← The Morning Edition
Loading summary
Transcript41 lines
- [00:08]
A
We are in a dangerous new nuclear age, according to a growing number of world leaders. The signs aren't just in Russia's threats to use its nuclear arsenal or China's steady buildup of its number of nuclear weapons. The signs are also plain to see in one sentence that was somewhat buried in an otherwise dull strategic document released last month by the Trump administration. I'm Samantha Sellinger Morris, and you're listening to the Morning edition from the Age and the Sydney Morning Herald. Today international and political editor Peter Harcher on Donald Trump's nuclear ambitions and why Australia must begin thinking about acquiring its own nuclear weapons. It's February 19th. Hey, Peter.
- [00:56]
B
Hi, Samantha.
- [00:58]
C
Okay, first off, I've just got to ask you, is your phone blowing up? Metaphorically, of course. Are you getting touchy messages from, say, our prime minister or Penny Wong as a result of arguing in your latest column that they need to seriously discuss the acquisition of nuclear weapons? Because I'm thinking this would be a tough sell for them right to the public. It's not long ago that the coalition suffered a catastrophic wipeout, in part because they, of course, were arguing for nuclear power, let alone weapons.
- [01:26]
B
So nuclear weapons, it's a subject that nobody in Australia ever really wants to talk about. And we've sheltered under the American nuclear umbrella since the 1960s, so we've not had the problem of having to think about it. But now the times have changed and responsible leaders everywhere are talking about it, thinking about it. Chances are Albanese, Penny Wong will do their very best to run away from the subject. Nobody wants to hear about it. And let's acknowledge at the outset we are entering the realm of the unthinkable and the shocking. Because that's what nuclear weapons are.
- [02:09]
C
Well, that's it. I mean, we've certainly seen a lot of commentary about this. I think the New York Times said we're entering a new nuclear age. So let's launch in. Why do you argue that Australia does need to seriously consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons?
- [02:22]
B
Well, there's a couple of factors. One is the level of risk has gone up. So that's primarily China, which has launched a breakneck speed of armament with nuclear weapons in a way they never have. They're building, deploying hundreds more. But the level of reassurance has gone way, way down. Two things have happened. One is that the US Nuclear umbrella, which notionally at least sheltered all US Allies around the world, is no longer. Nobody looks at Trump and thinks this is a man who will protect our country, even if it puts his own country at risk of nuclear attack. Because that's the essential equation at the basis of the whole concept of an American nuclear umbrella, or extended deterrence, as they call it. And one after another countries, US Allies, other US Allies are realizing this and even talking about it openly. Last week, the Chancellor of Germany, Friedrich Merz, approached the French leader Emmanuel Macron to ask whether Germany, now that Germany no longer has any confidence in the US could perhaps shelter under the French nuclear umbrella. Because the French have never trusted the US and have always maintained their own nuclear capability, as have the Brits. But other countries also are now considering developing their own nuclear weapons programs. Shockingly, this includes not just Germany, which has been, you know, very much, shall we say, a penitent power ever since World War II, but most shockingly, Japan. The Japanese are now having a debate, as are the South Koreans, the Poles, even the Swedes are now debating whether they need to acquire nuclear weapons for their own needs. So they're the reasons that this, what had been set, fixed in place for many years, is now fluid. Another factor that's just happened this month, which is that the last START treaty, which was a treaty between the US And Russia restraining the two of them in the number of nuclear weapons that they would build, hold, deploy, expired. There's no longer any treaty restraining the Russians and the Americans in their nuclear deployments. And Trump has talked about resuming nuclear testing. So everything is suddenly very fluid.
- [04:48]
C
Okay, well, this is what I wanted to ask you first. Let's just start off with the expiration of that last remaining nuclear arms limitation treaty between the US And Russia. Like you say, it's just expired, I think, two weeks ago. What might be the impact of that?
- [05:05]
B
Well, Trump's logic, and there is a logical basis for it. It's not just because he's insane or wanton. The logic was that why should we renegotiate a treaty with Russia for the two of us to restrain our nuclear ambitions and abilities when China is refusing to negotiate? Because Beijing's position, this, Samantha, has been consistent. They never disclose their activities, they never disclose their ambitions. They've never given an explanation for why the sudden surge in their nuclear capability. They were at around 300 or so nuclear warheads, nuclear missiles, until just a couple of years ago. They're now thought to be around the 5 to 600 mark. And the Pentagon assesses, and so does the Federation of American Scientists, which is an anti nuclear body, assess that the Chinese are probably going to have around 1,000 nuclear weapons within the next four years. And the Chinese have never explained, certainly not prepared to negotiate. So Trump has said, well, why should we have our hands tied when the Chinese aren't? So there is a logic to it. But unfortunately, it also means that this is now giving Russia and the U.S. the ability, the freedom, if you like, to get a little bit more adventurous. And the resumption of nuclear testing, Trump has said, we'll do it. Russians are going to do it. It's all become a very bit. A bit loose. And anything that's loose about nuclear weapons policy is something that nobody ever sleeps well about.
- [06:41]
A
No, it's scary.
- [06:42]
C
And I know that America hasn't done any nuclear tests since 92, and that was as a result of a congressional mandate. And at the time, I believe there was concerns about nuclear fallout on human health and in the environment, and also that it risked sort of ramping up the tensions between Russia and the US and the possibility of miscalculation and even war. So we know that Trump has been threatening that, you know, the US Needs to start up nuclear tests again. So does that risk putting the world back into this spiral of increasing tensions?
- [07:12]
B
And not necessarily okay, it's could, depending on how they do it. But the other thing is, it's unnecessary. The US has far more testing experience and data than any other country. More than a thousand tests. A thousand. The Chinese are thought to have conducted something like 50. They've been accused of conducting recent ones that they've masked with clever stratagems. But the essence of this is that the US has far more information. Any changes in its technology it can model without having to actually physically test it suits Russia. Vladimir Putin, he doesn't care about his citizens or civilians. He does care about his nuclear arsenal. Why? Russia has become, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a very limited power. It's no longer a superpower, hasn't been a superpower for decades. What gives it its heft in the world is its military, and the ultimate capability there is its nuclear capability. So he's happy to get into it. The Chinese are getting into it. The Americans don't need to. And yet Trump is signaling that he is prepared to.
- [08:14]
C
Right, okay. Because ostensibly, these nuclear tests are just to test that they're still functioning right, and that everything's a. Okay. That's what they're there for.
- [08:21]
A
Right.
- [08:22]
B
And to assist in the development of more capable bombs, more destructive weapons.
- [08:31]
A
After the break.
- [08:32]
B
For American allies around the world, country after country is starting to think, well, we can't trust the Americans any longer. How do we respond if we can no longer trust the shield.
- [08:53]
A
Well, I wanted to ask you then.
- [08:54]
C
About something that the New York Times just printed just three days ago, because they published an editorial headlined Trump Risks Igniting a Nuclear Wildfire. And it was arguing that with the expiration of that treaty limiting the tests, you know, between us and Russia, and with Trump's vague threats and what they've called dangerous brinkmanship, they say that this portends an unconstrained arms race not seen since the height of the Cold War. So is that alarmist, or is there some legitimate concern there?
- [09:23]
B
Well, will we see another arms race? The arms race is already underway. It's just that the Chinese are catching up with the other two, with Moscow and Washington. So I think what the New York Times is talking about is really already underway, and the Americans are helpless to prevent it.
- [09:39]
C
Wow.
- [09:39]
B
The question is not, can that be stopped? The question is, how do we deal with it? Well, for American allies around the world, country after country is starting to think, well, we can't trust the Americans any longer. The risks are going up. Russia is more aggressive. Putin has threatened to use at least tactical battlefield nuclear weapons in a war against Ukraine. The Chinese are building up at a breakneck pace. How do we respond if we can no longer trust the shield? And can I read to you some quotes from an interview that I did with the head of defense policy in the Pentagon, Elbridge Colby? When he made these comments, it was July 2024. So he was in the mix to be a senior official in the Trump administration. But Trump hadn't yet won power, but he now is in power. Elbridge Colby is now the undersecretary for Defense policy. So he's the guy who sets policy in the Pentagon for Trump. And Colby told me in an interview, when I asked him about the nuclear shield, extended nuclear deterrence, and how it might apply to Australia and other US Allies, he said, it's obviously not going to happen. I don't think there's any way that the American president would actually risk losing, like, five American cities because of something that North Korea did, because the stakes are too low for Americans, you know, and this is Colby still continuing. You know, there are no fallout shelters in Seattle. There are no civil defense drills. Right. Colby continues. If we actually were preparing to potentially lose a city because of something, you would see that evidence. And so it's obviously not going to happen.
- [11:27]
C
I gotta say, that's the sentence in your piece that really stopped me in my tracks, was that sort of very pragmatic. There are no fallout shelters in Seattle. And you kind of go, whoa. Yeah, yeah.
- [11:36]
B
So when de Gaulle, the French leader, was discussing this with the Americans in the 1960s, the Americans wanted the French, all their allies, to come under their umbrella, so called because they wanted to monopolize the nuclear capability. They didn't want their allies running around with nuclear weapons, creating potential problems for them. The French refused. And this was the critical and famous exchange between JFK and de Gaulle was where de Gaulle said, are you really prepared to trade New York for Paris? In other words, if the Russians are about to launch a nuclear weapon against Paris, are you really about to launch a nuclear attack on the Russians to protect Paris, even if it means that the Russians then attack New York? And of course, the unspoken answer was, well, probably not. Now, the spoken answer is from Elbridge Colby, absolutely not. Now, you could ask the question, well, that's what he said before he went into the Pentagon. And what's his view now that he's actually in the Pentagon? And the answer is that the National Defense Strategy that the administration published last month carries through without that blatant rejection of any concept that the US Would ever protect an ally from nuclear attack. But it's there in the form that extended deterrence is not mentioned, and it usually has been in the past in defence strategy documents published by the U.S. and there's a key line about allies are required to take primary responsibility for their own defence. So we can read between the lines that Colby has not changed his view, and he's the principal author of the US National Defence Strategy.
- [13:17]
C
In other words, Australia, et al, just chuff off.
- [13:20]
B
Exactly.
- [13:21]
C
Make your own way.
- [13:21]
B
But it doesn't suit you talked about Albanese, Penny Wong. It doesn't suit any Australian politician to bring this up because people are uneasy about it. They don't want to talk about it. We'd rather just go about our daily business and pretend it's not happening.
- [13:35]
C
Okay, well, this brings me to my next question, because you've already mentioned that, you know, among us NATO allies that are now discussing, you know, acquiring their own nukes, there's Germany, there's Poland, and there's Sweden. And shockingly, like you, even Japan hasn't ruled out these discussions, which is incredible, given that, like you've written, they're the only nation ever to endure nuclear attack. So tell me if I've got it right from my reading of your piece, like, are we perhaps late to the realization that is us in Australia, that we need to discuss this, given that so many other countries have already begun what you call the quote, long standing taboo and daring to speak the N word.
- [14:11]
B
Well, we were early and we're also late. We were early because in the 1960s the Australian government had an active debate about this. And the then Prime Minister, John Gorton in the late 60s decided Australia should have nuclear weapons. He tried to organize buying them from the British who weren't interested in selling them, and the Americans. And he decided that Australia did need its own capability, that it would start building a nuclear reactor. And it did start. The concrete footings are still there in Jarvis Bay on the New South Wales coast. But when Gorton left power, so did that idea and that ambition. And Australia then very sort of smugly fitted in under the US umbrella. And then in this great act of principled hypocrisy, if I can call it that, Australia became one of the leaders of the anti nuclear movement around the world and one of the leaders in promoting and signing and ratifying the Nuclear Non Proliferation treaty from the 90s until very recently. And yet all this while we're sheltering under the US Extended deterrence umbrella. So we were early, but now, because partly because of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty that Australia has been a stalwart advocate for, and partly because we just don't want to talk about this stuff. Australia is late to it. What are we going to do about it? In some of the secret conversations within the federal government, in departments, this subject is being talked about, but you will never hear it in public.
- [15:46]
C
Okay, well, you've brought this into the public domain now and I guess just.
- [15:50]
B
To write part of our job, it.
- [15:51]
C
Is definitely our job. And I guess, okay, so you've walked us through. The risks are growing. This is a live question, but I have to ask you, especially given what you've just said about, you know, our government's reluctance that, you know, they do not want to talk about this, what is the chance that we will ever actually acquire nuclear weapons?
- [16:10]
B
Well, so an expert on the subjects, national security, Rory Medcalf, who heads the National Security College at the anu, he said to me, well, the signal for Australia that we are going to have to move on this will be when the other U.S. allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, develop their own, decide to develop their own indigenous nuclear capability. When that happens, it'll be an undeniable signal that nobody has any faith in the US Umbrella anymore and we will have to start developing our own program. So he calls it the cascade of friendly proliferation is the signal that makes it irresistible and undeniable for us. But I Had one other thought, Samantha, which is people generally assume that you need a nuclear weapon to protect against, to deter nuclear war. That's true, of course, but it's also true that you need a nuclear capability. If you think that one day your military might have to fight against another country that does have a nuclear capability, it goes to the credibility of your force and your ability to escalate. In simple terms, let's say, just for illustrative purposes, let's say one of these dangerous Chinese military intercepts of the Australian Air Force or Navy that have been increasing in the last few years turns into a bigger incident, someone dies, it turns into a skirmish, the skirmish turns into a fight. What happens? Well, the Chinese can escalate to any level because ultimately they have the trump card of their own nuclear arsenal. Australia can never match that. So Australia must accept defeat. If we are engaged in military confrontation with the Chinese, we must accept defeat. We have to surrender and go to the negotiating table first. Unless the Americans step in, roll the dice, see what you think the chances are of the Americans stepping in to protect Australia against China and or Chinese nuclear capability. So what that tells you is that simply to conduct conventional military activity against a nuclear armed rival, your country needs its own nuclear capability simply to give you a conventional forces capability. So it's not necessarily anticipating a nuclear war, although it could be handy to deter a nuclear attack on your own country. Once we accept, acknowledge that the US is no longer going to do that for us, if it ever really was.
- [18:35]
C
But the fly in the ointment, if I can call it that, is that this does become another nuclear war. You know, like, you know, it's hard not to think about Nagasaki, Hiroshima, and think, oh my God, how are we returning to this?
- [18:47]
B
Absolutely. So it is unbelievable that humanity is in this position and yet it's real. We can pull up the Duna and put our heads under the covers and just pretend it's not happening, or we can have responsible conversations about it and talk about what our options might be. So could there one day be a nuclear war? Of course. It's been a constant risk ever since the first first bombs were deployed in the 40s and 50s. What prevented a nuclear war for all of these decades, especially during the Cold War, was so called Mutually Assured Destruction. Mad. Which was when the US and the Russians were in a stalemate and they were realized nobody could afford to launch the first nuke. And we are now moving into a more complex iteration of that. Instead of what had been described as two scorpions in a bottle the Soviets and the Americans where, you know, you could have, you could try to attack each other, but wouldn't end well for either of you. You're going to have three and perhaps more. And so countries are now thinking about what do we do? So it's not a question of how do we avoid talking about this. It's real, it's happening. It's the only responsible thing for responsible leaders to do. Of course, everybody does it in the hope that it will be a deterrent and not a weapon ever deployed.
- [20:11]
A
Wow.
- [20:12]
C
Well, thanks, Peter, as always, for your time.
- [20:14]
B
Always. Pleasure.
- [20:29]
A
In other news today, a new independent report compiled by the e61 institute has found federal and state budgets are increasingly fragile due to extra government spending and demographic pressures caused by the nation's aging population. Billionaire hotelier Justin Hems has splashed about $8,000,018,000,000 on an original Byron Bay beach shack. And in her first interview since taking the reins at Netflix Australia and New Zealand as head of content, Amanda Duffy unveils her vision for the streamer. Read these headlines and more on smh.com and theage.com Today's episode was produced by Chee Wong. Our executive producer is Tammy Mills. And our podcasts are overseen by Lisa Muxworthy and Tom McKendrick. If you like our show, follow the MORNING Edition and leave a review for.
- [21:20]
C
Us on Apple or Spotify.
- [21:22]
A
Thanks for listening.