← The Monocle Daily
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You're listening to the Monocle Daily, first.
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Broadcast on 15th October 2025 on Monaco Radio. What if they gave a summit and nobody came? Vladimir Putin's quiet night in. Is the US shifting position back towards Ukraine or are they just trying to sell stuff? And what is the fairest way to get the not necessarily willing into uniform? I'm Andrew Muller. The Monocle Daily starts. Hello, and welcome to the Monocle Daily. Coming to you from our studios here at Midori House in London. I'm Andrew Muller. My guests Julie Norman and Alexander Gerlach will discuss today's big stories. And our on this day historical series will reflect on the downfall of one burkanabe leader in a red beret and his appropriation by another. Stay tuned. All that and more coming up right here on the Monocle Daily. This is the Monocle Daily. I'm Andrew Muller and I am joined today by Julie Norman, associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at UCL & Co Author of Gaza the Dream and the Nightmare, and by Alexander Gerlach, professor of Political Philosophy and Geopolitics at New York University. Hello to you both. Hello. Hi, Julie, you have plugged your new book in this space before and I suppose we should give you one last chance to do it now that it is about to be condemned to irrelevance by the fact that President Donald Trump has sorted the whole thing out and it's all going to be fine.
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C
It's all fine now, done and dusted. No need to read the book? No, actually the opposite. The book comes out next Friday, October 24th. It's called the Dream and the Nightmare. And honestly, I think this moment really captures a lot of the what we're trying to capture in the book, this sense of these juncture points of possibility for Gaza that are then often completely turned on their head and things often get very much worse and don't seem to be getting better. And I think we're at one of those moments now where I think there's a very rocky road ahead. I think there will certainly need to be some additional chapters added to the book.
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B
Alexander, you have been though it says we have introduced you as being at New York University, you are very much here in our studio and indeed here in London where you have found somewhere to live. This is of course a shockingly tedious process pretty much anywhere in the world. But in what kind of specific ways is it shockingly tedious in London?
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A
Well, that's a very good question. Thank you for having me on the show. We moved over from New York where the pace is, is distinct, let's say. So like brokers or real estate agents as you call them here they would be active throughout the whole weekend. There's like no Sunday and no day of the Lord, no whatever religious holiday. Whereas here Friday afternoon and then that's that which I'm not. It's just different. You were like in the turnover period in New York's maybe a week or two. Here you have like, you know, announcements for in two or three months time. Another peculiarity is like you want to open a bank account but then you need like three months of utility bills but your utility bills do not have your name on it. So it's kind of like, you know, I think every country has these sort of peculiarities that makes it difficult for you to settle but it makes for great stories to share on radio.
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B
And it hasn't put you off.
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A
Oh no, it's my second time here. So it was actually like the prices have gone up. The first time I lived here was in the tail end of the pandemic and everything was much cheaper. So the pricing shock really hit hard.
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Well, to Russia first of all, where President Vladimir Putin thereof is mournfully making other plans. Today was supposed to see the kickoff of his long planned Russia Arab world summit in which of an array rather of Middle Eastern leaders would have gathered in Moscow. Putin at the head of his weird long table to demonstrate that Russia's favour is still worth cultivating. Instead, Putin has been compelled to cancel the DJ and stand down the balloon animal guy as nobody is coming. The only affirmative RSVPs were from Arab League Secretary General Ahmed Abu Ghait and new Syrian president Ahmed Al Shararra, who may just have wanted to drop in for a quick gloat at his predecessor Bashar Al Assad, now spending his days staying away from high windows. Alexander, is this just because everybody went to Sharm El Sheikh instead and nobody could be bothered flying to Russia afterwards?
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A
Well, I feel like Russia's position and acting in the region has not been like inviting now to see them as the leading constructive force for whatever. It's like coming now the engagement with Syria, the engagement with Iran, that doesn't make it, I mean like the first sort of like actor to be like thinking of when you think of the peace process, however, showcasing your own might to your own people and the world, portraying that what Xi Jinping that at the 80th anniversary of the liberation from colonial rule of Japan, we say like, oh, Kim Jong Un went and Vladimir Putin went and 20 other heads of state. So it has like a signal in public diplomacy, if you will. And you can say if you look through that lens, it's clearly a failure for Russia.
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B
Julie, has Russia now just completely blown it in the Middle East? Is it. I mean, Alexander mentions the recent closeness with Iran. Has the Arab Middle east basically decided of Russia? Well, you picked a team.
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C
And for Russia, I mean, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, the fact that Russia made it very clear that they did not have the will or the capacity to prop up Assad when things were going south, I think just showed how thinly stretched they've been by the Ukraine war. And their increasing coziness with Iran, too, has alienated Israel, who for a long time was at least had decent relations with Russia as well. And so I think things are definitely shifting for how state actors are looking at Russia. But I would say I think it's a little premature to say that the US has fully, like, swooped back into previous positions too. And I would say outside of elites, outside of governments, there's still a lot of anti Western sentiment, largely, obviously because of what happened in Gaza. And so I think things are still a bit tangled in how they're going to shake out. But for the moment, Russia is definitely just not in the same place that they were before all this started.
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B
Is it interesting, though, Alexander, that President Ahmed Al Sharar of Syria was actually willing to go to Russia? Because certainly as he sold it to his people, one of the great benefits of him coming to power was that the Russians were turfed out fairly unceremoniously. Is there anything in it for him of trying to repair that relationship somewhat?
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A
Well, I guess maybe there has been also a bargain with Russia or been in the mix when the terms were discussed for the transition of power. So I guess it might sound feel prudent for the new leader of Syria to just also show face in Moscow and now he doesn't even have to go. So he made his point without having been actually needing to go.
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B
And Julie, President Putin, we have heard this week issuing kind of pro forma congratulations to President Trump over his apparent triumph in Gaza. How furiously might Putin have been gritting his teeth at this point? Because he will be trying to figure out, does this do me any good? Is it bad for Russia or does it really not make the blindest bit of difference?
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C
Yeah, I feel like that was something that he obviously was not super happy to have to make those comments, but I think just felt he needed to in this world order and with Trump and at least keeping Trump somewhat amenable to him. I mean, obviously Trump's policy, his position on Russia, Ukraine has veered 180 degrees since the start of his term. Right now, he does not seem to be holding Putin in good light. But I think Putin's trying to at least stay somewhat, somewhat on Trump's good side and try and come back around to that. But I think at that moment it was, you couldn't not say something about what was happening in the Middle east this week, even though it was something that I don't think Putin was going to be rushing to be opening champagne bottles around.
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B
Just finally on this one, Alexandra, I mean, we always have to be careful of too much wishful thinking when things start appearing to go backwards for Russia. But is there a wider pattern emerging that Russia's sort of misadventure in Ukraine has diminished it elsewhere because it's not just in Syria and the wider Middle east that it is not as influential as it once was? We've seen what it really would think of its sphere of influence, countries like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan being a lot less deferential to Russia and a lot more open about seeking alliances elsewhere than they might have been three years ago.
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A
Yeah. And the power non couple in this context now is China in America and not Russia in America. And I feel that becomes very obvious, obvious that we nowadays discuss geopolitical questions with those two powers, whereas Russia has to see like Central Asia. I was just coming back from a trip there. There's Russians still spoken and whatnot. But I feel and there's also like no liberal democracies whatsoever. But you do remember the colonial or the imperial past. And that is not very enticing for many people in Central Asia, let's say. So they do not want and same for Eastern Europe or the Baltic countries. So I feel like you can see like, and Putin certainly will not like this, that he is not on par anymore when it comes to hardcore geopolitics with China, with Beijing and Washington and.
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B
Actually just an extra, extra question, Julie, because we are just about to move on to related issues. Is it possible that even this administration, American administration, that is, sees an opportunity here that if countries like those former Soviet republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan are not really feeling as obliged to Moscow as they once might have, then maybe there's an opportunity there for the United States. United States. But of course, that would need a fairly brisk rethink of the whole America first model.
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C
Yeah, I think that's the best way to say it is that for Trump Again, everything is how much this is going to serve the US and he saw it in his interest to intervene a bit with the Armenian, Azerbaijan conflict. You know, kind of both those states somewhat in his pocket, so to speak. But I think for broader engagement, broader kind of diplomacy and planning with Trump, obviously it's very unpredictable. And if he sees an immediate US Interest there, and if not, he'll focus.
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B
On something else, well, to Brussels, where NATO defence ministers are meeting U.S. secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who even as we speak may be filling an awkward silence by doing frantic push ups. Interestingly, Hegseth's public remarks have fueled hopes that US President Donald Trump's administration may be coming around to the orthodox old school Republican position that supporting a European democracy beset by Moscow is the sort of thing the United States should do. Hegseth said that the U.S. and its allies would impose costs on Russia should Russia not wind down its 44 month 72 hour lightning conquest of Ukraine. Julie, first of all, we talked about this on the Daily earlier this week. The thing that Ukraine wants now, and this is a familiar dance, is Tomahawk cruise missiles. Hegseth and Trump have so far not said yes, but they're not saying no. What do we think the chances are?
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C
Yeah, I mean the fact that we're not seeing a hard no I think means that pretty much everything is in play right now. And again, this is, I think a clear indication of Trump's style. I think if you asked people six months ago if they thought this kind of weaponry would be on the table at all, it would have been absolutely not. And yet instead, if Trump thinks it can be a deal for him, if he thinks the US can gain from it, suddenly it's back in play. And so I think the way they've kind of shifted from a US Aid model to more of a purchasing of U. S made weapons and arms, that's kind of changed the calculation for how Trump is view some of this.
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B
And does it seem like Alexander, and this is a question I know people all over the world have been asking themselves the last few weeks in particular, and again with all due caution about wishful thinking, does something seem to have shifted in terms because Trump came to office? Obviously extremely. Ukraine skeptic. It was only what are we up to now eight months ago that he had that dreadful row in full view of the world's cameras with President Zelensky in the Oval Office. Does the US now seem slightly more on Ukraine's side than it has for a while?
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A
Well, I feel when it comes to the president. Everything is calibrated according to his personal preferences. So there's not like a long policy line or like, you know, and these change. Yeah. So it's just like he is, like, now disappointed personally in Putin, which also is in all good, right, to me, because he believed, like, they had, like, an understanding, whatever. But we know for many other instances in world history that if, like, the responsible actors can build trust with each other, things are possible. And I think we can say this did not happen or is not enduring or sustaining between those two leaders. That doesn't mean necessarily that Trump is now in favor of Ukraine, but he's certainly having beef with Putin.
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B
He would be in favor, though. Julian, again, this is a continuation of a conversation we had on last night's Daily. It is this absolutely morbid obsession with the Nobel Peace Prize, and he would see this as surely the final tick on the checklist.
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C
Oh, absolutely. And this is, again, not just Gaza, you know, other ones this year, too, that he is touted as him as the peacemaker.
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B
And I think Cambodia, Azerbaijan, conflict. Who can forget that?
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C
Who can forget it? I mean, Rwanda all over the place. I mean, but I would say, I mean, he came into office, I think, you know, I think obviously, very naively thinking this was going to be easy, thinking if he just told Putin and Zelensky what he wanted, that people would do it. And I think he's facing the reality that even if you think you can make a deal, deals don't happen without diplomacy, details, negotiation. And he hasn't been willing to put in that work. And I'm worried that we'll see that in Gaza as well. But right now with Ukraine, that's been very evident to kind of this come in, say something, and if people don't follow it, you kind of move on to the next thing or change your position.
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B
He has returned to one familiar theme, and Hegseth, speaking on his behalf, has said the same thing. Alexander. And this is the slowness still of some European countries about upping their defence spending to what Trump believes it should be. This is European NATO members. It's fairly clear when you look at a map that there's an almost exact link between their distance from Russia's border and what they're spending. And one of the NATO countries which is furthest from Russia's border in Europe is Spain, which is still not spending anywhere near the 5% that people are now supposed to be spending. Trump is now threatening them with tariffs. Is that a reasonable response? And is it even going to work, because upping your defence spending dramatically is not something you can do by flicking a switch.
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A
Well, I feel also one side of this is also Trump loves to use these levies as a policy tool, which I think is just again, part of his personality. And that is kind of like darkening, if you so will like. Or the success of the last year, because over the course of the last 12 months, we went from 2% to 3.5% to 5%. So it's not like this is huge for NATO. Just if only one out of the 27, 28 countries is like saying, ah, maybe not, that's a huge success.
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B
And we do need to bear in mind that 5% of GDP of an economy the size of Spain's is a colossal sum of money that will also.
- [15:34]
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Be more than at the height of the Cold War. So I feel like this is kind of like these are the relations we talk about. And that's also like a mantra. Obama, George W. Bush, they all said to the European partners, we need to spend more at continental Europe. I think the Brits were out because they also spend a lot on your military. But yeah, so I think it's not like Trump specific to say an alliance, the defense alliance only works if we all put in some.
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B
I mean, this is one of the things about actually this one, Julie, when I've spoken to actual European policymakers these last few years especially, it's the one thing where they will all say whatever side of the political spectrum they are on credit where due to Trump on this one. Because as Alexander points out, he is very far from the first US President who believes that the Europeans had been taking a nice long nap between the American umbrella and Trump does seem to have roused them from it. But. But as a consequence of that, is there now still a mistrust of the United States among Europeans that wasn't there before? Because one of the things that does appear to be a source of dispute is that America obviously wants Europe to spend all this money on American kit. And the Europeans are starting to think maybe we'd just be better off building our own.
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C
Absolutely. I mean, especially when you have a leader as atypical and as unpredictable as Trump, you don't want to have all your defense kind of resting on if he's going to always have have your back or not. So, of course, Europe is looking at other security models, looking more at internal production. I don't think they're nearly at that capacity yet. And obviously certain types of weaponry, it's going to take a while to build that up. But obviously there's going to be a shift in that direction because the US is not seen as dependable as it was in the past. But they're getting that pressure now from Trump. Indeed.
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B
And also, Julie, as the representative American at the table, listeners may recall that we referred to Pete Hegseth earlier on as US Secretary of Defense. That is not a mistake, that is accurate. That is his official title. Nevertheless, he is still in Brussels trying to make War Department happen. Why?
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C
Oh, gosh. I mean, this is just very typical Hegseth, I would say, in the way he's trying to rebrand the Defense Department, flex American muscle, bring back this warrior mentality and try and harken it back to some, you know, prior US historical period. But there are many in the US who are very, very disappointed with that move and don't want it to happen.
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B
Well, to Germany now and in. In semi related news, a perhaps counterintuitive intervention by the Defence Minister has forestalled the reintroduction of a limited form of conscription. The idea was to institute lotteries to make up the numbers if insufficient volunteers stepped forward. One lottery to scare up a potential pool to report for medical screening. Another to put a cohort of 18 year olds in uniform for six months. The idea was to seek a compromise between an entirely volunteer military and the bringing back of the full scale conscription which Germany jettisoned in 2011. As is often the case with compromises, it seems to have pleased nobody and annoyed everybody. Alexandy, you know what you're talking about? Well, with most subjects, but certainly with this one because before Germany abolished it in 2011, you were of conscriptible age. How was that for you?
- [18:58]
A
We all were. And like when we were in high school, we would be like drafted, if you so will, to go to medical examinations and just like being like prepared. And you had the choice between joining the army, I think for 12 months or doing social service for 18. So you could clearly see where politics wanted you to be. That was also later like change obviously is unconstitutional. You have to treat everybody equal. And that's exactly what's now the problem with this lottery kind of thing. If you want to see like Thailand has this, you can just watch like reels on Instagram or TikTok, like the platform of your choosing where you see when the lottery is drawn. And then they say, yeah, I don't have to go, whatever. So that's kind of like. But I think, I don't know how they do this in Thailand. I think in Germany with the constitutional framework, that wouldn't work. It's either for everybody or now you cannot just have a drawn a lot. At least that's what the opponents of this new proposal say.
- [19:48]
B
What was the view of it among your generation at the time? Did people regard it as a massive nuisance, something they didn't want to do, or couldn't see the point of, or did people see the value in it?
- [19:58]
A
So like I did in the military.
- [20:00]
B
Service, you mean in either?
- [20:02]
A
In either. So I was like, I graduated high school in late 1996. So the peace movement of the 80s and the 70s and like the first Gulf War, the second Gulf War, if you Surville in 1991, that was like vivid in memory. Also the end of the Cold War. So you have to like, even it might have been of use in the past. There was really like a relief. I remember this even I was young, a relief after the Iron Curtain fell and that you do not need to worry about nuclear devastation anymore. So there was a common understanding of like, we need less military. And I think that was the time when I was like, sort of like graduating from high school and were like due to go either military or social service. But I. I think the military and the social service had a high standing in the German public as a mediator that brings together people from all walks of life, from all backgrounds, religiously, denominationally, ethnically, if you so will nowadays in Germany. So I think it was perceived as a good thing.
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B
Julie, what do you make of the method proposed here? Because it's not the first conscription lottery, obviously. Alexander mentions the Thai example. This is what your country, and indeed mine, did during the Vietnam War. Mine being Australia. Australia had what was called the birthday ballot. They literally drew marbles out of a little barrel. And if your birthday came up, off you went. Is that any more or less fair than doing it any other way?
- [21:28]
C
I mean, not that I can really see. And I think again, the fact that this came about as an attempted compromise between two very opposed positions just reveals how it's really trying to kind of fill this middle ground that is just not pleasing anyone. And I do think just the lottery concept, you know, as Alexander had said, impugns a sense of unfairness and inequality among people that I think it's a difficult one to sell in certain types of countries. It would certainly be a difficult one to bring back somewhere like the US unless you were really in the midst of an armed attack and really kind of needing to ramp up people. But the idea of just as a basic lottery I think is something that would be really difficult for most people to hold onto.
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B
But the US Just to follow that up has at least it seems, from a distance, done quite a good job of keeping numbers up by actually making a career in the military seem like an attractive thing to do.
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C
Right? Yes. The U.S. i think, provides a lot of incentives for joining the military, whether it's the ROTC for education, you know, the things that allow you to go to school afterwards, the job training, just the career path and the military. So it's something that a lot of people are attracted to and choose to go into. And, you know, the US Is very good about. I remember in my high school and stuff, they would, you know, have the table in the cafeteria and stuff like that. I mean, this was. And a lot of people have problems with this. I mean, there's a lot of controversies on college campuses about the recruitment. But overall, they do a very good job and they create the incentives and they reach out to communities who they think will want to take advantage of those.
- [23:01]
B
I mean, is it still aand this is a conversation I've had with certainly with German policymakers, current and former. Alexander, is it still a tougher sell in Germany than in most places because of the obvious history that there's still this kind of pall that hangs over the idea of Germany's military.
- [23:20]
A
So I do not know how it's now like these days, but certainly in my days you could, if you wanted to invite the military to school, that would have created havoc. Like, parents would not have liked. Half of the teaching body would not have liked it. So maybe that has changed a little. I don't know. I don't know. But the German military also has universities that offers, like, professional tracks, which I think are now also not in dispute. It's about like, do you draft? Like, you know, you have like a whole cohort going. And they have to kind of like, that is, I think, more like, of concern now. So nobody is doubting, like, this career path. But of course, America has, I'll say, perfectionized this sort of like, you know, entrenchment of the military in society. I think Germany, it's still a little more removed from the entirety of society.
- [24:06]
B
And just finally on this one, Julie, you weren't ever tempted to be all you could be yourself?
- [24:11]
C
Well, I mean, I was not, but I did have a lot of friends and have dated people who are in the military and certainly have a lot of. Of respect for people who did choose to serve. And, you know, I think there's Again, there's a lot of. There's a lot of really good things that the military does. That is not usually what people think of when they think of the US military, whether it's, you know, disaster relief, being there in flood zones. I mean, there's all kinds of things that are more, I would say, are more service oriented, like literally, you know, service rather than, you know, going to war. And that's lost a lot, I think, in the narrative, which is unfortunate for those who are serving.
- [24:43]
B
Well now to the remorseless onrush of techno dystopia and the degree to which we may or not be looking forward to a world in which reading, writing and thinking can be outsourced to machines and we as a species can concentrate on what we were clearly born to do, I. E. Perform manual labour to maintain our robot overlords until such time as we are too weak to carry buckets of coolant and are pulped for fuel. Boffins at the Pew Research center have released a report into global attitudes towards AI and their findings may be generalized as more trepidation than anticipation. Another study by Boffins, commissioned by Oxford University University Press finds that while 80% of British school kids report using AI to do their schoolwork, 62% believe it is having a negative impact on it. First of all, Alexander, to the global attitudes. Are you surprised that more people are worried than excited?
- [25:41]
A
Well, the Economist just recently had a survey which was looking into the attitudes of youngsters throughout the world. And Gen Z nowadays has the worst outlook. Usually it's like, you know, men in their mid or midlife or whatever who used to be like the most miserable, commiserating about their life, whatever, but like now it's the very young and that's indeed like a shift in attitudes. And I guess if you grow up like this, I talk to my students and maybe you have similar experiences. They, you know, they go from one crisis to another. Whereas when I was came, you know, when I was a teenager, the wall came down and we traveled the world and this has an effect on what you believe politics can. My outlook on the world is like, it's been absolutely positive. But now 30 years onwards, I know that was the exception, not the rule. So if you grew up in 9, 11, like the Lehman crisis, refugee crisis, all the crises, I can see how youngsters are worried. And also one last thing is like the innovation cycles were back in the day, 30 years, like how you had to like, you know, renovate education and like you had new jobs and that was like. But Now I think it's like getting, I don't know where we are in numbers, but we're certainly less than 15 years. So if you're now in school, you do not know what to make a living later. It's like much more difficult than it used to be in my days.
- [26:52]
B
Do you find that with your students, Julie, that AI just figures as yet another. What fresh hell is this?
- [26:59]
C
I would say yes and no. I mean I would say my students for the most part have pretty readily embraced it. They certainly use it a lot as I think the study has showed. I mean there's some concerns around it, but it's more, I'd say a sense of real keenness to understand how to use it. Well, they know that they are going to need, need it in jobs and in professions. I think as Alexander said, they're struggling a bit to know what paths and trajectories will still be available to them because it is so fast moving and it's hard for us as you know, mentors to even know where to steer them because there are things we would have said a few years ago regarding like data analysis or these kinds of things that are now write coding that are now pretty much useless because of AI. And so I think they have more anxiety about what will this mean for them personally in the job market rather than like global catastrophe around Alexander, if.
- [27:49]
B
Pew had asked you how far you trusted governments to regulate AI successfully and or competently, how would you have answered?
- [27:59]
A
Well, I mean the law making prerogative lies with in democracies at least with the governments or with parliament. So I, you know, it's a question do you entrust your data and all, you know, like, like in America more to corporates or to governments as it is in Europe. So I think all has its up and downs, you know, but like I feel honestly like they're training for instance the data models with articles from the New York Times, the Guardian, whatever. And then like these publishing houses say oh nice, you have a great data, you know, a great model. But you did it with our property. So of course this needs to be regulated because like you cannot just have a, you know, take other other people's like property again the articles which is. And so I think there is a lot of the leads, a lot of be regulated which is with lawmaking so that this is a sustainable like success that not only a few profit from economic.
- [28:48]
B
I want to go back to that thing you were saying Julie about your students using it. And I'm sure students are, but is it striking to you from this Oxford University Press survey that 62% of the kids who are using this stuff are actually kind of worried that they're cheating, if not their schoolteachers than themselves. And at this point I'm reminded of the joke that somebody else made about how using AI to do research and writing is a bit like taking a forklift to the gym. I mean, the weight gets lifted, but it hasn't done new anymore.
- [29:20]
C
Yeah, very well said. I think they are aware, I think we would probably consider it. De Skilling. I've heard that word a lot. Like they are struggling more to be able to write an essay and that kind of thing. But I think their mentality as well, we probably won't really have to do that that much in our jobs in the same way that our generation had to write a lot. And I would push back on that. I see a lot of value in the writing process. I see the writing process at the thinking process. And we still write in my classes. Be warned, all young students. But I would say that for them, I think it's more they're aw that the skills they are going to need in the coming world are just different than the ones that our generation needed.
- [29:56]
B
Julie Norman and Alexander Gerlach, thank you both very much for joining us. Finally on today's show, our on this Day historical series reflects on the demise and sort of resurrection of one of Africa's lost leaders. All hats, like all items, items of clothing, have a subtext. To wear something is to announce something. Few garments, however, declare anything as stridently as the red beret. Slap one of those on your head, possibly adorning it with a five pointed star or a hammer and sickle brooch and everyone understands that you are or wish to be seen as or enjoy pretending to be a fist raising barricade straddling sentinel of the people's revolution. In recent times, the Red Beret has been beloved of the likes of bellicose Venezuelan demagogue Hugo Chavez, combustible South African rabble rouser Julius Malema. I will never get tired. No one can make me tired. I march forward to the victory of our people and you rapper turned opposition leader Bobby I know that many of.
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A
You are now asking why then do we go to the polls? Why do we risk the tear gas, the bullets, the prisons, the torture chambers, the death and all the mess that is awaiting us. My answer to you is this. We risk it all because the alternative is giving up and that is 10 times worse.
- [31:45]
B
Whose red Beret was perceived as such a red flag that Ugandan authorities banned it. There is another implication of the Red beret, however, one which might cause the admirers and followers of the afore listed to recoil, but one which is well understood by the leaders who wear one, possibly as they are no less prone to narcissistic preening than those chanting their name. The Red beret is often the choice of those military units who believe themselves a cut above the ordinary square basher members of the Parachute Regiment of the British army, whose beret is more of a maroon, but the point stands have been heard to refer to soldiers of less storied units as crap hats. No current world leader understands all the above better than Ibrahim Traore, president of Burkina Faso. Traore, once a captain in the Burkanabe army, seized power in 2022 and has worn a red beret, ever setting off a workday outfit of orange green desert jungle camouflage, occasionally accessorised by an unnecessarily gold pistol. The look has helped Traore build something of a cult among the more easily beguiled factions of the online left, who should be beguiled less easily for all kinds of reasons, but in this specific instance, one, because Traore is not a terrifically commendable individual, and two, because he has pinched the pose from a predecessor for whom it all went wrong on October 15, 1987.
- [33:26]
A
What we have to do now is.
- [33:28]
B
To make revolution Thomas Sankara, for it was he had also acquired the presidency of Burkina Faso via coup d' etat back in 1983, aged just 33, although the country whose presidency he seized was then known as the Republic of Upper Volta, the name change was one of Sankara's many sweeping reforms, along with the institution of a new flag, which he designed himself, and a new national anthem which he wrote himself. Sankara was of a generation of anti imperialist leaders inspired by the example of the Cuban Revolution and obviously the millinery of Cheggio Guevara. Unlike certain other fans of the Red Beret, however, Sankara was not exclusively a posturing blowhard. He did get stuff done on Sankara's watch. Burkina Faso made considerable strides in healthcare and education and but like most wearers of Red Berets, he was prone to bigger ideas. In Sankara's case, especially the big idea of Pan Africanism. It is a blood that has nourished.
- [34:43]
A
The rays of capitalism that has made.
- [34:45]
B
Possible our present condition of dependence. This particular big idea has an understandable appeal. Africa's 54 countries absolutely should between them be able to feed, defend, organize and improve themselves. Africa's peoples do have a great many opportunities and difficulties in common, and it is not like most of the internal borders which divide them were actually drawn by Africans. Pan Africanism is, however, unlike most big ideas, a deal easier said than done. And like many self styled revolutionaries, Ankara had a preference for visions over details, rhetoric over reality. He'd also neglected to account for the problem that schemes for the dramatic redistribution of wealth and power tend to play pretty much badly with the people who already have them. On this day, 38 years ago, they came for him. Soldiers led by Sankara's former ally, Blaise Compaore, another Red Beret wearer, stormed the presidential residence in Ouagadougou and shot Sankara dead, along with a dozen ministers and officials. Compaore would rule for 27 years before being tossed in a coup himself. He is now in exile in Ivory coast and was sentence in absentia by a burkanabe, caught to life imprisonment in 2022, not for his many malfeasances in office, but for his role in the death of Thomas Sankara, who inhabited his role and his hat with more imagination than his successors. And that is all for this edition of the Monocle Daily. Thanks to our panelists today, Julie Norman and Alexander Gerlach. Today's show was produced by Chris Chermak and researched by Joanna Moser. Our sound engineer was Elliot Greenfield. I'm Andrew Muller here in Lond. Daily is back at the same time tomorrow. Thanks for listening.