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New year, same extra value meals at McDonald's now get a savory sausage McMuffin with egg plus hash browns and a small coffee for just $5 for a limited time only.
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Prices and participation may vary. Prices may be higher in Hawaii, Alaska and California. And for delivery. This is Interrupted by Matt Jones on.
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NewsRadio 840 WHAS now, here's Matt Jones.
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Welcome to episode 27 of Interrupted By. Matt, if you've been following the news, there have been a ton of, you know, national and international news stories. And one of the things we try to do on here bring people on who know a lot more about it than I do. And so Phil Stewart is a national security reporter for Reuters. He has covered 60 plus countries over the years and is covering the situation in Venezuela now with the capture of Maduro by the United States military slash Justice Department. And Phil, I appreciate you doing this. Nice to meet you through this. We've never talked before, but I followed your work on social media and I appreciate you taking the time.
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A
Well, I appreciate it. Thanks for having me.
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B
All right. I'm going to assume most people know what has happened, but let's take a step back, Phil. For people, Maduro kind of comes on the radar probably for the average American during this. But let's go back to him seizing power, taking over from Hugo Chavez. What are some of the reasons why America would have, if it was, would have felt the need to go in and give us a little background on Maduro as the leader of Venezuela?
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A
Well, you know, he had been a very controversial leader for some time. I was on a trip to South America with the last chairman of the Joint Chiefs, not the one that's there now. And during that trip the head of Southern Command had actually called him a dictator back then in Chile, which had a very left leaning government and he was seen as a dictator there too. And so Maduro had been quite controversial even among the left in Latin America because of the fact that, you know, his, his last election victory was, was widely condemned by international organizations as being fraudulent. And so, you know, although there's a lot of, you know, questions about the legality of the operation, there aren't so many questions really about how the international community viewed Maduro.
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B
Pretty much everyone suggests this was a dude who had, was maybe illegitimately elected but certainly had committed a lot of, I don't want to use maybe atrocities. What was he accused of doing outside of this drug issue that America said just as a leader, you always hear this is an awful person. What are some of the things he's accused of doing.
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A
Well, I mean, let's say for starters that he did have, he does have a lot of supporters inside Venezuela and you've seen some of them rallying in recent days to call for his return to Venezuela. And, but at the same time, the fact that there have been no celebrations inside Venezuela by the many, many, many people who don't support him is a sign of the kind of environment that exists in Venezuela where there isn't freedom of expression, where people have fear of voicing political views that are contrarian to the government in power. And for a state that calls itself a democracy, it's quite an indictment that there have been, you know, no public acts of celebration. Actually, yesterday I was watching, you know, regional television, television in Colombia. I used to be based in Colombia. So I'm watching one of the TV channels I used to watch when I was there, and they were talking about people who were being arrested for posting anti Maduro material on social media after his capture. So people posted things on social media and they were arrested and they were rounded up and arrested. So, you know, it is a, it is an intense climate. There are political prisoners. One of them has just been freed today. So there is a lot there. But it's not, you know, an open, democratic state that is he accused of.
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B
Committing atrocities against his people. I've seen that thrown around, but I've never really known what that was.
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A
Yeah, let me just finish myself. It's an open, democratic state in the view of international organizations. I'm not going to sit here and talk about my views on his actions. But there are a lot of human rights groups that have criticized his activity inside Venezuela and international organizations that again, say that his election was. He did not win the last election.
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B
Okay, so then he takes over from Chavez. Is it fair to call? I mean, on paper that's a democracy, but you also hear people say it's communist, socialist. I mean, how do you, how would you describe the Maduro government?
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A
Well, you know, I'm not, you know, that's not really my job. You know, my job is just to report on kind of the developments inside Venezuela. And I wouldn't want to be. Reuters wouldn't want. It was not a company that would brand the Venezuelan government or take a position on, you know, take a position on what kind of government it is. You know, we cover, we have reporters in Venezuela as we have reporters in all around the world. But, you know, the criticism that I've mentioned, you know, is documented. So.
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B
All right, so when the how long from your reporting have you. Do you think America was planning this sort of capture and arrest?
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A
So in November, I think Reuters was the, I think we were the only news organization to actually do this. But we broke a story that talked about how the military had developed a regime change option for Venezuela. That story ran on November 21st and at that point we wrote that they were kind of pivoting to this news phase of operations that would start with covert operations. And that all obviously was true. We believe that the operations, the planning for this military option began well over a month before we wrote that story. But it really kind of advanced more fulsomely after Thanksgiving and, and in the weeks before the, the operation itself.
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B
So that would have been. So you're saying of this year. Well, I guess now 2025, not 2020 24.
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A
2025, that's correct, yeah.
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B
Okay, so, and so see if we, there was a lot of sort of, I don't Chatter from the Trump administration leading up to it about things he needed to do. I mean, do you think the actual decision to go in was made back in October, November, or do you think it was made much more recently?
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A
Much more recently, yeah. They said that the decision had been made just in recent days and that, you know, I think the President himself said that they were going to go in four days before they, they did, but the circumstances didn't work out and they rescheduled Christmas Day. Right, right. And so, and so it was, it was one of those situations where the President, as is traditional, retains the ability to kind of decide, you know, at the very last moment whether to really go forward or not. Because you want to have all the information available to you. You don't want to pre decide a military operation and then maybe some other opportunity to resolve. It appears so he did. But the, but the, but the military option from what we understand was, was given enough support that you saw Delta Force soldiers training on a mock version of this compound and really Kentucky, where we are actually. Yeah. And so, and so there they are training hard on an operation that's extraordinarily dangerous. I mean the, the, the ability of anyone to go into a well guarded compound like that and come out, you know, with no casualties, no, no, no debt anyway, is really just incredible.
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B
What do we know about the operation? I mean a lot of my listeners probably have seen or read about Zero Dark Thirty, about the bin Laden, the bin Laden takeover. What do we know about what actually went down? And just from afar, I mean when I hear they went into the presidential palace took him and had no American casualties. What do we know about how that actually occurred?
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Well, I mean, it was, it was a very, it was a massive operation. I mean, I've heard someone describe it as an operation that was even more complicated than the bin Laden operation, partly due to the weather, you know, and the fact that you're coming off the sea and there's a lot of unstable air, so you're coming in with, with helos off the sea, you know. You know, around 150 aircraft were involved in this thing because they didn't just come in. They used all kinds of effects beforehand to black out part of the city and kill comms and knock out air defenses and knock out all the kind of threats that they could, you know, preemptively deal with. So that when they got in the ground they had to deal with Maduro's personal security, you know, the security of the compound. And that was quite deadly. You know, when they landed, they flew in at about 100ft off the, off the water in the darkness of night with the city blacked out. And they landed and they piled out of the helicopters. You're talking about a team of less than 200 probably. And they came in and from what we understand, I think the Cubans have said there were 32 Cuban nationals who were protecting Maduro who were killed then I think at least a couple dozen more, if not more than that of Venezuelans who are killed in that operation.
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B
So they black out the city. So first of all, were these helicopters, et cetera, stationed on some of those ships that we had heard were being surrounding the country? Do we know where they came from?
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A
They haven't said that. That's a safe assumption, but they haven't said.
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B
So they black out part of the city. There's, I've seen a couple videos where people are like filming themselves when the city goes black, they go in. And so they recreated a mock up of the, of his residence. Do you know, like how big are we talking about the place being? Is it a palace, is it a house?
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A
I mean, do you know, I couldn't tell you. You know, I wouldn't want to venture a guess about the size and scope of the compound itself and just not knowing it well enough.
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B
Okay, so Venezuela is a country. How much do you, as a reporter or do western journalists know about like what happened during, like on a day to day basis? There were people from the west allowed in to sort of see what was going on is like what is how much is known about sort of the day to day life of people in Caracas and in Venezuela.
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A
You know, international organizations for press freedom have said that there needs to be less restrictions on foreign access to reporting inside Venezuela. That said, you see foreign journalists who are on the ground there and take risk to report on what's going on even in these recent days. And that includes reporters who are, who are going to the aftermath of these strikes, interviewing survivors, going to hospitals, speaking to soldiers who survived, who are wounded. And so there is very vibrant reporting, but not as you might see in neighboring countries like Colombia.
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B
So the day the decision is to go ahead and go in, there's obviously a lot of danger there. Donald Trump said in a New York Times interview yesterday that he was worried it could be his own Jimmy Carter, Iran situation. What is it that made, what is it you think that made it to where the administration or from what you've heard with your reporting, finally decide, okay, yes, we're going to do this?
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A
You know, that is a great question. I'm glad you asked that. We are trying to understand the risk appetite of this administration because you've seen now since the summer, two major operations that are hard to imagine have happened. Really, when you sit back, one is the bombing of Iran's nuclear program. People have talked about that for years and years and years. And the risks of carrying out that operation and the blowback afterwards were, you know, enough to make a lot of people quite nervous. And then an operation like this, as we discussed, you know, there are enormous risks. I mean, let's say hypothetically only like, you know, one of the helicopters had gone down. One of the helicopters was shot, was shot at and took fire and people aboard were injured, at least one. And you know, had there been casualties, you know, would the media have seen it as a debacle with the United States or hostages? Right. Or you had a, have you had a Black Hawk down, you know, moment, kind of like, you know, the US Saw in Somalia. What would that have been like? And so I think, you know, we're trying to, you know, understand the risk appetite, what it was that got, you know, the president to decide that this was a, this was an operation worth worth pursuing. But I would say the success of both those operations probably will.
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Lead the.
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President to think this is a valid way of accomplishing foreign policy goals.
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B
Well, I want to get to that because I think that is obviously the next question is does it embolden them? But if you, okay, so now as of this moment, who is in charge? I know the vice president is in charge but we've also seen the president say something like, we're running the country. So how would you describe to the average person listening here the status of who is running what is happening on the ground in Venezuela today?
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A
So today you've seen the extraction of President Nicolas Maduro from Venezuela, but Maduro's government is still very much intact. And it is, you know, according to President Trump, is very responsive to Washington and its interests and its plans. But this is a government that has been fiercely anti American for many years, fiercely concerned about the United States, and a lot of its supporters are very skeptical of the United States. So it really remains to be seen how long the cooperation will last, if there will be a breaking point, if there'll be a request that just goes too far for them. And then also this sort of, you know, there are a lot of private discussions, we understand, between, you know, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the acting, the interim president. And, you know, it remains to be seen whether the kind of goodwill that's been described to the media, the goodwill in private, will become something of an open, you know, something public that the Venezuelan government would talk about.
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B
But you would say, would you say that Venezuela as a country still runs their country and still has like, I mean, again, part of it is the president uses language that sometimes we don't know what the meaning is. But would you still say at this moment Venezuela runs the country, even if you would say that America has a strong impact on their decisions?
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A
I would say that the Venezuelan government would certainly say that. And I would say that the Venezuelan government is very concerned about being seen as a US Colony or anything like that. Sorry, go ahead.
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B
Well, no, I was going to ask you, when you say the Venezuelan government would be concerned, I mean, I know there are questions about whether the election last time was legitimate. Is there any sense beyond, I guess, those election results, how popular, like what the stance of Venezuelans in Venezuela is? I know a lot of the Venezuelans in America are for it, but a lot of those people left probably for a reason. So what do we know about the people there now?
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A
Well, I mean, there was, I mean, if the international organizations that, that judged the last election are correct, there, there are a lot of people that do not, you know, support the, the government and when we're voted a different way. And so I would, I would say that based on the election, those were.
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B
Do we know? Because I know. I'm not sure I've ever read.
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A
Yeah, yeah. They're, they're, they're deaf. They're public, you know, and, and the, the international organizations had, you know, what they thought were the correct vote tallies. And, and they did not correspond with the official tallies. And they were very public about that at the time of the election. And so the question is today, you know, there is no real dissent in the streets. The Maduro government still is very much in charge. And as we discussed, you know, according to local media reports, they've arrested people who on social media criticized Maduro, celebrated his capture. And so I would say that the Maduro government still very much in charge, it would seem, from the outside.
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B
So let's talk about the arrest from the American standpoint. What is specifically Maduro charged with?
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So he is charged with, with, with different kinds of, of, of, of crimes related to narcotics trafficking, mostly cocaine trafficking. Yeah.
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B
Okay, so the fentanyl, that's not part of the charging, am I correct?
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Well, we don't, There wasn't, I didn't see it in the charges, but we don't know the entirety of the case and we have to. You know, there was an interesting interview by a former CIA station chief that I, that I watched recently where he was saying that, you know, the US Public needs to be a little patient here because soon they'll, they'll have a lot of evidence introduced into court that will detail the US Case against Maduro. And people who, like this person, who say that they know what's in that case file are quite confident. There's a lot there, but we'll have to see.
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B
And is the connection to America that those drugs ended up here, I mean, is that ultimately what gets the connection to America?
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Yeah, I can't speak to the ins and outs of the case. I haven't read the whole case yet what's been submitted to the courts, but I would tell you that the argument politically has been exactly that, that the United States has suffered as a result of what Maduro has done. And they're drawing parallels to, to, to Noriega, the Panamanian president, who was also extradited the United States and died here in jail.
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B
Reason I ask is, as a former lawyer, I'm just curious as to jurisdictional arguments, and that's why I wondered if they, if they had said that. Okay, so the military, as I understand it's been described the military helped aid in abet a DOJ arrest. Is that kind of the official explanation?
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Oh, that the DOJ was with the military and.
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It was clear this was not a military regime. I mean, normally you can't just go into a Foreign country and arrest somebody just because you have an arrest warrant. In America, they did this. Talk about the international law aspect of that because I, I mean, there are, there are criminals America has arrest warrants with all around the world. We don't just go into those countries and take the person. So explain to me the international law component of this.
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Well, you know, I think that the administration has been seeking to, you know, create a legal framework by having DOJ folks, you know, on the mission, reading him his rights, bring him to a courthouse immediately after his, his seizure in, in, in Venezuela is.
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B
Right. I didn't really, I didn't read that.
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A
Okay, that's what they said. That's what they said.
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C
Oh, interesting.
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A
Okay, I didn't see that, though. But that's what they said.
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B
Interesting. I didn't, I hadn't read that. But. So that, that is the, that's, I guess the, the framework. Now, internationally, generally speaking, have the rest of the countries in the world acknowledged this arrest as valid or not?
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It's been mixed. A lot of countries, even in Latin America. It's actually really interesting. In Latin America, there was a meeting of South American leaders the day after the operation. And Latin America has a long history of concern about US Military intervention dating back many decades.
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B
Panama, and you mentioned Grenada.
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A
You could go on and on. I mean, there's, you know, the US Occupied Nicaragua for a period of time. You know, I mean, there's, there's a long history of US military activity in Latin America. And so this meeting happens and there was some expectation they might come to a consensus, but there was no consensus on whether to condemn the operation. And internationally, you know, you saw the same thing play out at the UN where there wasn't a consensus there either. So, you know, there are countries that are, that are, that are condemning it. And there are countries, you know, including U.S. adversaries, like China and Russia, clearly. And there are countries that are trying to, you know, not get involved and not take a side. And there are some countries that support it. So it is a real mixed bag there.
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B
You mentioned. I am curious about the sort of thought in the rest of the world, obviously, the president has brought up. Well, we could go into Colombia, we could go into Cuba. We could. He's even mentioned Iran. Okay. Colombia and Cuba strike at least me as the two in our hemisphere. Two, most likely. I'm not. I know you don't give opinion in the sense of this is what I think will happen. But in Colombia and Cubia, do you think there is a real concern that that's next.
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A
Well, listen, I am actually, you know, I'm a former Latin America correspondent, right. So I used to be based in Colombia. And, you know, I'm one of the. I'm one of the people that I actually spoke to Fidel Castro once. Oh, really? Yeah. And so, like, I'm. I'm very interested in, you know, Cuba and very interested in Colombia. And, and, And I watched. It was funny. I was watching a rally last night in Colombia where their president, who President Trump does not like, Gustavo Petrov. He was about to give this big rally, and he was late, and it looks like he was late because he was speaking to President Trump.
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B
He talked during the New York Times interview.
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A
Right, right, right. The journalists were in the room, which is crazy that he didn't do that, which is a stunning. It is a stunning, stunning thing. So he gets out in front of this crowd of thousands and thousands of people in Bogota for what was expected to be a very anti US rally. And he says, I'm summarizing here. But he says something along the lines of, you know, I had one speech prepared, but now I have to give another speech. And he's like, let me tell you, the first speech was really tough. And then he said something along the lines of President Trump not being dumb, and he isn't. You know, he used the word Bobo. He's not dumb. And the crowd kind of hissed or booed or didn't react positively to that. And it's this amazing thing. And then he posts something on social media afterwards where. Where he has a Colombian jaguar and a US Bald eagle, and they're kind of like, nuzzling up together. Really? Yeah. And this is a guy. I mean, there's been like a war of words on social media between Trump and Gustavo Petro for many weeks now. And so to see this kind of turnaround in the last is just incredible. So.
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B
I don't know exactly how to phrase this, but I'm a critic of President Trump on the vast majority of things. But we had someone on here when we were talking about Israel and Palestine who said. I said something like, give me the best argument for Trump's foreign policy theory or capability. And he said something to the effect of. Because Trump is such a wild card and people have no idea what he's going to do, it leads to an unease that can often make him able to accomplish things maybe other people can't, because people are like, well, he might actually do this stuff. People have always said they would do, but wouldn't. So with Colombia and Cuba. I mean, we've been threatening to do stuff there for years. Could there be a little bit of those leaders actually believe, oh, this can happen? And that may be to explain a little bit of what you saw with the Colombian president.
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A
Well, I think with Colombia, you know, I would first take issue that for years there's been this kind of animosity, you know, to the point of military intervention. Gustavo Petro has never been, you know, a super fan of the United States. I think that's. That's a fair way to put it. You know, he's a former rebel himself, and so he. He has not been a fan. But the US Military and the Colombian military have a very, very strong relationship.
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B
Is our objection there. Drugs, too, in theory.
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A
The US has been a partner for many, many decades now in Colombia's war against drugs for, you know, since I was based there in the very early 2000s. And so, you know, the US counted Colombia as perhaps the strongest military ally in Latin America, period, full stop. And so it's a little bit of a different thing there because their objection really is to the president, not so much even, you know, the broader situation. And there's a lot of Trump, specifically Trump and Petro. Trump and the Colombian president just do not get. Have not gotten along until the last, you know, hours, you know, basically, so. Which is a remarkable turnaround. And I realize it's difficult. I don't know when you're airing this.
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B
But anyway, so it airs today. So you're Clayton. And Chrome was founded on a simple idea. All leather goods should last a lifetime. They make everything from bags, belts, wallets, and much more. And the best part, they're doing it right here in Kentucky. You can check them out at clayton and croom.com c-r u m e.com or visit one of their retail stores in Louisville, Charleston. And now open in Nashville. Clayton and Croo Quality goods Built to last. Okay, so. All right, let's go to Cuba. First of all, I gotta ask you, you said you met Fidel Castro.
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A
I did.
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B
Tell me about him.
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A
So I didn't. I. I never. I've never actually stepped foot on the island of Cuba. But I did talk to him when he was in Brazil, and I used to be based in Brazil, and. And it was a long time ago. It was during the Clinton administration. And it was a really bizarre interview where I asked him about the Monica Lewinsky scandal. That was what was going on. And he defended Bill Clinton. And it was the stunning moment where he was like, he's telling me I gotta respect Bill Clinton. And anyway, it was this real surreal moment for me because I was a Latin American Studies major in college and I had studied Fidel Castro, and there he is in his camouflage and talking about Bill Clinton and telling me that I should respect him.
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B
So, yeah, so the Cuba, you know, I mean, I grew up sort of always hearing that Cuba was, if not an enemy, at least something to worry about. And then it seemed like relations thawed. Marco Rubio also has. Cube, obviously has Cuban heritage. How would you best describe how the American government looks at. At Cuba today?
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A
Well, I think. I think Secretary of State Marco Rubio has put it pretty bluntly. I mean, he's basically saying that the Cubans should take notice of what happens in Venezuela. And so if anyone in the region should be really watching this, it's certainly the Cubans, because also they depended so much on their relationship with Venezuela, which the United States almost certainly seems. Seems to be moving to sever. Right. So if the Venezuelans can no longer provide any kind of oil, aid, support, cash, anything to the Cubans, that's going to have a real impact on an island that's already struggling economically.
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B
But what is. I guess this is a basic question, but I actually think it matters. What is the goal of all this at the end of the day? At the end of the day, I mean, there are bad people that run lots of countries, or at least people we think are bad in all these places. We don't seek to take them all over. At the end of the day, if you were to try to describe what the American interest is in who the Venezuela leader is, who the Cuban leader is, who the Colombian leader is, what is that interest?
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A
So I think that what. What, what we're, you know, as journalists, what we're trying to do is we're trying to make sense of this. This too, because, you know, nobody's seen anything quite like this. Right. Yeah. And so, you know, the closest thing is Noriega, and that's actually a different situation for a lot of reasons that we don't have to get into. So, you know, what we're. What we're doing is we're looking at, like, the national security strategy that the White House issued, which says, you know, which says basically that the Monroe Doctrine, you know, this idea that the hemisphere is kind of America's backyard and that the US Will, you know, look after it as such, you know, and protect its interests there, you know, really is the best way, I think, to understand what. Well, I think that in the case of Venezuela, you're going to see a lot of pressure on them to cut ties with countries the US Sees as adversaries.
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B
Okay, so like China and Russia.
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A
And actually I was on a trip with Secretary of Defense or secretary of war, I guess that's what he calls it. Pete Hegseth, the name isn't official yet, so I can't use secretary of war. But in Panama, that's when you get.
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B
To use one or the other Congress.
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A
But the name has been officially, the name has been changed on the building itself. So it's a tricky one for reporters. We still say, what do you do? Anyway, so I was with Secretary Hegseth in Panama in April, and he was basically really focusing on China and trying to keep the Chinese government. And the Chinese economy has really become more interested in Panama in recent decades. And that canal is quite important for U.S. commerce, but also for the U.S. military where there are contingency in Asia. So I think if you look at the broader US Policy, it seems to be more about rolling back the inroads of U.S. adversaries in the hemisphere and then I guess the drugs, too, because that's still a priority for him. But I don't remember him running on I don't remember him running on cocaine, though. So it's a trick. Yeah.
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B
I mean, you don't have to comment on this because I don't want you to feel like you have to. But it almost makes it's odd to me the way this case is made by the administration, because I actually think Americans would oddly be more likely to support or understand an argument of we need to control this because we're worried or concerned about security in America long term, China, Russia, et cetera, then let's keep the cocaine out, which or even he's a bad guy. Well, I don't know that those arguments work as well today, even as they did maybe 40 years ago. But I don't hear that argument being made. Matter of fact, the only time I've heard it, Billy and I talked about was a scene from Jack Ryan, the television show, where there's a two and a half minute scene that's gone viral of the guy from the office making the case as to why Venezuela was so important. Why do you think they. Or maybe you don't want to give your opinion, but the administration has not talked a lot about that publicly. Am I right?
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A
Well, no, I think that they've been I mean, the rationale for a lot of the actions they've taken, like the boat strikes in the Caribbean and on the Pacific side have been squarely based on the drug trade. But then, you know, the intervention in Venezuela has this kind of dual nature to it. So it's, you know, on the one hand, they're serving, you know, they've extracted Maduro based on his indictment on drug trafficking charges. Right. Or his involvement in drug trafficking. And then they're also talking about the oil industry. Right. And they're saying that the nationalization of the oil. So then it becomes a little bit different. Right. And so those journalists, I think their.
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B
Drug argument plays not as well as some of the, as the other one, but yet they always focus on that one.
- [34:18]
A
You know, there is one thing I would say that I think, you know, as reporters covering the strikes in particular, we were, we were really interested in, which was that, you know, the preponderance of US Military firepower that was assembled in, in the Caribbean didn't match up with the majority of the, the drug trade. Right. And so if you look at the main trafficking route actually is not through the Caribbean, it's through the Pacific. And so, you know, there isn't a big flotilla of ships off Mexico. You know, they're, they're in the Caribbean. So it always, it was, it was something that we've sort of scratched our heads about a little bit. You know, there have been strikes in the Pacific side, but the military firepower and everything else was really aimed at the, in the Caribbean, was really in the Caribbean. And the policy is really aimed at Venezuela. And so, you know, this seems to be a policy as much about Venezuela as it is about, about drugs. Not to say that it hasn't been about drugs.
- [35:15]
B
Let's talk about Venezuela now real quick. So we always hear about oil has the most oil reserves. To what extent is oil something that Venezuela can produce en masse in the near future? How long does it take? Trump initially said we're going to have all this oil. Then he said to the New York Times yesterday, now this is actually going to take years. What is actually the truth about that?
- [35:41]
A
So Reuters has a lot of really great reporters that are working on this exact issue right now. And the reporting that they're producing really does indicate that it's going to take years to recover for Venezuela and years and some good luck, really, for Venezuela to recover anything close to the industry it once had. The Venezuelans, I think, used to produce about 7% of the world's crude, and I think now it's down to like 1%. And as a comparison, just for context, you know, people talk about Venezuela as this massive, you know, the world's largest oil reserves, blah, blah, blah. But the, but the truth is they produce about the same amount as the US State of North Dakota.
- [36:23]
B
So they actually produce the. Almost the same as just North Dakota.
- [36:27]
A
Just North Dakota. And so, you know, right now, like, their industry is not, you know, this, this titan and powerhouse. It's. It's kind of. It's kind of, you know, not doing so well. And, and from folks that, that Reuters has talked to, you know, for the, the. The Venezuelan industry has really been plagued by, you know, corruption and mismanagement, and it will take a, it'll take a long time to fix all that. If you bring an American company and they're going to want to rebuild everything, you know, that takes, that takes a lot of time.
- [36:58]
B
So that leads me to two questions. When the US Administration says the Venezuelan government took our oil or took our equipment, explain to people at least what they mean by that.
- [37:12]
A
So, you know, Reuters doesn't know. I personally don't know exactly what that means, but we assume that that means they're talking about the nationalization of the oil industry, that, you know, U.S. companies used to be operating there. And during the Hugo Chavez years, particularly, you know, between, you know, prior, prior in the early 2000s, he really did take a lot of. He made a lot of efforts to bring the oil industry under state control and, and really make US Companies either leave or become, you know, very.
- [37:48]
B
What did they take? When they say they took. What did they take?
- [37:51]
A
They. Well, they, they canceled, you know, contracts that the US Companies had told the. They either had to become, you know, I think essentially contractors or, or leave. And I think a lot of the companies left. So that was, that's the history there.
- [38:08]
B
So just canceled contracts. Okay. I mean, I mean, I mean, that just seems like an odd. I, I actually thought they might have even stolen equipment. Is it.
- [38:18]
A
You know, I, I don't know. I mean, you'd have to. I mean, I have to go and talk to them, the folks at Exxon, to see whether, you know, their equipment is still there and whether they were compensated for anything, because.
- [38:27]
B
So what do we know? I keep hearing the president say the oil companies are ready to go in and they want to go and rebuild Venezuela.
- [38:34]
A
Yeah.
- [38:35]
B
Is that true? Are we hearing that oil companies do want to do that or do we know?
- [38:40]
A
I think that the companies are about to meet. They're going to have a meeting at the White House and they're going to talk about it. I think that right now there's some interest potentially, but there would have to be a lot of probably Reuters is reporting, there would have to be some guarantees for them because of the, you know, the kind of crude that Venezuela produces isn't, you know, the kind of crude that frankly even North Dakota produces, which can fetch a higher price. It's, you know, it needs, it needs a lot more work to be, to be used. And so I don't know, I don't know whether they're going to, you know, go running into Venezuela or not without quite a lot of US Government guarantees support.
- [39:21]
B
You know, there used to be a time, Phil, even when you were, when you probably started your career, where the American government was seen worldwide as like, regardless who the president was, the American government was like a unified thing that acted. How much do you think in countries like Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba, when they're thinking about these things or even the oil companies, you know, now if somebody besides Donald Trump is president in three years, a lot of these policies might completely change. Especially if, as you said with Columbia, a lot of it's just personally, these two leaders don't like each other when they're making these calculations. Do these countries in Latin America look at America as the American government or is it like Donald Trump and then we have to wait and see what happens three years after that? Does that make sense, what I'm asking?
- [40:15]
A
Yeah, I mean, I don't know really how to respond to that. I mean, I would say that the, you know, like us, you know, debt ratings agencies that look at American debt, you know, sometimes speak about, you know, political volatility as a risk to the US to the United States, financially, economically. So political volatility plays out in different areas. It's easier to see when it comes to, you know, bond prices than it is, you know, maybe in relations with other countries. But I think, you know, if you are in Colombia and there's right now, there's an election coming up in the spring, you know, you know that there is volatility there. I mean, the government won't be, might not be, you know, a left leaning government in four months. It might be a very pro Trump government in four months. And so this kind of era of political volatility I would say is, you know, is global. You know, we're seeing a lot of political volatility around the world and, and swings between different ideologies in different countries.
- [41:15]
B
We'll start to wrap up by me asking you this question. I was listening to two what I call bro podcasters discussing this and I like to Sometimes listen to them less for their insight, which I find to be little but to see. How do people like that think about all this? Because these were Trump supporting people and I heard them ask a question that I do think a lot of. I've heard a lot of my conservative listeners wonder, which is, okay, I followed all this was impressive that we pulled it off, had no casualties. But how does this affect me? Kind of like the average American's life, how does this affect you? See, you've dealt with these issues for a long time. The bigger picture, if you're the average American listening beyond just being curious about world affairs, do you think what is happening in Venezuela? What could happen in Cuba, Colombia? Will gas prices go down? Will that, like, are there things that you actually think would have impact on the average everyday American's life based on these events?
- [42:22]
A
I mean, it's really hard to say right now. You know, it's really, really hard to say. You would need a crystal ball to know whether or not this is going to devolve into some sort of quagmire that is going to drain US Resources or not. You know, you'd have to have a crystal ball to know whether or not the impact, whether there'll be an impact to America's standing internationally as a result of this or any other follow on actions that could, that could happen. And so right now we're at the precipice of, you know, potentially quite a lot of impact. You know, that could explain to me.
- [42:55]
B
What that, like, what that would look like if there was a lot.
- [42:58]
A
Well, I mean, on the negative side, you could see, you know, if there is a situation where the US Government becomes frustrated with the government in, in Venezuela, it might require, you know, further action. You know, and that action could become a military action or it could become something that would, would, would drain U.S. resources. If, if, if the United States has to create, you know, a subsidized Venezuelan oil industry, you know, the questions then become about return on investment. You know, how long would that be, you know, for how, how many billions of dollars or millions of dollars would the US need to put up in the short run and would there be a payoff, you know, on the positive side, you know, what does it mean? You know, what is the advantage to U.S. citizens of having, you know, countries, you know, close to, close to the United States that have less contact with, you know, U.S. adversaries like Russia, China, Iran, you know, and so is there a security upside there? Is there, you know, is there less of a, of a need to have. I don't know. There are so many variables when you, when you start talking about future effects that it's one of the things that kind of paralyze a lot of policymakers, even, you know, from doing a lot overseas in the short run, because they just don't know. Because they don't know what's next. And so, you know, as journalists, we're all asking that very question is, you know, what is the benefit? What could be the repercussions in the United States for this? And that's the big question we all have.
- [44:25]
B
Let me finish with this. A lot of reports that the administration is going to meet with the folks in Greenland and Denmark about whatever happens with Greenland. I understand, at least me, I feel like I understand why that matters to them. But it seems like it matters. Like, we have military bases there. Feels like we get along with Greenland pretty well. What do you think motivated Trump's fascination with Greenland?
- [44:56]
A
That's a great question. I don't know that there is an easy answer for that. There is a lot of potential security implications for Greenland falling under the. Let me start again. I mean, I guess a lot of journalists are kind of trying to understand what the United States would gain militarily, diplomatically, economically by acquiring, you know, Greenland, given, you know, the treaty arrangements and the US Military relationship with Denmark, which is a close NATO ally.
- [45:37]
B
I mean, what else do we need from them? We already are there. We already use it as a military base.
- [45:42]
A
Right?
- [45:42]
B
What, what have you heard that we want?
- [45:44]
A
Right. Well, I think, I think the answer the administration gives is that, you know, that the Denmark simply can't, you know, defend the island by itself. Denmark just doesn't. Isn't the US and doesn't have the reach of the US Military. And if you really want to make sure that, that Greenland is secure and that its assets in the Arctic are, you know, available to Americans, then you need to have it be American. And, and that's the argument they're putting forward.
- [46:11]
B
Someone's coming after Greenland. Like, am I missing something? Like, is there, are there, is there someone ready to take it over?
- [46:19]
A
I mean, again, like, I think that, you know, Denmark would tell you that they have Greenland, you know, under, under control and that the US Is a, is a NATO ally and that the US has, you know, basing access and all kinds of military access should they need it, and that they're a NATO ally. And so, like, so the, so the, the, you know, for Denmark, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a problematic situation. But, you know, there are non military ways that the US could go about pursuing this. So do you think there's any chance?
- [46:52]
B
Well, obviously there's a chance, but what do you think it is likely that the 50,000 people that live in Greenland become Americans at some point in the next three years?
- [47:05]
A
I mean, they're, they've done a lot to indicate that that's not their intent. The Reuters had a story out today saying that the US Is mulling payments to potentially, you know, lure them into becoming Americans. You know, and you could imagine a scenario where the US basically, you know, gives them, gives them some money. But I don't know, you know, it's a, it's a, it's a wild card issue for a lot of folks. And I don't know, you know, whether it's, it's something that's, you know, a front burner issue or a back burner issue or sort of just, you know, but, but the President said it, you know, it's something that he would, he would like to resolve within this term in office.
- [47:41]
B
So would you like to give $100,000 a person to Greenland to become Americans? No, I would be a lot of Americans that would say, where is my hundred thousand dollars if that were to happen? No, absolutely not. I got to keep an eye on that. Billy is just so, you know, fill my average person that doesn't care about politics. I cannot see Americans being excited that we would give every person from Greenland $100,000 to be an American. But stranger things have happened. I'll finish with this Donald Trump. Every day when I wake up, I look at my phone before I do my sports show and I go, what in the world now what? Right? Like what's the next thing from other countries in the world? How do they handle in general a president that on any given day you have no idea what he's going to do.
- [48:40]
A
You're talking about, you know, Trump from a policy perspective.
- [48:43]
B
You've talked, I'm sure, to leaders or in these, like how do it's got to be? There's so much volatility in terms of a day to day thing. You mentioned the Colombian president was given one speech, then he has to give another one. Like it has to be. Is it unique in dealing with him? Is it just different than dealing with other presidents or other world leaders?
- [49:03]
A
You know, I think that's an interesting question. I think that what I've seen in my conversations with diplomats and I guess that's the best way I could Answer this question is that in this administration since last year, there's sort of been an understanding that the Trump is, is who he is and that there's sort of an acceptance to the idea that he may, you know, say something, you know, quite provocative one day and then, and then, and then have a different position the next day. Right. And I think the Colombian president is a good example of that. Right. He was, he was, he openly floated, you know, just a couple of days ago the idea of a military action inside Colombia, you know, and it's basically, you know, said that Maduro could face, you know, some. A similar fate, that Petro could face a similar fate of Maduro. And then now, you know, he's going to come to Washington and they're going to welcome the foreign minister from Colombia, and it's a total turnaround. So, you know, I think that people have kind of accepted that, you know, this is, this, is this kind of, you know, volatility in US Foreign policy is probably by design, but it's definitely something that they're dealing with and they seem to be very. The diplomats that I talk to seem to understand it.
- [50:25]
B
Okay, well, listen, Phil, thank you very much. I enjoyed the conversation. I will give you. I enjoyed it, but also a compliment. I think it's rare today to hear someone talk about the issues or the news and distinctly not want to give their opinion, which is kind of what is supposed to happen but never happens. And is that like just on a personal level? Is that a Reuters policy? Is that a Phil Stewart policy? It's very refreshing. I don't, I'm not sure I've ever interviewed someone less likely to want to say what he thinks. What is that just how the, your news organization is?
- [51:09]
A
I mean, I've been at Reuters. Yeah, definitely. That's how Reuters is. But I've been at Reuters since I was in college, basically, you know. Yeah. So. So it's how I've always sort of carried myself. And if I did, you know, if you think I expressed an opinion anywhere, then that was certainly. That was. Yeah, that would have been. That must have been an accident because I didn't, I didn't. That was because I really don't. I try to keep myself out of it, you know, I try to.
- [51:34]
B
I just think that's very refreshing because the biggest thing I hear from my listeners, and they know I lean left, most of my listeners lean right, but the biggest thing I always hear from them is how do I know what's going on without hearing the tint of what People think while I'm hearing what's going on, and even the people who lean right, they understand that there are news organizations that are trying to tell them what they want to hear, and they sort of go, how do I find what's actually happening without the tent of opinion? And I just, just on a journalistic level, I think that's harder and harder to find. Do you agree?
- [52:15]
A
I mean, our goal at Reuters is really to do just that, is that you should, you shouldn't know, you shouldn't have any sense of any opinion about the journalist when you're reading an article. And if you do, you should write the ethics folks at Reuters to tell them that they've made a mistake and they need to address it. So that is definitely the policy that I've always kind of lived by. And Reuters.
- [52:41]
B
All right, shout out to Reuters. Last question. Give me. You've been all over Latin America. You've been all over 60. You've been to the 60s, 60 countries. Give me the most scared you've ever been doing your job.
- [52:53]
A
Roof. Most scared. You know, I don't know how to answer that question because it's, it's. I, I've been a war correspondent for a lot of my career, so I don't want to get too personal on your show. And, and I would feel, I would feel like that might actually also get in the way of the, the Reuters rules. But I would say that. Vulnerable. Okay. But I would say, but I would say, I will say this, though, that, you know, in the, in the, in the years, in the early years of my work in Colombia, there were moments where I, you know, it was a guerrilla war and, and I remember, you know, we would travel in and out of what was then the FARC guerrillas demilitarized zone. They had a, they had a country inside Colombia that was all theirs, about the size of Switzerland. And as journalists. Yeah, and as journalists, it was our job to go in and out of that. And sometimes that would be, you know, you just didn't know, you know, whether or not you might have some problems coming in and out of that area with the cause. These are teenagers with guns, you know, patrolling those, the border of that zone and always worried about folks. And I guess another time would be when I, after there was a coup against Chavez, and I remember our folks in Caracas needed, you know, flak jackets and helmets and bulletproof vests because there was gunfire in the streets. And, and I got in a plane and I, and I brought, and I brought it over there. And then in the wake of the coup, I landed with an American passport and the folks at the airport in Caracas were wondering, you know, was I CIA? You know, and, and there was a moment there I was and I thought to myself, I, I, I should have come with more documentation, you know, and, but it was, it was, you know, I, you know, I had a good conversation with.
- [54:38]
B
I bet you have great stories. I mean, that would be, maybe that's the next time we tell stories. Seriously, I do want to bring you on again because I, I found this very informative. Thank you very much for your time.
- [54:50]
A
My pleasure, My pleasure. Thanks.
- [54:51]
B
That's Phil Stewart, national security reporter for Reuters. And this has been interrupted by by.
- [54:58]
C
Matt Jones With Cargurus Discover you can skip the filters and describe what you're looking for in your own words. Simply type what you want and Cargurus Discover instantly surfaces real list your exact needs. It's no wonder Cargurus is the number one most visited car shopping site according to similar web's estimated traffic data. Buy or sell your next car today with Cargurus at cargurus. Com go to cargurus.com to make sure your big deal is the best deal. That's C A R G U R u s Com Cargurus. Com.