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- [00:04]
A
American President Donald Trump says he's nearly done with the war in Iran, declaring we will be leaving very soon. His secretary of state, too, said on Wednesday that he can see the finish line. This would be significant if the Americans were in control of the war. I'm Samantha Salinger Morris, and you're listening to the MORNING Edition for From the Age and the Sydney Morning Herald. Today, international and political editor Peter Harcher on how much power the United States has leached in only four weeks at war while the Iranian regime is in its element. It's April 2nd. Peter, welcome back to the podcast.
- [00:50]
B
Pleasure to be with you, Samantha.
- [00:52]
A
Okay, well, I'm going to start with a big question. Are the Americans now in a quagmire in Iran? We know this is a term that the, you know, former American Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld used in the early 2000s, swearing, of course, that America was not in a quagmire in Iraq when, of course, that's ultimately what happened. Now, Trump has just sent thousands of paratroopers to the Middle east ready to join the US Marines that have already been sent there. And then, of course, over the weekend, we saw that the Houthi rebels in Yemen entered the fight launching missiles at Israel. So we what say you, Peter? Are we in quagmire territory yet?
- [01:30]
B
Well, and of course, famously, Vietnam. The Vietnam War was described as a quagmire for the US as well. Well, I think we collectively are not in a military quagmire, but we collectively, the world, are deep in an energy and economic quagmire now, thanks to this war. So we can say that much. As for the military quagmire that the US May or may not be in, I think the answer is no, they're not, partly because Trump has never cogently or consistently defined the aim of this war. Therefore, he can walk away and just redefine the terms of victory as he chooses. And you'll remember from the very first day he said it could be two days, could be four or five weeks, could be regime change, could be nuclear weapons, could be destroying their navy and so on. And the roster of possible potential and ever rotating war aims that we're all now so familiar with. And now he's redefined regime change several times, most recently in the last couple of days. He said he's already changed the regime twice in the last, in the last month. So he can declare that job accomplished, he says, because the people running around now, he says nobody's ever heard of
- [02:47]
A
them before, which is, of course, Insane. We know, of course, there is no regime change. The theocrats are still in control.
- [02:53]
B
Well, if you think regime change means removing a one party theocratic dictatorship hell bent on destroying the countries it describes as the Great Satan being the US and the little Satan being Israel, then it's still exactly the same regime. So he has the option of declaring victory, walking away at any point. It's not that. That is the difficult part. I think the difficult part are the terms on which he walks out now that he, together with Netanyahu, with the full and willing participation of the Iranian regime, have now created this enormous shock to the global energy and economic systems. He's now signaled, he's now said explicitly he's prepared to walk away without fixing it. He said, I'm, I can leave without opening the Strait of Hormuz. I'll leave that to everybody else. I don't care. America doesn't need the oil. We have our own oil supplies, which technically is true. Of course, the US technically on a net basis, has energy independence produce about 106% of their own needs. The problem is that the price of oil is fungible. So what happens to the price of a barrel of Brent in the Strait of Hormuz also affects the price of a barrel of West Texas crude in the US So it's a nonsense that he can somehow insulate the US from this just by walking away from the war. He cannot and he's violating. If he does in fact walk out without subduing the Iranians and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, then he's broken the famous so called Pottery Barn rule that former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, also chairman of the Joint Chiefs and a decorated general in the US army declared. He declared the Pottery Barn rule is that if you break it, you own it. Donald Trump has certainly broken a lot of things, but he's not prepared to own any of them.
- [04:53]
A
Absolutely. And we know he breaks rules left, right and centre. So let's continue with what you've been saying. So we're not in a quagmire just yet. And like you say, Donald Trump, he could walk away at any time and we know that. I mean, he lies as well. So perhaps let's not think about what he's saying, but what he's doing. Because I am thinking, okay, he's now sent thousands of paratroopers and marines, and I'm wondering if he's going to do that if he's not going to use them. In addition to the fact that Trump has spoken about taking Kharg Island. This is the key hub for Iran's oil exports, but I believe that Iran can actually reach that island with missiles and drones. Now, this does not sound like a recipe for a quick, quick operation with Trump achieving, I don't know, any goals or even ending this war. So does that have the capacity to just absolutely expand the length and messiness of this war?
- [05:43]
B
Yes, it does. It's not clear whether he intends to use those troops. The Pentagon says it's giving the president options should he choose to use them. So it's entirely up to Trump and we simply don't know. But expert advice, for example, I talked to Mick Ryan, a former major general in the Australian army and a prominent military strategist, about exactly this, and he told me that he sees no either physically feasible or politically bearable way for the US to engage its troops in the occupation of either Haag island that you've described or any of the Iranian oil facilities or other facilities along the coasts. He did, however, say that a raid by Marines or paratroopers, a quick in and out raid to disable, to remove, to take, may be possible. He said he could think of dozens of such scenarios where that could be workable. But he said we're talking about a raid for hours or a few days where we're not talking about weeks or anything longer term than that. What Trump thinks that such a raid might achieve that a bombing campaign has not, we don't know.
- [07:05]
A
I guess we'll have to unfortunately wait to see how it plays out because I have heard some analysts saying that they think that it looks like Trump might be wanting to escalate in order to de escalate, so sort of bring the heat up on Iran to, I guess, compel them to back off. Which brings us to your latest column, because, you know, you've written that, of course, Donald Trump and the Iranian regime have both been talking about a US Iran war for decades. But the planning on each side is asymmetric, to say the least. So let's get into it. First, tell me what Trump has said or done about wanting to attack Iran over the decades.
- [07:42]
B
Well, Donald Trump, he does have form. He has a record, a long record on this. Way back when he was a businessman in 1987, 88, when he was flirting with the idea of running for the presidency, he talked about taking Iran's oil. He talked about hitting, destroying Hag island, the oil facilities on Haag island in Iran. He took out a full page ad in the New York Times where he complained about the unfairness of the way that US Allies treated the US and how Iran should be a part of the prize for the U.S. so he's been talking about this since 30, 38 years or something. On the other hand, the Iranians, ever since the end of the Iran Iraq war, which was a horrible eight year war where the Iraqis had a lot of advantages, including a lot of support and military supply, the US and others at the end of that war, the Iranians decided that they had to be ready for a long and difficult siege by superior forces at any point in their future. And I'd also just take you back, Samantha, briefly to the very origin point of this whole regime in Iran. The whole concept was that it was a regime of resistance. It was all about defiance. Death to America, Death to Israel. That's the battle cry of this regime since 1979. It's never wanted to be a full participant in the global affairs. It's never wanted to be a full participant with the US it's always set itself up as a center, a headquarters of global resistance. And that was its claim to legitimacy, it, its domestic legitimacy and its role on the world stage. So ever since then, ever since in particular the Iran Iraq war finished in 88, the Iranians have been making concrete preparations. They call it a resistance economy that they set up with high levels of self dependence, where they manufacture all their own essentials, pharmaceuticals, car parts, anything that they might need to endure a war, alternative import routes across land so they're not dependent on things like the Strait of Hormuz, enormous stocks of weapons, and also the flirting with and experimenting with and venturing into refining uranium with a potential view to one day perhaps developing a nuclear weapon. So they have been preparing in concrete terms. By contrast, Trump has been talking about it for a long time. But what we see in this war is that his preparations have been, shall we say, incomplete, shambolic. And at no point has he taken seriously the threat that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz. And at no point has he planned for what to do about that.
- [10:49]
A
Is this why Iran can take a lot more economic pain than the United States? Because you've made that point in your column. Is this why or is it something else?
- [10:56]
B
Well, it's exactly for those reasons. It has been making concrete pain preparations to be self reliant in the event of a crisis. But it's also the fact that the politics of the regime are that they see this as their doomsday. The regime has been waiting for the day when the great Satan so called, and the little Satan so called would team up and come against them. But this is the way the regime, the way the ayatollahs see it. This is doomsday. And they're enacting the full doomsday plan. It's survival is the goal. It's the only goal. Survive, resist, outweigh the Americans and have greater endurance, a greater pain tolerance. They don't have to face an electorate. Trump's got midterms coming up for them, there is no alternative to this. They either endure this war or they're all dead
- [11:57]
A
after the break.
- [11:59]
B
If it weren't so serious, everybody would laugh at Trump every day. You don't need a late night comedian. He writes the scenes himself.
- [12:14]
A
And so, Peter, I've got to ask, is Iran winning in this war so far?
- [12:19]
B
Well, so far. So again, to quote the strategist and retired general Mick Ryan, the Iranians are achieving their theory of victory earlier and more comprehensively than the Americans are achieving theirs. And to quote Mick Ryan, again, both sides might be ready to negotiate, but only one side is desperate to negotiate, and it's not the Iranians.
- [12:43]
A
And you spoke to an expert on Iran, and he said something which I just wanted to ask you about because I wonder if it sort of portends that this could become a very long entrenched conflict. Because this expert said to you it really seems to be a matter of when, not if, this Iranian control over oil exports forces deeper American involvement to dislodge the regime, particularly as more Marines are entering the region. That would seem to sort of foreshadow, well, a future quagmire by my reading, but I'm no military expert, so you tell me, Peter.
- [13:17]
B
Well, that was the view of an expert on Iran, as you say, Benham Tabloo from the foundation for the Defense of democracies in Washington, D.C. he follows Iran intimately and has been for decades. He's a native Farsi speaker. But on this reading of Trump's plans, he may or may not be right. Trump may or may not send those troops in, which then as you say, gets closer to quagmire territory and raises the risks for the US of direct military losses. But Trump himself, we now hear, and I know we hear a lot from Trump, but he's now said for the first time that negotiations don't matter. It doesn't matter whether he has a deal or not. He doesn'tuntil now, he's been pleading for negotiations and a deal. Now he says a deal doesn't matter. He can Just walk away and leave the burden of managing export of oil through the Strait of Hormuz to the allies. He specifically named Britain and France in the last 24 hours and said, we don't care, we don't need the oil. It's up to you guys. So I go in, I start a war, I escalate, the Iranians return the favour, cripple the global oil and energy system, I walk away, it's someone else's problem. Tough luck. So that seems to be the cusp on which we're poised. Does he walk away and leave a completely dysfunctional global economy in the balance for everyone else to worry about? My war, your problem? Or does he intend to insert greater force and perhaps including troops on the ground to try to smash the Iranian regime and smash their oil export market?
- [15:10]
A
Well, that's it. I mean, the troops, I don't believe they're on the ground yet, but they're certainly been mobilized in the area, which is significant. And of course, Donald Trump has threatened to blow up Iran's power stations if Iran doesn't agree to a ceasefire. So if Trump does go ahead with striking this infrastructure and in retaliation, Iran then destroys energy infrastructure across the Gulf, which I think is a, is a, is a likely scenario. Some commentators are saying that this could be one of the major quote before and after events of human history. Is there any validity to that?
- [15:42]
B
I think it already is, Samantha. I think we have already, just in this last month and a bit seen, the global systems have now crossed our threshold in a couple of ways. Now, what you're. The situation you're describing is where the Gulf states, including the Saudis, the Emiratis, can no longer freely or reliably export their oil because their systems have been smashed, and the Qataris, if they're. There's further damage to their LNG plants, they're a massive exporter of lng. So if that were to happen, the global oil price, which so far has been up about 60%, the global LNG price, which has been up over 100%, they would continue to increase to a much higher level. It would be a very difficult interim phase for the world to get through. But I think the net effect of this crisis will be to accelerate the global decarbonization of countries around the world who see that as the only way of severing their dependence on this. A lot of countries better placed than we in Australia are for a difficult interim phase. The other way in which I think we've crossed the threshold, Samantha, is the amount of power that Donald Trump, while he. The paradox here is that he thinks he's demonstrating America's great, mighty and unassailable invincible power. What he's actually done is reveal American weakness. And he has ceded power, notably to the great challenger of the US which is China. He sacrificed American credibility and reliability here. Everybody, the entire world, if it weren't so serious, everybody would laugh at Trump every day. It doesn't. You don't need a late night comedian. He writes the scenes himself. He cannot be trusted, he cannot be relied on. His allies are in a state of near apoplexy about his unreliability, but also the casual abuse and burdens that he throws out onto his allies. So the great beneficiary of this is China, whose own standing as the second biggest economy, or purchasing parity terms, biggest economy in the world, looks like a stable, credible, sensible regime without having to do anything, without having to do a thing. And the second way in which it transfers power is that while the US Is now tied up in the Middle east, while the US While Trump has now further degraded the use and the viability, political viability, of the use of military force in the U.S. it simply sapped the U.S. s ability to wage military force, not just Trump's, but any. And this is part of a continuum that really accelerated with the Iran and Afghanistan wars. And this is now another, under another president, demonstrating that they might have a bunch of missiles, but they have no strategy. And I think this does accelerate, this does hasten the relative decline of US Power against the relative rise of China's.
- [19:01]
A
I mean, just tell me here, I've just had a thought and you just tell me if it's outlandish or if I'm off with the pixies, because I wonder whether in decades to come, we'll look back at this moment as the beginning of when America became some sort of pariah. Like, not only, of course, is its power being degraded and its influences being degraded and its allies are. Well, they're not revolting against America yet, but they're certainly finding America revolting in terms of their lack of reliance. Like, could this, could we look back at this moment and go, wow, this is when America really. You know, it was the beginning of other countries ganging up on America.
- [19:36]
B
I think we are past that point. And I think history will see that because it's the moment that. This is the moment Donald Trump is the man, and this is the moment when he has willingly just junked the US Empire. Now, the US Empire, that's a controversial term. And the US does not have an empire in the traditional sense. But around the world. The distinctive feature of the US empire since World War II has been that it has been a virtual empire built on trust. And it's been an empire in which the US has made itself attractive and indispensable to other countries. So that volunteers, countries have volunteered, other countries have wanted to be US allies, they've clamored to be US allies. And that's given, that has given, had given the US an enormous structure of alliances around the world. More than 40 countries, all of the rich democracies on the planet were willing participants in this virtual empire. Now Trump has shattered that. This has all come to an end. There is no trust which takes decades to build. And Trump is shredding every single day. It's very difficult to recover that the virtual empire is ended. That was the US's distinctive source of power. It operated the rules and the alliance structures which governed the world. Obama started this, I think, when he showed the US did not have the willpower to enforce its own red lines even on a, you know, a tin pot state like Syria. And that then encouraged the Russians, the Chinese, to make the territorial and political expansions that they've been doing ever since. But Trump now, not only is he happy to appease the Russians under Putin, try to do deals without confronting Beijing, he's now thrown away the virtual empire which was the US distinctive source of power. And I do, I do absolutely think this is the historic threshold. We are watching the sun go down on this empire day by day. And it's Donald Trump.
- [21:43]
A
Wow. Like you've said in previous podcasts, big history in a short period of time, every day.
- [21:49]
B
It's all around us. Unfortunately, it's also at the petrol bowser.
- [21:53]
A
Well, it's on all levels, isn't it? So, as always, Peter, thank you so much for your time.
- [21:57]
B
Pleasure, Samantha.
- [22:14]
A
In other news today, Victorian police are searching two phones found at Desi Freeman's remote hideout for information on who helped the former fugitive. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese gave a rare address to the nation last night on the war and fuel supply. And two Sydney private schools have been found to be spending more than $5 million a year on a team of executives. To find out more, go to smhortheh.com au Today's episode was produced by Chi Wong. Our executive producer is Tammy Mills. And our podcasts are overseen by Lisa Muxworthy and Tom McKendrick. If you like our show, follow the Morning Edition and leave a review for us on Apple or Spotify? Thanks for listening.