The World War Two Series: Episode 1-5 w/ Thomas777 - 1/4

Summary

Podcast Summary: The Pete Quiñones Show – The World War Two Series: Episode 1-5 w/ Thomas777 (Part 1/4)

Released: August 2, 2026
Host: Pete Quiñones
Guest: Thomas777 (historian, revisionist thinker, writer)

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Episode Overview

Main Theme:
This episode launches an in-depth, multi-part World War II series, focusing on the political, economic, and ideological factors that precipitated WWII, with a particular emphasis on the interwar years, the rise of National Socialism in Germany, the interplay between global ideologies, and the roles played by major political actors in Europe and the US. Thomas777 brings a revisionist perspective, challenging common historical narratives about the era.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Treaty of Versailles and Its Aftermath

[00:43–06:52]

• Origin of Instability: The Treaty of Versailles is widely cited as the starting point for WWII, but Thomas expands this by emphasizing the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution, which created an international revolutionary paradigm, especially acute in Germany and Central Europe.

  • “It was the Bolshevik Revolution, which was an international phenomenon.” – Thomas [01:27]

• Ernst Nolte’s Influence: Thomas heavily references historian Ernst Nolte, who characterized the early 20th century as a “European civil war” fueled by revolutionary and counterrevolutionary ideologies.

• Weimar Culture: Beyond punitive reparations, the political culture of Weimar Germany (instability, struggle between revolutionary Communist and reactionary elements) is portrayed as essential for understanding the rise of National Socialism.

• Wilson and Versailles: Thomas exonerates US President Woodrow Wilson from sole blame for Versailles’ punitive nature, pointing to Britain and France’s desire to “loot Germany” over creating a stable peace.

  • “Wilson didn’t want to punish Berlin… he was disgusted by the Treaty of Versailles and threw his hands up.” – Thomas [05:30]

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2. Economic Factors, Banking, and Foreign Influence

[07:03–11:02]

• Financial Entanglements: US financial backing of the British during WWI (JP Morgan credits, etc.) created commitments that pressured Wilson into supporting the Allies.

• Misconceptions about War and Capitalism: Thomas rejects “war is always for profit” simplifications, stressing wars frequently disrupt business while accepting that corrupt actors exist.

• Deterrence Breakdown & Unpreparedness: In WWI, technological advancement outstripped diplomatic and military doctrine—leaders failed to grasp the true cost and duration of modern war.

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3. Weimar Society: Morality, Economics, and Subversion

[12:56–20:44]

• Moral & Economic Collapse: Weimar’s collapse is conceptualized as both an intentional economic “looting” (hyperinflation, reparations) and a coordinated attack on social morals (“moral deviancy”—sex, family structure, social order).

  • “West Berlin was flooded with pornography after the Second World War... about breaking the moral foundation of peoples in order to essentially make them malleable.” – Thomas [14:41]
  • He discusses thinkers like Wilhelm Reich and E. Michael Jones on the political dimension of moral subversion.

• Political Violence: The German 1920s saw street-fighting between Communist and National Socialist paramilitaries—a civil war atmosphere.

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4. The Great Depression and the Rise of the Nazis

[20:44–31:42]

• Stressman’s Temporary Stability: Gustav Stresemann provided some stability for Weimar Germany by attracting foreign investment and partial economic recovery.

• 1929 Crash: The global economic crisis undermined these fragile gains and renewed radicalization. The resulting despair led to a loss of faith in parliamentary solutions and the appeal of National Socialism.

• Hitler’s “Modern Campaigning” & Legitimacy: Hitler’s political rise is described as unprecedented in its use of mass campaigning and direct public engagement, leading to huge plebiscite victories by 1933.

  • “Hitler was the first national political figure to shoot all over the place in a plane... modern campaigning techniques.” – Thomas [24:55]
  • “Germans loved Adolf Hitler. Not that they loved the party that he represented, but the Germans loved Adolf Hitler.” – Thomas [28:00]

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5. Communism as Existential Threat: European Reactions

[31:42–38:57]

• Communist Momentum: The episode underscores the momentum and perceived inevitability of Communist revolution across Europe, beyond the Soviet Union itself.

  • “Both in terms of their kind of forces and being... they had tremendous reach… The communists were very, very good at political warfare.” – Thomas [32:34]

• Fear of Communist Ascendancy: Even non-Communist elites and moderates saw Communism as history’s vanguard, driving a sense of existential threat and driving the appeal of Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, et al.

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6. Roosevelt, The New Deal, and American Policy

[38:57–54:15]

• Roosevelt’s Ideological Motivation: Franklin D. Roosevelt is described as pursuing an ideologically anti-fascist agenda, making the destruction of Germany and fascism a central objective.

  • “The New Deal regime was as much a revolutionary paradigm as... what Stalin did in the Soviet Union.” – Thomas [39:45]

• FDR Admiration of Fascist Models: FDR’s New Deal is noted to have adopted techniques of managed economies, observing German and Italian experiments while pursuing the war against fascism.

  • “He was looking and he was like, 'Well, if they have a managed economy over there, we can have a managed economy here.'” – Pete [48:03]

• The Limits & Realities of the New Deal: Thomas asserts that the New Deal’s “make-work” programs had little economic impact beyond basic relief, dispelling the notion that it “saved the US economy.”

  • “If I pay you to dig a hole and give you food stamps, I'm not breathing new life into the national economy.” – Thomas [51:58]

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7. Germany’s Allies and Pan-European Movements

[54:27–78:19]

• Allies: Germany’s main allies in Europe were Italy, Romania, and Croatia. Romania is especially praised for its contribution and loyalty to the Axis, as is Croatia’s military integration.

  • “Romania was first and foremost Germany's best ally.” – Thomas [54:37]

• Neutral Powers: Spain (Franco) and Portugal (Salazar) stayed neutral or only provided limited support due to strategic calculation, not ideological commitment.

• Waffen-SS Volunteers: There’s detailed discussion about why non-Germans volunteered to fight for the Axis—all rooted in anti-Communism rather than ideological Nazism per se.

  • “Most guys like foreign fighters who joined the Waffen SS did so because they wanted to kill Ivan and they hated communists.” – Thomas [71:01]

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8. Conceptualizing National Socialism: Left or Right?

[82:54–93:47]

• Debate on Ideology: The conversation addresses the left-right debate regarding National Socialism, arguing from a European perspective that Nazism is best understood as a radical right-wing movement focused on spiritual, cultural, and racial preservation, not economic doctrine alone.

  • “The only way to look at National Socialism is as a radical right wing tendency, kind of like the ultimate radical right wing tendency.” – Thomas [84:12]

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9. The Road to War: Poland, the USSR, & Western Powers

[93:47–120:13]

• Why Germany Invaded Poland: Poland was offered relatively modest terms, including access to Danzig and guarantees for ethnic Germans, but according to Thomas, “outside interference”—especially from the US and UK—stiffened Polish resistance.

  • “Essentially what Germany demanded of Poland was... dedicated access to Danzig... These were entirely reasonable and they were precedented at that point.” – [93:57]

• Soviet Threat Awareness: The threat of the USSR is emphasized as the fundamental existential problem for Germany; Western narratives about Germany’s westward ambitions are challenged.

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10. How the US Entered the War & Roosevelt’s Maneuvers

[130:54–184:45]

• Manufacturing Consent: Despite strong American anti-intervention sentiment, FDR is described as maneuvering the country into war with Germany via secret war plans (Rainbow Five), diplomatic provocations, and pushing Japan into conflict as a “back door” to war with Germany.

  • “Roosevelt was trying to insinuate America into a war with the German Reich really from the moment he took office.” – [130:58]

• Pearl Harbor as Pretext: Thomas disputes the notion that the US government wanted or expected Pearl Harbor specifically, but acknowledges FDR needed a catalyzing event to shift public opinion into war.

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11. Churchill, British Politics, and the “Focus”

[204:48–328:13]

• Churchill’s Character & Rise: Churchill is portrayed as an opportunist who shifted political positions as expedient, ultimately becoming the frontman for a well-funded coalition (“the Focus”) of industrialists, Zionists, financiers, and others all seeking strong anti-German, pro-rearmament British policy.

  • On Churchill: “I've never met a guy who is like Mr. Clinton or Winston Churchill where…they're advocating for this, two years later they're advocating for the precise opposite…that's literally insane.” – Thomas [260:47]

• Funding and Influence: The Focus, largely bankrolled by wealthy Jewish businessmen and industrialists (notably Shell Oil’s chairman and others), became the most powerful private lobbying force in Britain, using media, political, and financial clout to push the UK toward confrontation with Hitler.

  • “No pressure group, no organ of government, no kind of tentacle of the royal family that…could affect anyone’s policy that came anywhere close to this NGO that Churchill had behind him.” – [327:30]

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12. The Convergence of Economic, Ethnic, and Industrial Interests

[310:04–328:13]

• Anti-Nazi Coalitions: The “Focus” and related groups brought together Zionists, Communists, trade unionists, profit-seeking industrialists, and disgruntled Tories, all united in anti-German agitation and anti-fascist activism.
• Propaganda and Policy: These groups systematically inflated the German threat and tailored British policy for confrontation with Berlin, aiming to subvert “appeasement” and build momentum for war.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “Germany doesn't survive unless it becomes a superpower, and it becomes a superpower by smashing Ivan [Soviet Union].” – Thomas [116:58]
• “Not only was [Hitler] the legitimate government—he did everything he said he was going to do. Unlike a lot of people.” – Thomas [29:25]
• “Churchill is really… the original example of [a politician] where a bunch of wealthy people and organizations select a man, install him, and he implements their demands as policy.” – Thomas [257:23]
• “If I pay you to dig a hole and give you food stamps, I'm not, I'm not breathing new life into… the national economy.” – Thomas [51:58]
• “Either you become a fiefdom of the Soviet Union or you can smash it and create a European superpower... The United States of Europe.” – Thomas [116:58]
• “The average man in the street fighting German occupation wasn't a commie... he didn't want German capital telling him his business.” – Thomas [76:51]

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Important Timestamps

• Treaty of Versailles and Weimar: [00:43–06:52]
• Banking & Foreign Influence: [07:03–11:02]
• Moral/Economic Weimar Analysis: [12:56–20:44]
• Great Depression/Nazis Rise: [20:44–31:42]
• Communists’ Momentum: [31:42–38:57]
• Roosevelt & New Deal: [38:57–54:15]
• Germany’s WWII Allies: [54:27–78:19]
• Nazism's Political Spectrum: [82:54–93:47]
• Path to War with Poland/USSR: [93:47–120:13]
• US War Entry & Propaganda: [130:54–184:45]
• Churchill’s Political Machinations & 'Focus': [204:48–328:13]

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Tone and Language

The episode’s tone is scholarly, combative, and revisionist. Thomas aggressively challenges standard histories, weaving in references to academic works/dissident historians alongside polemical critiques of mainstream political leaders. The dialogue is unsparing in its criticism of Churchill, Roosevelt, and certain Jewish/Zionist lobbying chains of influence but is academic rather than merely sensationalist.

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For the Next Episode

• Deeper dive into Churchill’s maneuverings leading up to WWII, "Munich," and his ascendancy as Prime Minister.
• The shift to Operation Barbarossa and the opening of the Eastern Front.
• More detail on the role of the “Focus” group in shaping UK foreign policy.

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Support and Find More:
Thomas777 can be found on Substack (realthomas777.substack.com), Gab, and Twitter. The host posts early episode releases and materials on his own Substack.

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Note:
This summary intentionally omits ads, intros/outros, and is intended as a guide for listeners, students of history, and those interested in revisionist takes on WWII. For maximum insight into arguments and evidence, refer to timestamped segments above.

Transcript

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[B]

Welcome back to the show. How are you doing?

[C]

I'm doing very well. Thank you for having me back. It's always a pleasure. Particularly, particularly so soon back to back. I really appreciate it.

[B]

Well, I want to have you on a few times, especially for this one subject because I, I know it's your specialty. It's of great interest to you and World War II is absolutely fascinating. I don't even think, well, we can even bother getting into the Pacific at this point. Let's stay in, you know, let's stay in Europe. But in your. Where do you start? Most people, when they. A lot of good historians start with the Treaty of Versailles and say the Treaty of Versailles basically was the foundation for what led up to World War II. So what's your take on that?

[C]

That certainly is what created the political culture of Weimar. So I mean, that was an essential catalyst, but it wasn't the sole proximate. Cause I really. It was the Bolshevik Revolution, which was an international phenomenon. Like, I know I don't want to. I don't want to jump the gun or go too far afield into a kind of theoretical topic that's not totally material to what we're. What's right in front of us. But you know, I cite Ernst Nolte a lot because he, he gets into the, the psychological as well as kind of the meta historical context of the war. And a lot of people don't like him for other reasons. I'm not going to flesh out all those reasons right here. Knocks. It's controversial, but because again, I don't want to. I've read two of his books.

[B]

I think I understand why.

[C]

Yeah, yeah. But the people who, people who, people who attack him. One of the things that they emphasize is they say, like, well, you know, the, the Russian Revolution that was happening in, in, you know, in Moscow and St. Petersburg, you know, to a lesser degree and, and you know, in these kind of frontier territories, the Baltic. It's like that. I mean, it's not really true. I mean, yeah, obviously I Mean, those were primary theaters, but you know, in Bavaria there was an actual Communist revolution. And in Berlin, I mean, the Communists were fighting the Stahl helm and, and the free core in the street. Quite literally. It's a, it's a really, really stupid movie. It was this TV movie from about 20 years ago. It's got Peter Stair as, as Captain Rom, which is kind of cool, but it's called Hitler Rise of Evil. I mean that, that, that's, that's a, that's an overwrought title if there ever was one. Rise of Evil. But there's a scene in Munich where the, where they, you know, the Communists are literally shooting it out with Peter Stormera Rahm and, and these Stahl type guys. And that's not Hollywood stuff. I mean, that really happened. You know, it was a, a civil war situation. So the, you know, the National Socialists. I mean, yeah, like that was the only reason there were like the treaty ever saw in the fact that it became clear, you know, that the Allies weren't really interested in, in creating some kind of workable political order that the, you know, combatant states or the former combatant states could live with. They were, they were basically interested in looting Germany. I mean, yeah, that was essential, but National Socialism, to understand National Socialism and understand the 20th century generally, you've got to understand communism and you gotta understand the fact that there's a revolutionary paradigm underway. And like Noldi said, it was like a European civil war was underway. And, and that, and that's so, I mean, yeah, but I, but again, the, the treaty conditions were such that, I mean that, that should not be this, that should be indisputable to people. I mean, wherever they fall in the issue or whatever. However, even if they write a very, very punitive view of Germany. You know, I mean, incidentally too, that's, I've gone to, I've gone to bed for Wilson before Knox. I think Wilson was a good man or because I think he, he was this great president or something, but you can't really hang responsibility for Versailles and, and the, the kind of disaster of the, of the, of the punitive piece on Wilson. You know, Wilson's 14 points. I mean that might seem kind of high futin and, and silly in from a real politic perspective, but Wilson didn't want to punish Berlin. He, he, he was disgusted by the Treaty of Versailles and he threw his hands up instead. I, you know, he, he, he, because he realized that, you know, he, he basically, he basically bailed out quite literally. You know, the like, like London and Paris. And then they. They paid him back by saying, okay, you know, now's our chance to loot Germany and. And not remedy the. The conditions that gave rise to war in the first place. So. Yeah, I mean, that's. That's correct. I don't really. I don't really. But at the same time, it's important not to reduce things just to that. Like I've heard. I know people like Ian Kershaw, they. They act like Adolf Hitler was. Was some kind of con man who just capitalized on these. These kinds of grievances that were. We're kind of middling. I mean, first of all, Weimar really was tailored direct the German economy. Like, that was its point. It wasn't just this misunderstanding or, you know, this kind of. This kind of somewhat objectionable piece that, you know, these crazy German chauvinists just decided to fixate on it. You know, the. You're gonna. You're. You're gonna. You're gonna provoke some kind of. You're going to provoke some kind of hostile reaction if you impose something like that on a people. I mean, and I. And plus, I mean, why. Why would you do that? The. You're not. Even if you're, Even if you hate the Germans, you don't care or you just don't care about their fortunes as a people. I mean, why you. If. If you're gonna. If you're gonna subject people to a starvation regime, I mean, you're. You're not. You're not looking forward to a workable piece.

[B]

You're.

[C]

You're gonna just generate structural instability. So. Yeah, I agree.

[B]

Yeah. It seems that Weimar, one of the easiest ways to destroy it was the way they always do it through the banks.

[C]

Well, it's also the thing with World War I is this. I. I object strongly. People are always. People think they're being smart, you know, when they. They such Smedley Butler and they're like, yeah, you know, war is just about, you know, Wall Street. Like, it's really not true. I mean, wars are bad for business generally. The fact that. The fact that there's firms and individual men who find ways to profit from war or the fact that there's guys like Dick Cheney and like Halberton who. Where that's basically their M.O. i mean, that. That, you know, there's guys. There's guys who have some kind of. Who are on the make in. In all kind of sectors of political life. But, but on its face, you know, Wall street is never hot to go to War because of this, some way to make money. But at the same time, like crazy as it might sound to us, I mean, because we take kind of informational awareness for granted. The, there was a strong financial aspect to the Great War as regards America and JP Morgan, they, they extended a huge amount of unsecured credit to the British Crown. And the British had essentially said this diplomatic delegation that also had these kind of high flying banker types with them and they, they'd approached, they'd approached Wall street, you know, in 1915, when it became clear that, you know, kind of a quagmire was sitting in, you know, and they secured all this, all this unsecured, they secured this, you know, this huge unsecured line of credits basically saying like, look, you know, that we, you know, in just a few months, you know, will have broken the back of the German war machine and then we're all going to get paid. And then it became clear that wasn't going to happen. And JP Morgan essentially got on the phone quite literally with a telegram, telegraph as it were, probably to the Colonel House. And, and Wilson had said, you fix this right now. You know, we, you, you cannot, you are not gonna let London lose this war and you're not gonna let us eat this loss. I mean that wasn't the sole reason why Wilson went to war, but I mean that was a big part of it, you know, so I mean it was, there's a whole lot of, there's a lot of very, very corrupt stuff going on. And that was, and it was a little more opaque than whatever in the Second World War. Like people lie about the Second World War a lot and say crazy things about it. And you know, there's ethno sectarian narratives about it that are nakedly political, but it's, it's more of, it's more kind of clear cut. Like the Great War doesn't really make a lot of sense. It was a strange example of, of, of security paradigms kind of not really matching up with the technology that they like the killing technology, I mean, of the battlefield. And it was and like a basic failure of deterrence. I mean that's why it's really interesting frankly. It, you know, and I, I think, I genuinely think, you know, the last we take for granted because, you know, the War between the States like really, really, really screwed things up in America for decades. You know, it did like America didn't really normalize until the turn of the century. But Europe, Europe after Waterloo didn't really fight any major wars. I mean, there's a Crimean War, but I mean that was kind of localized in theater, like in literally the Crimea, you know. And there was the Frago Prussian War which you know, was a, like this kind of incredible, you know, German victory. I mean I realized Prussia wasn't Germany yet, but you know, the modern German state is the Prussian state until 1945 in my opinion. But point being, it's not like Europe had fought some like heavy, heavy conflicts in, in the, in the, in the 19th century. And we're developing a sense of hey,

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[C]

conditions 21/ of, of what that modern battlefield is going to look like and how it's going to impact, you know, national economies and things and how it was going to create shortages and how was basically just going to slaughter people. I mean, so that was part of it like even, even and project like the, I think the German I command, I think, I think the Kaiser Reich. And this isn't just because I, I've got a warmer view of Germany than I do the other combatant states. I think it's indisputable they had a bit of better idea of how things were going to develop. And that's one of the reasons why Holvig, the, the Chancellor was beside himself when it became clear that France was going to go to war. Because I think he, despite, he wasn't any kind of military man but he, he knew that some kind of slaughter was going to happen. But I think, you know, if you, if you read the kind of internal memorandums, I mean what, what amounts of internal memorandums and kind of internal debate and discussion in London and in Paris and to a lesser degree like within this, within the czars kind of inner circle, but that's a bit more complicated. Like these guys really didn't get it. They thought this was kind of, they thought it was going to be kind of a brush fire affair and that, or they thought that, you know, they, they thought that, you know, the Germans just basically wanted to like force for some kind of concessions on their, on their key, on their key demands and, but you know, okay, well you know, we'll just fight for a little while and then you know, we'll, we can come to the table in position of strength. That's not, that's not at all the way The Kaiser Reich saw it and they certainly didn't think that they were going to lose, you know, a million people, but they, they, they didn't think it was, you know, it's going to be this, you know, four year long, just, you know, kind of like endless destructive affair. So. Yeah, that's a good point.

[B]

So what most people know about Weimar is there's two things. One, that it became really degenerate and morally and two, the money supply got inflated to the point where people were, you know, needed wheelbarrows full of money in order to buy a loaf of bread. Which was probably, you know, just lore, but I hope it's lore. But the. What do you see as, what's your understanding of what was going on there?

[C]

I mean, like I said, the, the, like we're talking about, you know, the.

[B]

But was it like, I mean it almost seems like, you know, how now we have these people, it's like, oh, we have to teach kindergarteners about queer theory.

[C]

Yeah.

[B]

Things like, I mean it's like it almost seems when you think about it, when you look back and you, if you know anything about the history of Prussia and then you go forward to Weimar, it's like that looks planned, that looks like somebody injected that into there on purpose. Even the degeneracy, even you know, the whole, the whole idea of siphoning and looting the country, which I think in the modern day we can talk about Ukraine, it seems like it's the same exact thing, but it seems like that was all planned, you know, that it was. Sure a lot of people are going to loot a lot of countries, but, but I mean they made sure that it was, that it was going to be catastrophic because they not only defeated them, you know, destroyed their money supply, but they destroyed their morality.

[C]

Yeah. And well, it's also too, the starvation blockade endured for months after the cessation of hostilities. With regard to the, the kind of moral deviancy. Yeah, I mean I, it, it wasn't essentially orchestrated as, as was the case post 1945. And in, in the Bundes Republic, the Buddhist Republic, and particularly West Berlin was flooded with pornography after the Second World War. And that if you read Wilhelm Reich, he, he was this, he was this German Jewish psychologist, he wrote about that, about, about, about breaking the moral foundation of peoples in, in order to essentially make them malleable. Obviously this is more above board than people think, but that, that there definitely wasn't. Yeah, there definitely was intentional subversion in that regard. But it, it's like I generally agree with E. Michael Jones, what he wrote about this and it, I'm not going too far afield because it's is material to what we're talking about in a very direct way. You know, you, Jones, always coming back to the idea that, you know, look like marquis dead was actually. He considered himself to be a political thinker. You know, he wasn't just this, he wasn't just this kind of sick individual, sort of degenerate aristocrat, like writing pornography and writing about sex because that's what kind of decadent aristocrats do. I mean. Yeah, that is what they do. But he was widely publishing this stuff because his notion was that, you know, well, you know, the, the, the, the foundation of what I don't like in France and in Europe generally is this kind of throne and alter sensibility where, you know, you've got this, you've got this kind of, you know, you've got this, you've got Roman Catholicism propping up this. See the sovereignty in the monarchy and, and it derives its authority, it derives its legitimacy from a, a claim that it reflects providential design. And the basis of that is the, the, the preeminence of reason over passion and irrational things. So it wasn't just that, you know, thead didn't like females and he didn't. Or that he was a statist and a homosexual or that he, you know, he wanted, he wanted to kind of screw with people's morals and horrify them. Like he wanted to do all of those things. But his idea was also that, well, if I can get people to say, you know, why. Why do I want to privilege reason over. Over my passions? I just want to, you know, I just want to do things that feel good or I want to pursue, you know, sexually deviant stuff or why. Why should I be a family man when I can, you know, visit prostitutes or, you know, why. Why would I want to be involved with women anyway when I can, you know, go. Go with men and just kind of do whatever I want, you know, I mean that this, this idea that sexuality and like social morals, like, aren't political. Like, that's nonsense. So, yeah, I mean, that was part of it. And it also, you know, I mean, people in Germany were, it wasn't just like far right guys and, and stuff. I mean, people very cognizant of these things in those days, you know, like, not because they were a bunch of prudes or they weren't, you know, worldly or something. You know, if anything, people then were like a lot more worldly than now because, like, life and death was kind of like in their everyday life. And particularly then you had, you know, you had millions of guys mowing about in Germany who, Who kind of come. They'd, you know, they'd spent their formative years, you know, in. In the military. You know, it's not this idea that Germany was this provincial kind of place who. And they freaked out about sex. Like, that's ridiculous, obviously, but they, you know, they. So not only Germans, they saw what was going on in terms of that kind of subversion. But it's also, you know, the, the. The National Socialists, or better or worse, they. They're. They were not conservatives and they didn't pretend to be. And you know, the reason why, speaking of Rom. The reason why guys like Rom or in the ranks, particularly in the revolutionary phase, you know, it's like Hitler said, you know, when people objected to some of these characters being in. In his Milou, he's like, you know, yeah, Ron might be a degenerate guy, but he's great under fire. And I think Hitler said, you know, the SA is a tough fighting force. It's not a finishing school for young ladies. So I don't give a. What these guys do on their off time as long as they're loyal and they're willing to fight. And so my point is that it's not like. It's not like Hitler and it's not, you know, or even Strasser or any of these guys. It's not. The National Associate didn't become popular because these guys are a bunch of, you know, kind of moralizing conservatives. And it's not like they. It's not like they, you know, just fixated on pornography and. And socially deviant things because they. They were these uptight conservatives. Like, I'm not saying there's anything wrong with conservatives. I'm objecting those things. Obviously those things are bad. My point is that this stuff is kind of so extreme and so nakedly political. I mean, that's why the National Socialists were. Were reacting to it so strongly because, you know, know, it. It. It was, you know, I mean, to. To Jones's point, I mean, that. That kind of stuff is always political. It's never. It's never truly just secular, never truly just, you know, incidental to political occurrences. But it was. It was so. It was so nakedly tailored to attack the kind of prevailing social order and, and things that it. It became a priority to. To remedy it to the kind of radical right, the radical National Socialist right. So, yeah, I mean, that's, that's really true.

[B]

You had already mentioned that you talk about rom fighting in the streets. Basically you have civil war in the streets in, in Germany in the 20s. So how does Weimar, how do, how do the National Socialists come out of this? And, and what's, what's the direction in the 20s?

[C]

I mean, my opinion is that Germany was, Germany was doing a little bit better. Gustav Stressman, he, he found a way of kind of mere compliance with the reparations payments. And he was also able to draw Germany even at its worst. You know, people have confidence in its ability to produce and get a return on their investment. So Stressman, who was, you know, Chancellor, he gets kind of a bad rap. I'm not saying he was a good man or he was like on the side of his own people, like the way he should have been.

[A]

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[C]

CTs and Cs 21 plus sponsored by Chumba Casino. You can't just like dismiss him as this like race trader or bad guy. And he understood economics very well. And Schumpeter actually praised him. And I'm a big stumper guy if I mean that. And not that I am some kind of authority on economics, but. Point being, Stressman's able to, to garner a fair amount of direct foreign investment such that it, I mean, there wasn't the kind of complex interdependence in those days that we did granted today. But the, the national economy was bouncing back to a degree. Germany was kind of beginning to come to terms a bit with, with London, not so much with Paris, but then, but then the 1929 financial crisis happened. Collapse happened rather wasn't as a crisis. And that threw that through Germany into a tailspin in a lot of ways. And all the kind of ground they, excuse me, all the kind of ground they gained seemed to have evaporated overnight. And that really, that really put the National Socialists back on the map. And plus the, the international situation was getting more critical too. You know, it became, I think it was around 1929, 1930, that it started to become clear. I mean, even though the Soviet Union was nothing like it was ten years subsequent, but it became clear that the Soviet Union was gonna. Was becoming a superpower. That though those concepts, those kind of geostrategic concepts weren't really in people's mind yet, but they, people understood the power potential of, of America and, and, and they unders. I mean, especially the Germans because they fought the Americans. You know, they taken the full brunt of the US army, which is not any fun thing, especially in those days, but, you know, so. But the, the power potential of the Soviet Union was becoming. Was becoming apparent. I mean, aside from the fact that Bolshevism was. It become something of a psychological contagion. I'm not saying that it's not melodramatic. That's the best way I can describe it. You know, it. There was like the, the apocalypse. The conditions of the epoch seem to be favoring communism and people really freaked out. So yeah, it was, it was all those things. And, and like I said, it wasn't. It wasn't just that the 1929 collapse, it, it didn't just kick people's asses. Like, it, I mean, like, I mean, it did people all across the planet, but I mean every major developed economy, but it, it was especially brutal to Germans because they'd actually, they've been making ground, you know, at, after, after in. In the, in the wake of, you know, the catastrophe in 1918. And then, and then they suddenly just, you know, all those games just evaporate overnight. And you know, it was, it was kind of like the final nail in the coffin of people's willingness to, to accept, you know, that there was some sort of like parliamentary democratic solution to their problems and that. That's my view of it. Perfect storm of stuff.

[B]

So around the time of the crash in 29. What's. Where's Hitler at? What's he doing?

[C]

That was a National Socialist. Big break. That was their first big breakthrough, you know, and it was, you know, I mean people, Adolf Hitler, in a lot of ways, he pioneered kind of what we can. What became kind of, you know, modern campaigning techniques of the 20th century. That's why in the, you know, trying for the will, you know how there's this, it opens up with this, you know, aerial shot of. Of Hitler's aircraft descending out of the airfield, you know, like breaches the clouds. I mean, that's just like a really cool shot, you know, and it it was kind of like, like the camera work was pretty radical. Like, not radical. Like it was cool. Like, I mean, it was that too. Like, radical. Like it hadn't really been done before. But the reason why it's a big deal, it wasn't, it wasn't just Hitler, you know, trying to flex about, like how cool like his, his, his PR staff was, although it was part of it, but like Hitler was the, it was the first national political figure to, you know, like, shoot all over the place in a plane. So, you know, that he campaigned face to face, you know, and that, that was a big deal because people didn't do that before. You know, I mean, Hitler was basically campaigning his ass off. And that's what Mein Kampf is too. I'm always telling people to read Hitler's second book that was unpublished. This is called the second Book. Even though it never actually was a book, it was just a manuscript because it was, it was discovered after the day of defeat. But that, that's, that's basically Hitler's geopolitical book. Like Mein Cop is, is like, it's basically, it's Hitler, like making his case to the German voter as the wife should vote for National Socialists. That's always, it's goofy when you get these losers. Whether it was, you know, old Chrissy Hitchens or whether it's Ian Kershaw, it's like, oh, my Cop's a terrible book. It's like, well, bro, it's not, it's not supposed to be Shakespeare. It's like, it's, it's. It's a man who's, you know, running for political office saying why you should vote for his party. I mean, that it's, that's not gonna be, you know, a compelling reading, you know, a century after the fact. Because, I mean, I can't. That point can't be overstated. Like, people act like people at. People act like the National Socialists put like, pulled the wool over everybody's eyes by like pretending to be this above board party. It's like they, they were, they were, they were a political party that wanted people to vote for them. And people did. They accomplished a parliamentary, A parliamentary majority. They were able to finangle a chancellorship out of it. Their primary up, their primary opposition was engaged in a war against the legitimate, against the seat of government. It was entirely legitimate to ban the kpd. It's like, you don't have to like Hitler. You don't have to like National Socialism, but unlike the, I mean, unlike the Bolsheviks and you know, In Russia who just kind of killed people because they get what they wanted. The National Socialists were the legitimate government in Germany. I mean, that. I don't, I don't want to get too far ahead of ourselves. I mean, that's, that, that's one of the interesting things about other Nuremberg narratives. Tailored. I mean, this idea that, you know, the government of Germany was illegitimate. I mean, you could say that it was an evil government, I guess, if that turns you on. But it wasn't. This illegal really, you know, illegitimate government. The election returns that the National Socials got were, I mean, above board. That's not super important anyway, like the point I made, you know, the plebiscite that made Hitler to fear the furor. Hitler had something totally insane. Like 89.3% of German voters, like, thought he was great. Like, people loved Adolf Hitler. They didn't like, love the National Socialist Party. I mean, they, they had the national sociality. But the key takeaway is that the Germans loved Adolf Hitler. Not that they loved the party that he represented, but that's, you know, that's, that's basically what Adolf Hitler was doing. I mean, really when he, when he got cut loose from Landsberg Prison. I mean, that's just what he said about doing. He said, well, we're gon. He. I mean, it was interesting give and take between him and, and the Weimar government. On the, I mean, on the one hand. On the one hand, he literally, you know, he. And he and Shubner, Richter and Ludendorf, who in. In those days was still an ally of. Of Hitler, you know, they literally merged into the. Against the guns of. Of Vimar. But when Hitler found himself in court, they. They actually treated him pretty. I mean, they treated him really, really. Not just efficaciously. I mean, they, they really showed him a lot of slack. So, I mean, I, I mean, I think Hiller realized the writing was on the wall and that there wasn't some kind of. He wasn't going to be able to duplicate what Mussolini had done in Rome in 1922. So part of that was pragmatic. It wasn't Hitler being a nice guy or something. But part of it was also that, you know, he. He realized he. He wasn't going to be marginalized by, you know, being locked away for 20 years or, you know, being banned from public life or something. So it's like, well, you know, the. It would have been, among other things, would have been unseemly for him to continue on a revolutionary course after that. And it probably would have been counterproductive. Absent some kind of absence, some kind of situation like happened in the Baltic states where, you know, the, you, you really did have, you know, a kind of bloody civil war under conditions of parody. Germany was dealing with a revolutionary paradigm on the ground, but it was localized. You know, that's, that's why, that's why, that's why the, that's why the Munich Soviet was the big, was the communist big coup. Because I mean that's where they, that's where they could pull that off. They, they didn't have the, they didn't have the political capital, the forces in being to pull it off nationwide. That does not mean it was any less of an existential threat. And only owing to the international situation, it didn't matter if most Germans weren't communists. It's like, okay, I mean if, if the communists can, if they, if they could, if they could carve out these fiefdoms in places like Bavaria, if they could control the Berlin street, you know, it didn't, you know, and, and Germany was a fracturing mess anyway owing to Weimar and you know, the occupation of. The occupation of the roar and things and know they, they wouldn't have been able to resist Soviet designs. I mean it's such a complicated situation. But yeah, it's that, that's essentially what Hitler was doing. You know, he was campaigning like a modern politician, which Hitler was many things. And I, I agree with Russell Sto, like I, I cited on my podcast the other week that, you know, I think Hiller was a messianic sort of figure, historically speaking, not in religious terms. Obviously. He wasn't a, he wasn't just a typical politician, but he was the main ass he wore. He was a modern politician and he did that very. So that's, that's what Hitler was doing during the twenties.

[B]

Let's jump into the thirties a little bit. And I wanted to talk a little bit more about Europe. You had talked about how you constantly bring up the Bolsheviks. I mean they, that 1917 revolution looms large over the whole 20th century. I mean it's right there. And what I think a lot of people don't realize is, and maybe you can talk to this is just how much sway and just how much they were infiltrating European countries. I mean there were, I mean obvious one Spanish Civil War, but pretty much every country had a, a communist kind of movement in it. I mean just anyone who's read anything about 1920s Italy can, can see who the, the anti fascists were.

[C]

So yeah, they had remarkable momentum, I mean, both in terms of their kind of forces and being might not be the right way to characterize it, but they had, they had tremendous reach, particularly, particularly for that. That time, you know, a century ago wasn't like today. I mean, there was, There was, There was more interdependence than people might think. And especially in Europe. I mean, people cross national frontiers pretty much as a matter of course. You know, it's not like there wasn't. There wasn't this kind of monadic and celerity to things. But the communists were very, very good at. At political warfare and they were very good at. At. At waging political war with this kind of cadre structure very effectively, even when they didn't have majorities on the ground or even pluralities. I think part of that owes to the radical commitment to the. The people he did have acting as a force multiplier. But it's also one of the reasons I like Noi. It's not just because I, I think that he. He describes the phenomenon, what happened during the war and with, with some of these really brutal, kind of categorically homicidal events. But he also, it can't really be overstated the degree to which communism seemed to have the force of apocalypse history behind it. That's why, like, last time you were kind enough to invite me on the podcast, I made the point that. Or you made the point that people like to rake James Burnham over the coals and a lot of these other political fingers of the era and economists, because they talk about. They talk about communism like it was just this perennial thing and that its victory was imminent. People weren't saying that because they loved Joseph Stalin or because they thought communism was great or something. I mean, yeah, some people thought that way, but it, the. The 1929 collapse, it wasn't just an economic crisis of, of the sort that, you know, you, you deal with when the world situation is in. Is deteriorating or when there's some kind of punctuated shock going to, you know, owing to like, you know, shortages or famine or something like happened before. You know, food insecurity got remedied globally in the 50s and stuff. It was the like, basically essentially like the banking structure as it existed at that point failed. You know, some people, like, well, all right, you know, capitalism and private industry can't deliver at scale. You know, it can't provide people with what they need, and there's too much uncertainty. You know, you can't just leave it in the, in the hands of, in the Proverbial hands of all these, you know, discrete decision makers that aren't coordinated. So this just doesn't work anymore. So some, some kind of central planning is going to have to take the place of, of the free market. Like everybody thought that way. Like, even right wing guys thought that way, you know, because what was the alternative? They, they didn't understand. Okay. I mean it wasn't, a lot of these guys, it wasn't a bad faith thing. They just didn't really get it. Because in the, in the moment you can't understand what's happening in historical terms, particularly with something as complex as 20th century economics. So that was underway. And so it, it says, he appeared to everybody like the man on the European street. Like this is, you know, this. Basically communists have the force of history behind them. You know, it's almost, it's almost like a crusade or some sort of like fervor that's, you know, sweeping millions of people up in it. So how do we stop this? And that was, that was, that. I mean, that was a big part of the strength of Adolf Hitler too. And that, that stove. His point about him being a messianic figure, you know, then that was a big. That's what's fascinating too because like, people are. I'm always taking the issue with people who say, like, well, you know, Hitler was his gutter snipe who just, you know, exploited anti Semitism. Hitler almost never, even as early as, he almost never mentioned Jews. I can think of two speeches where he referred to international jewelry. I can think of another one where he talked about Jewish bullshitism. But that's it. Like he just didn't bring it up. Not because he was afraid of being politically incorrect or upsetting people. But that's not, that just wasn't really his orientation, you know, I mean, yeah, Hiller took for granted that if you were a national Socialist, you view Jews as your mortal enemy. But this idea that, you know, Hitler was getting people clued into his program and excited by talking about Jews, like that's not true. I mean, I guess you could turn around and say this because it would have been redundant because everybody understood he was talking about. Okay, but you know, the, the, the kind of, the kind of shared premises that people were responding to with, with, with what he was presenting to them had to do with he, he made them believe that they weren't inevitably going to be swept up in this kind of mass homicidal, like workers revolt that then was just going to kind of transform everything into this sort of, you Know, this sort of giant like labor camp that, where you know, the trappings of national life and, and social capital have been kind of stripped away and you know, things have been kind of just like reduced to bear survival. And if you weren't privileged within the administration of that new regime, you know, you just were kind of gonna live a pointless life of relative deprivation. The only consolation being that, you know, you'd be assured that if you were politically reliable, you wouldn't starve or not have housing or something. I mean that's, that's really what was underway. And if people don't believe me on that, read Orwell's 1984. Like that, that's, that's basically that, you know, but name, that's, that's a Stalinist dystopia that a guy who came of age in the epoch like that was the big fear of every European including you know, even, even middle class tory types like Mr. Orwell. Okay, so I mean that's, this wasn't this like weird thing, that paranoid artist, you know, self styled shaman, Mr. Hitler just kind of came up with. So that, that's, I can't really emphasize that enough.

[B]

You mentioned Orwell and I mentioned the Spanish Civil War. So yeah, the. Okay, so 1932 and 1933, we have the election of two people who will fundamentally dictate what the next, even what we're dealing with today. So Hitler comes to power and the king for life, FDR comes to power. Yeah, and from what I understand, Mr. FDR was not exactly. He wasn't averse to what Mussolini or what Hitler were talking about in the, in their respective countries, was he?

[C]

Well, I mean Roosevelt's all. No, I, like I've, you know, like I said before last time we, we were discussing the 20th century. The, one of the reasons I like Thomas Fleming, not, not the Rockford Institute guy. For clarity, if people aren't familiar with the other Thomas Fleming, he was this east coast Irish guy. We're not going to hold it against him that he's Irish because he was a really good author, but he, he was this independent scholar, historian and he, he, he wrote kind of the seminal critical biography of, of Roosevelt as well as of the, of the, of the, of the Roosevelt administration called the New Dealers War. And it like Hap Arnold helped him write it. Like all, all these personages, some of whom were Roosevelt's allies, some of whom were his enemies. You know, guys in the, in, in the Diplomat and guys in the State Department, guys in the military apparatus. You know, then War Department. You know he had access to all this direct testimony and all these documents. But his core, I mean obviously he's got nothing nice to say about Roosevelt but his core thesis, the brass tax of it is is what I said last time that the New Deal regime was as much, was as much a revolutionary paradigm as we commented in Berlin and, and what Stalin did in the Soviet Union and it's foreign policy. You better believe that Roosevelt basically is raised on Detroit was to what you know what was the implemented in a. A progressive socialist and anti fascist political order, you know and, and kind of ground up know restructuring socially and politically and, and ultimately. I mean it's great foreign policy coup was you know the destruction of Germany and the destruction of fascism. That was its whole raise on Detra just as much as Hitler's raison D was dismash Bolshevism. And that's you know, make a point again and again if you want to understand not just, not just Hitler but the, the but like his orientation towards history. The last real speech before the Reichstag that Hitler made was the 12-11-1941 speech, which incidentally was also the formal declaration of war against the United States.

[A]

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[C]

CS21 plus sponsored by CHA Casino. And Hitler didn't talk about Stalin in it at all. Like he mentioned communism. He didn't mention Stalin. He mentioned Churchill very fleetingly and kind and you know, in kind of a condescending way he talked about Roosevelt. He did two things. He identif. He. He. He talked about the situation in the east where the assault on Moscow was, was halt, was being halted and which in my opinion was what decided the war. But he said, Hitler said two things. He said well you know, this is, this is, this isn't any. He's like we've been through this before in 1813. Now when he said we okay. In 1813 Prussia was fighting along with Napoleon in the, in the Russian Empire and Prussia was the only German state that went to war on Napoleon's side. So Hitler, the Habsburg Catholic was basically saying we the German people are the Prussian legacy state. And that's fascinating and it's key to understanding Hitler and why, why everybody was okay with him, you know, from his own kind of tribe, you know, the, the Bavarian Munich types as well. As you know, the, the Prussian officer types and everybody else, that's key. And I was. Hillary actually believed that that wasn't an affectation station or something. But secondly, what Hitler said was, he said, you know, this was a European war and it did not have to be a global war. And, and basically Mr. Roosevelt, we tried to come to terms with, with, with America over and over again, you know, and there was no reason. We, we have no interest in common with America. We have also no conflicts with them in common. You know, basically like Ro, why is, you know, Roosevelt basically is forcing us to fight America. And that's actually true. You can claim that, you know, well, Germans are evil and Hitler's an evil man. So I think it's good that America went to war with Germany. And I mean that you can, okay, I mean that if that's your position, that's fine. But align with the Soviet Union and assaulting Germany and make no mistake, September 11, 1941, that was the other September 11, that's when Roosevelt declared unrestricted naval war against all German flag military vessels. I mean like America went to war with Germany long before there was ever a German war declaration, long before there was ever Pearl harbor. You know, and that was, that didn't make any sense strategically. You know, it was, it was an ideological political decision. You know, so it's, that's, that's the key takeaway it. But I wrote some law inform on this too. I mean if you want to understand, if you want to understand Hitler versus Stalin. Yeah, there's a Manichean aspect to that and it's almost, it's, you know, it's almost kind of mythical. And the enmity between Germany and, and the Russian people is really horrible and tragic. I'm not like making light of that. But you know, the Germans and the Eastern Slavs are just gonna fight. Like even absent bullshitism, like that's just something that's going to happen. Hitler's real kind of ideological nemesis was Roosevelt because again, like there, there wasn't any reason for America to fight Germany other than the fact that Roosevelt and his, and his patrons slated Germany for annihilation. And I mean in political terms, I mean that's the definition of enmity. You know, it a man you don't have any objective strategic conflict with that's forcing you with, you know, into confrontation. It's quite literally, you know, he slated you for destruction for some ideological commitment or reason. So yeah, that's an important, that's an important point. And everybody, you know, when you're talking about Hitler and his intentions. You know, it's. It's kind of like people are constantly talking about what's in the Constitution or what's in the Bible, but they never ever read either, so they don't actually know. Like, people always talking about, like, things Hitler said and didn't thought, but they never actually bothered to read things he said, you know, and it's. David Irving made the point that, you know, Hitler was a very rare political figure the 20 20th century, because he basically did everything he said. You know, he didn't really have a filter, for better or worse. So it's the, the, you know, he was pretty. It's pretty above board if you want to, like, trace Hitler's strategic decisions as well as his political sensibilities, because he said these things in public, you know, with. Without his exceptions of things that, you know, requires secrecy in order to succeed. But, you know, there wasn't. This wasn't some, like, secret program or something or. There's not. There's not some complexity to. I mean, yeah, there's a lot of complexities. Adolf Hitler, but there's not. There's not some. There's not some great mystery to. Or ledger named or, you know, what, what, what. What his political commitments were and what he wanted to accomplish. So. Yeah, I think that's important.

[B]

Well, what I was saying about FDR is it's not a secret that a lot of people who are around him have said after that that through the 30s, when the. The German economy was seemingly doing very well, that he looked upon it and, you know, as he's doing the New Deal, which. As he's putting together a new Deal and passing all these laws, all these. What do they call those things? The. That president's just right. Executive orders. Yeah, yeah. Like 3,000 of them or 4,000, I think.

[C]

Yeah.

[B]

That he was looking and he was like, well, if. If they have a managed economy over there, we can have a managed economy here.

[C]

Oh, yeah, that was only part of it. And Adam Twos, he's a really interesting guy. He's an economic historian, and that's that those guys tend to be really brainy. I mean, like, economics is. If you're gonna write an economic history of any modern state, I mean, that's just like a kind of a Leviathan task. But he. I don't know what Tuesday's politics are. I mean, I'm sure. I'm sure they probably. I probably would not see it eye to eye with him. He's like a typical kind of British University type guy. But he wrote a book that's a history of the, the third rug economy called the Wages of Destruction. It's a really exhaustive book and it's got a huge amount of data and yeah, the. If you want to understand, if you want to understand national social economics. I mean it's basically, it's basically traditional you know, Hamilton Frederick List kind of stuff. I mean with you know with a, with it, with a, with a, with a bias for heavy industry and, and mass subsidies. The, that, that, that privileges terrestrial man. You know. You know, heavy terrestrial manufacturing over other sectors. But I mean that's. The German economy today is not really radically different. I mean we, we'd. It's a stupid term but what economists in the 80s used to call quote picking winners and losers like that. You know that the German economy is a lot more like that of, of Japan than it is like America or the uk. That's why there's a fast thing one of these like Goldman Sachs losers after, after a weight he he, he dropped it was in that. It was, it was that Rolling Stone piece by Matt Tybee or TV or whatever the. You pronounce his name. It was like Goldman Sachs rap. He shows up in Berlin in like 2005 or something and he starts like making his pitch you know and about you know basically trying to turn these German firms onto, onto you know binding up their pension system with you know, Goldman Sachs 401ks or something. And like I guess these, these Germans literally laughed at him. We're like get out of here. You know, we don't, we don't invest in derivatives. You know. I mean so that that sensibility remains. But it, yeah, that's what, that's what that, that's exactly what what Roosevelt did and that I mean but it's also too. I mean people you know the New Deal didn't actually accomplish anything. I mean in terms, I mean politically it got Roosevelt everything he wanted and it had earth shaking consequences. But basically it's you know Roosevelt didn't do it. Roosevelt didn't stimulate US economy or like breathe new blood into it or. And he's not it's not know Roosevelt's administration before 1941 isn't some, isn't some testament to how, you know, isn't some testament to you know how demand side paradigms work or are true it all he did, he. He. He literally put people to work digging holes for no reason and essentially paying them in government in food stamps, you know, so that you didn't have you didn't have unemployed guys milling about, you know, every in the middle of the street, you know, begging for food or something like. And you didn't, you didn't have riots because people, you know, people couldn't buy a loaf of bread because there was no work to be had. You know, it was it that, that's what it was. I lived down the street from Skokie Lagoons, which is this big nature preserve. And like, don't get me wrong, it's pretty dope. But like you know, scoring lagoons is, it's this giant, it's these giant man made lakes just like down the street. And from me that Roosevelt had a bunch of guys dig for no reason so he could like, you know, basically give him food stamps. I mean, that's why it's there.

[B]

Wow.

[C]

Yeah, but that's what the story conference, the CCC was like in other states you'll come across stuff like that. I mean Skoggy Lagoons is, it's, it's more, it's, it's, it's more, it's more scaled than a lot of these things. But you'll, cause you come across stuff like that, you know, these, these kinds of nature preserve things or these kinds of, these kinds of, you know, like man made lakes or whatever. And there'll be some plaque or something saying like, yeah, built by like the Civilian Conservation Corps, you know, of oklahoma in like 935. So I mean that was just like a side point. But I come back with it. I think they teach like I've had people who have kids like teenagers and like when they ask me stuff like their, you know, their teenage son or daughter will be like, but yeah, you know, like in, in like 10th grade public school, whatever. They told me they're like, you know, because Roosevelt, you know, put people to work and then, you know, that saved us economy. It's like, no, that doesn't happen. If I pay you to dig a hole and give you food stamps. I'm paying you to dig a hole and giving you food stamps. I'm not, I'm not, I'm not breathing new life into. I'm not, I'm not creating, you know, I'm not, I'm not, I'm not stimulating, I'm not stimulating the national economy through incentives. But I mean, I don't know. Thank God I haven't set foot in a public school in decades. But I, I glean that that is what is underway. I don't have kids of my own, but I, I mean I like Young people anyway. But I also kind of use, I also kind of use them as like human intelligence. So I feel like what, what's happening? It's like what's happening, you know, you know, in, in, in public schools and stuff. I mean. Yeah, kidding. Like I actually do. But yeah, that, that to your point, if, if Roosevelt had been anything other than this kind of crazy Zionist guy who would, you know, looked, who, who wanted to, you know, destroy Europe in alliance with Moscow, if he was some like, you know, if you sound like America first guy, he'd been like undertaking these, these kinds of steps, ruled by, ruling by executive order and kind of you know, situating himself as like a law unto himself. Yeah, people, people would have gone crazy then and they, even today they'd be, they'd be acting like he was, they'd be acting like he was Darth Vader or something. So. Yeah, I mean, absolutely.

[B]

Look at the way they treat the Santos in Florida.

[C]

Well, yeah, exactly like the Santa. And, and unlike Mr. Roosevelt, the Santa doesn't have people arrested who disagree with him. But yeah.

[B]

So in the 30s who were, who were Germany's biggest allies?

[C]

I would say, I mean it's a complicated situation because prior to, I mean obviously you've got to look at Germany and Austria as one, as one political culture. I'm not saying like, I'm not saying that that like Austrians can't think of themselves that there's not things unique to, you know, I mean Austria is very different than Germany proper. Okay. But it, the reason why the answer was able to go off out of hitch was. Was because of what I just said. It an incident that really I. After, after the, after, after. After Dolphus was murdered and after Hitler kind of smoothed over that potential in house crisis that that could have caused Mussolini and they could say the biggest Mussolini was he offered him the Tyrol region which was a huge. That, that was unprecedented especially for I mean Hill responded this huge German nationalist. He basically, you know, he handed, he handed German speaking lands over to Italy and that quite literally outright as a concession. So from like 36, 37 onward it would, it would, it would be Italy. And I'm of the belief that Romania was first and foremost Germany's best ally. They, they. They committed a huge contingent of men in scale terms to the Eastern front. And Antonescu, uh, you know he was the uh, he was the Marshal of Romania. Ian Antonescu, he was a holder of the Knight's Cross and, and just a real badass. But also he, he really had Hitler's back and, and vice versa. And people, you know, Romania was essential too, because Barbarossa was staged essentially from Romania in key ways. If, if you understand how things broke down in terms of deployment and things, you understand that. So, I mean, Romania is not. Romania is not just this like, insignificant, dumb little country or whatever people think. It's. It's situated in a way that's key. And I mean, that's also why it is such a strange regime during the Cold War and stuff. I mean, that's like outside the scope of. We're talking about here, but yeah, I

[B]

lived there for a little while.

[C]

It's a. Oh, wow, that's awesome. Yeah, it's a strange. Like, I've never been there, but if I. Romania. Kind of fascinating. Oh, no, you would, you'd love it.

[B]

You'd love Bucharest, man. You'd have a good time.

[C]

No, I'm sure they got. They got really, really pretty ladies and it's, It's a weird collision of like crazy Slavic and crazy Latin stuff. And I, I just think that's really cool. Maybe it's because I'm kind of like a square Protestant guy or something, but. Yeah, I. That, That's. That's freaking awesome. I, like, I genuinely want to hear about that sometime, but it. But yeah, so I, I mean, forgive the tangent, but yeah, yeah, I mean, Italy, because it goes without saying. And yeah, I, I'd say Romania

[B]

for

[C]

not just because the Romanians were like, Were. Were like very, very committed to the program, but Antonesco himself was. I mean, he was just an honorable guy and like I said, a real badass, but he, he just really had Hitler's back and Mussolini did too. I mean, Mussolini is a guy. Mussolini had a lot of flaws. And I think Mussolini, like Lenin was. I, I think he was kind of a master intriguer and kind of a political genius in, in terms of, you know, as a political soldier. I mean, I, I don't think he was really. I don't think he was cut out for, you know, gross. Wrong politic, if we can look at it that way. He just wasn't. But I, I think, you know, I know Mussolini some degenerate habits. I know he was a big womanizer and kind of a sex fiend, and he, He. He whacked his own son in law, you know, Count Ciano. I don't, I don't think that's a great thing to do. I, I mean, that's like crazy land stuff, I guess. But I'm not saying that to be mean or Prejudice. But.

[B]

But it's. It's also like you said in a recent episode of yours, Mussolini had this swagger about him.

[C]

Yeah.

[B]

G Smo about him. He had a. You. The average man on the street probably believed that Mussolini could kick his ass.

[C]

Yeah, that is true.

[B]

But Hitler didn't have that.

[C]

No, no, Hitler was. That's why Hitler and Mussolini are kind of. It's odd that they became like, personally really tight because they weren't similar kinds of men, you know, like, Hitler was this. Hitler was actually. I mean, Hitler was like a tense guy, but he was very subdued, you know, when he. Hitler. When he. He'd never. Hitler made the point. He didn't like wearing a uniform. Sometimes he felt it was necessary, particularly during, you know, like the revolutionary phase immediately after. But Hitler always wore just, you know, well tailored but modest suit, you know, and he'd wear. He'd wear his Iron Cross first class, but in his party lapel, like his party badge, you know, and he didn't, you know, Hitler, you know, he had Ava Braum, who was very beautiful and a lot younger than him, but, you know, she was his only girl. Like, he didn't, you know. Yeah, he was. He was very, very different than Mussolini there was. But I mean, it's straight. Like many become friends. It's kind of strange. I mean, like, there's guys that you wouldn't think would. Would become such close allies, and they do. But I think that's the case with Hitler and Mussolini. But it's all. Hitler took great risks, including, you know, deploying Scorsini to bail Mussolini out, like, literally to spring him from that. The Alpine redox where he was being imprisoned. I mean, I like Hitler the other. Because it, you know, owing to either his. His kind of sensibility as a combat veteran nco, or, Or. Or just as a political soldier. You know, Hitler, a lot of his decisions were informed by his. His personal loyalties. But Antonescu, Hillary and Antonescu, like, they were personally tight, but it's also. They. Antonescu was a great ally and. And yeah, that's a point that should be fleshed out more and more. The Romanians actually fought. They fought really hard. I mean, and they got. They got decimated. You know, they. They. It's not, you know, the Romanian army is not like some like, storied force, but they. They had a. Until they got chewed to pieces. They. In 1941, early 1942, the. The Romanians did really well. I mean, for that as well as gonna be expected. You know, they didn't they were at certain disadvantages, but they, you know, it. It's not. That's no small thing. Croatia was a great ally in Germany too. And the Croats that, you know, the Croats, man for man, were probably the best. Like minor access nation soldiers. The Croat, Uh, the Croats were incorporated. The Croats were incorporated into the ver. Into the here. Like, officially they weren't. They weren't like, they weren't bobbing assessed or some kind of auxiliary formation. And they, they were the only non German. They were the only non German element that breached the gates at Stalingrad, you know, like, and they, they were. They were super tough. But. And yeah, Pavlich was, uh, was. It was a rare example too of like the Independent State of Croatia and like the Ustasha, they really were like, like a client regime of the Third Reich. And that was rare. You know, like, if people notice that, you know, the, like Berlin and, And the SD and they, they particularly Himmler, he was always trying to kind of insinuate these like, proxy sort of parties, even ones that didn't really have any on the ground support. And Hitler was like, no, we're not going to do that.

[A]

To the point, Ryan Seacrest here. So every great barbecue takes a little patience. And while the food does its thing, you can enjoy a little Chumba Casino. The Perfect recipe. Chamba Casino. Always good to have you back. No purchase necessary. VGW Group void were prohibited by law.

[C]

CTS and CS21 plus sponsored by Champa Casino. Speaking of Romania, you know, the Antonescu himself, he's the one who put down, you know, the Iron Guard revolt and probably personally ordered Codreano to be murdered. And like the SS though, was. They were providing aid and comfort to these Iron Guard guys. Meanwhile, Berlin's policy was, you know, that these guys are like enemies of the state. You had like, you had like Berlin and the German army saying, doing one thing, then the SS saying like, no, these guys you're like arresting and haven't shot or our guys and helping them. So. Which is really crazy. But it, but the point being, Independent State of Croatia is a rare example of. I mean, that that owes the intrigues of what happened in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and. And what amounted to a kind of Chetnik coup and all but name on the eve of Barbarossa. But it. But yeah, so Croatia was a. Was a rare kind of like true, like client regime of, Of a national. Of a fascist or fascist type country. So. Yeah, yeah, forgive me if that was like, too tangential.

[B]

Oh, no, no problem. I want to wait until the next time we talk to actually get into the war. But one thing, one thing I wanted to ask was, was it because of American influence or was it because of Soviet influence that he didn't have more European countries that he could consider to be allies? Because, I mean, Spain seems like it could be a natural ally, especially at that point.

[C]

Yeah, the, Both Salazar and Franco were intriguing for their own purposes. I mean, I think Franco is kind of an idiot, unlike Salazar, I think was, was a great man in a lot of ways. And Salazar. There's nothing else Salazar could do other than kind of like try and strike this tense, like, middle path between, you know, the British Empire, the Third Reich, Italy. But Frank, Franco, I think was just a. And he, you know, Franco. But Franco's a great survivor and obtuse men often are good at surviving, even if they're, you know, kind of not good at much else. But the, the way to understand Franco was that the real, like the philandress who were real, like hard and fast national socialists or fascists, you know, he, he, he sent them off to fight the Soviet Unions that they were out of Spain and hopefully wouldn't come back. And that's kind of what happened. But it, you know, Frank, people, you know, France actually was a fascist state. Like, and it would, like, they were, you know, organically, like, they. That's why people conveniently forget that, you know, an Operation Torch. When American troops landed in North Africa, it was, they were opposed by French who fought them. Okay, like, and Commandant Darlon, who I think Roosevelt probably had murdered. You know, that was basically. Roosevelt was faced with having to try and bribe Darlon into like, quitting the war. I mean, like, the fact that France fought Germany, they fought that they fought Germany because they didn't want to be under Berlin's dominion. Like, they were, they were fascists, basically. You know, like a third, like, it's about, about a third of France were Reds and they like, refused to fight. But it's, you know, the idea that the, the quote, Vichy regime was like this total, total contrivance is not true. It's complicated by the fact they were under occupation. But you know, I, I think, I mean, I thought a lot about that too. I mean, to your point about why. But I mean, Hitler specifically said, you know, there was. There was a meeting of, of. Of what was supposed to be a fascist international of sorts of, I think in 1936. But I'd have to double check it and I cannot remember what the host venue was, but it didn't really go anywhere because again, the, you know, there was no National Socialist delegation and without a Berlin delegation representing Hitler, it. It was kind of like a big whatever. But it. I. It. Hitler himself always made the point that, you know, I mean, that's why I made the point about the Independent state of Croatia because Hiller himself said that, you know, that the National Socialist program and paradigm, it's not this ideology that is. Is. Is intended to be exported as some sort of, you know, as some sort of answer to. To Bolshevism or something. And that's important. I mean, I think Hitler did pretty. I think he did pretty well. I mean, I. In terms of, in terms of wooing allies, it he people in some of these smaller states, you know, you know, like Father Tiso in Slovakia. You know, Tiso was this kind of, I guess what most people would consider to be like a clerical fascist type. You know, that was like the big. That that was, that was the big coup against Bennis is that, you know, Czechoslovakia wasn't. It wasn't just. It wasn't dismantled somehow by the, by the cruel machinations of evil hair Hitler. You know, the. As soon as the, as soon as the Slovakians like saw their opportunity, they declared independence. They're like, we've got no truck with this enterprise. Czechoslovakia is a contrivance. And t. So was very much on board with the third. Right. And simply because I mean, Hiller made his case effectively and, and. And managing convince. Managing convinced him of. Of victory odds. So I mean, I think it's. But it's also you gotta. The Europe Europe kind of orbits around. I mean the whole Europe orbits around Berlin. I mean, kind of geostrategically as well as conceptually. I mean, I think that's, I think that's part of it. I mean, I think Hitler understood, you know, I mean, basically, basically people. It's even people who didn't particularly fancy taking standing orders from Berlin. I mean, it was understood that like. Well, I mean, in, you know, what happens in Berlin has got ramifications throughout the continent and you know, the kind of. That. That's. That's kind of the. The heart of political life. So I think that's part of it too. It was just under, you know, let's say, you know, let's say in, in this. In autumn or December 1941, you know, let's say Moscow did fall and you know, NC was realized. It's like, okay, I. Wherever people were at, you know, whether they were in Prague or whether they were in Paris, or whether they were in Madrid or in, you know, wherever they were. I think I would say like, well okay, you know this is, this is, this is kind of the new political culture. So that's, you know, we'll abide that. I think that's why. Also, I mean I, I, I really like, I really like Newt Hampson. You know he was the Norwegian father. He was like this agrarian romantic type guy. He wrote the book Growth of the Soil which is a really great book, as well as this book of Hunger which is kind of a autobiographical take of his early life as, you know, like when he was literally kind of like a starving author. But Hampson made the point. He, he wrote the eulogy to Hitler when, after the, in May 1945. And you know they, there's a million, there's a million, quite literally a million, like a 1.1 million foreign volunteers in the BAFF NSS, you know from, from all nations from Ukraine to the Netherlands to Belgium to Spain to, you know it's, it really was like this pan European army and these guys weren't conscripted at gunpoint or something. I mean it, you know, I, so I think there was, I think, I think there was more of a pan European allegiance.

[B]

Was that because of anti American sentiment or anti Soviet sentiment?

[C]

I mean primarily the latter. I think people outside of the Germans understood that they were in big trouble with regards to Roosevelt because he was targeting them for destruction. I speculate and I, I think it's pretty well substantiated by kind of statements of other, of, of other chief executives at the time in Europe. I, I think America wasn't really on people's radar in the same way in, prior to the Cold War and prior to the kind of, you know, destruction of Europe. And it's divvying up between the silver powers. If, if you were, unless you were situated in the UK or in Germany, if, if you were a European, if you were a European head of state or if you were in the executive kind of branch of a European state in the early 20th century, like America wasn't really at the forefront of your thoughts. I mean yeah, you had a sense of its great power capability and you know, you had, you had an understanding that its intervention or not intervention could make or break outcomes, particularly in geopolitical terms, but was just kind of this remote thing, you know. So yeah, I mean most, most, I, I, I, I guarantee you that most guys like foreign fighters who joined the Waffen SS did so if they wanted to kill Ivan and they hated communists, not because, you know, they're like, we love national Socialism, although some of them did. But at the same time, I mean, it doesn't matter because it, it owes to what I said. I mean, bro, you know, European political life orbits around Berlin. So it's like, well, you know, we're, we're going to, you know, we're, we're gonna, we're going to war with the communists, you know, so, you know, Berlin's gonna lead us, you know, and if, if the access had won, it's like, okay, well, you know, it, you know, whether people like it or not, you know, it's like, basically the tenor of political life would have originated in Berlin. I mean, where else is it going to come from? That's my view of it. It's a fascinating issue.

[B]

Yeah, I mean, I can understand why, why the Spanish would hate the communists,

[A]

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[C]

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[B]

Why do you think people were coming from all those other countries? I mean, what was the. Because we aren't taught this. I mean, you talked about it last time you were on here. Nuremberg just basically put a nail in the coffin for being right wing. And if you're right wing nowadays, you have to be middle of the road, right wing, and you just have to bow down to whatever the left says. But what was it about certain people in Europe who would be willing to go and fight for a foreign army? They hated communism so much. I mean, it was obvious in some countries, but

[C]

generally it's like, I mean, back to the point about when Nolte was saying it, these, these German guys, I mean, Hitler himself. But also, you know, this idea Germans had that, that Bolshevism is this, you know, homicidal paradigm that, you know, is the. Is being foisted upon us and implemented by radicals and, and, you know, Jews who want to kill us. I mean, you can say that's crazy or that's a bad way to think about things. That's basically the way people thought about it. You know, nobody's really neutral on communism. Either you were with the program or you viewed it like I just said. And in the case of people I talk about Father T, or in the case of people like these slow out guys who joined the vss, they would have done it because they're like, well, you know, the, the, this was basically a peasant population of pious Catholics and they're like, you know, the communists are, they're going to do to us what they did to the Kuloks and they're also going to just, you know, they're also going to burn our churches down and kill our priests. You know that, you know, we're, we're, we're gonna, we're gonna, we're gonna burn them to the ground first. In the case of a more developed country like France, you know and I mean the last defenders of the guys who. The bail of Berlin. The guys are literally defending the Reichstag with a French boffin ss. Okay. You got a situation like that. It's, you know, you'll have guys who basically would have viewed it the same way that the Germans did know be guys from like a, a developed kind of, you know, cosmopolitan, we can call it that European state. They would view communism as like, you know, so much, so much, you know, kind of Jewish radicalism aimed at, you know, kind of annihilating our national existence in favor of this, in favor of this, you know, paradigm of enslavement. Quite literally it done. But I mean there's not, you know, it's, I, I, I've got an idea. I mean I, I don't want to go too far afield and bring it into the, bring it into the realm of polemic. But it's the, you know, it doesn't really at the end of the. I mean I think the point a lot that I mean you know, anti fish people this idea that like, I mean I'm not saying you but like a lot of people this idea because I mean from like Hollywood or whatever from public school that like people are just like revolted by like Nazism or something. Like they weren't, you know, I mean even if you weren't like a big national Socialist, even like think Hitler was great. Even if you didn't, even if you

[B]

didn't love or fascist movements in every country.

[C]

Yeah. And I mean even the people who didn't particularly. Mosley was in the.

[B]

Mosley was an mp.

[C]

Yeah, yeah, exactly. I mean even if you weren't particularly keen to that it's not like you looked at it as something revolting or horribly evil. You know, it's like you, if you were like a middle of the road like conservative type or just kind of like a, a working man who you know, was, was a believing Catholic, you'd probably look at fascists like well these guys have some Strange ideas, and I think their pageantry is a bit silly. But they want to kill the communists and, you know, they want to get Jewish finance capital off our back. So, yeah, I'm with that. You know, that's a good thing. I mean, that's the way they would have looked at it. And I think that's basically the way most guys looked at it. I mean, that's what the, you know, like I said, the way to understand. The way to understand, say, for example, in a state like France, the, The way that people looked at the Germans is they're like, we don't like being under occupation by Berlin. But they, they didn't have. They didn't like, disdain the fact that these guys were fascists. They're like, they, they didn't care about that. I mean, a minority did of, you know, partisans. But I mean, that's, That's a different thing. You know, the average man in the street fighting German occupation wasn't a commie. He was just what I said. He was a guy who didn't. He didn't want, you know, some. He didn't want some German capital, you know, telling him his business. It, it's not that he had some kind of principled objection to the, the fascism. He probably was a fascist himself.

[B]

Yeah, a lot of the. It's funny that some of the people even that I know will today talk about how, you know, Israel involvement and how much of our foreign policy is based off of Israel involvement. We need to get out of it and we need to cut them off. Cut off funds, cut everything, just cut, Cut them loose. And a lot of these same people can't even look back to the 30s and see that people had the same arguments. They were just coming from a different direction.

[C]

You're talking about banking, you know. Well, that's also too. I mean, the fact I made the point. It, it's, you know, the, there's real, there's real sectarian remedy between, Between. Between people who identify with, with Judaism and everybody else now. I mean, does that mean that everybody else on the planet is like this big racist and just like, hates people for no reason? Or, or does this mean that, you know, there's, there's there's a real problem with, with, with the kind of, with the kind of intrinsic politics of, Of Jewish identity? I mean, I, you know, I, that's why I object, you know? Yeah. I mean, you can't, you can't have an honest conversation. Even Marx.

[B]

Even Marx wrote at length about it.

[C]

Well, yeah, exactly. Like he was Conscious of cognitive stuff. No, people can't have, people can't have grown up conversations about such things. So yeah, I mean it's, it's, it's, and it's amazing what people, even otherwise, like intelligent people, they, they can't, yeah, they can't like draw these connections between things. Like, it's, it's really, really extraordinary. But yeah, let's,

[B]

let's end it there so that we can get into the war the next time we talk.

[C]

No, no, that's fine. Yeah, yeah, I didn't mean to go out and do many tangents, but yeah, if you, oh no. Okay.

[B]

Yeah, I love tangents.

[C]

I appreciate you man. And yeah, I, I, I mean it's a complicated issue so I want to make sure I don't, I don't want to just gloss over things that are material to understanding the, the issues presented. But yeah, no, well, whatever you want talk about.

[B]

Promote your sub stack. Promote your sub stack because I, okay, yeah, I've gotten to the point, yeah, I've gotten to the point where I basically survive on what people, people give me for my substack. What people just send to me because they love the show. They, they love what, the people that I have on the conversations I have.

[C]

No, that's awesome.

[B]

Some of my own crazy thoughts. I want you, Yeah. I want you to get, you know, you deserve, I mean you only have, I think it's five episodes of your podcast that are exclusive on Substack and

[C]

every one of them. Yeah, I've been trying to drop it bi weekly and I'm going to, I, I've been like the second, the second installing my science fiction brand. I, I, I've been having to double down on that because I gotta get it to Imperium Press. But I, I, what I'm getting is I gotta, I gotta start putting more uh, long form written content on my sub stacks. I haven't in about a month and I promise I'm gonna, I'm going to bear down on that in earnest. But yeah, my sub stack is real. Thomas 777 real. R E A L T H O M A S777.substack.com and it's about half free content, about half sub content. Like the podcast is subscription and there's a like premium long form stuff that subscription. But there's also like, like I said, about half of the long form stuff on there is free and like my print stuff like for my Sci Fi brand, there's always like previews there that are free. Of like sample chapters and things. If you like what I do, go there. And yeah, it, it's only five bucks a month too, so it, it shouldn't break your bank and you can read everything. If you can't afford five bucks a month, you shouldn't be sitting around reading my substack. You should be trying to survive. So, but no, in all seriousness, I, I, yeah, I, I really, really, really appreciate the fact that people take an interest, but yeah, no, again man, this was great. And yeah, we'll, we'll get into the warriors. Whenever you want, just let me know and we'll, we'll get back to it.

[B]

It'll be real soon. Thank you. I want to welcome everyone back to the Picanone show, returning for the third time in less than a month. Thomas777 what's going on man?

[C]

Hi Pete. Thanks for hosting me yet again. It's always a pleasure and I'm very grateful.

[B]

Last time tried to explain what was happening in Germany that was leading up to we went from Treaty of Versailles even back a little bit to the Bolshevik Revolution and came forward to what would lead up to World War II. But before we started that, I wanted to ask you a question because this is a question that I've heard arguments on and debate on and watch lectures on for five, six years now. The National Socialists in Germany, would they be considered left wing or right wing?

[C]

I mean, the problem is that in America, and part of this owes to part of this. Part of this owes to two things. Part of it owes to Keynes and the kind of ideological baggage of Keynes, and part of it owes to the subsequent Cold War.

[A]

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[C]

Sponsored by Chumba Casino. No purchase necessary VGW group Void where prohibited by law 21 terms and conditions apply. Americans into a lesser degree. You find this in the UK as well as the rest of the kind of anglophone cultural sphere. You know this idea that the right left wing divide has something to do with economics or it has something to do with, you know, people's view of, you know, how the government interfaces with, with free, with the free market or the like or what purportedly is the free market. I mean, everybody knows it's not. There's no such thing as a kind of purely like free market, you know, like that, that just exists like in stasis, like Newtonian physics just exists or something. But I mean, that, that's a bit too abstract for what we're talking about here. But the, you know, the way the Europeans, if you want to understand what the right left divide originally meant, like, conceptually, you've got to look at the French Revolution and what gave rise to those clefts. It, it has to do with political values. It has to do with what you consider, like how, how you view authority, how you view the legitimacy of authority and what, what you view as, as the proper, you know, domain of, of. Of the state and, and of culture and where, where the dominion of one begins and the other ends and, and what the content of those things is. Okay. It's not. When you find these libertarian types who claim like, oh, Adolf Hitler was a left winger because he believed in high taxes or something. I mean, that's, that's either deliberately up to some kind of a, an effort to sabotage the conversation on purpose or, or it's just really, really provincial and ignorant. You know, the, the. The only way to understand National Socialism is as. I mean, there's something to the, the AJB Taylor's view of it as Sonder Vig is, you know, owing to the, the kind of peculiar, like, dialectical course of Germany that gave rise to it, like it would. It wouldn't really have emerged in another state. I believe that that's also why it's important to distinguish it from fascism and other kinds of autocratic movements that, that developed kind of coordinately with it. But it, you know, the, the fact of the matter is, was it was. It was an effort to salvage what culture from what Heiter called practical transcendence. And when Heideger said transcendence, he didn't mean, you know, like we, we think about in a Christian sense or like, in a Platonist sense. He meant that modern life and the challenges of it and particularly the emergence of technology and other things and the kind of tensions and intentions inherent therein. You know, one of which was class warfare or one of which culminated in class warfare. Rather, it's not a spontaneously occurring thing, despite what Mr. Mark said. This leads to the destruction of certain practices, values, for lack of a better way to Phrase it or characterize it, orientation points for the way people live their lives individually and, and severally or severally and, and in common with others, you know, in communitarian ways. So National Socialism had, if, if we're going to like boil it down to a like, say like three principles. It was, you know, to restore German sovereignty, you know, and to liberate it from the, from, you know, being yolked by its enemies, you know, to, to, to preserve the German culture and guarantee the, the posterity of its people. And, and then, you know, the German race, if, if you want to characterize it that way, as people in the 20th century tended to think about things in biological, material terms and to eradicate communism, you know, for all time and, and basically all iterations of, of, of left wing thought and praxis that, you know, were facilitating those first two things that I mentioned. So it's an existential proposition. You know, the idea that, you know, there's a check, like it's the same thing. I like Americans talk about democracy like there's a checklist. And you know, if you identify certain factors like oh, that's democracy or this is not democracy, you know, it's like let's look at Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers Party. You know, if I check off enough in the socialist box that means it's left wing or if I check off on it here, it's right wings. That's not really the way political theory develops and that's not the way, that's certainly not the way people conceptualize it in Europe. So you know, the only way to look at National Socialism is that is as a radical right wing tendency, kind of like the ultimate radical right wing tendency in, in, in Hegelian terms. And whether you accept Hegel's view of things or not, and is, you know, his, his idea about the cunning of reason in history. All that aside, even if you reject his metaphysics outright, you know, the Germans themselves, I'm talking about, you know, people like, like ordinary men involved in political life. Not just high flying academics. They basically accepted Hegelian paradigms and they thought, they, they thought of politics itself as like a dialectical process. So there weren't even, even National Socialists on the stressor side who you know, were had a conciliatory view of the Soviet Union in relative terms and who you know, incorporated a lot more of kind of class antagonism sorts of paradigms into their program. They, they viewed themselves, they viewed themselves as radically right wing and as the radical right wing response to subversive elements from the other side and the other side being the left. So in that sense you're talking about people who in existential terms look at themselves as the right wing vanguard. So it can't be anything other than right wing. Like if that's what you view yourself as in political terms, that's what everybody else views you as. You know, the enemy is who is willing to kill you and who you're willing to kill in kind like views. He was that, that's what you are. So I mean, that's, that's, that's the best way I can characterize it. There's no like argument there, in my opinion. But like I said, it's, it's, it, it's, it becomes convoluted because part of this is, you know, people view their left, right divide in America in part. I mean, like I said, I mean, Keens is really toxic in all kinds of ways. And I think he was a fraud and a pseudo intellectual at base as much as Marx was. But there's, there's ideological baggage to Keens and, and the kind of, and you know, in the kind of demand side paradigm, it's, it's basically, it's got what we would consider to be today, you know, like a, like a, like a social justice ethos baked into it that is essentially hostile to everything that came before it. And that suggests that, you know, the, the role of government is to, you know, resolve like certain inequalities that are just inherently unjust and need to be remedied. But that's not what, that's not what socialism at base is. Okay? I mean, you want to Spangle himself made the point that, you know, Prussia particularly, you know, and particularly like Bismarck's model of, of good government was highly socialistic. I mean, if you, if you think that, if you, if you think that, you know, Bismarck had something in common with, you know, like 19, the 1970s Labor Party in the UK, you have something wrong with you or you're an idiot. You know, I mean, it's not, or if you think that, you know, the, or if you think that, you know, the, the, the Prussian ethos was. Held something in common with, with, with, with Euro communism that came later. I mean, that's absurd too, you know, I mean it, it's, it's nonsense. I, I don't see how anybody could think otherwise. But you know, that's, that's the way to understand it. Verner Sombart is kind of the key. If you don't understand right Wing socialism such as. Such that it is. That's probably the wrong way to characterize it. But if you don't understand socialism not of the Marxist left, you should read Werner Sombard, you should probably read Oswald Spangler. But I don't even, I don't even think you need to get that esoteric. I mean all socialisms, it's are kind of European axiomatically because the origins of Europe as a kind of cultural sociopolitical form come develops out of the medieval mind, okay? And there was a, there was, there was an interdependence between casts there that was shattered by the modern age. Part of this was deliberate, but part of it just is, was, was inevitable owing to, you know, emergent modalities of, of labor, of, of production, but also of, you know, just patterns of living and, and, and what people and, and the authority, what people recognize as authority and like what authority they appeal to for justice and things like that. You know, when, when there's no more lord of the manor and there's, there's no more, there's no more, there's no more subsistence agriculture, that, that changes everything. And the whole kind of, the whole theory of socialism, wherever you peg it on the political spectrum and whatever iteration you're talking about, it's basically, it's basically an effort to, to restore the, the social capital that was shattered by the emergence of, of modern life. It's more complicated than that. But that's kind of the basic brass tax of it. That's the best answer I can give.

[B]

We'll let people chew on that. All right, so Germany invades Poland. What leads up to that? Why does that happen?

[C]

Well, Poland was essentially ruled by a military junta that was somewhat unstable. Not just in the way that, I mean conditions that lead to any military junta kind of taking power, unstable. But it, there was a kind of great power intrigues. These destabilize that situation. You know, like I raised before and on, on Bronze Age Perverts podcast, we deep dive into this. What became to be known as the Polish documents are something people need to pay attention to if they want to understand why Poland did what it did in terms of refusing to come to terms with Germany. Essentially what Germany demanded of Poland was they demanded dedicated access to Danzig. They demanded, you know, that their people be guaranteed certain rights of self determination. What was called the Polish Corridor. And they wanted some kind of guarantee that they could deploy. They could deploy to accomplish defense in depth like on Polish soil in common with Poland. Like an event that, you know, The Soviet Union mobilized with hostility, but they were willing to let the polls, you know, retain sovereign control over Danzig as long as the Germans had dedicated access. And so long as the. So long as the. So long as the ethnic Germans there had, you know, had had formal political rights. And I believe Poland would have come. Would have accepted those terms because they were entirely reasonable and they were precedented at that point. The Germans weren't even demanding that, you know, the territories that have been ceded to Poland ever the Great War, be decoupled from Poland and given back to them. I mean, this was a very moderate set of demands, frankly. And these demands owed to basic national security exigencies that I. Whatever. Whatever regime was in Berlin would have basically demanded the same thing. A couple things happened to frame this in con. Exist why as to why war kind of became inevitable, in my opinion. Like I said, the Polish documents a. A After the invasion of Poland by the Vermont a. An SS battalion sees these documents from. From. I can't remember was the Foreign Ministry or if it was uh, or if it was somewhere else. But uh, in any event, the. The crux of these documents was that they've been diplomatic overtures to Poland wherein Roosevelt, through William Bullet, had given Poland a formal guarantee that if they held out against Germany, like they would support them in event of war. And that I believe probably stiffened the resolve even more than Chamberlain's guarantee did. I mean, obviously Chamberlain's guarantee was above board and the Roosevelt that the New Dealers guarantee was not. But you've got to consider in context what have been going on between the New Dealers in Poland leading over to that point. Ambassador Patoski. Patolski. I always. I always butcher the pronunciation of these Slavic names. But when he'd been in Washington several months before the outbreak of hostilities, you know, late 1938, early 1939, I think it was around holiday season, 1938, he ran across William Bullet. William Bullet was ambassador to France, but he was something of a minister without portfolio in Roosevelt's administration. He was kind of the de facto secretary of state. Like Cordell hall, it was always kind of sidelined you, but was understood even at the time that Bullet it. He wielded disproportionate power. He was considered not a particularly serious guy. He was kind of this foppish guy, like a man about town. You know, he was one of Roosevelt's kind of a aristocratic conceits came out and some of these associations he maintained. And nor was that more evident than with William Bullet, but when Patoski Ran across a bullet. He voices he said that he relayed back to Wara Apovsky did that, you know, bullet was characterizing, you know, the Soviet Union in completely benign terms. Roosevelt was, Was. Was speaking at Germany in, In. In. In in such jingoistic language that, you know, it was having the effect of. Of. Of. Of kind of a. A facilitating a crisis where there didn't necessarily have to be one. Basically what Petoski said was that the New Dealers were facilitating a kind of war fever by their vilification of Germany. And on top of that they were kind of, you know, they were. They were placing Poland at a very precarious position vis a vis the Soviet Union because they were essentially demanding that Poland start looking at the Soviet Union as a strategic ally when according to Petoski, like these people, meaning the Soviets were a greater threat, it's essentially to Poland than the Germans were and indicated a real contempt for. For Roosevelt and, and the entire foreign policy apparatus in Washington. In Petoski's view. He said that, you know, Jews and their financiers, these are his words, not mine, were, were. Were trying to orchestrate a, a crisis and at the same time, you know, build a war coalition against Germany just, you know, for the sake of smashing Germany without regard, you know, what that would do to the geostrategic landscape in Europe and the fact that there'd be no, there'd be no bulwark against Soviet power, which was increasingly, you know, being asserted by Stalin both directly and implicitly at the same time. I mean, so in other words, you uh, you had these, you had natural conditions, attention extant between Germany and Poland. I mean that go back probably a millennia. And the Polish government was doing basically nothing to stop what amounted to a burgeoning kind of race war on the ground. The post majority was ethnically cleansing Jews, Russians, Germans, other people that they didn't like. You know, the. You had, you. You had a. You had some moderates in Warsaw within the military government. You had others who were incredibly, uh, incredibly jingoistic and were looking for any opportunity to uh, you know, essentially sue for war in order to grab even more land, uh, from Germany. On top of that, whichever even ceded to them. You even had some elements who were. Who believe that Germany's back had been broken so much by the defeat 1918 and by the subsequent, you know, by the, by the subsequent, you know, sanction of Versailles and everything else that, you know, if, if it came to war, they. There were even those who believe that, you know, the Polish army would you know, be able to march on Berlin within weeks. I mean, which seems totally insane, but this is history in the rearview mirror. And it's amazing what people can convince themselves of when they're. When they're convinced the rightness of their cause, as it were. So I mean, basically all those reasons and it, I believe too, the. What was always within the contemplation. And both John Tolan and David Irving make this point, neither of whom are military historians, but they're both were incredibly. I mean, Irving's still alive, but, you know, Irving's kind of the seminal historian of the Third Reich, where everybody feels about him in Toland. Toland is unique. Had unique insight into the personage of Hitler, I believe. And he had a good. Understand. I think he's probably the best documentarian of Hitler's relationship with the OKW and you know, the, the General Staff rather. It. The. Very much within the contemplation of. Of. Of Hitler was the Soviet Union and its power projection potential. And the. One of the reasons Hitler was so eager until it became clear that this was just totally off the table to sue for peace with the Western Allies is because, you know, like AJB Taylor to, you know, bring up him again, as I did about the Sunderbake point a moment ago, Hitler didn't really have any interest in the West. I mean, yeah, like any kind of. Any kind of German superpower, you know, was going to dominate Europe as a literal pivot politically and militarily of the continent. But this idea that, you know, the, this idea like the German had some sort of designs on France or something. I mean, what. In. In naked geostrategic terms, you know, what exactly would that accomplish? You know, nothing really as of 1939, 1940. So if you want to. What if Danny is. If you want to understand the polar situation too, like, aside from all these intrigues and just intrinsic tensions, you've also got to understand what the Soviet Union was doing. The Soviet Union was amassing the largest military force the world the planet had ever seen, was a burgundy superpower as much as the United States was in military terms, obviously not in, not in productive terms and in, in terms of, you know, in terms of economic wealth and the ability to translate its natural bounty into value added, you know, manufacturers. Obviously that wasn't there. But his capacity to make war and project power was, Was absolutely in a part of the United States potentially. But the. Anything Germany wanted to do if, if there, if it could not. If Germany could not reach some kind of sort of concord with Poland in the form of a mutual defense pact or at least, you know, some kind of right of parley in terms of, you know, deploying in depth how to

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and conditions apply across the Polish frontier in common with the Polish army. If that couldn't be achieved, jury would not be able to come to terms with Poland because that would mean that there was know they were just constantly essentially at, at risk of assault by the Soviet Union with no natural, no natural def, no naturally defensible boundaries between them and the Soviet army. And Poland would have been in a position too where they could essentially indefinitely play off the Soviet Union against Germany and vice versa in order to get what they wanted. I mean it, it would not be a tenable situation. That's why. But moving forward as late as, as late as October 1939, you know, like several weeks into the, uh, several weeks into the invasion, William Rhodes Davis, who was this kind of industrialist type, uh, he was, he was not a new Dealer, but nor was he in America. Firster, he, he made overtures to Berlin at the behest of department of State to see what, you know, as a civilian which is, and you know, not, not as, not, not in any official capacity. You know, this is very unofficial diplomacy. But Davis approached Hitler through Weiser at, you know, the foreign ministry in Berlin and asked what Germany was willing to offer, you know, if, if, if, if America was willing to step in and try and you know, negotiate some sort of peace. And uh, Germany said that they'd allow Poland to remain sovereign so long as it became a, uh, as long as it adopted a formal neutrality vis a vis Germany and the Soviet Union, so long as the territories that have been lost during the great war were decoupled and incorporated back into the German Reich, you know, so long as the Germans got Danzig. And you know, so long as, so long as, you know, so long as those conditions were met. Basically like they, they would withdraw, you know, they, they would withdraw beyond, you know, what would be the new German Borders which are basically what they'd been in 1914. Okay, which is not a great deal for the polls, but it's better than what became of the polls. And frankly, the Germans didn't have to offer anything. And then when, apparently when Davis returned to Washington, Roosevelt refused to meet him. Cordell Hull refused to meet him and he was basically stonewalled. And everybody in Roosevelt's regime pretended as if these conversations never happened. Now the cynic in me wants to believe that Roosevelt was trying to hedge his bets, looking forward to his re election, but I mean, who the hell knows? Davis had no reason to lie about this. What he. What he said was, uh. What the. It was pretty well documented by. By Tom Fleming in the New Dealers war and as well as by Mark Weber at ihr. He's. He's. If. I mean what. I'm dropping this for us that people can look it up if they want to. They don't need to just take my word for it. But I mean this was. The polar situation was very, very murky. In other words, okay, that's what. But it was, you know, it would. The. The primary catalyst was, you know, the, the. The power political paradigm between Germany and the Soviet Union. Which is why, I mean, that's. What did. What. What did Berlin do? What did Berlin Sl. Adolf Hitler do before. Before giving the assault order. I mean, they sat down with ribbon and you know, Stalin's delegates who had authority to negotiate in such capacities and you know, divvied up like what. You know, the. What, what. What the map would look like after this. After the cessation of hostilities of Poland. Because. And that wasn't an accident. I mean, that wasn't just, you know, Germany being a good neighbor and in power political terms, I mean, that was. This was the catalyst for the war. I mean it, you know, it was. It was a geostrategic contest between the Reich and the Soviet Union. And, and the polls thought that they could gamble and somehow profit. And that was incredibly foolish. But like I said, it was an unstable regime. He will make the point that one of the more bizarre things is. I mean. Yeah, okay, I realize that there's always. There's always fictions that are confabulated in order to rationalize, you know, an intervention and things. And in these. In these power political affairs and you know, there's always. There's ever honesty that afoot when America decides to go to war, but holding out the Polish regime of 1939 as some sort of beacon of democracy or some kind of. I You know, or some sort of. Or some sort of victim of. Of the intrigues of authoritarian states. I mean, that's particularly absurd. You know, like I said, it was. This was literally a military junta that was ethnically cleansing people that it. That it didn't think belonged in its. In its. In its national state. So that's the best summary I can forever.

[B]

Can you talk a little bit about the fact that we are taught nowhere when we're growing up, when we're in school, that the Soviet Union and communism at that point was a great threat to Europe? I mean, you saw, you already had the. We talked about the last time, the Spanish Civil War, all the, all the stuff that was happening in Spain and all these fascist movements rising up in certain countries because they felt the heat of this Germany, Germany being right there.

[C]

I mean,

[B]

what did they really. Did Germany really feel like the Soviet Union was going to push forward and basically take Europe if they wanted?

[C]

Oh, yeah, definitely. And I mean, Germany's problem going back. I mean, Germany's problem going back centuries was always Russia, okay? I mean, just. If you take communism out of it, that would have changed everything, okay, in terms of the world situation and the ideological persuasion of. Of the state actors involved and everything else. But Germany always had a. A geostrategic existential problem vis a vis Russia. That, that's just inevitable, okay? Because that's, that's the tragedy of, of great power paradigms and particularly Europe, where, I mean, one of the problems with Europe is that, you know, Europe is basically a peninsula. If you look at it, I mean, in geographic terms. I mean, you know, this. You've looked at maps and you're a learned guy. It's essentially. It's essentially, it's an underside. Yeah. There's no natural way to defend it. You know, and then you have this. There's nothing standing between. There's nothing standing between Europe and. And, you know, the barbaric east, if you want to look. I don't look at it that way, but I mean, that's the view and that's kind of the mythology of, Of Europe and its existential concerns and fears. So, I mean, there's that. And I, you know, the, the Communists had gone on the march immediately after the Great War, and they basically got stopped in their tracks, you know, by the polls. And that's one of the reasons why, you know, the Polish army had this kind of misplaced confidence, as people might view it, you know, intrinsically communism, as I made the point last time we spoke, communism is not just Intrinsically homicidal, it's intrinsically internationalist and it's, it's kind of like the praxis of it is to tear down national borders and frontiers and expand almost like, almost, almost like a plant germinates it's surroundings or something. I mean, I'm not trying to sound shrill or resort to lured hyperbole, but I mean there's, there's all these considerations, you know, there's like the apocal reality that, you know, Bolshevism truly had this, this kind of, this, this, this kind of, this momentum, this, this dialectical momentum that's, that's difficult for people to kind of identify with these days because there's nothing comparable. But it, but on top of all those things too is Stalin was mobilizing a massive military force that, you know, as I said, was the largest that up to that point had ever existed. I mean, well, and they were situated in offensive deployment by the time of Barbarossa two years subsequent, just shy of two years subsequent to the assault in Poland. I mean, what, what exactly was the Soviet Union planning on doing with this? I mean, they, you know, I, it's never benign. I mean, you never, you never estate never. I mean, even aside from all these other variables we just mentioned, you, estate never mobilizes, particularly a state with, you know, superpower potential. Like the Soviet Union was a state of immobilizes for benign purposes. You know, it, it's the equivalent is, is equivalent drawing down on somebody and saying, well, don't worry, I'm only pointing this weapon at you for defensive purposes. I mean, that's great. But it, you know, the, it doesn't change the fact it's an existential menace. And it's also too. I mean, I believe that was part of the problem with. There was, he was. There was a. I don't want to. We can deep dive into this at some other time if you want. But like the Hitler Strasser cleft, which in some ways is the, the radical rights equivalent to the Trotsky Stalin cleft. It's an imperfect metaphor, but I, I'm kind of intrigued by it. The parallel, the. I mean, that's. There was, there was, there was an international aspect to that because, I mean, Strasser was certainly no friend of the, of the Russians or, or of communism or the Soviet Union. But he realized, you know, we've got to somehow come to terms with these people. And the response to that, like the Hitler factions view was basically the Prussian view, which was like, okay, I mean, Even if you, even if you come to some kind of concord with Stalin and with the Russians, just by, just by a kind of osmosis, you know, Germany is going to become a fiefdom of Russia, slash Soviet Union. You know, you can't, you're going to be junior partner just in existential terms in any kind of, in any, in any sort of diplomatic political concord of that nature, you know, so it's not going to matter because, you know, whatever, whatever Germany does in terms of power projection or in terms of existential political decisions, you know, of, of a military nature is going to be dictated by Moscow. And if not dictated, you know, Moscow is going to have the ultimate veto over it. And, you know, in, in existential, like, realist terms. So, I mean, there's that. And finally, I write a lot of my long form as people who read me. I, I, I'm sure I've gleaned about the fact that I believe that, you know, Roosevelt and the United States was Germany's primary existential enemy in, I mean, yeah, I realized it was a Manichean kind of ideological collision between the German Reich and the Soviet Union and the, you know, Bolshevism and National Socialism emerged out of a, you know, a common dialectical process. And they, they can't be overstated. The significance of that. But in, in terms of the true kind of, in terms of the true kind of enemy of the German Reich, I, I'd say that was America and looking forward. That definitely was in Hitler's contemplation. Like I said, just read the text of the December 11 speech. And if you're gonna, if you're looking forward, you know, and the Germans did think in, in millennial increments, okay? I mean, you can say that it's grandiose and crazy, but it's really not. That's the way ancient peoples view the world. And it, historical time in the 20th century, people began to think in these kinds of gargantuan terms, okay? I mean, that's all the major, all the major powers did, okay? It wasn't just the Europeans. It wasn't just Hitler's kind of, you know, artist romanticism taking hold of his, taking hold of his fascinations. But if you're gonna, if you're gonna steal yourself for some ongoing kind of Cold War with the United States or some kind of great power competition with, with America. I mean, you've got to become a superpower yourself. And, you know, we're back to the, the Hitler Strasser problem. Like, we just Mentioned. Okay. I mean you can either become, you either become a, a fiefdom of the Soviet Union or you can smash it and you can create a European superpower that you know that stretches from the Atlantic coast to the Earls and is basically the United States of Europe like replete with you know comparable population and, and a power productive capacity and, and, and bounty of natural wealth and, and you know and petroleum and energy and farmland and everything else. I mean that's, that's the way to look at it. So it, either way Germany doesn't, Germany doesn't survive unless, unless it becomes a superpower and it becomes a superpower by smashing Ivan. So there's that even taking like I said the, even taking the ideological aspect out of it and, and the dialectical process that gave rise to the kind of intractable murderous tension between Berlin and Moscow out of it and taking the race war aspect out of it. I that's what's some, what's important to consider.

[B]

So Germany goes in in 1939 into Poland and what do they start setting up to as a cudgel against the Soviets?

[C]

Well I mean there's a non aggression. There was a non aggression. There's 1939 non aggression pact which, and people you know the Molotov ribbon trot pact and I mean people who like to put Shane in the Third Reich, you know they like to say like oh what you know Hitler was this horrible man for you know breaching the non aggression pact, you know less than two years later. But you don't sign non aggression packs with your friends. You sign non aggression packs with your enemies because I mean it should be obvious to anybody and I mean they like I said they'd, they'd, you know the, the Reich had approached and approached Stalin and uh, and uh, in Ribbentrop's ministry and uh, and establish that the demarcation lines would be in and, and the Vermont literally met the Red army and you know, Poland Central. I mean that's what, that's, that's what the hedge was and it was, it was less than perfect. I mean you still have the Red army on your frontier and Poland's not a small country but in, in the terms we're talking about and with the mobilization potential of the Soviet Union and with the way modern combat resolves with combined arms, I mean that you know that still doesn't constitute a hell of a lot of defense in depth. You know if, if, if you're facing off against, if you're facing off against the Soviet Union in the center of Poland rather than, I mean, certainly better than having them. It's certainly better than having him on the north German plane or something. But it's, it's certainly less than ideal. But that's, but I mean, that's why Barbarosa happened when it did. I don't want us to get ahead of ourselves, but it, uh, Looking, looking, looking eastward. That's exactly what the Germans saw. And that's what I mean. I believe Victor Suvarov wrote a book. He's a controversial guy. Not just court historians dislike him because they don't like the fact that he's basically a revisionist. A lot of revisionists don't like him because they just, they disagree with some of his takes because they think he's a, an eccentric kind of Russian. And then there's yet other people don't like him because he was a GRU defector. And there's always people who, I mean, defectors really don't, people don't look favorably upon that. Okay. I mean, regardless of how they feel about the regime from whence the person in question came.

[B]

But I was, I always questioned defectors because the first thing that they do is they get debriefed by the State Department. Department of whatever country they're defecting to.

[C]

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[B]

And they always, they always end up having housing and transportation out of nowhere. Yeah. How did this happen?

[C]

No, and it's just not, I, I'm not saying people should. Yeah, it's not an admirable thing to do. I mean, regardless of, I mean every, every circumstance is different. But. Yeah, I understand the suspicion people have for Mr. Suov and, and others. I, I, I get it. But what in, in very, in very, in very particular terms, what, what SUO said about what, what's, what was in Stalin's contemplation in the weeks and months leading up to Operation Barbarossa, I think is, I think is inarguable. The people today, they, we take for granted the way that combined arms, modern combat resolves, you know, rapidly. And we take for granted that, you know, the, France's back was kind of broken in political terms by the Great War. And they, they weren't really situated and you know, politically they were fractured. You know, they, they weren't really in a position to wage a general war against the German Reich. And plus it didn't, it didn't really make a lot of sense. You know, the whole, the whole issue of the war guarantee, like, was to prevent what happened, which was, you know, Germany's assault on Poland and you know, the alteration of strategic conditions in Europe. So like once that happened it's like okay, well the, the, you know, it's already failed in its purpose, you know, the mechanism in place, you know, that threat of war. So it's like why, why bother to even go through with it at this point? So there's a lot of issues presented by Francis decision to declare war on Berlin. But people did think, with the exception of a handful of mostly armored commanders who were very forward thinking. I mean Rommel's kind of first among them because he was a real stud in this regard. But there were others too but.

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play hundreds of games including online slots, Bingo, Slingo and more. Live the chumba [e-mail] no purchase necessary VGW Group void where prohibited by law 21/ Terms and Conditions apply. They're the minority. My point is that even people who put German victory odds is all but inevitable. They thought it would be a pretty long slog from, from you know, the, the Franco German frontier to the Paris as it were, including Stalin. So you know, the idea is that you know, as Germany's like, as Germany's hemorrhaging man and material on the Western front, you know, this is when the Soviets will strike from the east. And you know Germany was not particularly in 1940, you know, the advent, the onset of hostilities with the, with France in the uk. I mean that it, of the onset of actual hostilities. I mean obviously the war declaration had come, you know, months and months earlier but. Or declarations rather. But the Germany was not really in a position of. Germany just was not in a position to wage some sort of like, you know, protracted two front attrition war just wasn't. I mean that's, this is the ongoing existential nightmare that Germany always had in, in terms of its military quagmires or potential military quagmires. And when, when Germany smashed France within several weeks, you know, and not in lieu of you know, several months, this really, this really gave the Soviet Union pause. And this is uh, when it uh, became that, that's when Stalin realized he had to strike immediately essentially by uh, Autumn of, of 1941. And that's Suvarov's point and I, I accept that. And that's, that's also why the Germans struck when they did. I mean it, I, I believe with these, and I'm not any kind of military expert, but I know something about politics and, and the way governments behave at war and I know something of the historical record in this regard. And during this unfortunate Ukraine situation, I, I made the point to people a few times that historically, historically the Russians wait too long to act and then they only deploy when they're, you know, sure they can win and traditionally the Germans or you know, in the Prussians before them, but the modern German state is the, was the Prussian state traditionally they kind of jumped the gun. Arguably, I think that really played out in 1941. But that's, that's basically what I understand it. I mean the Soviet Union was, Soviet Union was an existential threat in military, if not political terms to Germany and to the entire continent. That's inarguable. It doesn't matter how anyone feels about a off Hitler. It doesn't matter how anyone feels about the German Reich. That I don't see how, that, I don't see how that's arguable. I mean there's, there's certain variables that when present make not just war inevitable, but they, they render certain political conditions inevitable and they, they establish parameters of how states are going to interact. And a, the a, A had a. One or two things was going to happen. Either you would, you know, like we just talked about at the onset of our conversation, you know, there would have been a Soviet dominated Europe either by default, it was existentially, you know, it was the only proximate superpower in the continent or you know, because Stalin just simply went all in and you know, absorbed Europe, you know, by force of arms, you know, because the historical moment was his, as it were, like owing to the momentum of Marcus Leninism and the kind of revolutionary fervor they were in, you know, only the fact that, you know, America still needed a few years to mobilize and thus the, you know, the opportunity would never present itself again because, you know, Stalin saw the writing on the wall too in terms of, in terms of, you know, what military preparedness, you know, and what, what the implications for that were, you know, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the epoch of what's, you know, Schmidt called gross wrong politics. I mean, all these things. Oh, it was a convergence of circumstances, you know, circumstances really do conspire sometimes. And that's, that's, that's the way to understand it, I believe, even if we take the ideological features out of the equation. But you know, these ideological features owe to these historical phenomena as well. You know, they don't emerge out of nothing or just, you know, they don't just manifest in people's minds, you know, out of the ether, you know, independent of historical conditions and things like that. I realize that seems very abstract, but. Yeah.

[B]

What. How is America being drawn into the war?

[C]

Well, I mean, like I said, I. Roseville had a problem. And I mean the New. This is. We can do a dedicated show about the New Dealers if you want, and I think we should. But Roosevelt was trying to insinuate America into a war with, with the German Reich really from the moment he took office. Okay, but he had a problem. Public opinion was solidly against that to the, as of 1939, it was something like 80%. It was in the, it was in the high 70s, low 80s. People opposed a general war with Germany absent some sort of direct assault upon America. Okay, this was not the case for Japan, which is very interesting, but for our purposes, let's, let's not get into that right now. But. And you had, you know, Senator NY, the NY committee had, had, had closed up shop in 36 to 37, having concluded that, you know, one of the proximate cause of the First World War was J.P. morgan bankrolling the Crown and, and demanding that they get, you know, a return on their investment, as it were, or not before to eat the loss. And you know, Nye Nya had gone on national television and said, you know, we've concluded, you know, that, that banking interests as well as the armaments industry quite literally conspired to, you know, to, to the creative circumstance which they could profit, you know, the cost of, you know, 50, 000 dead American boys in combat and another and equal that number, you know, dead from disease, you know, shipboard and in filthy trenches and things. You know, people are not going to get behind Roosevelt going to war with, you know, white Christian Germany just because, you know, we don't like those Germans. But you know, the communists are our friends. This wasn't going to work. So what happened was something very interesting happened on. I mean there's two key takeaways here. The first key takeaway obviously is that Pearl harbor was a godsend for, for the New Dealers. But they still had a problem because they couldn't fully insinuate that as causes belly against Germany, much as they would have liked to. What happened on December 4th? December 4th, 1941. Robert R. McCormick, you know, he was the arch America first or owner of the Chicago Tribune. Somebody leaked to him, uh, what was called the Rainbow Five war plan. It was splashed all over the Tribune and then, you know, every other news service picked it up rapidly. The Rainbow Five War Plan was commissioned by Roosevelt in 1940. And it was a real war plan. It was the war plan. And it was a war plan that had only one purpose and that was the wage war on Germany. It called for the mobilization of 10 million men. It called for an invasion of Europe. It called for the mass production of four engine bombers to devastate the German Reich from the air. And it was very clear that it would take until 1943 for this mobilization table to be affected, at which point the Rainbow Five war plan would be implemented. And General Wedemeyer, who then I believe was a captain, he was responsible for the Rainbow Five war plan. Kind of the brass tax of it. He was something of a logistics genius and sort of like an Omar Bradley type, but with a lot more integrity and character. And Weda Meyer had had connections to America first and Wedemeyer as he relayed to, to not just his biographer, but to a couple different historians who chronicled these events, including Tom Fleming. He was visited by the FBI as well as the Department of the army and they were accusing him of the leak. And he didn't leak it. And he approached half Arnold in later years and Hap Arnold apparently told him. And this became somewhat of the consensus of the army that it was Roosevelt's people themselves who leaked it. Crazy as that might seem. But it, that is really what convinced Germany that they were going to be under imminent assault by the United States.

[A]

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[C]

you read the December 11 speech by Hitler to the Reichstag, the concrete incidents that he references. I mean like I made the point before, like Hitler really does not mention Stalin in there. And he, he, he mentions Churchill only in the most dismissive terms. He talks about Roosevelt as a mortal enemy of the German Reich. He talks about there was no reason for this war to happen. And he talks about America as you know, as being, as having been captured by a Conspiratory, a conspiratorial cadre whose ambition was and is to wage total war on Germany. And this is what he was talking about. Okay. And I don't see, you know, honestly, too. I mean, the rebuttal to what people. The rebuttal of Wedemeyer and. And half Arnold and. And Fleming himself is that, you know, well, nobody would do that because of the national security implications. It's like. Well, you know, there. There really was only one way for America to wage war on the German Reich, and that was just, you know, to mobilize completely and then assault Europe. You know, it's not like this was some big secret. Either America was going to do that. The political war. The political will was there and the material and the men were there, or they were not. So, I mean, it's not as if it's. We're not. We're not talking about the leaking of nuclear secrets or something. So there's that. I mean, number two, there wasn't really any other way to get America into the war, you know, other than telling Germany in a roundabout, plausibly deniable way, we're going to assault you. And then, you know, making sure that Germany returns the serves that were by, you know, declaring war in kind, but then doing it officially. You know, then the president can go before commerce and say, like, you know, a war has been declared. You know, war has been brought to our shores. You know, we. We haven't done anything to provoke this. I mean, mind you, America was at war with Germany for years before that. You know, and most recently before the leak, September 11, that this was the first September 11, 1941, Roosevelt declared, I

[B]

could think of a September 11. Before that, they tried to kill. They tried to kill Mussolini on September 11th.

[C]

And. And September 11th, 1973, was Pinochet's seizure of power. So it's one of those haunted dates on November 9th. Yeah, that's a good. I didn't even think of that. Yeah, you're absolutely right. But it. But December, uh, But yeah, no, September 11th. Um, 41, Roosevelt declared, uh, unrestricted, uh, naval warfare against Germany. He said all German military vessels when encountered in the Atlantic Ocean will be fired upon. I mean, that's not a declaration of war. Like, I don't know what is. You know, it's like, you know, committing acts of war is a constructive declaration of war. I mean, so there's all of. All of them, all of these things. I mean, that was what. Because, I mean, people, this is what's fascinating about, like, Kind of pop history, like, because that's what people say. You know, you can bring up the people if you sell Pete the Rainbow 5 case to people, they were like, well, but Pearl harbor happened. That's what brought America into the war. It's like, yeah, but nobody knew Pearl harbor was gonna happen. I think it. I think it appeared inevitable. That's a whole other issue. But the point is too, that doesn't get into war with Germany. I mean, despite what Roosevelt's people were trying to sell for years, like, oh, anything that happens in Tokyo is coming from Berlin. You know, those, those little yellow Japanese, they're. They're our inferiors. It's the Germans anyway, telling them what to do. Like, nobody believed that. And nobody particularly wanted to, you know, wage war on Germany just because, you know, I mean, it. No matter what Japan did it, that wasn't going to somehow, you know, that wasn't going to somehow allow the. The New Deal regime to, you know, gets war declaration against Germany, particularly with the House of Congress. And like I said, we got to look at the political climate. You know, look at the Nye Committee. Like, look what people were thinking about. Like we talked about last time we held one of these discussions. You know, America, like World War I was viewed as. It was viewed as basically the Iraq War of the time. Like, people did not trust the government anymore. You know, they viewed World War I as a con. You know, they viewed the. What any. Anytime some War Department type or some. Or some State Department type, you know, came on the radio in those days and started to say, you know, trying to bang the war drums. You know, people said, like, you know, we're not, you know, going to who. We won't be fooled again. You know, I mean, that people, they've got this idea that they got this idea, you know, because they see like these. This kind of ticker tape parade footage of. And things, you know, like the sailor kissing the pretty nurse and stuff. They're like, oh, World War II is when everybody was, you know, you got war fever and jumped on the bandwagon. Like, that's not the case, you know, at all. And, uh, was not easy for the New Dealers to. To get a general war declaration against the German Reich out of this. Like, it really wasn't and there wasn't. It's not as if, you know, the Germans are very cunning too. Hitler made sure that there was not going to be some kind of. Some kind of Lusitania event. Like one of the things that. One of the early clefts between him and Raider, you know, the gross admiral, later replaced by Donitz. And there's a lot of things that led to that dismissal. But Raider was saying, like, you know, look like if my, if my, if my men encounter American vessels, we're gonna. We're gonna fire on them. And Hitler's like, you absolutely are not. You're not going to do anything unless you're defending yourself. You know, we're not going to give. We're not going to give the Americans, you know, some. Some pretext to, you know, to declare war on us. I mean, the Germans are very content of this. You know, like, it wasn't. It wasn't. It wasn't something that was. Was beyond their comprehension. And, and despite what. How the, How Hitler himself and the OKW are. Are presented, these were not like provincial guys who didn't understand, you know, the way that America did business in terms of war and peace questions. I mean, they'd fought America, not, you know, just, you know, over 20 years before and an historical time, that's a drop in the bucket. You know, this isn't. This isn't something. This isn't something that. That. That was not on their mind.

[B]

Yeah, I mean, I remember 20 years ago like it was yesterday.

[C]

Yeah, exactly. Exactly.

[B]

Nine, 11.

[C]

Yeah, exactly. Yeah. So people. People act like, among other things, they act like the Germans were ignorant or provincial number one. But also. Yeah, they act like. They act like, you know, the Great War was a hundred years previous or something. You know, it. The. And plus two, I mean, it. The German. The German general staff was full of guys who literally fought the U.S. army. You know, I mean, it's. This wasn't. This wasn't something remote to them. You know, they knew what America could do. They fought. They'd fought it. You know, I mean, was not theoretical. They had no illusions about this.

[B]

So Hitler declares war on the United States, and then how does the United States enter into the battle officially?

[C]

I mean, really, for all practical purposes? I mean, America, there was no. This is interesting too, because, I mean, you had like the. As everybody knows, there were the Doolittle raids over. Over Japan, wherein, you know, the. The pilots of these. Of these bomber craft literally had to bail out because they couldn't refuel and then be, you know, retrieved later. America did that because it was viewed as imperative, you know, kind of like return the serve. After Pearl harbor, you know, America didn't actually engage the Vermont until 43, like in North Africa, you know, and that was. That's fascinating too, because you had Darlon who was. I'm trying to remember what his formal title was. I mean he was basically the. He was the equivalent of the military procurator or like. Or what would have been in. In the German Reich. The galiletter of. You know. He was the military district commander of, you know, French Algeria basically. Okay. And was French for Operation Torch. When America landed in North Africa, it was. They traded hostile fire with. With fascist French forces, you know, not with the Vermont. And uh, the uh. Kasserine was the first, uh. Was the first engagement uh, with the Agate Corps. And America got uh. America was handily defeated. It wasn't until El Guitar. Months, months subsequent that. That America was able to attack like a victory over German forces on the board, as it were. And that was. That's what patent on the map. Interestingly. Like, I don't. I don't know if people still watch the movie Pat. And like when I was a kid and I'm sure when you were a kid, you know, it was always on tv like when we patent with George C. Scott.

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

And like. Yeah, yeah. Which is actually a really good movie.

[B]

The first Blu Rays I ever bought.

[C]

Oh, wow. Okay. Yeah. I mean it's a dope movie. It's my dad's favorite movie. So I've seen it a bunch. But you know they get. They get. They get into that. You know, that was. That was Patton's big coup was that. You know, he. He defeated the Africa Cordell guitar and the. I mean the writing was on the wall already. You know, like Rama was in terrible. Was in terrible trouble but. But just the same. I mean he ever. Or even on their worst day were. I mean they were. They were incredibly freaking squared away. That's not any. That's not any. That's not any small thing. But I'll. If you want to get into. If you want to get into the. If you want to get into the US War in Africa on the US War like you know, on. In. In the West. I would love to do that, but I'd like to do another dedicated hour to that. We can even do it tomorrow if you want. But frankly, I want to brush up on my nose if that's okay.

[B]

Sure. Yeah, that's fine.

[C]

Yeah.

[B]

Yeah, that's fine. Do you want to hit anything else before we go?

[C]

Not unless you got any more questions, man.

[B]

No, I think that's enough for people to People to deal with.

[C]

Okay. Yeah, let's. Let's hit up the next time though. It doesn't have to be tomorrow, but I'm willing to go tomorrow if you want, but yeah, whenever you want to. Let's hit up the. The onset of like actual hostilities in terms of America engaging with the Vermont and go from there.

[B]

Okay, that sounds good. Remind everybody about your substack and we'll. We'll get out of here.

[C]

Yes sir. Indeed. My substack is real. Thomas777.substack.com I put long form up there. I've got a podcast on there.

[A]

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[C]

CTS and C is 21 plus sponsored by Chumba Casino. And it's only $5 a month then. So even if you're a hobo, you can afford it. Maybe you're a hobo, you shouldn't be signing up for sub stacks. But I. But my point is that it's very affordable. I. I'm active on Twitter at number 7h O M as 777. I'm active on Gab at Real underscore Thomas 777 and I'm all over YouTubes now thanks to people like my friend Pete who, who put me on here, which is dope. And moving forward I may get my own YouTube channel. I haven't decided yet but I gotta, I gotta catch up on my. I gotta get to my print long form before I make any other moves. But in any event, I. I can't thank you enough, Pete. I mean I really enjoy these conversations and I really just on their own terms and we're friends. But also I really, really appreciate the exposure. It's dope. So thank you very much.

[B]

No problem at all. Until maybe tomorrow.

[C]

That would be great.

[B]

And we're back with Thomas 777. How are you doing, sir?

[C]

I'm doing very well, Pete. Thanks for having me back. I'm very much enjoying these. These sessions that we're having. And thanks for accommodating me the last two days. I was really going to sideline. I was quite sick. So thanks for accommodating the delay and I'm sorry about that.

[B]

No problem at all. So last time you had touched on Pearl harbor, you had mentioned it for a second and then a couple comments came in and said, hey, ask Thomas about Pearl harbor and how that plays into the whole war effort, both theaters. So you want to talk a little bit about Pearl harbor and you know, did, did they see it coming? Did they know it was coming? Was it, did they cause it?

[C]

Well, there's a couple ways we can look at that and I don't want to go too far outside the scope, but Admiral Kimmel, husband kill. That was his name. Husband Kimmel. I mean, you know how in that epoch, like particularly WASPy people had very strange names. You know, Admiral Kimmel was, was one of those types and the, the big criticism, I mean a lot of people claim, particularly on the. Right, you know that, doesn't it? Right. They claim that. Well, you know, the Pacific Fleet was deployed as it was at Pearl harbor essentially to bait the Japanese into assaulting it. I don't think that was true. I mean, yeah, it was a provocative act to deploy that way. But I don't, I do not think that, I don't think Roosevelt, I don't think Sumner Wells, I don't, I don't, I don't think Morgan Thou. I don't think their idea was we're going to deploy in this kind of array and you know, the Japanese are going to assault Hawaii and that, that's, that's going to get us into the war. I don't think that for a few reasons. But back to Admiral Kimmel, he himself was really hung out to dry and he was actually courts marshaled and he was acquitted. But he, Kimmel was really, he was really kind of burned in effigy and that wasn't entirely misplaced. I, I'm not a military vet, but I do know some things about how institutions work and that are scaled like, you know, institutions at scale. Granted, I'm talking about the private sector, not the military, but I read this whole treatment of this book called Groupthink, which it's, it's one part kind of military sociology and it deals with the Q Missile Crisis, it deals with Pearl Harbor. It's basically about a collective decision making can lead to very, very productive or very disastrous outcomes depending on the presence or absence of certain variables, depending upon the trust and confidence among the men in the group. I mean, all those things. Okay, but one of the case studies was Pearl Harbor. Okay. And the way this other cast though the kind of culture of these officers and their wives in, in Hawaii, it almost struck me as. You ever seen the old, you Ever seen Apocalypse Now Redux, where there's the. There's a deleted scene where these kinds of French aristocrats.

[B]

Yeah, yeah.

[C]

And they're like, pretending like the war is not really going on and, you know, they're still hosting their dinner parties and talking about, you know, the potential of a colored revolt and stuff. I. It almost seems like that, like Kimmel and. And these, These kinds of flag officers, they. They knew something terrible might happen, but it's. It's just, well, we're the United States Navy. What could possibly happen? So I think there was an aspect of that, but everything, everything. Washington in the War Department and Roosevelt's the many most trusted and the men who most wanted to insinuate America into war around, you know, within his inner circle, they kept coming back to the fact they were singularly focused on Germany. Okay? They just were. And there was talk, and I'll get to this in a minute. That ultimately led to real intrigues when it became clear that there just wasn't a political will in America to go to war with Germany. You know, just whether to, you know, save the UK or to defend democracy or to. Or to. Or to fight against fascism. It. When that became clear and when the polls, when the poll. I mean, government by poll really kind of began under Roosevelt, okay? And consistently, about fully about 80% of Americans as late as April 1941, like, were opposed going to war with Germany. Japan, it was a little more complicated, okay? People did not like the Japanese. Some of this was for racial reasons. Some of this was for. There was tensions between America and Japan that definitely did not need to approach anything that, that, that led to this. This horrible war. But there was real tension between American Japan. There was not only America and Germany, but still there was a solid majority against that, that was opposed to, you know, pursuing a policy of. Of aggressive posturing, let alone war with Japan. But there began to be talk in New Deal quarters of provoking a. A war with Japan as a back door to war with Germany, especially over the Tripartite Pact, for obvious reasons, which, for those who don't know, was a. A pact between Germany, Italy and. And the. In. In the Empire Japan that if any, if anyone was, Was attacked. The other two would. Would. Would come to the. Would come to the aid of the other, you know, basically a mutual defense pact. But it was framed in defensive terms. Okay. Not that that means anything in power politics and actual military terms, but in political terms it's highly significant. But in any event, I don't believe, given that climate it just does not seem credible to me that, you know, Kimmel's command, the four and the forces under his command were deliberately arrayed in order to provoke a Japanese attack. I, I don't believe that. And especially considering, you know, the, we, we talked about the Rainbow 5 leak in our last segment and the reason why people generally don't know about that and the reason why it kind of became a nullity, it's because Pearl harbor made it a nullity. It was not a nullity in actual, in cause and effect terms because that's what provoked the furor of the Third Reich g off Hitler to declare war against America. I mean it was, it was many things too was the Atlantic Charter. It was the fact that America was literally bankrolling the communist war against, against the Third Reich. It was, it was because, you know, as of 9-11-1941, America had quite literally declared a naval war against Germany. I mean it was all these things. But Rainbow 5 was really what pushed the German, the OKW gearing raider, the Fur himself like the entire control group of, of the Third Reich's military decision making apparatus. This is what pushed them towards war with the United States. This is what put them over that Rubicon as it were. Okay, but in terms of American perception and American public opinion didn't figure because the Rainbow 5 leaked happened on December 4, not even three days later. You know, two and a half days later, Pearl harbor happens. And after Pearl harbor happened, you know, war fever jumps off. Americans are outraged. They're frightened. Roosevelt goes on the radio and declares that, you know, the Japanese sold in Pearl harbor was playing planned by Adolf Hitler, which is ridiculous in all kinds of ways. Hitler was a surprise as Roosevelt at Pearl harbor. There was not good, there was good offices, there was between Tokyo and Berlin. There was not what we consider good diplomacy and good communication. There sure as hell was not military coordination at all. And this was not just going to the distance of the day and, and the absence of telecom tech that we take for granted. Okay, that's, that's, that, that's absurd. But when the getting back to,

[A]

getting

[C]

back to Pearl harbor and, and the political intrigues surrounding it on also on December 4th incident simultaneous with, you know, the, the same day as Rainbow 5 was leaked, something very, very strange happened at the, the Manila waterfront. The Philippines is America's largest overseas holding in Asia. People may or may not know that. That's why, that's why the assault on the Philippines was such a disaster. And there's a huge amount of casualties and, and and tens of thousands of people suffered horribly, including of course, you know, a huge number of American servicemen. Just awful stuff. But on December 4, Admiral Hart, who was, who was the commander of the Manila garrison or the Manila waterfront, I think it was known as, he ordered a young lieutenant named Kemp Tally to take command of an obsolescent schooner called the Lanakai, or the Lanakai to outfit it with a, a Spanish American war era cannon, a couple of machine guns. He swore in about half a dozen Filipinos as temporary, as temporary, uh, uh, uh, enlisted in the U. S. Navy. And uh, lieutenant Kemptale was ordered, uh, to pilot the schooner to the coast of Camaran bay, just off of what was Japanese territorial waters because Cameron bay is in what's now Vietnam and the Japanese were occupying it. Then Keptali was given an envelope and he was told to open it upon reaching his objective, which was immediately outside the contiguous zone of Caman bay. Okay, he got these orders on December 4. On December 7 was when Tali undertook this effort because the, the Lanakai had been outfitted for the purpose. And before he reached his destination, he was called back to the Manila waterfront because the assault on Pearl harbor had happened. And case orange, or plan orange, which was the code name for war with Japan, was. He was informed that this was now underway. Okay, destroy the envelope. Destroy the message. He did. Years later, Admiral Hart refused to talk about this for a couple decades. Tally told Thomas Fleming, who wrote an incredible history of the New deal regime and in the Roosevelt administration as well as World War II and Roosevelt's role therein. He actually interviewed Kemp Tali. By this time, admiral Hart was dead. Hart told Taliest heart point blank. He said, was I sent on a suicide mission to provoke essentially amounted to a Gulf of Tonkin kind of incident with the, the Japanese Imperial Navy. And Hart said, well, why else would you, why else would you have been deployed there? You know, he's like, I can't tell you for certain because I didn't read the message I gave you because it was from the president and it was, you know, eyes only or whatever the military equivalent is. But why else would he be sent there other than as a decoy, you know, so take that for what it's worth because I mean, again, the Roosevelt had a real problem on the Placentia bay conference with Roosevelt between Roosevelt and Churchill. That was supposed to be Roosevelt's big crew. You know, the, the uk's war effort was not going well against the third Reich. I mean, to say the least. I mean it was a disaster that's when the Atlantic charter was declared and Roosevelt said, you know, we stand with Britain with Great Britain. And the Atlantic Charter, you know, set out a series of points, almost Wilsonian sounding points about what the post war democratic order would look like once fascism was defeated. Which to me again is like another declaration of war and all but name against the Third Reich. And he. The minutes are of the, of the. Of the conference between Churchill and Roosevelt. This is documented that Roosevelt said that he was going to continue to wage war against the German Reich without declaring war and that he was continue. He was going to continue to provoke the Third Reich into declaring war on the United States. The poll returns after the the Placentia Bay summit after the Atlantic Charter out of this whole media push for you know, this, this kind of anti fascist crusade, there was still solidly between 70 and 80% of the. Of the. Of the country opposed entering a war with Germany and about between 60 and 70% opposed war with Germany even if the UK fell and even if the Soviet Union was defeated. And incidentally I believe and George Kennan kind of danced around this issue but with Ken wanted to kind of read between the lines. Roosevelt never particularly went over great with Catholic voters for obvious reasons. But once he once after after the after the ever. The ever the Barbarossa operation ensued. You know, 6-22-41 it and Roosevelt unconditionally declared alliance with Moscow. I mean that, that was it. You know, like he he, he lost. He lost Catholic America. You know, like how how could you stand with. How could you stand with Communism? You know, we don't care who's in the in. We don't care who's sitting in the in in Berlin is. You know, we don't care what what Hitler is. We don't care if he's a monster. Even you you can't stand with communism against Europe. You know, that's insane. That's madness. But I though what I'm getting at is that Roosevelt realized by. By late 41 he realized he just was not going to get some.

[A]

He.

[C]

He was not gonna be able to stir up war fever against the German Reich. It just was not going to happen. Absent some kind of mass assault by German absent some kind of Third Reich's version of Pearl harbor against America. And that would never happen because even as late as, as late as days were Pearl harbor there's you know, the like we talked in the last session about one of the major reasons for the cleft between the furor and and granted Grand Admiral Raider was that Hitler in no uncertain terms said like we are not going to provoke the United States Navy and you know, we your men will defend themselves if they're fired upon, but you know, we are, we, we are not going to provoke a, a confrontation in North Atlantic. And what Donit said later and granted, I mean Donitz was, didn't inherit command of the Kriegsmarine until, until years subsequent. But I mean he, he was in a position to know. He maintained in his own memoirs as well as at Nuremberg that most of the incidents in which, most of the incidents prior to December 41when German UBoats did fire upon American vessels, these American vessels were, were moving in tight formation with the, with Royal Navy warships that were indistinguishable therein. You know, I mean, and that, and I, I've got a reason to believe that that's exactly. They would have deployed I mean especially in the wake of the Atlantic Charter. But I mean they've been doing that for years by that point. I mean at least two years. So that was, that was, I mean that, that's, that's my take on Pearl harbor and it, you know, the way to understand too like we were talking before we went to air. I mean one of the, one of the real moral indictments of, of the New Deal regime, if, if your policy, particularly in America, I mean I think this is just, I think this goes just generally okay, but especially in America where there's purposeful structural hedges against overreach, particularly executive overreach. Almost the point I think of, of a sort of self defeating anxiety about it. You know, if you have a president who is pursuing a course that, that a purposeful course to sue for war, said he can, said he can derive political gain personal power and, or impose an ideological vision in the wake or, or presumed aftermath and victory within that war. I mean that's, that's a kind of gross breach of public trust and, and potentially catastrophic just I mean not just in apocalypse storical terms, but for the, for the fortunes of the country and its people that that potentially can endure the consequences of which can endure for centuries. And Roosevelt Secretary of State was a man named Cordell Hull, kind of a cipher. The guy taught her the lisp. And Roosevelt was known to make fun of him in the presence of witnesses. Roosevelt considered them an insufferable. Sumner Wells, the Undersecretary of State was, was, was kind of the real, was the, was the shadow Secretary of State, the real diplomat. And there's the kind of the universal consensus even among Pete the Uniform Consensus even among court historians is that deploying a hull to, to negotiate with the Japanese Ambassador Namura, who is this very kind of upright retired naval admiral. Hall's role was kind of just to obstruct and they sort of in a sort of scream moral cans quite literally yet namora and instruct him that the Japanese, you know, we're not, you know, we're not, we're not, we're not, we're not, we're not proceeding acceptably in, in power politics. Like meanwhile, this was as America was quite literally destroying the Japanese economy, you know, purposefully, you know, it's the Japanese the, the whole memo memorandum.

[A]

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[C]

se terms and conditions 21 plus was there much has been made about that by some historians and it was basically the final Namora's final effort to, to achieve peace with the United States. Japan was in a strange position politically. You had these kind of frightened civilian politicians who were, who were incessantly worried for good reason they'd be assassinated if they ran afoul of the military. Yet an army that was very, very radicalized. You had a navy that was a lot more reasoned and probably America's best bet for, for reaching some kind of negotiated settlement in terms of sphere of influence parameters in the Far East. Nomura offered, he said, look, he's like, why don't we have a 90 day hiatus of any deployment by the United States or Japanese forces in theater. You know, we will agree to withdraw from southern Indochina, which would would be southern Vietnam and parts of Cambodia and Laos. But by that point, most of the Japanese codes have been broken. So Washington messaged Hall and said that, well, you know, we've got intercepts that we've, you know, the codes have been broken and indicating the Japanese, they have plans to reinforce Indochina imminently. So obviously negotiating in bad faith. That doesn't make any sense. Like obviously you're gonna, you're gonna hedge your diplomatic efforts with, you know, the ability to deploy in depth defend if need be. I mean this is obvious. But that, so hall responded essentially by, you know, just reiterating terms to Japan. And there were terms that obviously were not going to be abided. You know, they were if, if Japan one of the embargo lifted, if Japan wanted to be able to access its assets which have been frozen and, and could not be recovered for, in. For all practical purposes in the United States, you know, they'd have to, they'd have to withdraw completely from Indochina. They'd have to, you know, they basically have to like. They'd have to end the war with, with the Chinese mainland essentially like seed. Like all the territory they'd conquer to Chiang Kai Shek as, you know, kind of like the American proxy, like client proxy, just like ridiculous terms. I mean, in, in. In the bounded rationale of what was underway. I mean, and it's, that's, that's, that's my point. You know, if you're not. And there's, there's a parallel today wherein, you know, the, the State Department doesn't actually practice diplomacy. It just, it just shrieks at people, you know, and, and pursues a provocative and lying. Provocative lines of. Of. Of. For these. It just issues these prerogative declarations that are. And the only purpose which is to be provocative and to preclude resolution short of hostilities. I mean, thankfully, America lacks the political will enforce them being to wage war against Russia. But I mean, you know, and unfortunately for the Japanese and ultimately for the, for the United States, that, that wasn't the case in 1941, but that was, that was, that was my point.

[B]

What was, what was FDR's deal with Germany? Seems to me that Germany is a more likely ally for the United States than Soviet than the Soviet Union is.

[C]

In actual terms.

[B]

It doesn't make sense. I mean, not even an ally, but just a trade ally. Just. It doesn't make any sense, you know, that you are going to alienate so many people by sitting down with Stalin.

[C]

Well, the thing is, I mean this goes back. It's. It's not approximate cause, but there's a parallel, you know, going back. Christopher Clark, you know, he's a historian. I invoke a lot because he's, he's written some really interesting stuff on World War I and, and this, he wrote a whole history of Prussia that's this huge volume, but it's really dope. But I mean, he made the point that the, the kind of absolute enmity, like the real hatred that developed between Kaiser Vilhelm and King George. I mean both of these men were insufferable people. That's part of it. But it. Yeah, there's really no, there's really no reason for America, the UK and Germany to have been at anything but to have been at odds at all. If Anything like, yeah, they should have been allies even notwithstanding communism and the monster that was Joe Stalin. That's kind of the natural alliance against, you know, the Russia and the East. I mean, yeah, it the best. I mean there's a little known guy. I mean he was not little known at the time. Yeah, go ahead.

[B]

But haven't some, haven't some historians gone as far as to say that basically that Hitler was an anglophile, that he just wanted to be, he wanted a partnership with England?

[C]

Well, yeah, unconditionally. Half a dozen times he offered the UK unconditional peace. I mean that's its own thing. Like next session, I want to cover that. We'll get into the UK's, we'll get into the Churchill war, okay, against the Reich. But it, there was a, there was a guy named Harry Hopkins. He's kind of forgotten history now, but he certainly was not unknown in his epoch. He was sort of the Colonel House of the Roosevelt administration. And he, it might have been NY or it might have been Burton Wheeler. It was, it was one of the kind of arch nemeses of Roosevelt himself who came to call Hopkins the American Rasputin. Rasputin been the Secretary of commerce, only 40. And he, he, he was forced to resign because the, because he made some frankly extremist statements both, you know, in what, what could only be construed as in support of communism, like overtly in support of communism. And he published in April 41, he was no longer Secretary of Commerce, but he'd been literally moved into the White House. And the, the COVID the claim for this was, well, he's in poor health and he was, and Mr. Roosevelt takes care of his people. It's like, okay, so why is he living in the White House? You know, and he wasn't exactly a man without means. So I mean, none of this, I mean the implication's obvious. You know, he was, he was quite obviously, you know, kind of Roosevelt's closest, you know, advisor de facto, as it were. But he, he declared in April 41, two things he said. Well, first of all, he said in response to people who criticize the,

[A]

you

[C]

know, criticized the, the, the kind of anti business climate that had emerged in America. I mean there's a real threat of capitalism kind of being relegated to the ashman history, not by circumstances or anything of a historical nature, but because of some kind of truly socialist revolution in America. This is not impossible. This is not a fantasy. Okay. Hopkins response to that was, well, you know, America's in danger of a quote, fascist revolution. By big business, I mean, he literally said this. And he said that we need a, quote, New Deal for the world. He said that the world's under threat by, by fascism. Adolf Hitler is the architect of it. If we do not go to war to destroy Adolf Hitler and his German Reich and Mussolini and the Empire of Japan, who in his mind, too, were all conspiring together and responsible for everything bad that happened anywhere. You know, it's, this is similar. Like Trotsky is nonsense, you know, like fascists and big business are conspiring to enslave us all. And if we don't, you know, we, you know, if we, if we don't export the New Deal abroad and annihilate our enemies, you know, we'll, you know, we'll just be a garrison state. You know, we'll, we'll be a city on the hill, but we'll be a besieged city on the hill. I mean, this is truly insane stuff. And it's, and frankly, if you're white and Christian and not some kind of deranged communist, I mean, that, that was like, on its face, treason. And Harry Hopkins died shortly thereafter. But if you're asking what I, I believe this is how Roosevelt thought. Roosevelt was not a stupid man. And I think Roosevelt himself, his thought was a little more nuanced. But Roosevelt wasn't a wasp, literally. He was Dutch, but he, I mean, he was a WASP culturally. Okay. He was an upper crust new Northeast Protestant. And people who disdained him would call him behind closed doors, obviously a traitor to his class. All right, there's something to that. Uh, my take on it is that Roosevelt believed these things. I think he was a crazy anti fascist. Okay. I mean, he, it's, it wasn't just, it wasn't just what people like Burton Wheeler said. I mean, Wheeler was a good man. Don't be wrong. But Roosevelt wasn't just a guy. I was in personal power. I mean, he was, he was interested in that. And I think, I think he became intoxicated by hubris, as many men do. But I, I think he literally believed what Hopkins elucidated in, in this kind of anti fascist screed that he, that he, that he both wrote and that he, he explicated in public life until he was kind of sidelined on grounds of, you know, the liability that he'd become for kind of saying these things above board that were not supposed to be said. That's my view of it. It's a crazy thing. I mean, crises, you. Crises can. Didn't Mr. Kissinger say, Never let a crisis go to waste. And I think he was paraphrased. I think he was paraphrasing Metternich. And people put a lot of shade on Kissinger. And I. I'm more friendly to Kissinger than people might think. And I'm not saying that. That. But I mean, just speaking in. In terms of. In. In objective terms, I mean that true structural crises, and particularly it. It At a key historical apocalypse junctures, there's great potential for. For. For. For, you know, remarkable things as well as like, really terrible things. And I think. I think that's that. That's how you. That was kind of the Roosevelt moment. But, you know, the. The war, among other things, allowed the New Deal to really become the New Deal because that. That allowed it to be a permanent regime, you know, as total wars do. I mean, that's my view. You know,

[B]

did anyone, like, at that point, talking about Roosevelt, like, said, basically, if you. If you take the side of the Soviet Union, that Spanish Civil War, you were on the side of the communists in the Sam. I mean, is basically just. I mean, it's hard to ignore that you've basically taken the side of people who throughout the 30s were causing insane 20s and 30s, 20s in Italy and then insane bloodshed all over freaking Europe.

[C]

Oh, yeah, I. And that's what, that's what the catalyst was for America first and for Father Coughlin. And I mean, there was huge opposition to this. What's fascinating is that Nye himself, there was a huge America first rally on the night of December 7th. Okay, nice. Somebody came into the auditorium and said, you know, the damn Jeffs just attacked Pearl Harbor. Like, what do you think now? You know, Senator Nye? And people thought the guy was a heckler, so he was removed. And then some new. It was either a newsman or an aide or came over, you know, ran off and handed a. A telegram. Deny. And I reads it. And he said, you know, stupefied. This is the. This is the worst news I've heard in 20 years. And then he said, the empire of Japan has assaulted Pearl Harbor. You know, like all these gasps go through the room. And that was like a game changer. And like Lindbergh said, like, not in public, but he. He said. One of his confidants, you know, he. He said, well, Roosevelt got us in the back door. I mean, at that point, there's still. At that point, I mean, the die was cast. You know, it's like you can't. You can't reason with people who are, who are swept up in that kind of war fever. And, and you know, in particular, like I said, like the, you know, the, especially considering the racial overtones of, of the Japanese American war. Like I'm not that, that's not some woke take like, oh, racist America. I mean there, there wasn't, there was in fact a two way hostility between east and west, oxidant and Orient, you know, the white man and the yellow man, if you want to look at it in those terms. That was very real. Okay, I, I don't think that can be denied. And obviously that was very much cultivated too by people who hated the Empire of Japan for cynical reasons. But that, that's what changed everything. And that's also why Hitler and the okw, they really, according to Ribbentrop and according to Gearing, both of whom I consider to be credible, particularly Gary. You can say a lot of things about Gary. And the guy wasn't a liar. And, and plus he knew he was going to be hanged no matter what he said. So like, why would he lie about this Anyway? He said like Hitler was shaken when he got the news that Pearl harbor had been assaulted. You know, he said, he said that it's very rare you saw Hitler genuinely shaken. He's like, you saw Hitler angry a fair amount. You know, you saw him like upset and somewhat agitated, but like shaken up like that. That was not something you generally saw like even when conditions were pretty catastrophic, you know, and he, he was genuinely like, you know, this is, this is very, very bad, you know, is what, is what Gary was getting it and it was. But that, that's, that's what changed everything, you know, and that's why, I mean, obviously too, I mean it was absurd that everybody from, from very different, I'll be for very different reasons, but everybody from Roosevelt to MacArthur was, was saying like, oh, this, you know, this was the crowds who like plotted this, you know, the Pearl harbor assault. I mean that's, that's obviously ridiculous. But if for no other reason, I mean the last thing, the last thing Berlin and Adolf Hitler wanted was for, you know, America to have some kind of catalyst like Pearl harbor to freaking, you know, issue a general mobilization order and finally get the, at least, if not a sweeping war mandate, at least an adequate consensus in order to pursue a war against, against the Reich. I mean, they sure as hell didn't want that. Like how, what, what the hell could they possibly gain from that? That, that put him in their nightmare quagmire of a true two front war. I Mean, Thomas Fleming makes the point, and I profoundly disagree with this, but he, he says, you know, if, if the Vermont withdrawn to quote a winter line. I mean, this presume some kind of armistice with Stalin too, that could have freed up 100 divisions at that point, as of December 1941, best case, America in the UK could have only mustered 20 divisions to assault North Africa. You know, the Fleming's take is that like, well, you know, the, the Kriegsmarine could have, you know, could have swept the Royal Navy out of the, out of the, out of the Mediterranean. The Germans could have fortified the Atlantic Wall, absorb Sweden as well as, you know, the Iberian Peninsula, and then, you know, like, assaulted North Africa full bore. But I mean, that, that, that basically presumes that, you know, the Soviet Union no longer exists. Okay. It's like, okay, what are the Soviets doing during this time? They're reconstituting and then, and, and Germany is dead. Hitler was not an amateur strategist. He, he was absolutely right. The way, the way, the only way Germany wins the Second World War is, is, is the annihilation of the Soviet Union. That was the only way out. I mean, that's kind of a tangent, but that's what, what, what defeated America first was what, what allowed Rose. What was Roosevelt's out. Um, was, uh, was, uh, was a Pearl harbor attack and nothing else. Like, make no mistake,

[B]

do you want to stay on the New Dealers a little bit more or do you want to jump into, I mean, you already mentioned once Barbarossa. Where do you want to go?

[C]

I'd like to stay with the New Dealers for the duration of this episode. And then, yeah, we'll, we'll jump into whatever you want. Next. Okay, next session, whether it's the UK's war against the riot or whether it's operating Barbarossa, you tell me.

[B]

Okay. All right, well, if we're going to, if we're going to stay on this, I mean, it seems to me that I've read not all of them, but I've read a good amount of. About how the Supreme Court was just basically redone in the 30s. I've read some cases, I mean, Ashwander versus Tennessee Valley authorities, a very famous case. And you just start seeing this whole different. The courts are interpreting things differently. And it almost seems like you talked about how he, he would do anything to get into, to start a war. And it almost seems like he set up the court system that if it came to a court decision, he had the court on his side.

[C]

Oh, yeah. And I think Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter was somewhat nuanced in his thought. He, you can't just dismiss him as like this left wing Jewish judge or as this Zionist. But he definitely was essential to the New Deal regime. That goes out saying and yeah, I mean Roosevelt quite literally tried to pack the court. I mean speaking of overreach, I mean he, he literally tried to, he, he literally tried to alter the, alter the paradigm of, of the separation of powers by, by you know, with, with the court packing bill which was defeated. But yeah, the, the kind of hubris indicated there is. It's unbelievable. But it's also even if that is somewhat complicated because the, I made the point again and again to people that and John Yu, who I think is a brilliant guy. I don't want to go too far afield, but people won't understand the judiciary and, and how it became kind of the, the truly seat, the true seat of sovereignty post Watergate in my opinion, even though the seeds were laid before that if not sewn. John, you was a good guy to read to learn about this topic, but Roosevelt I believe if he'd had a hostile judiciary that would have made, that would have made, that would have, that would have presented him some obstacles. But. You know, in the 20th century, presidents didn't just abide this idea that you know, they, you know, I make the point again and again that you know, the, the judiciary was looking for a

[A]

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[C]

CTS and CS21+ sponsored by Chamba Casino Almost an appendage of executive power. Whether it was, you know, an executive like Eisenhower deciding that he had to force integration in order to fight the Cold War on, on the sociopolitical front and then literally backing up that decision at the point it it with you know, at gunpoint like he did in Arkansas opposite Farbus. I think if, I think if Roosevelt had been dealing with a hostile Supreme Court that had been, you know, had been doing what it could to strike down, strike down the kind of more flagrantly uh, heavy handed to be charitable aspects of the New Deal, I think Roosevelt would have just ignored it or you know, he, he would have just, he would have just focused on the foreign policy frauds and even more earnest to trigger the war, you know, and then it would have been a done deal. You know, it's like okay, America's mobilized for a total war. I'm, you know, I'm, I'm. I man, I mean I. President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus during the war in the States. The Supreme Court. What's that where this is a national emergency, you know, you don't exist anymore. You know, I'm, I'm the law. And the national Emergency under Article 2. It's a fascinating question. Frankfurter later ran afoul for kind of for a very. He's a strange man, like in all kinds of ways. Like he, he. I can't remember. He got formally indicted but he got disbarred if I remember right. Like, like later in life for like simple corruption. Just like literally taking bribes. I mean a guy that stature, like that's very weird. Like think about that. Like even the kind of, even the kind of losers in the Supreme Court today, like it'd be weird to hear about one of them just like taking a bribe. Like some kind of like some jerk water governor or something. Like. I mean I, it's, it's weird. But yeah, that, that definitely Frankfurter, Frankfurter's cooperation, I mean not just a test support is. I mean it's ecological agreement with Roosevelt the man as well as the entire New Deal enterprise. I mean that, I think that was essential to it. I mean it. Roosevelt was a master Machiavellian and he'll be remembered is that I made the point before that. The real. One of the reasons I, I write so much longer form about Roosevelt and Hitler. It's not just because like I made the point before. I think they were each other's true nemesis.

[B]

Nemesis.

[C]

But I mean Roosevelt might have been a bad man, but he was a political genius. He wasn't a slob like Churchill. You know, he wasn't just a gangster like Stalin. I mean I've got. Stalin's a fascinating guy, but he, he was very much a gangster. I mean Roosevelt had something of a gangster in him. But Roosevelt and Hitler are definitely the most interesting executives in World War II. I, I think, I mean, I don't believe that's just my conceptual bias because I'm you know, an American type it. But yeah, Roosevelt was. It's. It's pretty amazing what he was able to get done. I mean and part of that owed the circumstances that fell in his lap like Pearl harbor, but some of it didn't, you know, I mean there's a lot of guys who tried to a cop who have, who have aimed to accomplish similar things and it just blew up in their face, you know, because it, most people can't do that. I, Roosevelt was not a particularly nice guy. I mean, he was a charismatic guy all day, but he, he was kind of a bully. He was kind of a nasty individual. I mean, it's not. But he commanded real loyalty from people, you know, as, and Hitler did too. I mean, that's that, Like I said, man, I, I, I, I think they're both, I, I think, I think they're the most interesting players on, on the grand chessboard of the time.

[B]

It seems to me that if considering you had the New Deal and then people are looking at New Deal programs and they're like, this is border, you know, words like socialism, terms like socialism start getting thrown around. It seems to me that when he decides that he's going to back the Soviet Union and he's going to meet, you know, he's in the famous pictures with him, Stalin and Churchill, that a lot of people at home really had to be worried about the direction that the United States was going because we are all these programs that have never been in existence before and they're just basically pushed through by fiat all through the 30s. Then all of a sudden he's climbing into bed with like, you know, an arch communist and.

[C]

Well, there's a couple of things.

[B]

Yeah, good.

[C]

The, the degree to which there was a systemic failure and Murray Rothbard we talked about a couple sessions ago. Rothbard's history of the Great Depression is outstanding. And I think it's key to understanding what happened. The degree to which, the, the degree to which people believed that capitalism had failed in structural terms and could no longer, and could no longer be adapted to modern conditions at scale. This was a universal, people just accepted this. You know, that's why even the right wing was, was socialistic in the, in the fact that they believe in the corporate state, you know, like, oh, obviously, you know, you need, you need some degree of central planning in the economy just because, you know, there's too many inputs to manage without catastrophes and there's too many uncertainties, you know, and, and capital can't be efficiently allocated. You know, when, when you're talking about, you know, when you're talking about the modern, when you're, when you're talking about modern national economics, like everybody thought this, okay, so people were more habituated that that kind of thinking was easier to swallow than it would be today. But also, yeah, to your point, people still hated communism for good reason. But that's one of the reasons why I made the point to People before. But that's also one of the reasons why the Nuremberg regime had to be implemented. Implemented okay, in the, in the, in the literal ashes of the war. And that's also the concord. I mean, I think Truman just hated the Russians anyway, and Stalin also was trying to hold him over. But Stalin viewed kind of. This is his moment, you know, like a time of transition always is. Like, particularly if an executive dies in office, like Roosevelt did. But yeah, that's. The Cold War jumped off rapidly. I mean, to your point, part of that was public opinion and people saying, like, why the hell are we in bed with Stalin? You know, particularly when his forces are poised to, you know, to march all the way to, you know, the, to the Riviera. And isn't this why we, like, fought the war in the first place, Supposedly to, like, you know, free captive nations from fascism, but it's okay if they go red? You know, what the hell is this? So that was part of it, but it, it's also the half of what Roosevelt really accomplished with the New Deal. I mean, I mean, in terms of like, the, the federal programs, like the works programs and the subsidies and things, it did basically nothing to, to stimulate, recover, like, like structural recovery. What it did do was it meant, like, guys weren't starving anymore and people, you know, you didn't. Cities weren't like, choked with, like, With. With. With like, young men and women and boys and girls, like, wandering aimlessly because they had no work and they were starving. You know, it gave them something to do. And it, you know, even if you're just paying them in food stamps, they could buy a loaf of bread and like a pint of milk like that. When people are no longer hungry, they. That takes their mind off things. They just assume that, you know, whoever's providing them with these things knows better. I, I'm not like, putting shade on, On Americans of the era. I'm just saying people in all times think that way. Not because they're stupid. I mean, sometimes they are, but it. The degree to which the middle and. And working classes got just wiped out. There's some insane statistic. It was something like, like something like 40 of the national wealth, like, got just like, wiped out by, like, the bank failure. Okay? Like, people had nothing. You know, you had millions of people who just got overnight. They had nothing anymore. Like, what do you do? You know, it's like, I, Especially if you're some guy, like a wife and kids, you know, it's like, I, you know, I got some. I got some kid I'm terrified is like, gonna come out with polio or, like, you know, die from malnutrition. You know, like, I'm worried that my wife's gonna have to resort to like, you know, literally like selling her or something on the street so we can eat. You know, it's like, I, if Mr. Roosevelt's gonna like, hand you, like, script to buy government cheese for digging a hole for no reason, like, you're gonna be cool with that. Okay. Even if, you know, and you'll. The rational side of your mind is going to work out later that like, well, why did this happen? And stuff. But in, in the moment, you know, it's, that's all you're thinking, you know, So, I mean, that was, it was all of those things. But yeah, to your point, I mean, that's why the, that's why, that's why that enterprise full of the, the Washington Moscow concord just fell apart rapidly. I mean, and, and that was, I mean, much as Roosevelt did have incredible political instincts, I mean, objectively, I'm not putting shine on him as like, a good man, obviously, but it, there was a big blind spot of his because he obviously thought, I mean, Roosevelt wasn't bad, hell, this whole adult life, you know, he knew he wasn't going to live to be an old man. And I mean, so, I mean, he, he, he obviously believed that, like, oh, this, you know, that what. How. Where the League of Nations failed, you know, this, this kind of American Soviet concord is just going to endure, you know, because we see eye to eye. Like, even though, you know, the Russians might be brutal and they, you know, they might, they might approach, you know, political reality and, and, and differently than we do. But, you know, this is just going to endure because, hey, we, you know, we, we defeated fascism and you know, we, we brought people, you know, we, we. We're elevating, man, and things like, he, he. I mean, I don't know how anybody can believe that. That. I mean, the American and Russia would always be at odds in some basic way. It's absurd that there's this, and this enmity right now owes the ethno sectarian hostility of a, of a, a very, a very powerful minority. That there's a great deal of power in America, particularly vis a vis foreign policy. I don't want to get into that right now because it's too off topic, but it, I'm not saying that it makes any sense that America is that loggerheads with Russia perpetually these days, but there would never be some kind of friendly concord between Washington and Moscow, no matter what, particularly considering, you know, when you had the Communist Party, the Soviet Union, you know, is, as the regime there, like, that's ridiculous. But that was Roosevelt's big blind spot. But he did think that

[B]

even somebody like Patton understood. He, at the end of the war, he's like, well, the armies are here. Let's go. Let's march to Russia. You know, and then he gets, what, two weeks later he gets hit by a car and he does, it's not very long after that.

[C]

Yeah, that's, I've heard a lot of guys on the right, particularly like a good, a good, a good buddy of mine. He's an Iraq War vet. He's a really cool Pepperwood kind of guy, but he's, you know, he, he was in the Marine Corps, not in the army, but he, he really likes to read about these, these, these military figures, obviously, because, I mean, he's a military type and that's dope. I, I, I really like that those guys participate on my platforms. But he's asked me more than once, like, what, I mean, he's convinced that Patton was murdered on account of the fact that, yeah, to your point, I mean, Patton really was not at all with the program and I mean, patent caused problems for, for civilian leadership as, as well as the military brass anyway. But I, I'd have to deep dive into it more. I mean, I know the circumstances that way he died. I know that it's weird. I'm not prepared to go as far as to say he was murdered. Knox, I think that's impossible. But. Because I, I'd have to spend more time with the evidence. But yeah, it certainly is strange. There's, there's a lot of fascinating stuff at Piper's. Yakim Piper, who's like a hero of mine, you know, the leap standard commander, not overall commander. I mean, he was the equivalent of a colonel, but he, you know, he originally was under a death sentence. The Dachau trials. These trials literally held. There were some of the secondary, the second wave of war crimes trials. They were actually held at the Dachau camp. They're not called the doggo trials because it was, it wasn't a trial of the, the KZ types who, who guarded Dacao. It was, it was the leap standard boys, Waffen SS guys who, and they, they were tried like at that facility. Okay. That's why. But this American captain, his name eludes me. He was, he was captured during the Battle of the Bulge and he got to know Peeper Pretty well. This conf group. Conf group. Peeper, like, it captured him. And yeah, he, he relayed that he and Peeper became pretty good friends. And he told Danny S. Parker, who wrote a couple of great books on yak and paper, and he, this, this captain relayed to women and kind of. Parker kind of took his oral history and he said it. Yeah, he's like, he's like, I'm not gonna lie, you know, he's like, I, I'm like, you know, deeper's a great guy. I, I frankly like the boys under his command. Like, what, why the hell am I shooting at these guys? Alliance with the Ivans, like. And granted, this guy was a cap. A young captain. He wasn't a general, but I, yeah, I don't, I don't. I, I, I, I, I, I can't imagine that those thoughts did not enter the minds of, you know, grounded man under arms in the European theater on the American side. I mean, I'll get it. Not. But yeah, what do you. Let's, we're coming up on an hour. Let's like wrap this up and then next session we'll take up whatever you want. But yeah, what do you want to deal with in closing?

[B]

Or did we miss anything?

[C]

I don't think so, man. I just want to make sure that, like I said, I've taken steps to, to kind of progress more linearly. I've got kind of a scattershot mind. I mean, I hope that doesn't mean I'm going senile, but I, I, I take, I take criticism seriously. The response went over, been overwhelmingly positive to this series we've done that is dope. I'm very honored by that and I take great pride in that because that's the whole point. But I've taken steps to, to proceed more in more linear terms so it's easier to follow. And I also want each hour we do to, to kind of COVID a different aspect of things. And it's your show, quite literally.

[B]

Sure.

[C]

So next session. Yeah, I think we should either cover the, like, Churchill's war against Hitler. We should cover Barbarosa. Either one is fine, but.

[B]

Well, I think, I think the England, England's play in all this probably should come into because there's a lot of interesting, there's a lot of interesting stuff there. Hitler wasn't particularly like the biggest fan of the United States, but he, he did like England.

[C]

Yeah. Yeah. And there's the whole Hess flight to the uk A lot of intrigues and fascinating stuff there. Yeah, yeah. No that like nothing more man, than they cover that.

[B]

Cool. All right, well, remind everybody about your sub stack and we'll end it.

[C]

Okay. You can find me a few different places. You can find my sub [e-mail] you can find me on Twitter at number 7H O M A S 777. You can find me on Gab at Real Thomas 777. I've got a book out, science fiction brand. I'm imminently releasing another one in the series through Imperium Press. It's called Steel Storm. I think you should read it. It's dope. I know it is because people tell me it is. I didn't think anybody would read it, but they did. And that is. That is great. But yeah, yeah, that is what I do. And that is where you can find me.

[B]

Until the next time. Thank you, everyone. Back to the Pete Canyona show. Thomas is back. What's going on, man?

[C]

Hello, Pete. Thanks for hosting once again. I'm really enjoying these discussions and I think it's important for posterity. Not because I have any kind of, you know, profound wisdom to drop on people, but I think the record from a revisionist perspective, it's important to get that out there. And like too many of these sources remain, even if they're a lot more accessible now than 20 or 30 years ago, you know, they remain kind of esoteric. And I think we're kind of doing God's work by, you know, making these things more immediately available to people or at least, you know, at least introducing them to the modes of thought, you know, scholarship that maybe they're not familiar with, you know, because there is a bully pulpit of. Of bad history that is disseminated everywhere and it's almost like the weather, like man made weather or something. So, yeah, I. I think this is important, what we're doing. It's not just because I enjoy talking to you and you're my friend and I like doing this kind of stuff.

[B]

I'm gonna figure out some place to put all of these episodes as like a. A series that's. I think I know where I'm going to do it too. All right. So before we started recording, you had mentioned that we had talked about the US getting into the war on the last episode. And you want to talk today, which is probably. You said it's probably gonna be two episodes about Churchill, but yeah. You said you wanted to do some mop up on that on the last episode.

[C]

Yeah, I wanted to just kind of just Kind of an addendum to the, to the New Dealer revolution, which is, I mean, mainly what we were talking about. We'll get more into kind of the nuts and bolts of the ethics of the American war and, and some of those things, you know, kind of when we get into the, the aftermath in Nuremberg, because I think that that would be the more proper way to treat it because I'm not a military science guy or like a military officer or something, you know, so I, I don't really get into the, I mean if people want to talk about the military side of things, like that's dope and it's fascinating. I'm probably not the guy to really get into that. I'm, you know, a political theory guy and a revisionist. But I kind of wanted to explore like all the policy facets of the New Deal and convey that it was truly a revolutionary enterprise and it touched and concerned every aspect of American life, you know, socially, politically, economically, all of that. And I think we covered that pretty completely last episode. But you know, kind of the final, kind of the final feature, not just in linear terms of what we were talking about, but kind of the kind of the ultimate, kind of the penultimate act of, of the New, of the New Dealers and Roosevelt himself was the unconditional surrender declaration and incident to that, what was called the Morgenthau Plan. And the latter did not actually become policy, but something like that was perceived by the Axis powers as what America's ultimate intention was. So, and we're going to talk about how they, we're going to talk about how Germany, Japan and to a lesser degree Italy responded to Roosevelt's declarations and American moves.

[A]

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[C]

conditions 21/ and why they didn't, you know, quote unquote surrender before. They were utterly devastated. This is fundamentally important to understand. Okay, there's this common myth that I run into all the time and Thomas Fleming was one of my favorite historians. He's deceased now, but he and David Irving are about the only historians who really address this directly. There's just war theorists and, and Article 2 kind of constitutional scholars like John Yu who deal with it in very kind of legalistic terms, but in truly historical and ethical terms and existential terms, it's not something that's really addressed. I'm constantly hearing guys who are otherwise learned declare that, oh, well, you know, the japs were crazy. They wouldn't surrender. You know, it's like, okay, something happened at the Casablanca Conference in 1943. Roosevelt and Churchill and Mr. Stalin, although Roosevelt made the proclamation, declared that nothing short of unconditional surrender would end the second world war. Like, what does unconditional surrender mean? People would ask rose about this, and he said that, well, you know, it means, you know, total and unconditional capitulation to the allies, you know, or, or face utter annihilation. Well, America cut off all diplomatic relations with the axis. So it's like, what does that mean? That means you're going to endlessly attack us until you decide to stop attacking. I mean, that makes. That makes it literally impossible to surrender. And if you want to understand why the Germans literally fought the last man, it was two things. It was. Number one, because the alternative was they were trying to get as many of their people out of the east as, as the, as the red army carried out this, this mass campaign of rape, homicide, and just utter devastation. And they want to get as many other people west as they could, okay? Because whatever the Americans were going to do, it was not that bad. Okay? Secondly, if, if, if the opposing force, neither officer corps, nor the military leadership, northern civilian leadership, nor their diplomatic offices will speak to you, it's quite literally impossible to surrender. You know, I mean, like, what do you do when they're, when there's a thousand bomber raid over your city? You're supposed to run outside and wave a white flag, you know, like, you're like, what? Like, how does that actually work? So essentially the second world war stopped when America decided it was going to stop. I mean, in Europe it stopped, you know, in the red army conquered Berlin and there was nobody left essentially, like, who was capable of taking up arms or proffering any meaningful resistance. And I mean, when, when the hammer and sickle was hoisted above the runes of the reichstag, I mean, that, I mean, that was it. I mean, in the case of Japan, you know, there's this, there's this mythology that like, well, we had to nuke Japan or the, or this. People are constantly banning that. Well, we would have lost a million u. S. Servicemen invading Japan. It's like, okay, why would you have to invade Japan? Japan had no capacity to make war. It was starving. It was defeated. Incendiary. Incendiary raids were being run over Tokyo where a hundred Thousand people were dying in 40 hours. Like, what the hell is Japan gonna do to you? You know, like, and how, why, why you need to invade and occupy it or nuke it. You know, the way in the west, for about 2,000 years, the way we waged war, not counting things, you know, like the, like the Greek Oregons, the Persians or the, the Romans war against Carthage. You know, the way, the way we aged war is we come to terms with a defeated enemy. We don't simply assault them until there's none of them left or you know, declare that we will not accept their surrender and then claim that they're crazy and refuse to surrender by not finding a way to, not not finding a way to lay down their arms. And we refuse to accept, when we refuse to accept that, that kind of capitulation. So I mean that's, that's, that's, that's crazy in of itself and, but it, so I mean that, that really, really stiffened access, resolve. But it also was a show. I mean the whole, the whole raison d' or the New Deal was, was the annihilation of, of, of certain forms of culture and political modalities together which constitute fascism in the mind of the New Dealer. That's what it was. And I brought up the Morgenthau plan because Henry Morgenthau, who was the Treasury Secretary, which seems like kind of a middling cabinet position to a lot of administrations, but like we talked about in, in the New Deal regime, there's a lot of posts in and of themselves would not seem to confer great power upon the man in the post. But you know, you had people close to Roosevelt who didn't even have any kind of formal cabinet post. They were just minister without portfolio, or they were guys like Sumner Wells who, you know, weren't. They were, you know, who in this case was Under Secretary of State, but he was the de facto kind of chief diplomat. Well, Henry Morgan thou, despite being Secretary of the treasury, he had tremendous authority in structuring policy and everything in the New Deal, from its foreign policy to its machinations to, you know, bringing America into war with Japan when it became clear that there probably was not going to be some sort of, there was not going to be some sort of Lusitania type incident with the Third Reich that would, you know, provide a catalyst, you know, everything from that, those kinds of intrigues to the Civilian Conservation Corps to the, to the kind of quasi, you know, Keynesian economic corporate scheme that, that was devised, you know, early on in, in the regime. I mean, A lot of this came from Henry Morgan though. And Morgenthau developed what he, what he considered to be a, a, a post victory regime for Germany called the Morganau Plan that was entailed was basically ethnically cleansing Germany, you know, reducing its population by about a third. He wasn't specific about how this would be done, but one can imagine, you know, he talked about suppressing the birth rate and things like this, like in unofficial capacities and one can imagine what that would mean. He wanted to strip it of all, of all, of all modern industry and divide it into basically four states, like mini states. The only economic activity would basically be subsistence farming. You know, he want to restrict people's education to like basic literacy. Like essentially like Morgan though, he was a, a crazy Zionist type who wanted. His plan for Germany was basically what, what Himler's plan was for, for, for. For the Russian hence land. Okay. He basically wanted to create like a population, got a half literate agrarian slaves. It would like never rise up again. And this is totally insane for all kinds of reasons, particularly because at that point I think it could still be said that America was at least in terms of the constitution of its population, was still, you know, like a white western Christian country. And I, that that's not just grotesque, it's, it's crazy. And even, even Churchill, like kind of awful brute that he was, said this is totally insane. And like how would this be workable anyway? And you know, it. London, to the, to the, to the credit of some of the people in Churchill's inner circle, they said look, if you're gonna do that, you might as well just see the entirety of, you know, of, of Germany to Ivan and, and let the Soviets do what they want with it because like what's the point of this? You know, is it other, other than the basically, you know, ethnically cleanse and punish the Germans? But you know, that's, that's not, that's ethics aside, that's, that's not, that's not viable in, in the, in the, in the emerging strategic landscape. In some ways the UK was more realistic about the Soviet Union than, than the United States was. I mean, which, which is ironic. But I, as we get into the person of Mr. Churchill, I, I think it maybe come apparent as to why that is. But I just, I wanted to clarify some of those final points because I, I was pretty certain that, that people would have called me on it had I not. And I just think it, I think it was an important addendum to, to the, to the new Deal, uh, to the New Deal regime. Do you want to get into, uh, you want to get.

[B]

Yeah, just jump right in.

[C]

Okay. The, I think the way to understand Churchill, I mean for, for this segment we're laying down today, I kind of want to get into the man of Churchill and without being too speculative or, or needlessly punitive kind of his character. Not. I, I don't generally delve into that in history, even when we're talking about wartime executives. But in Churchill's case, I think it's essential. The, the person at Churchill is this essential. Understanding the UK's war as the New Deal ideology of anti fascism is as essential. Understanding the American war. One of the, one of the, one of the bizarre things about Churchill and I, even people who had a basically amiable relationship with him made the point that Churchill basically was not at all consistent in his sympathies, in his statements. It things almost seem to be something of a game to him in an almost cliched way. I think it was David Irving. I can't remember where I read this initially, but it's, it's been sourced by a few people, but I think I initially read it in David Irving's two valiant treatment of Churchill. In March 1946, Church went on the. Churchill went on a speaking tour of the United States because he was very much in demand. I mean, America's always had this kind of peculiar fascination with, with the uk and I mean the Churchill cult was already well established then, not just, you know, in the UK proper, but in America. And I believe that endures to this day. Excuse me. Church will speak in Fulton, Missouri. He began unconditionally praising Stalin, you know, saying Stalin is a great man. He's the one true, like, you know, true humanist in Russia. You know, like he really understands, you know, what, why, why we fought the war. And people are kind of like a gassed, you know, like in this audience, you know, because this is Middle America, you know, and even, even people who are basically sympathetic to Roosevelt and the New Deal enterprise, I mean, first of all, Mr. Roosevelt was in the grave by this point. Secondly, I, I speculate. I mean, it goes without saying, I mean, even, even people who, who'd been very much on board with the war effort, you know, they were not, they were not going to respond well to, to these, these kinds of glowing suggestions about the character Mr. Stalin. So Churchill discerns that his audience is, it's kind of, he's losing his audience, say, quickly recover and says, oh, I mean, I mean, I just meant The Communist Party are very disciplined and very brave men. You know, when we, we know this because of their great sacrifice in Berlin to defeat fascism. But of course, you know, I, Mr. Churchill, you know, as you all know, like I, I commanded white armies against the Bolsheviks in 1919, you know, and I, you know, my, my, my, my credentials in this regard are impeccable. You know, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm a defender of freedom. You know, I, I've never had any truck with socialism. So John Davenport, who was this at the time, he was kind of a, kind of a well known journalist. Kind of like a thinking man's. Kind of like a thinking man's Walter Cronkite that makes any sense. I, I can't think of a better way to characterize him. He was a Churchill. He says, okay, you know, Mr. Churchill, if that's the case, how would you, how do you capitulate? We did a Yalta, like how could you basically hand the world to Stalin, you know, And Churchill's waved it off and said oh well, the war had to be ended at all costs. You know. But the thing is Yalta didn't end the war and the Soviets really didn't do anything to bring down the Japanese. They seized the, they seized the Carile Islands. I'm sure I'm butchering that pronunciation, but I mean post Yalta, I mean Okinawa happened, Iwo Jima happened. You know, America, America dropped two nuclear bombs on Japan. Atomic bombs or rather like, oh, you know, how exactly this end the war? I mean it might seem like a middling thing to focus on, but it's, you know, Churchill's kind of like this master of like fusicating actual issues, you know, like it wasn't he, he managed to always answer questions with this kind of grand flourish without actually saying anything. And if you want to understand his political career, you got to consider Churchill had a bizarre background. His father was descended from the Duke of Marlboro and his mother was an American and, and kind of a loose woman. While accounts like I believe, I believe when Churchill was during Churchill's brief time in the army, his, his mother was then, you know, then potion 50. He was involved with some kind of foppish young officer type was about Churchill's age. I mean that's, there's something wrong there. I mean one doesn't need to be a, some kind of moral prude or something to, to recognize that there was something very dysfunctional here, particularly for a society woman in the UK of, you know, the turn of the century. I mean, that's. This is strange. You know, Churchill's father dragged himself to death and apparently was demented for some time before then. Churchill. Churchill. In May 1904, he, uh. He abandoned what it. You know, his. His family's Tory heritage, declared that he hated the Conservatives and that Balfour was, you know, unworthy of. Of high office, let alone, you know, let alone the office of prime minister. He defected to the Liberal Party nominally on grounds that he supported free trade and that, you know, Belforce protectionism was sabotaging the. You know, the. The prosperity that. That. That was needed to compete not just with the United States, which at that time was not in particularly good terms with the U.K. i mean, that's a whole nother issue I don't want to digress into. But also, it's got to be. It's also got to be mentioned that the Liberals won a landslide in 1906, relatively. And Sir Henry Bannerman made Churchill undersecretary for the colonies. And then later, some kind of like, like minister, he signed him some kind of role in the Ministry of Trade. Okay? So basically, I mean, he. Church also an opportune moment, and he seized it. Okay? He, uh. By this point, the family did not. Its fortunes were waning. What it kind of salvaged things at this point was that a lot of the women in Churchill's family had married into wealth, including Churchill's Aunt Fanny, who's kind of well known because there's this endless correspondence between Churchill and Fanny which is not particularly interesting, but historians make a lot out of this. What is interesting is that Fanny's sister, she married a guy who in today's terms would have. Would be a billionaire, I believe. You know, he was like on the order of like Carnegie in terms of wealth. Okay. He was like some. He was some iron mogul in the UK and he was an arch enemy of. He had been an arch enemy a Chamberlain, John Chamberlain, the first Chamberlain and his tariff regime. And so suddenly, uh, Aunt Fanny and, uh, and her sister is. Is throwing all this money at dear Winston, who now is, you know, a Liberal member of Parliament. You know, I mean, this characterizes Churchill's entire life, okay? Kind of like going where the money is, changing his stripes whenever he has to. And during this period too, Churchill, one one stipulation he did make to John Chamberlain is Churchill said, at all costs, we've got to avoid another European war. We've got to find some way to come to terms with Germany. We've got to Find some way to build, you know, a ramparts defense against the colored world and the communists. This is fascinating, isn't it? Because this is, this is Mr. Churchill in the aftermath of the Boer War and he's positively talking like, like Lothrop Stoddard or, or Madison Grant. You know, I mean, dare I say he even sounds like what people would call a fascist, you know. And I mean this is his, this is his entire angle. This is basically how he's making a living. Lo and behold. Lo and behold, by 1911. Yeah, 1911, Churchill's uh, he's a, he's appointed first lord of the admiralty. This had always been something of any ambition of his and he insinuated himself, he insinuated himself into that role. Mind you, after almost a decade of you know, advocating peace on the continent and, and a conciliatory view towards the Kaiser, like, you know, suddenly he, suddenly Churchill changed his stripes completely and says, you know, there we, we've got a real problem with naval readiness. You know, we're not, we're the, the high seas fleet of Germany is, you know, a threat to the U.K. you know, we, we, we, we, we can't count on, on, on, on our own, you know, technical supremacy any longer. And one thing too, Churchill, Churchill's big coup was the conversion of cold oil firing ships. As it turned out in the war that like a lot of these, a lot of these dreadnought class ships like did not have adequate armaments. But that's another, that's kind of military esoterica. But it did become an issue at the, at the Dardanelles. Look at that in a minute. But any event, so this is about the third time in 15 years Churchill has done a 180 in terms of his purported political sympathies and, and, and, and made a, and staked his career fortunes on a position that, that you know, only a few years previously was, he was a complete opposite of what he proposed reported to believe. You know, I mean in some ways Churchill is kind of like the first lobbyist. You know, there's, there's this famous, there's this famous anecdote, you know, about the first Gulf War and then Senator Al Gore. He's like waiting in the atrium of the Senate of the heart, Senate building or something and he's like waiting, he's waiting for like exit poll data to come in to decide if he should like, you know, vote for the war resolution to go to war with Iraq or not. You know, I mean that, that, that's very Much kind of the, I mean Al Gore was kind of a, he was kind of easy to, it was kind of easy to lay in poon because the man was a fool and he had a tendency to do things like wear more pancake makeup and a Portuguese hooker. But it I. The point being that like this Churchill was kind of like the first of this type in the, in the Anglosphere. I mean yeah, there was always political corruption. Yeah, there were always people, there was, there was always men who you know, were, were, were morally compromised by the, by the prospect of money or promotion or.

[A]

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[C]

CTS and C is 21 Sponsored by Chumba Casino or, or all of the above. But you know, this guy like, like being a career politician who literally changes his stripes owing to the, you know, owing to the occurrence of public opinion or, or, or by literally following the, the lobbying money of industry as true. Like, like that really was not something that was done. You know, like guys like Churchill, you know, kind of lesser nobility types, they kind of insinuated themselves into a role and like that was their role, you know. So this, that's kind of, this kind of gave people pause within elite circles in the uk. Churchill's tenure as Lord of Admiralty frankly was disastrous. The Churchill fancied himself despite having no meaningful military experience other than about six months in, in India, wherein he didn't discern any real opportunity for battlefield heroism or anything exciting. You know, he, he quickly became bored with that and resigned his commission. Nonetheless, he fancied himself some great military mind or commander. He. There was a disaster when he sought to strike the German right flank of the Antwerp bridgehead. You know, there was. The UK's assault forces were totally under strength. This repeated 1915 at the Dardanelles, which is well known to people, you know, it's, it was a very, very dark incident for the Empire. It was a slaughter. The aim was to pulverize Ottoman fortifications and capture, capture Constantinople. Churchill gambled on, on, on Royal Navy guns being able to outrange the Turks as I understand it, and Again, I'm not any kind of military authority. This was another disaster. There weren't, there was not adequate inventory forces in being to the facilitate the follow up assault. Those that were available had been rushed through training. When finally deployed in March 1915, it was a slaughter. This however has become, would become a characteristic of Churchill. This kind of like failing upward. He was dismissed. Yet six months later he was assigned to France, the battalion commander. He was recommissioned as lieutenant colonel with the Royal Scots Fusiliers. Lloyd George basically intervened to save him. George isn't gonna find this for the man I owing probably the, I, I don't know, the, you know, whatever. It's hard to discern the kind of sympathies of, of inhabits of these, in these kind of aristocratic circles, particularly the last century. But I mean Lloyd George has become a patron of his in, in a very real way. Churchill George backed off though around 1919 because Churchill showed up quite literally. Now mind you, Churchill at this point was a Minister of Munitions and a Secretary of State for War which was kind of like a meaningless sinecure. Yet Churchill shows up in France, in Paris in 1919 in full uniform, swagging around drunk like some kind of cut dillo and he declares that he demands the intervention of all allies against the Bolsheviks and he will lead this expedition. And this was an embarrassment and it was bizarre, you know. So that basically ended Churchill's public life. I mean for the time. Five years later in 1924, Churchill suddenly reemerges. He, he's reinvented himself as a, he's rejoined the Conservative Party, you know and I guess memories being short and Churchill being Churchill being able to sell illusory promises even better than a Vegas showgirl can to a lonely businessman. Uh, you know, he, he got a new lease on life. He went from, he went from, he went from, from there. He began demanding a, a, a, a general re, a general naval build up. Uh, presumably because he was trying to cultivate, you know, allies in the admiralty who he'd alienated through his disastrous performance as Lord of the Admiralty. He started demanding, you know, Britain reconstitute its battleship fleet, you know, railing against the what, what, what became the uh, what became the uh, the Washington Naval Treaty. Then once again he reverses himself uh, by uh, by 1926 he's saying that we've got to cut you know, defense expenditures the bone because I mean this was the way the currents were going once again. And he, he, he obviously did not, he, he didn't find himself welcomed back into the into the admiralty fraternity. In both 1926 and 1928 he declared there's no chance that in his lifetime that there would be any war with Japan. He said, he said in his words it's unthinkable. I did not foresee the slightest chance of it. He said in 1926 and in 1928 that Britain should. Should adopt a 10 year policy that owing to the fact that war is unthinkable with any other power years that defense are cut down to the bare minimum. It was around this time that Lord Eer, who was a. An interesting figure and he died before the second World War. But he was a historian. He had some arguably socialist sympathies. But I think his discussion of the personages of the time and his lifetime. He wrote in during stuff interesting stuff on Disraeli. He wrote some really interesting stuff on Bell for on Churchill. He said Churchill was a flim flam man. He said the guy's a showman. He's totally devoid of substance. It is worse. He handles subjects and rhythmical language and quickly becomes enslaved to his own free or by his own phrases. He deceives himself into thinking he is taking broad views when his mind is fixed on one comparatively small aspect of the question. I want to say one thing about this and I'll give it over to you because I don't want to suckle the air out of the room. I've heard people say a lot, as I'm sure you have too, as everybody has, who's exposed the kind of pop history in this country. Oh, you know, and there's this film, this obnoxious film, Darkest Hour with Gary Oldman who otherwise is like a dope actor, right. I was sad to see him kind of feature in this propaganda piece but everybody must make a living, including actors. But you know, the big praise that people or the big shine people put on Mr. Churchill is like. Well, he was such a great order. You know, being some showman order like that's not really a great thing to be a man like Calvin Coolidge or like Abraham Lincoln. I know people have mixed feelings about Lincoln. I do too. But Lincoln actually was a plain spoken individual. He was not some kind of showman. The reason why the Gettysburg Address stood out is because the on grounds with brevity is because Lincoln was not. He was not some hustler who went out there and you know, kind of entertained ignorant people. Owing to the. Owing to the emergence, you know, one man, one vote and the fact that, you know, politicians by the late 19th century, literally become salesmen like Churchill. He, he, the fact that he treated Question Time in Parliament as some sort of, as the Winston Churchill show, like, I don't really see where that's admirable. You know, it. That's why I see parallels between Bill Clinton and, and Winston Churchill. Like, you're not, you're not somebody, not some great man or some man of the people. If your whole angle is you believe in nothing. You know, you have the soul of a pig, you have absolutely no principles. But hey, you like, you really, really, really Entertain people with IQs about 85. I mean, like, why, why is that admirable? You know, I mean, like. And that's basically what Churchill had going for him. And if you listen to. I'm always making the point that, you know, I, like we talked last session or last discussion. I'm always making the point that whatever we can say about Roosevelt and I, I think Roosevelt in some ways was a profoundly evil man. Roosevelt was a, was a brilliant guy. I mean he was a, he was a ruthless Machiavellian. But if you listen to Roosevelt's speeches, I mean, yeah, the guy's lying his ass off, but you can tell that there's like a, a complicated intellect there like Churchill. It's like it's, it's, it's ridiculous. You know, I mean, you can really like David Irving made the point that Churchill in his early 20s literally played with toy soldiers, you know, and he, he, Lloyd George was disgusted because on the, during the battle of ipra, Church was like running around like, like literally a billion that, you know, he was, he was getting to play war, you know, and everybody in the, everybody else in the chain of command, civilian military was beside themselves. And here's this fat man who's, you know, acting like a 12 year old playing with his GI Joes. I mean, it's, there's something grotesque about that. But yeah, I, I didn't mean to, I didn't mean to monopolize the discussion.

[B]

No. So you pretty much brought us up to 1932, 1933, when two elections happen that change the course of the world. So how is, what's Churchill doing at this time?

[C]

Essentially, Churchill made his, he, he staged his final comeback by, by fabricating a lot of forces and being numbers about, about the Vermont and particularly the Luftwaffe. Churchill realized there wasn't a lot of. Churchill realized very quickly, I mean, as everybody did, that, you know, hello, it is Ryan.

[A]

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[C]

void where prohibited by law 21+ terms and conditions apply. Alarmism like Admiralty. At least in the sense that he'd been able to fin angle his way into. Roll into positions of real power in the, in the first war like that. That was no longer going to carry the day. What he was, he was, he was busily. He was, he was. He was busily agitating for by inflated. You know inflating the. The purported threat posed by Germany to. To. To UK The UK supremacy on the continent and in uh. In the colonies. And uh. The way he was doing that. Oh the. What you gotta understand first you gotta understand who is funding Churchill. And we're gonna get more into that next session. But the Churchill between the time that he. He left or was forced out of his post the admiralty and he stages come back as a conservative member of Parliament, surely become quite wealthy as a. As a historical author. He published his own memoirs which I mean were incredibly self serving. He published the history of the British Empire. This multi volume. This multi volume kind of magnum opus. And for the time that made him quite wealthy. He. He became a firebrand against Germany. Owing to the convergence of a. What we consider a political action committee in today's terms called. They called. They quite literally call itself the focus group. It was a, it was a combination of. I mean the people in its ranks. I mean it was a diverse coalition. I mean not, not I mean by today's, in. In today's political cultures we take this for granted. But at that point it was somewhat novel. You know you had like out and out Zionist types who you know obviously had ethno sectarian reasons for. For hostility to the German Reich. You had industrialists who uh. Owing to the Washington Naval treaty and Britain's uh. Defense expenditures being cut down to the like literally to the bone had you know found themselves really kind of put out of business. I mean even before the 1929 crash, I mean hit the UK very hard. Arguably as hard as the United States. But it even, even notwithstanding that British heavy industry was, was having. They. They were looking at real problems in terms of salvaging their Fortunes and the, the, the end, the, the end, the end of defense subsidies, particularly naval subsidies, really, really, really hurt them. You know, so you had typical kind of military industrial interests. You had, you had people like Vantasartuda, not him himself, but people like him who just had a kind of hostility of the German Reich, I mean, dating back to, I mean, you raised, I don't want to go too far afield, but I mean, you raised in our last discussion, you know, why, why did the UK develop this kind of enmity towards Germany? That's a complicated issue. When I, I, we do need to delve into that a little bit just for context here. You know, like we've, like we talked about a moment ago, you know, John Chamberlain, the first Chamberlain, I think of him as the good Chamberlain, although, although Neville Chamberlain, I think is kind of unduly maligned. He was not a good executive. But the fact that he's, he's got a burden effigy, I, I think isn't misguided. But John Chamberlain, he quite literally said, you know, in strategic terms, the most sensible alliance would be that between, you know, London, Washington and Berlin against Moscow. And in the east, you know, the Anglo Japanese alliance will, you know, further hedge against both China and Russia, which makes perfect sense. And this is what, here's what's fascinating. Young Kaiser Wilhelm, you know, when he'd only ascended to the, to the throne a few years previously, he said that Chamberlain's vision would never come to fruition because the UK and France would never be able to put their differences aside. Lo and behold, like within a few years, you know, the, the, the Entente is what, is what truly poisoned Anglo German relations. But I think what if there was one single proximate cause, I mean, people say people like to drop everything from, you know, King George and, and Vill Elm were both kind of insufferable personalities. And Wilhelm never felt like the Germans were being respected by the uk and that's probably true. And there's a man, there's a, there's a Manichean aspect to this. Like George and Vilhelm like look literally like doppelgangers. It's bizarre, you know, I mean they were related, but they literally look like twin brothers, you know, and it, the Boer War, I think the Boer War more than any single catalyst was what, what set this empty in motion. The, the German Reich really strongly identified with the boars and vice versa. I mean, owing not just the fact that outside of Namibia, Germany didn't really have holdings in Africa, that they felt the great power should and the Boars were kind of their clients. But in cultural terms there's, there's commonality between the basically Dutch Bores and the Germans out of that, like the very, very kind of strong communitarian racial identity that developed, going in part to the fact that the Bores were quite literally beleaguered by whole continent of racial others. But this kind of, this, this kind of warrior Calvinist faith that sustained them. And I, I've got this whole idea that there's a PI. This dimension in National Socialism that's unique to the German character and Germanic peoples generally. But all that esoterica aside, the, The British began using the Boer War as an excuse to board and search and in many cases detain German ships under auspices of. Well, you know, we, any ships from the continent, you know, traveling to the Cape, you know, we've got to make sure that they're not, they're not furnishing weapons and munitions and supplies to the Boars. But somehow it's always German ships that are being, you know, corralled in this way. And the Germans weren't stupid. And Wilhelm was not without fault. I mean he. The High Seas fleet in my opinion and wholewig later that chance of the German Empire, who I think was probably about the only good guy of on the evil World War I, but that's another issue. And it whole egg always maintained that the Blue Water Navy, what the Germans called their High Seas Fleet, it was designed to be two things. Germany could be strangled and it was by a starvation blockade. And I want to get into that in a minute in our discussion to Mr. Churchill, but also Germany in 1904, in 1914, in 1924, in 1944 and 1984, always viewed Russia as its primary adversary. And if, if in the nineteen teens you're Wilhelm ii, you're looking eastward and you're saying I've got to be able to dominate, you know, I've got to be able to dominate the Baltic and, and essentially, you know, cut the Russian fleet off of the knees. I'm going to win a general war against Russia. And that makes sense. I don't think there's, I don't think there's a realistic. I, I don't think there's a strategic, I don't think a strategic challenge to the UK by the German Empire in 1914 like made really any sense in general terms. I just don't. But in the UK there was there, there the Strawberry Gables bag was the Boer War. And one of these village Did Paul Krueger, the kind of great boar revolutionary, as he was running raids, you know, against the British in. In the Transvaal and the Orange Free State or whatever, uh, Kreislerville all of a sudden sent him a telegram congratulating him. And this was not. This was not good form. And like, goofy as it sounds now, but in those days, these kinds of diplomatic slaps in the face were viewed almost like acts of war. I mean, like these days where like, diplomatic language become meaningless, you know, unless you're. Unless you're quite literally detonating ordinance or you're carrying on terrorist acts or opening fire on people, like, nobody cares what you say. I mean, the Cold War gonna change that. But it. But you better believe if you were. If you're some radical boar farmer like Mr. Krueger, you know, and you were. You were playing Viet Cong with. With the British Empire and a European out of state was like sending you formal praise for doing that. Like, this was viewed in the gravest terms. It really was.

[A]

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[C]

CTS and C is 21 plus sponsored by Trump a casino. Nobody said that Vilhelm was an intelligent man or that he made wise decisions. And like I'm always coming back to the point. There's a reason why Adolf Hitler denied him a state funeral when the old man died, you know, in 19. 1940. I think it. He died in exile in Holland then. But there's a reason, you know, I mean, and was. It was big that. It was big that Hitler, especially considering Hitler fought in the Great War. I mean, it. It was a. It's telling that he. He wouldn't even let the guy be buried with like, state honors. I mean, that's, you know, and that's not accidental. And it's not just owing to the fact that he grows. He mismanaged the war. You know, I mean, it. If you're that kind of despised by. By your own people, it. The problem generally is you. But in any event, I raised the Churchill's kind of final act. I mean, this was in his role as. This was in his role as war minister that I was kind of extended beyond all reasonable, uh, parameters. Uh, it is post. As Lord of Emerald, the Churchill is the one who imposed the starvation Blockade on Germany and literally was a starvation blockade 1916. There's food riots all across the German empire because people were starving, okay, Particularly elderly kids. You know, it was a disaster.

[B]

All told.

[C]

About three quarters of a million people died between 1915 and 1919. And Churchill in his post, the secretary of war, Secretary of state for war rather. He, he extended, he demanded and he got his way. They, the blockade was extended through 1919, resulting I believe in about 83000 dead for that year. And why was this done? This was done so that Germany would accept the world war guilt clause of another Versailles treaty. And that's really what truly disgusted the American delegation. It demanded that the Germans accept full guilt for the war. You know, for them to pay 32 billion in gold. Buon for them to pay. Churchill demanded that it be included, that they pay, that Germany pay the pensions of British soldiers who'd fought on the western front. I mean this was totally insane. And it demanded the Kaiser be arrested, prosecuted as a war criminal. And of course the Germans said they're not going to sign that. So Churchill demanded and got his way that the starvation blockade be sustained until they capitulated. And of course the U. S. Senate to its eternal credit, refused the, refused to endorse the Versailles treaty. It wasn't really worth the papers written on when America bowed out of it and refused to ratify it or enforce it. And you know, that entire, you know, Germany's unwillingness to comply and, and, and, and kind of Anglo, Anglo, French impotence therein, a posturing without the ability to actually deliver on threat by the western allies had a lot to do with the onset of hostilities 1939. And we will get to that. But I forgive the out of sequence discussion of the starvation blockade. I just, it's a rare instance of something that's truly unconscionable. And like Herbert Hoover said, I, I recommended the other day on my Twitter, my gab timeline, this biography of Herbert Hoover. And I think it's really dope. And Hoover is a guy, he was, he was a very decent guy and he was actually a pretty good president. And he's, he's burned effigy and, and held responsible for the great depression, which is grossly misguided. But Hoover said we don't start. He said in America we don't starve women and kids. We don't kick a man when he's down after we've defeated him. And the, and he's right. Okay. I mean there's something you're not, you're not, you're not being some, you're not being some liberal or you're not being some, you know, some, some social justice humanist or something to say that, you know, you don't, you don't impose draconian, A draconian peace, not just on another white Christian country, but even, you know, even on, even, even, even an alien power that's outside the culture completely, so long as you're not engaged in an existential war against them for, for survival. That's just, you don't treat people that way in defeat. There's no honor in it. And honor matters as an ethics matter. And the killing of non combatants matters too, and we're going to take that up in a more complete capacity when we deal with the Nuremberg addendum to our discussion. But what I want to, I want to get back to you in a moment, but I. What I want to do in our next discussion, which we can record anytime, use it Saturday. I want to get into, I want to get into the focus as we talked about, which was really the first, in my opinion, modern political action committee. It really was. That's not some, that's not some hokey metaphor I'm invoking or some imperfect analogy. You, you really did not, you did not have dedicated committees to raise money, you know, to advance discrete policy initiatives to elect like, an individual man and promote that man is like the face of these policies. Like, you had lobbyists, you know, all in sundry. And you had for, you know, a couple centuries by that point, you know, you had men who, who, who owe their political career to basically being representatives of you know, either, you know, industry or agriculture or, you know, military interests such that they could be said to exist in the early modern era. But you. Churchill is really, he really was the first man where you had a bunch of wealthy people and work and organizations that represented wealthy people saying, you know, here, here are policy demands. You know, we're going to cooperate to realize these demands, and we're going to select this man, you know, and we're gonna see to it that he is installed in office, you know, to implement these demands as policy. I've researched this thoroughly, and Churchill is, he is like, he, he is, he is the original example of this. I'm sure there's gonna be people in the comments who are like, oh, no, there was, you know, Lord, so and so from 1850 or whatever. It's not the same thing, okay? And especially considering there's a, literally a modern national media apparatus buying Churchill, you know, if you want in a central bank. Yeah, exactly.

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

And we're going to deep dive into that now. I don't want to now because we've been going for almost an hour. And frankly, I want to kind of organize my thoughts a little better for the second part. But what do you.

[B]

Let me. Let me ask an opinion question.

[C]

Yeah, yeah.

[B]

Did they get behind him? Because they knew that he was not the smartest man in the world, and he just seemed like he could be a good puppet.

[C]

I think there's a few things here. Okay. Churchill was a weird guy. I mean, he was weird in terms of his personal habits and stuff, but he also, like I said, Churchill had this kind of promiscuous, glamorous mom who was an American. He had this dad who literally drank himself to death and was. And was crazy. Churchill, like, straddled America and the uk. He hung around a bunch of nouveau reef type guys and, like, rich Jewish guys. But he also. He also was a. He also was a lesser noble. He literally was descended from, you know, the Lord of Marlboro. So, like, he knew how to move in aristocratic circles, too. Like, you take for granted these days that there's this kind of citizen of the world types, you know, who are insinuated into high places, and a lot of them are mediocrities, as I think Churchill was. That's not the point. Like, the point is that guys like that weren't real common in the United Kingdom of, you know, 1930. So Churchill was. He had rare characteristics in that way. But it's also, it's also like. It's. It's also like we discussed during the hour, like, Church was a guy who literally would defect at the drop of a dime. You know, he was for sale. And that's why I compare him to Bill Clinton. There's a lot of guys, and myself included, I mean, I'm a Christian. I, I, I, I. I'm a sinner like every other man and woman is. I'm not better any worse. You know, no man is any better any worse in this regard. And all men can be bought, basically, if they're in political life. That's why they're there. But there's very few guys where they literally have no principles at all. And if you dangle money in their face, they'll basically shill for whatever you want. Like whatever you want. You know, that's. That is rare. And I think it's indicative of being some kind of a psychopath, frankly. I'm not just saying that. Like, you can say what you want about Hitler? Hitler believed in everything he was doing. You can say Roosevelt was an evil guy. Roosevelt actually believed everything he said. I don't think Church will believe in anything. Yeah, like I really don't. And either that or it's, and I'm not, I'm not just dropping a cheap shot owing to his alcoholism. I mean owing to some of my own issues in the past that have been recanted about. I'm the last person who can like trash people for having like drug or alcohol problems. Okay? But if you're a lifelong drug addict or alcoholic, it does like start to make you go crazy. And I consider the fact. And David Irving dropped this in his Two Valley mystery. Like Church was probably starting to lose his mind by the time he was like our age, you know, like in his 40s. I mean you, you can't, you, you, you can't, you can't be a drunk for 30 years and have that not take its toll. You know, I'm sure that that must have had something to do with it. And again, it's not some.

[A]

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[C]

That sounds like a cheap, you know, that sounds some sort of cheap slander on Mr. Churchill. It just doesn't. I mean I, I know guys who've, I know guys who betrayed their own principles, you know, for profit. I, I, I've never met a guy who is like Mr. Clinton or like Winston Churchill where it's, you know, one day they're advocating for this, you know, two years later they're advocating for the precise opposite. And then a year after that they're arguing for something totally opposed to both. Like that, that's, that's literally insane, you know, or at a Churchill today would not be able to pull that off because he'd be, people have the memory of a house by these days. But it, he would have been caught up in some scandal and, or it would have just been like he would have just not been taken seriously. War. But you could reinvent yourself in 1924, 1934, you know, when there wasn't, not only was another 24 hour media cycle, there wasn't even television then, you know, I mean there was radio, visual, there was a global media developing. But it was, it was not this. You could, you could disappear for years, reinvent yourself. And if you got a controlled people's access to you, and if you had, like, Churchill did, like a real media and, and money apparatus behind you, you kind of like, literally, like reinvent your history. Okay, but we're gonna, we're gonna get into the Focus next, next session and, and the warriors, and we'll specifically deep dive into that.

[B]

Okay, then this may be somebody's first. They're just dropping in on this one. They haven't heard a previous one. So plug plug your stuff.

[C]

Okay, thank you, Pete. You can find me on Twitter, that, that awful, awful platform. But I, I've got high hopes for it moving forward thanks to Mr. Musk and other things. You can find me there at number 7H777. You can find me on GAB at Realore Thomas 777. You can find me on [e-mail] We've got a podcast there. We've got long form stuff there. We've got all kinds of stuff there. And you can join it for only $5 a month. And unless you're like a bonafide hobo, you can afford that. I'm not in a position yet where I can just drop stuff for free. I'm trying to get there. Like, I'm not just saying that. I genuinely am. But right now, every subscription helps and it'll, it'll never be more than five bucks a month, but like I said, that comes out of something like 17 cents a day. That's cheaper than feeding one of those African kids, like on those late night infomercials. And I, you know, like, those average kids got NGOs helping them out. I don't have NGOs. Like, I'm like an old peckerwood who, like, writes politically incorrect stuff. Like, no one's going to, like, no one's going to drop paper on me if you don't. So there you go.

[B]

Yeah, anybody who, anybody who comes up to us offering us large amounts of cash to write, to, writer, produce, we're going to be like, what the hell?

[C]

What?

[B]

All right, what are we being set up for? You know?

[C]

Yeah, exactly. And forgive me, I'm. I'm getting over a big RA flare up. That's why I'm not like, dying of freaking Covid or AIDS or something. Like, I. Forgive me for sniffling and coughing. I know it's gross, but I wanted to, I wanted to make sure we recorded today And I. Yeah, we're. We're gonna. Let's. Let's Record Part 2 of. Of Churchill and Churchill's war on Saturday. And we'll go for an hour and a half if need be, then.

[B]

Okay.

[C]

And then, yeah, subsequent to that, we'll get into Barbarossa, and then the addendum will be like, Nuremberg and like, you know, a summary of, you know, the, the political intrigues of the war and, and just kind of like a. A summing up, you know, the, The Nuremberg world order and, and the Raison Decker for the war itself. And again, I can't thank you enough, sincerely, and thanks for accommodating me. Like I said, I was real sick the past few days. And you're. You're very kind man and understanding. I appreciate that.

[B]

No problem at all. All right, until the next time. I want to welcome everyone back to the Picanono show by request. People have been making comments. We are going to pick up where we left off with Thomas 777. How's it going, Thomas?

[C]

Very well, thank you, Pete. Again, thank you for. Thank you for continuing to host me and for participating in this discussion series. Like I indicated last time, I think it's important for posterity and just to kind of disseminate revisionist perspectives in a way that's more accessible. And I think we're doing very good things here.

[B]

Yeah, I'm. The way I'm going to do this is once we record the last episode. All of the episodes I put on my sub stack are private. They're early releases. I'm going to put these on my sub stack and make them public and just make these public so anyone can go to them. Anyone can get the. The RSS feed from the substack and can listen to them. So that'll be. I think that's a good idea. And I trust that Substack is going to be there for a while.

[C]

Yeah, that's my primary platform anymore, because I, I mean, I get deplatformed a lot, as I think people know. I've never been censored or deplatformed or warned by Substack. I believe the only thing that they crack down on is obviously pornography, you know, threats of violence or criminality. And I, I do. I have heard people say that they've. They've. They've had issues if they. If they allow racially inflammatory language out of context. You know, just. I mean, jokes that nature and things. And I, I generally eschew that because that's. It's not generally Something I. I include anyway. I mean, I. Not because I care if people talk that way, but it's. I don't really do that. But yeah, substack is. Is there's a reason why I am associated with them. I've been very happy.

[B]

All right, so when we finished off last time, we got up to. We're talking about Winston Churchill, 1932. And it seems like right about 1933, he, with. He, along with a couple other people, really start to rise to prominence and power.

[C]

So jump in 1932 was really that. I mean, Churchill remained. Churchill's wilderness years really remained from 1932 probably until 1936. But 1932 especially, he was not behaving like a man of his portfolio. Okay. A lesser nobleman who had served in government and was considered something of a prodigy early on. I mean, rightly or wrongly,

[A]

he.

[C]

He began writing really, really, really what amounts to hat copy for pretty much anybody who would publish his. His essays for a time. And this is incredibly bizarre. He found this American publishing house that was, you know, as we talked before about Churchill, kind of playing a character quite literally, particularly in American media as, you know, this, the. This kind of John Bull, like, literally, like the manifestation of John Bull. Like he. He was almost like this mascot of old Blighty. And this publisher was paying him to write classics of English literature as reinterpreted by Winston Churchill. So it's Winston Churchill literally writing kind of the comic book Cliffs Notes version of things like Wuthering Heights, with his own kind of snarky commentary interspersed in jokes like, why Anybody want to read that? I have no idea. They didn't sell particularly well. I mean, Churchill pretty much was living on the advanced advancements from things like that. He still had a good relationship with the Daily Mail, which soured very rapidly shortly thereafter. We're going to get into why that was, but, I mean, that'd be like. It's an imperfect analogy, but imagine a guy like John Kerry or like Mitt Romney, one of these guys just kind of bounces around the swamp. Like, imagine if you started writing kind of cheap romance novels, you know, kind of men's adventure novels, and just started publishing op eds and WaPo and, you know, on the Daily Beast. Like, that would seem strange. I mean, would it not? I mean, that seems strange today. It's really strange for, you know, 1930, 1931. So anyways, my point is that, you know, this. This is not a man who, who, I mean, not only was he not particularly liquid and wealthy, but he wasn't just a man in the kind of genteel poverty that a lot of, you know, kind of lesser noblemen found themselves in the, in the hustle and bustle 20th century. I mean, this was a guy with real problems. You know, he, he was very, very, very addicted to alcohol. He had a son who couldn't seem to make his own way in the world and you know, was a degenerate gambler. You know, he had a daughter who suffered from depression. And there's nothing funny about that. And I'm not making fun of that or saying that that's grounds for prejudice or something, but you know, he. This was not a family that was doing well, okay? And, and Churchill really was. His ability to generate income was supporting not just himself and his wife, but his adult children and all these hanger ons. Like, it wasn't this, this was not a responsible man. Okay? And I mean, I, as I know in America, people like to draw this kind of distinction between private and public life. And in some ways that's appropriate. But if you look at the way a man governs his private affairs, if he does that in a grossly irresponsible way, I. You can't say that. Oh, but in public life he's entirely responsible and he's, you know, not at all a slave to his passions and you know, he's consummately able to, to discern the correct chorus even if he fails time and again. And affairs of the heart and personal matters. I mean, I think that's important. I mean, I don't. That's not just me putting shade on Churchill because I think that he's not an admirable figure.

[A]

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[C]

CTS and CS21 plus sponsored by Chumba Casino. Bring it back. Kind of the hard and fast facts of the thing in Frederick Lindman in throughout 1932, Frederick Lindman was kind of Churchill's only really close associate. Lindman had a background somewhat like Churchill. He was German born. He was the Lord Of Charwal. I'm probably butchering that pronunciation. He was something of a gadfly. He, he shared kind of Lord Van Van Satart's hostility to Germany, but at the same time he was quite anti Jewish, anti Zionist, and he was dogmatically anti communist. But Churl's association with him, both he and Churchill, they kind of made a habit of. Of costly assailing Ramsay McDonald, who was then prime minister. And McDonald, I think he's an interesting prime minister, brief as his tenure was. But he made a lot of enemies among industrialists and, and, and among old empire loyalist types because, you know, the guy was viewed as being, you know, not just friendly to trade unionism, but, you know, people. People accuse him of being red. People accused him of having these radical socialist sympathies, which he really didn't. I mean, he was something of a grand coalition builder where he fancied himself as that. That included. That included being somewhat cozy with radical elements. But he certainly was not a communist. He certainly was not, you know, some. Some sort of radical. But McDonald was, you know, one of his, uh, one of his big policy points was disarmament. I mean, this was a global movement towards disarmament. Okay, the League of Nations, that was its purported raison d'. Etre. But McDonald, he actually took that seriously and he said, why the hell? What, what are we arming for war against? You know, he's like, Germany right now is pro straight. And even were it not, there's really no reason for us to. To collide with them on strategic matters. You know, even. Even with. Even with the situation in Weimar and with the then, you know, ascendant National Socialists, you know, that this is not some clear and present threat to the, to the United Kingdom or its empire. That's ridiculous. He avoided discussion of the Soviet Union, but that was pretty common among any labor politician then this. And you can say that that's not a particularly flattering tendency as, as such that it existed, but he was not unique in that. But the point is, McDonald was not simply trying to stick it to the. These arm, these armaments concerns and these munitions manufacturers and the very, very strong admiralty lobby. He, he really believed in this and you know, he believed that this was viable. And frankly, what killed the enterprise in 1933 was when the Germans formally withdrew from the League of Nations. But by that point, McDonald's efforts had been. Had really had really been tanked by the fact that it was becoming increasingly clear that, you know, proposals like the Washington Naval Treaty and you know, what the French are demanding as regards collective security in the continent. You know, it meant disarmament for, for thee, but not for me. And even if Hitler had not been at the helm by then, I, I think whoever was chancellor would, would have done the same thing. You know, the Japanese unceremoniously withdrew after, you know, in the wake of the Washington Naval Treaty. And, and in their, you know, in their words, they were being treated like coolies. And there's some truth to that. I mean, however anybody feels with the Japanese Empire, they were, they were essentially being dictated to that, you know, they could only, they could only maintain a fraction of the military maritime tonnage that the United States and the UK would. And I mean nobody. You're, you're, you're essentially, you're not practicing diplomacy when you issue those kinds of ultimatums. You know, you're, you're, you're aiming for diplomacy to fail on purpose, to rationalize your own continued course defense policy. And that's exactly what happened. But during this time, Churchill's other patron that he picked up, probably for cynical reasons only in large part, as we just mentioned, is continued salts on McDonald. Lord Rothmere, who was, was, he was a newspaper magnate. Okay. Like he was kind of, I'm trying to think of a good counterpart to kind of a Robert McCormick sort of figure. Okay. Ross Bear lost two sons in the Great War. You know, he, so he, it was, he, he very much had an interest in reaching a concord with Germany that was personal, not just because he was kind of an old line patriot. He eventually developed a fairly amiable correspondence Hitler, which was rare, there was very, very few people in the uk, Mosley with another one, but he was very selective in his contacts. There's not a lot to this correspondence other than Rothmir stating that, you know, he, he sees no reason why the Tories or the Liberals, if ever swept into office, why they would not continue a course of, you know, reconciliation with Germany. However, in the euphemistic language where all they are employed, you know, there were elements that wanted to see this fail. I mean, you can read the, you can read the entirety of the correspondence, I believe on the Wilson Center's website. I'm not endorsing the Wilson center, but I believe it is there. If not, there's other places you can find it. But my point is there's not some, there's not some remarkable nuggets of historical truth in these things. I only, I only bring it up because it's significant to addressing the rift between Churchill and Rothmere as, as, as Churchill's kind of, kind of anti German polemic reached increasingly fevered piss. Fevered pitch. Rothner finally got so affronted by it that he, he, he ended any, any association with Churchill. He, he refused to pay him for any more content. You refused to run anything secondhand that have been penned by Churchill or was it all sympathetic to his, to his position? And so again, I mean, Churchill was, if not so much cast into the wilderness politically as he had been. He was once again without a financial patron. And Roger had extended him, you know, loans, you know, pretty early gifts in all that name. And so I'm sure, to a certain. Being seen and.

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Hold on, we're losing. Hold on, we're losing.

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You're.

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You're going in and out. Your connection, your connection is weak.

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Okay, how about now?

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I don't see the. It sounds better.

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Yeah, we're trying to restore the connection.

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Okay.

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Okay, how about now?

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It sounds better. It's. I'm still reading it as weak, but that doesn't mean anything. It just matters how it sounds.

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Okay, I'm coming through. Okay.

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Yeah, keep going.

[C]

Okay. So Churchill's yachting in the Mediterranean. You know, with at least giving up appearances. It makes the acquaintance of a man named Alexander Corda. Alan Cora is a Hungarian Jew. He's. He immigrated literally to Hollywood. Okay. Like he was the early, uh, talking films. Okay. He was very prominent in, in this nascent industry. Business at this time. Okay. UK production. Coffee film production was filmed, I can't recount on the film, make much of it. I have no idea of the quality of it. But it was massively profitable. Quarter became incredibly wealthy, according to Churchill's acquaintance. And he bails him out. He quite literally pays his debts and he wanted me to do so. Okay, go ahead. You know, Bacon literally. Bails out Churchill, I believe to the tune of 10,000 pounds sterling, which was a huge amount of money in those days. Okay. Later, really weeks later, owing to Churchill, Spencer ways, he approaches Corda, asks for more money. Okay. You know, you know, gives him another infusion of, of cash. Even hire Churchill's daughter for a no work job. Okay. Because Churchill kind of confided to him, you know, I'm worried about my daughter. And you know, the man she's, he's carrying on with, that's a total other story. I don't want to get into a digression, but so, you know, not only is Corda paying Churchill's bills, he's covering on the gambling debts and he's hiring Churchill's wayward Kind of sad butter with these, with these psychological problems, which again, are no fault of her own. But, you know, he's. He's literally hiring the man's family for these no show jobs, you know, like some kind of mafiosi would or something. Court of Ferg gets his hooks and Churchill tells him, hey, look, I'm gonna give you a job. You know, he's like, I. You don't need to pay back the money I gave you, but I'm going to give you a job. I'm going to commission you to write a screenplay on, you know, the life of George V titled Jubilee, because, you know, the, the jubilee celebration of George V is coming up and, you know, this would just be so great. And this will put you on the map again and, you know, you can kind of rebuild some respectability as, you know, not, not. Not just a man of title, but a man of means and, you know, who's kind of engaged with, you know, the, the 20th century. And this will be great, you know, and Churchill does that kind of on and off. You know, he writes this screenplay that never comes to fruition, but there's much made and kind of like society pages like, oh, Churchill's under the film industry. Like, what a great, what a great thing this is, you know, and look, he's, you know, he's this man about tow to Mr. Corda. I know. Wow. You know, like, you know, Winston's not just this kind of stuffy old, you know, descendant of the. The house of Marlboro or whatever. He's, you know, really on the. He's really, he's really doing great things for national prestige and, and all this other stuff. I mean, so throughout 1934, this is kind of Churchill's new patron. Court introduces Churchill to Bernard Baruch. Bernard Baruch is a banker, quite literally. You know, he's a Wall street financer. He's also a huge Zionist. Okay, his, his whole, his whole cause his whole kind of life outside of business finance. And, and, and this kind of wheeling and dealing is, you know, procuring a. A racially pure, if we can, you know, use the familiar terms of the era, it create a Jewish state in Palestine, you know, in a homeland for the Jewish people where that would be for them alone. And, you know, he's, when he's not agitating for this, he's, you know, he's funding myriad Jewish causes and, you know, in, in the United States and in Europe, you know, he's, he's active with the nascent Anti Defamation League, which Was, you know, had come into existence in the 19 teens after the Leo Frank incident, which I don't want to get into here. People have strong feelings about that and my own opinions, but that, you know, my point is that he was as. As Jewish power in America became institutionalized. He was an instrumental figure in this. Okay. Churchill became so tight with Baruch and with Korda later on. I mean, to jump ahead just for a moment. In 1942, quarter was made a knight by Churchill or Churchill sponsored and essentially demanded his knighthood. Now this was unheard of for. For a film industry personage, okay? It was the first time the title been confir deferred on anybody like that. All right? But this gives you an idea of the degree to which they were their. Their kind of fortunes were insinuated. Okay. This was not just some, you know, temporary marriage with convenience like Churchill's. Churchill's job basically became, you know, acting in the employee of this man and his associates. Very quickly after this is kind of solidified Churchill's kind of singular focus. He begins declaring that German air power is a moral threat to the British Empire. He begins stating that, you know, owing to these intelligent sources that he never discloses, you know, Germany's by. By 1935, Germany will have 5, 000 assault aircraft. You know, these aircrafts can drop. These aircraft in one sortie can drop 500 tons of bombs on London. You know, in contrast, you know, there. There's not. There's not a single, you know, the. The Royal Air Force doesn't even have the capacity to reach the. The European continent, which was nonsense by that time, even prior, even. Even before the Lancaster bomber had go to the drawing board like the RAF, 9, 34, 35, they could have easily reached the Low Countries and even the r. Okay, so I mean, this was just an out now confabulation. This is largely met with derision, but it gains an audience with people sympathetic to the politics of. Of people like. Like Baroque and Corda. A man named Desmond Morton, businessman, industrialist, another wealthy patron. He establishes a. What we consider a political action committee. It's called the Industrial Intelligence Center. I mean, that sounds innocuous, right? And neutral and you know, like some kind of source you go for. You'd go to for data on the world around you and particularly on, you know, the capabilities of nations actually your potential. He starts this industrial intelligence, this industrial Intelligence Center. It begins presenting figures and data once again based on undisclosed sources in the intelligence community. He again reiterates, he says that, you know, by the 1935, there'll be 5, 000 German assault aircraft. You know, the UK, even at maximum production, you know, could only field 900. You know, mind you, there's never these, these statistics were never cited. There's never any discussion of the make or model of these aircraft. There's never any discussion of their quality. There's never any discussion of their range. There's never any discussion of their armaments. You know, nothing further. They claimed, you know, if London was targeted in one day, there'd be 30, 000 dead, you know, within seven days of assault, possibly double that. You know, Chamberlain, to his credit, publicly stated, you know, there's no information backing Churchill's claims. But, you know, even before, even before Chamberlain became this kind of figure that was burning effigy, you know, after, after the Munich, after the aftermath of the Munich summit and, and subsequent, you know, history, that, that, that, that, you know, assigned him this kind of villains role. You know, Chamberlain didn't have the public profile Churchill did, nor did he have the backing, you know, nor did he have the, the ability to disseminate rebuttals to what Churchill was saying. You know, Churchill didn't quite have a bully pulpit. He wasn't even in government at this time. But if your friends are all millionaires, I mean, by today's standards, that'd be billionaires. You know, they're insinuated in media. You know, they're, they're, they've got power and authority on Wall Street. I mean, you can get a lot done. And if you go around yelling things from the proverbial rooftops, even if it's nonsense, you're gonna, people are gonna listen to you if you say it enough. Okay, it doesn't matter if you got Ramsy McDonald, you know, who's kind of on his way out anyway and risking, you know, no, a vote of no confidence. It doesn't matter if you got, you know, Mr. Chamberlain kind of, kind of, kind of stuffy, dull, Mr. Chamberlain saying, well, actually this isn't true, and citing the facts and figures to rebut it. You know, it, it comes down to presentation. It comes down to saturation of the, of the conceptual landscape. I mean, we see this today. You know, people say totally insane things about Vladimir Putin and Russia. Like, even if you don't like the Russians or don't like Mr. Putin or sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause, whatever that may be, the, the things that are said about this situation don't make any sense. It's like, okay, well, it was the same thing in those days. And I'd argue it was even more insidious because you didn't. You couldn't get on the Internet and fact check, you know, and you didn't. You didn't. You didn't have alternative sources of media. You know, you basically had whoever could yell the loudest who were the most outlets that would be receptive to publicizing and disseminating these statements. That was the opinion that won out. 1935. The German air cords, the German air codes, at least the lower operational air codes, are actually broken by British intelligence. UK Foreign Secretary John Simon, he says what Churchill's saying is nonsense. The number of extant actually existing German aircraft. He's talking forces and being was 578. UK Foreign Secretary John Simon met with Earhart Milch in March of 1935. For those that don't know, Milch was the first CEO when he was really the. He was the founder of Lufthans or. He later became a field marshal. He was the hero of the battle of Narvik. He was ethnically part Jewish. He's an interesting guy. David Irving wrote a great biography of him. But Simon met with Milch because Milch was something. I mean, he wasn't just. He didn't just have military rank. He was a diplomat of his in his own right as much as business moguls are, because they have to be. Mills was a guy who was genuinely well liked, unlike, Unlike. Unlike the. Unlike the official Foreign Ministry. A lot of these figures in the UK actually like dealing with Milch. Okay? That's if it seems strange for him to be meeting with the Foreign Secretary. That's why Simon wanted to meet with him to discuss the. Up. The forthcoming naval talks. The. After the. After the. After what happened, you know, with the Kaiser's high seas fleet. And in terms of provoking anxieties which led to an arms race which in turn was a contributing factor to the Great War. There was great concern and more responsible policy circles about transparency in. In our. In maritime armaments. Okay? That was the context of that Milk wrote down in his diary, his personal diary, after the meeting with John Simon, quote, we are banking on Britain's assistance against Russia. Russia. That is important. Okay? That actually is an essential kind of nugget of truth, like buried in this kind of murky miasma of. Of. Of diplomatic and military intrigues of the era. Okay. I mean, Milch really. Not only was he close to Adolf Hitler, he was. Even though Jason at that point and Ernst Udet had Bubba Wallace here from 2311 Racing on the track. My car's look is everything. But today I'm talking about more than just paint schemes. I'm talking about my favorite games at Chumba Casino. Check out exclusives like Stampede Fury and my own King Croc Fury. It's just as wild as my car looked in Texas. With over 200 games and new ones weekly play for free at Chumbacasino.com let's

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formal authority within the Luftwaffe. I would argue that Milch was probably closest to gearing in operational terms. Okay. The fact that Milch not only is he striking a, a non confrontational posture towards the UK he's openly you know writing in his private diary that an essential aspect of his strategic vision and those Berlin strategic vision is bringing the UK into its strategic fold as an ally against the communist East. I believe that says it all. Okay. I mean I, I, I, I, I don't see how anybody can rebut that, you know or how, or how it can be said that like. Well M is not in a position to know what the actual intentions of Berlin or, or, or his furor were or what the OKW actually had in mind. I mean I, but that is something of a tangent. November 1935 the British Air staff convenes issued an internal and issued an internal memorandum stating unequivocally that German forces in being was no more than 594 aircraft. They did not single out Churchill as the target of this rebuttal but they did make mention of irresponsibly inflated figures. Okay. Named location here is obvious. Churchill wrote in response to this. The Committee of Imperial Defense which was the UK did not have a general staff like the, like the Vermont did and or you know in our equivalent in this country would be the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Committee of Imperial Defense was basically that equivalent. Okay, so Churchill addresses the Committee of Imperial Defense and he wrote rather ominously is my sincere hope that this figure will not be made public as it would certainly give rise to misunderstandings and challenges. So think about that. Some guy who's become the kind of Aaron boy, a bunch of billionaires. I mean some of whom are frankly pretty dangerous people. They've got ties to militant Zionism, they've got ties the armaments industry, they've got ties to Wall street. They've got this kind of media bully pulpit that's just kind of coming into existence. You know on Account of, you know, movie house visual media becoming kind of a dominant propaganda platform. They're writing you, you know, they're, they're writing you letters saying, you know, we, I, we really don't think you should publish certain data that, that would cause misunderstandings. I mean it, you don't, you don't need to be prone to conspiratorial thinking or paranoiac to understand that there, the implied threat therein. Okay. I mean this is really incredible to me that I, that, that any, you know, but I mean the, the, the uk I mean kind of, and I'm not trashing English people, but they're for all their reputation for subtlety and, and kind of, and kind of nuance and irony, they, they, they, they tend to speak rather plainly when they plan to threaten people. And I think this is in a way that would not be the case in America. Opposite perception as that may be. November 1935 is a seminal. That, that, that, that this is a seminal month in year for Churchill because the Conservatives are swept into power. This is no surprise to anybody. Baldwin becomes the Prime Minister. He has no time for Churchill. He's committed to peace. He's, he's got no interest in, in, in, in, in pandering to the armaments lobby. He's got no interest in. In villainizing Germany. So as a substantiated general mobilization or a military buildup. Okay, the uh, during this time, as we mentioned Lord Rothmir, he was still in contact with Adolf Hitler. I believe this was his second to last correspondence with him. He wrote to Adolf Hitler clandestinely. He said that if, if, If Hitler could broker a peace between Italy, which was then at war with Ethiopia, Abyssinian Empire as it was then known, that that could bring beneficial diplomatic overtures from the new government in London. I find Hitler's response somewhat fascinating. Let me bring it up here, but I'll, I'll read it word for word. Hiller replied. For 100 million years this earth has moved around the sun. During that long time, it has always been filled with the struggle of human beings for nourishment and later for dwellings and clothing, etc. Countless influences have wrought constant changes in the distribution of property. And now, in a certain year, after millions of years in which the earth has moved around the sun, an American professor claims the formation of a diplomatic league of partly heterogeneous nations with completely opposite interests, with a view to banishing future change from the world, can effectively banish any change. And that sounds ominous, but that's also a very Hitler statement. I mean, essentially Hitler was saying, what's going to happen is going to happen. You know, there I, I have no reason not to, you know, see if he'll do. I'll be responsive to peace overtures, but this will not change anything. And you of all people should know better, considering you're, you know, you're Mr. Empire Loyalist. That seems like a very stilted statement from Hitler. But you got to understand the way that British aristocrats wrote and the way that Hitler, the kind of Habsburg German artist wrote. Reading between the lines, this is a fascinating response, but the point is that, you know, it was not just. It was not just kind of degenerate eccentric royals who, who were making friendly overtures to. Directly to Berlin. Okay. I mean, it was, there was, there was active correspondence between Rothmere and. I mean, Rothmere himself was an unusual person, but he wasn't some outlier. Okay, I just, I wanted to drop that for context. Forgive me if it was kind of a tangent, but what Hitler also said was that not to Rothmir, but when he was asked, I believe by ribbon Trop, because ribbon Trop always had ribbon Trop is the foreign minister of the Third Reich achieve diplomat. When he asked, you know, he said, okay, now, now with, you know, with. With what remains a League of Nations. That's why he's trying to broker some kind of peace between Italy and, and Ethiopia. You know, would now be the time to, you know, push for reclamation of colonies in Africa? Hitler said, I don't get the slightest impression that I'm trying to capitalize on a crisis. Which is interesting to me because Hitler supposedly is the man who, you know, like Mr. Kissinger said, never let a crisis go to waste. Now, of course, Hitler didn't hesitate to act or strike when he felt that circumstances were favoring the moment in military political terms. But the point being, you know, if Hitler was this guy who was hell bent on weakening the British Empire, like, why wasn't the Vermont also in Ethiopia? Why wasn't Hitler doing executive ribbon Trapp said saying, like, hey, we demand a stake in Africa. You know, I mean, he could have been doing all these things and he wasn't. He was basically saying he was. He was kind of dropping these cryptic philosophical statements on Rothmir. You're telling ribbon trop, hey, I don't want to provoke London. I mean, this is not. These are not the ants. These are not the antics of a man who's trying to exploit a weakness and we use as his enemy. They're just not especially. One considers that Baldwin. The conservatives were swept into power with a pretty strong mandate, but Baldwin himself, a British prime minister, is not like a u. S. President, okay? It's not the man Baldwin. It's not like he, you know, it's not like the voters were voting for Baldwin. They were voting for the tories, I mean. But moving on 1935, because 1936, Churchill angles for the position of minister of defense, which seems strange considering Baldwin's kind of antipathy to him. But the sponsorship that Churchill had behind him, you know, people like Baruch, people like Corda, he probably assumed that, that the, the. Both the prestige and the implied threat or menace of that would carry him. He's unceremoniously passed over William c. Bullet, who will be a familiar name to people who followed this series. You know, the arch new dealer, Roosevelt, ambassador of France. A man who for all practical purposes was kind of chief diplomat without formal title. Can you hear me?

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Yeah, go ahead.

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Yeah, we're good. Okay. Yeah, yeah, I'd say I. I got a. Okay. Yeah, it said for a minute my signal cut out. But bullet wrote to Churchill when he was in London when this was underway, you know, when the new Baldwin government was, was swept to power and, and children was continuing these kinds of deranged annex claiming that the Germans are going to kill us all. He said that. He said the FDR quote. Strangely enough, all the old anti Bolshevik fanatics like Winston Churchill are trumpeting the Bolshevik thesis and are advocating an intent with the Soviet Union. And he wasn't being funny. You know it. And bear in mind in 1920, and you'll still find this among woke types who don't really understand that their, their own kind of ideological heritage, you know, 1920, Churchill is. The man was saying that, you know, we've got to stand with Europe at all cost against bolshevism. He was showing up in Paris, you know, proverbially waving a saber around, saying that he wanted to lead an army against the, you know, the reds. And, and all of this. And incidentally too, he was saying that, you know, the Jews are the source of all of this radicalism. You know, very, very interesting. Now he's on the payroll of, of American, of American zionist millionaires. But what energized Churchill's propaganda efforts probably more than anything, rightly or wrongly. I'm not saying this was warranted. I'm saying just in terms of public opinion, March 1936 is when the Vermont, the Rhineland, okay? This really, more than anything was Hitler's big gamble. Okay? Hitler was not really a military gambler. Politically, yes. Militarily, no. That's a subject for another show. But this was the real test of Versailles and what remained of the political will to enforce this, it. Okay. And when the French did not act, when London did not, you know, stage a diplomatic coup and, and put pressure on Paris to do something or offer, if not direct military, you know, logistical and you know, maritime support for the effort, it was, it was clear that Versailles was dead. Okay? This energized Churchill to say, see, see, I was right all along. You know, the, the Germans are these mad ear at dentists. And I mean that, that can't be overstated. Okay? I mean again, this certainly did not like, so a seed of war fever in, in, in on the London street or something. But it did, it did, it did give people pause, particularly people who had frankly something of a backwards looking view of strategic matters and viewed France as kind of key ally of the empire. And for context too, at this time, France was viewed as a preeminent European army and like land powers in generally, okay, like they were not, they were not viewed as a paper tiger. They were not viewed as a state that, you know, due to political fracturing, like lack the will to fight a general war with Germany. Okay? I mean, so even people who had a more cynical view of politics and did not accept this kind of Germanophobic, you know, kind of pro Zionist view that was just intractably hostile to Germany, it would have given them pause regardless if it seemed as if, you know, war between France and Germany was looming and a lot of them would have been sympathetic to France. And that's what I meant. But by, by the end of, by the end of 1935, you know, as we talked about, we talked about Churchill's financial difficulties and the fact that he was quite literally rescued from destitution by, by Baruch and Corda by the end of 1935. Another, another kind of figure, like enter Churchill's orbit, Leonard Montefori. He was president of the Anglo Jewish association, which was exactly what it sounded like. But it wasn't, it wasn't just an ethnic lobbying group, you know, like the adl. I mean it was that too, but its big thing was kind of having like an international presence and it was pretty much an advocacy group for German Jews and German Jews. I'm just speaking candidly here. There was a great deal of enmity between German Jewry and obviously the Third Reich government, but also many German people. Okay, I'm not saying that's right. Or wrong. I'm not trying to just come on here and say bad things about Jewish people, but this is a fact, okay? And no sectarian conflict happens in Europe as it happens in America, as it happens anywhere on this planet. The, the Jews were very, the Jews of Germany were very much at odds with the broader conflict culture. And people who claim like this was not the case are deluding themselves, okay? Because they were people who claim that Hiller just confabulated this narrative and out of nowhere it are diluting themselves. So that is the context. Lord M. Leonard Monte for he facilitates the introduction. Not only does it become another one of Churchill's monetary patrons, he facilitates the introduction at Churchill to what was called the Anti Nazi Council. It was quite literally called the Anti Nazi Council. Okay, what was the Anti Nazi Council? A man named Eugen Spire, or you can Speyer, okay? He was the chief financer of it. He was for all practical purposes a Jewish refugee. In later years, interestingly, Speier, he published an autobiography and a testimonial basically of the inner war years. This is after the Second World War, okay? Spire, basically he was writing this kind of testimonial. This is my life. This is how I founded, you know, as financier, you know, the Anti Nazi League, which became the focus. And we'll get into what the focus was in a minute, you know, and he, he made much of the fact, thinking he was praising him, like, oh, and, you know, I brought Mr. Churchill into the indoor service. Essentially, Churchill begged him not to publish it. And according to some people, Churchill threatened to sue to prevent it being published. I don't know if that second allegation is true. I'd have to further fact check it. But it is documented that Churchill zealously opposed the publication of this testimonial. And that's very, very interesting, you know, like why, if, if church was so, you know, this man was just so committed in his, in his opinions and they, you know, they, they were so grounded and right and, you know, against the grain of public opinion. Like, why would he care? You know, it's very, very interesting, but the Anti Nazi Council, it did not actually originate in, in, in London society circles. It originated in New York City. Speier again financed it, you know, did a lot of the kind of legwork, brought people into its orbit. But a New York City attorney named Samuel Untermeyer, he was chairman of the World Jewish Economic Federation, which, you know, was again, I mean, it was an ethno sectarian advocacy group, but kind of more business oriented More commerce oriented, less of a focus on, you know, kind of traditional ethnopolitical lobbying. Although that was also a strong interest of it. But Ultrameyer incorporated it. And what put the World Jewish Economic Federation on the map is that the Jewish Economic Federation. The World Jewish Economic Federation, they organized a trade boycott on German goods and manufacturers upon the the National Socialist ascendancy to government in 1934. They approached a man named Sir Walter Citrine. He was chairman of the Trades Union Congress. Okay. Which seems an odd alliance, okay. These kinds of, these kinds of ethnic lobbyist type guys, you know, or high flying Wall street attorneys in America, you know, kind of big shot London financiers, you know, very, very capitalist oriented people. You know, they address this trade union guy, you know, Citrine, who's got a, you know, reputation for being, you know, red. But interestingly they, they, they, they, they incorporate together the Trade Union Congress becomes one with the World Jewish Economic Federation. And what do they incorporate as the quote, non sectarian, anti Nazi Council for Human Rights. That's a mouthful of nonsense if I've ever heard it.

[B]

When you were saying about capitalists getting together with the trade unionists and everything.

[C]

Yes sir.

[B]

Anyone who studied what happened with election laws up to the 2020 election will recognize that.

[C]

Oh definitely, definitely. I was being halfway facetious but I mean for people who don't know, I'm not making fun of people who don't know the history of this but on its face it seems bizarre if one doesn't understand the kind of intrigues and the sympathies that people involved. But yeah, the, the World Jewish Economic Federation under Sam Untermeyer and you know, bankrolled by, you know, London millionaires. And it incorporates with the trade union, the Trade Union Congress as the non sectarian anti Nazi Council for what? For human rights. So what we have here is we have, we have what amounts to. It's one and a half Anti Defamation League type ethno nationalist lobbying organization, one half kind of foreign policy pressure group to make war on Germany. And it's this odd constellation, a kind of crazy Zionist bigots, Jewish businessmen who yeah, definitely have Zionist sympathies but also are like, you know, looking to get paid out and out Communists, a handful of disgruntled toy disgruntled Tories just like regular old Englishmen who hate Prime Minister Baldwin and are willing to basically, you know, burn down anything to stick it to Baldwin. Crazy as that seems. You know, Wall street financiers are in this circle of all stripes A lot of, a lot of Jewish individuals among them, but not exclusively. And then you got these regular old war profiteers, industrialists, you know, who were, who, who, who, who old Ramsay McDonald had stuck it to with disarmaments, you know, and they don't, they don't care who's footing the bill. They don't care if it's Zionists, they don't care if it's Tories, they don't care if it's piggy Winston Churchill on another crusade. All they know is that we're all going to get rich, you know, and we, and times have been bleak for us for the last 20 years. We've had a succession of hostile, of hostile prime ministers who didn't give us what we want. And even the ones who had a more bellicose posture towards Berlin said, there's just not the money here to give you what you want. Now, interestingly, drew McIntyre here from WWE wielding the Claymore can be a life of chaos when I'm not dominating in the ring. Chumba Casino is how this warrior takes a wee break. With hundreds of online social games and new weekly releases, there's always something fresh to try and those daily boosts next level.

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plus sponsored by Chumba Casino as this anti, not non sectarian, anti Nazi council becomes more and more bounded with Mr. Churchill and Churchill becomes more and more vocal and it becomes more and more publicly associated with, you know, a lot of these kind of significant figures in the Jewish community of, of powerful, you know, pedigree. The, the Board of Jewish Deputies, which was the oldest Zionist NGO basically in the world, okay, they got a little bit nervous, you know, and they're like, look, we should probably avoid this kind of, we should probably avoid this kind of overly aggressive lobbying, you know, because it looks unseemly foreign. Rabbi Stephen Wise, who was kind of the American counterpart, he basically just told these people like, you're out of it. You're either gonna go, you're either gonna go along with this and you're gonna go along with our strategy, or we're gonna destroy you. You know, we're gonna say, if you have your funding, we're gonna discredit you in media. You're just gonna be nothing. You're gonna cease to exist. He founds the rival world Jewish Congress based in Geneva. And what precedes is all these elements that had been brought into the, this non sectarian anonymity council, you know, basically closed ranks against the board of Jewish Deputies and its holdouts, okay? And basically just crushed like any opposition within their own house ruthlessly. Okay? And what followed this was highly conspiratorial, okay? So basically now we have a quorum of all these elements with a decided and with a decidedly Zionist bent. Politically, Mr. Citrine, the trade union leader, the trade union Congress leader, he's seen, he's documented to be dining regularly with representatives both of the, the, the now cowed or, or the, or the now dominant world Jewish Congress. He's seen in their company at the same time of a chairman of major industrial and chemical combines. Which is interesting because a lot of these people, they were looking forward to the next war thinking that chemical munitions were going to be a thing, but they weren't in terms of battlefield utility but as well as, you know, weapons manufacturers, representatives of munitions combines, you know, industrial lobbyists, you know, it's like, like literally you can't like make this stuff up. It's like something you'd see in like some quirky superhero movie of like all these evil guys at the table. You know, here's some mafiosi, here's the mayor, here's the dirty congressman. I'm not trying to be silly, but this is like literally what, this literally goes underway, you know, I mean it's, it's, it seems like something out of a movie or, or some kind of cheap pamphlet commissioned by her Goebbels to try and make British policy look like it had been co opted entirely by Jewish interests or something. But this is in fact what happened, you know, after, even after the, even after, after and after the Rhineland occupation. Interestingly the. But, but, but Congress with its, with its charter, the Labor Party still flatly opposed rearmament. They said we're not going to remilitarize. You know, we're not, we're not going to strike at Bellagos posture against Germany. We're not going to seek deterrence through, through mobilization of arms. Basically. Okay, so the, the anti Nazi Council, which is now increasingly called the focus in their communications to one another which could have, which could be intercepted. Obviously the euphemism they utilized was the focus. And so when you run across in Churchill's own writings review on, across in documentary evidence corralled by people like David Irving and like Thomas Flem references to the focus, this is what they're talking about. And later the anti Nazi Congress of Human Rights. You know, it was later formally incorporated as the Focus, but at this point, it was still an unofficial moniker. But when the Labor Party, in the wake of the Rhineland occupation, flatly announces that, you know, even as the opposition, where you're not, you know, we're not going to criticize Baldwin's unwillingness to rearm, it's. It's just not on the table. The Focus convenes a meeting organized by Citrine man named Henry Wickham Steed, with the keynote speaker. Steed had been on the payroll of the Prague government, which even in the best of times, had a tenuous grip on power owing to the ethnic and political situation. Steed declared that he was going to take this war chest, which had to be substantial because in the year 1923, 1924 alone even paid the equivalent of between 250,000 and £500,000 sterling by Prague for political activity. So jumping into 1936, if he was still being paid anything like that, he had a huge amount of money at his disposal. At this meeting, it's decided that Steed, utilizing his contacts, diplomatic and otherwise, he's going to approach potentially what he called potentially sympathetic politician, not just in the Labor Party, when they could serve in Liberal parties as well, and see if he can change their mind about the rearmament, you know, which is obviously a euphemism for buying legislation. Okay? As all this is underway, Baldwin, the Prime Minister, realizes he's a problem. Okay? The man wasn't a fool, and he realized that Churchill was in real danger of garnering some kind of quorum against him, and that amounted to a war party. Okay. Baldwin decides he's gonna try and neutralize Churchill by granting him what's called a deputation. That's essentially a minister without portfolio. What would be considered that on the Continent, but in the British government, which seems kind of Byzantine even to me, and I know something about it. It's basically one part minister without a portfolio, one part unofficial advisor. Okay, so Churchill now has access to Baldwin when he wants. Like I said, I believe, and I realize every historian speculates, but I think this is pretty clear. I believe Baldwin had two things in mind. I believe that would neutralize Churchill's vanity because, oh, now, you know, he's got a role in government, but it also. Churchill couldn't keep his mouth shut. Okay? He wasn't just a bragger, but he was an alcoholic. And he. He just said things that he should not have said, you know, both in terms of insulting People and in terms of kind of disclosing what he was doing. And Baldwin knew that because he knew the man very well. So Mr. Churchill's plotting against you. It's kind of better to have him coming by your office and slugging down, you know, gin and kind of talking to you about what's on his mind than to have him out doing God knows what. I mean, silly as that sounds, it's not a joke. I mean, it's, it's a real thing, you know, I mean it, it kind of in all times, but Churchill's sort of a, an almost comical example of a man who you subject to that sort of, who you neutral attempt to neutralize in that way. Okay, right at this time is when the anc, you know, the Anti Nazi Council for Human Rights, it begins formally referring to itself as the focus. Charles says, look, we, we can't have people thinking that, you know, we're a pressure group, okay? And this made sense because Churchill did have good Machiavellian instincts, you know, it. Not to be crude about it, but he realized I can't be seen about town hanging around a bunch of rich Jews calling themselves the anti Nazi Congress, okay? Meanwhile, I'm, you know, ducking into Mr. Baldwin's office and telling him his business, okay? This, this would not be a good thing. So from then on, what's now the focus becomes exponentially more powerful, but in some ways more profile. There's no more of these lunchtime meetings between, you know, you know, millionaire industrialistic chemical concerns and armaments factories who, you know, are meeting with, you know, you know, some New York City rabbi who's also, you know, got his hands in Wall street and all whom, you know, are, are talking about how we can pressure the Baldwin government to really, really, you know, sock into Germany. That's not going to happen anymore because now they're getting their way and congruous with this Wickham Steed. He sets up what's called a research section or what they call it, a research section for the Focus. Now what does that mean in practical terms? Well, that meant dissemination of propaganda. It meant doing things like formally disseminating, you know, facts and figures on Nazi rearmament to the press. You know, it meant declaring from undisclosed sources, you know, intelligence sources. Oh, these are the, this is Germany's intention or, you know, these are our forces in being versus the Germans. And you know, this is our aircraft gap. You know, things like this. Basically a propaganda office. Okay? Now, ah, Richards, who was, I don't believe he was Jewish, but He was kind of the front man for the. What it. For the anti Nazi Congress going back some years. And he was the organizing secretary. He was the money man. So as Wickham Steed kind of proudly announces, I'm setting up the research section. Richard says, you know, without really thinking, where. Where's the money going to come from? From this. Churchill suddenly became visibly livid, and Richards quickly was kind of ushered out of the room. And according to him, in later years was instructed, look, you are never to inquire about funding and you never to insult Mr. Churchill like that again, okay? Especially not in the presence of witnesses. All you need to know is that rest assured, all expenses have been taken care of. And if any of our benefactors ask you, tell them that it's not a problem, okay? That this will be paid for. All we need is them to contribute their time and efforts and to basically, you know, carry out our requests. Whether that's arranging meetings for who we need to meet with, you know, whether that's, you know, issuing statements to the newspaper outlets that they're familiar with and friendly with, you know, or whether it's seeking out friends across the Atlantic, you know, who might be sympathetic to our. Our plight. But you never, ever raise money and you Never, ever address Mr. Churchill directly on such matters. And that's very interesting, too, because basically, by this point, which would come as no surprise considering the resumes of the men who constituted it, church, was the frontman of an organization that basically had a bottomless war chest, okay, within reason. But for what it needed to accomplish, you can buy a lot of legislation for tens of millions of dollars in 1936, okay? I mean, that's. That's. And people misunderstand. I mean, the days these days where we talk in terms of billions of dollars and, you know, we talk about guys like Elon Musk, you know, throwing around, you know, tens of billions of dollars, like, we lose sight of this. But, you know, if you had. When the average person was making a few hundred dollars a year, I mean, if you were talking about tens of millions of dollars, you might as well have been talking about all the money on this planet. I mean, that was an obscene amount of money, you know? I mean, it was not. It was. It was not any small thing, okay? I mean. And nothing even came close and to that, to demonstrate that the funds for the research group under Steed were, in fact, they were arranged by the board. By the Board of Dep. Board of Deputies of British Jews, the vice president of the Board of Jeopardy. Board of Deputies of British Jews was a man named Sir Robert Whaley Cohen. Who was Sir Robert Whaley Cohen? Whaley Cohen was the chairman of Shell. You know, Shell, where you get your gas? Formerly known as British Shell, okay, that Shell. At a meeting at Cohen's home July 22, he donated 50, 000 pounds sterling for any expenses needed by the Focus. The rest of the membership of the board of W. Of British Jews. They cut checks for 25, 000 pounds sterling, and they pledged to match that anytime was needed. Okay, now for context, to give kind of life to what I just said. This was five times the budget of the British Council. The British Council was the top foreign policy lobbying organization in the British Empire. It was bankrolled, literally, by the royal family. The British Council was. Okay, it was kind of like the Council on. It was kind of like the Council on Foreign Relations of the British Empire, okay? The Focus. They had five times their budget. Like, think about that for a minute. So basically, there was. There was no pressure group, no lobbying group, no organ of government, no kind of tentacle of the royal family that. That could. That could affect everyone's policy that came anywhere close to this NGO that Churchill had behind him. Like, nothing probably on this planet other than like the U. S. War Department and the kind of several industrial concerns that constituted that. I mean, if they. If we could even, you know, make a comparison. Because obviously they hadn't even mobilized for war yet. So I'm just trying to give an idea of like, the kind of bottomless nature of this budget, you know, without exaggeration. It. It was that vast. But WH Cohen's patronage came at a price. What was that price? He said he wanted to have authority, final authority over all, all. All official statements on policy by the Focus. Okay. He wanted the opportunity to edit or censor any policy statements. Anything Churchill took to Baldwin, any declaration within the Focus itself, not for public consumption, that was considered to be, you know, an essential policy ambition. He was the final authority on that, okay? He was. He. He even redacted. Later on, he'd redact entire section of the Churchill speeches because he didn't like the way it read. Now, what was his. Beyond being a control freak or just wanted to know where his money was going? Like, what was Mr. Cohen's rationale? Cohen said that. He said Ed base. He said the policy of Focus has to be to refute the claim that there were any redeemable aspects of the German Third Reich and its regiment and that there were any redeemable aspects to Adolf Hitler and that there was any legitimacy to any policy they pursued or any claim they issued. It kind of sounds like the American orientation towards Putin's Russia today, doesn't it? That's very interesting, but I, I think I've kind of dropped a lot here. I'm sorry.

[B]

Literally.

[C]

Yeah, yeah, yeah. But it, what I, I kind of want to conclude, I want, I, I kind of want to wait until our next session. I want to get into Churchill becomes Prime Minister. Or before that, I'm going to Munich. Churchill becomes Prime Minister. The war years, that'll take about half an hour, I think, and then have our 45 minutes and then we'll get into the onset of Operation Barbarosa and switch our focus to the Soviet Union. And then in our final episode before we get into the aftermath of the war, in the Nuremberg, we'll deal with kind of the convergence of policy, New Deal policy, Churchill in the focus, Stalin, Soviet Union. I realize it seems like we're getting bogged down in minutia, especially on the issue of Churchill in the uk but there's an incredible amount of detail and complexity here and it's a lot more conspiratorial than what happened in America or the Soviet Union. Does that sound agreeable?

[B]

Sounds good to me.

[C]

Okay. And again, I'm so sorry we had to delay this particular session, but if you want to, if you want to jump back on, on the content on Saturday or anytime thereafter, that would be just fine.

[B]

Okay. Yeah. When we stop recording, I'll tell. I'll talk to you about that.

[C]

Okay.

[B]

Yeah, plug your sub stack real quick and we'll end this.

[C]

Actually, I get deplatformed a lot, so don't look for me on Twitter because I probably won't be back there. But you can find me on substack real thomas777.substack.com I've got a lot of print content coming out imminently and a lot of long form. I'm going to be posting up more regularly on the sub stack, so please follow it. Please join it. The podcast drops every other week. It's only $5 a month. It'll never be more than that unless you're truly like in dire freaking hobo straits. Like, join for $5 a month, please. It helps. That's all I got.

[B]

Appreciate it. Until the next time.

[C]

Thank you, Pete.

[B]

Thanks.

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