Podcast Summary

The New Yorker Radio Hour

Episode: How the “Dangerous Gimmick” of the Two-State Solution Ended in Disaster
Host: David Remnick
Guests: Hussein Aga and Robert Malley
Date: September 12, 2025

Overview

This episode delves deep into the unraveling of the two-state solution as a framework for peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Host David Remnick speaks with veteran Middle East negotiators Hussein Aga and Robert Malley, authors of the new book Tomorrow Is Yesterday. Drawing on decades of diplomatic involvement, they reflect candidly on whether peace was ever realistically possible, why the two-state idea became a “dangerous gimmick,” the failures of negotiation, the human and psychological drives behind the conflict, and what little hope or direction might remain today.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

The Loss of Hope in the Two-State Solution

• Despair and Personal Reflection
  • Aga recounts initial post-October 7th feelings—a sense of exhausting futility after five decades trying to help, only for events to “culminate in an act of brutality”:
    • “It reminds me that I'm a loser. For 55 years I've been trying to do something and now it culminates in an act of brutality … it's all meaningless. It didn't amount to a hill of beans.” (Aga, 01:18)
• Misguided Rationality vs. Deep-Rooted Emotions
  • Aga notes that the West and some Israelis attempted to treat the conflict as a rational, technical problem, ignoring the emotional, historical, and psychological wounds that actually drive it.
    • “The deep issue of the psyche of both communities was given lip service... When you do that, you can never resolve it.” (Aga, 05:38)

The Two-State Solution as “Dangerous Gimmick”

• Failures of the Oslo Era
  • Malley, from a U.S. diplomatic perspective, argues that the process has not only failed but worsened the situation for both sides.
    • “A waste of time is almost a charitable way to look at it because things are so much worse today.” (Malley, 06:40)
  • The two-state framework became, over decades, a hollow line repeated by officials while on-the-ground realities (settlements, demolitions, exclusion of alternate activism) moved in the opposite direction.
    • “At that point it does become a lie ... It's been used to cover and perpetuate a status quo that is in every way moving in a direction opposite to the stated goal.” (Malley, 09:27)
• Freezing Out Other Possibilities
  • The quest for two states marginalized other models: binational state, confederation, federation with Jordan. U.S.-dominated negotiations also excluded other Arab states for being “cumbersome”.

October 7th, Hamas, and Interpretations

• Motivations behind the Attack
  • Aga dismisses the idea that Sinwar (Hamas leader) aimed for a broader regional war; instead, he sought prisoner exchanges.
    • “Sinwar … promised his comrades in prison that he will not forgive them and he will get to get ways of freeing them. ... I think this really is the core motivation for Sinwar for October 7, nothing more.” (Aga, 13:47)
  • Malley is skeptical that stopping Arab normalization with Israel was the true motive, arguing it was more about making the Palestinian cause impossible to ignore.
    • “This is a way to remind the world that the Palestinians are not going anywhere.” (Malley, 15:02)

Camp David 2000 & the ‘Missed Opportunity’ Myth

• What Really Happened?
  • Aga challenges the American/Israeli narrative that Arafat rejected a generous deal:
    • “Show me the deal that was offered in Camp David. Show me anything official that really can be construed as an offer that was rejected. … They were ideas, they were like brainstorming.” (Aga, 16:55)
  • Malley notes even Israeli participants later agreed the “offers” amounted to demanding major Palestinian concessions for little in return.
    • “For them accepting to move on from their aspiration … they’re then told, sorry, we’re going to pocket that. Now you’re going to make a concession on your concession.” (Malley, 18:13)

Emotional and Historical Barriers

• Why a Technical Deal Never Worked
  • The value systems of each side are fundamentally mismatched; Israeli/American focus on rational proposals, Palestinians rooted in dispossession and national trauma.
    • “The Israelis, like the Americans, they have material matrix... It's not how the passing is staying. They think in terms of their feelings, of their emotions, of their history, of things like dispossession, dispersal.” (Aga, 21:21)

Post-October 7th Reality and Bleak Future Outlook

• ‘Arrangements,’ Not ‘Resolution’
  • Aga and Malley are both skeptical that “resolving” the conflict is even possible—what remains are only temporary arrangements, potentially truces (‘hudna’).
    • “I do not believe in the resolution of the conflict anymore. ... I believe in arrangements.” (Aga, 26:55)
    • “Any agreement based on trust is very fragile. ... But resolution, forget it. Not this generation, not next generation. Next generation is going to be much more radical than this generation.” (Aga, 27:42)
• The Dismal Future of Palestinian Leadership
  • Fatah/Hamas division, lack of representative leadership, and legacy of peace process manipulation have produced a “divided, impotent, feckless” Palestinian movement.
    • “That’s the leadership with which you’re going to negotiate something that’s going to last. That’s a contradiction in terms.” (Malley, 30:10)
  • Palestinian political groups have historically been parties of liberation, not governance.
    • “The Palestinians were not interested in governance. And governance was kind of came as an afterthought.” (Aga, 30:23)

The "Iran Question" and Netanyahu's Agenda

• Was October 7th an Iranian Plot?
  • Malley and Aga agree Iran’s larger “ring of fire” strategy is real, but see little evidence of direct tactical coordination for October 7th.
    • “If the plan had been to really go after Israel, the time to do was October 8th. ... Iran sat on its hands.” (Malley, 31:32)
  • Netanyahu’s focus, since the 1990s, has been to push the Palestinian question aside and concentrate on the Iranian threat.
• On the Nuclear Deal
  • Malley argues the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran deal (under Trump/Netanyahu influence) undermined efforts at nuclear containment:
    • “If your real preoccupation was Iran acquiring a bomb, then that deal at least gave you the 10 years ... The notion of throwing it out ... was completely at odds with the stated objective.” (Malley, 34:04)

The Role of the United States Now

• Prescription: Do No Harm
  • Malley: “Very hard to answer. ... I’d say the main thing is do no harm, which probably means stay away, right?” (Malley, 37:07)
  • He notes that U.S. policy is fundamentally inconsistent—calling for an end to war while “continuing to provide the weapons that fuel the war.” (Malley, 23:38)
• Aga: The (Unrealized) Potential of Abraham Accords
  • Suggests future positive steps would require the Palestinians being part of a larger Arab negotiation team—expanding the Abraham Accords to finally include the Palestinian cause:
    • “If the Palestinians can be incorporated in the Abrahamic Accords in the sense of ... the Palestinians would be part of a larger Arab delegation that would negotiate with Israel ... That will be a positive move.” (Aga, 37:37)
  • He doubts any bilateral Israeli-Palestinian initiative can succeed.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Hussein Aga:

  • “For 55 years I've been trying to do something and now it culminates in an act of brutality ... it's all meaningless.” (01:18)
  • “Rational and cool has nothing to do with the conflict.” (04:25)
  • “Show me the deal that was offered in Camp David. ... They were ideas, they were like brainstorming.” (16:55)
  • “I do not believe in the resolution of the conflict anymore. ... Not this generation, not next generation. Next generation is going to be much more radical than this generation.” (27:42)

• Robert Malley:

  • “A waste of time is almost a charitable way to look at it because things are so much worse today.” (06:40)
  • “At that point it does become a lie.” (09:27)
  • “Do no harm, which probably means stay away, right?” (37:07)
  • “You’re not going to have a peace between Israelis and Palestinians if you don’t have a representative Palestinian national movement.” (30:08)

Timestamps for Important Segments

• Opening & Despairing View Post-October 7th – [00:41 - 03:48]
• Why Rational Approaches Failed – [04:03 - 06:08]
• Two-State Solution as ‘Dangerous Gimmick’ – [06:40 - 10:36]
• Motivations of Hamas and October 7th – [13:20 - 16:19]
• Camp David and the Missed Opportunity Narrative – [16:19 - 20:48]
• Emotional & Historical Impediments to Peace – [21:08 - 22:29]
• Assessment of Current Tragedy & What’s Possible – [23:00 - 24:52]
• Prospects for Coexistence, Binational State, Confederation – [24:52 - 26:06]
• No Blueprint, Only Arrangements – [26:47 - 28:25]
• Fragmented Palestinian Leadership – [29:24 - 30:59]
• Iran’s Strategic Role and Netanyahu’s Priorities – [31:32 - 35:15]
• What Can America Do? – [36:02 - 38:45]
• Closing – [38:45 - 39:19]

Tone

• The conversation is frank, mournful, and at times deeply personal, blending high-level policy analysis with emotional candor. There’s little optimism offered for immediate change; instead, the focus is on recognizing the tragic realities, historical errors, and enduring psychological wounds at the conflict’s core.

For further reading:
An excerpt from Aga and Malley's Tomorrow Is Yesterday is available at NewYorker.com.