A (3:28)

When I observe something being called the law, the next thing I see is that it stops holding for some period of time. So there's one version of the Baumill effect where you just say different things have different rates of productivity growth and ex post we can identify winners and losers. That's clearly true, but that's tautologous, right? The more important version, which is what Baumill and Bowen put forward in the 1960s, is that ex ante we can identify where productivity growth will be high and where it will be low. And that I don't buy. So you look at higher education for more than a decade now, the price in real terms has been falling. I'm not sure I know why, but it's certainly not the Bamal effect. And it's not just for a year or two. And it's funny to think, for instance, that higher education is a Baumolesque kind of sector. For one thing, the laborers in it, we're two of them, we work for below market rates and we get paid these non pecuniary benefits. We could earn more doing other things. We like to think we could. So the wage effect seemed funny and just the whole way higher ed is organized, how it runs, how it works, it seems to do with factors of organizational incentives which also account for a lot of the cost inflation. And there's some more unified theory that gets you. Well, the costs are screwed up sometimes and the product quality is screwed up sometimes. And it's not so closely connected to the fact that, oh, in some other sector the computer programmers are being paid more. So when it comes for instance, to higher ed, I'm quite a skeptic. I don't think it's the best place to start to understand the problems of higher education.

B (5:06)

Well, it's funny you should say that because you know, our colleague Bryan Kaplan is always on at me for exactly the same reasons. He'll be very happy.

A (5:15)

Of course he will be. He'll think he persuaded me. But in fact that's not the actual story.

B (5:22)

So Brian says as you do that, look, Alex, how can you say it's the Bommel effect? I mean, look around, you can't you see that our university is run so inefficiently? It's a nonprofit. We don't have price incentives, of course, the costs are so high. But look, I have a couple of responses to this. First of all, you can explain, of course the university is run inefficiently, okay, obviously. But that's a level effect. Okay? What we need to explain is why year after year after year you have this grinding ever, it seems, increasing relative price. I mean, this has been going on for well over 100 years. Okay? So you can go back into the, as early as the 1920s or even earlier. And people then are complaining about the rising cost of health care and also of education. So it's this long term trend. And this long term trend, I mean, it has happened under highly regulated systems, it's happened under less regulated systems. You know, it's happened when the university's education was more free market, when it was less free market. It just seems to go on and on and on. And that, I think is what the bommel effect explains.

A (6:40)

But I mean, let's do it one at a time. Level effects often turn into rate effects because a crummy organization just tends to fall apart. But I don't think the price has been going up for like a century and a quarter. First of all, the last 10 to 15 years, clearly falling. But in earlier times especially, product quality is getting so much better. I wouldn't say product quality is getting better right now necessarily, but over you look at what was taught in 1920 compared, say to our textbook, just to toss in the obligatory plug, or in entire areas of science, biology, huge gains in product quality brought by labor, of course, which is supposed to be the stagnant factor. And I just think you have a very varied pattern. Sometimes real price goes up, sometimes it goes down.

B (7:28)

So let me take both of those issues in turn. First of all, the last 10 years. Now here's an interesting part of the bommel effect which people don't really appreciate. The Bommel effect actually says, right, that the relative price of these service goods to should be going up faster when manufacturing productivity or the productivity in other sectors of the economy is increasing. So actually you get the biggest bommel effect in the 1960s and the 1970s when growth is actually quite high. So when I look at the fact that in the last 10 years or so the price of education has not been increasing in relative terms, I'm actually worried about that, okay? Because that says that manufacturing productivity hasn't increased. And we know that that is True. So that's a sign of stagnation.

A (8:22)

No, now you're wanting to have it both ways. So the entire premise is that manufacturing productivity grows at a higher rate. And in fact, by a lot of measures, since 1987, manufacturing productivity hasn't gone up much at all.

B (8:35)

Well, in the last. I mean, it's gone up since 87, but in the last 10 years it's been actually flat. And that explains why the price of education has also been flat.

A (8:46)

I think that just shows that sectors can go up at higher or lower rates of productivity growth compared to other sectors. And there's not this ex ante generalization that we ought to hang our hats on.

B (8:56)

Okay, so that's one point the last 10 years. Let me get to the second point, quality, and then I'll come back to the third point, quality.

A (9:04)

I'm ready on quality. Let's hear it.

B (9:06)

Well, look, it's true in some sense that quality of education and healthcare has gone up, but there's no reason that should imply higher prices. Like in almost all sectors of the economy, when you have higher quality, usually get lower prices. I mean, look at electronics and computers and manufactured goods, you get higher quality and lower prices at the same time. So yeah, it's a little bit difficult to measure quality in some of these service sector industries, I'll grant you that. But in general, higher quality does not mean higher prices. So the fact that we're getting that, it seems like an excuse. Oh, well, you know, prices have gone up in education, but you know, our textbook is so much better than the previous book. There's no reason it is better, I grant you, but there's no reason why the price should be higher. Right?

A (10:01)

That's not the reason. A lot of the reason might be third party payment in some of these sectors. But keep in mind the whole Baumo framework, it doesn't deal with changes in quality well at all. I once had an exchange with Baumill at a conference in Boston and I said, you know, Bill, you're a paradigmatic example of the Mozart string quartet. It took them 35 minutes to play a string quartet back then. It takes them 35 minutes now. But I said, isn't productivity fantastically high in that sector because people prefer to listen to. Well now it would be Taylor Swift. And it's sad aesthetically that they're bored with Mozart. But the leap from Mozart to Taylor Swift is a phenomenal leap in terms of consumer surplus. And Baume said back to me, he's like, he got very mad actually. He insisted it's all a story about fixed product quality. But once you say that, you're just ruling out a priori new ideas as a source of productivity improvements. And of course labor intensive sectors will look worse because the way they do well often is by having new ideas, that to me was just a tautology. But the fact that once you introduce new ideas, you could push it a bit too far in the other direction and say, well, look, popular music people get bored by it very quickly, so its value asymptotically approaches 0 and then someone comes along with a new song and the productivity gain is like 1000% a year. Now that's also not quite the right way to think about it. It's something about Lancastrian bundles characteristics. But still I don't think the whole framework accommodates changes in product quality very well. And Baumill himself knew that. He wanted to rule it out of consideration.

B (11:40)

Well, but product quality increases in manufactured goods as well. And it's not at all obvious.

A (11:44)

Yeah. And it's not clear where the effect is higher or lower.

B (11:47)

No, I think it is clear where the effect is higher or lower. I mean, you can look the. If we do focus, I don't want to follow Bamal too closely, but if we do focus on a fixed good, then it is clear that for a live performance, okay, the costs have gone way up. Okay? But here's why I really like the Bauml effect, okay? It's because it's a very general theory that explains a lot of different sectors. We've talked about health care and education, okay? But here's another sector which is completely different. Okay? You know I bashed my car recently, okay? Nothing, nothing. Just a little minor fender bender really. But to fix the side panel which just had a big scratch in it, okay, that was like $3,500. Okay? So it's like a tenth the value of the entire car.

A (12:47)

This happened to Natasha too, except someone hit her car.

B (12:50)

Yeah. So just to fix the aesthetic problem, okay, the car was running fine, the engine was fine, the wheels were fine, transmission's fine. We're just fixing an aesthetic problem is one tenth. Now what's the general point? The general point is that the price of the car has gone way down relative to the price of fixing the car. So the repair services, okay, have gone way, way up. And it's not just in relative terms and it's not just for automobiles. You know, when was the last time you took your shoes to the cobbler? Okay, I don't even know.

A (13:25)

Not that long ago. In fact.

B (13:28)

It'S pretty rare. It's pretty rare. Or when you had, you know, your, you take your clothes to the tailor to be fixed. You know, my mother, you know, thinks that, you know, the new generation just wastes products and, you know, they don't know the value of fixing things, you know. But actually it's not that the new generation is more wasteful or less concerned about saving money. It's that the new generation faces different relative prices. And it's just much, much easier to buy new clothes than it is to fix the old. It's much not easier. It's much cheaper to buy new clothes than it is to fix the old clothes. Because the new clothes are basically made in a manufactured process. The repairing the clothes takes a lot of labor. So we don't repair clothes, we don't repair shoes. Much more expensive to repair cars. So there's an entire sector very different from healthcare and education. And I think Baumil explains it very well.

A (14:25)

I don't think that example is going to help you. So recall what I said near the beginning, the next post. You can always pick sectors with lower productivity growth and say that was the cost disease. But ex ante, if you're trying to predict where productivity growth rates will be low, Car repair is one of the last places I would look for one thing, electric vehicles. You don't have to fix the engine anymore. There won't be an engine in the traditional sense. So those costs will plummet. And engines can be very difficult, very costly to fix. Robots, of course, if there's anything they'll be able to do, probably we hope it would be car repair. Right. With the standard set of repeated problems. So I would predict moving forward that you have a lot of productivity growth in that area. And from the exante predictive point of view, I don't think cost disease is so useful there. But I'll grant you the point that ex post you can look at low productivity sectors and say it often has to do a lot with labor costs. Of course that will be true. It could have to do with capital costs as well, or land costs. But labor costs, of course, labor is a pretty significant chunk of gdp.

B (15:27)

Well, it's not just that it's a significant chunk of gdp. It's the one thing that we do want to, to go up in price, that is that, you know, economic growth is all about making, you know, labor more valuable. Right. So it's not surprising that with economic growth that you have higher labor costs.

A (15:45)

What do you think's Been the productivity growth rate in the music sector over the last 30 years. Just like to test how you would apply the theory. Like I want to say it's been very, very high. But I agree this is debatable.

B (15:59)

I think it's been, I mean, look, if you think about the changing number of musical genres and so forth, it's gone up a little bit. But of course that's always been true. It's not entirely obvious to me that, you know, the shift from to rock and roll or electric music is that bigger than, you know, happened. You know, in the 1900s I have.

A (16:24)

The universal jukebox now. YouTube, Spotify, you can add to that list. Even Amazon. 12 day delivery for me is a big productivity boast for music, not for everyone. But I think it's a super high growth sector over the last 30 years.

B (16:38)

Yeah, if you define the sector large enough.

A (16:41)

Well, I'm not defining it that large. Stuff I listen to and enjoy and it has notes and melody and harmony. That's my definition of music.

B (16:49)

Define it as live performance. And live performance has clearly become much, much more expensive, right? I mean, it now costs $150 to go to a concert, right? So, you know, that's just a. And it has become much more expensive, an opportunity cost. Right.

A (17:06)

People give up for more recorded music most of the time because you do it at home. So you're defining away product quality improvements.

B (17:14)

No, because of.

A (17:16)

If you let me toss out the improvements people care about. Productivity has been stagnant is what you're saying. Even live performance, you can debate whether that has become so terrible. Most music is heard in bars, right? You and I may not like it, we may not think of it as real music. I don't go to bars. I'm not sure what the prices are there. I would just say it's an open question. The music typically is free. There's the price of the alcohol, which I have no knowledge of. But it's not the story of, oh, I had to pay so much to hear the Rolling Stones. You look at live performance music, it's a very complicated story.

B (17:52)

Well, what makes it complicated, I think is that people are becoming richer. And that's another advantage of the Bamal effect, okay? In that the reason you have the change in relative price from the Bommel effect is always because of productivity improvements. So it always comes with people getting richer so people can want to buy more. Now contrast the story that you want to tell with education, for example, or health care perhaps, where it's just inefficiency well, if it's just inefficiency, then people should shift away from education. If the price is going up because costs are going up because it's becoming more difficult to produce the same value, then people should be consuming other goods. But if it's the Bommel effect, then you can simultaneously have a rising relative price and, and people consuming more because of the income effect. So we're still going to have income effects which naturally come with a Bommel effect. So I think that's another advantage of the Bommel effect.

A (18:51)

Now, we haven't talked about health care yet, so why do we do that for a few minutes?

B (18:55)

Sure.

A (18:55)

So it seems to me product quality in many, not all areas is up a great deal. Right. Life expectancy, if you take care of yourself, a big if. But it's much higher, you suffer much less. People used to be a wreck at 70. Now you say 70 is the new 55. Whatever. I'm not saying that's all from healthcare, but a lot feeds into the product quality being better. And of course the prices are a big problem in the United States in particular. But third party payment is clearly a major part of that story. Increasing government subsidies, whether you're for them, against them, clearly a major part of that story. I don't start with the Bamal effect as a way of thinking about our healthcare sector. I just think it's one thing in the mix. And pharmaceuticals, which has been phenomenal, Right? Sure. And now GLP1 drugs, well, you could say they're capital, but inventing those is in turn labor intensive at some level. They weren't invented using AI. Right. So that too is labor intensive. But they've been great for productivity in healthcare.

B (20:01)

So.

A (20:01)

So I just don't really see how the story applies in a simple way.

B (20:05)

So, I mean, it's interesting that you are denying the thing which the Bommel effect is intended to explain, which is the rising cost of services. But that I think is a hard road to hoe because almost everybody agrees with me that these things have become more expensive.

A (20:31)

No, not in quality adjusted terms. I think it's highly unclear whether my healthcare or my sofa has improved more over the last 40 years.

B (20:40)

Right. But one of them has gone up in price and the other has gone down in price even with quality improvements. So again, I don't think.

A (20:47)

But the price of stain for me has fallen from infinity to whatever it is that it costs now.

B (20:52)

Sure.

A (20:52)

And that's a huge price decrease. So I don't want to say that its price has just gone up when you realize the price of these medications used to be infinity. I don't know how to put that in the index number, but it gets back to the point that it's not a simple comparison.

B (21:07)

It's not a simple comparison, but going to the doctor is just much more expensive than it used to be. And people are spending a larger share of their income on these service sector industries.

A (21:20)

You're not being alex enough here. Look, there are legal restrictions. If, if you allowed telemedicine to India, which is a relatively new technology, it would be much cheaper. Now, I agree, we don't allow that, but clearly it could be the price of that has just been falling under a regime of, you know, more or less unfettered markets.

B (21:38)

Okay, well, I want to pick up on that for two reasons. First of all, you said that ex ante were not able to predict which sectors rise in price.

A (21:50)

Not typically. At times like I'll predict auto repair is going to do very well. But in general, it's not the simple.

B (21:57)

Story, but I would say that people have been pointing to education, healthcare, also repair sectors for a very long period of time. As I said, I can go back to the 1920s, I can go back to the 1950s, 1970s, and they're right.

A (22:11)

About two of them and wrong about two of them.

B (22:13)

No, no, no. They're basically. You go back and look at what Obama was first talking about and he is able to make the same arguments that he made in 1955. He's able to make them in 20, his book, I guess, 2020 or something like that. It's. Those sectors have remained fairly constant. Now this relates.

A (22:36)

That's at all true, but.

B (22:36)

Go on. But. All right, all right. So this relates to the second point which you raised about India, which I'll make two points about. First of all, yes, we can reduce the costs of service sector industries by relying on lower opportunity cost labor. Okay? So that's a good thing. Now the second interesting thing about labor, this is the more important point, okay? And it goes to predictability and it goes to whether these things can be explained. When you and I go to India, okay, what do we see that's really cheap in India?

A (23:11)

Haircuts.

B (23:11)

Haircuts, right. Yes. It's services. Okay? Healthcare is cheap if you can afford it. Okay? Healthcare, that is free. It is cheap for us. It is cheap for us. Not necessarily cheap for people in India, but it is cheap for us because you can get fantastic nursing care, 24 hour nursing care, for example, in India, you and I never drive A car. We are always chauffeured. Two reasons for that. One, the roads are insane. Two, it is very cheap to have a chauffeur, to have a home cook. Even people of middle class incomes in India, you know, they have drivers and they have cooks and they have, every single day they have people clean their houses. Right, okay, so exactly. So it's very telling to me that exactly the sorts of things which are cheap in India today were cheap in our past. So the past is a foreign country and a foreign country is the past. Right? So I think that the Bommel effect and the Balassa Samuelson effect, okay, are really the same thing. The Bamal effect explains which sectors have been rising in price over time. Balassus Amelson explains why services are cheaper in poorer countries. And the reason is, is that in India, the productivity of a haircut is about the same as here. My barber in India is just as good as my barber in the United States. But my barber in India does not have the opportunity to work in a high productivity manufacturing sector. So his wages are low. And that means that the price of a haircut is low in India. So we always get haircuts in India.

A (25:06)

You love to cite India in this context, but it becomes much more complicated when you think about the significant parts of sub Saharan Africa. So India in part does so well because they are a mix of fairly cheap labor and extremely well organized networks. Just like, you know that movie from a few years back about the Indian networks that deliver the boxed lunches to everyone. So India has incredible logistics. They have the English language, at least in some sectors, they have standards of quality. Poor countries in general, they're not the places you should necessarily go to get your hair cut. There can be problems of sanitation, problems of training, just problems of general safety, getting to the barber shop. A lot of services, manufactured goods for that matter, also in Africa are really quite expensive, especially when you adjust for quality. So India, it's like cherry picking or curry picking, whatever you want to call it. I don't, in most poor countries, want to do services.

B (26:06)

Well, there are many reasons why poor countries are poor. And many services also involve complex networks and technology. I mean, for example, it is the case that technically, electricity, that's a service. Okay, Right. But obviously it relies not on labor per se, not on a huge amount of labor. It's a service which is provided by technology. Some of the other things you mentioned, streaming services for music and for movies, Netflix and so forth, yeah, those are services. Okay? Technically, they're services in the GDP accounts, but they're not labor intensive services. And so it's quite possible. Yes, in many poor countries the electricity is bad. So it's not the case that every single service in a poor country is cheap because a lot of services rely on high technology and high productivity sectors. But it is the case that you can take a driver from India or from sub Saharan Africa and you move them to the United States and they become a taxi driver and they're just as good. Okay. They're equally as capable of driving around Lagos as driving around New York City. Probably easier to drive around New York City, and yet their wages are much higher. Okay, and why is that? Well, it's because they have a higher opportunity cost in the United States.

A (27:36)

Sure, no one doubts that people are paid more in the US than say in India. But to give more of a like versus like example, I'll predict you get your haircut in India and not in Pakistan. Pakistan's a poorer country. So there's a lot of different factors. Labor cost is one of them. Since labor share of GDP in the US like it's often between between 58 and 61%. Of course wages will be a big part of explanations for everything. But these ex ante predictions about where productivity will grow, I mostly don't buy them. And like, has cost disease helped people do better in the stock market because they see where the productivity gains are coming? I don't think so.

B (28:16)

Let me put it this way.

A (28:17)

You should have, in fact, you know, invested in a lot of labor intensive stocks say 15, 20 years ago rather than manufacturing. Look at the big winners. Meta, formerly Facebook. Right. It's becoming more about capital costs now.

B (28:33)

Yes, that's very high productivity labor.

A (28:36)

And now it's shifting to hardware for reasons that are not mainly the cost disease. So now Nvidia, it's worth 4 trillion at the time we're recording. You need all these big expenditures for data centers, energy. So that's a shift back, you could say, in a more Baumo esque direction. But for 15 years we had a big shift in the other direction where it's about having these smart people like Mark Zuckerberg who turn their labor into capital and build networks that bring in a lot of people and that's the big productivity gain. So I just think we've seen it go both ways in the last 20 years. And I didn't predict Nvidia per se.

B (29:13)

That's disappointing.

A (29:14)

No, I thought there'd be a huge chip demand. I didn't realize it would be so bottlenecked in one company at all, of course.

B (29:20)

Yeah, yeah. Well, let me put it this way. I predict that the price of health care and education and home cleaning services and chauffeuring services will all rise in India over the next 20 years. So in fact, even if you look today, you'll find all of these middle class people in India are starting to complain. Right? It used to be I was able to hire servants, I was able to, you know, have somebody clean my house. And now it's just so much more expensive. Okay. I predict that that will continue to happen and the relative price of services, labor intensive services, will go up in India over the next 20 years, let's say.

A (30:05)

And I'll predict the price of chauffeuring services in the United States and eventually India will decline with Waymo Taza.

B (30:12)

Okay.

A (30:12)

And others. So it goes both ways. I'm not saying there are no cases where it goes in your direction. There's both. And eventually India will have Waymo and Tesla further away for them, almost certainly. But sometimes poor countries are actually quicker to adopt new networks like with biometric scans and the like. So no, I don't buy your examples. And I think healthcare in the U.S. i know less about India, but in quality adjusted terms that will become a lot cheaper. There's a lot of major advances either recent or on the horizon.

B (30:44)

So it's clearly true. So we can think about if it's the Bauml effect, okay, then what can we do to compensate or to alleviate the rising costs of services. Now if you think that it's inefficiency or some, if you think it's the cost disease, which is a term I don't like, okay, Then again, you have to look at, well, we need more, you know, competition in health care or, you know, we need more vouchers, you know, for university education or something like that. More of a free market in education. And I'm not against those things, okay, for different reasons, but I don't think any of those things would change the rising relative price over time. If you want to affect the rising relative price over time, then you have to do exactly what you just said, okay, which is you take a labor intensive service like being a chauffeur and you turn it into a capital intensive service like having Waymo. So you're agreeing with me, you're agreeing with me that it's the Bommel effect.

A (31:54)

You're just trying to win by tautology. It's ex ante labor intensive. I'm just saying it might get a lot of great new ideas. It might not. It can go either way. And the new ideas might involve a lot of capital or, say, in the music sector might involve just one person with an acoustic guitar in a recording studio and lower capital costs than Led Zeppelin faced. It can go either way.

B (32:15)

WAYMO is using capital to replace labor. Robots are capital which replace labor.

A (32:22)

There's even there a huge fixed and marginal distinction. So eventually the marginal cost will be pretty low. Yes, it's high fixed costs to set up the network, get data.

B (32:33)

Well, we know it's low because you can just. In India, you can rent a car and a driver for less than it costs to rent just a car here. Right? Okay, so that tells you that the major cost of a taxi service, of a chauffeuring service, right. Is the labor. Is the labor because it's so much cheaper in India, because. And that tells you that in principle, WAYMO can be much, much cheaper because the price of the labor is so much a is such a large fraction of the price of the chauffeuring services. So that's why all of the effort in AI is to replace labor, because that's the major cause.

A (33:25)

And they use a ton of labor to do it.

B (33:27)

They don't use a ton of labor. They use a small number of very productive laborers who also, by the way, are worried that they're going to be replaced. Okay, but yeah, I mean, you can. It can sometimes make sense to use a bunch of high productivity labor to create capital to remove labor in a very, very. You know, it doesn't take that many people to create Waymo, where the addressable market of drivers, you know, is hundreds of millions of people. We all drive. So it doesn't take hundreds of millions of people. Hundreds of millions of people are driving, but it only takes less than a million, okay, very smart people to replace all of those hundred millions of drivers with technology.

A (34:18)

AI is a very good example of how hard it is to predict where the productivity gains will come, because most people were shocked by AI working so well lately. And if we take the Alex Tabarak of 1990, when we first met, you knew the Bamil effect. Then. If you just had to write down over the next 50 years, where are the relative prices going to go? Up and down, quality adjusted. I'm not sure you would have done that. Well, I don't feel I would have done that. Well. Now, one case. Here's a case where I can't find any grounds for disagreeing with you. I'm surprised you haven't mentioned it.

B (34:51)

Yet.

A (34:51)

But that's childcare.

B (34:52)

Yes.

A (34:53)

Now, I may just not be imaginative enough, but if you said I, Alex Tabarrok, predict childcare, we're just stuck there because parents dogmatically want humans rather than robots to watch their kids. I'd say, okay, yeah, that's probably going to be explained pretty well by the Bamal effect. Again, I could be missing the point, the new innovation, but there. Why haven't you mentioned child care?

B (35:15)

Well, actually I have a post coming up which will be next week, which will be on exactly this question.

A (35:21)

It'll be up by the time anyone's listening.

B (35:23)

Yes, exactly. So it's up now. You can go read the post now. It's a great post and it actually is looking at exactly this question. Child care. And many people, including people from our group, when they look at why is the price of childcare going up, and everyone agrees it is going up, it's going up faster than inflation. That much is true. They point to regulation and they say, look at all these ridiculous regulations where we're requiring childcare workers to have university degrees. Okay, what a waste. And again, while I'm not against that. Okay, here is my test. I recently had to go on a trip. And you know, when you go on a trip, you factor in the price of, you know, the airfare and the hotel. I often forget to factor in the price of doggy daycare.

A (36:14)

I have the same problem now. But you're paying too much.

B (36:18)

I don't. Well, maybe, maybe I should bring my dog over to you. Maybe we should swap services or something. But it's extremely expensive. It's like $80 a day for doggy daycare. And that is not, that is not with the treats and the, you know, the fancy services and the walking and all of that. That's pretty standard doggy daycare in Northern Virginia. $80 a day, which is about the same as like a Motel 6.

A (36:43)

I accept your general point here, but you do need to connect to an ethnically based network of people taking care of dogs and the price will be lower. Side point. Totally accepting your general point. Here's my hope for childcare. Again, I'm not predicting this. I agree with you on the general point. But I hope boarding schools come back as an organizational innovation, including with a lot of AI, that becomes a new form of child care. Tongue in cheek, I'll say maybe we can make it a bit like factory farmings and it might be cheaper than current childcare, you know, above some age. Obviously not for three year olds. So there could still be innovations you and I can't think of.

B (37:22)

Yes, it's possible, but the bam will affect people.

A (37:27)

They want to define the thing so narrowly. Whenever you give them progress, they'll either say, oh, that's a different good or service, or they want to say, oh, sweat was capital intensive after all. But I want to again stress the ex ante exposed distinction. That childcare and doggy care aside, I don't feel my intuitions about future productivity are so great and I'm more tuned into these things than most people. Do you think yours are that great?

B (37:52)

Well, I do think Obama made these predictions in 1954. I think it was. And they all turned out to be true.

A (38:01)

No, they didn't all turn out to be true. Yes, quality adjusted health care.

B (38:06)

Again, the quality adjusted. This is just a way of faking the issue.

A (38:12)

No, no, this is. You want to slip out of it by saying the good or service changed. It's just a productivity gain.

B (38:19)

But, but in almost all sectors, quality comes with falling prices, not with rising prices. You can't just, you know, it is.

A (38:27)

Plenty of other reasons why health care prices have gone up. Technology is a huge one and government's another. We had no Medicaid, Medicare, you know, when Baumo first wrote on these topics.

B (38:37)

Well, that's in favor of Obama because the increase in the price of medical care has happened before. There was Medicaid and Medicare and it happened after as well. So here's an interesting example.

A (38:52)

Health care expenditures really take off in the early 80s, right? I don't pretend to know. I. There's a literature on this. I don't think it's because wage growth exploded in the early 80s. Before then they go up a bit, but it's not out of control. Then all of a sudden you have these several decades where it's crazy.

B (39:08)

No, I don't think that's correct.

A (39:09)

And people don't in general say, oh, that's the Baumill effect.

B (39:12)

No, no, no, no, I don't think that's correct. I think what happened is the price increase was happening for a very long period of time. You can go back to the 1900s and the price increase of healthcare is going up and up and up. What happened in the 1980s was not a big increase, not a faster increase in the price. It's just that the price times the quantity, the revenues became higher. It became a bigger part of people's checkbook. Okay, but that's just because, you know, the same price increase on a small base, people don't Notice as much the same price increase on a larger base becomes something which people talk about, but the actual price increases go back much, much before the 1980s.

A (39:57)

I'll predict that for two thirds of that history you decided quality adjusted prices for healthcare have been going down. Look, even the AMA admits before year whatever, I forget the number. Doctors were more likely to kill you than save you. We have one colleague, our dear Robin Hansen, who thinks that still may be the case, which I don't agree with that, but man, until, I don't know. Partly it was possible to do without Medicare because there weren't that many useful treatments before the 1960s. So to me that looks highly deflationary. And if you ask yourself the question, you know, you get $100,000 to spend on the health care of today or the health care of 1950, which one do you order? I know what Alex would do.

B (40:39)

Yes, of course, of course.

A (40:41)

So most of the time that's going down the price.

B (40:43)

But when you look at, when you look at all of these multiple sectors, the repair sector, repairing of clothing, repairing of shoes, repairing of cars, repairing of people, right? It's not an accident that these are all the same thing. Healthcare is the repairing of people, right? So repair services in general have gone up because it's a very labor intensive area of the economy. It's all the same thing. That's why I like the Baumla effect, because it explains a very wide set of phenomena. And let me give you, a lot.

A (41:16)

Of things are easier to repair than they used to be. Just to be clear. Or you just buy a new one.

B (41:21)

That's my point.

A (41:21)

No, it's so cheap to buy a new one.

B (41:24)

Exactly. The new one is manufactured. So that's the whole point is the new one takes a lot less labor, the repair is much more labor intensive than the actual production of the good. So when you actually produce the good, it's on a, it's on a factory floor and you've got robots and you've got, they're all going through, you know, da da da, da da da. But repair services is unique.

A (41:49)

But I think you're not being subjectivist enough in terms of how you define the service. The service for me if my CD player breaks is getting a stream of music again. And that is much easier now and cheaper than it used to be. If you define the service as the repair. Well, okay, you're ruling out a lot of technological progress, but, but you can think of just diversity of sources of music as a very close substitute for this narrow vision. Of repair. And again, from the consumer's point of view, productivity on quote, unquote, repair has been phenomenal.

B (42:21)

Well, but that is a consequence of the Bommel effect, not a denial of the Bommel effect. Because of the Bommel effect, repair becomes much more expensive over time, so people look for substitutes. So yes, we have substituted into producing new goods. And precisely so. It works both ways. The new goods are becoming cheaper to manufacture. Okay, so we are less interested in repair. Repair is becoming more expensive, so we're more interested in the new goods. But that's a consequence of the Bommel effect. You can't just say, oh look, we solved the repair problem by throwing things out. Now we don't have to worry about repairs. Yeah, that's because repair became so much more expensive. A shift in relative prices caused people to innovate. I'm not saying that innovation doesn't happen. One of the reasons that innovation happens is because the relative price of repair services is going up.

A (43:18)

But that's a minor effect. It's not the case that, oh, I started listening to YouTube because it became too expensive to repair my CD player. It might be a modest, very modest effect, but mostly there's technological progress. YouTube, Spotify and other services come along, Amazon one day delivery, whatever else. And for the thing consumers care about, which is never what Bamal wanted to talk about. He always wanted to fixate on the physical properties of the goods. Like the anti Austrian he was, it's just like, oh, there's been a lot of progress. It takes the form of networks with very complex capital and labor interactions. It's very hard to even tease out what is truly capital intensive, truly labor intensive. You see this with the AI companies all very mixed together. And that just is another way of looking at why the predictions are so hard. And you can only get the prediction simple by focusing very simply on these non subjectivist, non economic physical notions of what the good has to be.

B (44:16)

So I think there's too much mood affiliation there, Tyler.

A (44:19)

There's not enough Kevin Lancaster in Baumo.

B (44:24)

So I agree with you. Here's the point which I do agree, is that the initial Bauml and Bowen book on the arts was very pessimistic. Okay. As was a lot of the discussion is the term cost disease. Okay.

A (44:41)

Right.

B (44:42)

And I think that pessimism was wrong and it's wrong because of the Baumill effect. Actually Bauml did not completely understand the Baumill effect when he wrote Bauml and Bowen. And the part that he didn't Quite grasp too much is that the rise in the price of services is always caused by an increase in the productivity of the manufactured goods. So we're getting richer. So it is absolutely the case that the Bommel effect is not a reason to be pessimistic about the arts, and it's not a reason to be pessimistic about, you know, healthcare or education. It's even as the price of these goods rises in relative terms, it's just a relative price change, okay? And you can have a relative price change without it being driven by costs, without it being driven by inefficiencies. So in that sense, we're getting richer. And yes, we're purchasing more art services, and that's great. And we can purchase more health care, and that's great. Still, in terms of the shift in the relative price, I think it's undeniable. And I would give you another I think, which is very telling example. We don't have great data on this, but it's interesting. Even in the Soviet Union, they were complaining that the price of hard, you know, price of the ballet, you know, had gone up. Okay, now in one sense, this didn't make any sense at all, right? Because we're talking about the Soviet Union. All of the prices are set by fiat, let's say, okay, in the perfect communist system. So how could they possibly complain about the rising price of the ballet? Well, but even in the Soviet Union, they had to recognize relative price trade offs. And so they recognized that even, you know, without having a physical price, without having a named price, they recognized that manufactured goods were becoming cheaper. So what you had to give up to produce the ballet, to go to the ballet was becoming more expensive. You had to give up more good stuff to go to the ballet. And that's the ultimate Bommel effect, is what you have to give up in order to get that good of going to the ballet, producing the ballet, the cost of that is going up in terms of the opportunity cost. So even in the Soviet Union, the Baumill effect continued to hold. And that, I think shows how deep and important the effect is.

A (47:18)

As a final topic for this episode, what do you think of the staff and Linder effect, sometimes considered a close cousin of the Baumill effect? And Linder said in a series of articles somewhere in the qje that basically because the number of hours in a day is fixed, that over time as productivity would rise, leisure would become more goods intensive. So more snowmobiles is one way to think of it.

B (47:40)

The harried leisure class the harried leisure class.

A (47:42)

Do you buy it or not?

B (47:44)

Yes, I do buy it. So the way I would put it is that the richer we become, the more valuable time becomes. So people want to squeeze more and more utils, more and more utility, into a shorter period of time. So what happens is that, you know, people get the dopamine hit on the phones and things like that. They're looking for quicker and quicker fixes rather than getting their pleasure from things which take a longer period of time. Yeah, I think that's true, but there's.

A (48:19)

Two different effects on what you say. One is the quicker fixes point, which may or may not be true, and the other is the more snowmobiles point. Now, a snowmobile may or may not be a quick fix. It may take a long time to learn how to drive it. You go out with it for three hours, whatever. I don't know. I'm less convinced of the Linder effect. So clearly, in an economy with more goods, leisure will have more goods, but work will have more goods too. Right? So people are more likely to listen to music when they work because you don't have to bring a stereo into your office. So whether that has gone up more than how goods are connected to leisure, I genuinely don't know. I think it's another case where ex ante prediction is difficult. And certainly the number of hours of leisure time you have has gone up. So goods have gone up, but you have more hours to squeeze those goods into. So I would say I'm not sure. I'm not against the Linder effect. It's an interesting claim, but I'm not.

B (49:12)

Persuaded either you do have more hours as working hours goes up, goes down, and leisure hours goes up. Still, I think if you would go out and ask people in the street, do they feel more harried even in pursuing leisure, I think the answer would be yes. Right. So now part of this, to be sure, is psychological and under a person's own control. But if you think about the leisure activities of the past, many more of them involved longer hours, more time, like talking with your friends, sitting on the porch. Like, people don't get pleasure from sitting on the porch and watching people go down the street. Okay? You know, instead, they want to be right on their phone. They want to be watching a movie. They want to have instant access. And, you know, why do we? People are less likely even to go to the theater, the movie theater, because it just takes a longer period of time. You got to drive there, okay? You got to find parking it's an hour to get there. Okay. And then you watch the movie and then it's an hour to get back. So it's like two hours of the movie and two hours of your time in getting there. The price is doubled. Why don't I just watch it at home?

A (50:30)

Alex, what's your favorite leisure activity at the margin of course.

B (50:35)

Well, talking with you, Tyler.

A (50:36)

That's what I was going to say. So our favorite leisure activity is quote unquote work. And that's exactly the kind of ambiguity that worries me about the Linder effect.

B (50:46)

Well, but at the same time I suspect that many people are watching or listening to this podcast at 1.25 speed.

A (50:54)

And they're calling it work. They're doing it at 9:30am in the morning.

B (50:58)

Yes, that's. Well, it's going to improve their productivity. Right.

A (51:01)

Alex Tabarrok, thank you very much.

B (51:03)

Always good talking with you.

A (51:15)

It.