Is Iran Really a Threat to the United States? A Debate.

Summary

Podcast Summary: "Is Iran Really a Threat to the United States? A Debate"

Podcast Information:

• Title: The Opinions
• Host/Author: The New York Times Opinion
• Description: You've heard the news, here's what to make of it.
• Episode: Is Iran Really a Threat to the United States? A Debate.
• Release Date: June 25, 2025

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Introduction

In this compelling episode of The Opinions, David Leonhardt, Director of the New York Times Editorial Board, moderates a spirited debate on the perceived threat of Iran to the United States. Released on June 25, 2025, the episode features two experts with divergent perspectives: Brett Stevens, a columnist who supports President Trump's recent strikes in Iran, and Rosemary Kalanick, Director of the Middle East Program at Defense Priorities, who warns against U.S. involvement in the conflict.

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Current Status of the Conflict

David Leonhardt opens the discussion by addressing the current state of the conflict, referencing President Trump's characterization of the situation as the "12 Day War." He highlights Trump's recent criticism of both Israel and Iran for prolonging the hostilities beyond his preferred timeframe.

• David Leonhardt (00:31): "This week, we want to make sense of the war in Iran. Have Israel and the United States achieved their goals? Does Iran still have a nuclear program and is the ceasefire real?"

Brett Stevens' Perspective: Optimism for Resolution

Brett Stevens expresses optimism that the initial phase of the conflict, which he refers to as the "12 Day War," may be nearing its end. He underscores the significant military achievements by Israel in degrading Iran's ballistic missile capabilities and disrupting its nuclear endeavors.

• Brett Stevens (02:01): "President Trump feels very much like he's accomplished a goal. He said Iran would not get nuclear weapons. He took action that appeared to be decisive."

Stevens believes that the minimal immediate retaliation from Iran suggests that the decisive strikes have achieved their intended impact, although he acknowledges the situation remains fluid.

Rosemary Kalanick's Concerns: Potential for Ongoing Conflict

Contrasting Stevens, Rosemary Kalanick voices concerns that the conflict may serve as merely an intermission rather than a conclusive end to hostilities. She warns that the lack of urgency, based on U.S. intelligence assessments that Iran was not imminently weaponizing its nuclear program, could render the U.S. actions counterproductive.

• Rosemary Kalanick (03:13): "There was no urgency in the sense that US Intelligence had consistently assessed that Iran was not engaged in weapons research."

Kalanick fears that the attacks could embolden Iran to accelerate its nuclear ambitions, undermining previous diplomatic efforts and increasing regional instability.

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Debating Urgency and Intelligence Assessments

The conversation delves into the differing assessments of Iran's nuclear threat. Brett Stevens argues that Israeli intelligence, known for its precision, assessed Iran's progress as alarmingly close to weaponization, justifying the urgent military response.

• Brett Stevens (05:05): "What you have to do is see it from the Israeli perspective... The Israelis have been succeeding in postponing, delaying, retarding Iran's nuclear bids for decades."

In contrast, Kalanick criticizes Israel's track record of overstating the immediacy of Iran's nuclear threat, citing past instances where Israeli intelligence warnings were later proven inaccurate.

• Rosemary Kalanick (08:47): "I don't trust Israeli intelligence on this. I trust US Intelligence on this. And US Intelligence ascertained the opposite."

She emphasizes the need to rely on U.S. intelligence, which had assessed that Iran's program was not on the brink of weaponization.

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Assessing the Threat to the United States

The debate shifts to whether a nuclear-capable Iran poses a direct threat to the United States. Stevens contends that Iran's advancements could eventually challenge U.S. national security and trigger a regional nuclear arms race.

• Brett Stevens (12:49): "If Iran were to acquire a bomb tomorrow, then the Saudis would surely get a bomb either by buying it from the Pakistanis or developing an indigenous capability."

Conversely, Kalanick argues that while Iran is a significant regional threat, it does not have the means or intentions to target the U.S. homeland directly.

• Rosemary Kalanick (10:55): "Iran can't reach the United States. They don't have missiles that can reach the US Homeland. They have never attacked the United States homeland."

Kalanick emphasizes the robustness of U.S. deterrence capabilities, including its overwhelming conventional and nuclear forces, which mitigate the threat posed by Iran to the U.S.

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Potential for Nuclear Proliferation

Stevens raises a critical concern about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. He warns that a nuclear-armed Iran could inspire neighboring countries to pursue their own nuclear arsenals, destabilizing the region further.

• Brett Stevens (14:21): "The real threat is what an Iranian bomb would mean for proliferation in the Middle East... all of our national endeavors are going to go into this."

Kalanick counters this by questioning the historical precedent of nuclear dominoes, arguing that U.S. security guarantees could deter other nations like Saudi Arabia from developing nuclear weapons.

• Rosemary Kalanick (16:48): "The Saudis would get a security guarantee from the United States to prevent them from ever getting a bomb."

She continues to express skepticism about the likelihood of widespread nuclear proliferation, citing successful non-proliferation with allies such as South Korea and Japan.

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Future Implications and Strategic Outcomes

The discussion explores the long-term consequences of the current military actions. Stevens remains cautiously optimistic, suggesting that the operations have significantly set back Iran's nuclear capabilities and created an opportunity for diplomatic resolution.

• Brett Stevens (17:26): "We've probably retarded their program by some substantial period of time... it’s an open and interesting and in many ways, of course, a terrifying question."

Meanwhile, Kalanick voices concerns that continued aggression could foster deeper resentment and insecurity within Iran, potentially accelerating its quest for nuclear weapons as a deterrent against future U.S. actions.

• Rosemary Kalanick (20:09): "Everybody understands attacking Iran makes Iran angry, makes Iran feel insecure, and increases their motivations to want a bomb."

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Diplomatic Solutions and Shared Hopes

As the debate concludes, both participants find common ground in the potential for diplomatic solutions. Stevens advocates for offering Iran a deal to dismantle its nuclear and proxy operations in exchange for lifting economic sanctions, emphasizing that even if Iran rejects the offer, it sets a precedent for future negotiations.

• Brett Stevens (26:01): "Offer the following deal, which I think would be a very useful one... in exchange for Iran verifiably abandoning its enrichment programs."

Kalanick expresses full support for such a diplomatic approach, highlighting it as a shared hope for resolving the conflict peacefully.

• Rosemary Kalanick (27:51): "Yes, 100%, yes."

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Conclusion

The episode of The Opinions presents a nuanced debate on Iran's threat to the United States, highlighting the complexities of intelligence assessments, the implications of military intervention, and the potential paths forward. Brett Stevens and Rosemary Kalanick offer contrasting yet complementary viewpoints, underscoring the delicate balance between military action and diplomatic engagement in addressing Iran's nuclear ambitions.

For those seeking to understand the multifaceted nature of this critical geopolitical issue, this episode provides valuable insights into the ongoing discourse surrounding Iran's role on the global stage.

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Notable Quotes with Timestamps:

• David Leonhardt (00:31): "This week, we want to make sense of the war in Iran. Have Israel and the United States achieved their goals?"

• Brett Stevens (02:01): "President Trump feels very much like he's accomplished a goal. He said Iran would not get nuclear weapons."

• Rosemary Kalanick (03:13): "There was no urgency in the sense that US Intelligence had consistently assessed that Iran was not engaged in weapons research."

• Brett Stevens (05:05): "The real question about urgency is just how serious a threat should we see in Iran with a nuclear capability."

• Rosemary Kalanick (08:47): "I don't trust Israeli intelligence on this. I trust US Intelligence on this."

• Brett Stevens (12:49): "If Iran were to acquire a bomb tomorrow, then the Saudis would surely get a bomb."

• Rosemary Kalanick (16:48): "The Saudis would get a security guarantee from the United States to prevent them from ever getting a bomb."

• Brett Stevens (26:01): "Offer the following deal, which I think would be a very useful one... in exchange for Iran verifiably abandoning its enrichment programs."

• Rosemary Kalanick (27:51): "Yes, 100%, yes."

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This summary encapsulates the key discussions, diverse viewpoints, and critical insights presented in the episode, providing a comprehensive understanding for listeners and non-listeners alike.

Transcript

[Rosemary Kalanick]

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[David Leonhardt]

This is the Opinions, a show that brings you a mix of voices from New York Times opinion. You've heard the news. Here's what to make of it. I'm David Leonhart, the director of the New York Times Editorial Board. Every week I'm having conversations to shape the board's opinions. This week, we want to make sense of the war in Iran. Have Israel and the United States achieved their goals? Does Iran still have a nuclear program and is the ceasefire real? To answer these questions, I've invited two guests with very different points of view. One is my colleague, columnist Brett Stevens, who has applauded President Trump's strikes in Iran. Brett, welcome.

[Brett Stevens]

Good to see you, David.

[David Leonhardt]

The other is Rosemary Kalanick, director of the Middle east program at Defense Priorities, a think tank. Rosemary warned against the US Getting involved before Trump bombed Iran. Rosemary, welcome.

[Rosemary Kalanick]

Thank you.

[David Leonhardt]

We're recording this on Tuesday morning and I want to start by asking you roughly where you think we are and where this is going. So on the one hand, President Trump has referred to this as the 12 Day War, suggesting that it's over. And on the other hand, President Trump came out on Tuesday morning and lashed out at both Israel and Iran for continuing to fight longer and more intensely than he wanted. Brett, I'm interested. Do you think we're going to look back on this as the 12 Day War, and do you think this part of the hostilities are likely to be over?

[Brett Stevens]

Well, I hope so. Quite obviously for both sides, I think the Israelis feel that they have accomplished, if not all than many of their strategic military goals in substantially degrading Iran's ballistic missile capabilities. Doing very real, although we still don't yet know how substantial damage to Iran's nuclear endeavors and then finally bringing in the United States to bomb and presumably massively degrade. Again, we don't quite know the extent of it. Iran's facilities underground at Fordo. So I think the Israelis feel like if they haven't accomplished 100% of their goals, they've accomplished 80% of them. President Trump, I think, feels very much like he's accomplished a goal. He said Iran would not get nuclear weapons. He took action that appeared to be decisive. So far, the blowback from Iran appears to be really minimal. Although again, early days, this could unfold over a long period of time.

[David Leonhardt]

Rosemarie, what do you think? Do you think we're going to look back on this as the 12 Day War or something longer?

[Rosemary Kalanick]

Well, I think I agree with Brett that I certainly hope so. I certainly hope that any military kinetic phase of this dispute is. But I am much more pessimistic that this could turn out to be the intermission rather than the end. I was against Trump getting the United States involved in the war for a number of reasons. But the biggest reason is that there was no urgency in the sense that US Intelligence had consistently assessed that Iran was not engaged in weapons research. Right. That they had enrichment capabilities, but that they were not actively trying to weaponize the program and doing so would take an extra six months to a year at minimum. So there was no urgency. But then also by attacking, I fear that it's going to prove counterproductive because whereas before it was quite clear to me that the Iranians were signaling that they did not actually want a nuclear weapon, they wanted sanctions relief, and they're playing the Spinksmanship game and using this sort of latent nuclear threat or deterrent to get what they wanted out of negotiations, it was pretty clear to me they didn't actually really want a bomb or they would have built one. But now the US has given them a huge incentive to build a bomb. Now, it doesn't mean they're actually going to build it, but since we've actually struck them, and we struck them in the middle of a negotiations process, we've made them extremely insecure. And countries that are insecure are more interested in getting a nuclear weapons deterrent. So I'm afraid that even if in the short term this turns out to be a pause or a 12 day war, it could usher in future conflict.

[David Leonhardt]

Well, let's pull those two things apart. So you talked, Rosemary, both about urgency, which to some extent is backward looking, and about the idea that you're worried it's counterproductive, which is forward looking. So, Brett, can you talk about why you saw a degree of urgency here that Rosemary and people who were against this attack didn't see?

[Brett Stevens]

Yeah, I mean, I'm always reminded of that wonderful line attributed to Daniel Patrick Moynihan that intelligence must never be mistaken for intelligence. Look The Israelis had a very different assessment, owing partly, I think, to superior collection methods, which they've demonstrated again and again they have of the state of Iran's nuclear program. Their assessments were that Iran was much closer that they had been in fact working on elements of bomb designs. But I think there's also a kind of a confusion about the way in which bombs get made and the timetable. It's not like you pass a finish line, so to speak, like a trinity test in, in the New Mexico desert. What happens really is that countries enter into a kind of a nuclear gray zone as they're developing weapons, they've acquired sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium. That's part one of it. They have developed ballistic missiles which can deploy or field miniaturized nuclear warheads. And what Iran was doing was sort of very systematically putting together all of those components in a way that didn't quite provide a clear line, which would say to Western intelligence officials, okay, this is the point of no return, but was getting incredibly close, uncomfortably close. I think for the Israelis, the sense was that they had to strike before Iran had acquired sufficient quantities of uranium enriched to a 90% level, which is what's broadly considered weapons grade uranium, they'd gotten to 60%, which is very, very close. So from that point of view, it seemed that the urgency, at least from the Israeli perspective, was there. There was also an opportunity for the Israelis because they had previously substantially degraded Iran's anti air capabilities. So they had a kind of, they had a moment of opportunity, an opening. And the question that ultimately needs to be raised isn't like whether Israel waited till the last possible minute or the next to last possible minute. The real question about urgency is just how serious a threat should we see in Iran with a nuclear capability, not only to Israel's interest or Middle Eastern interests, but to core American interests. I think the answer is it was an urgent, pressing threat and there was an opportunity to do something about it. And Israel seized that opportunity and Donald Trump followed up with what I hope was a decisive blow.

[Rosemary Kalanick]

I agree with Brett that there was an opportunity here with the degradation of Iranian capabilities that didn't exist 100%. But I think that we need to be critical of the claims that Israel made about intelligence. I don't think we can just take them at face value because Israel has a dog in the fight. They have a political agenda here. They clearly have wanted to bring the United States into war against Iran and to use US Firepower to target these sites for a very long time. And in fact, the intelligence has been wrong over and over again. I mean, the number of times that Israel has cried wolf on Iranian nuclear weapons is astounding. Benjamin Netanyahu warned the Israeli Knesset in 1992 that Iran was three to five years away. He repeated that warning in 1995. In 2012, he went to the UN with the wile E. Coyote looking sort of bomb graphic and said that Iran was only a year away from obtaining a nuclear bomb. So I don't trust Israeli intelligence on this. I trust US Intelligence on this. And US Intelligence ascertained the opposite.

[Brett Stevens]

Well, of course, Israel has a dog in the fight because the Islamic Republic of Iran has been threatening its annihilation, has been threatening a second holocaust since it came into power in 1979. So I think it's quite natural, if you're any Israeli leader of the left or of the right, that you're going to take this threat with the utmost seriousness, because this is a regime that states its intentions and then amasses capabilities in order to carry them out. I don't think we can fault the Israelis for taking this threat seriously. The reason that we have not had to deal with this previously is because high quality Israeli intelligence has been succeeding in postponing, delaying, retarding Iran's nuclear bids for decades. The reason these warnings have not sort of come to fruition is because covert action by Israelis succeeded for a remarkable period of time to consistently postpone Iran's nuclear bids. Now, it is true that intelligence is sometimes wrong, but I think that the Israelis have demonstrated a capacity for close, remarkable intelligence that I am guessing their counterparts at the CIA could only dream of in terms of the granularity with which they've been able to track down Iranian capabilities and figures in that system and, and harm them. But the larger point, Rosemary, which Friedrich Mertz, the German chancellor, made just the other day, and I think it's worth noting, is you don't build a uranium enrichment facility 300, 200, 300 meters underground if your intentions are peaceful. You just don't.

[David Leonhardt]

Rosemary, I want to try to understand how you think about this a little bit. I understand that Brett views an Iranian nuclear program as an intolerable threat. And I'm curious, do you view it as something that the United States can with, or maybe has to live with, has no way to stop, or do you instead view it as something that is also intolerable, but you didn't think it was close enough at this point to reality to justify military action?

[Rosemary Kalanick]

It's more the latter. I mean, I think we agree I don't want Iran to get nuclear weapons. I do not think that that would be a good outcome here. I think, unfortunately, the steps that have been taken make it more likely that they will ultimately get nuclear weapons, not less likely. Whether Iran with nuclear weapons is an intoler threat I think breaks down into two questions. One, is it an intolerable threat to Israel? 100%. If I was the Israelis, I would be extremely upset about this. I would not want Iran to be anywhere close to a nuclear program. I think everything that they've done makes perfect sense. Honestly, I do. For the United States, though, this is not a direct threat to the United States. It's just not. Iran can't reach the United States. They don't have missiles that can reach the US Homeland. They have never attacked the United States homeland. Are they a bad actor? Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. They've caused lots of problems in the region, but they can't hit the United States and have shown no interest in doing so. And the fact of the matter is, I believe a lot in nuclear deterrence. The United States is the most powerful country in the world. We have overwhelming conventional capabilities. We have overwhelming nuclear capabilities, and we can retaliate against Iran. We could probably even prevent them from doing it or preempt any kind of Iranian attack. Israel is not in that same situation. Israel is much more vulnerable to Iran. So I do think it's a much thornier problem for them. And the United States does need to worry about that, because the United States cares about Israel. But I don't think that we can conflate it as a threat against the United States.

[David Leonhardt]

I think for some people, Rosemary, there's something a little bit counterintuitive about the idea that this attack could accelerate the Iranian program. Iran had these three sites. The US And Israel together have done enormous damage to them. So can you spool out for us how is it that that this attack, in your view, could actually accelerate an Iranian nuclear program?

[Rosemary Kalanick]

Yeah, so that's a great question. And I need to draw a distinction between the capabilities and the intent. Right. So capabilities. It definitely slows down their ability to pursue a nuclear program, let alone a nuclear weapons program. Right? 100%. It does that. However, it gives them urgency and an incentive to go from a civilian nuclear program to a weapons program. It would take them longer to get to a bomb if that's in fact what they want. But I'm not convinced that that is what Iran wanted. If Iran wanted to build a nuclear weapon, they could have done it many years ago. They had already achieved, quote, unquote, zero breakout capacity in June of 2022, according to David Albright. They could have built a weapon then, and they did not. That says to me that they were not hell bent on getting a nuclear weapon. Now, if they are hell bent on getting it, this will help prevent them from getting it sooner. But I think that they were not hell bent on getting it. And by attacking them, we are risking making them hell bent on getting it. Does that make sense?

[Brett Stevens]

So can I just go back to something Rosemary said a little bit earlier? I think the conversation we're getting into is a really interesting one about what this attack will mean for Iran's intentions. But I want to push back on Rosemary's contention that Iran, a nuclear Iran, is not a direct threat to the United States. First of all, if you can lob a missile, say, 1200 miles, you're going to soon, sooner or later, master the technology to lob a missile 7,000 miles, or whatever it is, whatever the range is of an intercontinental ballistic missile. And Iran is a country that is busy trying to carry out assassinations on American soil, including my friend Masih Alinejad, including our sometime contributor John Bolton, the former national security adviser of the United States. The Iranians have demonstrated time and again that they're up for playing dirty tricks at a great distance. But the more important threat, the thing that really should keep American decision makers up at night, is what an Iranian bomb would mean for proliferation in the Middle East. Because if Iran were to acquire a bomb tomorrow, then the Saudis would surely get a bomb either by buying it from the Pakistanis or developing an indigenous capability. The Turks would do it. The Egyptians would do it, perhaps the Algerians would do it. And then you have to ask yourself as a decision maker in Washington, do you really want five or six nuclear weapon states in the world's most volatile region, each of them at daggers drawn with one another. All of a sudden, figuring out the kind of nature of deterrence in a region like that becomes really terrifying for American decision makers. So the interest in the United States in prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon isn't simply that this is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism and possession of the world's worst weapons. It's the chain reaction that it sets off throughout the region.

[Rosemary Kalanick]

Okay, so a couple of things. I agree. I mean, I'm not a proliferation dove. The best outcome for the United States is for the United States to have a nuclear weapon and nobody else in the world to have one. Like no country should Ever want other countries to have nuclear weapons pointed at them? 100%. Okay. But the whole argument about nuclear dominoes is just not borne out by history. I think that there would be negative repercussions if Iran got nuclear weapons for the regional balance. But I do not believe they would play out the way that Brett suggested. The Saudis would not get a bomb. The Saudis would get a security guarantee from the United States to prevent them from ever getting a bomb. That is what we have done with allies in the past. It's what we did with South Korea. It's why they don't have a bomb. It's what we did with Japan. It's why they don't have a bomb. It's what we did with Germany. It's why they don't have a bomb. Now, I personally don't want to the Saudis American security guarantees because I don't trust them not to then run amok in the region and cause problems for us if we give them security guarantees. But that's the obvious solution to that problem.

[David Leonhardt]

Brett, let me push you a little bit on one question, which is given how strongly you think Iran wants a nuclear weapon, how does this end now as opposed to Iran continuing to try to do it and us essentially being committed to continued bombing in the future? We've heard that Iran potentially moved some of uranium. It certainly seems like they now have even more reason to want a nuclear weapon than they did before. So where do you see Iran's nuclear program going, and how worried are you that we've essentially committed ourselves to future rounds of bombing by having done this?

[Brett Stevens]

Well, I think the choice that confronted the Trump administration wasn't between Iran with bomb and Iran with no bomb. It was Iran with bomb and Iran with, hopefully no bomb. And the Iranians were moving into a gray zone where it would have become almost impossible to stop them through military means. But we've probably retarded their program by some substantial period of time. It's not easy to reassemble all of the industrial equipment that goes into making nuclear weapons. It's not easy to find ways to do so in secret, now that the Iranian regime knows that it's been so deeply penetrated by Israeli intelligence. And it's not easy to do so in the teeth of a president who has now demonstrated that he really is willing to use force if necessary. So my guess is that it'll actually be many years before Iran can reassemble what it had on the eve of its war with Israel. Just 12 or whatever, 13, 14 days ago. Now, does that mean that Iran will now sort of see the light, understand that it needs to invest in economic development rather than squander it on nuclear capability? I don't know, but I think there's actually a better chance of it than people think. Now, Rosemary could turn out to be right here, that the lesson that the Iranians will draw is we should have gotten a nuclear weapon much sooner. We're going to be hell bent on acquiring one now. All of our national endeavors are going to go into this. Khamenei could be replaced by an IRGC leader even more extreme and less cautious than he is. All of that is totally within the realm of possibility. But also within the realm of possibility is that they will see that they invested 500 billion doll dollars of national treasure into a wasted effort that cost them nothing but humiliation and loss of hardware and prestige. They are in a much poor strategic position. Thanks to Israeli actions in Gaza, in Lebanon and in Syria. They may well choose, out of national interest and the interest of the preservation of their regime, to recalibrate and seek, seek to do something else. And by the way, it's also possible that not now, but in six months, a year's time, when the next morality policeman beats up and murders an Iranian woman in the streets, setting off demonstrations, that a much weaker and uncertain regime will have a harder time pressing through with the engines of repression as they had in the past. I think it makes the regime more vulnerable over time to internal changes and hopefully positive ones.

[David Leonhardt]

What do you think of that, Rosemary?

[Rosemary Kalanick]

I hope that Brett's right. I hope that Iran takes this lesson as a reason to go ahead and get rid of their nuclear program and comply with all these US Demands and become a more responsible, less belligerent actor in the region. That is possibilities. But what I'm worried the most about is that everybody understands attacking Iran makes Iran angry, makes Iran feel insecure, and increases their motivations to want a bomb. And what I'm afraid will happen is that even if Iran puts all its cards on the table and says, here are all the facilities, here is all the stuff, bring all the people in, bring in the IAEA inspectors, we're coming clean, we're giving it all up, I'm worried that that won't be enough for Israel. Iran could reasonably argue that they did that in 2015 with the JCPOA, that they did that, that they put their cards on the table and complied, and it still wasn't enough to reassure the United States and Israel that it was not going to get nuclear Weapons. And certainly the sort of flirtation with regime change that Trump has posted on social media and that Netanyahu has occasionally referenced doesn't help Iran not feel worried about that possibility. But the problem is if there's no trust with Israel, which I don't blame them for not trusting Iran, right? Iran retaliated and killed. Israelis like Israel should be mad at Iran. But how will Israel know that they can ever really trust Iran? They won't.

[David Leonhardt]

When I look at what has happened since October 7, 2023 to Iran in particular, even if some of the details have been problematic, I look at Iran as a malevolent force in the world that's killed a lot of Americans over the years. That is very clear that it wants to destroy the state of Israel. And I see an Iran that over the last nearly three years is vastly weakened in ways that honestly I couldn't have predicted. Its proxy forces, Hamas and Hezbollah, are vastly weakened. Its nuclear program is weakened, even if it now has a bigger incentive to do it. And I look at that as an American, as someone who favors democracy, and that cheers me in some ways that a force for ill in the world, a country that has this phrase, death to America, and that has really caused a lot of pain and suffering over the last several decades, is much, much weaker and much less able to cause that suffering. And I think you look at that differently. And so I want to ask you to tell me why you think that framing that I put on it is either wrong or incomplete.

[Rosemary Kalanick]

I mean, look, I don't want to make any excuses for Iran. Iran has put themselves in this situation, Right? They do chant things like death to Israel and death to America. Right. They are the world's largest state sponsored terrorism. Now that doesn't mean that they're a threat to the United States. Right? They are not sponsoring terrorism against the United States. They have not attacked the United States on its own soil. After 9 11, the US invaded Afghanistan and made it 100% clear that any regime that allows somebody from their country to attack the United States homeland is going to get overthrown. Like, we have made a very credible promise that if Iran ever allowed somebody within Iran to attack the US Homeland, we would go and overthrow Iran. So, like, I am not worried that Iran, as awful as they are, I am not worried that they are going to attack the United States States in the near future. Aside from apart from the fact that we just bombed them. Ultimately you have to think that they're suicidal to be willing to attack the United States when the United States has conventional preponderance and nuclear preponderance. And I do see evidence of some rationality and restraint coming out of Iran in terms of how they responded to the U.S. attack. Right. They could have gone all out and attacked a bunch of US Forward operating bases in Syria and Iraq that are super vulnerable, that don't have a lot of missile defense. And they didn't do that. They had a very calibrated sort of escalate to deescalate sort of response. If the United States really thinks that Iran might be trying to get a nuclear weapon and that there's no end to what that's going to require the United States to do, either we have boots on the ground in the form of IAEA inspectors who go to these sites and say, yes, they've been destroyed and yes, Iran is complying. That's one way to make sure they they don't get the bomb. But the other way is with a regime change operation that I'm worried that there's some risk that the United States might go down that road. And I think that that would be a disaster for everybody. I don't think that's something that a lot of people really want to have happen. I don't think that the president wants to have happen. But I do think that's a concern.

[David Leonhardt]

That actually perfectly tees up my closing question for you, Brett, which is when the United States has gotten involved in the Middle east and the broader region in the 21st century, I think it's ended badly every time. Afghanistan, the second Iraq War, Libya. And to some extent, what I think I hear you saying is this one can end better. And I know a lot of people heard when President Trump came out and announced this attack and talked about in his Trumpian language, how it had been the greatest attack that anyone's ever seen. I think people heard echoes of George W. Bush with Mission Accomplished. And so I'm interested in why you think this operation has a chance to be the first US military involvement in the Middle east in the 21st century that's going to end well. Or if you think I'm framing that question unfairly.

[Brett Stevens]

Well, it remains to be seen. But when I think of the parade of horribles that we were hearing from people like Tucker Carlson, thousands of Americans dead if the United States were to bomb from Fordo, it seems that this, as we're speaking now, that this has been an astonishing success, the destructure or massive degradation of Iran's nuclear capabilities in a swift period of time, at no cost so far to American lives. And with the Iranians very swiftly signaling that they want to back down both vis a vis the United States and also with the Israelis. I'm a great believer in Churchill's phrase in victory, magnanimity. And I think a lot will depend on how the United States proceeds diplomatically from here. One of the things that I have suggested for the Trump administration, I wrote this in a column just last week, is essentially first bomb Fordo, of course, Natanz and Isfahan, but then offer the following deal, which I think would be a very useful one, even if the Iranians reject it, which is this, that in exchange for Iran and and verifiably abandoning its enrichment programs and its nuclear programs and an end to their support for proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas that the United States lift all economic sanctions, we should find ways to entice the Iranian regime with proverbial offers that no sane country can refuse to see if we can turn a new leaf. But as Niels Bohr or Yogi Berra or someone said, prediction is very difficult, especially about the future. So I don't want to discount anything that Rosemary has said in terms of how this might affect the regime going forward. It's an open and interesting and in many ways, of course, a terrifying question.

[David Leonhardt]

Rosemary, even if you think that deal is unlikely, would you welcome it?

[Rosemary Kalanick]

Yes, 100%, yes.

[David Leonhardt]

Well, that is a good place to end it on a point of shared hope. Rosemary Rhett, thank you so much.

[Rosemary Kalanick]

Thank you, thank you.

[David Leonhardt]

And let me add a thank you to Aspen Ideas Health for letting me record today. If you like this show, follow it on Spotify, Apple or wherever you get your podcasts. The Opinions is produced by Derek Arthur Bishaka Darba, Kristina Samulewski and Gillian Weinberger. It's edited by Kari Pitkin and Alison Bruzek. Engineering, mixing and original music by Isaac Jones, sonia Herrero, Pat McCusker, Carol Sabaro and Afim Shapiro. Additional music by Aman Sahota. The Fact Check team is Kate Sinclair, Mary Marge Locker and Michelle Harris. Audience strategy by Shannon Busta and Christina Samulewski. The director of Times Opinion Audio is Annie Rose Strasser.