Discussing Sorel's 'Reflections on Violence' with Thomas777 - Complete

Summary

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The Pete Quiñones Show

Discussing Sorel's Reflections on Violence with Thomas777 – Complete

Release Date: August 12, 2026

Host: Pete Quiñones

Guest: Thomas777

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Episode Overview

This episode is a two-part, in-depth conversation between host Pete Quiñones and recurring guest Thomas777, a historian and political theorist, focusing on Georges Sorel’s Reflections on Violence—a book influential among 20th-century revolutionaries, syndicalists, and right-wing thinkers. The discussion explores the nuances of “right-wing socialism,” historical interpretations of violence, the meaning of authority and hierarchy, distinctions between American and European political traditions, and the relevance of Sorel’s ideas for present-day politics. Thomas777 also reflects on the evolution and demise of the political right in America.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Introduction to Sorel and His Significance

• Sorel’s Intellectual Legacy: Sorel stands at the crossroads of left and right, associated with revolutionary socialism but drawn upon by right-wing movements. His work was foundational to figures ranging from syndicalists to radical conservatives (01:00–05:14).
  • Quote: "If you want to understand European politics after 1789, you've got to be in dialogue with socialism" (03:29, Thomas777).
• Sorel, Violence, and the Right: His thought addressed revolutionary imperatives beyond materialist Marxism, exploring myth, culture, and the function of violence as formative processes in politics (05:16–06:31).

2. Socialism on the Right: Definitions and Misconceptions

• The 'Socialist Right': Addressed confusion over the claims that National Socialists were right-wing, and the inadequacy of the left/right binary as usually discussed in America (07:06–08:04).
  • Quote: "The difference between the left and the right is egalitarianism. The left is egalitarian. So was the socialist right egalitarian?" (07:06, Pete).
• European Versus American Understandings: European rightist socialism (e.g., Prussianism) was hierarchical and anti-liberal, not egalitarian in a biological sense. American perceptions are distorted by projection and lack of historical context (13:05–14:34).
  • Quote: “The Prussian ethos... the ultimate hierarchy.” (13:14, Thomas777).

3. The Role of History and Myth in Political Organization

• Myth and Revolutionary Consciousness: Sorel’s focus wasn’t just on class struggle or materialism but on animating myths and heroic virtues drawn from pre-Socratic (and often pre-modern) cultures (05:16–06:31, 53:01–54:16).
  • Sorel’s admiration for Doric Athens and the idea of the “yeoman homestead as a school of command” led to a vision where family and community are political units (53:01–54:43).
  • Quote: “[Sorel] viewed the organization, management, and economics of the homestead and the cultural values intrinsic to this enterprise as being inextricably linked to and mutually reinforcing of military competence and endeavors and the waging of war...” (51:57–52:57, Thomas777 quoting his own foreword).

4. Hierarchy, Authority, and the American Political Tradition

• Divergence from European Models: America’s anti-hierarchical, Protestant, and "yeoman farmer" tradition stands in contrast to the monarchical, Catholic, or military models of Europe. Attempts to import or adapt European models are usually ahistorical or unworkable (54:43–57:29).
  • Quote: "There is no Caesar in that equation. There's not even a King Arthur... The American hero is an archetype." (55:31, Thomas777)
• Tradition and Social Order: Attempts by “trad” types to establish monarchist or Catholic orders in America are lampooned as being outside historical context (56:08–57:29).

5. Sorel, Violence, and the Cycle of Regimes

• Violence as a 'Hygienic' Mechanism: Sorel saw violence not as utopian, but as a means for societies to renew themselves by radical rupture—necessary but not glorious, and to be invoked only with utmost seriousness (41:48–43:40).
  • Quote: “He was saying... in political terms, you're not serious unless you're willing to implement your will through violence.” (43:40, Thomas777)
• Cycles of Decay: Political regimes, especially the bourgeoisie, become decadent and lose legitimacy, requiring renewal through revolutionary or “hygienic” violence (43:21–45:30).

6. American Right-Wing Evolution & Decline

• Historical Roots: The American right is traced from antebellum (Civil War) lines through the Old Right (Taft, America Firsters). The conservative movement since WWII is described as either moribund or replaced by managerial technocracy (62:21–66:31).
  • Quote: "The Nuremberg system... made the political right quite literally illegal..." (64:08, Thomas777)
• January 6th as a Symbol: The MAGA movement reflects the old right’s residue. January 6th is cited as an example of both legitimate protest and “goofiness”—demonstrating both the passion and lack of direction in the current right (66:43–68:19).

7. Syndicalism, State Power, and American Anarchist Fantasies

• Anarchism & Zeitgeist: American "anarchists" are critiqued as being disconnected from historical content and seeking moral purity rather than acting in accordance with real political conditions (83:52–87:33).
  • Quote: “It's very easy to win a political argument if you just say, well, all war is immoral, all taxation is immoral...” (87:13, Pete).

8. Culture Distortion and Media Control

• Culture as the Battleground: The power of media, propaganda (citing Edward Bernays), and “culture distorters” is underscored as the primary means of establishing new hierarchies by subverting traditional ones (120:08–124:17).
  • Quote: “Media is like weather, but it's man-made weather.” (60:05, 119:49, Thomas777 quoting Natural Born Killers).

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Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• On the originality of Sorel:
  • "He was in a very real sense, philosophizing with a hammer..." (73:36, Thomas777)
• On politics as spiritual:
  • “Politics is mysterious... warfare itself is... its origin is mysterious. We don’t really know why things are ordered this way.” (46:27, Thomas777)
• On American exceptionalism:
  • "You can't be a Catholic and then decide you're gonna pretend Joe Biden is the president." (57:29, Thomas777)
• On the contemporary regime:
  • "It's a fire department that starts fires... a government that drives its legitimacy from the degree to which it guarantees the posterity of a people and culture. If a government is quite literally working to annihilate those things, that's abjectly perverse." (91:32–91:54, Thomas777)

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• Introduction to Sorel and episode framing: 00:00–07:06
• What is Right-Wing Socialism?: 07:06–14:30
• European vs. American politics – historic divergence: 18:28–24:45
• Sorel, myth, and the family as social unit: 51:57–55:31
• Violence, legitimacy, and cycles of decay: 41:48–45:30
• Defining the American right, from Civil War to present: 62:25–68:10
• Anarchism, Zeitgeist, and political action in America: 83:52–87:33
• Media, propaganda, and culture distortion: 119:49–124:16
• Violence: American attitudes and the Enlightenment: 131:15–135:49

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Language, Tone, and Style

• Conversations are candid and intellectual, blending historical analysis with pointed cultural criticism. Thomas777 often uses direct, sometimes colloquial language ("It's like a fire department that starts fires"). There is sustained skepticism toward establishment historians and the mainstream narrative, favoring an “outsider” and revisionist mindset.
• The tone is critical but frequently self-aware and at times laced with dry humor or sardonic takes, especially regarding modern politics, media culture, and online “trad” movements.

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Conclusion and Takeaways

The two-part conversation provides an advanced tour through Sorel's thought, refracted through the lens of contemporary dissident right analysis. The American right’s lack of historical depth, the profound power of myth, the danger and necessity of hierarchy, and the ambiguous place of violence in politics all recur as central themes. The hosts agree that political and social renewal must begin locally—with family and community—and that real solutions are unlikely to be found in either anarchist fantasies or imported foreign models, but through a rigorous engagement with historical realities and the American Zeitgeist itself.

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Resources & Further Reading

• Georges Sorel – Reflections on Violence (Imperium Press edition, with foreword by Thomas777)
• Francis Parker Yockey – Imperium
• Ernst Jünger – On Pain / Storm of Steel
• Edward Bernays – Propaganda
• Carl Schmitt – The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy
• Oswald Spengler – Prussianism and Socialism / Decline of the West

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For more from Thomas777:

• Twitter: @TriskelionJihad (the T is a 7)
• Substack: realthomas777.substack.com
• Upcoming YouTube: Thomas TV

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Transcript

[Pete Canyono]

I want to welcome everyone back to the Pete Canyono Show. I am here again with Thomas 777, but we have something a little different, a little diversion planned for today. How are you doing, Thomas?

[Thomas 777]

I'm well, thank you. Thanks for hosting me again, as always.

[Pete Canyono]

Yeah, well, I had contacted you and said instead of Cold War Part six, with the holidays coming up, let's pick that up after, after the holidays are over. But there was a book that I read a few years ago when I found out how. How many people at the time, influential people, people who became leaders, were inspired by it, Reflections on Violence by Sorrel. And then I found out that the Imperium Press version had a forward by you. So I decided to have you on and let's discuss it. I think that this can go in a lot of different directions.

[Thomas 777]

Yeah, I appreciate the opportunity, man. Definitely.

[Pete Canyono]

When did Sorel come on your radar? Like, when did you read them first?

[Thomas 777]

You know, it's interesting because a lot of people, a lot of people associate Sorel, like, evil and some of these other thinkers with kind of the rise

[Unidentified Guest]

of like, you know, a kind of

[Thomas 777]

right wing subculture on the Internet. I came to Sorrel before that. I'm not trying to sound like some like, original, like, or something like OG he was like, oh, I knew about S before, but in the stuff that national alliance would put out and the Institute for Historical Review, that stuff was pretty weighty, man. You know, like William Pierce, whatever, whatever anybody thinks of him or thinks of that whole scene. You know, he was, he was, he was a serious intellectual.

[Unidentified Guest]

You know, he.

[Thomas 777]

He read tons of stuff. Some. Some of which I, I didn't really connect with. You know, he was a big William G. Simpson guy and he was a big kind of, you know, he spent a lot of time with, you know, a lot of this kind of like social Darwinist stuff that I, I don't put a lot of stock in. But he'd reference George Sorrell, okay, like on some of his adv broadcasts and more than a passing capacity and the IHR and guys like H.K. thompson and Keith Stimley and, and, and the like, like, they, they raised Sorel all the time and they considered him to be like a serious thinker. And one of the reasons why is because part of their whole, part of their whole mandate, because the ihr, I mean, they're still putting out great content that's very, very relevant. They made the transition to, to the information age very seamlessly.

[Unidentified Guest]

But during the Cold War, you know,

[Thomas 777]

during the early Reagan era was kind of when, when they launched and became really active. So obviously, like they were constantly kind of defending the revisionist perspective against allegations like, oh, well, you know, the Second World War, among other things. It, you know, it was a fight against these like, socialist conceits and, and, and the brutalities that derived therein. And, you know, the Third Reich, it was just another socialist government and we all have socialism, this godless thing that, you know, doesn't have any legs to stand on.

[Unidentified Guest]

And why would anybody on the right,

[Thomas 777]

you know, pay it any mind? And Sorrel, the, the answer to that is because of thinkers like Sorel. And even if you got no interest in kind of the different iterations of socialism and the revolutionary imperatives that, you know, kind of became the, the animating mythologies of these, of these inner war of the, of these early 20th century and then later interwar ideologies, even you don't put a lot of stock in that.

[Unidentified Guest]

Like, you get.

[Thomas 777]

So if you want to understand, if you want to understand European politics after 1789, you've got to be in dialogue with socialism and you got to understand,

[Unidentified Guest]

you know, what, how, how the, how

[Thomas 777]

the right, how the revolutionary right was dealing with those realities, you know, and Sorel was kind of first among those thinkers. And if I basically accept Ernest Nolte's

[Unidentified Guest]

paradigm that the, that, that, that, that

[Thomas 777]

Italian fascism and things like the Flange party in, in Spain, they were reacting, they were reaction against, you know, kind of the monarchist right and like the reactionary right. As much as they were a reaction against Marxist Leninism and then national socialism was, was a reaction to that in, in dialectical terms, like, you know, some premises that were hostile and some that were not. But that's the way to understand George Sorrell. And in America, when people think of

[Unidentified Guest]

the right, you know, they think of, they think of.

[Thomas 777]

They think of Jeffersonians who, you know, like, like John C. Calhoun or they think like America first guys in the 21st century, you know, and like that, the Taft Republicans who were, you know, who were anti New Deal and anti interventionist and both of those guys, I mean, even the latter, obviously they were kind of traditional Hamiltonian nationalists, but, you know, their whole idea is, you know, like, get the government off your back,

[Unidentified Guest]

you know,

[Thomas 777]

you know, and, and decentralized authority and, you know, to kind of hustle on the, on their own terms. The, to the kind of class identities that most kind of European paradigms suggest are, are what informs political reality. But Sorrel wasn't a class Warrior. And, like, we'll get into that.

[Unidentified Guest]

You know, like, his.

[Thomas 777]

Sorel's.

[Unidentified Guest]

His.

[Thomas 777]

His kind of. He would, you know, like Nietzsche did before he viewed thrill, viewed culture as, like, peaking early, you know, like the pre Socratic era, you know, like the pre Peloponnesian War era of Doric Athens. That's what Sorrel. That's what Sorel thought was like the zenith of, like, human culture and political organization. Like, it wasn't some guy who was saying, like, oh, we just gotta give. And he wasn't even. He wasn't even, like.

[Unidentified Guest]

He wasn't even like the.

[Thomas 777]

The Stefan George circle or, like, Ernst Younger. He wasn't even saying, like, oh, we just. We just got to inundate, you know, the working class with some kind of, like, patriotic or, like, racialized identity. He wasn't saying that at all. He was saying that, you know, there's a way. There's a way to insinuate into revolutionary consciousness among the workers, like something that's, like, culturally elevated, you know, and that. That will change things and, you know, educate people in a way that, you know, is progressive, not progressive with a capital P, but, you know, is. Is progressive in terms of, you know, allowing them to conceptualize themselves and. And conceptualize, you know, political action in. In ways outside of this, like, narrow, like, paradigm of, like, you know, hostility to capital and, you know, control of one's labor and, you know, like, material justice in terms of, you know, getting paid for one's labor. Like, he viewed that as kind of

[Unidentified Guest]

banal, you know, not. Like, that's not important.

[Thomas 777]

Obviously it's important, but that can't be the end all purpose of your political activity. And it certainly doesn't rationalize, you know, like. Like murdering your own countryman wholesale. I mean, if that's what it comes down to, because that's, you know, what the proverbial gods ordain. Okay. I mean, you got to deal with that in a manly and serious way and a stoic way. But that's not something you pine for just because, you know, it's. It. It's like, well, you know, God is dead. So we just got to find some kind of catalyst, you know, for violence that can be rationalized in the language of the day. Like, he wasn't saying that at all.

[Pete Canyono]

But, yeah, so let's talk a little bit about this, because this is. I mean, I've even written a little bit on this recently. It's the. The socialist right. When you say, well, the National Socialists were on the right, people lose Their minds. I mean, mind you, these are the same people who use the term capitalism and don't realize where, you know, they know where the term came from. So they're like, well, we're just taking that term for ourselves. And I think what they would say is the difference between the left and the right is egalitarianism. The left is egalitarian. So was the socialist right egalitarian?

[Thomas 777]

Not in the sense of like, like, not. Not in a biological sense and not in, not in the way that,

[Unidentified Guest]

like, not. Not in the way that in, in

[Thomas 777]

contemporary discourse people think of it. And I'll qualify it too. Even a lot of people, a lot of people should know better. Misunderstand too what Marxian equality was. You know, the whole, like the secular humanist, they've taken, you know, the idea of, quote, human dignity and kind of extrapolated all kinds of strange things out of it. But Marx, I've got nothing nice to say about Marx and Lenin. When Marx was talking about quot equality, he was talking about a kind of equal dignity across the class divide and across, you know, kind of like the,

[Unidentified Guest]

you know, and eliminating and eliminating these

[Thomas 777]

kind of contrived distinctions between people based on rank, you know, and, you know, this and, and, and, and from there, you know, like affording a kind of elevated dignity to the workers whom, you know, in his estimation were, were the, were. Were the ones responsible for generating the wealth of the nation.

[Unidentified Guest]

Okay.

[Thomas 777]

He wasn't saying like, oh, men, women are exactly the same or like there's no differences in intelligence between men. Like that's a weird kind of cope that, that, that, that, like post 1945

[Unidentified Guest]

cope that, you know, people wanted to

[Thomas 777]

kind of maintain people who were not going to attack the capitalist system on structural terms. You know, that was kind of like what they'd invoke in order to say, like, no, actually like we're, we're more morally sound than, than, you know, than, than the Marxists and in, in the Soviet Union and their satellite states. So that's important to keep in mind. But the, the idea of socialism, you know, it didn't originate with Marx and that was, that was one of Spangler's important points. Like, even if you don't accept Spangler's view of history and you think it's like, you know, just kind of needlessly esoteric and mystical. His, his essay, his essay. Prussian Prussianism and Socialism. And then later, to a lesser degree, his book. Yeah, it's like a longer. I say that it's been turned. It's Been beefed off with, like, secondary analyses. But the hour of decision, like, basically, the modern state as we know it in structural terms, like, owes to the Prussian state, okay? Everything from the military draft, you know, to public education, you know, to having, like, pensions for. For retired people like that. That came from the Prussians, okay? And I mean, even that. That's literally why in America, too, like, early education is kindergarten, okay? Like, it's not an accident, okay? I mean, so that's. And this is something you could be openly acknowledged. Like, it's not so much anymore. I mean, some of that's political. Some of that's just because people are kind of ignorant. But, you know, it's not like. It's not like when Marx and Engels put their proverbial ink to paper. It's not like they. It's not like. It's not like Europe was, you know, like this feudal society or some. Or some kind of Jeffersonian yeoman society like the Confederate States. And they were like, you know what? We need to, like, beef up a government that can, you know, provide equity, you know, to people based on their labor and can, like, look after, like, old folks. What they were doing was they were taking something that already existed in places like Prussia and to a lesser degree, you know, in places like France and the Habsburg Empire and saying, like, okay, we. We've got to, like, improve upon this. Make it into a progressive instrumentality to advance history. So this. That's important mind, too.

[Unidentified Guest]

Like, if.

[Thomas 777]

If you were a European writing, you know, in.

[Unidentified Guest]

In the. In the.

[Thomas 777]

In the 1900s, like Sorel, like, you were looking backwards at, you know, your political heritage going back about three centuries, you were just looking at Marx and saying, oh, I see Marx's idea. I can improve upon that and make it acceptable to the right. So that's important to keep in mind. And, you know, kind of the kind of. The first truly socialist institution is. Is the modern military. Like, it is, okay? Like, it's not. The military is a lot of things. What it's not is it's not some robustly capitalist thing, okay? I mean, it's.

[Unidentified Guest]

And the.

[Thomas 777]

The Prussians, arguably, this was their strength and their weakness. Prussia really is a wasteland. There's, like, nothing there, okay? I mean, you can, like, farm dirt and rocks, and you.

[Unidentified Guest]

You've got.

[Thomas 777]

You've got port access, but I mean, other than that, it's. And you're surrounded by hostiles, okay?

[Unidentified Guest]

And I mean.

[Thomas 777]

And obviously, like, Prussia was. Prussia was.

[Unidentified Guest]

The.

[Thomas 777]

The Germans weren't the original occupants of Prussia. Okay. There was, there was, there, there was a barbarian element there. Like a true, like pagan barbarian element of indigenous Slavs that they ethnically cleansed. Not because the Germans are bad guys. I mean, ethnic cleansing, it was just, wasn't is just the way of things, especially in that part of the world. But the kind of key institution of the Prussian state was the Prussian army. That's what made it possible. It was literally like this garrison state.

[Unidentified Guest]

Okay.

[Thomas 777]

And so from that, that's what they extrapolated kind of like their model of what, of what, of what society should look like and how it should be organized.

[Unidentified Guest]

Like, it's very much at odds with

[Thomas 777]

like the Anglo American sensibility. But yeah, that's a lot of things. You can say that it's authoritarian. You can say it doesn't respect people's

[Unidentified Guest]

freedom or individual liberty.

[Thomas 777]

Can say that in some way it stunts like creativity and maybe it does. I don't see it that way. But I, I also don't hold it out as like the zenith of human political development. But one thing it's not. Is it all like left wing or, or, or liberal? I mean, it's, it's the opposite in extreme terms, you know, I mean, because, yeah, like a military type structure, if that's your model. Like, yeah, there's some kind of basic, there's some kind of basic cohesion and respect for like the various ranks, but it's, it's singularly obsessed with rank. You know, it's, it's the ultimate hierarchy. It has no conceit that like, oh, we're all equals here. You know, it, it's very, in fact very much repudiates that. So that's something important to keep in mind. And that, that's basically what Sorrel was getting at. You know, it is like what he was calling for, you know, a socialism that, you know, makes meaningful cultural activity possible and that reflects, you know, basic human nature in some way that's not

[Unidentified Guest]

totally at odds with reality.

[Thomas 777]

But again too, he was like, he looked at that as like, as a means on that because again, like his model, he's not saying like, oh, the Kaiser Reich is so great, or you know, Frederick II's Prussia is so great. Like what he was saying was that,

[Unidentified Guest]

you know, things went wrong when things

[Thomas 777]

went wrong when men like Socrates became powerful in ancient Athens. You know, like his, his ideal was the, the pre Socratic, you know, Peloponnesus.

[Pete Canyono]

So the socialist right, when they're coming to power, are they, is there a rebellion against establishment liberalism or or is there a rebellion against what is growing Communism at the time?

[Thomas 777]

I mean, it was both, but it depended on where you were at. If we're going to use Weimar as kind of the, I mean, obviously like Sorel was writing in the pre Weimar era and the situation in France is more complicated. But if you're talking about the real, like, if you're talking about the true kind of divide dialectically and socially as

[Unidentified Guest]

well as politically and in terms of

[Thomas 777]

armed conflict, obviously, you know, it came down to like actual civil war. The place like Munich. There's a couple different things going on in the Weimar years. You had, you, you had organizations like the Stahlhelm. You know, they were basically, you know, Kaiserreich veterans who wanted to turn things back to the way they were.

[Unidentified Guest]

But they, and you know, they, they

[Thomas 777]

were fighting the cake. They were the guys who constituted the early Free Corps. But then you had guys, you had guys like Ernst Rahm and Joseph Goebbels who basically saw the Communists as essentially correct in their methods. They were just, you know, wrong in their, in their ideological conceits. You know, Goebbels would go as far as he, he'd organize street protests with the kpd, you know, to bring, to,

[Unidentified Guest]

to bring down the, the unions that

[Thomas 777]

were like friendly to the Social Democrats, you know, and, and this made a lot of people upset. And Goebbels was the one kind of Strasser faction National Socialist dinner party man who survived the night of June, of, of June 1934. You know, so that's something to keep in mind.

[Unidentified Guest]

I think what really like, I think

[Thomas 777]

National Socialism like ossified into what it truly was when, when Hindenburg told Hitler that Ernst Rahm and all of his fellows in, in Strasser had to die. And then Hitler gave the order and then Himler and Sep Dietrich and the rest of them not just carried it out, but they also murdered guys like Kurt von Schleicher. I mean that was, that's kind of like what turned National Socialism into like a, a pretty conventional right wing tendency. Honestly. Like I, not, not in the sense

[Unidentified Guest]

of, you know, not, not, not, not

[Thomas 777]

right wing in terms of like Donald Trump or not even right wing in terms of like Robert Taft. But by European standards, they third right was more conventionally right wing than people will acknowledge. I mean they, because there's, there's moronic stuff like, like Jonah Goldberg saying like, oh, fascists are a bunch of like Hillary Clinton liberals or something like. But it, but there's serious people too who aren't prone to that kind of moronic stuff who don't, like, really understand

[Unidentified Guest]

because they, you know, they, they read

[Thomas 777]

these like, dispatches from, from, from Dietrich, er and from Ernst Rahm, like, saying, yeah, God is dead. You know, like, the hell with the capitalists and the Jews, like, burn everything down. You know, we're gonna, we're gonna march on everything and we're gonna kill everybody and we're gonna build this, like, new society of the barracks like that.

[Unidentified Guest]

I mean, those, don't get me wrong,

[Thomas 777]

those guys were serious about that. That wasn't, that wasn't just like so much talk.

[Unidentified Guest]

And, and a lot of them were

[Thomas 777]

frankly psychopaths, but they, they.

[Unidentified Guest]

That, that, that, that came to an

[Thomas 777]

end in June 1934. And if, if you're, if you're killing people because a man like Hindenburg is telling you that, like, you know, these men are, these men are red revolutionary rabble who have to be stopped. Like, you're a lot of things, but you're not left wing, okay, when you're executing that order. So, I mean, that's my opinion. I know some people disagree, but I, I've been studying the topic for a lot of years. I think I had some insight into what.

[Pete Canyono]

Let's talk a little bit about what you, you said about Europe and how Europe define things differently than here. When socialism or communism is mentioned here, it almost seems like we just have this. We know exactly what's being said. But from a European standpoint, especially at that time when socialism was spoken of or communism was spoken of, how did the European culture make it? A different interpretation? Even when you read Yaqui, you know, Yaqui, when he's talking about, when he's talking about Europe, it's a different language than the language that we're used to reading in the books that, you know, were basically written by the victors.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah, no, definitely.

[Thomas 777]

Well, it's also too. It goes back to. It goes back to sociological origins, you know, I mean, America and some depending on where you fall on it ethically, but also just depending on what kind of weight you put on the different variables. You know, America is something of an incomplete society. I mean, that's either good or bad.

[Unidentified Guest]

But, you know, everything that Europe was

[Thomas 777]

trying to do in the modern era, okay, and this reached its Zenith in the 20th century, we were trying to repair the social fabric in some ethical way that had been smashed after them after the Middle Ages, okay, In the Middle Ages, there was this basic interdependence between everybody. You know, the lords were dependent upon the Serbs. Both were dependent upon the king, and the intermediary between the two of them was the clergy. You know, these people couldn't survive without each other. Like, that cannot be overstated. You know, this idea that if you were like a lord of the manor, you know, you could just act like the. The character in that silly Mad Max movie who's like, you know, forcing people to worship him from water or something. Like, that's not. That's not the way things work. Like, I'm not saying if you were a medieval serf. I'm not saying you had some great life, and I'm not saying you had some. I'm not saying you had adequate remedies If. If you had a cruel master, but he needed you, you know, he could not defend the land without you. He could not chill the land without you. He had nothing if. If. If you were not willing to work. But in contrast, like, you had. You had no access to justice, and you had.

[Unidentified Guest]

You had no.

[Thomas 777]

Nobody to abigate for you with.

[Unidentified Guest]

With.

[Thomas 777]

With royal authority. Like, if he did not exist. I mean, you had the church too, but that was that the church weren't men who worked. They did very important things, but they. They operate in a totally different world. I mean, so it's. You didn't have a direct line to authority unless, you know, you had a rapport with the lord of the manor. So that's fundamentally important. What changed in the modern age and reach kind of as critical and in every sense, you know, and it, like, in existential terms and conceptual terms, reach this kind of critical state. In the 20th century, you know, people were ripped off the land. They were thrown into factories that literally employed tens of thousands of people in these dangerous conditions where you were insinuated into some machine, you know, for hours and hours a day. I mean, if you died on the job, nobody really cared. Or if they did, it's like. Well, it's so much. It's a mark in a ledger book,

[Unidentified Guest]

you know, like, you don't have any rights. And it's not even.

[Thomas 777]

Even if somebody wanted to confer upon you some kind of voice or wanted

[Unidentified Guest]

to, you know, kind of make you

[Thomas 777]

a lot, like, better. Just like the velocity of production and the trajectory of things. Like, there was. You didn't. You didn't matter.

[Unidentified Guest]

You know, you were.

[Thomas 777]

You became totally dehumanized. You know, and that's what the socialists were trying to do.

[Unidentified Guest]

They're like, we on the right and

[Thomas 777]

the left, they're like, you know, we. We've got to, like, Repair this kind of social fabric and this interdependence and this basic basic ethical unity of classes and functions, you know, so that people aren't being treated like a commodity and so that like, when they die in the job, you know, they're just not like shoveled away like so much garbage, like literally. You know, I mean, that's, that's the way to keep in mind. That's the thing to keep in mind. Like in America, there, there wasn't some medieval order from which things originated. Like, even in the south, like, people I know, the Southerners themselves, kind of looked at themselves as a, as, as. It's kind of like lords and knights, which wasn't totally inaccurate, but it was more like. But again, it was more like Athens than it was like, than it was like, you know, a 13th century England. You know, like, you had like, the south is basically made up of like kulak types. You know, there were white serfs and there were black slaves, but they weren't the majority. The majority was not like rich plantation owners and like poor serfs and like, and slaves who were property. Like, the majority was like small freehold farmers who were doing their own thing. And that's, that's supposedly the American ideal. Okay. Like now it's like a small businessman. I'm not saying that's actually the way things are, but that's like what's idealized.

[Unidentified Guest]

But you know, the.

[Thomas 777]

In America, if you're on the right, your idea isn't like, well, you know, we gotta, we gotta bring things back to, you know, the throne and altar and like, reverence for God and God's emissaries on earth. And you know, we got to create some kind of codependence between the classes that's not dysfunctional. Like, the ideal is like, you know,

[Unidentified Guest]

I, I need, I, I need to

[Thomas 777]

be given the opportunity to like, till the land and get what's mine and, you know, have the government stay off my bed, not take the fruits of my labor. I mean, a totally different sensibility. Like one's not superior to the other. I mean, obviously I'm more sympathetic to the American model because that's my heritage and I, you know, and then plus, that's just like what's realistic. Like, you can't. One of the reasons it's goofy when I realize some of this is polemical, but some of these idiots actually believe this. Like when, like when, like regime loyal people or when these like Mother Jones types claim that like Donald Trump's this big fascist or something. I Mean, that's like retarded for long as a reason, but like some radical right wing guy, like if George Wallace become president or Huey Longer become president, it would not look anything like Germany in 1933. You're like Italy in 1922. Like, that's ridiculous. That's not the way we do things here. Like, that's like, that's like saying that says retarded as saying like, oh, if Donald Trump hit his way, you know, he would, he would, he, you know,

[Unidentified Guest]

he would be like the Holy Roman Emperor.

[Thomas 777]

Like, it doesn't, it doesn't make any sense.

[Unidentified Guest]

But I, you know, like I made

[Thomas 777]

the point before that the entire like civic religion of America is like, is anti fascism, which, which is particularly kind of asinine in this country.

[Pete Canyono]

But yeah, well, that set me up perfectly. So we know because Gentile wrote what fascism was in Italy. But as far as I know, really, nobody in Germany at the time was writing what socialism meant to them. What socialist. You can listen to the Strasser debates and everything and you can get an idea. But, but in your opinion, what was the National Socialism of Germany? What did, what did that socialism actually mean?

[Thomas 777]

I mean, they were drawing upon a couple of things and if you read, there's not a lot you can extrapolate. I love telling people to read Hitler's second book because it, it's instructive. It fleshes out as geostrategic ideas and some other things and it's just interesting reading. It was never published. Like the manuscript was found by the US army and then it was handed over to, it's handled by army intelligence. The chain of custody was weird, but it is, it has been authenticated. I mean it was, it was Hitler's actual manuscript, but it wasn't published and available at public until after the war. But you know, people, there's not like, there's not a lot you can extrapolate from Minecamp. That's why it's idiotic when people go, it's a boring book. It's like, well, yeah, it's, it's, it's, it's an election year screed from the 1920s. Like why, why would it be interesting today? But what is interesting? Like when he talks about, when he, when Hiller talks about his, his ideas on, on conflict between human populations, like, that's, that's instructive. And also, you know, I made a

[Unidentified Guest]

point of people before Hitler, he was

[Thomas 777]

this Catholic Habsburg Austrian who basically identified his movement as the legacy of the Prussian state. And you know, the, the December 11th speech, the Reichstag, which is really Hitler's last public address of the Reichstag. You know, that's like when he issued the declaration of war against America. He talks about, he talks about we

[Unidentified Guest]

like the royal, we like in reference

[Thomas 777]

to the Prussians and the Napoleonic Wars.

[Unidentified Guest]

Okay.

[Thomas 777]

So I mean he's saying like, and

[Unidentified Guest]

then that's notable because like, you know, Prussia was at odds with the rest

[Thomas 777]

of the German kingdoms. I mean that's a little bit off topic, but be as it may, like Adolf Hitler himself. If Adolf Hitler is like the standard bearer of like right wing socialism in Weimar, which, I mean, I think, I think we can say that he was because he's the man who became king proverbially. His view was what I just said it was that, you know, the, the proper, like German, the proper German model of, of national life is, is Prussia and, and the Prussian model was based on, was based on the army and you know, the, the civic apparatus that,

[Unidentified Guest]

that revolved around that.

[Thomas 777]

So I mean, that's the way, that's the way you can think of German socialism. Of course, to your point, guys like Strasser, guys like Rom, Kurt von Schleicher I think was a lesser aristocrat, was basically cynical and he didn't really care. But he was obviously through in his lot with, with Strasser and Ron because he wanted to destroy Hitler. But all these guys, at least what they were advocating in public was they were saying like, you know, Hitler's a tool of the bourgeoisie.

[Unidentified Guest]

He's not really a revolutionary, he's just

[Thomas 777]

a reactionary and he's a petty bourgeois buffoon. So I mean the no true Scotsman stuff about socialism, a lot of that was interesting rivalry between National Socialists. It's not like the German street was we're like 1970s era, like, you know, Berkeley types, you know, talking about like, who's a real socialist. It was a lot more, it was a lot less existential and like a lot more like polemical and kind of cynical than that. I mean, that's my view and I think I'm something if not an expert. I think I have some, I think I have some expertise in the topic at least.

[Pete Canyono]

I want to get back to Sorel, but I wanted to mention this. So you mentioned that Prussia was based off of the military. A lot of people, a lot of Americans point out that, you know, Prussian schooling is, you know, what's his name? I can't remember his name now. He went to Prussia. Saw, saw how the Schooling was done and basically back and. But what a lot of people will say is that all that schooling is meant to do is turn people into a cog in the machine to be played, plugged in. So if that is true, it seems like that is creating a group of people in that they're the students. If the students are all learning the same thing, then that could be seen as egalitarian.

[Thomas 777]

Yeah, well, the difference too, of course, is. Yeah, it's not just that, you know, the Prussian model identifies that, you know, that the vast difference in human intellect and abilities and kind of organizes people in a proverbial slots or organize them based on, you know, how those things can be cultivated and utilized. But also like the core of the Prussian ethos is, you know, the. The racial community. So if you take that Prussian model, but you utilize it as kind of a way of. Of deration people and saying, okay, you're not like a Mexican. You're not like a white man.

[Unidentified Guest]

You're not. You're not black. You know, you're not.

[Thomas 777]

You're not Asian. You're. You're just. You're just American. You just have this civic identity where you're not going to speak your own language anymore.

[Unidentified Guest]

You know, you're not going to go

[Thomas 777]

to your own church anymore.

[Unidentified Guest]

You're not gonna, you know, you're not

[Thomas 777]

gonna abide these habits anymore of your forebears, you know, like, that's like. That's what's really insidious about, like, the New Dealer, like, American model. It's not. It's not so much that it declares, like, every man's gonna have some kind of, like, income in common or that it's gonna like, reduce, you know, like the proverbial disparity, you know, between the ownership cast and what was then the working cast, like, was insidious about. Is that it. It was tailored to essentially, like, strip people of any ability to live historically. And any, like, meaningful, you know, actual cultural identity, you know, is going to, like, alienate man from his heritage and from history in absolute terms. Like, that's the big difference. And that's also why I object a lot. There's something to it. When people talk about, quote, cultural Marxism,

[Unidentified Guest]

if they're talking about Gramy and Adorno,

[Thomas 777]

like Contra Marx and Engels, but they don't understand that, like, a lot of this. A lot of this doesn't have to do with orthodox Marxism or, or. Or Frank or school stuff at all. A lot of it's like New Dealer, you know, like race blind, like God is dead.

[Unidentified Guest]

You know, we, We, We.

[Thomas 777]

We know now that, like, everything is reducible to, you know, data derived from the scientific method. You know, the man's basically just like an animal who can talk. And, you know, there's no more history and there's no more culture. All that matters is making man more suitable to governance and eliminating these, you know, these problems.

[Unidentified Guest]

Like, you know, like, Like.

[Thomas 777]

Like conflict between the races or like, men and women not getting along. Like, that's like that kind of.

[Pete Canyono]

Or. Or family. I mean, just read the authority. Read the authoritarian personality.

[Thomas 777]

Yeah, exactly, exactly. So, I mean, there's like a pastiche, like, definitely, like, Frankfurt School stuff. And, and that kind of thing became preeminent, like in. Especially, like, as. As the American left broke entirely. Not just the American left, but in Europe, like, when the left just in. In macro terms, like, broke with, like, Stalinism and decided, like, the east block or their enemy. I mean, this was long in coming, but they were looking around for some kind of. For some ideological canon, and they settled on, like, the Frankfurt School. But this is also what would have been turned loose on. On.

[Unidentified Guest]

On.

[Thomas 777]

On divided Germany. You know. I mean, so there was a lot of things. And yeah, this definitely became part of, like, the American conceptual horizon, like, in policy terms as well as academic, intellectual terms.

[Unidentified Guest]

But there was a lot of stuff

[Thomas 777]

that also, like, preceded that, you know, like these fools, like, who were. Who built like, the Department of Education and all that kind of stuff. And, and these. In these. And even, even. Even a lot of guys who proceed in their dealers, like Colonel House, who was, you know, will kind of the Wilson's kind of Machiavelli, you know, administer without portfolio.

[Unidentified Guest]

Like, even.

[Thomas 777]

Even he was, like, prone to a lot of that kind of nonsense. Like, House wrote that. He wrote this really bad science fiction novel where there was like, this benevolent dictator who was obviously supposed to be himself. And he basically, like, you know, finds a way to, like, strip man of any, like, historical identity. And he, like, forces everybody to speak this, like, Esperanto language. So now there's like, no more war. And this great man becomes like, God on Earth because there's no more war. And it's like, why. Why would that be remotely desirable? It sounds like a nightmare. But like, idiots like Colonel House, like, this is some, like, great utopia that, like, you know, that equips government of any criticism because, you know, the greatest thing ever is somehow, like, if black kids have high test scores and, like, everybody lives in a big prison where war is impossible. Like, no one can explain like why these things are so awesome. But like, that's their conceit.

[Pete Canyono]

Let me just try to nail down exactly what you meant when I, when I mentioned the Prussian schooling. So, yeah, in Prussia, if your, if your goal is to educate everyone and bring them down into a cohesive culture that works within itself, and that's what the Prussian, that's what the Prussian education system meant to do. But if you tr. If you transfer that over into the United States now you're stripping a multicultural society and you're saying everyone has to be one. And obviously some are going to rebel against that. And the ones who don't rebel against it are going to basically lose what kind of social cohesion they have within their own community.

[Thomas 777]

No, exactly. And that's why one of the things that brought the United States and the Soviet Union together, I'm talking, you know, like the, the New Deal Stalinist alliance, like on its face, in geostrategic terms, it doesn't make a lot of sense. Like I, what Lindberg said and what Houston Stewart Chamberlain said, they, I mean, yeah, those guys obviously had political and aesthetic preferences for Germany, but in raw geo. Strategic terms, it doesn't really make sense for America and the UK to decide they're going to annihilate Germany in alliance with Russia. Like, what makes sense is for, you know, Europe, led by Germany, the UK and the United States, you know, to constantly this kind of ramparts against the east, you know, whether it's China, whether it's Russia, you know, whatever it is. Okay, that's. There's a basic illogic to, to what developed. And one of the reasons why that happened was ideological necessity. And you know, I see from the Soviet Union with, about irrationality of their objectives domestically. They were, they, they had similar problems. You know, Stalin's big problem was the nationalities problem, you know, like, how do I strip everybody of their ethnic identity and make them into new Soviet men? And the New Dealers were like, they had the same problem, you know, like, how do you like, destroy like the nationalities in America, you know, and, and I mean that this still goes on today. Like, that's why in typical fashion, when the regime talks about, quote, multiculturalism, they're talking about the opposite. They're talking about like the eradication of all culture, you know, but that's, there was very few. I mean, that is now there's not a hell of a lot of states organized like the United States or like the Soviet Union was like, it's not, it's not a natural political mode of Organization. So you can do one or two things there. You know, you can either, you, you

[Unidentified Guest]

can either, you can either rule by

[Thomas 777]

way like kind of evolved federalism, you know, and, and basically leave people alone to manage their own affairs within their own cultural spaces or.

[Unidentified Guest]

But I mean, government never is willing to do that.

[Thomas 777]

I mean, at least here. So they're, they're always going to opt for this idea of, of just, you know, eradicating culture and ripping people out of, out of a historical existence and

[Unidentified Guest]

both that are, I mean, that's one of the things that brought down the

[Thomas 777]

Soviet Union and that's all. That's also one of the reasons why post Cold War, like, America does not have moral legitimacy. But that was definitely what they wanted to do.

[Unidentified Guest]

And the. But there's weird.

[Thomas 777]

This is going to sound like a

[Unidentified Guest]

goofy example, but I'm using it because

[Thomas 777]

it pops up again and again. In the 60s. I read a lot of science fiction from the era, and science fiction from that era wasn't just entertainment. There's a lot of think tank guys, I mean, even to the, until the 80s, you know, Jerry Pornell, who was, you know, kind of the drivers on sdi, like, he wrote science fiction and he was. When he, you know, incident to his like think tank and policy work and stuff. But, you know, there's that corny old Star Trek episode or like Captain Kirk and, and Spock, they go down to this planet and it's like the Third Reich and they don't know how this is possible.

[Unidentified Guest]

Like, you know what I'm talking about?

[Pete Canyono]

Yeah.

[Thomas 777]

And then they, and then ultimately it's unraveled. Like, oh, well, this guy in like the 22nd century, he crashed like from early crash lands on this planet. There's these primitive humanoids, but they're always at war. And he's like, okay, well, I, I

[Unidentified Guest]

know, I know how to resolve this.

[Thomas 777]

So he creates this like Third Reichstyle regime. And then Kirk like addresses the audience like, you know, this was the most efficient government of all time. But, you know, they, they were, they were brutal races. So, you know, that's why it didn't work. But the idea was sent some way noble. And that's, that's interesting. And that, that comes up again and again not just in like corny science fiction, but in like policy papers. Like, we admire the Prussian state because the Germans are a great people, but they're these brutal races. So that's why it didn't work. But we've got to extrapolate that here in some way. But strip it up of these chauvinistic and, like, racialized views and things. People don't think that way directly anymore. It's been finessed in different ways. But that's like, what underlies it, like, especially in a place like Chicago, but nationwide, like, the degree of which these institutions people take for granted are like things taken from the Prussian state. It's crazy, you know, it really is, you know, the degree that's not just me. That's not just me, you know, being like a Tutano file or something. I mean, I'm sure, like, in part on that too. But it just like, can't be denied. Like, I'm not even saying that's like a.

[Unidentified Guest]

A good or bad thing.

[Thomas 777]

It's just reality, you know, and that people, at one time, people were way more kind of like, directly cognizant of

[Unidentified Guest]

that or at least willing to acknowledge it.

[Thomas 777]

So that's important to consider.

[Pete Canyono]

All right, wanted to get back to the book. Let show everybody. This is from Imperium Press, reflections on by Sorel. And from the forward, I'm going to read your words and have you comment on this. It says Rather has already been alluded to. Sorelian violence can best be understood as an absolute, uncompromising and radical commitment to pure history and bloodletting parentheses one's own in the case of the martyr and the enemies in the case of the partisan. And bloodletting is the sanctifying process. And you go on to say a partisan unwilling to die or commit homicide is no more a political soldier or agent of history than would be a lawgiver who is incapable, for reasons of moral or physical frailty, of executing a death warrant issued by order of the King's Bench, as an agent of exclusive sovereign authority. Authority. Sorel viewed the modern bourgeoisie as particularly decadent and harmful, but he did not think the conditions of his epoch to be otherwise unique. All ruling regimes, political and social, develop over time a kind of moral and intellectual apathy that precludes its worthiness, or at least revokes its mandate to act in a role of guardianship or standard bearer over the subject matter of its dominion. This is not to suggest that Sorel shared a secularized, eschatological vision of utopian salvation common to Marxists and progressives, which posited that the condition of man or the state or national community was capable of perfection by way of revolutionary processes. Rather, and I underlined this, he viewed the fervor of violence as a hygienic mechanism entirely congruent congress with his own rejection of the linear view of history.

[Thomas 777]

Yeah, I mean, that. That's the best way. I know it seems verbose, but it's. It's hard to convey these things in. In, in kind of rational terms. But that's. Yeah, I mean that's the best way I could think of to describe it. And that's. I mean, that's the. The degree to which I mean this.

[Unidentified Guest]

Also

[Thomas 777]

this. Some of this Sorel was definitely like in. In direct dialogue with the maestro, but some of this again is found in. In the kind of pre Socratic hero epics. Like s. Like Sorel saw the. The Socratic Would he use like the decadence of the Socratic era in Athens. He said, what you were left with was, you know, instead of this. Instead of this mono class of yeoman farmers, you know, the best of whom, you know, rose to leadership rank, who's. Whose education consisted of mythology and hero epics, what you had was there developed this class of professional politicians who relied upon the intellectuals like Socrates to rationalize their rule, but neither of whom were capable of real action. And both resented each other and both were afraid of and hostile to the y women warriors. To look at this kind of like parallel paralysis where the, the men who should be the ones like most capable of direct action and violence are declare that, you know, this kind of thing is illegal and immoral because they're terrified of their own position being swept aside

[Unidentified Guest]

and, and their own like, you know,

[Thomas 777]

lives being threatened by such a process. So there's this kind of like ongoing paralysis where this. Where the just kind of like meaningless discourse takes the place of action. And yeah, like I said in the intro that you just reiterated, it's not as felt that violence was so great or like the sexy thing that we

[Unidentified Guest]

all got to get into.

[Thomas 777]

He was saying that, you know, in political terms, you're not serious unless, you know, you're willing to implement your will through violence. And in fact, he took human life and they're taking out very seriously. And that's one of the reasons why there's something sacrosanc about the revolutionary process. If you're literally willing to kill people even if they're your enemies, and maybe especially if they're your enemies, like that's a very serious thing. You know, it's not something you do flippantly and it's certainly not something you deal repetitive disagreements. And if you're willing to do that, there's a sacred aspect to that that commands a certain reverential observance. I mean, it's it's all those things. But that's also why. That's also. And until things reach that state, whether it's because, you know, the, the, like, the exit system is failing structurally at such a point that people find themselves in these just dire circumstances where their survival's in jeopardy, or when you're talking about, you know, a revolutionary circumstance sensitive to, you know, a wider kind of strategic pairing of warfare, you know, what, what necessitates these things is, is, is a convergence of extreme conditions and, and the human will and the hardening of the human heart within that will. So like, when people in America, like at present, I mean, like, like talk about it like, oh, Donald Trump is an extremist or oh, you know, we're, we're under siege by, by, by quote, Marxists, you'll know, you'll know when that's underway, man, because there's bodies being dropped. And thankfully that's not happening because in the Americans condition in the, in the. Under present conditions, I don't, I don't think that would lead anything positive, frankly.

[Unidentified Guest]

Okay.

[Thomas 777]

I just don't. That may change, but for now we would, it would, it would mean a lot of suffering and a lot of, A lot of dead people being stacked up for no real purpose. But yeah, that's, that's also, and also like, I don't want to get too far afield, but this is intrinsic to anything that European political theorists wrote about really until the 20th century. This idea, this kind of Rawlsian capital liberal idea that people have in America kind of like on all sides of the political, or both sides of the political spectrum of like, oh, politics is just this rational process that people decided to create and implement. Like no Europeans thought that way. Politics is mysterious. And like the zenith of political occurrences is warfare. And you know, politics, like warfare itself is. Its origin is mysterious. We don't really know why things are ordered this way.

[Unidentified Guest]

You know, even if you don't believe

[Thomas 777]

in God, there's, there's some kind of there, there, there's some kind of design even, even, even if just man acting out, you know, is, is, is programming like, as, as in, as in an ant colony would. That's very mysterious and strange. We don't know why that happens. You know, so all you can really do is you're truly like in quite literal terms, like riding the proverbial tiger to try and manage, you know, political occurrences and, and violence therein chooses us. We don't really choose it. So there's an inherent kind of providential they have an identification of providential things and phenomenon within the European mind conceptually. So that that's important to keep in mind. Like this really jumps out at me I think because I mean I'm very much like a God centric person. I'm a Bible Protestant, but I'm like an old stock American. So like I'm inundated with, with kind of like American viewpoints and things, know, and I always was even guys like Russell Kirk, you know, who was a

[Unidentified Guest]

Catholic buddy, he was kind of the

[Thomas 777]

quintessential like American, like 20th century political historian. Like even he like falls into this kind of trap of, of kind of like Rawian and, and, and Habesian ontology about man kind of like rationally choosing to like organize politics this way. And that's nonsense and maybe that's a topic for another episode.

[Pete Canyono]

But yeah, feeling I like that you mentioned how Europeans view politics versus Americans, especially back then because, and then earlier you had mentioned how, you know, people read Spengler and he seemed, it seems esoteric because I recommended Imperium to somebody and they started reading it and they're like this, does it stay this esoteric? And then that's when you realize it's like, well, politics isn't one thing. We've been convinced, we've been taught in this country that politics is just one thing or it's this side against this side. And no, politics has a very spiritual side to it. That's why I think a lot of people, especially people who are biblical, when they read Imperium and they read Part One, they're completely blown away because they've never read politics like that before.

[Thomas 777]

That's a good point.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah.

[Thomas 777]

And Imperium's a really well written book. It's not just because I like Francis Yockey a lot. I mean even before I even like knew anything about Francis Yockey, like his book would always pop up on ihr, you know, IHR newsletters and Willis Cardo obviously would always plug it.

[Unidentified Guest]

And I got it.

[Thomas 777]

There's a, there was a used bookstore in Evanston and like Noontide Press at that time, which was Willis Carter's outfit. Like they weren't currently stocking it. So this was like in 1997 or so. Like I, I, I just, I just, I just used bookstore in Evanston, like order me like an old hard copy of Imperium, you know, like took it

[Unidentified Guest]

over to Reddit and I, I, I

[Thomas 777]

was like, wow, this is really intense stuff and it's really insightful. So I mean, I Came to Yaki by reading his book and realizing like this is, this is a. This is incredibly, you know, highly developed and serious stuff. And yeah, it's just really well written. Some of Yagi's language at times seems overwrought because he know he was a. He was, he was, he was, he was a. He was a litigation attorney. I mean that kind of comes out, but that's all. That's also as part of like the time though, like in the early, like really until like the 1950s. That's just kind of like the way people wrote. Even kind of square people just like, you know, writing on behalf of some kind of like even somebody like writing

[Unidentified Guest]

like, like an op ed on behalf

[Thomas 777]

of like Eisenhower in like the early 50s. Like what. It would seem kind of like overwrought to us probably.

[Unidentified Guest]

Like.

[Thomas 777]

But it, the language, I mean, but. But yeah, that's, you know, it's, it's a, it's a serious book. Like whether you, you know, even if you. Even if you're basically kind of hostile to fascism or you know, post fascist ideas and even if you're not, you know, any kind of, any kind of Germana file. I mean, you can't like, like the people claim like, oh, imperiums. Like mystical garbage. Like none of them have actually read the book. I know it's not kind of engaged. I'm like, well, what do you object to specifically? Like, they can't tell you. They're just like repeating. There's like repeating some nonsense they online or they're just, you know, it's just like some conceit they have that I guarantee you they have not actually read it.

[Unidentified Guest]

I.

[Thomas 777]

Not because I'm so great, because I'm like a bookworm. I've actually read like I, I've read Marks and angles for 20 years. Like when I. I don't like sound off about a body of political theory

[Unidentified Guest]

that I haven't read.

[Thomas 777]

And you'll notice like when you're raising. I haven't read. I tell you straight up, like, I haven't read that. But I don't. Most people, Most people don't sit around like you know, reading Dos Cava Call. Most people don't sit down and read like all 600 pages of imperium. They just don't.

[Unidentified Guest]

Owing to the fact that everybody's got

[Thomas 777]

to live their life doing what they got to do. I'm lucky I have the time to like read this kind of. But it's also, I mean people. I don't think people have the attention span anymore. Like, even smart guys like I. One of the things I learned to do in law school, if. If I derive anything of value in that experience is like, I can sit

[Unidentified Guest]

down for like nine hours and like,

[Thomas 777]

power through, like, page and page and pages of dense text. There's things I'd much rather do than that, but I can do it and like it. You know, it doesn't. Like. It's not like torture to me. So. Yeah.

[Pete Canyono]

A part of the forward is under the title Modernist Violence in Service of Ancient Virtues and something that I. A couple sections on a pick out here. He viewed the organization, management, and economics of the homestead and the cultural values intrinsic to this enterprise as being inextricably linked to and mutually reinforcing of military competence and endeavors and the waging of war itself. Moving down, he further views the yeoman homestead as a school of command. A man must rule his wife and children firmly, but also caringly and justly. He must also demonstrate his worthiness to wield his authority. A man's wife and children are obliged to obey his commands, but only insofar as his commands command role is tempered by correct virtues and practical reason. Do you think that is why the founding of this country, like, actually worked in the beginning? In the beginning, yeah.

[Thomas 777]

And like I said, it calls back too, to.

[Unidentified Guest]

If you read.

[Thomas 777]

If. If you read what these Confederate, like, metal letters were writing about, I mean, that.

[Unidentified Guest]

That's what they. That was their mythology.

[Thomas 777]

They were calling upon. They were. They were calling upon Athens.

[Unidentified Guest]

Okay.

[Thomas 777]

I mean, like, later, you know, you read everything from Walker Percy to. To Michael Shara, you know, guy with the killer angels, you know, they. They evoke like, Arthurian legend and stuff. But I mean, really, the way the Southerners thought of themselves, it was like

[Unidentified Guest]

that, you know, and.

[Thomas 777]

And that's why, like, you know, in terms of, like, place names, everything else, you know, like Athenian references, you know, were ubiquitous in the antebellum south and to some degree, like, still are in the south. And. Yeah, that's the way they viewed it because again, the south was not. The south was not the Habsburg Empire. It was. It was. It was a.

[Unidentified Guest]

It was.

[Thomas 777]

It was a yay womanry who viewed themselves as kind of like a monocast, you know, like, that's why. And I mean, part of that was possible because, like, slavery was racialized, you know, like that. But it was so. I mean, you dated so many type of a monocast, like, even. Even like a poor. Even like a poor, like, white, like, tenant farmer and like a lord of the manor. Like, they had some kind of political interest in common, like con for the slaves.

[Unidentified Guest]

Now, I know that, like, I know

[Thomas 777]

people like Howard Zinn would be like, oh, well, that's because they were just educated in, you know, racial prejudice. That's not the case. Like, there. People do obviously identify in communitarian terms, like along racial and cultural lines. And it's only possible. That's really only possible if there is like, an us and them, like, paradigm that's not good or bad. It's just the way it is. And yeah, that's.

[Unidentified Guest]

If you. In the north, it was a little

[Thomas 777]

bit different, but at the same time, too, like I said, even, you know, the, The. The old right, what was called old right in the 20th century, you know, America first and. And Robert Taft and stuff.

[Unidentified Guest]

That was. Those guys were.

[Thomas 777]

Those guys were Hamiltonian Republicans. They were like northern city slickers. But at the same time, you know, they. They viewed.

[Unidentified Guest]

They viewed kind of the American ideal,

[Thomas 777]

you know, as like the small businessman,

[Unidentified Guest]

like our version of the kulak, you know, like, they.

[Thomas 777]

So that I maintain that's not just a confederate conceit. That is truly like the old American ethos. And yeah, it's got no. It's got nothing. You know, there is no Caesar in that equation. Okay? So it's, you know, it's not. There's no Caesar, and there's not even a King Arthur. You know, there's the.

[Unidentified Guest]

I.

[Thomas 777]

The ideal, like, like the American hero. He's an archetype. He's not. He's not a king or he's not like a man in a certain. In a certain official role. So, yeah, I think. I think that's fundamentally important. And I admit, I mean, that's the way I think. Like, not even consciously.

[Unidentified Guest]

Like, I, you know, that's why I

[Thomas 777]

think some of these, like, trad guys

[Unidentified Guest]

in the Internet are weirdos.

[Thomas 777]

Like, I'm not talking about like, like actual, like Russian guys or. I'm not talking about, you know, some of these. Some of these Muslim guys who, who abide that worldview too, I thought. I like guys like Terry Hood, Indiana, who, like the side that they're like trad Catholics or something. It's like, bro, like, what you want, you want. Like, you. You want to.

[Unidentified Guest]

You want.

[Thomas 777]

You want to. You only want to pretend it's, you know, we got a king here or something, or you want to pretend you're in the court of Caesar. Like, why the would you want to do that? And plus, I mean, it's not like our Heritage anyway, you know, like, that doesn't. That doesn't work.

[Pete Canyono]

People hate to hear this, but, I mean, we're a Protestant country.

[Thomas 777]

Yeah, yeah, exactly.

[Pete Canyono]

Yeah.

[Unidentified Guest]

I mean, I agree with you.

[Thomas 777]

Michael Jones, he's like. If you are, like, you know, culturally Catholic. I mean, Jones is right. Like, America wasn't as a massively anti Catholic country. And I don't think that's a good thing because I'm not a bigot. But that. This idea, you can, like, somehow reconcile Americanism with Roman Catholicism and just make the Pope some kind of, like, first deacon or some kind of, like, you know, or some kind of, like, equivalent of. Of Billy Graham. Like that. That's ridiculous. Like, that. That's. That's not Catholicism. Then, you know, you're just like some guy, like, who, like, goes to mass occasionally and, you know, Christmas Eve at midnight, you know, goes, like, his local parish. But that Catholicism has actual implications for politics and authority. And, like, the Pope is either the Pope's either the Emperor of Europe in absolute terms, or he's not. You know, I mean, he's not. He's not Billy Graham. He's not this. He's not this deacon in a weird hat who, like, we all kind of listen to when we want to. You know, like, he. He is either God's emissary on earth or he's not.

[Unidentified Guest]

You know, in my fight, I'm not

[Thomas 777]

a Catholic, but if you are, you can't. You can't be a Catholic and then decide that, like, you're gonna, like, pretend Joe Biden is the president, you know, like.

[Pete Canyono]

Yeah, I wanted to. I wanted to read this one section. Under Anti Modern Modernism. It says, Sorel shared with Proudhon and Hobbes a pessimistic view of nature. This is one facet of Sorelian thought that fundamentally alters the way in which Sorel's relationship to socialism is to be understood. Sorel viewed man as basically mired in sin and driven by his own avarice and egoism and desire for his own gain. This tendency, in the Sorelian view, and this is the part I underlined, is only overcome by submission to sovereign authority, customary as well as formal, in ordinary conditions, and, when necessary, by immersion in collectively dynamic and violent efforts, often themselves both revolutionary and restorative in character. Sorel's commitment to socialism must be understood within this context. That socialism, for better or worse, was considered a historic inevitability in structural terms. And if nothing else, it was at least grudgingly stipulated even by many of its staunchest critics. On the European right that at least some, some concessions to the popular demands of socialist parties would need to be made for any future government to enjoy the legitimacy it required to effectively rule.

[Thomas 777]

Yeah. And that's why. And that's all. And that explains the ascendancy of the NSDAP and Adolf Hitler. I mean Hitler was always more popular than the party.

[Unidentified Guest]

But eventually, you know, Hindenburg, Hindenburg personally

[Thomas 777]

disliked Hitler and I think him, I think Hber personally disliked the National Socialist. But you know, again, it was the Stahl. Helen wasn't going anywhere for that. For that reason that Sorel outlined and that I just kind of like explicated in plain English the, you know, this, there's. I, I realize that, you know, in. From the 20th century onward, especially with the am of visual media as well as, you know, the concentration of power in, in key loci and the ability of, of consolidated governments to, you know, to kind of dictate policy, you know, they, there's a power to kind of create a conceptual horizon.

[Unidentified Guest]

You know, like the media like in

[Thomas 777]

the, in the Oliver Stone movie Natural Born Killers. You know, like Woody Harold and says, he says the reporter, like media is like weather, but it's man made weather. Like that that's actually really poignant. Okay. And like I stipulate that that's very true. At the same time, you can't just generate some kind of like revolutionary tendency out of the air or. And you can't just quash one that's emerging. So this idea that, you know, I

[Unidentified Guest]

mean I, I think Adolf Hitler believed

[Thomas 777]

everything he said for better or worse, whether Hitler was great or whether you think he was evil. Like he wasn't a liar and he wasn't, he wasn't a politician in the conventional sense. Like he believed everything he said. He didn't take on like a socialist program like, like Thallman claimed and the KBD claim. You know, just for cynical reasons. Like he believed in it. Like even if you didn't. Like. Yeah. It was. The reality was that he may be

[Pete Canyono]

wrong, that he never lied.

[Thomas 777]

Yeah.

[Unidentified Guest]

And the, and the Weimar voter, the

[Thomas 777]

viral voter had a socialist sensibility. Like you could say that that was bad or that you didn't accept that. It's like, well, okay, but then you're not in the game, you know, so there's no, there's no way any kind of like reactionary party or, or some kind of like Kaiser like revanchist party, like what would have gone anywhere in Germany. Like it just wouldn't have, you know, and, and Like I said, that wasn't just, that was, that wasn't just like

[Unidentified Guest]

the fervor of like, you know, the

[Thomas 777]

kind of red wave after 1921, 22. It was, that was like deeply insinuated into like a German consciousness. You know, like the, this idea, you know, like, like we talked about at the, at the top of the hour, like the, the, you know, socialism as we know it essentially, you know, came from, came from Prussia and, and came from that, that state of organization which itself was derived from this desire and this fundamental imperative to kind of repair the social fabric that it ceased to exist after, you know, the medieval era disappeared into, into historical time.

[Unidentified Guest]

I gotta raise up in a minute

[Thomas 777]

though, so if, let's, we can, we can do a part two on this if you want.

[Pete Canyono]

Sure, sure.

[Thomas 777]

But yeah, I, yeah, if there's anything else you want to hit just real quick though, in terms of key points, let's take those up now.

[Pete Canyono]

Okay, let's just do one, one last question.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah, man.

[Pete Canyono]

Do you think America has ever had a right wing. And if they did, when did it disappear? Do they have a right wing now? Yeah.

[Thomas 777]

I'm gonna deal with the first part of the question first. The War between the States. There was, there was something of a, there was not conventionally right left paradigm to that, but it was the precursor of it.

[Unidentified Guest]

Okay. I mean there was guys in the north who were, who, who were kind

[Thomas 777]

of nullifiers who didn't really want to, you know, in the, who were the free soilers. They didn't really want a part of the War between the States states, but they were highly racially conscious and highly anti government.

[Unidentified Guest]

But if you're talking about the actual

[Thomas 777]

partisans, you know, like the kind of, like the kind of the, the true like rebels in the south and, and you're talking about the fire eaters in

[Unidentified Guest]

the north, you like, and, and the,

[Thomas 777]

the like the radical abolitionists, like there was, that was something of a precursor to like right left divide in America. It's an imperfect analogy, but there's that later. I agree with basically what Pat Buchanan was wrote in the 80s and 90s about the old right being, you know, the, the Hamiltonian Robert Taft. Right, The America first. Right. That was that, that was the emergent American right in modern terms. Okay.

[Unidentified Guest]

And you know, in the, in the,

[Thomas 777]

you know, in the, in the 20th century, the war between the States wasn't ancient history. It was less than 100 years in the past.

[Unidentified Guest]

Okay.

[Thomas 777]

So I mean the, like America is like a consolidated national union. Was, was a pretty New thing. So there's that too.

[Unidentified Guest]

The. I believe I'm always making the point

[Thomas 777]

that, you know, the Nuremberg system replacing the Westphalian system that had not just profound implications for international order and war and peace and, and, and, and the conceptual horizon of, of, of, of heads of state, but it also, it made,

[Unidentified Guest]

it made the political right quite literally

[Thomas 777]

illegal because that, that, that was part, that was, that was half of the reason for holding the Nuremberg proceedings in the first place is to say that,

[Unidentified Guest]

you know, okay, like, you know, the

[Thomas 777]

allies were on the side of, of providence and opposition to that which is the right wing. You know, this is a criminal conspiracy of racist murders, you know, and, and, and obviously, you know, no, no rational actors such as, you know, the Marxist Leninist in Moscow and the New Dealers in Washington, whatever start a war. So wars were only started, you know, by the intrigues and, and conspiracies of, of, of brigands and criminals and racists. And that's what the right wing is. You know, so we're, it's, it's, it's illegal to hold these views because they result in genocide and warfare. That's why after, that's why there was no like Huey Long or Robert Taft after 1949 or 48. 49.

[Unidentified Guest]

Okay.

[Thomas 777]

Like you, the closest thing was a guy like Joe McCarthy, but obviously, you

[Unidentified Guest]

know, there were, there were the, the

[Thomas 777]

deep state closed ranks to, to wipe

[Unidentified Guest]

him out like last night.

[Thomas 777]

McCarthy was like a great guy. I mean, I'm not saying morally. I mean, I don't think he was. I think he was kind of a bumpkin. I don't think he was a great figurehead and I've got my own issues with him, but I certainly associated with Roy Con, didn't do him any favors. But, but the, for all kinds of reasons. But we'll get into that in our Cold War series. But the, but that was, that was basically the American right as it was, as it was ossifying, you know, Huey Long, Robert Taft, Wallace was a resurgence

[Unidentified Guest]

of that, you know, and, and of

[Thomas 777]

course Nixon took on the Walls coalition which became the Reagan coalition, which became mega. That's right wing in the American sense. I mean, I, I think it's somewhat of a protest movement, but at the. If those people had better leadership and if they had. And if they had a stronger intellectual foundation, I think they'd very much like identify with Taftian principles, like actual America first principles. So.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah, I mean, I think I, I

[Thomas 777]

think that's basically genuine. I, I think there's a lot of silly Stuff like, within. I mean, if we still consider, like,

[Unidentified Guest]

MEGA to be a movement, like the, you know, the.

[Thomas 777]

I was on the ground on January 6th. And I'm not saying that to sound like. I mean, like, speaking of one killer.

[Unidentified Guest]

I'm not trying to come off, like

[Thomas 777]

Robert Jr's character said, you know, like, I was there when the went down in Grenade. I was there. I'm not trying to come off like that. But, like, I raised that a lot because, like, people say all kinds of crazy stuff about January 6th. And, like, when I tell them, like, they're wrong and you're like, well, how do you know? It's like, well, because I was there. Like, I. That's how. But.

[Unidentified Guest]

And. And I.

[Thomas 777]

Those people were gutsy.

[Unidentified Guest]

I think a lot of them for,

[Thomas 777]

like, turning out in depth, you know, to exhibit their discontent, which was entirely well placed. But it was also just like a lot of, like, real goofs, man, and like, guys doing dumb, you know, like. Like that freaking weirdo, like, who painted himself up like Braveheart, like, running around, like, acting like an idiot, like, saw a lot of. Like that kind of. And there's, like, goofy stuff like that

[Unidentified Guest]

that, you know, like, on the mega.

[Thomas 777]

Right? So, I mean, there's like, more than, like, a seed of potential and they are in some real way, like the errors to, like, you know, the TA Hamiltonian and later, like, the, you know, the Wallace Nixon, Reagan coalition. But it's problematic because, like, America is problematic in terms of how politics breaks down. And that's my view of it.

[Unidentified Guest]

I'm sure. I'm not.

[Thomas 777]

I'm not saying bad. I'm not trashing MEGA people. I. I mean, most of my friends are. Are constitute. Are people like that. You know, I'm not. I'm not some snob. I mean, how can I be?

[Unidentified Guest]

What.

[Thomas 777]

So I don't want people to think I'm, like, saying mean things about them. But. But yeah, that's my view. And at a glance, I. I know

[Pete Canyono]

you need to get out of here. Do plugs real quick and we'll do that.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah.

[Thomas 777]

Thank you, Pete. Yep. You can find me on Twitter at Triskelian Jihad. The T is a number seven.

[Unidentified Guest]

But if.

[Thomas 777]

I think if you search for Thomas 777, I come up. I. I got kicked off at T Grand for criticizing Mr. Zalinsky, which is interesting. On T Gram, there's guys who literally post, like, really gross, like, pornography and, like, pictures of dead people, like, really awful stuff. I. I don't sound like some shrinking violet, but I. I Mean, I find that kind of stuff upsetting, you know, and like, I. But. So that's okay. But like, if you trash like Zelensky, like, you get, like, nuked. So, I mean, hey, I. It's. It's neither here nor there. We don't need T Gram anymore because the censorship regime is, Is. Is. Has been broken in some way, like enough that at least we can get our message out. But.

[Unidentified Guest]

So I'm not on T?

[Thomas 777]

Gram anymore, but on my sub stack, it's real time at 777.substack.com there's a chat in there, and if you're a subscriber, like, you don't need to pay, but you do need to subscribe to access the chat. And like, that's like, where we've been congregating.

[Unidentified Guest]

And you can always, like, hit me

[Thomas 777]

up on email if you want to talk to me direct. It might take me a week or two to reply just because I get a lot of email. It's Zartax Z-A R T A X777protonmail.com and yeah, that's. That's all I got.

[Pete Canyono]

Well, I appreciate your time. Thanks a lot, man.

[Thomas 777]

No, likewise, man. This was great. Thank you.

[Pete Canyono]

One back to the Picanono Show. Returning for part two on George Sorrell is Thomas 777. How are you doing, sir?

[Unidentified Guest]

I'm very well, thanks, man. And like I indicated before we went live, there's been an overwhelmingly positive response to covering Sorel and that our first episode on Sorel, I mean, and that's.

[Thomas 777]

That's fantastic.

[Unidentified Guest]

Not because it gives my ego a boost, although frankly, it kind of does. I'm not ashamed to say that. But the fact that people are engaging with Sorel in a meaningful way is, Is great. It's essential to understanding the 20th century and the trajectory of the political right and, and how European political culture developed in fundamental ways. And, you know, more and more what we do. I mean, it's important to educate our people in our faction, as it were, anyway. But, you know, major academia just is not taking these things up. The exception is guys like Paul Gottfried, but I mean, he's really on his own, you know, I mean, I mean, obviously Godfrey's not, you know, one of us writ large, but he's a serious political theorist. But he's, you know, he, he. He's found a niche audience, kind of like E. Michael Jones has. But, you know, that my point being that what. What we're doing is really kind of filled,

[Thomas 777]

satisfying a demand, you Know, and

[Unidentified Guest]

the fact that demand exists in the first place is a very positive tendency, because that was not the case 20 years ago. But, yeah, we. We can dive in. We can dive in immediately, man.

[Pete Canyono]

All right, well, yeah, here's something to start out with. What did. What did Sorrel consider himself? You're, you know, you read this and definitely brings up syndicalism a lot. Definitely. And also, we know that he changed his mind on some things as. As his life progressed. So when you read Sorrell, when you read Reflections on Violence, what is he. How. How do you see the framework with that he's personally writing it in?

[Unidentified Guest]

What I think of Sorel, I mean, that's. That's. That's a great question. What I think of Sorrell personally. I think he's a pure. I think he was a pure political theorist in a lot of ways. And that's one of the reasons. That's one of the things that distinguishes him from Marx. I mean, obviously his ideological sympathies and his aesthetic tendencies were totally at odds with Marxism. But, you know, like we talked about before, you know, Marx had these pretension. Marx and Engels, both, in equal measure,

[Thomas 777]

they had these pretensions to science, you

[Unidentified Guest]

know, where this idea that, you know, they were. They were. You know, they were. They were positing theories of economics and nothing of the store was underway. That's not my own conceptual bias. Like, there is no Marxist economics. There's a Marxist sociology. And yeah, it. It posits, you know, values and. And. And. And observations about, you know, the human condition and how. And obviously, I mean, that's something they're fundamentally concerned with, particularly man and his relationship to his own labor. But that's. That's not a theory of economics. You know, it's a. It's a kind of. It's a kind of political sociology that places a premium on. On man as an economic actor, both separately and collectively, as is kind of like his primary. Is his primary kind of function, as in historically as well as anthropologically. But that's not. That's. That's not an economic science, okay? And. But Sorrell, I mean, so it was

[Thomas 777]

very clear

[Unidentified Guest]

that he was. He was dealing pure political theory, okay? He was talking about value creation. He's talking about enemies, people, you know, to. To. To create political cultures, um, and, you know, and, And. And. And to live historically, you know, and, you know, fundamentally get some of the questions of identity with aesthetic. With value judgments kind of rendered by aesthetical tendencies, you know, the things, you know, kind of Kind of. Kind of the distilled down as into human values. You know, things like heroism and like, what is heroism in the political realm? And things like that. You know, that's why the seminal text of Sorrel, if you want to understand this point I'm trying to make, and forgive me if I'm being able to Scattershot, is, you know, Sorel's essay on the trial of Socrates and why Socrates deserved, not only deserved to be executed in absolute moral terms, but it was imperative in political terms because people like Socrates had wrought horrible damage to Athens, you know, and, and, and really kind of destroyed the legacy of Heracles, as it were. And that's why. That's why Sorel's favorite. Isrel's favorite pre Socratic thinker is Xenophon. I mean, that's a really complicated issue, and I'm not a guy who's an expert in the classics, but that, you know, that. That's fundamentally important. I mean, just for our purposes, what we're talking about here, it's, it's prima, it's prima facie evidence that Sorrell did not pretend that he was, you know, that he was. That he was presenting some, like, new science of economics, and he was not pretending that, you know, he, he was like the heir to some kind of rationalist socialism that was an improvement upon Marks or something. Like, he, he was in a very, he was in a very real sense, philosophizing with a hammer. And frankly, he was concerned with a lot of the same, with a lot of the same phenomenon that Nietzsche was, but he was far more of a practical political theorist about it. And he, he was driving different conclusions that had superficially sort of similar features, if that makes sense. But I draw the distinction, right? I make the comparison not accidentally or, or, or not because I'm trying to be funny, but like, the other day online, like, I was bombarded with people who were mad at me because they thought that I was putting shade on, on their kind of Nietzschean sensibilities. And that's not really what I was doing. But people like us, I feel, can read whatever they want, okay? And I'm not, I'm not like the Grand Librarian of philosophy or something. They, like, tell people like, like, hey man, you should, like, read this, but not that. But, you know, when people do approach me and say they're interested in understanding, you know, the 20th century, and they tell me that they're interested in understanding, you know, developing kind of like a practical paradigm of political action, you know, you should Be reading stuff like Sorel a lot more than you should be, you know, sitting around reading, you know, Zarathustra and, you know, genealogy and morals

[Thomas 777]

and things like that.

[Unidentified Guest]

But they, you know, I, and I try and steer people. I mean, even, even if people are just kind of like guiding the wool intellectuals, I mean, that's great. Okay? I mean, there's nothing at all wrong with that as long as it's tempered by a kind of pragmatic grounding in the world. And it's not some kind of, you know, it's not some kind of psychological coping mechanism of retreat. But the. If, if the one of the things that people. That caused people to gravitate towards thinkers like Nietzsche and to some degree Heidegger, although they were very different, is, you know, there was, There was. There was a real historical crisis that, that reaches zenith, you know, in, In. In. In. In late modernity, you know, the mid. Really the mid 19th century. That's when it started to impact, like, regular people's individual lives, you know, and obviously it reached a horrible zenith in the 20th century. I mean, I don't, I don't say that for the reasons what court historians do, obviously. I, I make, I, I drew. I derive that observation for radically different reasons, but, you know, this can't be denied. And I try and expand people's conceptual horizons and make them see that, like, look, Nietzsche was not the only. And Nietzsche v. Powerful language that really resonates with, with people, especially, especially younger guys, which is fine. Young guys have great energy that we need. But I try and help steer people. The, the fact that, you know, each was not the only thinker concerned with these things. There was many others who were. And there was many on the right who were. And there was many who, Whose ideas and. And philosophies held a. A far more kind of relevant, practical relevance to, you know, the, the current dilemma. And so that's kind of where Sorel comes in. But I, he was. I, I look at Cyril as a pure political theorist and a. And a political sociologist writ large. And he was fundamentally concerned with the economic. But, you know, that's. Everybody was, you know, like the, the zeitgeist you exist in is like the zeitgeist to exist in. You know, you've gotta. You've gotta, like, whether you want to or not, you've got to abide the, the epoch in which you're situated and the kind of conceptual realities that are paramount, you know, and zeitgeist is a real thing. You know, you don't have to be a Hegelian. You don't have to believe in God if. But you can't deny that like zeitgeist is a real thing. I mean, maybe you maybe come at it as like, well, you know, it's just kind of a, you know, it's just like a function of mass psychology or whatever or, you know, people or like you're like epigenetic memory come basic structures of mind. It's like, okay, it doesn't matter for our purposes, like what causes zeitgeist to emerge, but it is a real thing, you know, and like what's possible politically is very much bounded like hen hemmed in by those parameters, you know. That's why lately, I mean, my big project right now is, is, is. Is, you know, making progress on the Nuremberg book transcript and that that's proceeding at pace. But I want to write about the DDR and the radical German left post 1945 and things like the Bad or Meinhof gang, you know, more globally known as the Red Army Faction. You know, like a lot of these people. And I realize this is a tangent, but I'll bring it back along.

[Thomas 777]

Some word.

[Unidentified Guest]

This is topical. A lot of the people who are involved with it, they weren't, first of all, like, virtually none of them were glacier minorities. Like, they, they were very much like German boys and girls. Okay. And they were attracted to this really because that's what was possible within, with, you know, within the conceptual parameters of the Cold War, you know. And interestingly, Horst Mahler, who was, you know, a self identified, you know, Stalinist radical who, who became a lawyer and he defended a lot of the badder Meinhof people in court. You know, he. After. After the Berlin Wall came down, he joined, he joined the npd and he was actually arrested in prison for quote,

[Thomas 777]

Holocaust denial and things.

[Unidentified Guest]

I mean, so he basically. And some people were like, oh, what a cynic this man is. It's like, no, I think that was

[Thomas 777]

always what his sympathies were.

[Unidentified Guest]

But, you know, he was a German guy from the east who was, you know, born in the 1940s. Like, what is he, like, what was he gonna do? Like, march around like horse vessel? Was he gonna, you know, was he gonna try and organize like a march on Rome in 1960? I mean, that's not that, that's not the way the world was, you know, and it, and it's not just, it's not just a matter of practical potentialities. It's also, I mean, just what, what speaks to people like what guys potentialities within the political realm emerge, you know, so I, I, I want to write more about this, you know, and there's also, and that's one of the reasons too, like I'm interested in guys like Johan von Weirs. I mean, I'm interested in Islam for, and its impact on, on the political

[Thomas 777]

for all kinds of reasons.

[Unidentified Guest]

But guys like him and guys like Ahmed Huber, it was like the same kind of thing, okay. Like they were kind of unusual people and you know, kind of like orientalist adventurer types, but they, they very much. I, I mean, I, I'm not going to claim to know like what, I mean I've never leave the Christian faith, okay, But I, I, I can't, I can only speculate on like what motivates people to convert to like what amounts to very alien religions. I, I, I mean for all I know this was very genuine and some kind of spiritual calling. But I also, there's a natively political aspect in the case of people like von Lears and Mahler and that owed to what I just said, it owed the Zeitgeist. And I know the questions of, you know, what, what, what is, what, what is, what is possible, you know, within, within the conceptual parameters of, of the eponymous were situated. I know that was long winded, but it's, it's, it's frankly a big question. But yeah, that's, that's, that's, that's not just how I characterized Sorel. That's why I believe he's, there's an enduring relevance there. It's same for Werner Shambart and well, if you want to, we'll do a they, an episode on Verner Shambart. You know, he was, he was kind of like the other, like socialist of the right. And he was German, obviously, and he wrote specific America and why socialism is, is not resonant in America. Um, which is fascinating and I think timely. But that's, that's, that's my not so brief answer to the question as to how I characterize Sorrel or categorize them.

[Pete Canyono]

Okay. I'm glad you brought up the Zeitgeist, because I think that operating in the Zeitgeist, when your thought is firmly planted within the Zeitgeist, you can make, you either make very realistic decisions or, or in my case in the past, you have very fanciful decisions. And I want to read this passage right here and it points to a lot of what I was talking about. And this is in part three of the chapter Prejudices Against Violence. I just Want to read this chapter? It says the army is the clearest and most tangible of all possible manifestations of the state and the one which is most firmly connected with its origins and traditions. Syndicalists do not propose to reform the state as the men of the 18th century did. They want to destroy it because they wish to realize the idea of Marx's that the socialist revolution ought not to culminate in the replacement of one governing minority by another minority. The syndicalists outline their doctrine still more clearly when they give it a more ideological aspect and declare themselves and anti patriotic, following the example of the Communist Manifesto. He actually goes on to say it is impossible that there should be the slightest understanding between syndicalists and official socialists on this question. The latter, of course, talking about official socialists, speak of breaking up everything. But they attack men in power rather than power itself. They hope to possess the state for forces. And they are aware that on the day when they control the government, they will have need of an army, they will carry on foreign politics and consequently they in their turn will have to praise the feeling of devotion to the fatherland. The reason I brought, I chose that passage is because it's very easy. I know a lot of the people in my orbit are anarchists. A lot of them call themselves right wing anarchists. And it seems to me that the reason that anarchy can seem very appealing to a lot of people is because they don't see an answer in the zeitgeist for their morality, what they believe. And another thing something that I wrote is it seems that moral superiority, when you have no solution to present dilemmas, leads you to become somebody who. Politics becomes all about morality. Because it's very easy to win a political argument if you just say, well, all war is immoral, all taxation is immoral, everything is immoral. When you have no. When there is no vision that you can see of overthrowing what is in power. Now, where it seems like these anarchists, and I'm including my former self,

[Unidentified Guest]

are

[Pete Canyono]

no different than these syndicalists who just want to destroy everything and will even resort to anti patriotism and saying that power, it is possible to destroy power when you're basically moralizing against the zeitgeist that exists.

[Unidentified Guest]

Well, yeah, and I think in America there's a conceptual problem here too. The reason why, you know, the anarchists who did crazy stuff like attacking the Chicago Federal Building and just like literally blowing it up, and these, these guys like Sacco and Manzetti, like these Italian anarchists who to your point were very much like in, in bed with syndicalists, you know, like, like conceptually in Europe that, that had, that was kind of like anarchism, like had, within the conceptual vocabulary of European socialism, like anarchism made sense, even if it even was not a good idea in America. I think there are like anarchists in America who actually, like, I, I think that I, I think I, I think they're to your point in indulging in flights of fantasy, but they do have a pretty deep understanding of, of the source material. But I think most people in America gravity towards it. Like when they think of anarchism, they're not really thinking of anarchism per se. They're thinking of kind of like a Habizian ontology of oh, well, naturally there's no, there's no course of authority, you know, and all we need to do is, you know, kind of overcome this tendency to exploit others and you know, that the state of nature has no government, which is nonsense. And also too, if people kind of associate all authority with like this, you know, New Dealer bureaucracy, committed to social engineering and all kinds of, and all kinds of, in all kinds of tyrannies, like prosaic and profound, like screw with people's lives, you know, individually as well as collectively, culturally, socially and everything else. Like, it's not so people develop this binary tendency. They don't realize that there's various iterations of government and like government quad government doesn't just equate to, you know, what this like obsolete, like Cold War Leviathan that we're kind of stuck with in America. You know, I, Government's neither good or bad like on its face. You know, I mean, it's, I'm always making the point to people that, you know, because like a lot of people know that I, you know, I identify a lot with, you know, Confederate heritage and stuff, you know, for, for cultural and theological and like racial reasons, but as well as, you know, historical ones. And they're like, well, how can you also like admire the Prussian state? It's like, because there's a commonality there in that, you know, the regime that came into existence was appropriate for the people within its dominion as well as, you know, the political challenges that were extant. You know, it like the Prussian regime was appropriate for Prussia, like, you know, the Confederate yeomanry, you know, who truly were kind of like self governing and in a classical sense, at least as much as that was possible, you know, in the, in the 19th century. I mean, that was appropriate for them. You know, it's not like there's like one. Like, it's not, it's not like there's like one modality of government that is appropriate. There is categorically wrong. I mean, obviously there's some things. There's some. There's some configurations of government that are just absolutely like, terrible. Okay? Like, unless there's some like, weird Internet guy, like, nobody would say that, like, you know, democratic camp of chill. Like he had like this great regime, you know, like, or something. But, you know, the. Yeah, people can't just make these like, categorically sweeping judgments. Like the, the problem with regimes like that in America and like that which has been imposed on western Europe is that it's, it's. I compare it to like, you know, you know, like the old Ray Bradbury story, Fahrenheit 451. Like when I was in high school, like people still like, read that, like

[Thomas 777]

they decided

[Unidentified Guest]

and you know how like the fire department and very affirm v1 their guys actually go out and start fires. Like the U. S. Government is like a fire department that starts fires because like, governmentally drives its legitimacy from the degree to which it guarantees the posterity, like, of a people in their culture. And if a government is quite literally working to annihilate those things, I mean, that, that's, that's. It's beyond like a. A dysfunctional government.

[Thomas 777]

It's. It's abjectly perverse.

[Unidentified Guest]

You know, it's a. It's at cross purposes with the raison Detroit government. I mean, that's, that's really what brought down the Soviet system. You know, I mean, yeah, there was the, the. The planned economy doesn't work. You know, you can't, you can't, you can't abolish the incentive for creativity writ large. And they just say like, well, we're gonna, you know, we're just gonna plan all like, economic activity. You know, you can't like, plan spontaneous innovation.

[Thomas 777]

Okay, that's ridiculous.

[Unidentified Guest]

You know, and obviously like, it didn't, it didn't, it didn't deliver anything of, of real value to people other than some kind of basic security of material nature.

[Thomas 777]

Yeah.

[Unidentified Guest]

I mean, in a really like, bare bones sense, but that's not like why it collapsed. And there's dysfunctional governments that just like lurch on for centuries. You know, like the Ottoman empire, okay. Like the, the Soviet regime fell because it was, it was literally like this perverse iteration of, of. Of. Of. Of a regime that was literally across purposes with, with, you know, what, what should be like the Telos of government. Then if you, if you're literally like one of the things I agree with you, Michael Jones on is if you're literally proceeding, like, if you're literally proceeding against a reason, like that's kind of like your course set, you know, you're like anti reason like that can't really sustain itself and eventually people are going to revolt against that. I mean, even if they don't understand really like what's wrong with the regime they're under in like philosophical or ethical or, or any kind of, you know, it, like, you know, intellectual terms. Just because it's, it's gonna like start. It's gonna start like for any obstacles, their ability to lead a normal life, you know, and like do anything constructive, you know. And that's, that's kind of where we're at now. But yeah, I forgive me if that was long winded.

[Pete Canyono]

Well, I think the, you, you had talked about how understanding the zeitgeist is most important. So if you were to take any lessons from Sorrel in repairing what we have here. Okay, so we don't have, we don't have a history of communism here. Um, we have a history, we don't have a history of Roman Catholicism here. You know, we have a history of Protestant farmers, working men who basically can have a history of providing for themselves. So the, you know, what is the answer? That's, you know, it's like a lot of the people I know, their answer is, well, we just have to get rid of the state. As we get rid of the state, then we can institute good economics, quote economics, of course that has never been tried. They just assume that it's going to be better, people will be able to defend themselves. Well, if we just get rid of gun laws, any gun law, then violence can take care of itself. Because you can, if somebody comes at you now, you're, you can have a bigger gun than them. I mean not, not taking into account that people just, people with large families just put together their own armies, you know. And so what when you try to devise an answer to what we have now, I don't think that going backwards in time is what's going to solve it. It's going to be something new, but it's going to be something that involves a government of some sort. And I think it's going to, I would assume it's going to be something that would be more of a right, classic right wing government. If we're going to hold any of this together. Unless of course it just breaks up and Balkanizes.

[Unidentified Guest]

Well, there. Some of. Some of the problems got to take care of itself. There's not anything a Pollyanna or. Or some kind of. Or some kind of. I don't have some kind of like, eschatology of, you know, how the government's going to all go down or something that. But what's gonna hit to my point about what I raised earlier about. Or a minute ago, rather about, you know, not being able to sustain a course that's literally at odds with reason. I mean, there's a few things wrong with the government, okay? One of which is structural. You know, like we've talked about, like, regardless how you felt, feel about, like, Roosevelt and history or the New Deal or whatever, like the regimes that exist today is. It's an anachronism. It's as much as. As the Soviet Union was in like, a Chernobyl era, okay? Because it's.

[Thomas 777]

It's.

[Unidentified Guest]

It's structured to do something that. That is. That is no longer extant, okay? I mean, it's. It's structured to wage the Cold War, okay? Then that's about it. And literally everything else is subservient to that because even. Even regimes are totally dysfunctional. Even. Even those that are populated by people who don't have any meaningful understanding of. Of high politics, conceptually they're like, bound by basic realities, okay? Like going to. The fact that, you know, their ability to act is like, hemmed in by. By. By. By critical disincentives to know, to. To push up against that. Okay? So everything was. Everything is subservient to high politics, okay? When. Particularly when you have a situ. A strategic landscape like that of the Cold War. So I mean, it. The. The regime just. It's. It's.

[Thomas 777]

It's.

[Unidentified Guest]

It's, you know, it's a. It's a quote, solution, like, in constant search of. Of a problem to. To, you know, To. To rationalize its continued existence. So there's. That. There's also. There's this radical faction that's, you know, really, really. I mean, the New Deal was when it was. Was when it was able to assert itself politically, um, in truly kind of concrete, organized capacities. So, I mean, for the century we've had this kind of like, lamprey wrapped around the. The structure of government, proverbially speaking. That's. That's. That's actively trying to destroy the culture and the ability of the people who are the, you know, within that culture to live historically or. Or to harbor any identities of a historical nature, okay? If. And that must that has to be excised. How it's going to be excised, that depends on what develops. But the structural problem I was talking about, about the obsolescence of, of the regime that's going to take care of itself and not in some punctuated way. There's not going to be some like Mad Max scenario where everything blows up one day. It might take 250 years or something. Okay? But gradually it's just not going to be able to assert itself anymore. And you're going to see localities, you know, whether, you know, whether it's some what, you know, whether it's like some, some mid sized city in, in New Mexico, Arizona, that, you know, can't rely on the federal government, you know, to provide it with, with the water it needs and things like that and the infrastructural, the things it needs. So, you know, it's just gonna, it's just gonna have to find ways to, you know, to, to resort to self help, you know, in, in Congress with you know, like other states and municipalities that are similarly situated or whether it's, you know, some place like Chicago where, you know, you take this, you know, you take like the west side that's like increasingly just like kind of going to hell in a hand basket, you know, like the police increasingly. You just kind of like just don't patrol anymore. You know, you're gonna see more and more situations like that where you know, people in true like ghettos like, like live like Pearl, not intersecting lives with like bourgeois people. And then they don't even like really interfere with each other anymore. Okay. Like, and then that's happening as we speak. Like I see it, I'm not just like, it's not some science fiction thing I came up with. So like things like that are kind of, kind of going to conspire to, you know, just kind of like deprive the regime of credibility and in hard power terms and that will, that, that'll like the, the, the radical culture distortion element within that regime, like on account of these kinds of structural frailties that are increasingly emergent, it won't be able to impose its will on people anymore. You know, it's not going to be able to like insinuate crazy ideas to the Department of Education. You know, it's not going to be able to, you know, transform like what were, you know, basically functional with kind of poor communities into like ghettos where like, you know, race wars are going on. It's not going to be able to, you know, it's not it's not going to be able to mobilize people, you know, to go and annihilate, you know, other societies overseas that decides, you know, have to be destroyed. And that, that's already happening too. You know, that's why increasingly this reliance on mercenaries and, and things like that. So what, what will emerge from those proverbial ashes, I believe once you strip away what I just talked about and the core of America, you know, kind of like the white Christian core and those people who are, know, who perhaps aren't, you know, like us ethnically or, or, or, or, or who don't like abide, you know, the same sex that we do, but who are my fellow travelers in terms of their ability to, you know, create and sustain culture. That kind of core, I think that kind of like the core setting of America is like Hamilton versus Jefferson. And a lot of people object to that and that can be like oversimplified. But basically it's the federalist versus like the anti federalist perspective, okay? And you're gonna see some states that tend towards the former and some towards the latter and that's going to cause tensions. But generally it's not in anybody's interest, you know, to wage bloody civil wars. And I think by necessity, particularly in America, it becomes poorer. You know, kind of pragmatism is going to carry the day, you know, but just in practical terms, you know, you're not gonna, you know, like 200 years from now, you know, if you do have, you know, the geographic division is gonna, isn't gonna be between, you know, like the old north and the old south. But there's gonna be some of the same kind of tendencies that, you know, cause like a political and, and sociological cloth flat between them. But you're not, you're not gonna, you're not gonna have this regime that's kind of got like endless, that's got kind of like a, that's got bottomless pockets, you know, and the ability to just kind of like, you know, marshall unprecedented productive capabilities to like wage war and dominate, you know, anybody who wants on a continent that's not going to exist anymore. You know, aside the fact that that's really kind of self defeating as, as a, as, as a, as a course to, you know, to unite the country in some sort of, in some sort of unitary political culture under a single sovereign. I mean, that was possible during the War between the States for kind of complicated reasons. But it's also, you know, the, the war between the States shouldn't happen in the first Place. I mean, I don't want to throw this into a Civil War discussion, but it's. My point is, like, I'm not. It's. There's not some, like, inevitability that, you know, absent these kinds of. Absent these kinds of alien elements that I. I just talked about, you know, who are literally attacking the body politic and absent this kind of obsolescent and very corrupt regime, you know, morally and materially, that's kind of desperately trying to cling to power. I don't see Americans just kind of like going to the rifle to kill each other as a matter of first recourse. You know, generally these things can be resolved. You know, it's. And I may be wrong, but I. I don't think I'm overly optimistic. I mean, I am like a. Basically a gloomy angle 6 and Calvinist kind of dude. I. I don't think anyone, excuse me, of being some, like, optimist Pollyanna who says everything's gonna be all right all the time. But I don't. I don't agree with guys like Thomas Chittam and who. He is a fascinating guy. He wrote some great stuff in the 90s and his, like, Civil War Two paradigm. Like, he literally wrote a book called Civil War two. It was. I'm sure some of the fellows are familiar with. I. I mean, like, I'm an old guy, so I'm familiar with that. I read it when I was like, 16. But the kind of ethnic conflict he talks about. Yeah, I don't doubt that. That that's very possible. And it's unfortunately, in some places that's underway.

[Pete Canyono]

Right. But yeah, even Pierce. Right turn. Turner Diaries. Yeah, Pierce wrote the same everything. A lot of that talk was in and around the militia movement of, you know, the late 80s and 90s that Clinton declared war on.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah, I mean, in the 90s were. The 90s were wild times in mostly in good and bad ways. Mostly bad ways. And yeah, that I do. I mean, don't get me wrong. Like, there's definitely. I can definitely see, you know, like. Like 80 years from now or whatever. You know, a place like Detroit or a place like west side Chicago. You know, basically some like, gangster warlords, like, telling the cops, like, you're not the law here. Like, we're the law here. And like, what we say goes. And, you know, we're the Lord, King and Sovereign and them being kind of like a periodic war with, like, Blackwater types who own to some interest or another, you know, are being hired by, you know, either wealthy private agents or by what remains of, you know, the, the seat of sovereign government in the state and like, and going to war with these people in localized ways or something, where I can see, like, militia type guys, you know, pulling like, what the Aryan nations did and saying, like, look, like we're seceding because, you know, we're like, you know, we're like the Aryan community of Christ. And if you're not white, you're not right. And if you're a fed, you're dead. So, like, you're not gonna know. You're not gonna. With our, like, municipality and the government just being like, well, we're not gonna, like, we're not gonna fight some, like, endless war with these people. We're not gonna kill them all. It's like, leave them alone. Like, stuff like that I definitely see happening. I don't see, like, you know, I, I don't, I don't see, you know, like, 30 years from now some kind of uprising, some kind of simultaneous uprising, kind of like the white underclass against, you know, the regime and like, blacks against the man and like, immigrants who, like, you know, want to create, like, you know, Aslan and like, the Southwest. I just don't see that happening. It's not likely. And Shidon was. Sh. Was a, A dude born in the forties who, Whose for. Of experience was in, Was in Vietnam. And I mean, I totally get that. And I got a lot of respect for dudes like that, you know, and that. I mean, that's my dad's generation, you know, and I, I, I got huge respect for my dad as. And, and all them guys. I'm not saying, like, they got stupid ideas at all. What I'm saying is, like, their worldviews, like, is colored by that. And I don't have a crystal ball. I'm not some kind of like, auger. But I do think I'm pretty good at kind of just discerning basic. The basic trajectory of, of, of political events, you know, like, in a very basic sense. Okay. I think that's why people read my content. Frankly, you know, it's not, it's not because I'm a comedian or because, like, I'm a, Because I'm a great novelist. But, you know, I, and yeah.

[Thomas 777]

And plus, too.

[Unidentified Guest]

I'll turn it back to you in a minute. I'm sorry for rambling. But the, you know, frankly, too. And I mean, I, I recognize this because it's my culture and I, I totally. I, I've got a problem acknowledging it. There's a tendency to like, apoc. Not just eschatological, but like, apocalyptic thinking in America. You know, there's an idea that there's gonna, there's always gonna be a deluge and there's gonna be, there's gonna be, you know, there's always gonna be some like, punctuated event that brings everything down. You know, there's gonna be, you know, some kind of like, mass, some like, extinction level event. Honestly, that's like what underlies the global warming. It's like the weirdo basic kind of like, it's, it's like, it's kind of like the loser basic bougie version of that. But I mean, that's, that's why it's weird to hear like, Europeans parody, because it's not a European thing. That's like America think, you know, and, but on our side, I mean, even intelligent guys and some ladies, you know, who don't ascribe to that kind of nonsense. There's even kind of cogs on the tendency I talk about. Like, anthropologically, they still, like, they've got this kind of like, instinctive tendency to think in terms of like, punctuated equilibrium in, in historical events and like, apocalyptic stuff. Like, oh, you know, just one day everything's going to come down or there's going to be a race war or like, infrastructure is just going to go belly up and we're not gonna have clean water.

[Thomas 777]

Like, that's not gonna happen.

[Unidentified Guest]

You know, it's, it's gonna be a death by a thousand cuts and it's gonna be like, it's gonna be a couple hundred years. Like America's gonna exist in some form or another for a couple hundred years yet. You know, even, even if it's just like, even if, even if 200 years now, it's just like in name only, kind of like the last days, the Holy Roman Empire or something. But it's, it's going to exist in some sense. And there's going to be a guy who's identified as President of the United States, like, what kind of cloud he has, what kind of ability he has to, you know, raise an army. I mean, that's, that's a different question, but I, I, I firmly believe that. But yeah, go ahead. I'm sorry, I didn't mean to monopolize the conversation.

[Pete Canyono]

I want everyone to know that this ad break is personal to me because soon as I found out about crowd health, I became a member. We know the insurance model is broken with crowdhealth. You can see any doctor you want no deductibles, exclusions or co pays. You just pay the first $500 of any health care event and the crowd health community takes care of the rest. You don't have to worry about exclusive Dr. Networks, huge premiums or high deductibles. There are no surprises. You get peace of mind that no insurance company concerns itself with. Take charge of your health care today with crowd health. Open enrollment is the only time you can hit eject on the broken system without penalty. So don't wait. And for a limited time, join for just $99 per month for the first six months when you use promo code [e-mail] open enrollment ends January 15th, so sign up today before it's too late. That's joincrowdhealth.com promo code pete Q. Crowd health is not health insurance. It's a totally different way of paying for health care. Terms and conditions may apply. Then we can start, we can start an argument on when the, when the Roman Empire started to fall. I mean, yeah, some people will say, yeah, what's he, you know, with Caesar and somebody, you know, with the first Caesar. But. Okay, well, here's something I wanted to bring up. So this book actually talks about violence. It has violence in the, in the, the title. Yeah, but he also, he also talks about social change. He also talks about political change. And from everything you've just said, is the change that would happen in our culture, where we were born, where, you know, where we are, I don't think any of us are, most of us aren't planning on going anywhere else, is going to be social and is going to be political because that's where. Sure, if you go back to the war between the states, the war of Northern aggression, then you can talk about violence and you can talk about an invasion of a foreign land. But really what started to bring down what we have now was social and political. And it was by you mentioned the term culture distortion, invoking Yaqui and invoking Spengler. That's what has to be won back. And I really think, and people are probably sick of hearing me say this over and over again, that that's going to have to start at the most local level and probably the most local level is in the home and then spreading out to community and going forward like that. Like that.

[Unidentified Guest]

Oh, yeah, yeah, definitely. And that's one of the things, I mean, that's a cerulean point too.

[Thomas 777]

You know, one of the things, one

[Unidentified Guest]

of the reasons he was hung up on Xenophon and one of the reasons why, you know, he talked about, you know, the home being kind of like the. The school of command, you know, where we're like the patriarch, you know, learns how to, you know, how to. How to rule over his wife and children in a firm way but an equitable way. You know, that's, that's how. That. That's where women learn, you know, how to like, how to like, relate to men and stuff and like hold down the household. And women do that, you know, believe that, you know, it's not some conceit. That's very true. So I don't like people being down at females. That's where kids like learn, you know, how. How to grow up into adult men and women, you know, and, and. And you know, and, and the nature of like what, you know, what is just. And the parameters of obedience, like within. Within, you know, within that kind of justice paradigm of command and obedience. And that's why, you know, this kind of concrete engagement with. With what we consider the body politic. I mean, in s. Now, I mean as the body politic in Athens consisted of. Of like every, like had a household, you know. And uh. Some of these men were rich and some of them were not so rich. But know, they all went to war together. They all tilled the soil together. You know, they all. They all participated in the assembly together. Like this idea of, you know, hypers. Specialization and dividing people into like, you know, basically needlessly dividing people's functions within the same kind of cast. That's. That's a recipe. That's. That's a recipe for self destruction among other things. Because that's Terrell's point is like. Well then you have this basic parasitic cast of politicians who even if they themselves aren't. Aren't wealthy by birth, you know, they. They basically become like the clients of wealthy patrons. And aside from everything else is wrong with that. Like these guys don't work, they don't do anything. You know, they're like this. There's this weird leisured class that by nature is kind of decadence, you know, that develops resentments of the yeomanry and vice versa. And in turn they're dependent upon these kinds of intellectuals and financiers who in Sorrel's view, like have more. Are like in bed together, like proverbially, you know. And they, and you know, these guys view themselves as. They, you know, they. They've got their own kind of like resentment and fear of like the Yale memory or the proletariat, like in Sorrel's epoch, you know, but they themselves are as parasitic as like the political cast and just as, and just as prone to intrigues, you know, because they're, they're, they're. Their situation is always tenuous, you know, because they're, they're, they're, they're, they're. By definition they're parasitic. You know, they, they, they rely upon the willingness of, of the two other factions they just identified to not just tolerate them, but to sustain them and everything else aside. Like, even if you had a totally like homogenous population, even if at least nominally there was some kind of common culture and common religion, like civil religion and like ethics in common, that they'd still agree all kinds of weird pathologies. And it would institutionalize social divisions in

[Thomas 777]

ways that, not that, not just are

[Unidentified Guest]

counterproductive, you know, to like a virtuous society, but just in practical terms. Like what? You don't institutionalize social divisions for its own sake. Because I'm going to endless conversation and endless argument and endless contention is some marvelous thing from which we all benefit. That was, that was Carl Schmidt's point about parliamentarism and why it's dysfunctional, like on his face. It's, there's, there's something very ethological about it. I, I don't mean to insinuate these kinds of psychological terms into the discussion, but I can't think of a better way to describe it because it is, it's, it's, it's. It's a maladaptive conceived of, of human minds that pre. These things. It's not like practical, it's not things that exist and like, you know, in kind of political reality that we just come upon and have like address these things are very much cultivated and created and it's very artificial. You know, I mean, you see this today. I mean, even there's, you know, like, even if you took away the culture distortion aspect, like look at like this, look at like this infotainment garbage, its job basically is to kind of like, is a manufacturer like wedge issues to like make people upset about, you know, like, this isn't stuff that's like emergent within people, within people's actual lives. Or if this isn't stuff that, you know, people would, people would identify as, as being something that, you know, warning their attention and some like oncological capacity. It's like literally just like confabulated and you know, because people are like, you know, even in the best of times, you know, like common people are, you know, Deal with a lot of uncertainty and like anxiety derived therein, you know, that that's, that's kind of formless, you know, because I mean that's just kind of human condition, you know, when they're plugged into, figuratively and literally like plugged into some kind of media organ 24 7. You know, one of the things that satisfies or one of like the needs of fulfills like psychologically to help them cope with things is like giving form to these kinds of amorphous like negative feelings and anxieties. And so it, it's, it's kind of like a, these people kind of like permanently situated to be, you know, like manipulated by a sort of idol like parasite political cast whose only real role is to kind of, is to kind of create like, you know, institutionalized grievance

[Thomas 777]

structures, if that makes any sense.

[Unidentified Guest]

And I mean, yeah, obviously high tech and like, you know, media like changes all that. I mean even like radio before tv, like visual media was a huge game changer. But even like radio like the ability just like literally brought, brought be able to broadcast any capacity like coast to coast or like across the European continent, you know, from like Paris to like Prague, like that was, that was a game changer, you know, for the reasons I just stated and that, that, that's one of the reasons why people ask like why, why it's kind of like full democracy or it's kind of like institutionalized or it's kind of like institutionalized grievance structure. I just identified like why, why, why it seems to like axiomatically coexist with you know, like the modern like natural state. Well, I mean, the answer is media. I mean, I don't mean to sound reductionist, but I, I, I think I've, I think I've invoked the quote before

[Thomas 777]

from Natural Born Killers.

[Unidentified Guest]

I really like natural word killers. It's a really dope movie and I, I try and turn people on to it because it's not, it's not just like gross Quentin Tarantino stuff or like Oliver Stone, like preachy stuff. It's really, really insightful and it's really

[Thomas 777]

subversive in some ways.

[Unidentified Guest]

But the guy who's like the stark weather, like Dillinger character, you know, Woody Harrelson, when he's talking like the media guy, he's like, you know, he's like, he's like media's like the weather, but it's man made. Weather is this thing you're immersed in and you don't even, you don't even like Notice it. I found myself like not even really noticing it. I mean I discern like what, what, what's on people's minds and kind of like you like with something like the Floyd craziness. George Floyd craziness was jumping off obviously I discern like this is what people are thinking about. But it's like I don't even like, I don't even always like detect immediately. They're like well that's, that's the narrative that's being created by what, you know, the media they're immersed in because they just like take it for granted, you know. And it, and, and speaking of zeitgeist, the you know, like the day to day, like the day to day fixations of people like within that like broader paradigm like that that comes 100% from media. I mean it plays upon like things like intrinsic to mind, you know, like symbolically and, and, and things really the impulse and appetite and stuff and, and symbols that are kind of universally resonant in like most basic terms but in terms of like the actual narrative, like the concrete particulars like of those narratives and of like those symbols and like what form they take, those totems rather like that's 100% created by, by, by architects of media. And I mean that sounds conspiratorial to people, whatever. I mean I'm making a sociological observation.

[Pete Canyono]

It's not, it's not conspiratorial.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah,

[Pete Canyono]

yeah. This is part two. But when I released part one, the, the next episode I did after that was me and my friend Buck writing the engine, reading the engineering consent by Bernays. And he wrote that in propaganda. He wrote in 20, in 2021 but he wrote this in 47 and he's already radios in every house, TVs are starting to go in every house. And he basically says news is what we say it is.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah. No,

[Pete Canyono]

so that's the.

[Unidentified Guest]

God.

[Pete Canyono]

I'm sorry, yeah, I was going to say so 200 years ago you had 10 year olds that could run a farm and you had a farm that people could survive on. Then you have the industrial revolution and now everyone is just comfortable enough that they won't revolt. But they also have this engineering. And I was going to bring this back to what I was reading earlier. Earlier is when you read about these syndicalists, how they want to destroy anything that's anti patriotic. Well in the process of destroying anything that's anti patriotic you have to destroy family, you have to destroy people's religion. And that's exactly what the Culture distorters that we, you know, that we've talked about set out to do. And it's not a conspiracy theory. They wrote, you know, Bernays wrote about, about propaganda. And that's why you have to have. That's why the Internet is the blessing and curse it is because it puts out propaganda, but you can also destroy that propaganda within minutes in real time. But you're basically dealing with culture distorters who are like, okay, if we are going to have the kind of power over the people that we want, if we are going to be the managers over these people, we, we have to do everything we can to destroy this. And it seems like that is something clearly out of the syndicalist, the communist playbook. And even today, people that I know who are the, you know, some of the great, you know, they believe they're fighting for freedom and liberty for the individual, don't realize that they're basically on the same side as the syndicalists who want to destroy every bit of hierarchy. And as soon as you destroy hierarchy, you are

[Unidentified Guest]

word.

[Pete Canyono]

You're where we. Where we are. Now you're in managerialism.

[Unidentified Guest]

Well, yeah, and like I said, I. The problem is that there's a counterfeit hierarchy that is across purposes with virtue and logos. That's the problem. The problem isn't that, you know, there. These distinctions exist in the first place in structural terms, I mean, in legitimate ways and like organic ways that occur spontaneously. There's also the syndicalists who were on the right and some of these guys, like a lot of these guys that actually fought really hard in Spain on, on the right, I mean, you know, against the Reds, but they, and you found this with, with, with the ROM faction too. You know, in, in, in. In. There's a, there's a type of man who like really holds a communist in contempt. Not just for the kind of more obvious reasons, but because communism really just promises. It's kind of like telloric utopia. And it, it doesn't just like rob kind of the, you know, our living environment and our, our conceptual space of anything beautiful or edifying or cool frankly, for if you'll forgive the kind of colloquialism, but it also, at the end of the day it's not really heroic because it's just saying essentially, well, you know, technology is going to usher in this kind of Garden of Eden of, of, of like productive surplus. You know, we're all going to have like all the cargo we want and you know, we can, we can like e. As much as we want and like sit around as much as we want and it's going to be great, you know. And the cynical is know part of their reverence for violence and kind of like their relationship to Sorel is like. No, the problem with communism is that it's just as decadent as that is is is. You know, the is. Is the. As the bourie worldview, you know. And the function of violence is that, you know, it forces man to be engaged with mortality and, and with you know, at least potentially heroic action and like a day to day sense, you know. Now that can go too far and you get like gangster ass dudes as well as psychopaths as well as some guys who are just kind of like angry and misguided for various reasons. You know, they take that to mean like. Well there just kind of like endless mer to like burn things the down and like people up and like the most kind of pure iteration of that right now is like ISIS or whatever ISIS is like morphing into currently. Okay, you know what you have there is. You have like a bunch of Mongols. Okay, I mean that. And that's not. I mean there's all kinds of reasons why that's not. I'm sure some guys are gonna say

[Thomas 777]

the comments of me like a.

[Unidentified Guest]

Or something, it's like okay, whatever. But I, I don't think, I, I don't think some kind of like endless like you know, Mongol rampage against things we don't like is. Is. Is the way forward. But that is like a real tendency, man. And that's why violence does need to be tempered with reason. And I think and, and so is not like abandoned reason or something. Like that's why he's not, he's not, he's not. Not only is he not an Ian, but he's not some. He. He was not some like anti rationalist, you know, like Foucault of the right or something at all. You know, I mean that's why his issue with, you know, is his issue with Socrates is that like Socrates like wasn't serving reason. You know, rationalism isn't logos, you know, it's. It's something entirely different. And you know, that's why I, like I said, I'm not an expert at all in the Presocratics. As sure as hell I can't read Greek or anything like that. But I do think I've got a pretty decent understanding of Sorel and O to Sorel and O to Heidegger. Like I, I read a. You know, I Read the fragments Heraclitus, that, I mean, that do exist. You know, I, I spent a lot of time with Xenophon and there's nothing, there's nothing anarchic about what Sorrell posits in, like, a colloquial sense. You know, I mean, yeah, there's. He partakes of some of the same, same, the same intellectual heritage as like actual Capital 8 anarchists did, like, in his epoch. But he's not. He was not at all a guy like Ron. He was not at all a guy who, you know, he's not at all some like, criminally minded strange person or some, or some kind of nefarious outlier who, you know, just, just identify like a path to, like, revolutionary action. Then that's the way people like to mischaracterize him. I mean, Sorel's probably, He's esoteric, like, his whole body of work is. But those that do actually have a deep understanding of 20th century European intellectual foundations, they will do very directly attack Sorrel and, And paint him as like, what I just said. Like, oh, this guy was like, you know, he was. He, you know, he, he was some Ernst Rom type psychopath, but without the, without the medals and the war record and, and, and the body count, and it's not. And that's a deliberate slander. They think it's not what he was at all. You know, it. So that's why there's an, there's an enduring value to Sorel, not just to the political soldier.

[Thomas 777]

I guess that's what I'm getting at.

[Unidentified Guest]

I even argue, like, kind of hyper modernist and worldly and like, secularist as Sorel was. I say that guys like the Iron Guard and Kodrianu probably had, like, more in common with Sorrel than what he identified as. I mean, at the kind of Eastern mysticism that, you know, the Romanian Orthodox guys were into, like, obviously Sorel would have, like, no use for that. But in terms of, like, within their own kind of cultural paradigm, like what they were trying to accomplish, like that the. Sorel probably would have, like, looked approvingly on that more than, More than any kind of, you know, inner, inner war, like, you know, radical right movement, at least I think so. You know, it's. And that's what I'm about to say. It was in Spain. Like, didn't. They.

[Thomas 777]

Didn't.

[Unidentified Guest]

They didn't go anywhere. Like, they, I mean, like I said, those guys had guts and they had a heart and they fought really hard. I think a segregate place should be honored. But, I mean, there's a reason why. There is. There's a reason why I kind of like the dullard Cardillo Franco, this kind of, like, reactionary, like, crook, like, one out, you know, I mean, it's not. It certainly wasn't because of, like, his charisma or like, his great mind or something. It was because cynicalism, even if it is tempered by a basic decency, like, in moral terms, it. It isn't just kind of this, like, orgiastic, you know, path, like orgiastic cathartic violence or something. It. It does. It does not, like, lay a foundation for sustainable structures or for, like, a new kind of, like, dialectic that's gonna, you know, build something in its stead. I guess that was my point. We're coming up in the hour here, man.

[Pete Canyono]

Yeah, yeah, let me get you one more. Yeah, yeah, one more question.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yes.

[Pete Canyono]

All right. So when it comes to violence, do you think the aversion to violence in the United States is that because of our political heritage, our Protestant heritage? Do you think it's because of the culture distorters coming in and basically making it verboten, or is it a combination of both? Is it the culture distorters using our Protestant heritage against us?

[Unidentified Guest]

America's got a very perverse relationship to violence. And I think about something Ernst Younger kind of got into and stuff like, you know, and some of his, like, later somebody's, like, quasi science fiction novels had a lot more social commentary, like, Like, America's a place where in the land. People claim, like, they hate violence, but they get all excited. The idea of, like, people being sexually tortured in prison. You know, like, until recently, it was, you know, an identified, you know, quote, human right to infanticide. Like, there's this. There's this mass homicide machine in the Pentagon that just constantly murders thousands of people for the most, like, ambiguous reasons, you know, like, as it's currently doing to Russia. And people. People, like, cheer that on. Like, it's just like, not only, like, they always tolerate. Like, they get excited about it, but then they'll turn around and say that, like, you know, violence is the most horrible thing we can imagine. They, you know, they. But they don't. They don't really believe that they've actually got no real respect for human life, but because they don't. It's. It's a kind of. It's. It's a kind of. It's kind of milk toast aversion to actual sovereign decisionism. Like, coupled with a kind of couple, coupled with A kind of like unmanly like content for human life where you know, that kind of, that, that, that kind of identifies, you know, living things as, as commodities to be exploited, just like everything else. I mean that's the way I read it. But it's also too like in ethical terms the way people, the way these like the way these like post war

[Thomas 777]

liberals like John Rawls, they're, they're really

[Unidentified Guest]

the heiress, like Jeremy Bentham and like Ben, you know, the, the Enlightenment liberals and Demeisher was always the people that demise was always savaging correctly. I mean they, their whole, their utopia is a pointless society. You know, like we talked about before. Like it's, it's the ideology of a nursing home or like the luxurious prison. It's a place like nothing ever happens. You know, there's no value creation, there's no culture, there's no passion, there's no love, there's no hate. It's like where people like exist like fornicate or perhaps masturbate more properly, you know, like defecate and like and, and, and, and, and, and eat and sleep and like that's it. But it's, it's this wonderful utopia because like you know, nothing bad happen, Nothing quote unquote bad happens. I think it's, I think it's the intellectual poverty of the Enlightenment project, you know, coupled with it basically kind of see like, like aged senility in terms of, in terms of the, you know, the, the dominant bourgeoisie cultural strain, like dominant in terms of its ability to like impose its view upon like the culture as a whole. And yeah, it obviously it's you know, kind of like the culture distorters. It's, it's a primary objective of theirs to you know, to kind of like defang like their, the people identify as

[Thomas 777]

like their mortal like enemies, you know.

[Unidentified Guest]

And one way to do that is the, is to kind of, you know, condition people against you know, quote unquote violence or like, you know, condition into a tolerance for like all kinds of horrible stuff. But you know, to you know, to condition them away from the ability to like apply violence constructively or in like, you know, a political capacity. It's a complicated issue, but it's all those things. But it, without those conceits though, like rationalism, like rationalism can't abide anything that doesn't have some like utilitarian, you know, like very basically explicable purpose like within its own kind of self referencing paradigm. So like why would you care about anything enough to be violent, you know, like why, why would you care about redemptive action? Like why would you care about, you know, like writing injustice? Like why would you care about heroism? Like why would you care about like, you know, masculine honor? Like none of those things matter because they don't have some kind of utilitarian end that like helps us more efficiently or like eat more food or something.

[Pete Canyono]

Yeah, they make the excuse that we have no problem with violence as long as it's in, it's in self defense. And then they get to define what self defense is.

[Unidentified Guest]

Well, yeah, it's like it's like some 250 pound like linebacker, like beating the crap out of some like 80 year old lady while screaming she's trying to kill me.

[Thomas 777]

Like that's what America is, yo.

[Pete Canyono]

Well, and that's def. That's definitely what the culture distorters are.

[Thomas 777]

Well, I mean, it's like what's like how.

[Unidentified Guest]

I mean whether like you. This idea like Vladimir Putin is, is like a deranged maniacs. He, he doesn't want people pointing hypersonic missiles at Moscow at range of 300 miles. I mean it's like, like America's deployed in something like 170 bases across the world. What if, if Russia deploys on its border? It's like this is like a deranged act of aggression. I mean it's like there's, it's one part like delusion and senility on the part of, you know, on the part of these clowns in, in government since 1992. But part of it is, I mean people are, yeah, people are actually, I think a lot of people like in, in these kinds of managerial cadres, they really are like that obtuse and stupid and like morally illiterate. Like they really believe that. Like how dare you not let me punch you in the face over and over again. Like it's. I, I didn't realize that for a long time. Then I realized like these people really are.

[Thomas 777]

They're creeps.

[Unidentified Guest]

They're like moral cres. And they're just like a lot of, are just like stupid. Like they're not acting like Joe Biden. Like Biden.

[Pete Canyono]

They're not acting.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah, yeah, yeah. Biden really is a, like he's like, aside from his, aside from whatever, like organic that mention issues that they may not have. Like the guy.

[Thomas 777]

The guys are idiots.

[Unidentified Guest]

You know, like, like Nancy Pelosi is like a subnormal, you know, like they're, with very rare exceptions, they're, they're all

[Thomas 777]

like that, you know, and it's there's

[Unidentified Guest]

outliers, but they, you know, they're kind of only in the game. Like, I like Rand Paul's only in the game because that's like, literally become kind of like the family business. I'm not, like, putting shade on Rand Paul. Paul, I, he's, he's about the only, like, he's about the only career with Paul, who I, I, I like it all these days, but he, but my point is, like, I think had he had another kind of, like, path to clout and money, I, I don't think he'd be hanging around Washington. I just don't. I. That's, that's, that's whole other talk, the sociology of the managerial state. Like, there's not, there's some grand historical project, the merit of that project notwithstanding, you know, whether it's world. Whether it's world, Whether it's World War II or whether it's the Cold War, like, you know, made the point before, like, Elon Musk. Forty years ago, he'd be like Jerry Pernell. He would have been, you know, heading up some pack and, like, working hand in glove with the DOD on like, SDI and stuff like that. But, like, guys like him, like, they don't want anything to do with garment these days. Why would they? Like, that's repository of, like, losers and, like, weirdos, frankly. You know what I mean? That doesn't matter like how.

[Thomas 777]

He's definitely smart.

[Pete Canyono]

He's smart enough to take their money, though.

[Unidentified Guest]

Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But, I mean, that's part of the game, you know, it's like I, I get mad at people putting on elons or something. That seems, like, loserish about it. I mean, the dude is, he's an African or a billionaire who's a genius innovator. And he, he, he's. He's, he's one of the only people who's talking about truly Faustian things, you know, like the conquest of space, which, despite what people tell you, actually is important on its own terms. So there's something like losers about people, like, just deciding they hate Elon Musk. But he, but yeah, I mean, the role he's in not as good as wealth, but because of, like, how that wealth is kind of insinuated into things of touching concern, you know, like, like, you know, technology that at scale, you know, the, the regime's relying upon. I mean, he's going to be like, a political actor. Okay, but it, but the reason why, like, he doesn't covet, like, formal office. So the reason why he's not, you know, engaged in, like, think tank stuff is because. Yeah. That the end of the Cold War brought an end to the ability of, of the regime to attract men such as he to their environments. Well, yeah, let's. If you want to do it, that'd be great, man. It's all up to you. And then we'll. After that, we'll. We'll get back to the Cold War series and take up Vietnam. Vietnam era. Like, what next episode will do whichever you want. Like, either of those.

[Pete Canyono]

I was thinking about jumping back into the Cold War.

[Thomas 777]

I feel like a few episodes and

[Pete Canyono]

then coming back into this because I think a lot of it'll cross over. I think we'll have. We'll actually even generate content for the next Sorel Talk, especially with what we're. We're going to talk about in the next couple in the next few Cold War episodes.

[Unidentified Guest]

No, that would be great, man. Yeah. There's a lot. There's a lot. There's a lot to. There's a lot there with Vietnam. And then that dovetails not just with my research on this, on this Nuremberg international. International jurisprudence manuscript I'm working on, but it, like Vietnam's. Vietnam's important in ways that, not unlike World War II, is important. Understanding the current regime, I mean, not. It's like a founding mythology, obviously nothing like that, but it changed things in all kinds of ways. And that, that really was like the hot battlefield of the Cold War in all kinds of, like, militarily, politically, I think culturally it changed things and we'll get into all of that. But my point is, like, it's not just some. It's not just like a. A question of trivia or some. Or some, some that's, like, interesting to talk about. Like, you know, it might be to talk about kind of like, you know, the, you know, some. Some kind of like long forgotten, you know, war waged by the British Empire or something like. It remains truly important, is my point.

[Pete Canyono]

All right, two plugs and we'll get out of here.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah, you can still find me on Twitter. I mean, they screw with me a lot, but I don't think they're gonna ban me again because I think those days are over. And I mean, if they did. Well, I'm launching a YouTube channel just in a few days here after the first week in January, and I'll make sure everybody knows where to find it. It's Thomas tv. You'll be able to find it. But I'll, I'll plug it, like, on Twitter. I'll plug it on Substack. I'll make sure people can find it. My Twitter is at triskelion jihad. The first T is 7. If you search for Thomas 777 I think you'll find it. But you can find me on [e-mail] I've been canceled from T gram which is a company in my opinion. I. I was a paid subscriber and you know, mind you, they welcome garbage like you know, hardcore pornography and like really disgusting like gore stuff. But it's run by some Zionist crud who like and apparently like the crime of like criticizing Somalia of the Earls, also known as Ukraine is like a cancelable offense. So I've got no use for that. I wish people would. There's plenty of other chat options popping up, including on Substack itself. You can join my Substack chat for free. They, it's. It's a lot more user friendly than T Gram. They don't censor anybody and we've got total control of it because it's incident to my T gram account, my substitute account and subs.

[Pete Canyono]

You need to have the sub. Need to have the Substack app installed on your phone in order to get notifications for it.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah, but it's, it's dope and so far sub has never ever done anything to censor any of my content. And frankly people like us genuine generate a hell of a lot of revenue for them and I think they realize which side their bread is buttered on, as it were. So I don't think that's going to change. But please, please migrate to Substack. I, I'm done with T. I'm not. I can't have good conscience. I'm not going to pay money to people who cancel me. I'm not going to utilize a platform where people abuse me. And I've gotten really disgusting and awful communications from from these like Ukrainian sickos and like other people man. Like there's it just really gross stuff. I mean like I, I cannot, I don't want to, you know, play martyr or something but this idea that like well tam kind of sucks but you know, it's good for other thing. It's not a good platform, man. And it's, it's a repository of malwar and spy war spyware. It's always up like the user interface.

[Pete Canyono]

It's a bot. It's bot. Hell yeah man.

[Unidentified Guest]

It's a hole. And I don't know why people are like so attached to it. It's like, what are you. What are you getting out of this? But whatever. So, yeah, they have to know more. I will never return there. But, yeah, forgive the rant, but that's. That's going to find me. My second novel, which is the second Steelstorm novel, is gonna drop in January. I hope you would ask me about that. But that's all I got for now. And thank you very much, everybody for all the kind feedback.

[Pete Canyono]

This will be the first episode of the new year. Thank everybody for this previous year. It's been absolutely amazing. And just to say about Substack, Substack will be the only place that someone like you or me will ever get a check mark.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[Pete Canyono]

I remember I, I logged on and I looked at my. I looked at one of my posts and there was a check mark next to my name and I'm like, that's weird.

[Unidentified Guest]

Yeah, no, it's. It's. In some ways the, the market is a corrective and we, we make a lot of money for those people, man. Man, they make money because of us. I mean, they're not. They're not. I mean, that's. That, that really is their bread and butter. I mean, it's not a platform that draws advertising revenue, really. I mean, it. Yeah, so they. I'm a huge fan of Substack, man. I. I really am. So, yeah, please dip into the Substack chat.

[Thomas 777]

It's.

[Unidentified Guest]

I basically like the core guys and a few ladies and we, we appreciate them being among us too. It's basically like the T Grand Mob, like, basically migrated there, but there's still some, like, holdouts and I don't know if they're masochist or what.

[Thomas 777]

It's like quite the freaking t. GR man. It's bad for you. It's bad for you.

[Unidentified Guest]

But yeah, again, I can't thank you enough, man. And I, I'm really stoked that people have been so excited about this, this, this series. And yeah, we'll. We'll get into. We'll get into. We'll get into the Vietnam War next episode and then we'll get back to Sorel and Reflections on Violence subsequent.

[Pete Canyono]

Appreciate it, Thomas. Thank you.