Sheline from the Quincy Institute about sort of like the mystery of why America did this and what what Netanyahu is hoping to gain out of this. Give us your perspective of sort of the regional reaction. And to the extent that there is both surprise in what the US has done and the surprise in which, if they have any, in Iran's reaction and the US's inability to protect them from
B
Iran's reaction in the Gulf there, I have not seen very much in the way of criticizing the United States, at least for now. They are mostly concerned with shooting down Iranian drones Iranian ballistic missiles. But this is something that the Gulf states had been warning Trump about. They had previously intervened in order to stop a potential strike back in January because of the threat of that retaliation. And apparently Trump did not consider this to be a real possibility, nor did, I think a lot of people in the administration right now. I think they are limiting their strong reactions to Iran solely just because right now self defenses, as in the Patriot missiles that are shooting down these missiles and drones, they are reliant on US Supply. They cannot do a unilateral retaliation if they wanted to do that against Iran without significant American support. I think they're trying to treat this as delicately as they possibly can.
A
Well, I mean, what, what do you make of, you know, we heard the statement from Rubio and it's also, Mike Johnson has said the same thing. Like, we had to strike because we knew Israel was going to strike. And we knew that if Israel struck, then Iran would strike us. And so we needed to strike them first so that as to minimize the casualties for us if they struck, which. Okay, take that at face value. But Trump also said that he was surprised that Iran struck these various countries in the region. American bases for the most part, although some, you know, like, I guess maybe airports, but ones that were affiliated, you know, next to, to. So what ostensibly did when Rubio says they would strike us, is he saying that they thought that Iran would send missiles to America? Like, I don't understand. How can you be both surprised and anticipate Iranian retaliation?
B
I don't think Trump on a personal level understands anything that is happening or thinking knows about what's happening or has any idea of what comes later. On the issue of, like, leadership for Iran, he seems to oscillate between hearing that there is a temporary council of three people and those are three choices. But then those choices got killed, but didn't really get killed. And now there may be moderate elements, but he doesn't know what those moderate elements are. I think he personally is just hearing things in his briefing and he remembers bits and pieces of it and then he just says it to the press. As for Rubio and Mike Johnson, these are people with functioning minds. And I think this is mostly deception. Dropside, I believe, was reporting on this, that the date for this, for these strikes was decided weeks in advance and that the negotiating process was intended, deliberately intended to fail. They expected this to happen. But Trump himself, I think, has been pretty much not present here.
D
What do the Iranians fear here more? I mean, I would imagine that because as Sam's been saying the state is so it's more institutionalized than other countries that the United States has tried to wage offensive wars against. I mean, what they're, it seems like they're prepared to take a significant amount of damage, more than basically capitulating. And that's been the case for decades. I don't see why this would change just because they take out Khomeini.
B
No, there is, there is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Republic by most Republicans and I also think most Democrats. There is the expectation that because Ali Khamenei was the Supreme Leader for such a long time that all the power was vested in him and that as soon as he took him out, then democracy would flourish and the protesters would rush in and everything would be hunky dory from there. But when Khomeini died, the Republic did not fall. They were able to simply elect a new one. And that appears to be the case here. No, they're really hoping that a Venezuela situation could happen here in which a much less institutionalized country, to borrow the language that you're using, they see one of their top leaders, their top leader get taken out and the rest of them fall in line because they fear death. They fear being taken out of the picture one way or another. In Iran, there are multiple different institutional structures that would fight against that. And also there is like, there is just no chance, I hate to rely on polemicism, but there is really no chance that they are just going to give in on this and acquiesce to American demands, that there is no way that the political system will allow for that in any strong way. It is a managed democracy, but there have always been political wins inside the country pushing their heels in against American influence.
A
For the past 20 years, anyone I've interviewed about Iran has more or less said the same thing, that there are wide, deep institutions that are structural. And so if that's the case, just to get back to, and I want to come back to what you think broadly, Iranian reaction will be. But if that is the case and Rubio has a functioning brain and Lindsey Graham has a functioning brain and Netanyahu theoretically has a functioning brain, like, what do they expect to happen? Like, I guess, you know, you know, I can understand that Netanyahu has no problem with a redux of the Iraq war for America. It didn't really in any way harm Israel. If anything, it strengthened Israel.
D
He was happy about it.
A
And, and I could see how he'd be like, that would be great if America was Here fighting a ten year war in Iran. It's no skin off our back. But what, what does like Rubio or Graham expect to happen? Like what? What do they think the outcome that is going to be positive here for them to have done?
B
Positive, the positive reaction, the positive result. They hope to see a state collapse and civil war. The idea like Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late Shah, is clearly trying to angle for a strong Iranian ally of the US and Israel. Talking about the Cyrus Accords. He was on Fox News with Bartiromo, talking about there being a trillion dollar market opening for the Americans if they invested Iran and invest in regime change. But I think Lindsey Graham was the one who said this. He doesn't care if there's another cleric or a representative democracy. He cares that Iran is no longer a threat. And that means that Iran needs to be neutralized in its entirety as a force that can project against America. I think those were Hegsef's words. So when Steve Wyckoff, who said to Sean Hannity last night that he asked Iran to dismantle its own navy in negotiations, that is not something that I assume he expects to reconstitute under Reza Pahlavir, any pro democracy leader. The expectation is that it no longer exists permanently so that America continues that freedom operation. The Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. If Iran is constantly tied up fighting Kurdish separatist groups, groups or Balochi separatist groups or whichever ethnic group, then it has no opportunity to focus on projecting against the west or forming its own foreign policy objectives or projecting influence anywhere. It becomes America and Israel's ball game entirely.
D
And I think that's also why Netanyahu is in favor of really anything that entangles the United States states in the Middle east once again is that it increases our reliance on Israeli intelligence. My camera's being a little funky. Sorry about that, folks. But it increases our reliance on Israeli intelligence. It entangles the United States even further in that relationship and makes it so that it's less likely that the growing political winds at home are going to shift in the direction of say an arms embargo, which I think like we've been dancing around the timing of this, but the fact that this is happening as the, you have Republican members resigning from the House and as the midterms are coming up and you have even centrists like Mark Warner who are speaking about Israel's dragging us into this war, like they feel that they basically have a nine month year long period to wage this war before the tide of American public opinion might impact them. And they're also, by the way, bombing Lebanon. We should say, like Israel's done everything it can to make this, the region destabilize outside. But the country that they need U.S. support for because the Iranian missiles can impact them, is the U.S. i mean, they need U.S. support, I should say, if they're going to take action against Iran directly.
B
Israel knows that it's still. I mean, Israel enjoys so much support from the United States. That's putting it lightly. It wants to be in a position in which it is not reliant on US support in the future. Netanyahu had said that in 10 years, it wants to be free of any sort of American military aid. But conversely, it also wants America to be, as you said, completely tied up in this, completely reliant on Israeli intelligence, Israeli leadership aligned with Israeli objectives and Israeli strategy. But if anyone in the government pulls back or wants to pull back, then they have no ability to control Israel. That is the ideal situation that they want to get to. Netanyahu, specifically,
A
what do you make of the Oman's foreign minister saying that Iran had agreed to not stockpile enriched uranium and just, you know, having enriched uranium itself gets diminished as you use it in a nuclear reactor for power. Iran has always wanted to control their own power because obviously you want to be able to generate your own power as a country. If you agree not to stockpile it, you can't build a nuclear weapon. And what do you make of the timing relative to Iran having just offered that? This is according to the foreign minister from Oman.
B
I mean, there had been that reports, as I said before, that this date was entrenched weeks ago, I guess on the eve of Purim, because they are using that symbology. But your intuition is correct that they wanted to head off some sort of conundrum where Iran is clearly offering things in public. But they keep having to say that Iran is, in fact digging in its heels and not giving them anything. And they have to be.
A
This is what happened with Iraq. I mean, we had weapons inspectors on the ground. They were not finding anything. We were hearing more and more the weapons inspectors are going to, to the U.S. to the CIA, tell us where they are, because we're looking where you told us, and they're not there. And that's when I think the US Realized, like, okay, pull them out, because we've got to go in now or it's just going to. We're going to lose the PR battle in this instance. Like, it doesn't even seem like they were waging a PR battle. They just said, we're just going to do it. We don't need to give justification. We're just going to create these facts on the ground. You mentioned, like the, the possibility of there being, I mean, there are many different, I guess, ethnicities, factions, you could say, in Iran. How if there was a. And I imagine there are, you know, we have had, whether Israeli or US Or British, I mean, whomever trying to agitate these things, funneling weapons in certain instances, funneling cash, whatever. Is there any way to see any indication of if those efforts are like, what's happening with those efforts?
B
Apparently there was a story, I believe, in the New York Times that Trump had met with Kurdish leaders in Iraq yesterday. He had talked with Masoud Barzani and the name escapes him, but I believe the leader of the PUK in Iraq there was already a Kurdish coalition that had been formed shortly before the war broke out between numerous different Iranian Kurdish factions, one of which used to be allied with Reza Pahlavi, but now has obviously gone against him in this regard. They are preparing for this. There are factions within that coalition that have openly sought out Israeli support. They are actively courting that in public, and they want that because they know it is instrumental, it is fundamental to their success, whatever that might be.
D
Can you just shed some light a little bit on how the IRGC operates without the supreme leader at this point? What is the chain of command? Is your understanding? And does that have an impact on, like, say, the discipline of the response?
B
Iran has focused a lot on decentralization of its military. I think they call it the mosaic defense strategy, which allows it. Like, the defense minister was killed, the commander in chief of the armed forces was killed, numerous other military officials. Trump obviously says something like 40 something, but he has not released the names in that regard. But it has allowed it that local commanders, regional commanders still operate completely functionally because of prior instructions about what to do. And that has meant the ladder of escalation continues to be climbed without the defense minister authorizing it, without the commander in chief of the IRGC authorizing it. So that means that they are authorized technically to strike Oman, to potentially have struck Riyadh, the US Embassy in Riyadh, without the Iranian government authorizing it and in some cases directly saying that they did not authorize it and they would not have authorized it. That has allowed them to control the ladder of escalation better than, say, Hezbollah would have been to.
A
Able.
B
Able to, had been able to.
D
Well, That's, I guess Hezbollah is relevant here because Hezbollah has been severely weakened by the decapitation strikes that Israel has engaged in over the past two and a half years of genocide and also, you know, bombing illegal bombing campaigns in other countries. But there seems to be a really concerted effort by the Israelis to conceal how much damage Iranian missiles have caused. We've also touched on this throughout our conversation. But I'm curious about your thoughts on that front and why that's the case, how that's happened, and what the capacity is for Iranian weaponry to actually inflict damage on Israel.
B
What happened during the last war was that Iran hit numerous buildings related to the Israeli Defense Ministry and the Mossad. It achieved direct hits on these places. It was not an overwhelming show of force like Israel was able to do so, whereas America is doing so now. But it clearedly, it clearly showed one, the ability for Iran to circumvent Israeli air defenses. When Israel had been claiming that 99% of drones and missiles are being intercepted at one point or another, but also that it had intelligence about where the these places were, more than Israel would want to admit. I have not been able, again, the military censorship regime prevents me from making any sort of assumptions about the current situation, but they are very adamant about that not happening again. There have already been instructions sent to the Israeli public not to film sites where Iranian missiles are located. I believe Turkish journalists were just arrested on camera just a few hours before this because they have been filming. And we also remember last year when Trey Youngst, the Fox News cameraman, was trying to film the Kyria having been attacked by Iran and the IDF immediately descended on this position. There has to be a complete shield around the aura of Israel's invincibility and that has to be maintained because otherwise, otherwise people lose faith in that. They can utilize scenes of mass devastation in places like Tel Aviv or Beit Shemesh when that is useful. But it cannot be constant. It cannot be.
D
Mearsheimer talks about this as escalation, dominance. And that being kind of, you know, Israel's prime part of their kind of psychological element of their warfare is trying to maintain this idea that like the Iron Dome and their missile defense and their weapon systems are so advanced and sophisticated that you should not strike against them. But. But it's important to note that that contradicts their actions and their fear of Iran is contradicted by their open fear of Iran's capabilities.
B
Yes, I mean, it's both that Israel has the ability to intercept everything, but also Iran holds not Only the existential threat to Israel through its ballistic missile capabilities. And that one day, Netanyahu was on Hannity last night and said that. That in a couple months it would be impossible to stop the nuclear program, even with Israeli weaponry. But also that Iran doesn't just threaten Israel, doesn't just threaten Europe, but it threatens the entire earth. I remember the IDF had a. Posted a video during the last war where they had a bunch of flags wave on screen about what countries Israel could threaten, and one of them was China. Like the whole of China is apparently a threat that is in Iran's crosshairs. It's not based in any sort of reality. You have to. You have to signal that you are both invincible, but also incredibly vulnerable. And it is not. It's a very schizophrenic position.
A
When you look at. Are there signs that you look for that give an indication of where this is going? In other words, if the number of interceptors is diminished and you start to see Iranian drones or missiles hit certain places, that should not be possible based upon interceptors. Or if there are more US Ships or less US ships moving in. I mean, what, what, what would be indicators of where this is going? Because, I mean, I guess, like, on some level, it's very difficult to predict what the US Is going to do because we have a mad king who, it seems to me it's just as possible. He wakes up tomorrow morning and Laura Loomer says something that annoys him and he's like, we're done. We won and we're done, and, you know, we're going back, or, you know, Laura Loomer sends him a muffet bat, a muffin basket, and he's like, we're boots on the ground. I'm not skittish. But what are other sort of, like, more tangible things that, if we could predict, if it wasn't a monkey playing chess, what would they be?
B
If we remember after, I think, what Trump called Liberation Day with the tariffs, I mean, he was gung ho for all of this stuff, but as soon as the market responded poorly, to say the least, then he had to pull back from that. When it's clear that he is screwing with the money, as it were, that is when I think he usually gets the picture. He starts to get calls from people he would most likely not like to get calls from. The Dow apparently plunged a thousand points today at opening. Oil prices are sky high. They're getting sky high. But what's interesting to me is that Trump is starting to not only Dig in his heels rhetorically in that. He said that after this is all over, the oil price is going to go lower than maybe you've ever heard before. But apparently there are moves being made to force tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz to get them insurance because insurers are dropping them. Yes, I think there is an attempt here. He wants an off ramp. Obviously he wants to get this done in a matter of days, like was the case in Venezuela. But I think the four or five week thing is probably going to be the general timeline when the 12 Day War happened. There was a bottleneck approaching near the end of that conflict with Israel, where Israel was running out and there was going to be significant restrictions on their part. Now, America is obviously has the USS Gerald Ford there to intercept things. It is apparently bringing in more interceptor batteries from the Asian theater, which I find incredible. I don't think the bottleneck will come as quickly, but it is going to approach. And I'm guessing that that four or five week window was what was given because of that, that that is when things are going to get nasty for the Americans.
A
So in other words, we have interceptors that will last for four or five weeks.
B
That is my assumption. It could come earlier if Iran continues to throw drones at the Gulf at the rate that it has. But Iran does not have. It has an immense domestic capability, but it does not have infinite domestic capability. It will inevitably have to cut the rate at which it fires things, which will give America potentially time to move in things and extend that timeline. But I won't say anything for certain because we are truly an uncharted territory here with the kind of assets that are being brought in.
D
And this is where Venezuela. It's important to put it in that context when we're trying to understand. Trump's motivation here, obviously is because, I mean, it seems like he was willing, because he was on this high, really willing to accept these pie in the sky assumptions about how quickly he could both like topple the regime, but then maybe even do what he said with Venezuela, which is just take the oil, you know, does he. Is he deluded enough to think that he can seize the oil? And that's when he says things like oil prices are going to be going down to record record lows, because he views this as another way to have for conquest and that we're essentially just going to be taking over their reserves or their oil fields quite quickly.
B
He hasn't said that explicitly yet, which I am almost surprised by. He has mostly focused on eliminating Missile capabilities in navy. But I am sure that that will come into the discussion soon. If this becomes drawn out and costly when America needs to justify to the public that it will be getting something out of this arrangement other than simply waging a war primarily for Israeli interests. That entered the equation. Venezuela, as you said, it's going to enter the conversation with Cuba. It entered the conversation with Ukraine. It is. It's a matter of time, I think, with him, even if he is moving towards state collapse with Iran,
A
I guess we'll see. I mean, it's going to be interesting to see if, you know, he's an old guy, if he passes away in the next six weeks. How many people go like, I didn't want to do this, but he insisted.
D
Well, if he is assassinated by Iran, we can just take comfort in knowing that it's not an act of war, because just how the world did I break? Seamus.
A
Does. Seamus does want this conversation.
D
It's a joke.
A
I know.
B
Does anyone listening? It's a joke.
D
Yeah.
A
Yes, of course. I mean, but there, you know, a precedent has been set.
D
It's not an act of war.
A
It's obviously illegal, but it's not an act of war.
D
And Iran should be able to bomb our facilities as well and we should not be able to punch back. So precedent set.
A
Well, they would have only done that so that. To prevent us from punching back after. Right after somebody else did it. Yeah, so, yeah, exactly. Seamus Malik Evzali, thank you so much for your time today. We will put a link to your newsletter@ Majority FM and our podcast and YouTube as well as a link to the Turbulence podcast. And I suspect you're going to have a lot to talk about over the next, I don't know, couple weeks or 10 years. So thanks so much for coming on.
B
Appreciate it.
D
Thanks, Seamus.
A
All right, folks, we're going to take a. A break and head to the fun half of the program. I mean, I. Who knows? I ate.
D
Oh, my God, we really got in
E
the carol dance today, folks.
D
You got to go back in the archives like the neocons are. You know, they're back. They never left us, but they're back. And so we need some Bush era kind of reminiscing if we're going to be doing this.
A
I was going to mention to him, I was going to mention to him the idea of someone like Lindsey Graham or Rubio for that matter, or Netanyahu being okay with a Balkanized Iran with multiple warring factions is a mini version of what the Project for New American Century document was that was written in the wake of the first Iraq war by folks like Dick Cheney and Pearl and Wolfowitz I think was in Right. And Feist, Doug Feist, I think it was his name. These names I haven't said in 15 years. And the project for New American Century was the contemplation by the neocons that America could become a hyperpower and that the rest of the world would be in. What would happen is there'd be no other superpower to contest with us. We would be a hyperpower that would oversee a world with a bunch of regional conflicts. And those regional conflicts would be both containable but also serve to prevent any type of coalition or buildup of power that would challenge us. And we would have a somewhat pox but totally Americana in terms of over the entire globe by having that hegemony that was enhanced by low level conflicts. And so the idea of a balkanized Iran that would be helpful to Israel just means like nobody can coalesce and deal with our power.
E
Iran plays a pretty key part in China's Belt and Road initiative.
A
I mean all of the Middle East, I mean I was also quite convinced that much of Iraq was a, was founded in a concern that Iran would, I mean, excuse me, that China would get hegemony or creep into. We would lose hegemony over the oil. And it wasn't so much that we would just get it cheaply, but rather we would control the spigot.
D
And, and that's, I mean why of
A
course China then goes and yeah, like oh well we're going to do solar and all our cars are going to be electric.
E
So we have obstacles.
D
I mean that's why it's important to mention that that report about the Gulf states getting stonewalled by the United States if they're going to experience the blowback but not the benefit. This is mandate from heaven for Xi Jinping.
E
I gotta say. Like being aware of American history and the way the American colonists played different tribes against each other and eventually came for all of them. I would just say that when Dave Rubin says you're all Muslims and you don't, he doesn't know why Iran would attack other Muslims. Yeah, like that's, that's where that's. You're all on the menu. You should figure out how to get off out from under America because we're not going to treat you any better.
A
Dorsey reminds me it was Douglas Fyith who Spain also wanted to investigate him for war crimes. Spain was quite good in the whole war crime thing, I think they got pretty far down the road with Dick Cheney because of the way that they have their prosecutors, but he escaped by dying. That's it for us today, at least for the free show. So we're going to head into the fun half and boy, is it going to be fun.
D
Oh yeah.
A
You're going to hear more from folks Third way. Mike Johnson. Oh, yes, there's a lot of third way stuff. Here's the other thing I wanted to mention because I mean, we're not quite in Iraq war territory in terms of, of our attack on Iran. We may or may not get there. But the thing I learned from going through those four or five years, those first four or five years, well, six years I guess, of that war is that during that time there was enough insight by people I did not like, like Rahm Emanuel, let's say, and those forces within the Democratic Party to understand that someday the Democrats would be back in power and they prepared. And that's been going on through the Trump years, even through the Biden years. And the difference is this time is that it's not just been happening with the third way types. It's been happening with the, the folks to the left of the Democratic Party who want to pull the Democratic Party left, left, dsa, Justice Democrats, however you want to, you know, place that ideologically. And so Bernie Sanders came out with a proposal yesterday for a wealth tax. And you know, it occurred to me that like, if something like this had been proposed during the beginning of the Iraq war, I'd be like, there's no time to talk about this. But this is a very important time to talk about it because Donald Trump is not going to be president forever. He may not even be alive for the rest of his term. Who knows? He's got a huge rash on his neck and who knows what that is?
D
It's all I know is it's gross
A
called the winning rash.
D
Yes.
A
My understanding is there are flesh eating bacteria that exist in the world. So it could be anything. It could just be eczema. But Bernie Sanders introducing a wealth tax. It would be 5% annually on billionaires. It would raise about $4.4 trillion. He has a list of things on how to spend that 4.3 trillion. So it would be deficit positive. In other words, it would shrink the deficit. So you could say that, but you know, by a billion dollars. But the point that this is going to serve as or could is very much like Medicare for All did in various campaigns and does today, like every candidate that we talked to yesterday. And I would say almost like, you know, the number of candidates who it's non controversial. We need Medicare for all at this point is astounding relative to the way it would have been 10, 12 years ago.
D
Yeah.
A
And it's a litmus test and it's a shorthand and it's a, not necessarily a purity test, but it is a litmus test. Are you, you know, it is a shorthand. This person can be supported in many respects. And I think that the reason why Sanders is introducing this now is as we go forward into the midterms and we're getting closer in many respects to things like, you know, primaries, obviously a big primary today in North Carolina. From a congressional standpoint, the trillionaire tax becomes a way in which people can ask candidates and get a sense of where they're located in this battle between money. We'll talk more about this as we talk about these third way clips. But this is a very important piece of legislation regardless of whether you think it can happen or not. It is a way of ideologically defining yourself. As to the question of a wealth tax is definitive in the same way that a single payer health care system is. It is basically saying that you know what, we do not want a society where people can accumulate so much money that they function as royalty in a system where royalty actually gets to make the rules. So we'll talk more about that. But in the meantime, this show relies on its members to keep on keeping on and you can help this show survive and thrive by becoming a member@jointhemajorityreport.com when you do, you not only get the free show free of commercials, you also get to IMs on the and the fun half. We'll take phone calls today I think even Whoa. Yes. Also just coffee co op. It's a co op. It's in Madison, Wisconsin. They make great coffee. They make a majority report blend and they'll give you 10% off if you use the coupon code. Majority, our longest sponsor on this program actually predates this program. And I even curious how.
C
No.
A
Okay, Matt, what's happening in the Matt Leck universe?
E
Yeah, we've been doing a lot on Iran. For the Sunday show I did a solo show talking about Iran and what Charlie Kirk would have wanted, which is to celebrate last year how Lindsey Graham is definitely not going to get what he wants. What a difference a year makes. And today after the show we're going to have Gene Bajalon TMBS original guest on talking about Iran and also someone named anel Sheline talked about. About Iran as well. So a lot of Iran stuff today coming up right after the show for the fun half.
D
That was a happy coincidence, by the way. But yes. Oh, I have to plug. If you are in LA in a few weeks, March 22, I'm going to be a dynasty typewriter with Francesca Fiorentini Van Lath and Ida Rodriguez. Great, great, great lineup. Link down below. March 22nd, it's a matinee. It's gonna be really fun and people
A
are gonna be able to party and go to things in LA because. Because it's so far from Iran that the ballistic missiles won't be able to. Intercontinental missiles that Iran has will not be able to get to California. Right. I mean, well, thanks to Trump. Are we closer on the East Coast?
D
I don't know.
A
To Iran as the crow flies? Yeah, I think.
D
Great phrase.
E
You go over the northern North Pole. I think we're probably closer.
D
Probably.
A
Okay, so you're out there. People are going to be partying in here.
D
Right, Right. I'm hopefully escaping.
E
It's like London and the Blitz.
D
Iran's looking nuclear wasteland. And then also, I guess check out my episode of Doom scroll if you haven't already, folks.
A
See you in the fun half three months from now, six months from now, nine months from now. And I don't think it's going to be the same as it looks like in six months from now. And I don't know if it's necessarily going to be better six months from now than it is three months from now, but I think around 18 months out, we're going to look back and go like, wow. What? What is that going on? It's nuts. Wait a second. Hold on. Hold on for a second. Emma, welcome to the program. Unpack. Matt, Blue. Fun half. What is up, everyone? Fun hack. No. Mickey, you did it. Fun half.
D
Let's go, Brandon.
F
Let's go, Brandon.
A
Fun half. Bradley, you want to say hello?
E
Sorry to disappoint everyone. I'm just a random guy.
A
It's all the boys today.
D
Fundamentally false. No. I'm sorry.
B
Women.
A
Stop talking for a second.
D
Let me finish.
C
Where is this coming from?
D
Dude?
A
But. Dude, you want to smoke this? 7A. Yes. Sink.
B
Yeah.
A
Yes. Is this me?
C
Is it me?
A
It is you? Is this me?
B
Hello?
A
Is this me? I think it is you. Who is you? No sound every single freaking day. What's on your mind?
D
Sports.
A
We can discuss free markets and we can discuss capitalism. I'm going to guess my right.
F
Who?
A
Libertarian. They're so stupid. Though common sense says. Of course.
D
Gobbledygook.
A
We nailed him.
D
So what's 79 plus 21?
A
Challenge. Ma, I'm positively quivering. I believe 96. I want to say. 8572-103550-11038, 911. For instance.
D
$3,400. $1,900. 5, 4.
A
$3 trillion. Sold. It's a zero sum game, actually.
D
You making me think less.
A
But. But let me say this. You call it satire, Sam goes satire.
C
On top of it all. My favorite part about you is just
D
like every day, all day, like, everything you do.
A
Without a doubt. Hey, buddy. We seen you. All right, folks, folks, folks.
D
It's just the week being weeded out. Obvious.
B
Yeah.
A
Sun's out, guns out. I. I don't know.
D
But you should know,
A
people just don't
E
like to entertain ideas anymore.
A
I have a question. Who cares?
E
Our chat is enabled, folks.
A
I love it.
D
I do love that.
A
Gotta jump. Gotta be quick. I gotta jump.
B
I'm losing it, bro.
A
Two o', clock, we're already late, and the guy's being a dick. So screw him. Sent to a gulag.
D
Outrageous.
A
Like, what is wrong with you?
D
Love you.
B
Bye.
A
Love you. Bye. Bye.
Date: March 3, 2026
Guests: Annelle Sheline (Quincy Institute), Seamus Malekafzali (Turbulence Pod)
Summary by Podcast Summarizer
This episode dives deep into the ongoing crisis sparked by the Trump administration’s war with Iran, examining both the conflicting justifications from the U.S. government and the regional fallout. Sam Seder and Emma Vigeland bring on expert guests Annelle Sheline and Seamus Malekafzali to unpack the strategic incoherence, political motivations, and the ripple effects in the Middle East. The hosts and guests probe not only the “why” of the war, but also the “what next,” including the impact on U.S. allies, Israel's influence, internal administration chaos, and the very real danger of escalation or quagmire.
Irreverent, analytical, and deeply skeptical, Sam and his guests maintain a mixture of dry humor, frustration, and concern. The expert guests bring clarity and depth, grounding the analysis in both policy and regional history, while the hosts contextualize developments in American and global politics.
| Time | Segment | Key Points / Quotes | |----------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------| | 07:14 | Admin contradiction | “Seemingly put no effort... coordinating the reason... astonishing”| | 11:10 | Rubio’s “logic” | “We knew there was going to be an Israeli action...” | | 15:31 | Political toxicity, base | “He just went and said Israel controls our foreign policy.” | | 24:11 | Sheline on war rationale | “Hard to even answer that question... all over the place.” | | 31:19 | Netanyahu’s aims | “He wants the country to fall apart... extremely destabilizing.” | | 34:16 | Gulf state risks | “Finding is, no, the US is not going to be there to protect them.” | | 38:59 | Decay of statecraft | “Kushner and Witkoff not only leading these negotiations...” | | 52:18 | Iran’s regime resilience | “Multiple different institutional structures... won't acquiesce.” | | 55:19 | Balkanization as goal | “State collapse and civil war... becomes America and Israel’s game.”| | 67:21 | Israel’s image management | “Complete shield... you are both invincible, but also vulnerable.” | | 71:38 | U.S. war timeline | “That 4–5 week window... when things are going to get nasty...” | | 82:07 | Wealth tax as politics | “It is a way of ideologically defining yourself...” |
This episode provides a scathing, expert-driven dissection of the Trump administration’s war in Iran, highlighting not only its strategic incoherence but its dangerous potential for far-reaching upheaval. Listeners come away with a much deeper understanding of the internal logic (or lack thereof) behind Washington’s actions, the precarious interests of regional actors, the collapse of diplomatic norms, and the real dangers of catastrophic escalation.