← The Pete Quiñones Show
The Pete Quiñones Show
The Complete World War One Series w/ Thomas777
09:16:47
9 Hours and 17 Minutes PG-13 Thomas777 is a revisionist historian and a fiction writer. This is the complete audio to the World War One series Thomas777 did with Pete. https://substack.com/profile/19860866-realthomas777...
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- [00:00]
Thomas
What's up everybody? It's Bretzky and America is turning 250 and I can't think of a better way to celebrate that than playing on an American owned social casino. Spinquest.com with all of your favorite games, live craft bubble craps, live blackjack, there's no better place to play for free and win real cash prizes. Spinquest.com Spinquest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. Hey, it's Ryan Reynolds here for Mint Mobile. Now I was looking for fun ways to tell you that Mint's offer of unlimited Premium Wireless for $15 a month is back. So I thought it would be fun if we made $15 bills but it turns out that's very illegal. So there goes my big idea for the commercial. Give it a try@mintmobile.com switch upfront payment of $45 for three months, $90 for six months or $180 or 12 month plan required $15 per month equivalent taxes and fees. Extra initial plan term only greater than 50 gigabytes. Me slow when network is busy See terms if the world were like a sleep number mattress, everything would adapt for your comfort. Your coffee would never get cold, your flight would always be on time and your mattress would always respond to you and your unique sleep needs. Sleep number mattresses are designed to respond to your body and shift with your changing life, helping you fall asleep faster and stay asleep longer. To experience a whole new world of comfort, visit a sleep number store or go to sleepnumber.com sleep number to a good life sleep.
- [01:32]
Pete
I want to welcome everyone back to the Picanone show. It feels like we haven't recorded in like six months, Thomas, and it's only been a couple weeks. You had a birthday. Let me wish you a happy belated and. Yeah. How you doing?
- [01:45]
Thomas
Oh, thank you. I'm doing well, man. Yeah. Like I said, I. I'm not feeling great today. So I, I want the subscribers and the viewers forgive me in advance If I'm not 100%, but yeah, things have been very well. I want to preface this too. This is going to be a long series. I mean just the by nature of the subject, I mean you could, I mean frankly, we could. I'm not suggesting we do this, but we could undertake quite literally an endless series on the Great War from this moment now until we die. Assuming both of us are long lived, there still remain aspects that, you know, we, we neglected to cover in any complete capacity. My view of the great War is essentially in line with Christopher Clark's. I don't. And honestly, it's. What was the kind of conventional view of the war outside of, you know, the experience of the second war and the subsequent narrative about Germany is this kind of, like, irredentist power that could not be placated, that's colored any analysis of the strategic paradigm as it stood in August 1914. You've got to understand the Great War as I don't. The last thing I do is assign a war guild because it's conceptually that. That's asinine. You know, there's not. Like, warfare is not a schoolyard fight. There's not people who started it and people who are victims, you know, nor, you know, like I said, I'm sure people are tired of hearing it by now, but I reject the clause of its model of war as this kind of rational process. You know, I view it in. In classical terms or traditional realist terms is frankly, just like arriving like the seasons, okay? Like it. There's a bounded rationality to it, but its origins are. I have to do with anthropological variables of scale and things that precede rationality and discrete decision making to accomplish, you know, material goals. That said, the. The conditions that created the crisis paradigm orbited around Russia, okay? That's not to say like, World War I is Russia's fault, but the Russian situation is what caused it. Okay? And the reaction of great powers and adjacent states reacting to the reality of Russian power, actual and potential, as well as, you know, political tendencies that they viewed as emanating from Russia and animating and mobilize, you know, animating Allied Slavic populations in particular, you know, towards a grand political enterprise that I think that's indisputable. Okay. Germany was reacting at every step of the way, except for 1917, of course, the. The final German offensive. I mean, yeah, in every war, every In. In warfare, every combatant is at times acting offensively and at times defensively. But the only time Germany was really in the driver's seat, as it were, was. Was in 1917, okay? And it was trying to end the war in one fell swoop. And obviously, what precluded. What precluded that was, you know, the. The arrival of the American Expeditionary Force. But this idea of World War I orbiting around Germany and just kind of like this kind of like, moronic caricature of the Kaiser just doing things for no reason or like, suing for war just because, like, that. That doesn't really make any sense. And also in August, in the autumn, of 1914, summer, autumn 1914. Germany hadn't been at war for decades. The Franco Prussian War. I mean that's what there's many people who believe that if Bismarck cultivated that war in order to bring the several German states into the Northern Confederation and the crushing victory scored over France, that's what led to Germany becoming a real power and consolidating. If that's true, that makes Bismarck the greatest Machiavellian who ever lived. But regardless, you know, this idea of, oh, Germany was just helping on militarism. Like, where was German militarism? Like one of the reasons they had so many problems in the early stage of the war, they had a bunch of their combat commanders who were still in service or elderly men. You know, you had a bunch of reservists on the frontier in East Prussia who were in their 40s and 50s, like German Germany did. Germany had no idea how to fight a modern war. Yeah, nobody did. But you know, that's not, that's, it's a bad faith case to claim that, you know, Germany simply, quote, started the second war. But it's at least, you know, you can point to things like a culture of militarism, you know, an entire generation of men who had come of age not just in uniform but in heavy combat. You know, you could, you can suggest, you know, a kind of deforming of the national psyche and not be wrong. But in 1914, I mean there was, you'd be hard pressed again, you'd be hard for us to find living men in Germany who'd actually heard a shot fired in anger. You know, and I think that's important to keep in mind. You know, this was not, I mean one of the reasons the war happened is because the 19th century, you know, like I'm always coming back to Hobsbawm's description of it as the long century is because nothing really happened after Waterloo in Europe in power political terms. I mean all kinds of things happened, you know, otherwise historically. And the Crimean War was important, but I mean that was remote, you know, like that wasn't, I mean it was a big deal to the men who fought it, but it wasn't, you know, the people in, people in Moscow, people in London, people in Berlin, people in Paris, that, that didn't impact their lives in any way. You know, it's not like there's some mass mobilization of, of, of male youth or something. You know, it wasn't the, one of the reasons why if you, there's all these, there's all These European mercenaries, you know, they're talking about Pulaski, whether you're talking about infamous people like Henry Verse at Andersonville or whether you're talking about, you know, the, whether you're talking about the executive officer on the, the Confederate Hunley, you know, these were like German Swiss polls. Like the reason why they were showing up in or stage is because there was no action in Europe. You know, so this idea that you know, at what, what, what was this supposedly like German militarism built on, you know, like, like war gaming, you know, like, like fantasies like it doesn't, it doesn't bear out. Kaiser Vilhelm was, was not a good executive and I think there was something brutish about him quite literally in terms of his habits and, and his aversion to, to diplomacy of the sort that was called for and that was easy to lampoon. But as we'll see, the man who was really in the driver's seat was Hovig and he was beside himself of what happened. And obviously too, you know, the war began as a fight between the Russian Empire and, and the, and the Hapsburgs, you know, Franz Joseph, who was in my opinion kind of the hero of World War I. I mean, and it's just like a very upright individual and you know, who, who came to, who had a very, who had something of a tragic life, you know, capped off. Obviously. I mean he was, he was genuinely elderly by, by the time the Great War arrived. But it, you know, the, the, the main, the main theater was not even the German frontier. I mean in immediate terms, you know, like in adjacent and like sphere of influence terms like yeah, I, the half Empire was the frontier of Germania, if you want to look at it like that in like civilizational terms. But it, you know, these things are, that's. I just, I want to get that out of the way because I'm sure people are going to pick up on it like the kind of overall theory of the war that I present. And these days it's not, I mean people aren't wrong when they identify this kind of like reactive kind of like anti Russian sentiment among like a lot of people. And I don't harbor that okay at all. And I'm not. The purpose of what I've, you know, prepared for discussion is not like trash the Russians or anything at all. And people who, people kind of understand my, my sort of like my view of kind of like the ontology of war and peace, like won't make that mistake. But I'm sure That not everybody who watches these, like, knows kind of what my thoughts are generally. World War I really begins. Like, what. What became what, you know, what, what, what generated the paradigm that caused it originated in Serbia. That is true. Serbia is an oddly situated state. I don't think that needs to be said. I mean, it's obvious, you know, there was two competing dynasties in, in Serbia in the 19th century who were, who were both intriguing for Serbian independence. It was the Obranovich line in the Cara Jordevich line, a cattle herder, George, or George Cardo Jevitz, literally Black George, owing to his, not his complexion, but his, his hair and, and, and, and his eyes and his, his beard. They had driven the Ottomans out of Serbia in the wake of an armed uprising in 1804. So perennially from then on, as their fortunes waxed, and Wayne as well, see, the courage or Devich line, they had a lot of clout, okay? They didn't cut deals with the, with the Turks. They didn't, you know, they didn't, they didn't embrace any, any kind of dimitude or anything like that. I mean, they, they had a victory at death, like, like, absolutely, like Chetnik sensibility on, you know, the path forward for Serbia. Black George was ultimately driven into exile in Austria decades subsequent, right around the time of Waterloo, 1813. This is after this massive Ottoman counteroffensive. Now, if you know anything about Serbian society, people say Serbs have a victim complex. I'm not going to be that punitive about it. But they, they're lost cause romantics, okay? Black George leading his race to freedom, you know, from the hated Turks, and then like, you know, ending up being chased into exile. That actually gave him more clout and made his, like, patriotic credentials impeccable, like in the eyes of Serbian society, like at all levels, you know, like, he couldn't, like his reputation, like, was unimpeachable. Okay? Now this is when the Obranovich dynasty enters subsequently and kind of riding this wave of, of resurgent, you know, kind of nationalist fervor or, you know, like, like the Serbs on a war fighting, obviously, because now they're back in their occupation. A man named Milos Abranovich, very much a conspiratorial Machiavellian, he negotiated the recognition of the Serbian principality with the Ottoman authorities, which lifted a lot of the more offensive, you know, kind of autocratic trappings of, of, of Islamic rule from Serbia. Okay? So superficially, you know, he, he brought, he brought a lot of, like, civic benefits to the Serbian people as Serbians, even If in concrete, real terms, you know, they. They were politically totally, you know, like, neutralized. Now this becomes problematic when Black George returns to Serbia from exile. He was very quickly assassinated on the orders of Abranovich with obviously the connivance and probably like at the demand of the Ottomans. Now Abranovich was covenantly granted the title of Princess Serbia. Members of his clan ruled the Serbian principality for. For most of its existence in the Ottoman empire from about 1816, 17 until the late 1870s. You know, is this. This is very autocratic. This is brutal. This was not something that won any favor with the people. Abranovich, Milo Sabranovich, he. He managed this in. In literally Machiavellian terms, okay? Like, he stepped up his wave of repression in the summer of 1839, and then he very suddenly abdicated in favor of his eldest son, Milan, who died almost immediately. The second younger son, Mahalo, inherited the mantle, obviously, like, you know, with his father actually controlling the reigns of power, but under the auspices of these, you know, abdications and these successions, like the appearance of. Of. Of civil liberties were. Were restored or in superficial capacities, you know. And I said literally Machiavellian, because that's. That's a page from like the Book of the Borgias, like that, you know, Machiavelli talked about as being this great thing, you know, like, act, like. Act like a malevolent brute, you know, and then. And then either. Or like a point of man who, you know, who fulfills that role splendidly and instinctively, you know, then either whack him, you know, and become, you know, the hero of the people, or, you know, do it yourself, then abdicate, you know, and then install a cipher. Ideally, you know, one of your relations, but otherwise just, you know, somebody who's power hungry and has no backbone and. And, you know, rule from behind the curtain. But the. Nahalo was ultimately deposed, however, by constellation of rebel elements. And this made way for the installation of Alexander Courager Devich, none other than the son of Black George. It. This went back and forth for decades owing to clan intrigues, you know, owing to the machinations of Moscow and the Ottomans, or St. Petersburg rather. In the Ottomans, it, you know, and. And also, you know, not infrequently, the Habsburgs. In 1858, Alexander was. Ab. Was forced to abdicate. Amidst this corruption scandal, he was exceeded again by Mahalia Mahalo, you know, who was no more popular during his second reign than his first. Eight years later he was assassinated, almost certain, like. Like who, you know, one of his female Cousins was instrumental in getting him whacked. And she almost certainly, you know, was. Had been in alliance with the, the Carriage Radevich clan. But the final, the kind of, the kind of final or the kind of danu moi, like this kind of back and forth was Mahalo's immediate successor, Milan Abranovich, ruled from the late 1860s until 1889. 1889, 90. And that, that allowed kind of like a civic apparatus to develop in Serbia. And this becomes important because before then, like really the only constant had been the military, you know, in terms of, in terms of kind of like a formal apparatus of state. The. And in 1882, the Congress of Berlin had further kind of won Serbia, you know, quasi independent status. It did the Serbian bas understand kind of like the, understand the kind of strange maneuverings of both the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, depending on who held sway over Serbia, either like literally because, you know, the Ottomans are occupying it, or de facto because, you know, the Habsburgs owned Bosnia and you know, had this, had this easily agitated and frankly sanguinary Serbian minority. The finding ways, finding ways to kind of assuage this kind of Serbian tendency towards national revolution became this kind of ongoing problem. Like, not because, like Serbia itself is particularly. What was particularly unstable in comparative terms for the region, but again, I mean, owing to, owing to factors that became more pronounced of a kind of, of a kind of meta political nature. I don't mean to invoke some kind of obscure terminology to describe something that's probably more prosaic than that, but it's the best way to think of, to describe it. I don't want us to get ahead of ourselves. You'll see what I mean in the, you know, you'll see what I mean in a moment. Now, Serbian political culture in the early, in the early 1880s, this was the first time that actual political parties emerged, okay, of the modern type. Their caucuses, they had newspapers, they had ideological manifestos, they had campaign strategies, they had local party cadres, you know, like, like, you know, Germany or Serbia kind of entered the, the modern age politically very rapidly in the 1880s. Now, to manage this and to kind of manage the sort of birth pangs of nascent parliamentarism, the monarchy responded with increasingly autocratic measures when elections consistently and most notably in 1883 produced a hostile majority in the Serbian parliament. And this became such a regular thing. It. There's. There's a term develops for it, a scoopstina. You know, it means, like it means, it means the monarch ruling is a hostile executive Basically, with like a. With. With. With like a. With like a parliament that's just pr. That's just like nullifying, okay? So the. The k. With the. You know, the. The king's solution was to simply refuse to appoint a government, you know, from. From the ruling coalition, and instead to assemble a cabinet of civil servants, you know, bureaucrats, like military men, you know, like whoever you consider to be, you know, loyal to the. Loyal to the crown first and foremost. Now, this sure to be a dangerous game, literally. I mean, to the life and limb of the king. The dominant party in Serbia had come to be the radical party. And it was exactly that. It was a radical party. They. It was a party of peasants. If there's Serbs watching this or. And I. And I hope they'll contribute in the comments if they are. I. I don't want to speak in an incomplete sense. This is kind of the beginning of the modern Chetnik movement, okay? Like, the way they're about the radical parties that think of them as, like, Chetniks as we know them, okay? I know that it's. I know that the roots of the Chetnik identity and movement go way, way, way deeper than that. And I. I don't speak sero Croatian or anything like that, but with the limited time we have, and just to make things kind of conceptually, you know, clear, think. Think of the radicals as like, very, very game Chetniks, okay? They. The. This. This kind of. This. This. This kind of ongoing paralysis of government and this kind of like, permanent divide between the executive and the parliamentary organs. Something that dramatically kind of aggravated it. The king, Alexander, he was viewed as basically a fool and a degenerate. The woman he married, he married a much older woman who. Dry. Draga. Queen Drag. It was kind of like a Wallace Simpson situation. Like, I. I've got 70 redwood. VIII. But I. But they're, you know, anybody in public life, and particularly somebody like Edward, who is, you know, burning effigy, if people make the most out of any man's frailties in that way. But, you know, there is something. There's something unmanly about a guy, particularly a guy in world authority, who's basically like, marrying his mommy, okay? And like it. Draga not only was. Was much older than Alexander, she'd been a prostitute. According to rumor, Alexander, when he announced he was gonna marry her, some tax official, like, apparently, you know, said. And approach him delicately, you know, and he's like, you know, your majesty, like, I've had an affair with this woman. And. And like, half the men in this room had relations with her or something that effect. Alexander slapped him. And that, that was, you know, just. Things like this happen again and again, you know, and just. He was not a man who commanded respect even from people who viewed the monarch. He has the essential. Got a habizi and a linchpin to keep the, the. The entire state together. Now the, the kind of. The kind of crown jewel of the Serbian nation was, was the army. Okay? It was kind of like the Prussian army without, like the, without the global cloud and without the kind of stunning, you know, genius for war. But in cult, in terms of cultural power and the way people viewed it, like the Syrian army was super dynamic. You know, Serbian Serbia as a society, it was, it was very backwards, very rural, an underperforming economy. If you were a man, there were. Who was not, you know, of noble pedigree, you did not have opportunities for upward mobility, but you did in the army, okay. And it attracted, it attracted a surprising number of, of educated men from the nascent middle class. And it became a repository of radical thought, like, literally like the kind of thought that informed the radical party. Okay. It was not exactly easy to get an officer's commission. Obviously those who were afforded it were those who were viewed as, you know, people who could be trusted with that kind of authority. But again, in the kind of climate that was underway in Serbia and with the kind of alienation of the crown from. Of every other aspect of civil society and, you know, parliament, any. In any con monarchy, it's kind of like the intermediary between the people and the monarch, where there's no meaningful, like, give and take there. You know, like the monarch's not really going to understand the, the kind of. The kind of pulse of the proverbial street. So even if Alexander had been more capable, building a. An officer cadre that was basically loyal would have been nigh impossible, in my opinion. They're. They're preeminence and part owed. Like earlier in the century, they've been like, funding had been like, lavished on them, especially by King Milan, but by a lot of the back and forth, uh, during this back and forth kind of dynasty warring for the monarchy, like, the military got what it wanted because whoever was on the throne was obviously trying to like, pray their favor. Alexander did. He pursued probably like the worst of all possible courses. He abruptly cut back the state's subsidies the military. Not just that, but he allowed officer salaries to fall into arrears and promotion became the exclusive domain of favoritism. You know, I mean, essentially it's I, this, this seems like a, if one were like write a playbook on how to kind of cultivate a regicidal sensibility among, among your officer corps, it would, it's, it's almost as if one would follow this playbook. I mean, not to be flippant about it, but this all culminated in June 11, 1903. Serbian army officers, you know, animated by the, you know, the common ideology, the radical party, they, they murdered Alexander and Draga. It was, it was very, very brutal. It was, it was an uncanny precursor to what happened to the Romanovs. But apparently they, these 28 officers, they stormed the palace, they shot it out with the centuries in like a pitch battle. They blew the door with a box of dynamite, literally. That had the effect of knocking out all the electricity in the palace. They stormed, they stormed the, the King and Queen's bedroom and they found only like the king's. Forget whatever plans you have this weekend because you're staying at home and playing on Spin Quest. And there's never been a better time to sign up than right now. New users get $30 coin packs for just $10. All the table games you love with hundreds of slot games and real cash Prizes. That's at spinquest.coms P I N Q U-E S T.com Spinquest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. Hi, Ryan Reynolds here for Mint Mobile. Are you looking for a beach read this summer? May I suggest your big wireless build? It's got suspense, mystery, a slightly flat emotional arc, and a shocking twist where you realize you've been overpaying the entire time. Fortunately though, Mint's story is better. 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Pete
That's it.
- [32:59]
Thomas
Happy ending, zero tears. Give it a try@mintmobile.com Switch upfront payment of $45 for three months, $90 for six months, or $180 for a 12 month plan. Required $15 per month equivalent taxes and fees. Extra initial plan term only greater than 50 gigabytes. May slow when network is busy. See terms like man servant in there. One of the officers put his hand on the bed. You notice it was still warm. He said, where are they? You know, after this extended search, extensive search, there was an antechamber above the bedroom that was hidden where apparently Queen Draga's like servants had iron her gowns and stuff. They were hiding up there. The, the, the attack force. They ordered this man servant to call out to the king. Apparently the king Responded, you know, can I trust the loyalty of my officers? Like one of the men in nominal command said, yes. So the king presented himself with Draga. They proceeded to shoot his servant in the head. They shot Draga. Apparently to Alexander's credit, he did try and stand in front of his wife. They like take, take the bullet forward snakely. But they were, they were, they were, they were done just like that. Apparently. Apparently their bodies were heavily mutilated. They were stabbed with bayonets. Post mortem, I guess Draga was basically disemboweled. Somebody picked her up and like threw her over the balcony and like her body crashed into the garden and it was just like a, like the, the, the court barber who was also the, you know, the role of defago coroner. Like he said that it was, he said, he said like what was done to this woman was just like horrific. Supposedly Alexander, when they tried, when they went, they went to defense straight. His body too. Alexander's hand gripped a railing abutting the balcony. It wasn't clear if this was some sort of rigor mortis response or if he was still alive, but one of the, one of the, one of the officers pulled a dagger, chopped his fingers off and then like threw him over as well. It. So this wasn't just, this wasn't just a Regis eye, it was like mean. They treated these people with like utter contempt, you know, like it. They to be shot, you know, then had your corpse desecrated, you know, and then to be dumb, slimy with gore, basically naked, you know, like into, into a, you know, over, over, over a, over a balcony where you know, you can be viewed by, by all and sundry and you know, the, you know, in the early morning sun is pretty, pretty horrific. Now what these conspirators did was they immediately, they really turned power over to an all party provisional government. Okay. Parliament was reconvened. Petar Kyrie Jordevich, he was called back from exile, you know, and he was, he, you know, he was touted, you know, as a returning hero. You know, the Constitution of 1888 which had been drafted, you know, with high hopes of parliamentarians, but it never really been implemented. It basically, basically looks something like the Weimar constitution in terms of, you know, the power of the power of the parliamentary majority. It was renamed the Constitution in 1903. You know, the, the belief was that like, you know, the, the problem of the, of dynastic rivalry was resolved, you know, not, not just, you know, not, not just because Alexander and Draga were killed and not just because you know, power had been returned to the, you know, to the people. But Kvic, he was the last KIC heir. He spent most of his life in France and Switzerland. He. He'd been to Germany. He. He quoted John Stuart Mill like he trained. He. He translated On Liberty into Serbo Croatian. You know, he was. He was holding himself out as, like this big liberal, you know, like, I'm here to reform. I'm not. I'm not here to, you know, take us back to, you know, to, you know, the dark days of, you know, when. When either intriguing of our enemies or occupation by. By the Ottomans, you know, called for, you know, the suppression of liberties and in the interest of, you know, our survival politically and otherwise. But this caused problems, and these problems endured perennially. And interestingly, on the eve of Barbarossa, something similar transpired and. And an opportune moment within this series. I'll get into that. But if you create a parliamentary democracy, but you do it because a cadre of radicals murders the king and subsequently this cadre of who committed this regicide, they take up key positions in the apparent of state. You're left with a situation where there's always the understanding that there's a cadre around whom government orbits who's willing to affect a veto by homicide. Okay, this isn't a situation like Schmidt talks about, you know, where there's a safeguard within the constitution that if the constitutional order unravels or if the moral consensus breaks down, you know, the monarch or the president, you know, or the emergency executive, you know, acts outside of the constitutional order in order to impose, you know, a new order, you know, based upon a. A reconstituted consensus. This is people declaring that, you know, they've righted the ship by violence and now things are going to continue as usual. Like, existentially, that's not an open system, you know, and even if the best of intentions vest in the hearts of people are willing to commit regicide, the fact of their willingness to undertake those measures changes everything. It means nobody is going to truly oppose, you know, the. The trajectory of state as ordained by this de facto inner party, you know, lest they quite literally risk, you know, their own life and limb in doing so. The. One of the people who came to the forefront of, Not just of the kind of nascent parliamentary system, but also who kind of became the man around who this whole kind of constellation orbited was the leader of the Radical Party. His name was Nicola Passage. He was an engineering. He was. He was an engineer by trade, and he. He studied in Zurich. So I mean he was, he was an educated man, okay? From 1904 until the very end of the Great War 1918, he headed 10 cabinets and he, he was kind of the shadow executive of, of, of. Of Serbia, you know, before, during and after the Sarajevo assassinations in 1914, which we're not going to get into today, but we will get into. Passage was key in, In, in, in. In attaching Serbia's fortunes to those of, of the Russian empire. Okay? During his years in exile, he'd established Conex in St. Petersburg. He became a very serious player in Pan Slav circles from his. From that moment onward, not just in, in terms of his values, but in terms of the trajectory of his policy course. Everything orbited around Russia, okay? The popular base of the party. Again, like these were people who were basically Chetniks in the radical party. Like they, they absolutely embraced this kind of Pan Slavism that viewed Russia as like the homeland, you know, like a homeland of like the, of like the Slavic race. Okay? Now understand the context of this. Like this wasn't some new thing at all, okay? Underpinning the modern idea of unifying all Serbs. Like this is not just. And this bears into what happened in the 90s. This plays. This bears on what happened in the 90s too. And we'll get into that, but which we're talking about uniting the Serbs in a Pan Slavic sort of constitution. Like we're not, we're not, we're not just talking about Serbia and you know, like swaths of Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia. In fact, it bears no relation related them like political map as we know it, what we think of as Serb lands. Serving interior minister of one of the, of one of the Kara Jadovic regents, a guy named Garasan, he sketched out a proposal called quote program for the national and foreign policy of Serbia. This, this is literally the Magna Carta of Serb nationalism. The historical template for this is the empire of Stepan Dusan. Dusan was his, his official title was Emperor and autocrat of the Serbs and Greeks, the Bulgarians and Albanians from 1345 to 1371 A.D. okay? This is when this, this, this was the reign of Doosan, okay? For the purpose of what we're talking about, I think he died in, in 1380. But following the conquest of Macedonia in November 1345, do proclaimed himself emperor. And he claimed that he laid claim on the Byzantine imperial inheritance. Okay? This was very problematic for a lot of reasons. And it also raises questions like in Orthodox Christianity that I have like no standing to talk about. And I also don't know the nuances, but any event, this Doosan's empire, Serbia, like what we know of as is Serbia today, all of all present Albania, most of Macedonia, central and northern Greece, not Bosnia, interestingly. And that was very calculated, that owed to what we call in the modern era the nationalities problem there. But the point is, basically it's like the Doosan reigned over what was viewed as this, as. As a third Rome, you know, the concerted Greece, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, you know, and that's the Serbian vision, you know, it's not. It's not. It's not just some petit nationalist grievance or something stupid, you know, like. Like, frankly, a lot of like modern identitarian movements are. It's actually incredibly ambitious and within its own rationality. It makes a lot of sense. Okay, Now, Doosan. Doosan's empire collapsed. Duan died in 1390, thereabouts. Forgive me, I think I said 1380. Duan's empire collapsed after crushing defeat at the hands of the Turks at the Field of Black Birds, like which people know colloquially as kosovo field in 1389. That's interesting, isn't it? The. So like, the restoration of Serbia and also viewing it as the restoration of Byzantium, you know, and also viewing it as, you know, not just adjacent, but intrinsic to the ambition of, you know, Russia entering the modern age, you know, and preserving the Byzantine faith as well as, you know, the racial survival of Slavic peoples. This, I mean, this was a huge thing, okay? Like, it wasn't. And it wasn't just something that, you know, kind of like a fever and imaginings of crazy radicals or, you know, like, like old peasant men and ladies, you know, who. Who just kind of like did whatever the. The patriarch said. Like this was like serious guys were believed in this and serious geostrategic thinkers viewed this as basically possible. You know, this. This was not a joke, you know. And this brings us to. Before we wrap up, I want to touch on, you know, what was the Russian situation at the outbreak of war, World War I, Russia had a terrible logistics problem. You know, they were starved for serviceable rail and, you know, things like this. But their forces being were 115 infantry and 38 cavalry divisions with close to 8, 000 guns, you know, 540 of which were howitzers and 257 heavy field guns. This was a huge standing army, you know, that could be mustered on mobilization, you know, and not for nothing, and I don't want to get ahead of us But I've been amazed. Particularly I noticed, you know, in 2018, there was a lot of fervor about, you know, the 100th anniversary of Armistice Day and things like that. I'd see like, news people, not just locally, like MSNBC dives, talking about like, you know, the Germans starting World War I. The Russians stormed East Prussia. I mean, that, that was the, that, that's, that was the first engagement of the German Empire in the Great War. And when the Russians assaulted Maximilian von Pritvitz, he was a general oberst on the ground. He'd served in the Franco Prussian War with distinction. You know, he was a combat veteran. He, he, he, he, he was considering a strategic withdrawal and abandoning East Prussia to the Russian Army. Like such was the depth of the, of the assault, you know. You know, this was, this was the Russian army moving on, on Europe Central, you know, as it was. Hoffman, Ludendorff, Hindenburg himself were able to establish the situation. They stopped the Russian assault within about two weeks. And then the stalemate began to set in the East. But, but again, I mean, this was, you know, the Russian army overran half of East Prussia, you know, and this understanding of Russia as this, as this power that spanned, you know, one fifth of this planet that had basically limitless resource potential, you know, like the United States did and does. And. That had in Serbia a client regime that was very game that was populated by Marshall people, you know, that was literally on, on the border of Vienna's gates. I mean, this is, this is what caused World War I. Man. Like it, you know, it's, this should be obvious to anybody who's at all serious about the subject. But, and I mean, there were, there were grave mistakes made in, in Berlin and in Vienna, no doubt. But it's also kind of the other key. And again, like, I'm gonna leave this for next episode, but, you know, we talked at the outset about the French and them kind of never recovering in their, in their national psyche from being s. Defeated by Prussia. You know, the French entering into this kind of like secret diplomacy with Russia. This was catastrophic. And the fact that war isn't what Clovit says, the fact that it does arrive like the seasons, you damn well better let's other. You damn well better know your potential adversary. You damn well better let your potential adversaries know, like, what your intentions are in event of hostilities. Okay? Because it's not a chess game, you know, because it's not bounded by, you know, it's, it's. The rationality of it is only a Bounded rationality. You know, it's deciding like, you know, you're going to hold. You're going to keep your cards close to the chest, you know, until a mobilization or comes down, and then you're going to swoop in and alter the paradigm. I mean, that. That's a recipe for disaster. You know, like, these things aren't just rational processes unfolding, you know, and the only, like, diplomacy of the alliance kind is only valuable insofar as that there's total information awareness on the part of the adversary in terms of your willingness to go to war. You know, I mean, it's like it's all of these things, but. And admittedly, you know, by some of the kind of first lesson always is with Germany as like a people and a culture, but you can't, you know, the. The Habsburg Empire, the Russian Empire and Serbia. That's why this war happened. You know, it wasn't. And again, this isn't like a signing, like fault or war guild, because that's nonsense. But this idea that, you know, it was. It was, you know, the intrigues of the irredentist Germans or something that caused this doesn't make any sense. But I'm. I'm gonna leave it at that for today because I'm not feeling great and I feel like we covered a lot, even though it's just short of an hour, but we'll. I realize this is like a lot of background stuff, like we'll get into the advent of hostilities in the next episode because I know that's what people actually want to hear about probably, but it wouldn't have made any sense without the context.
- [55:12]
Pete
Let me ask you something about war guilt. War guilt seems to be. It seems to be a modern something that's. Modern. Where did that really start, in your opinion?
- [55:25]
Thomas
I think the origins of it are. In stuff is. I think it's intrinsic to Enlightenment thinking, especially thinkers like Grotius. But also, you know, it's intrinsic to the. It's intrinsic to the kind of logic of that derived from Hobbes, you know, and Locke and. And pain. Like this idea that, like, discrete decision making is, you know, the cause of political events. Because, like, from there, then it's like, oh, well, obviously, you know, if you allow a war to happen, it's because, you know, you weren't acting reasonably. I think that was. I mean, I think that's the foundation of it. Like the. Because the. The internal logic of capital liberalism refuses to accept that warfare is part of the human condition in terms of when it began. In terms of when, when people began applying it as this kind of like contrived remedial measure that only really happened in the 20th century. And people forget, you know, what the radical Republicans did to the South. Like Lincoln had said, we're not, we're not going to punish the south, you know, and after the cessation of hostilities, that's what Grant said. Like, we're not, you know, we, we're not, we're not going to treat the south, you know, like, like our mortal enemies or something under occupation. Like the murder of Lincoln, you know, the, the show trial, impeachment of Johnson, you know, the ascendancy of these, of these, of these crazy elements is what facilitated Reconstruction, you know, because even in the, even in the, even in the way of the work with the States, like that wasn't, that wasn't initially with anybody's contemplation. And it. So, and I think you'd be hard for us to find precedent like out outside of the 20th century, in my opinion. You know, and it's also, but, and it's also notable, like that's one of the reasons Americans were disgusted by the end of World War I. And Wilson, Wilson wasn't a good president. Wilson was a flawed man. But, you know, Wilson's 14 points said we're not going to punish Germany. Wilson didn't want the reparations regime. Wilson didn't want, he didn't want a starvation blockade. Like the fact that, you know, he was just waved off and mocked, you know, and the British and the French set about, you know, to, you know, to kind of like pick apart the German Empire and for themselves and, and, and impose this kind of like genocidal regime on Germany. Like, Americans were disgusted by that. They're like, why, why'd we go to war? Like make, to make, to make Englishmen rich and, you know, like let the French swagger around, you know, and, and, and, and, and humiliate their enemies. Like this is garbage. You know, like that's not to say like the American sentiment before that about World War I was like, good or something. Okay? But my point is that people, Americans viewed World War I as the country having been duped, you know, that, you know, bankers and, and Anglophone, you know, kind of blue blood types who viewed the whole thing as a game, you know, manipulating policy, you know, to their own benefits. You know, like nobody, nobody, like nobody, like nobody in the American street was like, oh yeah, the Germans started this war, you know, and it was, it was viewed as an incredibly cynical kind of rationale for a lot of really gross abuses.
- [59:04]
Pete
All right, well, do your plugs and we'll. We'll get out of here. Awesome, awesome episode, by the way. Great information. Great background on that.
- [59:12]
Thomas
Yeah, no, thank you. Yeah, like I said, I'm not feeling great, so I. I was kind of worried I might not perform up to par. You can always find me at thomas777.com. It's number 7 h o m a s777.com I'm on x at real capital r e a l underscore number 7 hmas 777. You can find my podcast and. And some of my longer form stuff on Substack. It's a real thomas777.substack.com you can find me on T gram. You know, I'm. I'm working on some. I'm working on some book manuscripts. You know, I got all kinds of stuff going on that I will plug on the website and on X. And I have a YouTube channel. It's not populated by content yet, but it's coming in the next few weeks. It's Thomas TV, number 7H Omas Space TV. Please check that out. Subscribe. It'll. There'll be some fire stuff there soon, I promise. That's all I got.
- [60:31]
Pete
All right, man. As always, appreciate it. Till the next time.
- [60:34]
Thomas
Yeah. Thank you, Pete.
- [60:35]
Pete
Thank you. I want to welcome everyone back to the Pika Yodo show. I'm here with Thomas 777 for part seven seven seven. Did I say four sevens for part two of the World War I series. How are you doing, Thomas?
- [60:53]
Thomas
I'm doing well, thank you. Today, what I want to talk about, I want to talk about misconceptions, not just about the strategic landscape as it existed in the decades prior to the Great War, but specifically the transfer of power from Kanzler Bismarck to various successors, all of whom really, until Holvig, were very much subjugated to the will of the emperor of the Kaiser. Okay. And this was not a good thing. You know, we talked about briefly the man of Kaiser Wilhelm. He. He was. He was very much a brutish person, you know, and this was. This was lampooned to full effect by, you know, allied media and things. But it's an oversimplification. It just to just talk about, oh, the. The man Wilhelm, you know, he sabotaged what was an imperfect but, you know, workable paradigm of conflict resolution on the continent. Okay. That's not the case at all. And this idea that again, that London and Berlin were just at permanent loggerheads. That's history through the lens of 1939, frankly. Okay, as is this idea that America and the UK are simply, you know, axiomatically allied and there's some just historical trajectories and supposedly shared values that this is just some immutable thing. That's not the case at all either. One of the reasons the Great War happened is because outcomes were not things that had been in the contemplation of strategic planners. Because as it developed. Like what. What developed? And like the. The deeper paradigm that developed within the general balance of power, it seemed incredibly unlikely that these things would happen. Okay. Really, the only. Really, the only. Really, the only conflict dyad that was predictable was that, you know, between Germany and France, because that's perennial. Okay. And the degree to which the French political culture was animated by, you know, defeat in. In the 30 years war or not. Jesus Christ, I'm losing my mind. In the. The Franco Prussian War of 1870, and the degree to which, you know, Germany retaining Alsace Lorraine and, you know, some of these other territories that arguably are, you know, ethnographically and historically French, you know, that. That was obviously not any surprise that, you know, in the early 20th century, a state of general war emerged between the two great continental powers. But the way in which it developed and the alliance structure that had replaced the order that it existed until 1890 was very strange and not particularly rational outside of the discrete moment at which hostilities ensued. Like we talked about, I don't want to belabor points to death, but, you know, speaking of the Franco Prussian War, Germany hadn't fought a war in decades since, you know, at the onset of hostilities. So this. This idea that, you know, Germany's. This irredentist power animated by militarism or, you know, the caricature of the Prussian martinet who, you know, has the ear of the Kaiser, who himself is this militant, militaristic brute. I mean, it doesn't really bear out, you know, it's like, oh, you can't. You can't be. You can't be a militarist culture animated by Sonderweg. If you never fight wars, I mean, that just doesn't, you know, bear out. And finally, what should be inarguable. I mean, like we discussed in episode one, the 20th century in power political terms literally orbited around Russia now and again. It's not like assigning war guilt or something. We don't do that here. We're serious people who deal with history in a serious Capacity. But the emergence of superpowers, and in the case of Europe, obviously first and foremost in existential terms was concerned them was emergence of Russia as a superpower. I mean, this is what this was kind of the axial pivot around which all events of a power political nature orbited. This idea just on its face that, you know, Germany, which is a small country which at the time, you know, had half, less than half the population that America did before it, at least before it assimilated, you know, the Volkdeutsch in Austria and the Sudan land, you know, this country of like 70 million people that, you know, is for all practical purposes landlocked, you know, and has to import most of its essential commodities such that it can be strangled by an embargo, as was the case. Like this idea that, you know, Germany was this nascent superpower that, you know, the world collectively feared. I mean, it's really kind of ridiculous. Like, make no mistake, what was in the contemplation of people like Bismarck in a long view kind of way, like the measures that he considered to be essential, like when he was, during his long tenure as consular, he wasn't pursuing some superpower strategy in immediate tactical terms, but the things he was doing and the alliance structure that he created. And it's not overstating the case to suggest that he himself created it. He was one of the greatest statesmen that ever lived in any epoch. You know, it was obvious to anybody who understood the German situation that Europe would have to become a superpower or parish at some point. Okay? And obviously that was what was in the contemplation of Adolf Hitler a generation later. But as, as, as mobilization potential was in 1914, that, that's ridiculous as it sort of suggests that anybody viewed the, you know, newly united Germany as a, as a, as a nascent superpower that, you know, within years would, would be able to project power on the order of, you know, the United States or Russia potentially. Like, that's utterly absurd. But today, next episode, we're going to get into the onset of hostilities and the immediate catalyst for that, you know, and also like, we'll get into the culture, the Habsburg Empire too, because that's important and I think it's fascinating. What's going on everyone. It's Bluff here and we're driving through the States in the Bluff mobile and the best thing that we can do is play our favorite casino style games on Spin Quest. They have over a thousand games, including live dealer blackjack and craps with tons of slots and unlimited options. You can get a 30 coin pack for just $10 for new users. Sign up today. Go to spinquest.com right now. Spin Quest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spin benquest.com for more details. People ask me a lot because we discuss, you know, historical topics and things, you know, like it was. I think it's on people's minds too because in one of the later episodes of Better Call Saul, like Saul asked Mike Urman Trout like, where he'd go if he had a time machine, you know, and you know, people ask me, like, where would you if he had a time machine? I think, I think they're assuming I'd say, you know, the Old west or the Third Reich or something. I, I mean frankly like I'd go to Pericles Athens and I'd go to Habsburg Vienna in like the close of the 19th century because it's just like this baroque like, like almost like fairy tale kind of place, you know, sort of like the zenith of continental optics and things, which is like on the one hand kind of like exotic and compelling, but on the other hand, you know, unmistakably European. This is incredibly cool. And Franz Joseph, like I said, I think along with Holvag, he's kind of the most sympathetic statesman of the war, the war years. But forgive me if that was a scattershot sort of introduction. There's a lot here. But speaking of the Frago Prussian war and the emergence of Germany as a united state, what was the strategic landscape after 1870? Obviously, I mean, this put Germany and France on a permanent, on a permanently strained, if not outright hostile footing. The sheer scale of German victory over the French army that traumatized French elites, among other things. And it's something that nobody predicted. Even the most optimistic war planners and the Prussian general staff, they, you know, they, they, they war gamed extensively, you know, and such that, such that military outcomes can be modeled. They had, they very much were adept at that. And even they didn't predict, you know, kind of the scope and depth of, of other destruction that the, the Prussian army was able to, was able to issue to, to France the, and again like the, the annexation of Elsass Lorraine. Bismarck had actually, he'd only reluctantly abided that because he viewed it as not particularly strategically important. The, the military and the general staff especially, they strongly advocated for it and he made it a point that they were not willing to concede on. So Bismarck reluctantly accepted it. And this will become a theme. Bismar found himself increasingly at loggerheads with the general Staff and really with the foreign policy establishment, which in those days was very much. It's kind of a chicken of the egg thing. Like whether the military and the. And the Foreign Ministry was just kind of in the pocket of the Kaiser Wilhelm, you know, when he, when he took the reigns of power in 1888, or if Vilhelm was something of a cipher, aside from all those kind of bullying tendencies, who sort of like, it just was affecting a role and it sort of taken on, you know, at least in an affected way, the kind of trappings of, of the General Staff's worldview. I mean, it's. Who knows. And it's neither here nor there. But there was. There was a constellation of forces arraying against Bismarck at what was arguably the zenith of his power, which is interesting for a lot of reasons, but it also, it goes. I've always thought the German system in those days was a lot more like ours was in those days than it was like France or the uk and that was kind of the traditional view too. You know, The Germany until 1945, you know, true sovereignty is like vested in the executive. There was, There was a kind of hardcoded separation of powers that made it very, very clear and unsubtle. You know, what expressly delegated powers were the respective branches of government. But that had the effect of, you know, kind of institutionalizing hostility in a way that in more kind of fluid systems, that's not the case. But that's one of the things that made Germany effective. I mean, just the same as the United States, at least after, after 1865, 1870 or so. But, but regardless of, like to bring it back, regardless of, regardless of whether the French were truly disadvantaged by the occupation of Alsace Lorraine, it didn't matter because this is, this was a sore point for them. And if nothing else, it was something that was invoked to inflame public opinion. Okay. And something that's ironic and peculiar about France is that the French should have been the last people. Whether we're talking about the friend, whether we're talking about the body politic or they're talking about elites, they should have been the last people who like, clung to this, like, myth of petty nationalism. I mean, they, I mean they, they. They virtually reshape Europe literally in their own image, you know, under a francophone emperor, you know, this kind of return to this kind of petty cult of the national state and this kind of like, utter refusal to abide an understanding of a European order wherein the constituent elements like, and, you know, various chauvinisms therein have no place if for no other reason that you know, as a matter of existential survival, you know, the 20th century, 20th century wouldn't abide was catastrophically self defeating that the French kind of like took on this, like this kind of irrational like nationalism. And again too it's strangely at odds with what was then, you know, like their own basically living memory. But such that it was though after 1871 France essentially undertook every possible angle to contain, Contain Germany. I use scare quotes because under Bismarck's tenure again like Germany was if anything you know, being unreasonably conciliatory, you know, kind of on every frontier which, in which it, you know, in which it, in which it projected power, you know, as a matter of, as a matter of existential necessity. Now realizing the reality of this, some people have argued that the European international system that came into existence, you know, largely again with Bismarck as the architect, that that system itself like programmed into it was like a Franco German enmity. And what I mean by that will become clear in a minute and I don't disagree with that. But again Bismarck or any other statesman takes the strategic landscape as it exists, okay? It's an intrinsically reactive enterprise. You know, one can't really, you can't, you can finesse enmity and you can incentivize abandoning it as a matter of diplomacy. You can't really generate it where it doesn't already exist, you know. And that's, that's kind of, that's kind of politics 101. There's probably some Machiavellians who disagree with me, but that's a whole other, that's a whole other whole other show. If we wanted to delve into that the, the most, the most attractive potential ally for France obviously and really its only option would be. Would. Would be the Russian Empire. J.B. eustis who was the ambassador to Paris. His tenure was over by 1897 but I think it was in his memoirs he said on in power political terms French quote had one of two courses open either to be self reliant and independent, falling back on our own resources to brave every peril or crisis or to seek to make an alliance with Russia the only power accessible tour and that doesn't really overstate the case. However. The specter of a Franco Russian alliance presents a catastrophic quagmire for Germany in all times. Because the only way then to prevent a two front war is, is to attach Russia to an alliance of its own. Whatever. Like you know, for Berlin to, to do so but that itself is a dangerous enterprise potentially. Because what's to prevent what, what, what's to prevent Germany's power, political capability from de facto being completely absorbed into that of Russia? Not just based on mobilization potential or any or material considerations, but political ones as well. You know, in such an alliance, or even something short of alliance, you know, a non aggression treaty or some kind of a limited declaration of rights between the two powers. Any, any, any, any kind of deployment, any kind of change Germany makes in its military disposition, unless it's clearly and nakedly a response to a threat posed by France in the Western theater, or what is to be the Western theater is going to be perceived by Russia as an existentially hostile act. Bismarck's solution to this was the dry Kaiser Bund, known more commonly as the Three Emperors League. The signatories were the German Empire, Austria, Hungary and Russia. In 1873, what was the Drake Heiser Bund? It was an alliance between the Germans, the Russians and the Hatzburg empires. In effect from 1873 to 1887. And again this was from 1870 to 1890. Bismarck was fully at the helm of German foreign policy. So that's, that's something to keep in mind. Like again, when I say this was Bismarck's solution, it was his solution, not the general staff, not the emperor. Bismarck realized that any constellation of the Hasbro Empire, France and Russia could crush Germany if any two of them were allied. Okay. The possibility of the Hasbro Empire and Germany going to war was remote, but that owed to who was sitting on the throne. Okay, that was by no means like a perennial guarantee. All right, so that's, I, I'm sure that somebody in the comments going to raise like why would he think that? But the solution was to ally with two of the three. Okay. And obviously the reason we just discussed any kind of concord with France is off the table. So the solution was this, you know, league of the Three Emperors. Okay? And I just want to insinuate something while we're kind of on the topic, as we'll see when we get into the relationship between Wilhelm and King George. The degree to which royals, when they still wielded sovereign authority would signal to each other in the decisions they made and the public statements they issued and the moves they made militarily that can't be overstated. And a certain amount of masculine honor and other things entered into this equation. And that's one of the things that doomed monarchy to the dustbin of history. Because by the 20th century, you know, going to war on grounds of interseen rivalries and disrespect between royals, you know, meant mobilizing millions of people and then killing millions of people. You know, that's not the whole story, but that's something that has to be considered. And it's not just, you know, the punitive. That's not just some, you know, punitive take on that, the sociology and the internal logic of that system. That system kept the peace really for centuries. You know, we remember the catastrophic wars like the thirty years War and these intermittent, intermittent breakdowns of that system. But the things that had been the strength of it became castratic weaknesses by, you know, by the late modern period. So that's important to keep in mind when people emphasize the hostility, like the personal hostility between George and Wilhelm. It's not that it's. It's not just like, you know, Euros who are like obsessed with, you know, the, the kind of mystique of. Of aristocracy who emphasized that it's a very real thing. And it was a causative variable in both direct and indirect capacities. But it essentially what this three Emperors alliance did, it was kind of like a declaration of rights as regards sphere of influence. It made sure that certain restive and problematic ethnic groups, ideally like the Poles and the Serbs, would be placated and would be suppressed when need be. But it afforded. It basically afforded Russia a free hand in dealing with, you know, Slavic peoples. The sticking point obviously was the Balkans. Bismarck's solution was to give the Habsburgs predominance in the western Balkans and Russia in the eastern Balkans. Okay, that basically breaks down on, you know, Croatia and the German Habsburg camp, Serbia, obviously, with Russia, but like Bosnia, of course, is the sticking point. You know, there are interface areas where, you know, such things. It's ridiculous to talk about, you know, finessing things in those terms. I mean, by definition, that's what these areas are. Are places where any kind of consensus such as that is impossible. There was a second. The first, the first league of three emperors was. Was in effect from 1873-78. The second was established in 1881. It only lasted three years. It was renewed in 1884, was allowed to lapse in 1887. And basically they. It owed, I mean, just irregnal conflict of interest between the Habsburg Empire and Russia in the Balkans. I mean, that was. That. That's an ear. That's a not solvable conundrum, you know. And I mean, then. Then is now. Although the, Although the bad. Although the proverbial and little bad lines Are, are somewhat different. The second treaty and this isn't just a trivial point of minutia or a minor point of trivia. It's actually important how the general staff and how the German emperor came to view Bismarck. The second treaty provided that no material change could take place in the Balkans without prior agreement between, you know, the, the parties, the, the signatories. It stipulated that Austria, in event of, you know, a critical emergency, war emergency in Bosnia, could annex Bosnia Herzegovina at least until the cessation of hostilities. And in the event of war between one party and a great power not party to the treaty, all signatories maintain like friendly status and good offices between each other. Now, where the rubber meets the road, would these treaties have been workable in the outbreak of war? I'm of the belief in Oliver Wendell, Oliver Wendell Holmes, who a lot of people bash on the right, which they shouldn't. But the few things that he stated about, I mean legal realism is applied to international law. There is no international law. That itself is a fiction. So we're talking especially in those days, you know, where again, like the personage of the monarch, like you know, carried tremendous force in the actual, you know, conduct of politics. Signing a treaty such as the Three Emperors Treaty, it was an expression of political will and you were essentially like putting your word, you know, to the express conditions of the treaty. So it indicated, you know, a clear and present will to pursue peaceful resolutions. Okay, so as a matter of honor as well as a matter of practical security. So in that way the idea was that this becomes like a self fulfilling prophecy. Okay, if you want to look at it like that. But I sense, you know, since really the central 1930s, like treaties don't really mean anything, you know, so it's important to emphasize that amidst a basic moral consensus they actually do hold meaning, you know, if not in the traditional sense that we think of as laws within a sovereign, within the parameters of a sovereign polity. But what kind of the last. Kind of like the last act of, of Bismarckian diplomacy. Happy birthday America. It's time to celebrate and play your favorite Las Vegas casino games by American owned spinquest.com what's better than fireworks and American pie? Hitting a blackjack in the palm of your hand, your hand and you won't lose your fingers. Over a thousand games including slots and live dealers and 30 coin packs are on sale for 10 spinquest.com buy American players. For American players, Spin Quest is a free to play social casino boy where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. Was what was called the quote reinsurance treaty. It was only in effect for three years. It's what was devised by Bismarck to you know, to, to quite literally like reinsure the peace which had been the subject of the three emperors treaties which had been allowed to lapse it. The treaty provided that both Germany and Russia would remain neutral if the other party became involved with a third great power, but that it would not apply if Germany attacked France or if Russia attacked Austria, Hungary. Germany's concession as consideration of the agreement was in agreeing that Bulgaria and what was then eastern Romelia, which is now part of southern Bulgaria, by, by, by seeding unconditionally that this was in the Russian sphere of influence and to support any Russian acts, support any Russian action to keep the Black Sea as its exclusive preserve. Now when Bismarck lost power in 1890 he was sidelined by a constellation of foreign ministry functionaries including his own son. The Kaiser had had come to despise him. And one of the key, one of the key grievances that was levied was that Bismarck has, has sold us out to Moscow or St. Petersburg. You know, like he's, he's allowed the Russians to, he's given the Russians the Black Sea, you know, like this, this is peace at the cost of our security. Because you know, Bismarck is, he's, he's facilitating Russia's emergence as a hegemon, okay for all practical purposes a superpower. Although obviously conceptually people understood that power potential in a basic way but obviously they wouldn't conceive of it in those ways as a superpower. I mean they conceptualize as a hegemon. Now there was very publicly not renewed by the Kaiser who just Wilhelm who just you know, ascended to the throne. He stated very publicly that you know, it was too much in Russia's favor. It absolutely would not be, should not be renewed. But the actual cancellation of it remains something of an ambiguity. Something of an ambiguity. Like there's no like diplomatic statement to Russia formally that like hey, you know, this is no longer operative, we're no longer going to honor it. And that kind of ledgered main by omission. That's another thing that really created kind of catastrophic outcomes culminating in the Great War. You know, like we talked about secret diploma, secret diplomacy is totally self defeating with the exception of very rare, very rare iterations of, of of anticipated total war whereby you know, you and ally agree essentially that when war comes and you can say that with confidence because you are planning a surprise attack on your enemy. And particularly obviously if nuclear weapons are Involved like this facilitates such things, you know, and your secret ally agrees that like they will assault the minute that you do for the purpose of essentially annihilating like a third power. Okay? But in conventional power politics it is totally self defeating to not convey your intention, you know, because again, capabilities plus intentions are the only considerations in the decision to go to war or to sue for peace. You know, deliberately depriving people at that stage, you know, your potential allies and adversaries alike of what your intentions are. You're, you're dramatically increasing the possibility of war without any tangible benefit, you know, but be it as it may, Russia saw the writing on the wall. They thought, they thought Bismarck was dangerously on or not Bismarck, they thought Wilhelm was dangerously unstable. They realized that, you know, the kind of the new, the new culture of the executive branch in Germany was of a basic hostility to and fear of Russia. They realized that they needed, they needed a new hedge, okay? So naturally they made strong overtures to France and the resulting Franco Russian alliance of 1891-92 and beyond, you know, began to take shape. Court historians, I mean ones that aren't totally off base, they view the Franco Russian alliance as, as an abject disaster and one of the long term causes of World War I. And I basically agree with that. It's not the proximate cause though, and. There's too many intervening causes subsequent that facilitated the war in proximate causal terms. Just taken by itself. And we'll get into the view from London on all of this in a minute, but on its own terms, if, if the UK had refused, you know, to abide any kind of strategic concord with Moscow and Paris and it either remained neutral or allied itself with Berlin, which as we'll see was a very real possibility that would not have had the effect that it did. So I think it's important to qualify analysis of the Franco Russian treaty through that lens. Now I think it's important to summarize a bit the degree to which Bismarck's policy model, which wasn't just an enduring kind of power political paradigm that served Germany's short and long term interest, but this was truly the united Germany's first kind of foreign policy orientation, okay? It was really the founding orientation. So to say that it's impactful in discussing the formative contribution to the balance of power as it stood in the decade for the Great War can't be overstated. Bismarck was uniquely sensitive to the nuances of balance of power and he also had a tremendous understanding of military affairs. That's Very rare. And Germany produced guys like that pretty consistently. You know, Clausewitz obviously first among them. I, I part ways with his ontology. But the genius of him and his kind of rare, it's kind of rare psychological makeup is noteworthy. Bismarck himself stated in the summer of 1877, he said that his goal was to create, quote, an overall political situation in which all powers except France need us and are kept by virtue of their mutual relations as far as possible from forming coalitions against us. So essentially what Bismarck was doing was he entered into an alliance with every re, with every major power on the continent and even some adjacent lesser powers that you know, had outsized influence owing to accidents of geostrategic situation. He found a way essentially to make it cost prohibitive for states to ally against Germany, you know, even if there was a short term benefit to doing so. And to be able to sustain that for years, let alone decades is incredible. I know, I know a lot of kind of traditional realists in political theory. I mean they, they abide Mr. Kissinger's example and, and they, they view Metronic as, as like the greatest statesman of all time. To me it's Bismarck and hands down it's not, not even close. Okay, if you want to suggest that's a conceptual bias of mine, I mean, okay, I mean I, you know, I, now or any other time, if anybody wants to discuss or debate a point of interest in these series, we do, I'm happy to do it. But I don't, I don't think, I don't think putting Bismarck on top as the, you know, most brilliant diplomat of all time or you know, power political statesman of all time. And I don't, I don't think that's really controversial opinion. But at the same time it's not like I'm hanging around mainstream academe. So maybe it is. But the other key to Bismarck's foreign policy is he went out of his way not to alienate London and he stayed completely out of the rush for colonial possessions in Africa and the Pacific. Now again, this was a sticking point with the Kaiser and the general staff, but I mean it was twofold. First of all, not developing a blue water naval capability and not demanding colonies. That wasn't really Germany sacrificing to finesse the uk. Germany's path forward was to become a superpower. Germany becomes a superpower by uniting Europe, not by cabinet warring and not by demanding, you know, concessions in sub Saharan Africa. You know, that was, that was the thinking of the last century. So I mean that's important to keep in mind. You know, it's like what, what? Like what? I mean, I mean Hitler made that point too. Like what does Germany want with colonies? You know, and that's, you know, I made the point not just in our first episode of this series, but
- [102:12]
Pete
you
- [102:12]
Thomas
know, during the series on, on Churchill's war and the second World War. This idea that the English hated Germany or like this, this bizarre kind of like bigotry of people like Vance, its heart of the Germans are this like alien hostile race that is dangerous and they're like the Huns. Like nobody thought that way. And the UK is a, is a highly diverse place. You know, there's a constellation of many different kinds of indigenous people there. You know, whether you're talking about Welsh, Scots, Irish, English and among the English, you know, there's, there's indigenous elements, there's Anglo Saxons, there's people who basically, you know, are Latin know, or Latinized, you know, Norsemen or what have you. But the, there's a tremendous Germanic strain in the English culture. Okay. And people recognize that. And plus two, just owing to geography, you know, England's traditional enemy was France, you know, and it's literally the UK's neighbor, albeit there's the channel that, you know, provides a kind of natural moat. But you know, aside from the, aside from the kind of sociological and cultural aspects of any, of any conflict paradigm between England and Germany, it's, it's France who they need a natural hedge against, not the Germans. You know, that doesn't really make any sense. So the way to look at Bismarg is twofold. I mean, yes, he aimed to avoid direct confrontations with potential adversaries while at the same time stoking hostilities between those adversaries through like a complicated net of diplomacy and ledgered Maine when called for. But these things also, I mean this is, this is what dovetailed perfectly with, with Germany's power political needs and it's. And what. And what it needed to prioritize in existential terms, provide for its own security. And he publicly maintained repeatedly in the Reichstag, most directly in around Christmas 1876 when challenged on the Balkan situation or the Balkan question. You know what? It sucks to be bored. But when I get on my phone and play real casino games on spin quest.com the time flies by. That two hour wait at the DMV seems like 10 minutes. Play your favorite slots, live blackjack, live craps with a live dealer. New players, 30 coin packs are on sale for 10 bucks. Play spinquest.com and you'll never be bored again. Spin Quest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. He said, quote, where the Balkans are, quote, not worth the healthy bones of one Pomeranian musketeer. Now, that was not realistic, but the appearance of balanced diplomacy was maintained and that was what was key. Okay. He didn't issue some belligerent statement, you know, saying that there's a line in the sand and if any dirty slob crosses it, you know, into Croatia or, you know, across the, or becomes within sight of the Bosnian frontier, you know, like, we're gonna, you know, we're gonna, we're gonna, we're gonna go to war to, you know, defend our vocaloids in, in the Hasbro empire. So I mean, again, like, he was the, the point, the point's not the merit of that statement or realistic. That statement was. It was what was he telegraphing to the Russians and the British for that matter, too. The British interest in the, in the Balkans is, is obviously totally different than that of the Russians. But if you can't move in the Balkans, you, you can't dominate the Mediterranean. But another, another big coup when the Russians went to war with the Ottomans. 1877, 78, that triggered a major international crisis which on the one hand was remote from Europe in terms of the theater in which it occurred. But Europe was impacted in power political terms directly and indirectly in all kinds of ways. Bismarck insinuated himself as a mediator over the post war settlement. And he made absolutely no, he sought no direct concessions for Germany. And he became hailed as this great kind of like, man of peace, you know, like it was. He telegraphed essentially that European peace and German security were synonymous. Like, and again, this was a perception. Whether you believe that or not is not important. Like, like people kind of accepted, not kind of people did accept this, this view. You know, that's how they read. That's how they read the outcome as having developed. Okay? And this was possible because again, by the end, by the last three years of Bismarck's 10 or 1887-18, Germany was tied by express agreements of one form or another. You know, whether they were, you know, direct military treaties or whether they were, you know, treaties facilitating deep interdependence on trade or whether they were, you know, agreements declaring maritime rights. Germany was tied one way or another to virtually every continental power. The triple, most significantly of this era was the triple alliance between Germany, Austria, Hungary and Italy. It was, it was codified on May 20, 1882. It provided that Germany and the Habsburg Empire would resist. Italy was attacked by France, quote, without provocation. In turn, Italy would assist. Germany if, if attacked by France. And in the event of a war between the hatchery empire and Russia, Italy declared neutrality. Now the ultimate ambition of this, Bismarck's ambition was to bring the UK into this triple alliance, okay? And that always, that, that always was the intended master stroke of German diplomacy. That's what Ribbentrop was trying to accomplish decades later. Okay? And that was, that wasn't outlandish and I'll get into why in a minute. Bismarck was never able to realize that. But what he did do, the establishment of what was called the Mediterranean Agreements, the practical effect was creating an adjacent security concord with the uk okay? And that coupled with the reinsurance treaty with Russia, when it was in effect that, that had the, that had the effect of freezing France out of any potential anti German coalition. Because for it to attempt to develop such competing alliance like any penal party signatories, it would be in direct violation and frustration of purpose of the express conditions of a treaty that was in effect with Germany. And in material terms it would be self defeating in various ways, you know, owing to the underlying catalyst for these treaties with those countries that had provided them tangible benefits. Okay? So again I, I, I can't emphasize enough like what a master statesman Bismarck was. Specifically the Mediterranean Agreement, the Mediterranean Agreements. In effect, it recognized the status quo in the Mediterranean Sea, okay? One of the objectives was to halt the expansion of the Russian Empire in the Balkans, at least in its ability to, to dominate the sea lanes and, and deploy a wartime naval contingent there. It was obvious that the Russians wanted to control the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, okay? And this is why they were always at loggerheads with the Ottoman Empire. This also obviously it, so not only did it, you know, allow the UK to kind of retain its naval hegemony, it preserved, it also served to assure the survival, at least in immediate terms of the Ottoman Empire. And Germany relied upon that for its global security ambitions. And it also, it protected Italian interests from France. And there was from immediately out of the Franco Prussian War until really until 1945, there was profound amity of a power political nature between Italy and France. And like the, the Four Powers Pact, which was the, the Third Reich's kind of first effort at establishing like a stabilizing security paradigm in the continent. The subtext of that was, you know, an understanding that, that France and Italy can be played off against one another. Played off against one another. Essentially to the benefit of the German Reich. But that's, that's another issue. But the, and the benefit of this, of course, you know, again, it didn't just situate, it didn't just protect Germany in existential terms. It situated Bismarck as the literally the architect of the European peace. And it brought the UK into an adjacent situation, if not an alliance with Berlin on key matters of national and regional security. This was tested by what we think of in America as small wars. But in Europe, small wars become big wars very rapidly. There's a series of crises in Bulgaria, the most critical of which. In the mid-1880s, a Bulgarian era dentist movement seized eastern Romelia, which was then under Ottoman rule, direct Ottoman rule, and they announced the creation of a Greater Bulgaria. The Russian government opposed this. Interestingly, like despite how tight the Russians claim to be with know all of the eastern and southern Slavs, like they, when, when those interests clash in a direct capacity, you know, that, that sort of claim to universal brotherhood of, of, of Byzantium or whatever. I'm not trying to be flippant or mean, but it, you know, these things seem to like rapidly deteriorate and lose their significance. But the, you know, this is a prime example of that. The brought Bulgaria closer to the Bosphorus and Constantinople, both coveted by Russia. And the last thing the Russians wanted was some lesser power, you know, to be capable of kind of like brokering benefits by playing both, you know, the Ottoman Empire and Russia, you know, against, not even just against one another, but you know, just by the ability to deprive them of strategic objectives that both correctly deemed essential. The, this was the, the, the, the, the problem came in. The British government, you know, was constantly at odds with the Russian Empire in Central Asia during this period. It immediately ordered its consoles to recognize the new Bulgarian regime. And then finally the Serbs invaded Bulgaria in November 1885. And it's like ill fated kind of Byzantine Crusade. The Serbs were beaten back, but then the Hasbro army had intervened to prevent the Bulgarians from occupying Belgrade. So this potentially could have deteriorated into a situation such as that which touched off the Great War. I mean obviously that's, I, I assume people realize that's where I'm going. The, the compromise that was, that followed though it Bismarck was able to finesse the Russians into agreeing a, A, a personal union of the monarch of the monarchy between the northern and southern Ottoman parts of the country, as well as a guarantee that there'd be no direct Russian intervention, you know, short of that which was, you know, precipitated by, you know, an attack on Russia herself. And essentially, again, like, Bismar was only able to accomplish things like this because of like the inherent, like the inherent confidence not just in his abilities, but in his integrity as a statesman. And his, his. The, the. His perceived personal honor that prevented him from making hash with what theretofore, albeit in the bounded terms of a real politic was, you know, the moral consensus. I can't, I can't really think of anyone else in living memory like a single man was able to, you know, kind of like pull off that many, that many coups. But the. What this did have the effect of, though the pan Slavic press, which had great cachet in places like Serbia, they started casting Germany as these, you know, kind of like highly racialized aggressors who would intervene. It's a. Either basically the guardian of like Austrian vogue Deutsche interest in the Balkans, you know, like, regardless of, you know, the competing and legitimate rights of the nationalities, like, you know, who are not Volkdeuture adjacent allies. And that kind of thing became just kind of like mainstream Russian opinion by the, by the outset of World War I or by the eve of World War I. Okay, the degree to which that was a spontaneous and deeply felt sentiment as opposed to something that was exploited because there already was like kind of lore in literature, in extremist circles that suggested that narrative. You could argue that either way, but that was not within the contemplation of most people. People and certainly not within, you know, Russian czar circles at that time, I can tell you that. And part of this O again, Bismar went into full diplomacy mode and, and, and again, aim to seek good offices with Russia at all costs and try and mute conflicts of interest at all costs and you know, re. Reiterate guarantees of, you know, the impossibility of war between Germany and Russia and things like this, you know, and that largely, I mean, not largely. I mean that did hold until, until Bismarck was forced out.
- [120:26]
Pete
Now again,
- [120:30]
Thomas
like we said, not everybody in Berlin was convinced of the wisdom of the Bismarckian course, especially given, you know, the aggressive tone of the Slavic press subsequent to the Bulgarian crisis. Bismarck's son Herbert, he was the Secretary of State for the Foreign Office. Ugh. I have had no luck lately. Wait. Lady luck Britsky. I got you. I've had so much luck on spinquest.com they have all of my favorite games, slot games, live blackjack craps and bubble craps. You can even get a 30 coin pack for just 10 bucks. 10 bucks for 30. I'm headed over to spinquest.com right now. Spin Quest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. He was in what became like Bismarck's role for practical purposes. Okay. He basically said in public, you know, my father's allowing the Russians to disrespect us. You know, he said the, he said the latest round of trees to Russia. He's like, you know, if the worst came to worse, we could probably, we might keep Russia at bay for a matter of weeks. Within the military, a real sense of existential dread, if not paranoia developed. There was guys in the general staff who started calling for a preventative war on the Russian empire, okay? And these guys very much got the ear of the Kaiser, okay? And this being the core of the anti Bismarck faction, you know. Now again, the, this was a very misguided sensibility, you know, this idea in 1890 of some among the general staff and you know, perhaps in the contemplation of the Kaiser himself, this idea that, you know, we should preemptively assault Russia and just knock it out for all time, precluding the possibility of a two front war. And then, you know, Europe belongs to us and where Napoleon failed, we succeeded. This viewpoint was not what won out. Okay? I want to make that clear. That sensibility, yeah, I believe among the Prussian general, I believe among the general staff was Prussian dominated. I believe among a lot of, a lot of, a lot of loyalists to the emperor, there was a sense of that and there was a sense of Bismarck as a weak intriguer who is more interested in personal clout than the existential security of Germany and the protection of the Germans as a race and a people. But again, this idea that there's close to 25 years intervening between Bismarck's dismissal and the onset of hostilities, okay? So this idea that a radicalized general staff and the crazy German emperor just like made this happen immediately after sandbagging Bismarck, that's, that's not right. That's totally off base. The big critics of, in more moderate circles, you want to look at it that way, who came out against Bismarck because it was something of a pylon, as it often is the case when a once beloved statesman is unceremoniously dismissed. I mean, the basic rebuttal to the Bismarck paradigm was like, why does Germany have to on the one hand undertake to protect Austria Hungary, but on the other hand has to make all these concessions, you know, why, why do we always need to be hedging and balancing, you know, no Other power has to behave like this, you know, like why, why can't we just, you know, pursue a peace through strength orientation, you know, zealously and violently defend what's ours when necessary and you know, unqualifiedly and unashamedly, you know, pursue a course of benevolent, when required self interest on the world stage. And of course. The response to that would be, you know, the geostrategic situation is what it is and it's accidental. This is the reality of German political life because Germany was bordered by two great powers. You know, for all practical purposes that's why. But this was the climate that emerged. Bismarck, Bismarck's successor as consular was Leo Van Caprivi and he the reinsurance treaty, you know, unceremoniously lapsed deliberately, you know, on his watch and again and as we raised a moment ago the, the Russians weren't informed any official capacity of its rescission. It was just this kind of like, it was just kind of like increasingly ominous sort of like coldness like emanating from official quarters in Berlin. And I'm not trying to be punitive against the Kaiser Reich or something. I've got great sympathy for Germany in all times and I think anybody who follows us should know that. But the, it's also, you know, Tsar Alexander iii. The tragedy of you know, of Nicholas II and his family kind of overshadows Alexander. He was not a particularly palatable ally for the French and he was, he was quite belligerent. It's an interesting question. Had he survived or had he been succeeded by a man of similar disposition? If France and Russia could have ever come and could have ever reached any kind of real concord on some questions Russian and French interests were literally diametrically opposed. You know, a French standing policy was to block any Russian claim or design on the Turkish Straits that would ultimately compromise France's political influence and its ability to deploy it in the eastern Mediterranean, for example. Okay. And superficially it was difficult to see why Russia would want to compromise their good relations with Germany. I mean admittedly after Bismarck's dismissal they were not as robustly amiable as they had been, but they certainly were not yet categorically hostile. And I mean frankly at the end of the day like the only real kind of sticking point in objective terms between Russia and Berlin was you know, it was on the status the Balkans and you know, Russian rivalry and hostility to the Hapser Empire. You know. But this is why Alexander, he basically turned a deaf ear to the pan Slavic press. I mean that never really had, that never really gave the kind of momentum in Russia that it hoped to. But, you know, despite his, despite his kind of hardness of heart and his willingness to go to war for Russian honor and things, you know, he was kind of willing to turn a deaf ear to a lot of this kind of bellicose rhetoric coming out of Russian quarters and adjacent, and from adjacent, you know, the media cultures of adjacent nationalities, like namely Serbia, as things kind of deteriorated in the post Bismarck era. But I'll wrap this up here in a minute. But what's key. What is the key to the Great War? Britain. And at least in my opinion, I don't think that can be denied, But to bring it back first. So why, given what I just said about this situation in Russia and Alexander's unwillingness to kind of abide this kind of, this kind of emergent, you know, like neo Byzantine sentiment, like why. Why the Russians welcome French overtures in the 1890s towards a security concord, like an official security concord. It. There was still a pro German foreign minister in Russia. He realized I, presumably there was some kind of leak in the German foreign ministry. Nikolai. Gears or gears. He was the Russian foreign minister. He knew that the, the reinsurance treaty had, there'd been discussion about it. It had been allowed to be deliberately. It had been allowed to very deliberately lapse. Okay. He approached the German foreign Ministry. He offered him improved terms of all kinds, you know, if, if the treaty could be reinstated. And he was greeted with a deafening silence. Okay. That I believe was kind of the nail in the coffin or, or that was what, that, that was what hardened Russia to the possibility of, of, of a, of a concord with Germany. And that's what put them in. Cause them to adopt a footing that, that made possible, you know, like a formal alliance with France, like unthinkable as that might have been only a few years ago. I, that seems like a strong case to make for a minor point of interest, but frankly, there's nothing else. Okay. There's a, there's a bill in 1890 which increased the peacetime forces and being of the German army by about 18,000 men. But I mean, that's a drop in the bucket, okay. Especially when you're talking about, especially when you're talking about, you know, the potential, the mobilization potential of the respective states, you know, Germany and Russia. But some people argue that France had a lot of money. France was still very much a lender nation at that time. One of the ways they did business with military allies was by extending them loans and credit on very desirable terms but what really changed everything was Russia believed that the UK was going to join the Triple alliance in Germany and the UK were going to dominate the world. Like, I'm not kidding, that's what they thought. The early 1890s was a high point of what appeared to be a true Anglo German rapprochement. There's a Helioland Zanzibar treaty where the British and the Germans they ceded various African territories between each other. Germany was granted the concession of the North Sea island of Heligoland. St. Petersburg viewed this as a future base of a blue water German navy that the British were going to utilize to embargo Russia in event of war. Like, as they like managed, you know, their holdings in the east with the Royal Navy. When, and to give you an idea, this wasn't just the Russians kind of in their fevered imaginings developing a narrative that had no basis in reality. Crazy it seemed crazy as it seems to us because everybody, I mean even people who spend time with history in a serious capacity, their view of Anglo German affairs is so tethered to this like 20th century perspective. But this, when the Kaiser visited London in 1891 and he was greeted like, like, like, like a hero and like, like one of their racial brethren. The Morning Post said it referred to, it referred to Kaiser's visit in Germany and the UK is quote, friends and allies of ancient friends and allies of ancient standings who quote and quote, future threats to European peace will be met by the union of England's naval strength and the military power of Germany. Like people are openly discussing this, you know, like in, in, in British media. The, the French ambassador in St. Petersburg around the same time that same summer, he apparently advised the right, he apparently advised his counterpart that some, some kind of, some kind of rapprochement between you know, Berlin and, and in London was imminent. You know, that the, that the, the Germans are going to give Britain like a free hand in the Balkans to do whatever the hell they want, you know, to, to keep, to keep Russia permanently out of the Mediterranean and to basically, you know, force them to contend with, you know, not just, not just the Ottomans but you know, with like a true military, British military presence in their frontier, like all, all kinds of things like that. And that's what, that's what, what ended up being put to paper, roughly translated, it was a series of agreements between Russia and France called the definition, quote, definition of understanding or definition of understandings. It, it and this directly referenced the supposed threat presented by British ascendancy to the Triple alliance as if Not a formal member like an adjacent power that was fully allied with Germany. So a French Russian military convention followed on formally on the 18th of August 1892. And then two years later, there's the treaty everyone knows about, which was like, the alliance of 1894, but again, it's this, the 1892 predecessor document. It specifically mentions that, you know, the UK is our enemy and they are now allying with. They are now allying with Germany. So essentially, as we'll see, the alliance that probably more than any other caused the Great War, you know, that between, like, Russia and France, was premised upon the idea that the UK was going to ally with Germany and attack them. Like, that's like something funny about that. But that's absurd, you know, but it goes to show you how. How Murky World War I was, you know, and how its origins are not, are not, are not well understood. I'll wrap up now, but I want to include this because I know someone's going to raise it. Benjamin Disraeli, One of his most famous speeches was on February 9, 1871, for the House of Commons. This is only three weeks after the official proclamation of the German Empire in the hall of Mirrors at Versailles. Okay, Disraeli, he was reflecting on the Franco Prussian War and the declaration of the German Empire. And this whole speech, okay, people grossly misunderstand what he was talking about in his speech. He started by saying that the Franco Prussian War was, quote, no common war. You know, it wasn't even like the Crimean War doesn't even measure up to its significance. He said that it was a greater political event than the French Revolution because he said, quote, there is not a single diplomatic tradition which has not been swept away. The balance of power has been totally destroyed. And the country which suffers more and feels the effects of this change most is England. He goes on to kind of describe the situation as it stands then, contra, before the advent of hostilities between France and Prussia. People read this through like a Churchill lens. They're like, oh, Disraeli was talking about the German threat. He was not. He was saying that this changes everything. Russia is going to view Germany as its mortal enemy. Russia is a nascent superpower and we've got to rethink our relationship with Germany and France in order to meet this challenge that's fundamentally important. He wasn't talking about, when he talked about the German revolution, he's not talking about the threat posed by the new Germany. He's talking about the global consequences of a unified Germany and what this massive Russian state is going to do about it when they modernize, you know, like that is key. He was not, he was not having like a Vance to tart moment. Well like the evil Hun is going to kill us all, you know. And that's like in context what I'm saying is inarguable. I know somebody's gonna like try and claim otherwise but we can return to that at some point. But I, I'm gonna, I'm gonna wrap up now because I think there's like a lot there that I, I put out there and we'll get into the nitty gritty of the immediate catalyst for the war next time and like you know the battlefield situation as it developed as hostilities jumped off. But trust me, this background was essential even if people find it boring. Otherwise anything subsequent we're going to discuss does not make any sense.
- [140:49]
Pete
Well, I think you made everything pretty clear. I don't really, I don't have a question. So give plugs and you know, we'll get out of here.
- [141:01]
Thomas
Surely as always you can find me on my website. It's thomas777.com that's kind of like one stop. That's kind of like a one stop location for like all the things I do. It's number seven H1S777.com the podcast season two is dropping on Halloween. I appreciate everybody being patient for the arrival of fresh content. I'm working hard on the pod. It's time consuming because we're upping our production game. I've also got a whole lot of footage for the channel. What's going on everyone? It's bluff here. And you know what's more American than America's 250th birthday? Supporting American owned companies like Spinquest. America's number one social casino with over a thousand games like live dealer blackjack and craps. They're offering new users a $30 coin package for just $10. Go to spinquest.com and sign up. Today Spinquest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. That's currently being edited. The channel's Thomas TV on YouTube number 7H Omas Space TV. You can find the pod and some of my longer form writing at substack. It's real thomas777.com I'm on X at capital R E a l/ number 7 h o m a s777 and you can find me on T. Graham at Thomas Graham. That's all I got for them.
- [142:40]
Pete
All right, I appreciate it as always. And until the next time, I want to welcome everyone back to the Picano Show. Haven't talked in a while, Thomas, and
- [142:53]
Thomas
yeah, it feels a little while.
- [142:55]
Pete
Yeah, yeah, it's been like 10 days or so, but a lot has happened. We want to get into talking about continual World War I, but I thought I'd just give you a chance to comment on the news that's happened the past couple days.
- [143:12]
Thomas
Yeah, it's, I mean, these developments aren't surprising to me and I don't want to take the discussion too far afield in terms of depth and complexity, but it's important, it's important for people to understand that what Israel's unconditional support for the Ukraine war effort and that support acting as a catalyst for the escalation of hostilities when it happened, that that was inextricably tethered in causal terms to the defeat that was issued due America and Israel and Syria. Okay. And I mean that was very much a proxy war between, you know, the Russian Federation, Hezbollah, the Syrian Arab Army, American Israel and a various constellation of, of jihadist proxies. Okay. As well as well as some other, as well as some other non state actors like, you know, that, like, like, like, like these Kurdish militias and things who, and I mean that, that's a, that's a very contrived phenomenon, but I mean, they do shield men under arms, but so I encourage people not to treat this in isolation and I don't want to come off like I'm preaching or something, so. And I don't want to make what sounds like an ideological point, but I will say that, I mean, if people don't have an opinion on power political affairs, I mean, that's fine, but don't pretend to have an opinion and then pretend that there's just some like brush fire war and you're, you know, you've got some like cool head perspective by which you quote, don't care about the combatants. It's not a question of caring. And when the state of Israel goes to war, considering the reality of political life and of American power and of the Zeitgeist and of world order and the ethical assumptions that underlie its structure since 1945. Kind of like pretend that like Israel is a meaningless country and it's meaningless when they go to war. Okay? And the, the entire rationale for Israel's existence is not what people purport it to be. Ernst Nolte made the point emphatically and interestingly. Martin Martin Van Creel. Yeah. Who's a, who's an Israeli. He, he stipulated the basic merit of this position. Israel, the Soviet Union, the Third Reich were, were, were totally abnormal states. Okay? And I'm saying that in like value neutral terms, okay? Like they, and, and they all emerged in dialogue with like, like the causes from where they emerged politically were, were in dialogue with, with, with one another. Okay. And obviously the only one of those states that still exists is Israel. But it's asinine when people talk about Israel is that it's a democracy. Like it's not at all, it just objectively it's not, not in like the Aristotelian sense, not in kind of like the, the, the, in the liberal globalist sense. Like it has, it has nothing in common with, with, with a normal state. Okay. In terms of, I'm not talking about like, you know, the way it's like legislature is structured or something. I mean in terms of like, it's raised on Detroit in terms of like, like the underlying mythos of its founding and, and what it considers to be like its mandate like on Earth to like engage in, in high politics. Okay? It's, it's not at all remotely, you know, like, like, like Japan or like South Korea or like you know, some EU state. I mean the EU's a bit different because it's, it's been socially engineered in discreet ways since the end of the war. But I mean, you know what I mean? So it's important to keep these things in mind and when people speak emphatically about, myself included, about what's significant about this or troubling about this or impactful upon us. Like I'm not just like saying things. I'm not, I'm not just trying to, you know, throw shade on, on peoples or things I don't like. I mean that's not, I mean I don't see how this can't be clear to people. But you know, one of the reasons why America has become so insidious is that there's a naked irrationality to the way it behaves as the Zionist perspective. It's going to become more insinuated into the policy making establishment. Like you see that more and more. You see this with the Ukraine war. Like everyone feels about, however anyone feels about the Ukraine war. Like, like a rational actor aims to end hostilities as soon as possible in terms most advantageous. Like he doesn't say that, he doesn't scream over and over that his enemy is evil and the war must continue in perpetuity. That's irrational. You know, like the, we don't fight wars to like see how many bodies we can stack up or so that we can like shriek with moral righteousness at people we hate over and over again. Like, that's, that's not that. This is basic. This is basic real politic, okay? And there's not military solutions to political problems generally, so there's that. And I will say too, again, I mean, I know, I mean, if people want to, if you want to be bigots towards Muslims or Arabs or Persians, I mean, it's pretty lame if you're gonna just like take on like the prejudices of Zionists when you're just like some random guy and like the side you like hate people because, I mean, you think you're cool or that makes you look a badass. I mean, that's pretty basic. But I'm trying to be like a bigot, man. Like be a bigot on behalf of your own people. Like, not on behalf like Israelis or something. And you know, the situation in Gaza, this isn't hyperbole. Despite the, or perhaps because of the policy of disengagement in 2005, Gaza is quite literally an open air prison, okay? Like Rashid Khalidi described it as an iron cage. Like, these people live in what amounts to a giant open air concentration camp of source where they're deprived of access to commodities and resources and the liberty to move about freely in, in a way that people would really consider unacceptable for, for any, for any other population, I think. Now I'm not saying you need to feel bad for those people or that you should like cry about that or something, but there's obviously gonna be, there's obviously gonna be, you know, active hostilities emergent from those conditions, okay? And so pretending that, you know, these people are the epitome of evil for, you know, not being willing to tolerate that, or for identifying the Zionist state who ethnically cleanse their forebears, which is why they're situated in Gaza as they are. Like, make no mistake. And Israel freely admits that, you know, don't, don't pretend, don't, don't pretend that you're outraged that, you know, like your enemies shoot back. You know, bullets don't only go one way, man. You know, like, don't, don't, don't. Don't become outrage when, like, you know, there's, there's incoming as well as outgoing, you know, I mean, so I find that kind of offensive. I mean, frankly, like, like most people have no political opinions and if that's you just like, don't pretend to. I don't weigh on quantum physics because I don't know about it. You know, like, just, just hold your peace, man. Don't, don't like, say things like that. Some sputtering Zionist told you on msnbc. I mean, I. What the. Where the rubber meets the road in. In. In kind of war fighting terms. There's long been a suggestion, and not just, not, not just by like, crazy leaker guys or by these kinds of corny Stratford types, that at operational level there's been deep integration between Hamas and Hezbollah and that this sectarian divide has somewhat been healed in this regard, which, I mean, that raises a lot of interesting questions is the, the degree to which this kind of thing really was being actively stoked somewhat artificially, you know, during, during the Iraq occupation and things. I mean, that's kind of a different issue. But be as it may, Hamas or Hezbollah is an arguably a very, very capable infantry element, okay? And they, they, they fought the IDF to a standstill in 2006. And the thing that Hamas is performing as well as it is, at least at company level, that would seem to indicate they've gotten their. They've gotten their act together so that, you know, it's something. I mean, the point's been made before. You can't, you can't literally be at war with the world. You know, like, Israel is kind of incredibly managed to make an enemy of literally everybody, like Shia, Sunni, Christian, Alawite, you know, Arab, Persian, Azeri and other. I mean, you can't. You can't. It's just not feasible, you know, and nobody else thinks like that other than Zionists. Like, I made the point. People compare the strategic situation of South Africa to Israel, and that's not like, misguided. They, culturally, historically, in the foundations of these respective states ideologically, do not have a lot in common. But in a purely strategic paradigm, they had a lot in common. But, you know, like Clive Derby Lewis pointed out, there was. There wasn't just like, white people and black people in South Africa. There's dozens of ethnicities, like, some of which the Afrikaners allied with, some of which they were actively at war with, some of which they had, you know, some kind of neutral. They found this was a neutral foot, neutral footing with. But I mean, this is, this is just pragmatic, okay? And I mean, even in a truly grand apartheid state, like South Africa was, you know, during the kind of long emergency of, of the Bush war, other than maybe like some unhinged cranks who didn't hold any real power. Like, nobody in South Africa was running around saying that, you know, we will not give one inch and we are at war with everybody else on this continent. I mean, that's just not feasible. I think the Zionist state's going down, not in days or weeks. But I, I don't see how this, I don't see how this, I don't see how the 20th century ends with Israel insisting that it has a, quote, right to exist as this bizarre, like hyper racialized state that refuses to abide, you know, sacrificing this like artificial majoritarian status of, of ethnic Jews and nobody else. Like, I don't see how the century ends with that intact, you know, and these people in Gaza, to say nothing of these people in the Levant, in Jordan, in Saudi Arabia, in Iran, like, it's going to disappear. Okay? I mean, you have to, like, rational people understand, like you've got to deal with other people in some basic capacity, like even if they're your enemies, you know, like Zionists don't think that way. You know, like, EM Jones makes that point a lot. Like, this is the way people, the way they think. This is the way people thought 10,000 years ago. Like saying like, nobody else is actually human. Everybody else is always wrong 100 of the time. And not just wrong, but evil. Everything I do is correct. Like, nobody thinks that way. Like, especially not in like war and peace terms. Like only America and Israel think that way. And you, you can't, you can't see a policy through. I mean, that is, there is no policy there. You know, it's, it's not something that's sustainable. So. And finally, I mean, people tell me they hate me and I'm a terrible person all the time, but like the big thing now. And I don't know how people can still be susceptible to this stuff. There's some horrible story circulating about Hamas, like kidnapping and raping women and like, make no mistake, like, like sexual violence and horrible stuff related to that, like happens in every combat zone. But when there's these kinds of like lurid pre made stories that suddenly appear, you know, like I remember exactly like 33 years ago the, remember the Naira testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Human Rights. Like, Naira was talking about the Iraqi soldiers, like ripping babies out of incubators. But then it turned out Nyira was the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador and she had connection to the royal family. Like this whole story was confabulated by some, literally by some, like Madison Avenue PR Firm like I don't like again, you don't need to sy. But saying I'm a terrible person and, and, and Arabs all need to be exterminated because on the Internet I saw this found footage type horror video of Arab guys kidnapping pretty girls and raping them. Like that's not what's up everybody, it's Bretty. And America is turning 250. And I can't think of a better way to celebrate that than playing on an American owned social casino. Spin quest.com with all of your favorite games, live crafts, bubble craps, live blackjack. There's no better place to play or free and win real, real cash prizes. Spinquest.com Spin Quest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. Rational adults shouldn't think that way. And even if that kind of thing is 100 documented, that's obviously inexcusable. But that doesn't sound like shut down conversation on, on, on the nuances of the war. You know, I can, I can pull out horror stories from Vietnam, including the incident on Hill 192. Like, I mean does that like shut down all conversation on, on the Cold War, like did it in its epoch? Like oh, people doing bad things in a war zone. You know, if you can like the guy who photographs OP for doing it first like wins because he's right. Like that's. I, I guess it's incredible to me like you know, decades into the, you know, consumer Internet being basically like ubiquitous. Like people like still you can basically like show them a movie and then they'll decide that a political issue is like reducible to like what they saw bad guys doing like on an Internet video. Like I find that incredible. But I guess you know, propaganda is effective because it doesn't like really take much, you know, other than a kind of rudimentary level of competency. But that's, I mean that just, I forgive me if that wasn't particularly coherent, but that's like at a glance, like that's what I see. And finally. And then we'll get on to like the subject at hand for the day, which is the Great War. I. If people here in, and they're not here, people in this situation in, in Gaza, they're like saying the same things they did. Like when Ukraine order had to escalated. Like as if there's like some, some, some potential for like catastrophic global escalation. Like this isn't the 20th century. Like that's not possible anymore. And frankly that's never really possible. The 20th century was totally abnormal and there's not really much you can extrapolate from it in terms of precedent because it's so, it was so at odds with what is the status quo generally. You know, I mean it's not this idea or this, or this paradigm of you know, the world being hyper mobilized on what amounts to hair trigger nuclear alert at all times between two camps and you know, there being a handful of conflict dyads and such that, you know, it's such that integration, interdependence in, in strategic terms is so deep, you know, that any kind of like brush fire war on the periphery could potentially lead to like a general conflagration and then like nuclear war. That's not possible, that's not politically possible, it's not psychologically possible. The forces in being don't exist. That kind of mobilization paradigm doesn't exist. I don't even think people know how to do that kind of thing anymore. Okay, like, like, I mean in technical terms, okay, so that's, that's foolish when people talk that way. Like I don't even, I don't even know what they think. Like World War III would, would entail like the, like the, the like the non existent East Germany and is gonna, is gonna lead an assault followed by like Soviet tank columns and across the folded gap. Like what? It's, it's stupid, but. Yeah, I mean that's, that's basically, you know, but like I said, this shouldn't, this shouldn't, this shouldn't surprise anybody. Especially like I said, it's, it warrants a longer form treatment either in like essay form or in like a dedicated pod or stream as to what exactly the relationship is between the Syrian war, you know, the, like the Zionist escalation in Ukraine and what is happening now. But it's complicated. But these things are very much connected, okay? They're not happening in isolation and they're not, you know, there's a common like causal nexus. Okay? And that's not my pet theory. It's, it's irrebuttable. But that's all I have on like the state of the world situation.
- [162:22]
Pete
Your neighbors aren't reading your memes. If you want to counter demoralization where it counts most, your community, you're going to have to bring it into meatspace. Get your counter propaganda gear@mostlypeaceful.com made especially for people who did have breakfast this morning. Mostlypeaceful.com has merch for the dissident, right, recovering libertarians and Your based uncle, who knew about them 20 years before you did, featuring apparel, hats and stickers that piss off all the bad people and make the right people laugh. There's plenty of Uncle Ted stuff. Killdozer, Waco and Ruby Ridge. There's even a Rhodesia designer, too. Most of it has been banned from the big marketplaces and led to PayPal and Shopify, suspending accounts. If you're more Bill Cooper than Alex Jones, more Pinochet than PragerU, stop@mostlypeaceful.com and start shirt posting. Use code PETE to save 20% off your order. This message was not approved by the ADL or splc. All right, I appreciate that. And I'll probably clip that and release that. Release that separately so people can.
- [163:32]
Thomas
Oh, no, no. Whatever you want to do, man. Like I said right away. Yeah, I'm just. Today you get into the war. Not quite yet. And I know people are trying to get the bit for that, but I, I don't want to have to backtrack and address things that I forgot to kind of flesh out, because I like to, unless it's warranted for. Not just for narrative purposes, but for causal purposes, to demonstrate something essential about the events under discussion. I like to proceed in linear terms. And like, what I'm doing now, I'm attempting to create, like, paint a picture of the strategic paradigm as existed, you know, at dawn of hostilities in 1914. But also I want to. I want to. I want to convey like, a conceptual picture of, you know, the, the constitution of each country, you know, like, culturally, politically, what the. Like the personalities of. Of. Of monarchs and. And men in executive roles. I think that's fundamentally important. And we, we will. Next episode, we're going to get into the Habsburg Empire and we'll segue from there in that episode, like into the onset of hostilities. But today we're not quite there yet. But I think people will see why I consider this imperative to cover, you know, as we get deeper into the series and kind of into the Dynamo many moons from now. But as a brief side note, we discussed, and this relates to the way the View from London, which we got into in depth last episode. Okay. And this is a point I can't emphasize enough, and we got into it a bit in our World War II discussion, but the degree to which the Anglo Japanese alliance was the lynch pin of world security, like literally, specifically in the Pacific and as an essential feature of. Of. Of. Of. Of. Of Anglo national security strategy, or like imperial strategy, rather, as well as a guarantor of you know, world stability. Like the significance of the Anglo Japanese treaty, like can't be overstated. And the fact that the English just abruptly trashed their alliance, literally, you know, not even a generation subsequent and adopted like an enemy footing with the Japanese that completely defies reasonably like in every conceivable sense. But the, the existence of that alliance when it was added to zenith, I think in terms of, you know, political will as well as, you know, it being kind of fresh in the minds of the signatories as an essential feature of, of, you know, the paradigm of, of, of a stable if not lasting peace is, is something I think that's important to convey. And the like we got into last time. The, the core from Britain's perspective, the core of, of their like, security problem after the turn of 20th century was the growth of Russia against power and influence. That's indisputable. Particularly Russia's ambitions as they were perceived in, in Asia. China was in, in, in commercial terms was infinitely exponentially more important to Britain than even, than even Africa. Okay. Like potentially. Okay. And Russia posed a direct threat to British interest there. Okay. This was exacerbated by the fact that in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion, the Russians had had exploited that as a predext to insinuate themselves into, you know, into garrisons on, on the Asian mainland. Okay. And this was very much cause for alarm because if you force the British to fight on land, they've got a problem, okay. That goes without saying. And the, the fact that, I mean Russia couldn't rapidly reinforce those elements, you know, on the Chinese mainland, but they could reinforce them and they could do so basically indefinitely. Okay. Albeit the logistical infrastructure wasn't what it was even 20, 30 years subsequent. But the, but the point is the British couldn't do it at all. Okay? It was hard and given, given, given that like just the, the vastness of the Russian Empire and this geostrategic location, the preponderance of his lands forces and like the sheer size of their forces and being to say nothing to their, you know, potential as regarded, you know, trained reserves, at least nominally trained reserves and, and men annually, you know, reaching military age, there's a tremendous vulnerability being exposed here. And it was hard to see how the, the UK could, if, if there was a general Russian push in the Far east, like on land, like how, how the British could resist it. Russia also, I mean obviously since mid the mid 19th century, it seemed to be pursuing a basically ant policy in Central Asia. You know, like the British and the Russians are Not friends, you know, like remotely it, the, the Franco Russian alliance that we talked about too. I mean that further aggravated the issue, but it was also, there was a major, there's a major concern. I mean mighty as the British Empire seemed, I mean the British at this point run beatable on the water, but they, you know, the jewel of their empire was, was India. But if India came under general land assault, there's no way they could defend it. As we'll see in a minute. We're getting into the Boer War. You know, the, there's a very real potential the British being dragged into kind of like an endless, you know, quagmire in South Africa. Speaking of South Africa, you know, this is how this is. Even empires that do everything right, you know, and don't have a kind of suicide moment like the UK did a generation later, you know, they, when I say death by a thousand costs, it doesn't imply like a long and even agonizing process. I mean it can happen in the blink of an eye. You know, it can happen rapidly and it does. This was such a concern in August 1901. The Intelligence Department of the, of the British War Office. It's, it's report what was quite literally titled quote, Military needs of the Empire in a War with France and Russia. Okay. So I mean it's this, I point this out a lot. I mean not just because it's essential to understand, you know, like the degree to which the, the, the, the alliance system and kind of the assumptions that went into its creation and kind of the blind spots. Particularly relating again as we talked about, you know, with secret diplomacy and it being totally self defeating, you know, I, I raise all that stuff because it becomes clear like, like you know, 12, even 10, 12, 13 years prior to the onset of hostilities. You know, there was no, there was no sense of, of, of, of Great Britain and German in the German Empire just you know, being like an axiomatic loggerheads. You know, in fact they, they're, they, they like they viewed the primary threat, they probably view the primary existential military threat, you know, to be their future allies. Okay, so this, this kind of thing, I, I raise it too because again like I think it stands in stark rebuttal to the, this kind of court historian view that like, oh, it was this irredentist Germany that was done on world domination. So naturally, you know, the, the kind of pragmatic and, and fair minded and basically moral British Empire like had to stop this. Like that was not anybody's contemplation other Than you know, people were kind of like had like, like were constitutionally like committed to like that prejudice, you know, or you know, people became swept up in, in the kind of, you know, in the kind of, in the kind of hostilities that often emerge from like almost banal of events and that. That's exactly what happened between the UK and Germany in my opinion. And the degree to which the Boer War, as we'll see in a minute was approximate cause or what it came to represent in the respective public minds of the British body politic and then of the German empire, like can't be overstated. But in any event, British policymakers in the Foreign Office and the military and everywhere else, they responded to the Russian threat by basically, basically pursuing like a two, like a two track like policy. If you want to look at it like that. First and foremost, you know, there was the, there, there's, there's the alliance with Japan and it's when, when Japan and Russia went to War in 1904, 905 and the Japanese utterly devastated the Russian Navy like this, this, this basically like everybody, everybody in the R establishment who, who backed you know, the, the policy of you know, essentially like unconditional report from Japan like felt totally, you know, exonerated and validated. Yeah, Japan also was, they were burgunding. They were burgunding land power and which had come as no surprise considering what they rolled a muster, you know, 1931 and about 1940. But they, they man that when Japan in 1895, about, about a quarter, about 200,000, a quarter million Japanese troops had entered me in Shuria and they felt that, I mean not just was that you know, kind of like a flex on like a demonstration of deployment capabilities but like the, the British very much felt that like okay, like these kinds of forces and being very much offset like any vulnerability to India. Okay. And they were absolutely right. And of course like the Japanese Navy even before the Russo Japanese War and before they were battle tested, you know, it was. This would, this would absolutely like relieve the strain on the British to maintain, you know, like, like a 2 Fleet Navy. You know, it was a long process. There was something of a, an unhappy history to say the least. You know, between the Occident in Japan and particularly between the British and Japan. But despite again, you know, the Japanese are saddled with something of the same. Somewhat defame. I mean that's somewhat like. It's very much so defamatory. The, the very, very kind of unflattering and our defamatory perspective tends to accompany any discussion of the Japanese in history as these, as these kind of like crazed warmongers or these like anti modernists. I got a time like the, The Japanese Foreign Policy 7 is very pragmatic, okay? And the fact that you know they, they could basically get their way like on every well sacrificing nothing in this like in this angle Japanese treaty other than the, other than the promise that like essentially they'd go to war with Russia like if Russia went on the march, which they do anyway. So it's. Yeah, I mean I think, I mean don't get me wrong, it was established the, this, this, this was a master stroke for the UK also. But it's, I mean the UK was, I mean they were the empire Japan was not at that point, you know when they, they were an accidental power and they were probably the closest thing. This is like a pre superpower era. But you know, blue water navies in those days that was, that was the most, that, that was, that was the most powerful strategic element one could muster. Okay. It was the equivalent of nuclear weapons of their day. I mean not equivalent in terms of destructive power and an existential dread accompanying them and everything else. But my point is that you know a truly like blue water navy with, with service dreadnoughts could could, could, could cause like utter devastation. Okay. So my point being the, the British Empire making any like concession to the Japanese was I mean obviously like you know the Germany were perceived just in terms of, in terms of, in terms of clout and in terms of you know, the kind of power relationship paradigm would be perceived as like the big winner in, in those outcomes or that outcome. But the, the Japanese naval treaty was renewed about. It was renewed in in it was. It was augmented in 05 then renewed in 1911 and then I mean from 911 onward. I mean like again it was, it was a feature of the pre. Of the international system. You know, it was considered an essential staple of. Of world order. Britain seeking understanding with France was a bit, was a bit more tricky because France obviously among other things not just owing to the geostrategic situation, you know, as we discussed, there's nothing. I mean hanging out at the pool is great. Relaxing and playing Vegas style games on my phone at the same time. Drink in one hand and a blackjack in the other. It's all at spinquest. Over a thousand games including your favorite slots and table games. Be cool with this summer special new players get 30 coin packs for 10@Spinquest.com Spin Quest is a free to Play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. Britain's natural rival is, is frankly Russia. Like or not, it's France, not Germany. I mean, you know, Germany if anything is in united Germany if anything is a natural hedge against the traditional enemy France. And Ribbentrop himself made that point a lot I think we got into some weeks back. But the, aside from all of that, France was Britain's direct rival in, in the. In the colonial enterprise. You know. And obviously one of the, one of the tragedies of great power politics in, in the colonial era when you know, modern warfare became truly devastating is that you know, the, the. The obstacles to European unity and integration, you know, like as, like as. As a gross rom power or as a, or as a superpower, you know, the, the European states. I mean there's not much in Europe frankly. It's an impoverished peninsula basically. You know, the Europeans had to go abroad in search of essential commodities or die. Okay. The carving up of the planet didn't just occur. I mean I'm sure today it's people are. People believe it's because like Europeans are like mean and racist and stuff. But this is very much. I mean nobody takes on. Nobody takes on that. That kind of Nobody. Nobody takes on some centuries long enterprise literally planetary in nature, you know. And in, in. In. In the centuries, in the period we're talking about, you know, the, like the, the like the 5, 600 years we're talking about, you know, these are the most primitive of conditions by our standards. Like nobody takes on such endeavors just like because it is there or to be like a fian, you know, like world creator or something. Like I, I'm the first to you know, praise the Faustian spirit of European man. But these kinds of. The kind of sacrifice and sort of like labors at scale required to accomplish something like a successful colonial policy. Nobody undertakes such things like unless it's an absolute necessity of survival, you know, like physically and existentially or like as a race and as a people, as a culture. Okay. So in order, in order to, in order to achieve any kind of rapprochement with France, you know, like real concessions had to be made. This came in the form of. Lord Salisbury had already kind of opened the door to that in 1896. The, the British had basically like abandoned like their claim on. On Indochina, like outside of what they held in Burma, which was essential to their like rubber plantations mostly. But other things too like in the Mekong Delta region, this, this why. This why France became Totally dominant in, in Vietnam, for example. And Vietnam's not like strategically worthless, despite that being the kind of refrain of people, you know, throughout the Cold War and the war years in Vietnam. But be as it may, it, France came out a big winner in Indochina owing to British concessions and basically like London was able to buy French goodwill in that way. Okay, but I mean, at the same. So I mean, these. What became the Entente Corjal, I'm sure I butchered that, as the French called it in 1904. This wasn't primarily like an anti German agreement. Like, I mean, the French base and the French realized that, I mean, for, for the proceeding, you know, for the. For the preceding millennia. I mean, it was. They were intermittently at war with. With Britain. You know, there's always that possibility emergent, you know, like it wasn't. So it's important to keep in mind at the juncture, you know, like this wasn't. The British were not seeking some. Some kind of. Some kind of anti German agreement and nor, nor was France really. I mean, again, like, it was. It was kind of a way of shoring up stability and you know, especially, you know, as the 19th and the 20th century, there was a lot of uncertainty. I mean, in all kinds of ways. I mean, literally the entire human zeitgeist in the Occident was being altered. That's a bit more philosophical, I think, than what we're up on in this series. But the French perspective was also that. And this is very French Dhul Cassie or Delcas, you know, the. The French foreign minister, he had an idea that, oh, into the good offices between France and Russia that were already existing, the Russians would look at it as something of a benefit despite the hostility to Britain that like France had this like, cordial intent with. With London and you know, and that's that. That then I think he was right. Okay. And it. And the view from Paris was that the sort of a moderating. Moderating influence on Russian ambitions so as to not like, throw the baby out with the bathwater and you know, I fancy about like the delicate minuet required by these constellations of alliances. You know, I mean, that's like. That's real statecraft and like the complexity of it. You know, the need to have a strategic mind to be able to perceive historical phenomena as they're emergent in the most impersonal. The most impersonal phenomena as well as having just like a remarkable insight for human sociology individually and at scale, as well as the psychology of powerful men who find themselves insinuated into such roles where hubris is not just common, but perhaps axiomatic. I mean, I find this fascinating, and I don't think I'm just being some, you know, romantic soul or something in viewing it that way. But the, quite literally, the, the. The sentiment from the British Foreign Ministry and specifically a guy named Lord Lanzone, was that, quote, a good understanding with France would not improbably be the precursor of a better understanding with Russia. Okay? So, I mean, this was, this was not a war alliance, okay? This was not. This is not some Churchillian, like, anti German alliance. That, that sentiment did come later. But again, it's important to keep in mind that that was not the impetus for what we're talking about at this juncture now. What, what actually was happening in Germany at this time. Okay? The aim of Bismar. I mean, like I said, I think people, people like Kissinger, you know, they claim, like Metternich is, you know, like the greatest, like, statesman who ever lived in, In a. In the era of, you know, like, high politics and cabinet warring and like, intrigues between the European powers. I'm somewhat of a Germanophile. I mean, I mean, I am one. I'm not, you know, I don't run from that. But in purely brass tax terms, I think the title belongs to Bismarck. However, the, the problem with the problem is that Bismarck is something of an impossible quagmire because the, like, the core aim of a Bismarckian foreign policy and the core aim of a united Germany, which he had managed to pull off, which, I mean, as we talked about, like, makes him, in my opinion, like the most brilliant Machiavellian of all time. I mean, if you, if you, if you accept that, you know, the, you know. Except he was basically able to orchestrate events that brought the Northern Confederation into alliance with Prussia, which then became the German Empire. But his first, last and always his mission had to be to prevent the emergence of a hostile coalition of great powers against the Reich. Now, inherent and latent tensions between rival states made that objective, if not easy to accomplish, more feasible than it would have been otherwise. But at the same time, the sheer complexity and kind of like, balancing of interests and kind of like the promises when we have to make both, you know, in terms of open declarations of rights as well as secret diplomacy, there's something paralyzing about it. You know, you like. Like the man who hedges literally, like all of his, all his, all of his potential bets or moves, you know, with guarantees, you know, to all adversaries at actual Potential like he finds himself unable to move without sabotaging, you know, like that kind of splendid that, that, that kind of splendid safety net in which he's right around himself. And that net like seems to become something of a, A. An optically gilded cage at some point. What the way Germany managed, the way Bismarck managed this. I mean he basically turned his attention to the half story empire and courted them as something of a proxy, particularly in the Balkans. And from there obviously like this opened the door for you know, Germany to kind of develop a, a felt politic with the east, you know, particularly you know the Ottoman Empire which then was although in precipice decline like a real power. But the you know Germany frankly they could, they could afford, they could afford to stay out of the great game of colonies. But you know, in, in like, in like in purely material terms but in terms of global prestige number one and in terms of power projection capability and being able to demand equality of status not being in the colonial game place them at some disadvantages. This is something of a complicated issue and it's interesting how Hitler had absolutely no interest in this because say what you want about Hitler, like he was incredibly forward looking in terms of his geopolitical orientation as well as just kind of understanding that like that, that that you know the, the era of like petty cabinet wearing was just like dead like not like even if the, even if the will is somehow like the will for to try and revive it was emergent. Like it would not be possible. But the such that Germany developed and like a colonial imperial policy basically Germany would have to play the margins as they existed between Britain, France and Russia like when, when they were at odds, you know, they, they created like a little bit of like wiggle room. But it, but it, but frankly, I mean it always required, it always required the Germans to punch below their weight. You know because like again if you're, if you're kind of just like taking the leftovers and you know you're, you're like the way you assert like a velt. The way you assert veldt politic claims is like waiting when your potential adversaries are you know, distracted in the business of hostilities with one another. I mean that's not, that's not the way great powers behave. You know, great powers assert themselves on, on terms of equality, a formal equality as a matter of status. But the, this really, this really, this really reached, this reached like a genuine crisis point in, in. In South Africa which seems incredibly strange that South Africa or the Transvaal, South African Republic Contra the United Kingdom, Cape Colony. Like, like, it seems bizarre that like, basically like a proxy war between, you know, like, you know, Cal. Both Dutch Calvinist pioneers and. And. And British privateers would. Would sour, you know, relations with any great powers. But the symbolic significance of these things is. Is always outsized. But before we get into that, I just wanted to add too, that the. Something I noticed even when I was in Europe, you know, like in the 90s, you know, and I mean, obviously Europe now can get whatever it needs, but especially, you know, owing to. Especially today, I mean, because of, you know, logistical chains are such that, you know, anyone can get like, anything to their door in the developed world you know, within a day or two. But there's. There's always this kind of, like, understanding of shortage. That's the only way I can like, explain it. Like, I'm not talking like, even the minds, like everyday people, they wouldn't characterize it that way. I'm sure you'd be totally cognizant of it. But nowhere was this more present than in, you know, the 19th century. And this. This idea Europeans had, you know, like, what I mean is like, the middle classes that were, like, basically engaged in the political process. Process. This idea that, you know, things would be easier if we were able to capture real estate overseas. This kind of like. Like the myth of El Dorado almost, you know, like this loomed like, really large. And, you know, Bismar, I'm sure that people court historians today. I'm sure they continue to pretend that he was some like, mad dictator who's not accountable to anybody. Like, like. Like he was like their version of Putin or something. But, you know, there's no. There's no. I mean, first of all, Germany was. Was. Was as democratic as any other modern state at the time. But it. But I mean, even. Even were it not. Like, there's no. There's no chief executive who's like, not at all accountable to the body politic. That's ridiculous. So there was, you know, there was pressure. Not just as a matter of pride and prestige and equality, his status. There was pressure from people to say, like, why? Basically, like, why. Why do we have to settle for second best? Like, why can't we get stuff we need when we have, like, money to spend, you know, and that, That. I mean, people take this stuff seriously, man. You know, like. And especially a state like Germany, which, even though, you know, the starvation embargo was a decade and a half off, I mean, the, like, the possibility of that happening, like, even though it hadn't happened yet. I mean was something that existed in people's minds. You know, they didn't have any illusions that you know, a, that, that, that, that the continent could become a prison without it. Without a true, you know, power projection capability at global scale. So in part, in part the, in part the solution of this was the, was, was the seek out was a seek out forces in Africa. I mean not just because it was huge and because there was plenty of. I mean there's probably just like a lot of opportunity there, you know for to get rich as well as, you know it wasn't even clear yet, you know, like what the actual resource potential was. The Dark continent. But anytime, anytime the, anytime the Germans approached the foreign Ministry about you know, working out arrangements in that regard or some kind of declaration of rights, you know, in terms of like where Germany could move in Africa. Like they, they, you know they were, they were met with at best condescension and at words like outright contempt and not lost in the German at this time. The Germans always respected the Japanese but the Japanese were a non white power. So there's a sense and at the end of Bismarck's tenure like so the British are willing to cut deals with the French as well as you know, the Japanese. But like they're, they're going to treat, you know, us, you know, we're not, not only are we white European Christians but we're the preeminent continental power. And like we're being told like we don't rate colonies and like we're not on the same level as the United Kingdom and France. Like that that was a slap in the face and such that it was a, a lot of German, there's a lot of wealthy German merchant types who ended up buying land nominally for discrete commercial purposes, particularly in southern Namibia but also in the Transvaal. These guys were very connected. They were very insinuated into, into government circles. But it, that wasn't entirely clear at first. So it's, there was kind of a, there was kind of like a shadow colonization policy pursued by Berlin during this time. And by the turn of the, by the turn of the 20th century, you know, Germany was insinuated into Africa but not in ways that would allow them to assert sovereign political rights. And Bismarck there after, after one of the kind of fruitless negotiations with the British on this, you know, enduring kind of sore point he lamented like you know, the British declared like a Monroe Doctrine of Africa. Like that's preposterous. You know, like you can, you, you can assert Sphere of influence within reason. You know, basically like anywhere in the continent you occupy. Like now the British are saying like the seas belong entirely to them. Like the, the largest continent on earth belongs entirely to them. Like that's, that, that's preposterous. You know, there's, there's, there's an arrogance there that needn't be abided. Okay. And it's, I mean frankly there's, there's an aspect of that like in the American mind too. Like that's, that's not, that's not the way you do things. You know, it's not a, you don't, you know, you don't go out of your way to disrespect people particularly when it's imperative that they believe you're treating them as equals, especially when you're not. Okay. I mean this is, this is kind of like Power Politics 101. But it's also when one considers the situation of the empire and the precarious position in which it was and the rise of the quote colored world as was referred to, you know, in less delicate times there was something kind of stupefying about the fact that the British were treating Germany like, not just like a second rate power but as this kind of like alien elements know. And it, so there's something reworked about it. I maintain. Bismarck was forced out in 1890 and we got into that and kind of the constellation of forces that facilitated that. But this kind of, this led to a real policy adrift. The kind of nominal reasoning for forcing out Bismarck was to throw off the shackles of the self imposed constraints of Bismarckian policy. And towards that effect Germany immediately abandoned the reinsurance treaty with Russia in 1890, which was a dumb move because again you don't, you don't, you don't flagrantly, you don't, you don't flagrantly repudiate treaties unless you have to to make a statement. So they set about, you know, striking immediately antagonistic posture towards the Tsar. With the departure of Bismarck there's the appointment of Leovon Caprivi as chancellor who was very much overshadowed by the Kaiser Wilhelm who also ascended to the throne that same year. Velh had a tendency to overpower people. He was a bullying figure like subsequently Chancellor Hovig was not at all was, was a very strong executive and, and as they indicated a very kind of tragic figure. But the preview was anything but and the new course of the, of the post Bismarck era. It was less a matter of kind of concerted design than it Was but again it was, it was just like a lot of drift, you know, like a scattershot irresolute it. The chief of the foreign ministry was Frederick von Holstein. Holstein. Such that there was like a real like policy vision. Holstein was responsible for formulating it. He doubled down on reinforcing ties with the Habsburg Empire and sought to balance some emergent risks in the Balkans that could lead to war with the UK by approaching London directly. And he was largely repudiated. He didn't favor a full fledged alliance with Britain nor do you think that was possible. But he, he saw the writing on the wall and he realized that at the core of his thinking was, was, was, was, was that was that Germany to act before the United Kingdom. You know, it became, became an enemy. Okay. Essentially the, the price for that superficially seemed to be based on the kind of signaling from, from London was a formal renunciation by Germany of any claim to colonial acquisitions and Caprivi. And frankly Bismarck too at that juncture seemed willing to pay that. The. What really changed things again was in 1894, 95, just about three years subsequent to this kind of like, you know, not quite concord, but understanding with the UK that you know, so long as, so long as Germany repudiated any, any claim to sovereign dominion and in, in Africa or any of the other colonial domains whereby the United Kingdom was, you know, the sole colonial authority that they, they at least have some kind of like informal guarantee that regardless of any pre existing alliances that London entered into, like Germany first and foremost would be afforded equality status and you know, negotiation would occur on individual terms between London and Berlin. I missed any, any, any, any, any emergent crisis. But what happened was like I touched on a minute ago there long been strange tensions, Anglo German tension relating to the, the Cape Colony, the British Cape Colony and its neighbor to the north, which was the Transvaal or the Boer South African Republic. The Transvaal was internationally recognized, including by Britain as independent. Cecil Rhodes who was the chief executive, the procurator of the Cape Colony. He had every intention of conquering the Transvaal. He believed it was rich in gold deposits. There's vast gold reserves discovered in the 1880s. Since this became, this became an inquisitive fixation. Okay. The background of the Transvaal was German settlers. Again, there'd been this informal kind of policy of colonization by capital. Fully, fully like 1/5 or something of the foreign capital invested in Transvaal was, was German. Okay. The Germans naturally took an interest in maintaining the Boer Republic's independence. And the Boers themselves, they were reformed, you know, they were Calvinists. They were a pioneer people. I mean, like us, they were mostly Dutch, but there was Huguenots, like Scots Anglos among them. But they, they were very. They were Germanic people, okay? And very, very, very racially aware. Only their congregational reform faith, like, very, very focused on communitarian concerns. You know, like, very, very racialized. Like, like, like, like warrior, like Germanic people, okay? This kind of like, very strong affinity developed, okay? And of course, you know, like these, These. The. This kind of German, like capitalist class that settled there. You know, like they married the daughters, the bores, things like this, okay? So the po.
- [206:32]
Pete
The.
- [206:32]
Thomas
The. The. The post Bismarck Berlin regime developed like a very, very strong interest in. In. In the Transwaal, okay? Berlin planned to build a railway linking the Transvaal with Portuguese Mozambique and specifically with the Loga Bay. This caused London to go berserk and issue formal protests. And when the Germans refused to abandon construction of the project, the government continued the. The London considered quite literally assaulting the Loga Bay, annexing it, destroying the inu. Construction of the railroad up to that point and essentially like laying everything to waste. Okay. What their solution was wasn't quite that catastrophically severe, but it was probably one of the worst possible courses around this time too. Sir Edward Mallet, who was the British ambassador in Berlin, he aired gravely when he started openly speaking of the Transvaal as a troubled spot in German relations, Anglo German relations, and just kind of casually, just kind of flippantly declared that, you know, if there was going to be like any possibility of war between. Between countries, it would be in the Transvaal. It would be because the Germans, you know, would. Were too pigheaded to back down. So like a perfect storm kind of. Of. Of ill will began developing here, you know. And again, I think. Richard Clark, I don't find historians who really emphasize this and like, it's. To me it's so obvious, but once this caused something of an infrastructure race with the Cape Colony, Rhodes had been intending to build a railway, a railway line of. Of his own to Johannesburg. And it was in part rerouted to try and get as much of the railway traffic as possible from the Transvaal by like, reducing its rates to near nothing. And you know, I mean, all kinds of. All kinds of like, dirty business, okay? The Transvaal Republic responded by levying huge tariffs on the parts of the Cape Cody railroad they ran through the Transvaal. In answer to this, the British started disembarking their goods once the railroad crashed. Once the. Once the cargo passed the Vaal river, they'd like, unload it they'd load it onto beast of Burton and literally take it by beast and wagon, you know to the border. Then like reloaded another train car to like avoid having to pay the train which is kind of like money python like and funny but like you know the, the Germans and the Boers and think it was too funny. So Paul Krueger who was chancellor of the Transvaal Republic and it was a fascinating guy, like a real, a real hero. You know Krugerrands are Krugerrands because Paul Kruger's face is on them. Will probably know but I, I don't know if everybody does. The Paul Krueger reacted by blocking access to the Transvaal and closing like literally like, like closing like ingress. Ingress access Rouse on, on the Cape side. This uh, this led Cecil Rhodes. He began seriously, he began to seriously lobby London for like a formal assault occupation, annexation at Transvaal. Just like the hell with it. Like let's just kill these people. Let's conquer, you know, the Transvaal. We're all going to get rich anyway because those Kraut bastards are sitting a bunch of gold and they won't give us any. What this culminated in was, was called the Jameson raid on December 29th, 1895. Rhodes had been steadily importing, steadily conspiring to conquer the trans law the way of Utlanders Uitlanders is a boar Dutch literally for outlanders foreigners like white people who were generally English, some of which were like bona fide settlers but a lot of whom were mercenaries and just kind of like privateers and, and you know like you, you know like outlaw types who you know were going to Africa to find their fortune and you know if it, if that, if that entailed, you know going to war against, against the boors, you know, we'll do that. Rhodes was conspiring to orchestrated conquest of Transvaal by these guys, you know and, and, and try and maintain some kind of plausible deniability, you know, like oh hey, like I, you know I, I've got no control of these people and they certainly are here on the best of the Crown. You know it's. But the James was forced the minute they crossed into the Transvaal. They were tracked by the boars who you know were basically like as deadly as Apache like in their own turf. They basically encountered immediate resistance. There's a brief exchange of fire and, and the board just freaking clobbered them. Jameson immediately surrendered like local commandant. Like the surviving men were like thrown into Frateria jail. And you know, Kruger made a big deal about this. Like basically like you guys are idiots. Like you're never gonna. You're never gonna. Like you're never like you're never going to take the Transvaal, you know. The aborted attack though, it caused an international incident. You know, I mean like there was like. I mean like it's funny, the whole thing's funny but like, but like people didn't think it was funny. Like you know, I mean international incidents are like often funny in actual terms but like, but they lead to like not so funny. The, the. The British government, you know they insisted like they, you know, this was not sanctioned or anything. You know the Berlin was like demanding you know, some kind of like formal apology. It The. It began appearing in. In. In. In. In German dailies basically that you know, like, like look at these fools. Like I mean first of all they're bandits. They've got no respect for the rule of law. Despite them insisting that you know they, They've got a scrupulous. They scrupulously honor you know like the laws of the. Of. Of. Of white Christian Dom. Even like in these outlying domains. You know, like basically all the kind of forget whatever plans you have this weekend because you're staying at home and playing on Spin Quest. And there's never been a better time to sign up than right now. New users get $30 coin packs for just $10. All the table games you love with hundreds of slot games and real cash Prizes. That's at spinquest.com S-P-I-N Q U-E-T.com Spin Quest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. Hostility that it been brewing relating to you know, Germany's need and kind of desire to assert a gross rom veld politik kind of came to a head owing to. Owing to this incident. Now what really kind of made this infamous. A lot of people have heard of the quote Kruger Telegram, Wilhelm. He sent a telegram to Krueger congratulating him, wishing him a happy New Year and congratulate him on quote, having quote defended the independence of your country against external attack without. Without appealing for the help of friendly powers. So basically Vilhelm was just openly said like yeah, you know, like if you go to war with the British Empire, you know, and you need like, like the German army will be there if you need us. Which was an incredibly stupid thing to say, you know, for all. All kinds of reasons. And when the Boer War did pop off this, this really. This really constrained like Germany's freedom of action and it hurt the Bores frankly, like there was nothing funny about it. But it was also just results are just obtuse. I mean like it's not even, there's really nothing to be gained by that. Especially in those days when politics, particularly between monarchs like truly was personal in a matter of masculine honor. Especially in the colonial dominions which literally bore like your name, you know, as like your sovereign dominion. Like it's, you know, you don't. You, you should always give men like a way out unless they're truly your enemy and you're. There's no coming back from the enmity between you. Like whether you talk about business warfare, you know, something as grand as high politics or as banal is like an interpersonal problem. Like you, you always got to give other men like a way out. You can't just like disrespect people and you know, grin and like hope for the best and like gloat about it. I mean you can, but it's a terrible way to, a terrible way to go through life because it, it tends to be incredibly self defeating. But this, this caus it, this cause it like, like huge outrage in the British press as well as in the British street, you know, and more than anything, frankly in that era and even later, man, even, even during like the Churchill era, like this, this really, this, this, this was really the only time I think the British street was truly soured against like the German Reich, you know, in, in genuine terms. Ultimately Berlin accepted some perfunctory diplomatic concessions short of an apology, but you know, enough of a. The crown, if you're to genuflect enough like to Berlin that they felt like they could claim victory. But what they extracted was concessions that excluded Germany from any further involvement in the political future of southern Africa. And to the disgust of the German nationalists, the Germans refused to, they absolutely refused to intervene on behalf of the Transvaal during the Boer War, which was a horrible war, a genocidal war. And the Boers were literally locked in concentration camps. That's not war propaganda. That happened. Okay. I mean that's well documented. Like regardless of age, sex, overall health, you know, like, like, like women, like little boys and girls, like old people, war wounded. I mean they, they, they look like skeletons and they, they were, they were treated as, as categorical enemies. But that, but I mean that goes to show you too, like how, how, how much Wilhelm just kind of acted on impulse, you know. I mean if you're gonna. Particularly, particularly considering the situation of the Boars, which really was a David Goliath situation. Contra the British Empire issuing this telegram which amounts to a guarantee like basically like a war guarantee an event. You know these people go to war with the Crown like poisoning. Poisoning relations with. With London for a generation and then, and then completely abdicating the guarantee for the purpose of sustaining the peace. You know. All the boars essentially. Well essentially like the doomsday scenario ensues vis a vis the. The. You know the, the. The. The. The Cape Colony is. Is just unconscionable. But as I'm always pointing out to people, there's a reason as. And we'll get into the why There's a reason why Hitler denied the Kaiser state funeral and basically there was a schustafel guards. He he died in exile in the Netherlands. But he you know, he was not like treated as some like honored dignitary by the Third Reich. And Hitler held him in. In. In in genuine contempt which I think was well placed. It's easy these days particularly in America to They're like lampoon monarchs or, or kind of like burn them in effigy like. Like oh, we know better now. But in. In the case of Vil, he really was an ugly person. Every every step of the way from his ascendancy until the cessation of hostilities. I'm frankly getting tired. So I think I'm gonna. I think. I think I'm gonna call it quits for now, man. And at long last we'll get into like the guts of. Of of us of the onset of hostilities. Next episode. We should talk a little bit about the Blue Water naval race. But that's kind of a. This could. That won't take long. But yeah, we'll, we'll dive into the good stuff next time. I hope I didn't bore anybody to death. This stuff's really important. I find it fascinating but for background and context it's essential.
- [221:35]
Pete
I think people really enjoy the. The Boar and the Transvaal stuff.
- [221:39]
Thomas
Yeah, I think it's fascinating and like I said along with. I mean. I mean I identify strolling with people in Ulster. I mean, I mean it's part of like what I am. I mean blood wise. I mean but it's. But Africana's are like really early are like if you're like reformed and you're like white and you're you know, pioneer stock. I mean those. They really are like our people. Like there is like, you know, there is like a. A Protestant diaspora. Discernibly. It's not just you know, a. Some some kind of construct of historians or sociologists but yeah, this was great, man. I hope, I hope it meets, I hope it lives up to your expectations as well as the subscribers.
- [222:28]
Pete
Always, always do plugs and we'll get out.
- [222:32]
Thomas
Yeah man. For the time being. I'm on Twitter. I got, I, I, I got banned from Telegram again. I, I don't know how I, I find Telegram to be horrible, frankly. I only, I only started with it again because people like really like it and they were like begging me to start a channel again but they, it's run by these cr, these like Yuki sickos who literally like do stuff like posting like snuff porn porn. But then they like, but then they like ban me for like saying like fairly innocuous like about Ukraine or like sometimes Israel. It's, it's like literally insane. So I'm not on there anymore. I'm trying to get the chat on my sub stack a little more live on my sub stack. That's what the podcast is. That's where a lot of my longer form stuff is. It's a real R e a l thomas777.substack.com Season 2 of the Pod is gonna drop right around Halloween at which time all season one content will be free. It is only five bucks a month to subscribe. I'm gonna make it totally free as soon as possible. As of now that's the lowest I can go without like eating a loss on it for the time being. I'm on X formerly Twitter. It's real capital R E A L underscore number seven H O M A S777. You can always find me at thomas777.com again number seven in lieu of a T H O M A S777.com it's kind of like a one stop spot for like just like stuff that I'm doing and like and kind of like photos and shit if you like that kind of stuff. People seem to dig it and the kid who maintains the website for me is a great guy. And the the Asylum mag run by my dear friend Giles. I'm gonna have another piece appearing there soon. I'm working on Steelstorm 3. I'm working on some other shit. I got a lot going on. Even doesn't seem like it not I got a lot going on. I got a cool busy life. Like I'm, I'm doing a lot of like content wise. It's just not going to drop for a minute. But rest assured I'm not going slack. That's all right man.
- [224:52]
Pete
Yep. Till the Next time. Thank you.
- [224:54]
Thomas
Thank you, Pete.
- [224:56]
Pete
I want to welcome everyone back to the Piono Show. We are back here for part four of the World War I series. How are you doing, Thomas?
- [225:04]
Thomas
I'm doing well. I wanted to apologize. The last recording session in particular, there's a little bit more dead air on my end and pauses that I usually, you know, that I usually am afflicted with. Like, I've not been feeling well this winter. Man, that's not some like old lady lament. When I'm in that kind of shape and like on like little sleep and like medicated, I'm not at 100%, but I prefer to power through rather than canceling stuff because if we cancel stuff every time, it'll feel, well, like nothing gets done. And I realize that sometimes I'm. I perform better than others. So just keep that in mind. Like, don't spare my feelings with feedback. But I just wanted to make that clear. And I apologize in advance if sometimes, like, I'm not listenable because of shit like that. But today we got to get into the murder of Franz Ferdinand. That's what we're going to conclude with. And then at long last, we'll get into the battlefield situation and how such things developed. But you know, honestly, the First World War, like the War between the States, the battlefield dimension is tremendously important because literally in the course of the conflict, the entire conceptual landscape changed about how land war is conducted. Like, you know, 100% World War I started out as well. One started out as basically, I mean, not basically like, like conventional cavalry, like still had a combined arms role at the outside of hostilities. Like by the end, by night, by the end of the, by the end of the war, like mechanized war had arrived. That's just the way, you know, people conceptualize land warfare, you know, and just like, just like the War between the States, like, started as, you know, not, not particularly distinguishable from, you know, the Crimean War or even like the later Napoleonic wars, you know, but by the end of it, it was like a World War I type engagement. Okay, but aside from that, the, the political situation is what matters in World War I and the bizarre convergence of circumstances that led to it happening in the first place and the fact that, you know, nobody like in situ or like in the EPA could even really point to what was the absolute imperative to go to war. You know, this isn't just like fog of war stuff or, you know, like, I, I'm always reiterating, I'm the first to acknowledge emphatically that war Arrives like the season. It's not as a result of conspiratorial designs or things like that. But World War I is a particularly odd case of politics and pretty much pure politics leading to a disastrous outcome of endless battlefield violence. And it's not really precedented. And in the Second World War, like, the political. It was clear, like, what the political division was, you know, for a decade previous. If you, if you. If you cite the onset of World War II at September 3, 1939. I mean, it was clear for a decade what, what was, what was underway, okay? World War I was not at all like that. And that's why I focus so much on. On the political aspect. It's not just. I try to give, like, military guys, like, equal. Equal conceptual time. I mean, not just because they have interesting things to say. So when they suggest things to me or like, you know, when they let me pick their brain, I very, very. I hugely appreciate that. And I'm. I always check beforehand that I'm conveying what they expressed to me accurately. But the fact is, like, I'm not like a military guy, okay, at all. You know, I'm not. I'm not only not like private surveys, like, I'm just not. I think I know something about power politics at scale and like, the war and peace aspect of that, obviously. But I'm the kind of guy who reads stuff like Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn and, you know, like clause of wit so much. I part ways of clouds of wit. And I mean, stuff like that, you know, I'm not, I'm not a guy who pours over, like, battlefield maps and, you know, it's not like I can draw upon, you know, some like, you know, some like, experience of infantry combat or something, and, and, you know, convey that to people. So I think what's important as a historical writer, you know, not just to stick to the evidentiary record and pretty much that alone, but also, you know, not, not. Not to hold forth on aspects of it that, you know, one is not an expert on. And it'd be, like, misguided for me, like, hold myself as a military expert anyway. Okay? That's what I'm getting at. But I take people's point. I'm trying to get equal time. I mean, look, this is a huge topic, okay? I promise that by the time we're done dealing with the battlefield aspect of World War I, you're going to be sick of hearing about it, okay? So I'm not just going to. I'm not. I'm not Just going to be talking about a bunch of like boring royals and their intrigues and then, you know, gives like a little bit of time to things like, you know, poison gas and machine guns and what these things do to human bodies and how awesome it is. I'm just kidding. It's not awesome, but it is cool. And you're lying if you don't think so. But today, like I said, we're going to get into the murder of Franz Ferdinand, which is a pretty horrible homicide in all honesty. And Ferdinand is kind of unduly maligned. He was one of the better royals, that final kind of coterie, as was Franz Joseph. And we'll get into a little bit of that too. You know, the Habsburg system, however dysfunctional it was, you know, however much it's kind of raison d' etre in practical terms, had long since evaporated, you know, and you know, kind of like washed away by time as it were. Like the Habsburgs themselves, they were a hell of a lot more admirable than, you know, their counterparts in London and in Berlin and elsewhere. And people forget too, one of the things that was truly perverse about Colonel House and these, these guys in Wilson's orbit who ultimately started shrieking about like, we've got to fight for democracy. Other than France, every, every European power was a monarchy. You know, in some of those states, like Russia was, was a true monarchy, like the czar was the czar, and we'll get into that too, and like the impact that had on the political situation and ultimately the, the resolution of the, of the crisis. But you know, you're talking about Europe. The European political landscape was populated by nothing but monarchies. You know, in the French situation, it like the absence of one or the absence of a successor executive, you know, that had, that had the confidence of body politic in essential ways. You know, France was a basket case. It was essentially react by perennial gridlock in political terms. There was no momentum one way or the other. And arguably the reason why France became so committed to, to pursuing the war effort is because it finally like provided a trajectory by which, you know, the, the kind of machine could lurch like one way or another, you know, pursuant to the kind of subconscious desire that, you know, some, some momentum or movement is preferable to none. But I'm getting ahead of myself. When we finished off last time, and I will not dwell on this, but we spoke about the fact that at the turn of the 20th century, a blue water navy that was the equivalent of nuclear weapons, okay. I mean, Obviously, like adjusting for destructive power and scale and you know, not in material terms, but also in, in conceptual terms like the psychological impactfulness of these things. But a true world power. You, you were not a world power unless you had a blue water navy and a fleet of service battleships of the era. Could it could they could, they could deliver devastating firepower. Okay, so one of the big criticisms in the epoch and now, like I said, other than Christopher Clark, there's not much thoughtful scholarship on the causes of World War I that brings something new to the table. You know, kind of the fallback is either German militarism, which we've been dealing with really is a myth. I mean it's not some, that's not some Germanophile cope. I mean it really is. Germany hadn't been at war for decades. You know, Europe had been at peace other than the, other than the Crimean War, you know, and the, the Franco Prussian War, which was a. Which. Which by that, which by the. Which by the onset of hostilities was, you know, decades in the past. You know, I mean, so it can't be said to this kind of culture of militarism, supposedly. I mean, who was sustaining it? You know, a handful of men in their 60s and 70s. But in any event, one of the main supposed concrete examples of Germany's provocative disposition was Germany pursuing a blue water navy. Now, for any world power, nascent or otherwise, there was nothing outrageous about believing that one would not be taken seriously in power political terms unless it acquired a credible naval capability. Okay? Now as we talked about last week, you know, London not only had welcomed the naval treaty with Japan, but had become literally a staple of regional stability in the Pacific, which indirectly facilitated continued British hegemony over the high seas. Because what truly mattered was the Atlantic Fleet, okay, in power political terms. And the British, they had no problem affording Japan, you know, a non white, you know, a colored power from that kind of, you know, equality of status in, in basic terms, but they retain this kind of masterful and highly disrespectful tone with Germany. Like in 1897, the, the acting German ambassador in London was Eckerstein. Eckerstein. Baron Hermann von Eckerstein. One of the reasons why he was favored by the Foreign ministry at that time, even as the post Bismarck regime course of policy was kind of adrift. Eckerstein, the traditional process of selecting your diplomats is you find a man who's both well liked by the host country in the right circles and a man who understands the hosting culture. And Eric, he was this notorious Anglophile, you know, he, he spent basically all year round in, in the UK He. He was, he was this kind of womanizer. He would hang around London clubs. He literally dressed like Edward vii. You know, he. He carried on like, like, like, like in like an English F era. Okay. He was the, the. The undersecretary of the British Home of Foreign Office, who was Francis Bertie, who was known to have particular clout in, in naval matters. There was something of a meritocratic culture to that and that. Which is interesting how Churchill became insinuated into. Into. Into a maritime role when he was completely unqualified. But that was the exception. In any event, Egerstein approached Bertie, you know, in kind of softball terms about whether there, you know, some kind of. Some kind of concord could be reached in on the Avrian Cape, you know, particularly in the matter of the Transvaal, you know, so that however unlikely a general war might be between powers, you know, such, such, such misunderstandings could be avoided. Bertie's reply was that the British government would stop at nothing, you know, even a dec. A full declaration of war to repel any German intervention in Africa, you know, and any, any deployment of German forces, the German Imperial Forces, Africa, you know, to that the threatened the Cape Colony to be treated as an assault on the UK Herself. Which was a crazy thing to say, you know, but this is a man who spoke for the high seas English fleet, and he's doing two things. He's taking a friendly diplomat from a fellow white European power, a nascent world power that. Who's approached him somewhat beseechingly and he's slapping him in the face proverbially, while also declaring that he's going to go to war quite literally for a fairly meaningless colonial holding that only really became contentious owing to the foolish posturing ultimately of a German emperor who is known for saying foolish things all the time that nobody took seriously. So like, this idea that, you know, this idea that you know, kind of unified Germany, like the kind of Nazi German empire was this ridiculously bellicose state that just nobody, you know, who's. He's kind of like aggressive posturing nobody could abide is nonsense. You know, for the record too. I mean, this was, this was the. This is like the Roosevelt era. Like Roosevelt the first, you know, Teddy Roosevelt elect the Rough Riders and all that, you know, of America, you know, America provoked a war with this, with Spain, you know, essentially to like grab up what remained of Spanish holdings in the Americas. I'm not saying that's wrong at all, but I mean, this led to a disastrous war in the Philippines for the Filipinos. I mean, America certainly kicked a lot of ass, but it killed about half a million people. You know, the. Not during the war between the States, which was still within living memory. You know, there'd been some incredibly bad blood, you know, between the Union and London. There had been the Trent affair where the secretary that the US Navy had said, you know, we've got, we've got to think, we've got to think seriously in the future about, you know, considering the British Atlantic Fleet as, you know, our like, main enemy on the high seas. So this idea that Germany is saying like, hey, can we find a way, you know, a, like we want a blue water navy, like, you know, Japan has, but not nearly that scaled and can we find a way to, you know, defend our own interests in southern Africa without going to war and like being treated as if, you know, such things are just beyond the pale of, of, of, of diplomacy as it stood then, you know, let alone precursors to. Precursors to, to the statements or conduct giving, you know, that could be interpreted as the acts of war is. And that's completely absurd. And it's Clark as well as AJP Taylor a generation before. For those that don't know Taylor. I'm sorry, I'm in a lot of pain. Taylor wrote, Taylor wrote the Origins of the Second World War. That's kind of a seminal book. Okay. He's a revisionist of a sword. Absolutely.
- [240:06]
Pete
You want me to pause?
- [240:07]
Thomas
No, no, it's fine. But thank you though. But he, you know, he became the origin of the Second World War was, was tremendously impactful in academic circles. Okay. He was Norman Davies mentor in a lot of ways. Okay. Also like Norman Davies, but he, he, he wrote a lot of shorter form stuff on the First World War. And like I said, Christopher Clark is a contemporary historian who's one of the best historians of, of modern Germany, I think, who is active today. Those are the only two historians who are well known and that I've come across who raised the point, you know, again, you know, in trying to kind of identify and aggregate statements by Wilhelm himself, who again said a lot of stupid things as royals tended to do or by the German Foreign Office or by men in the German admiralty like Tirpitz himself, that could be interpreted as, you know, bellicose posturing or threats to the status quo in power political terms or things that by their tenor or implication could be interpreted to be unacceptable within the culture of European public diplomacy. That stood, you just don't find these things. So there's not really concrete particulars people can point to when they talk about this like German belligerence. It's just not really there, you know. Now the rebuttal of that is that, well, you know, the German Navy
- [241:54]
Pete
in
- [241:55]
Thomas
their war games they openly identify the hypothetical adversary as the Royal Navy. It's like, yeah, but in a general staff system where you know, you've got a permanent professional class, the staff officers who plan for military contingencies and exigencies, they're in you proceed with your war gaming in based upon capabilities. Okay, and that's it. I mean like who would, who would the German general staff be war gaming against in their, in their, in their scenarios? You know, I mean like it's, this should be obvious, you know, I mean I, I know there's like foolish rhetoric on Capitol Hill these days, but the UE's, the US Navy runs war games where obviously the OP4 is a stand in for the Chinese. Okay. That doesn't mean America's imminently going to assault China, you know, but that's kind of the, you know, and especially too like a culture like the uk which is true, like a maritime culture. I mean they didn't, they didn't have the same kind of staff system that Prussia and then Germany did. But I mean, you better believe that they, you better believe that they gamed possible scenarios in their own way. I don't really understand a lot about that. Where the rubber meets the road in terms of naval combat is extraordinarily complicated. And there's variables that somebody like me who's like literally like never been near like a ship just doesn't understand. I know there's people who claim, I mean, and maybe they're right. There's infantry officer types who say that, you know, armored combat in the open desert is somewhat like naval warfare. That may be true. Okay. But I haven't found the concrete particulars and the variables identified in those kinds of scenarios to be like unintelligible in the way that I have with these like intricate like naval games. But I mean the point being, you know, this is not, this is not some, this is not some gotcha whereby oh, the Germans were planning to fight England. I mean it's, that's not how things work, you know. But be as it may, the, By the same, I mean turned about being fair play until, until the signing of the entente Cordell in 1904, you know, between, between the British and the French. You know, the French talked about Ways to. Or they, they gamed, you know, ways to. To blockade the English Channel, you know, and essentially systematically, systematically starve out the British ability to. To wage war. And you know, what was called the new school in continental naval war planning was. I'm sure I'm butchering that like I do pronunciations, but they'd envision the systematic use of blockade coupled with. And this is the pre aircraft area, like fast ships, you know, they could chase down vessels quick enough to, you know, to bust. To bust through the cordon. Okay. I mean this was not. And this was as. Again, this was as late as like 1897, 98, 99. The French were talking this way and then. And of course to what ultimately one of the, one of the, one of the things that loomed so large in the German public mind, not just among military types, but I mean among just regular people. And we'll get to this in our series. The British blockade against the Kaiserreich was devastating. You know, the continent truly can be locked down in a kind of quarantine, you know, and the European continent is not the United States, you know, it's, it's a peninsula that truly is starved of essential commodities. And this had not happened before. But the Germans saw the writing on the wall. And if there's a pragmatic, if there's a determinative pragmatic impetus, again like notwithstanding, you know, ideological, cultural or moral in general terms, impetus for, you know, Berlin cultivating the United Kingdom notwithstanding any of those things, the possibility of a true starvation blockade being implemented by the UK and the Royal Navy specifically was something that people realized was very, very possible and which would be entirely congruous with then developing war doctrine. But also the Germans had lost the naval race hands down. If we didn't say that a naval race was underway. The number of German surface battleships rose from 13 to 16 between about 1895 and 1905. Meanwhile, the British battle fleet more than doubled or almost doubled from 29 to 44. Tirpitz's Admiral Tirpitz his ambition had been at the outset of the Blue Water Navy. Blue Water Navy program was a ratio of one German battleship like surface warfare battleship for every 1.5 Royal Navy battleship. But I mean, but that never is it his it where the river met the road. That ambition was never close to being realized, not just in, in concrete terms what was built but it, it was, it was not. It was not taken seriously by the Reichstag and I, I don't think by the rest of the military establishment, but by. But by 1912, 1913, I mean, part of this is political because traditionally German general officers abide the will of political leadership. And part of this was, I'm sure, you know, a face saving measure. But Turbotz declared that based on capabilities inherent to, you know, then like new weapons platforms that had been fielded, he declared he was happy with the ratio they'd accomplished. And so I mean essentially like by 1913 Germany had abandoned if there was an Anglo German arms race at all. It had been abandoned formally by 1913. And meanwhile the British never scaled back the production table at pace that they pursued for the preceding nine years by that point. So I mean it's not. Sometimes the truth is in the numbers. You know, where is this German arms race? Or was this Anglo German arms race supposedly initiated by Germany? You know, it was. Happy birthday America. It's time to celebrate and play your favorite Las Vegas casino games by American owned spinquest.com what's better than fireworks and American pie? Hitting a blackjack in the palm of your hand and you won't lose your fingers. Over a thousand games including slots and live dealers and 30 coin packs are on sale for 10 spinquest.com buy American players. For American players, Spin Quest is a free to play social casino. Boyd where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. You could say, well that's like Webb declaring that we need a 600 ship Navy to defeat Warsaw Pact. And we didn't get close to that. It's like no, but a 400 ship Navy. And when you pull your, when you pull your Iowa class battleships out of, out of being mothballed to, to make them like, to make them like nuclear battle cruisers, like that sends a kind of statement that it doesn't. When you simply, when you, you know, when you simply declare yourself satisfied with forces and being okay. I mean that's, people can argue this all day, but I, I don't believe that German survey ships are somehow, I don't see how they're somehow like superpowered or what have you and that, you know, they're, they can be said to just by existing, you know, make up for, make up for numeric disparities of you know, 2 and 3 to 1. But that's kind of the other. I mean the only emphasize, I'm not trying to bore, bore everybody to death with the minutia and trivia of naval warfare, but this is like a big issue that is like thrown in the face where a vision is like, oh, what about what, what about this naval arms race that was, that was instigated by, you know, by, by Wilhelm and Turpus. You know, my, my rebuttal is that it did not exist. Okay. Yeah. And it's also something to keep in mind about all this talk that was bandied about threats, strategic threats, and what kind of primary threats and what sort of budgetary allocations had to be rendered. This was the emergence really kind of the managerial state. Even though, as we talked about at the onset of this episode outset, rather, you know, European political life remained populated by monarchs. These monarchs were increasingly kind of, kind of, kind of self conscious ops, like self consciously, like, like obsolescent, you know, you had these, you had legislatures that to some degree or another were all accountable to the body politic. You had formal lobbying structures that represented heavy industry, trade unions, Discrete military industries that quite literally relied upon the ability to present a cognizable strategic threat or challenge in order to survive. And also when politics becomes, and this was the lament of Carl Schmidt and, and everybody else in the Weimar era, you know, politics, you know, the modern parliamentary system, it's not just about, you know, it's not just about, it's not just about whether or not there's perverse incentives, you know, the parliamentarians to act correctly or whatever and you know, historical terms and what have you and the way that, you know, the ancient regime will not perfect, at least, you know, theoretically, was, was, was, was constitutionally structured to do so. There's the, there's the issue of, you know, populations becoming, you know, massively scaled in the tens of millions, which was an issue of first impression most places, you know, the true onset of actual media, you know, not, not just, you know, an occasional newspaper where, you know, 5% of people could read. You're talking about like a constant transmission of radio, you know, you're talking about movie houses where people develop their conceptual picture of the world, you know, from like these two minute like shorts, you know, war and peace questions get reduced to slogans. Then, you know, and if you want to survive in the parliamentary system, if your opponent, you know, if your opponent takes the floor and says, you know, I'm going to meet the German threat, you know, without exception, you know, whatever it takes, like, what's my opponent going to do? Like, you can't, you can't take an hour and explain why that's a fucked up attitude. And that doesn't make any sense.
- [254:34]
Pete
Your neighbors aren't reading your memes. If you want to counter demoralization where it counts most, your community, you're going to have to bring it into meatspace. Get your counter propaganda gear@mostlypeaceful.com made especially for people who did have breakfast this morning. Mostlypeaceful.com has merch for the dissonant right, recovering libertarians and your based uncle, who knew about them 20 years before you did, featuring apparel, hats and stickers that piss off all the bad people and make the right people laugh. There's plenty of Uncle Ted stuff. Killdozer, Waco and Ruby Ridge. There's even a Rhodesia designer too. Most of it has been banned from the big marketplaces and led to PayPal and Shopify, suspending accounts. If you're more Bill Cooper than Alex Jones, more Pinochet than PragerU, stop@mostlypeaceful.com and start shirt posting. Use code PETE to save 20% off your order. This message was not approved by the ADL or splc. Can I ask you a question? Yeah. With the level of propaganda we've been seeing lately with this, with this thing in the Middle east, would you say that World War I was probably the premier, was like the true start of war propaganda in history or on a wide scale? I mean, obviously there was propaganda before, but it was limited how much it could be generated.
- [256:05]
Thomas
In Europe, definitely. I think the War between the States. One of the Reasons why I Like a Disease in the Public Mind by Tom Fleming. I mean, Fleming was a great historian and writer. I mean, he was also like. He was also like a very objective voice. He wasn't some lost cause historian. There's nothing wrong with that. I'm something of a lost cause story myself. But he was like this Irish Catholic guy from the Northeast. So it's not like he's carrying water for either side. But there was an outsized literacy rate in a lot of places in America which where political authority kind of concentrated. And for about 30 years there's this constant stream of abolitionist agit prophet that was just like unending. Okay. And some of these people were true believers, you know, like people like John Brown. Like. Like John Brown was a terrible person, but he wasn't. He wasn't just like saying things. He believed everything he said. You know, like he thought that he was ushering in this kind of like racial apocalypse that would. That would cleanse the land, like insane as that sounds. But John Brown didn't just think this up all by himself. You know, there was a lot of guys and some ladies, you know, who were basically literate, you know, from having learned to read scripture. And like all they read. Like all they read Was this, like, crazy abolitionist stuff, you know, and, yeah, that's different than a radio broadcasting all day, you know, more immersive propaganda. And it's certainly different than, like, you know, a movie house blasting out the same stuff with a visual element. But it is. But that was the first example at scale. I think Michael Jones, he makes a big deal about the Jaguar revolution. I see his point. And he makes the point, too, about how, like, the Saad was, like, exploiting pornography, like, literally, like, dirty pictures to kind of insinuate a revolutionary sensibility into people and not to be crude, but kind of like getting people to think with their dick instead of their mind. Like, that stuff is all true, but in terms of, like, a concrete, like, coherent, if insane, conceptual narrative, like, over years, you know, and in America's case, decades of the south is Gamora. It's totally evil. These slave masters are butchering blacks and taking black women as these concubine slaves. You know, it's going to get struck down by God. Like, do you want to get struck down with them? No. Stand up and liberate these people. And the black man is an innocent primitive. So, you know, he's, He's. He, He's. He's the richest in the eyes of God. So you got to lead him against Mammon and Gamora. Like, that stuff is really, really, really powerful, you know, so that's my take on it. But, yeah, and in the terms we're discussing, definitely. And it's also too, just this convergence. Unfortunately, the causal relationship or the common, like, causal nexus is complicated, but there was some relationship between the onset of conditions that led to the war itself and, you know, kind of modern as we know it. Parliament. Parliament. Parliamentaris. Parliamentarism. So this kind of endless discussion whereby, you know, kind of like your trump card is to say, like, oh, you're not meeting, you know, XYZ strategic threat, or you're not willing to address these things, you know, in a. In a. In a responsible capacity. Yeah, that definitely. That definitely created a perfect storm. It's also too. Like we talked about, and this doesn't excuse the. The cravenness of parliamentarians, but the last. The last European war anybody was alive who fought in really, was the Franco Prussian War. And these were guys in their 60s and 70s, you know, and it was. There was a handful of officers still in uniform who'd been there, but your average parliamentarian, your average, you know, your average firebrand, you know, party whip or whatever, like, he. He had no idea what modern warfare was like. He probably thought it would be like the Crimean War, and there'd be some, you know, there'd be some deployment to the frontier of Hungary or something, and for a few days, you know, there'd be like some token casualties, and then everybody would save face and, like, things would go back to normal. I mean, that's ridiculous, but people are ridiculous. You know, they had no concept it, even though I think in the German general staff they did. And I think there was. There was British army types who I think were serious, but they'd also. One of the things that killed the British Empire, I mean, there was. It was. It was. It died a bizarre natural death owing to Churchill and that coterie. But one of the things that was hurting it, managing a truly global empire, you're constantly dealing with these weird intrigues on the periphery of it, and you're constantly having to kind of finesse various factions, both of whom are kind of grimy. But you. But you have to take a side just because, you know, the balance in your outlying dominions demand it, you know, and it's not the kind of thing. It's not really the kind of thing you can sell as a parliamentary program or as a defense policy, and you can discernibly identify. And Orwell got into this in Burmese Days, which I think is by far his best book. At some point in the 20th century, around the Edwardian era, policy in the colonies and these outlying dominions in the orientation in the. In the. The British Raj, you know, in Africa just started becoming, like, visibly senile. You know, it's like people couldn't, like, the white man couldn't keep it together anymore the way that he had to, you know, it. You had these ambitious guys who wanted to kind of put in a couple years as, you know, like a con, like a constabulary policeman in Burma or in Uganda or something, but they were just kind of pretending that, you know, things were like they were back in London or. I don't care about these darkies and their intrigues anyway, you know, I'm just going to get paid and get out, you know, it's not. That's not the way you can conduct things and, And. And rule the world, literally. So there's part of it, too. You know, you had these guys who were like, oh, no, nobody can beat us in the colonies anyway. What about this German problem? Like, that's a way that you can actually. That's why that. Even dumb. That's a concept even dummies can understand. It brings money in. It brings. It gets, you know, kind of the it gets kind of like the, the, the, the, the, the frozen gears of, of, of, of, of the establishment moving, you know, in a, in a, in a parliamentary driven system. You know, like it, it lets you grand stand as, as some kind of defender of the realm. You know, I'm not even saying people like consciously do this, although some do. But it, you know, that even if you try to explain to people,
- [263:35]
Pete
I'm
- [263:36]
Thomas
no political genius or some guy like in the order of Metternich or Bismarck or Kissinger, but I do know something. And when people approach me, I'm talking about in the real world, okay? And they do a lot, believe it or not. I mean, God help us, right? But ask me something about what do you think the situation is in xyz. And I'll be like, well, my opinion. And I'll start dropping on them what I think the relevant factors are, you know, in terms of the players and the kind of power, political nuance it is. And like their eyes literally like glaze over. Like, people don't want to think about that stuff because it's boring or it doesn't make sense. Like, I'm not denying it. I don't know why I, These are my skill set lies is analyzing these things. I'm not pretending it's like interesting.
- [264:18]
Pete
But everybody wants, everybody wants a checker's answer when it's a chess, when the, when the answer is in chess.
- [264:26]
Thomas
You know, let's also, I mean, just look at today and I'll get back, I'll get back to the, the subject at hand. You know, I, I'm not saying this to stroke myself or say like, oh, I'm so great, I was right. But I said at the onset of hostilities that, that Israel's in grave jeopardy with, with Netanyahu at the helm. And what Netanyahu should have done is assaulted immediately. Like, I mean, immediately. Okay. Basically before, you know, world opinion had a chance to even kind of piece together the variables. Instead, you know, in weird ways, it's kind of like, it's almost like how the heat of passion defense at traditional common law was accepted, you know, incident to an accusation of unprivileged homicide. You know, if you're, if it appears that you're returning the serve in war and peace terms, you know, you, you're, you're afforded a freedom of action that you're not. If you wait for some kind of quorum to develop or if you wait for permission, you know, it really is true. Okay, if you're going to go to war, act Immediately do not ever wait if you're going to go to war. And if you're not going to go to war, do not ever say you are going to and then not do it. Okay? This isn't corny. Like stuff that, like, that like fucking fairies who like in. On Wall street will like read a book of five rings, say, like, this is, this is like very precedented. And it's like human nature and the way the international system works. And it's just the way it is. Like, you don't give. If you have to go to war, you particularly a state like Israel, which is not particularly well situated, I mean, due to its own. This is completely its own doing. But it's not, it's not, it's not particularly, you know, well situated in terms of the ability to defend in depth or anything approaching that. But I mean, this is one of the things that, as we'll see, this is one of the things that led to the catastrophe of the Great War. There's literally a month between what amounted, in my opinion, to a nakedly brutal and truly, truly grotesque political assassination by a gang of real brutes. I'm not, I'm not some bigoted asshole. I'm not, I'm not saying like, I'm not like putting out Slavic people or Serbs, but the people in question here, as we'll see, we're not admirable people. Okay? If the Habsburg Empire acted immediately, you know, it's not, it's not, it's not like the Russians like went all in, you know, when Bulgaria, like, you know, was, was went to war with Turkey or something, you know, like, don't get me wrong, there was a special relationship between Serbia in Russia. I mean, to this day. But again, reacting immediately to a provocation is always the proper course. If I'm not saying you should always react, but if it's essential to react, you must do so immediately. And that will place you not just in the optimal strategic and tactical position, but it also will give you a lot of wiggle room in the court of public opinion. And nowhere and the world. World opinion does actually matter, as we talked about. But I'll. I'll. I'll try and wrap this up meaningfully without, like rushing through, without rushing through anything unduly. The, I think kind of the final, Kind of the final aspect of inventing the German strategic threat or inventing kind of the idea of a German hegemon looming. Okay. The United Kingdom is. Empires are often at their apparent zenith, at least in terms of their ability to Project power. And in terms of the sheer scale and vastness of territory they directly control, you know the British Empire was frankly on the decline. It was not. Its economic model was robust in basic terms so long as the political situation globally was, was, was, was basically stable. But it had really kind of exhausted its potential for real growth. Okay. In 1862 when Bismarck became the minister president of Prussia, the manufacturing regions of Germany, of the German states accounted for the fifth largest share of industrial production. Britain was well ahead. Britain was on top in the 1860s at 19.9%. Between 1880 and 1890, Germany shot up the third place behind the United States and Britain. By the eve of War, 1913, 1914, the United States was well on top of Germany's share of world industrial production had quadrupled and Britain had sank to third place in declining. And obviously concomitant with that, Germany's share of world trade like it, like it's, it's exports finding, you know, destination markets globally had dramatically increased. They were on par to overtake the UK by 1913 which had shared shrunk to 14.2% of exports with Germany holding at about 12,13%. Frederick list was like his ideas of this economic architecture. You know, he was, he was very much, was a, was a Hamiltonian like Pat Buchan used to make that point a lot. But the point is like Germany was, Germany was becoming a superpower. Okay, that, that's, that's inarguable. Forget whatever plans you have this weekend because you're staying at home and playing on spinquest and there's never been a better time to sign up than right now. New users get $30 coin packs for just $10. All the table games you love with hundreds of slot games and real cash Prizes. That's at spinquest.coms P I N Q U S T.com Spin Quest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spin quest.com for more details. Like, like Germany slash Europe. I mean the writing was on the wall, okay? Now if there was some sort of possibility of London fighting a war with Germany in 1914 or in 1939 whereby some kind of declaration of rights subsequent was implemented and the world was literally divided up between powers, okay fine, but that was never on the table for all kinds of reasons. This, this idea that Britain had to literally burn Germany down, burn Europe down, bring the United States and the Russians into the heart of Europe and you know, Britain had to, Britain had to be willing to become Airstrip One. But haha, now the Germans no longer on top. That's literally insane. That's the way people think, you know, but it's. I think there was some aspect of that with Churchill who had, among other things, didn't give a fuck what Britain's fortunes were. But like I said, I think with other people who were, you know, insinuated into high places. I think it was kind of the ongoing illogic of the things we discuss and the variables emergent related to parliamentarism and a changing world situation that men in executive roles are proximate to executive commander in chief role simply didn't understand anymore. This kind of illogic taken to its kind of inevitable conclusion led to these terrible policy outcomes, particularly as regards, you know, power, political hegemony and things. But I mean, that's a question. There's a metaphysical aspect of this too. Like it's heavily psychological and sociological. It's, you know, it requires, you know, a deep immersion in the process of history, which I think accepting there is a process of history is a prerequisite to what we're doing. Know, some would disagree, but there's also a metaphysical aspect. It's the cunning of reason, you know, which maybe it prefers the hand of God, but I know, I mean, some people uncomfortable, they hear it so described where they just tune out when anybody invokes the G word. So I don't deny Christ, I don't deny God, but you know what I mean, like there are times where I think euphemism is in order. So people don't think that, you know, they're tuning into a Sunday sermon. But the, what I want to wrap up with here was because we do have to get into the. The conflict itself and what remains in terms of addressing and explicating the political cultures of combatant states and the personages that helm those states will do that as we discuss the decisions rendered that led these states to battle. Specifically, I'm thinking of the Habsburg Empire and Franz Josef, as well as Hovig and the Tsar Nicholas. But like I said, at the top of the hour, you know, who was Franz Ferdinand? Ferdinand had a peculiar ascendancy to becoming heir. He was born in Graz, Austria. He was the eldest son of Archduke Carl Ludwig, who was the younger brother of Franz Joseph, the Habsburg Emperor. When, When Ferdinand was 11 years old in 1875, his cousin, the Duke of Modena died, naming France Fernand as, as his heir. And subsequently in adulthood, Ferdinand went on to become one of the wealthiest men in Europe. He was a very cunning businessman in addition to other Things. One of the reasons I say Ferdinand's been unduly maligned is because he was. He was the right kind of noble, okay? And the German system produced some of these guys. The German and the Habsburg system, okay? Dysfunctional as the Habsburg regime was, it produced some. It produced some men who really shined, okay? And Ferdinand, he was worldly in the right kinds of ways. He understood business. He understood, you know, he understood the emergent, you know, industrial economy at scale and the role of, like, literally the role of money therein. But what really altered his fortunes or, like, his life trajectory, which is often the case with great men and. 1880. In 1889, Franz Joseph's son, Crown Prince Rudolph, committed suicide at his hunting lodge, which is somewhat of a tragic thing. Like you. I. I don't. We're treated like. Like we're treated to idiots like that. Like that freaking simp who goes around making a fool of himself with that Meghan Markle woman. But like actual royals of actual responsibilities and particularly a man. I think Franz Joseph was, like I said, I think he was. I think he was a great man and. And something of a tragic figure. But having him for a father wouldn't have been fun. I speculate. I speculate. Crown Prince Rudolph saw the writing on the wall. Not the odds he could have predicted by some augury, the Great War, but I. What he saw waiting for him when he became emperor. I don't think he saw anything he liked, Okay? I don't think people generally kill themselves flippantly, but it's important to recognize, too, you know, by the. Out, by the outbreak of hostilities, Franz Joseph had been on the throne 66 years. The guy was in his 80s, you know, I mean, it was this was this, this was this, this. This was bad, you know, and we're getting ahead of ourselves. But the Crown prince killing himself, this left Franz Ferdinand's father, you know, the emperor's brother is first in line for the throne, but he dropped dead, you know, a few years later. So Franz Ferdinand, you know, this kind of guy from Graz. This guy was a big, big outdoorsman, big hunter, you know, big businessman. His wife, too. This is not going to make sense. Anybody but Europeans of a certain ilk. I'm not being mean, but Ferdinand married a lady in waiting, and this, like, scandalized everybody. But this lady was a royal herself. She doesn't have, like, a height of pedigree to marry a Hebsburg, which is, I mean, just like. But he's. But Ferdinand's, like, gave no about that kind of stuff. This is like the woman he wanted and she was very beautiful. So he's like, you know, he had to agree to forego any, like he had, he had to agree to like forego any claim of his heirs to the throne, which is incredibly petty. But, you know, he, he did what he wanted. You know, he married the woman he loved. You know, so. And he, he had a reputation as being a hardline sectarian, very proud Austrian, very staunch Catholic. You know, he had, he had no time for Orthodox. He had no time for Lutherans. You had no, he had no, no, no time for Muslims. But behind that hard talk and kind of pride of Ross, he favored very much granting the minorities, particularly the Slavs, you know, the South Slavs in Habsburg lands, you know, like limited autonomy. You know, generally murdering a chief executive doesn't lead anything good. I refer people to the murder of Abraham Lincoln. Well, murdering Franz Ferdinand didn't do anything good for the Serbs. Okay. And, and arguably they, it was, it was totally self defeating. But we'll get into like how this all developed. One of the key is for the next episode, but one of the key, one of the key things to consider. The czar and his cabinet were utterly convinced that the Habsburg Empire was threatening to go to war with Serbia as a, as you know, as a, you know, at the behest of Germany, as a kind of cipher to draw Russia into the conflicts. That German Germany would have a pretext to assault it. That's incredibly paranoid and also doesn't make any sense. But this was, I put that out there kind of in context to see the sort of outsized impact this, this murder had. But it was on its own terms pretty horrible. Unfortunately, what the Habsburg army, which was this highly ceremonial. There's a highly ceremonial aspect to it. I mean Europe on the era was like, there was like, there was like military pageantry everywhere. You know, that was, this was misconstrued by people like Colonel House and when he visited Europe said that like, you know, militarism is a, is a cancer there. It's like he didn't get it. You know, like royals all were military uniforms to these, you know, ribbon cutting events. You know, armies on parade were. Was a thing, you know, but it's. Ferdinand himself had been a colonel in the Habsburg army. I'm sure a lot of that inflated rank was nepotism. But you know, the guy did, he, he, he, he had, he was, you know, he had trained as an infantry officer. He wasn't just pretending. Unfortunately, the hat army's summer maneuvers in 1914 were. Were held in Bosnia on an ill chosen day, that being June 28th. June 28th is the anniversary of the Battle of kosovo field in 1389. So they had the Habsburg Empire showing up in Bosnia with Franz Ferdinand, you know, who's notorious for issuing, you know, rather nakedly sectarian statements, was not. Was probably not the best idea. But at the same time, he was trying to send a message that he wasn't afraid and he wouldn't be cowed by threats, which again, I think is a point in his favor, honestly. And in this case, the kill team that was in place, it was five ethnic Serbs and one Bosnian Moslem, I believe. And traditionally everybody accepted this. This Muslim guy was. Was there for cosmetic purposes. And the umbrella organization that call itself Young Bosnia historians these days. And it's not just like Chetnik types or like Zionists, they claim that it's some bigoted statement or narrow or scapegoating myth. They claim Young Bosnia consisted of radicalized Serbs. They claim that, oh, there was Croats and Bosniaks in its ranks too, who just believed in Yugoslavianism. Nobody believes in Yugoslavianism, okay? These Croats and Bosniaks who were in the ranks, they were either anarchists, some of them, strangely enough, were almost undoubtedly like radicalized Muslims who, despite the fact that there was absolutely zero love lost, you know, between the Orthodox Serbs and Muslims, they had some acts. They hated the Habsburg regime and they just clicked up with whoever was going to kill it, you know. But this idea that this wasn't a Serbian endeavor is preposterous beyond belief that, you know, you murder an heir to the throne, you know, for the sake of, you know, some, like, bureaucratic apparatus you hope is emergent. That's like declaring that, like, there's men who, like, commit suicide bombings, like, for the greater. For the greater glory of, like, Ron Desantis, like, there, there's. It's like literally that stupid. But as Ferdinand and. And his wife made their way in their motorcade to the residence of the provincial governor, a member of the. A member of the kill team, Youngster Cabranovich, he threw an IED at Fernand's vehicle, but it ricocheted off and then exploded under the car following and wounded the officer at the wheel, the Imperial Party proceeded. Apparently, Ferdinand, upon arriving at the governor's mansion, said, you always welcome your guests with bombs. But a gallows humor. About an hour later, The furnace demanded that the. The caravan be detoured to go to the hospital to look in on the victims of the bombing, which again, in My opinion, Fernand looks like better and better during his last day on Earth. Okay. The driver in the lead vehicle hadn't been informed of this, so the caravan had to stop and reroute. And as they stopped to correct the wrong turn and reversed, several of the cars stalled. Now, Gavrilo Princep by chance, who was part of the kill team, he was sitting literally across the street at a cafe drinking coffee. He was armed with a Browning.380. It was of European manufacturer, but it was a 380. Okay. Hey guys, lady luck here. Are you going on any road trips this summer? I know I'm going to be going on a bunch of road trips and being that I'm going to be passenger Princess, I Love playing on Spinquest.com Spinquest has all of my favorite slot games. Live blackjack, live craps. Head over to Spinquest right now and get yourself a 30 coin coin pack for just 10 bucks. Spin Quest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. This is a model for gear queers. What became the, the Walter, like, I don't know when The Walter, when 3D Walter, like first appeared, but this is what it's based on. It was a Browning platform, but it was manufactured in Belgium. But I mean a powerful, powerful handgun. Gabriel Prince of literally looks over and he's like, that looks like Ferdinand. That is Ferdinand. So presumably he racks around. He literally walks up to Ferdinand's car at point blank range. He just started shooting and he was, you know, immediately tackled and subdued. Franz Ferdinand, he was shot in the neck. His wife Sophie got shot in the, in the abdomen. And I find this really sad, like, like a lot. Sophie was wearing this, this really like ornate, you know, like, like, like royal dress kind of thing. And you know, like women of those days, they all, you know, they all wore those like girdles that like, you know, they could hardly breathe in that like acted as a tourniquet for a minute. So like, so we kind of like lingered on in agony and. And then like succumbed to. She succumbed like internal injuries where they got her to the hospital. But like, basically like that kept her from like bleeding out. But I mean she knew she was gonna die. And Ferdinand, Ferdinand was gushing blood count Harak, I guess, like blood splattered from like Ferdinand's wound, like onto Count Harrock's face, who was standing on like the running boards of the car. Harak pulled out his handkerchief and you know, tried to press it onto Fernand's neck. And Haruk said, you know, for God's sake, are you okay? Sophie then I guess fell to her knees, you know, either from shock or, you know, blood loss or whatever. And Har originally thought she'd only fainted. Then he realized, like, she'd been shot. Ferdinand apparently was still lucid at this time. He turned to Sophie and kind of, like, picked her up and said, if I butcher this, forgive me, Sarah Benedict believe I'm leaving for Unsick. Hinder Sophie. Don't die. Stay alive for the kids. I guess after a minute or two, according to Harik, Ferdinand fell down, like, into a seat from blood loss, I guess. Like, these green feathers in his plume, like, fell all over his face. And there's a bunch of green feathers all over the car floor, like, stained with his blood that, like, people took either. I mean, which is. I. People do strange things like when. When people had murder scenes, but that I found that that's like something you'd see in a movie. But the. You know, Sophie died, you know, shortly thereafter, and apparently, you know, a few minutes subsequents. A few minutes subsequent, you know, Ferdinand died. I mean, he had. He had. He was literally shot in the neck and gushing everywhere. The Princip was arrested on the spot. Obviously. The fate of Princip is almost too horrible to think about. He was literally, like, chained to a wall for years. And. And. And. And, like. And, like, left to rot. Like. Like, literally. I'm not saying people should feel bad
- [291:10]
Pete
for
- [291:13]
Thomas
him, but that's not. That's no way for anybody to go. Like, it's something out of a horror movie. But the investigation revealed that all. All the. All the members of the kill team were Austrian subjects. I mean, which is no surprise. I mean, they were. They were. They were Bosnians. But it was proving it was. They've been armed in Serbia. They've been smuggled across the. They were smuggled across the border by Serbian nationalists, many of whom were also in the Serbian army. Okay. It was. It was determined that not. Not just by Austrian investigators, but by neutral parties that Nardonia, literally National Defense. It was this kind of shadowy organization that was set up in 1908 to work against the incorporation of Bosnia into the Habsburg Empire, a tenet of its mandate and base. I mean, like a tenet of. Of Chetnik ideology today. I mean, always. And again, I'm not saying this to be punitive towards Serbs or anything. This is just a fact. They're. The. The Serb nationalist creed is that. Is that Bosnia has historically served. And it belongs to the Serbs as a people. You know, like it's, and that, and that's, that's indisputable. The organization that plotted the assassination was the, was the Union or Death, commonly known as the Black Hand. There was a lot of men who had membership in all these organizations and that's led a lot of people then is now to say, like, oh, it can't be identified if there was any sort of control element related to the Serbian government. That's really not true. Nadonia Urbana at the operational level, they were intimately involved with the Black Hand and the man who wielded ultimate authority over it was Dragudin Dmitrijevich, also known as APIs, after the Egyptian God or demon. That wasn't just his code name, that's what people called him. He was a terrifying individual. For those familiar with Archon APIs was kind of like, was kind of like Archon APIs had been part of the, part of the death squad that murdered King Alexander and Queen Vaga. He'd taken at the entrance to the royal residence. He'd taken three rounds like to the chest and stomach. So he wasn't the one who pulled the trigger and killed Alexander and the Queen. But I mean, he was, he was. The only reason he wasn't is because he, he, he'd been shot and, and those, those rounds were never, were never removed from his body. But he was the, he was the commander of the intelligence section of the Serbian army's general staff. And like we talked about last episode. So you have, in Serbia, you have a government where the, like, literally you have a government, a national government where the men in command authority roles over the military and intelligence apparatus have committed murder, like extrajudicial murder. And not just that, but of a sitting monarch and head of state and his wife. And you know, look, I'm the last person to, you know, opt for like pearl clutching condemnations of the realities of the wicked world. But what these people did to the, to Alexander and Drago was, was, was pretty. It's beneath the identity of, of, of, of a white man. Okay, this woman was in her underwear. They gunned her down in front of her husband. They gunned him down. Then they disemboweled these people and, and violated their corpses and then threw them, threw them out. They differentiated their remains for, for people to, to mock, I mean, that this is not a good look, you know, so such that, such that people want to say, like, oh, Serbians are given some kind of bad rap. And sometimes that is true. Okay, I'm not going to say that it's not, but these are not men who collectively were conducting politics in a way that was inclined to inspire goodwill. Okay. And again, I think. I think when Serbia is truly threatened, in geostrategic terms, I think Russian intervention is inevitable. However, it's not. It's not as if. It's not as if Moscow, and historically Moscow and St. Petersburg are so axiomatically driven to intervene on behalf of their brother Slavs or something, no matter what the cost, I believe. Had Franz Joseph assaulted immediately, and what could be argued was, you know, the heat of passion in the wake of a grotesque assault upon an heir to the throne, but also one of his relatives. And by men who in the past, you know, despite their claim to legitimate office, you know, carried the stain of homicide literally on their hands. I think that would have put the Habsburg regime in a far better position than what they opted for, which was weeks of fruitless negotiation and threats and finally an ultimatum. The kind of preposterousness, the kind of prima facie preposterousness of it seems tailored to provoke hostilities and nothing else. But I'm gonna. I'm gonna wrap it up for tonight. I. No, go ahead.
- [297:43]
Pete
No, it was great. It was great. Do your plugs and we'll get out of here. I know you're. I know you've been feeling it physically.
- [297:50]
Thomas
Yeah. No, no, I. I appreciate you, man. And I'm on the mend. And we'll. We'll get into the fireworks of the Great War in the next episode, I promise, please, to say that my dear friend Giles at the Asylum Mag, he's requested that I write another essay for them. I hope that'll appear in the next few weeks. I'm writing it literally as we speak. Season 2 of Mind Phaser is gonna drop Halloween weekend. I'm very excited about that. You can find my podcast, some of my short and medium form stuff, as well as just kind of updates on, like, what we're doing. Like, we. I mean, like, people in my. People in my. In our orbit and like, in our thing. You can find all that@realthomas777.subsect.com you can find kind of an aggregate of my content of all kinds in my website. It's thomas777.com Number 7H1S 777.com. I'm on X, formerly Twitter. It's Real Capital R E, A L Corore Number 7H 777 and I'm. I'm going like, Ethan Ralph invited me on Kill Stream again this week, so I'll be doing that. Joel Davis was kind enough to have me on his stream the other day. You can find that on YouTube. I believe a lot of really good stuff is afoot. I realize don't look well and I don't sound well, but I'm on the mend and good stuff is happening.
- [299:28]
Pete
All right, well, I appreciate it. And until the next episode. Thank you, Thomas.
- [299:33]
Thomas
Thank you, man.
- [299:35]
Pete
I want to welcome everyone back to the Pete Canono Show. I'm here with Thomas and we are going to continue the World War I series. How are you doing, Thomas?
- [299:44]
Thomas
I'm very well, thanks. I want to talk about the constellation of political factors that led to the formal onset of hostilities, because there's a lot that's misunderstood here, even by people who address the matter in good faith. And something I want to make clear also. This is something that's sort of conspicuously absent from both mainstream histories and revisionist treatments. And I don't, I don't think it's deliberate. I mean, it isn't the case of people who suggest that the dividing line in, in terms of, you know, characteristics of the, of the, of the central and allied powers, you know, was democracies, representative governments versus autocratic dictatorships. There's obviously like a value loaded suggestion there. But this idea that these European states, whatever their configuration, and for the record, by far the most autocratic combat in the state was Russia, that goes without saying. Okay, it was, it was not remotely, quote, democratic or, or, you know, a system characterized by balance of power, especially not in executive terms. But there's this idea that, you know, that the United Kingdom or France especially, were characterized. We're like, we're like the United States or something. Like there's a clear separation of powers, the authority to make war or to choose the super peace was expressly delegated, you know, to an executive, you know, be it a prime minister or somebody in a counselor role. That was not true at all. These European states that there, there'd been a very confused, convoluted and literally violent, in many cases, transition from monarchy to, you know, these, these mixed systems of government that were forced to balance emergent bases of power, that were forced to, you know, to deal with scenarios and daily exigencies at scale that they were never designed to do. So the, the complexity of variables as well as the sheer volume of inputs that had to be dealt with in dealing with, you know, high diplomacy and war and peace questions. It's not something that could possibly be put to a referendum any meaningful way. So it was there, there was confusion as to who actually had authority to act. You know, and that's one thing, particularly in the case of the German Empire. And I'll get into some anecdotes here from which people extrapolate this sort of punitive myth. It's claimed. Oh well, you know, the, the, the, you know, the, the German general staff was constantly overreaching and subjugating civilian authority or anomaly civilian authority to its whims. That's not really true. There was a give and take and there was definitely a kind of agonistic pluralism, some of which was built into the system, some of which was incidental. But it wasn't clear who had final authority on, on the decision to make war. I mean, yeah, obviously the Kaiser and only the Kaiser could sign off on like a war declaration, but it's, you know, he, he wasn't studying war and peace questions all day. Like, he wasn't, you know, he, there's the reason why there's a foreign ministry was so that, you know, these matters could be addressed in a truly contemporaneous way, like up to the minute, as much as was feasible. But there wasn't, there wasn't some, there wasn't some specifically drafted constitution, you know, with an eye to, to manage these things. And you know, the U.S. constitution, like there's nothing, nothing is worse than midwits who worship the U.S. constitution because that's in all kinds of ways. And it's just not like it's not a magical scroll or miraculous document. It's basically a miniature code of criminal procedure. But it's also, its delegation of power is, is very clear and very concise and particularly on Article 2 questions of war and peace, it's very, very clear that the President is in fact the commander in chief. That's expressly delegated the War Powers act and attendant legislation. It's not worth the papers written on in real world terms if it was ever challenged. I mean, in my opinion, it was challenged during the Reagan administration and nobody pretended that it had forced a law. But that's way, way outside the scope of what we're talking about. But that's the degree to which this contributed to confused signaling and bad decision making really can't be overstated. And I'm not one of these people who thinks that, you know, in the, in the post war years, post 1945, obviously I don't, I know these people are going to suggest that these IGOs, like the United nations were some great thing that. That had all kinds of potential at all. But there were conventions, both formal and informal, that basically everybody abided in both camps. And obviously it simplified things that there was this kind of single basic ideological divide that, you know, created a kind of bipolar series of dyads. I mean, that. That has to be accounted for. But there was. There. There was. There was basically a formalized structure, a conflict resolution. It was flawed and it certainly was not. There certainly weren't any, like, built in guarantees that it wouldn't be neutralized by the emergence of, you know, deep strategic parodies and things. But it did exist. And the Soviet Union in war and peace terms was somewhat like the United States. It was pretty clear, even though Kremlin ology it. You know, like men's formal titles often didn't indicate what their actual authority was. It was pretty clear who was in charge of the Soviet Union at any given time and war and peace terms. So you knew who to negotiate with and you knew who to. Who to watch for personal signaling amidst a crisis to try and determine what future moves would be. Like, none of this existed in 1914, okay? Like, nothing remotely like it. And also, and I'll get into the meat of what we're talking about today in a moment, but again, and I realize I'm probably belaboring this point, but it's important, you know, contra the claim of German, quote, German militarism being either like a causes belli or this ongoing sort of structural problem. You know, again, Germany hadn't fought a war in decades. You know, like, what. What militarism are we talking about? One of the reasons why, as we'll see, there was nothing inherent caution to the ordering of mobilization protocol to be implemented is because people really didn't have an understanding of how devastating combined arms were, okay? Because they hadn't been utilized at scale before and some of these technologies hadn't been utilized period. Okay? At least not at the caliber literally in scale that was to be. You know, that was to take the field in 1914. So there's that too. It. I was just. I was reading just the other day, I mean, in part owing to something I'm writing, but in part in preparation for our series, you know, even one of the things, uh, one of the reasons why Celine, you know, like, called his. His. His protagonist Baru, you know, and he was always talking about, like, you know, the endless walking and like this, like. And then like, how, you know, the burden of the infantryman and stuff like that. Every Combatant state, their infantryman packed a load of around £60 of gear. That's incredibly burdensome, you know, and that's, I mean, just even something as small as that, like you weren't, you know, that. No, no, nobody was packing a load like that during the Crimean War or like the War between the States, you know, like, like everything, like every facet of, every facet of, of. Of. Of combat had, had become altered, you know, and it's us, you know, and that's, that's something that obviously it, there's no comparison, you know, between the, the nuclear age and you know, the, the battlefield of the, of the early 20th century wherein, you know, like strategic air power hadn't even emerged yet. But, you know, the, there was a common, the common theme is that a lack of ability of existent structures, you know, to adapt to emergent technologies and you know, destabilizing influences and complex parodies therein. So it's something to keep in mind every step of the way here and as well as, you know, like, again, I, I realize it sounds like I'm, I'm suggesting warg yield be laid at the door of the Russian Empire. I don't believe in war guild conceptually at all. I, I reject that concept outright. It doesn't feature into my political ontology.
- [310:18]
Pete
Why is that?
- [310:20]
Thomas
Because it's, because it's just misguided. It's like saying that like, like wars are no more planned or devised than, you know, national economies are planned and devised. You know, I mean, that's not to say that there's times where chief executives or men insinuated into roles where they're able to influence policy decisions at critical junctures. That's not to say that such people do not at times sue for war and you know, either owing to some kind of clause of Witzian logic where they believe that it's, you know, the most profitable option in literal or figurative terms. But they. No, no, no man or men or government or nation is capable of just devising conditions wherein war is emergent. That's not, that's not the way reality is, but that's, that's a whole deep like philosophical question. But in any event, at a key juncture, Russia's decision to mobilize is what set World War I in motion or what set the, the nexus of causality in motion that caused the onset of hostilities. However, I understand why Russia within the boundary rationality of, you know, strategic thinking, particularly as, particularly owing to certain factors emergent, you know, in, in August of 1914. It's understandable why they did that. Their, their grave strategic error was believing that Hapsburg Empire was quite, quite literally a proxy of, of Berlin. And, and that was not the case at all. The relationship of the German Empire and Germany itself, I mean, even today to Austria and to a lesser degree to Croatia, that's there, there's definitely like a deep, like racial allegiance and as well as, you know, cultural interdependence and everything else there. But this idea that the German Empire was simply not going to let the Habsburg Empire disintegrate and this idea that, you know, Vienna was just this client regime of the German Empire, that's totally facile. But I can see why the Russians thought that. And if that was correct, if that was a correct strategic analysis, that totally changed everything that was happening. And that basically meant it was imperative to prepare for general war against the German Empire because to simply prepare for a localized conflict that would have, that would have been disastrous. And if anything, arguably that would have been, you know, assuming that Russ, the Russian view was correct, that that would, they, they, they could have possibly been being duped into a strategic ruse and then annihilated. That's where their thinking was. And the. Russia is a conspiratorial society and I think they outsmart themselves because like every man and every agent and every, every decision making cadre project something of themselves both onto his enemies and rivals and allies, but also just like onto the strategic landscape itself. Even if you're self aware, you, you do this axiomatically, you know, so the, the Russians view everything as inherently conspiratorial. You know, and they, they, they, they, they always fall back. They, they have a tendency to outsmart themselves. They did it In World War I, they did it in the assault on Afghanistan in 1979. They, Stalin did it in, you know, trying to, trying to finesse and essentially lie to Hitler. You know, meanwhile devising, you know, a plan to conquer Europe, you know, the icebreaker plan as it's kind of known colloquially. But that's a, that's key to understanding the First World War and as well as the situation in the United Kingdom, which is something really nobody talks about. And the impact of the Ulster situation on the internal situation of the United Kingdom as well as on its decision to deploy as a combatant state to the continent. The situation in Ireland was just positive on that decision. And that's the only combatant state where the internal situation literally dictated what, you know, with the decision to the, the decision to go to war abroad. And I don't know if this passes most people by or if it doesn't fit with the rest of the narrative, but we'll get into that a little bit, too. And finally, just because I can't think of a, like, a more appropriate place to insinuate it, to return just momentarily to the relationship of the German Empire to the Habsburg regime for people who think that, well, this was just, you know, like a third Balkan war that was developing, but Germany just wouldn't allow the Habsburg regime to fall, that's nonsense. And if, you know, what Germany was doing for a decade for the onset of hostilities was cultivating the Ottoman Empire. I mean, Vilhelm said a lot of kind of dumb things, and he just kind of like, made statements like, you know, he'd issued declarations of friendship or enmity and, you know, just kind of. Just kind of whimsically. But he consistently was courting the Ottomans during his visit to Damascus. He literally said that, you know, like, the Sultan is like, a friend of Germany and the Kaiser is a friend of Darl Islam and Islamic people. German firms were trying to create parallel infrastructure, like, throughout the Ottoman Empire, you know, like, obviously the hedge against the United Kingdom, but also obviously, if they're. In your. In their view, if the Ottoman Empire survived, it's like, okay, if, you know, if the Ottomans get Bosnia and everything south and east, like, who cares if there are allies or if it falls apart? You know, we can. We, like, you know, being the Germans, can stand to inherit a bunch of these territories. And as long as we can, like, finesse the populations there who are, like, racial and sectarian aliens, you know, like, well, well, you know, we'll. We'll be at tremendously. We'll be in a position of tremendous, you know, political power. And obviously, if, you know, there. I. If, obviously if their notion was the, you know, kind of preserve the, like, the gripping hand of. Of Habsburg rule, that that would not have been remotely what they were, you know, what they were pursuing. But we could probably do a whole, like, series on that. But that's. That's just. That's another thing that jumps out at me and researching the. That decade before August 1914 that not a lot of people talk about now, The. The historical date that's assigned is the onset of World War I is July 28, 1914. That's when Emperor Franz Joseph. That's when he signed his declaration of war against Serbia at the imperial villa at Bad ISL or Eichel. The text. The text followed, basically the identical, like template format that the hats recorded always used. It was nearly identical to the format the Austrians had used for declaring war on Prussia back in 1866. The. The text literally read, quote, to my people, it was my fervent wish to consecrate the years which by grace of God still remain to me to the works of peace and protect our people from the heavy sacrifices and burdens of war. Providence in its wisdom is otherwise decreed. The intrigues of a malevolent opponent compel me in the defense of the honor of my monarchy, the protection of its dignity and his position as a power, the security of its possessions, to grasp the sword after long years of peace. That sounds very overwrought and it, it is. That's what that's basically like with all, like these, these, there's almost a contract of adhesion language, like if people can believe that or not. These formal declarations of war under, like the Westphalian system. And this was the last, this, this, this was the last general war that was waged within the Westphalian paradigm. World War II. If you look at 1939-1941 or 40 or 1939, 1940, I believe, until Dunkirk, that was within, at least within the contemplation of, of the German Reich and another French Republic that was a wage according to Westphalian custom and precedent. But if you know, the other combatant states, namely the UK and then the Soviet Union, reject that paradigm outright. It can't be said to be, you know, the, the controlling modality of, of hostilities. What was key though, in my opinion, and like I said, Christopher Clark, who's a histor, who's a historian, I esteem a lot, his take is he doesn't come out to see this, but it's pretty clear from his historiography he identifies July 25, 1914 is when the die was cast three days before Franz Joseph's declaration of war. This was when there's a meeting of the Russian Council of Ministers presided over by the Tsar himself, attended by the chief of Staff, Ian Eskevich, and by the Grand Duke Nikolai, who was significant because he was the commander of the St. Petersburg district of the. The other Russian army. Okay. This meeting confirmed the council's decisions of the preceding days, which most significantly was they'd been sold by the Foreign Ministry on this idea that the Habsburg Empire was acting in a pure proxy role of the German Empire. So any war preparations had to be tailored with an eye to wage a general war against the German Empire and, and with an eye to, you know, with an eye to defeat. It's, it's. It's power potential. Hey guys, lady luck here. Are you going on any road trips this summer? I know I'm going to be going on a bunch of road trips and, and being that I'm going to be passenger Princess. I Love playing on Spinquest.com Spinquest has all of my favorite slot games. Live blackjack, live craps. Head on over to Spinquest right now and get yourself a $30 coin pack for just 10 bucks. Spin Quest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. You know, it's forces and being as well as, you know what, what could be mustered upon mobilization now most importantly what the council decided on July 25, they authorized this complex backs of batch of regulations known as the period preparatory to war. Now these measures, it would seem at a glance that these, these measures were devised owing to the vastness of Russia's territory and its need to divide forces, you know, in a way that maximize the ability to defend in depth, you know, on its flanks, as well as to, as well as to muster, you know, maximum firepower at the point of a, at the point of assault across the main line of resistance. But that's not the effect. That is, that's, that's not the effect that this paradigm had. As we'll see in a minute. The obviously the problem with this was that owing to the outsized comparatively, you know, power potential of Russia, its strategic reserve system and everything else, like any, any mobilization indicator that, that Russia ordered was going to be treated as a constructive declaration of war. It doesn't matter what it was really the only way Russia could have ordered any, any, any, any mobilization activity that would not, that would not have been viewed as a general act of aggression against both the German Empire and Austria Hungary. As if forces were truly localized
- [324:38]
Pete
to
- [324:39]
Thomas
strike into the Balkans against the anticipated path of assaulting Habsburg columns and that these efforts were attended every step of the way by a, by a declaration of intent to Berlin, you know, to avoid a general state of hostilities emergent with the German Empire even then that would be no guarantee obviously of avoidance of escalation to a general of war with both Austria Hungary and the German Empire. But that's the only way feasibly that such an outcome could be avoided. What focused the minds of the kind of entire war council that coalesced around the Czar, Sergey Sazonov, he was the Russian foreign Minister. He had tremendously, in my opinion, internalized the logic of the Franco Russian alliance which of course was that Germany, not the Habsburg Empire was always the principal adversary, you know, and that anything Austria did was at the behest and whim of Berlin. And that any, any, any disposition of Austria Hungary towards Serbia has to be understood as an effort to, to contain and roll back Russian influence in the Balkans. But again that's, that's, that's very much at odds with reality, you know, but that was, this was what the Russian, this is what the czars were cabinet. This, this was their mindset. As for the, as for the problem of, As the problem of Russia's general kind of like unreadiness for war, there's a strange dichotomy. Both the, both France and the UK and the UK tended to the UK's ability to kind of forecast power potential outcomes was better than that of the French for a few reasons in my opinion. The French had a totally outsized view of, of the capabilities of, of the Russian infantry. They just did. Okay, I'm sure part of that was wishful thinking. Part of that was French and Russian battle doctrine in the Great War wasn't radically different. An early kind of iteration, a deep battle kind of ruled the day. I think part of that was, you know, conceptually, specifically on strategic matters. Peoples who mirror each other, they, you know, that they, they, they tend to develop like an outsized belief in their own capabilities and the correctness of their own kind of tactical orientation. But the, the British had no such conceits. But at the same time they did view, they, they didn't account for the fact that like, okay, Russia had this vast like reserve system, you know, that could eat, that could pretty much like immediately be, be, be transformed into forces and being, but these men were barely trained, you know, and again like there hadn't been like the Russians have been in action in the Crimea and they'd been in action and you know, brush fire wars on the frontiers of the empire in the Balkans. But you know, Russian infantry hadn't been deployed at scale in like open ended combat for decades. You know, sounds like the Napoleonic era. But the, the Germans took, took this very seriously as you have to, you know, in terms of capabilities. I mean, but I mean even if they, even if they, even, even if, even if they didn't, even if, even if Berlin didn't, the fact that Russia was by far, you know, like the largest military power on the continent and they, they were quite clearly targeting Germany as their primary adversary and they were treating any, they were treating any, they were treating any hostile action against Serbia by the Habsburg Empire, quite literally as, you know, a German assault on, on Russia's sphere of influence. Bethman, Hovig and any, anybody in the military command staff had, you know, had, had to treat Russia as an existential threat or they were not fulfilling their, the duty of their office. Now, as I mentioned a minute ago, the practical measures that constituted this period preparatory to war were somewhat baffling. First and foremost, there was a. It calls for a partial mobilization. This was specifically advocated by Sazonov. But this partial mobilization, it wasn't aimed at localizing the conflict or signaling a desire to localize the conflict. It was a general deployment, just only partially so it had the effect of presenting a direct threat to the Habsburg Empire. It would signal to the German Empire a desire and intent to wage war. You know, just as a German partial mobilization would have thrown the Russian war machine in the full year, as it were. But at the same time wasn't the scale and depth of which wasn't adequate to, you know, to wage a general broad front assault against the relatively localized theater of Serbia, against relatively localized sea for the Balkans, you know, coming to the defense of Serbia and assaulting Austria Hungary as well as, you know, penetrating deep into, into German lines and, and presumably, you know, assaulting with adequate forces to break the main line of resistance. So it was kind of conceived the worst of all possible options. Unless, you know, unless, unless the idea, unless and as some people suggested the notion of it was that it was a bluff. But A, I don't believe that and B, if you're gonna bluff, like you go all in with the ruse, you know, you don't partially mobilize. I mean, the only reason you do that is to presumably like theoretically leave room for negotiation before onset of hostilities. But again, you know, any, any mobilization is gonna, is gonna indicate hostile intent and to claim your, and to claim you want peace while mobilizing is just appears duplicitous or incoherent. This, so what's key is that this, this, this mobilization schedule was, it was, it was, it was an all or nothing proposition. You know, it made no distinction between adversaries vis a vis Austria Hungary and the German Empire. It, the variations in population density across mobilization zones meant that the Russian army just kind of drew generally on the entirety of the population. And it's, it's localized draft boards or whatever or like reserve system. It fed centrally into the Russian army system. And then deployments were rendered like as needed, you know, like as, as attrition set in, you know, so it can't be understood as you know, the, the Russians obviously signaling the again like reinforce locally or to, or to strike a defensive posture. You know, I mean there's no such thing as defensive mobilization anyway. But that's a different, this kind of a different thing. But the, it also, It also arguably and again I'm not enough of a, I'm not enough of a, of like a war gamer egghead. And even if I was like, I haven't like gamed the scenarios enough
- [334:00]
Pete
to
- [334:00]
Thomas
just to render like a judgment on this. But arguably too that the Russian system wasn't even capable of a localized mobilization just owing to the nature of Russian infrastructure, the arrangement of its rail lines, you know, the complexity of logistics, you know, to both reinforce the infantry as, as it's attritioned, you know, and to get it, you know, food ammo, replacement, you know, livestock is needed. And this was still like a horse drawn army. I've seen it said by war college types who know what they're talking about that it wasn't even possible for the Russians to affect, you know, again like an in scaled down in theater mobilization even if they wanted to. So you know, again it just confirming that this was a, that this was an entirely binary enterprise in terms of how it would be interpreted by Berlin. So in other words, again as I, as I, as I stated at the onset of the discussion, this was a constructive declaration of war. That's not hyperbole. That's literally what it was. It was the, it was monumentous and, and, and, and horrific in consequences. Not just because the obvious fact that it threw the German mobilization machine into motion by reciprocal necessity, but it also came at a moment when the German government had not, had not even declared a state of impending war which was their counterpart to the Russian period preparatory to war, but was, it wasn't like a two phase mobilization paradigm. It was more a declaration of intent and a way of marshaling the executive around the Kaiser as warlord and you know, and, and, and, and bringing together, you know, the war cabinet to function as, as, as it had to. In other words, it, Germany had not made the decision to go to war or not. Okay. And it certainly hadn't decided to wage a general war against the Russian, against the Russian Empire. I don't even think, I don't even think that was in when Hovig's contemplation. I think Hovig believed a localized war was possible, but even that I think he thought cooler heads would prevail. And it appeared over a time that the Serbs would abide the Habsburg Emperor's demands, at least with some face saving stipulations. But there's certainly, there certainly was no, there certainly was no sense in Berlin either from the general staff or from the Kaiser or from the consular that you know, so that they, a general war with the Russian empire was somehow desirable.
- [337:08]
Pete
Well, let me, Would you say that Germany was what, the fourth country into the war?
- [337:16]
Thomas
I. No, I'd say they were the second, just owing to, I mean, we'll get into that in a minute, okay. I mean I think that frankly like Russia going to war, the Russian decision to go to war meant that France was going to war as well. Okay. So I mean we can't really separate Russian intention from French intention. And that was the nature of their alliance. And the French executive was a basket case, as we'll see. But by definition Germany was reacting at every step to what Russia was signaling or what they were interpreting Russian signaling as correctly or incorrectly. So I, I, but so categorically Germany was the second bell to the ball. People will argue and we'll get into that at the end of this conversation briefly. You know, the battle of Liege, that's the whole myth of the quote Rape of Belgium comes from like, was Belgium a combatant state? It's like, well, I mean the Hovig not just said openly but he, he documented in his own journal that the transgressing Belgian sovereignty, sovereignty demanded some sort of recompense. But, but the minute it became clear, the minute, the minute that the German army crossed the frontier that Belgium wasn't a neutral state. They had a series of, of complex fortifications. They'd, they'd armed and equipped military age males who were masquerading as civilians, you know, who, who put up ferocious resistance. This went on for weeks. I mean we're, we're getting ahead of ourselves. But I, anytime we're talking about the European balance of power at all times, okay, in, in par. Political terms, like we're talking about, we're talking about Germany and Russia and we're talking about, you know, them responding to one another's signaling and, and, and, and, and, and deployment mobilization and, or deployment paradigms, you know, depending on the epoch and everything else. But Bethman Hova, who I've said before, I find highly sympathetic and I, I think he and Franz Joseph were both very heroic and not, there were not many heroes. I mean they never are in any epoch. But the, the, the men, men in command roles in on the Eve of the, of the Great War look particularly Bad. Hovig and Franz Joseph look particularly good in my opinion. Hovig went as far as he instructed the. Instructed the German ambassadors in London and Paris to in no uncertain terms warn anybody would listen that the military measures that Russia was undertaking were considered to be an existential threat. You know, in no uncertain terms. The German ambassador in Saint Petersburg, he was instructed to say in no uncertain terms that unless discontinued, Germany would mobilize and upon mobilization, this would mean war. Okay, so the voice from Berlin, basically you're telling anybody will listen and mind you, they haven't yet given their own mobilization order, saying, we recognize what you're doing. It's a war indicator. We don't want to go to war. If you don't stop it, we'll mobilize too, and war will become inevitable. And this is a civilian making these declarations. Bethman Holve, who speaks for the government of the German Empire, quite literally, this is like the supposed. Like militaristic German Empire. You know, when h. Was informed to reply from the. From the. From the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, he was informed by his British and French counterparts that they were working to, quote, restrain Russia while Sasov, the foreign minister, was, you know, was. Was moderating his position, you know, under pressure, under diplomatic pressure from Paris and London, which seems like complete. They kind of built into. Plus, I believe that attends secret diplomacy. There's a very real thing in the case of London, again, you know, the United Kingdom of 1914 was not that of 1939. It was a lot more sane. It was a lot less prone to irrationality and just provocative hostility. I think the view from London may have been. Maybe will have been that and we'll get into. I mean, London had its own grave problems at this time. I do not think they were truly engaged with the political situation on the continent. In the case of Paris, in the case of the French Foreign Ministry, this was just like out now. This was just like out and out ledgered Maine. It was. It was out. You know, it was out. It was. It was. It was. These things were being stated with an intent to mislead, in my opinion. Okay, Whether you accept that there was some kind of deliberate disinformation campaign. I mean, that's. That's neither here nor there. It. I. There is no possible way that the French believed in good faith what was just uttered. The. The British Foreign Office, they briefly advocated a. A mediation effort with the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy coming to the table, which Mussolini a generation later, this is what he was trying to attempt with what was called the, the short lived four powers pact or was proposed at the four powers pact. So basically, I think until the 11th hour, the UK was hoping cooler heads would prevail. Why the UK intervened when they did and why they. And why they did. We'll get to that in a minute. But I developed a more charitable view of their decision and their, and their decision makers in recent years. But I think that, you know, again, however foolish the Foreign Office had been with respect to the Boer War and other things, there had been a fair amount of successes since the Crimean War vis a vis the Foreign Office and its ability to, you know, finesse a diplomatic solution in lieu of the onset of hostilities, you know, in 1909 and 1913. It was able to achieve, I mean, not by themselves, but you know, they, they played an essential, essential role in mitigating what could have been crises tending towards general war. However, I think they didn't fully comprehend the, the severity and the rapidity of the trigger effect of Russian mobilization on the Continent. You know, Sir George Buchanan, who's the British Ambassador to the Russian Empire, he had something of a counterpart in Jules Cambon. He was the French ambassador to the German Empire in Berlin. I think they fully, they seem to fully comprehend this both in their own private writings as well as their correspondences as well as their dispatches, you know, to their respective home offices. Quite literally. Buchanan specifically had warned that, that, that, that a Russian mobilization would, would, would, would push Germany into a reciprocal mobilization which, which is, which for all practical purposes would be a declaration of war. And Cambon had come to the same conclusion and both. But I mean again, the Kanbon was in Germany and I think traditionally there's people who stand out like, like George Kennan and stark contrast to this archetype. But generally, you know, the diplomat you deploy to a great power is a man who kind of like by nature he takes on the characteristics of his host and ideally he's a man who, who sympathizes with the people whom he's charged with, you know, liaising with. And Gambon, like the Germans is pretty clear and it kind of, and like he walked among them long enough to kind of taken on their, their, their, their cultural mind in basic ways. But again, he was in Berlin. Okay. I mean it, he wasn't really in a position to impact executive policy decisions. And even if he were, you know, the French were, the, the French were irrationally committed in my opinion, to the pack with Russia. In the case of Buchanan, again, he was in St. Petersburg. But the British had pressure. The British and the Russians despised each other in some basic way. They still do, they always do. You know, the British didn't hit some British aristocrat. He's not, you know, trying to tell, trying to tell the Tsar's war cabinet their business. I mean who the hell is he? You know, it's, this is just another Englishman trying to, you know, trying to dictate to the world, you know, how they should conduct themselves and how they should do politics. You know, that's, that's welcomed by exactly nobody. That is now however well intentioned Buchanan was and like I said, I think he was entirely well intentioned, rare as that might be for a limey, but though the Habsburg Empire for its part was, was locked in a, in a localized mobilization very clearly, very deliberately and they had far less territory to defend than any of their combatants. I mean save the UK but there was never on the table because the UK were fighting, you know, on, on the continent and they weren't at risk of an invasion. But you know, the, the Hasburg army was actually structured, you know, to mobilize locally and it was clear that they were, they were preparing, they were mobilized, structured and deployed to fight and defeat Serbia. There would later be some discomfort about this reality. Both the Russians and the French, both of their foreign offices respectively, they, they retroactively wrote these post dated reports backdated, they backed it by three days like when the Austrian order of general mobilization came down so as to make Russian measures appear to be like a countermeasure. You know, when in reality like there was no, there was no Serbian or there was no, there was no Austro Hungarian general mobilization until well after the Russ order came down. Which is interesting. I mean it's, it's, I mean it's unsurprising that people would lie in this way. But this is, this is very craven and it certainly suggests cognizance of, I'm not going to say dealt because again I don't deal in those terms but it definitely independently one another both Paris and Moscow did this like obviously like it. They realize, they realized the facts were cutting against their narrative of, of rationale for essentially suing for war before there was any general mobilization threat extant or ordered by any other combatant state. The, in the case of the, in the case of the Russians, the Russian ambassador to Vienna, he'd, he'd backdated a telegram from the 31st to the, to the 28th of July stating, you know, that he had evidence that, you know, a General mobilization order had been issued from the, you know, from, from Franz Joseph, which is like, which again is like just obvious nonsense. But I, I, I found that interesting to say the least. Again, like the cravenness of it like this isn't it kind of removes these things from like fog of war sort of copes and what have you. But again the, the French documentary record is apparently even more manipulated. But I don't, I don't, I don't read French. Apparently it alleged that, it alleged that Berlin had undertaken secret mobilization for the preceding six days to the Russian order coming down. This is a complete confabulation. In reality the Germans had remained in military terms like remarkably cool headed. And I mean the fact again, even when it became clear that you know, the Russians were on, were going to sue for war, almost certainly, you know, he, he still left the option open. He gave them an out with a safe, with a face saving option. The leaders of the German general staff, this is what historians like John Keegan, who otherwise is a pretty good historian, but he's afflicted with that English, the English have this inability to objectively discuss Germany at war. So Keegan talks about, you know, well at this juncture, you know, the, the militarist German general staff, you know, they took over and then the die was cast and, and, and this horrible tragedy ensued of you know, the, the killing fields of 1914 and 1918. The leaders of the German army, if they weren't in a state of acute anxiety, they would not have been fulfilling their duty. Von Falkenhayn, he was the, he was the Minister of War. And he, you know, he, he emphasized over and over again to the Kaiser that any mobilization by Russia had the same consequences. Okay. Which was true. And that if the, like any head start the Russians had upset the, you know, the, the glass delicate timing of the von Schlieffen plan, which was of course you know, the prevailing doctrine to fight and win a two front war. So I mean this idea that the kind of hyper vigilance, the perceived hyper vigilance of the General Staff was evidence of you know, a German hair trigger willingness to sue for war. I mean that, that was their job. You know, you, the, like the, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Cold War were exactly the same way. I mean that's, that's their job. Literally. Again the fact that Hovig was, you know, not the Kaiser, not, not von Falkenhayn, not, not von Molt who was the chief of the General Staff, like these, these were not the Men with the ultimate decision of government. Okay? It. Speaking of von Molt, he was less, he was less aggressive in advocating Germany fully mobilized, you know, immediately than Falkenhayn. But he wanted at least a proclamation of, of, of, you know, intent to war preparation be issued, you know, by the Kaiser, which would at least send a political signal to Moscow and would at least indicate an intent to, you know, escalate reciprocally in order to get, in order to get his way. He began insinuating himself into meetings between Hovig, Falkenhayn and Tirpitz, which again, some historians present as overreach. He began issuing statements on what it would require for Germany to fight and win a general war against both Russia and France. You know, he began very kind of openly and publicly, you know, discussing what scenarios would warrant intervention on behalf of the Habsburg Empire in Serbia. He began communicating directly with his counterpart in Vienna, issuing statements like, stand firm against Russian mobilization, you know, against Slavic irredentism. You know, Austria, Hungary must be preserved. You know, Germany will mobilize to defend you. Now, obviously this is kind of overreach, but again, like I said, people like Keegan say, you know, oh, this even, even, even in hyper militaristic Germany, like, this is evidence of, you know, like a Burgundy, you know, military dictatorship. It's like that. Military men say dumb all the time, okay? They always overreach. I mean, look at it, look at Douglas MacArthur, okay? Like if you want the case in point, Bert told who was, who was Von Mok's counterpart in Vienna. He famously responded to one of, one of these telegrams saying, you know, who, who the hell runs the government in Berlin? Moor Ben holding, you know, obviously kind of annoyed by the uncertainty of this, of these things. But I mean, that's, you know, like I said, find me, find me, find me. Like a four star general in America who doesn't try and, you know, throw his weight around, conjure the president, you know, it's not. That's paltry evidence to make the case for, you know, psychotic German militarism, you know, and the savage warlike Hun, you know, being the proximate cause of war. I have had no luck lately. Wait. Lady Luck Bretzky. I got you. I've had so much luck on spinquest.com they have all of my favorite games, slot games, live blackjack, crash craps and bubble craps. You can even get a 30 coin pack for just 10 bucks. 10 bucks for 30. I'm headed over to spinquest.com right now. Spinquest is a free to play social casino. Void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. Now, what was the, what was the situation I referred in, I referred to in the United Kingdom? Well, Throughout pretty much the entirety of the July Crisis of 1914, the eyes of the key decision makers in London were on the nine counties of Ulster in the north of Ireland. On May 21, 2014, the Irish Home Rule Bill had been passed by the House of Commons and was being aggressively rejected by the House of Lords. HHS asked with the Liberal Party Prime Minister, he, his coalition was dependent upon Irish Nationalist votes. He was threatening to utilize provisions of the Parliament act which in some circumstances allowed a sitting government to circumvent the House of Lords and pass a bill by direct royal assent. This prospect of a partial devolution of government functions to a Catholic Irish Republic, like United Irish Republic, this caused Tories to go berserk. And for context, the Conservative Party in these days was literally called the Conservative and Unionist Party. Okay? It appeared that, it appeared that there was probably going to be some kind of general civil war, sectarian civil war, if some kind of compromise wasn't accomplished. And on top of that, like, again, this reached into like the heart of like English political life, okay? And there's a disproportionate number of like rabid loyalists in the officer corps. Like, I'm not saying that punitively, like my sympathy is with these people, okay? I mean, that's my heritage. But a huge amount of the officer corps, the British army, specifically the infantry, these guys hailed from Protestant Anglo Irish families, you know, who had like a direct stake in unions, in unionism. It wasn't just, you know, like, it wasn't just, you know, ethno sectarian loyalty. It was that too, but. And what came to be known as the Kara incident, 20th March, 57 British officers based in County Kildare, they said that they'd resign their commissions rather than enforce the introduction of Home Rule against, against Unionist Northern Ireland. It went as high as the Director of Military Operations, Henry Wilson, he was a staunch Unionist and he started openly calling for insubordination against any government that, that tried to try to enforce Home Rule. And like the subtext of this, I mean, you're looking at a situation where quite literally you would have had a British army not just in mutiny, but fighting on the Unionist side against, you know, a parliamentary and royal mandate. I mean, that's, this is insane. Now this obviously wasn't lost on people that, you know, again, like we talked about the other week, among other things. I mean, really, for the proceeding, really, since the end of Disraeli's tenure, there been a kind of, like, listlessness to imperial policy in the UK and, you know, among other things, you know, making an enemy in Germany resolve that in kind of, like, absolute ontological terms. But in the case of the home rule issue, in very specific terms, it's like, okay, like, it kind of brought the army to heal. It gave him something to do. It took like, the home rule issue totally off the table and definitely, you know, like, like, like it made sense. Like, the trajectory towards intervention on the continent was increasingly becoming a foregone conclusion, if that makes sense. It, like, I'm not saying that was the sole proximate cause or anything, obviously. And ultimately, the. Initially, the UK was reluctant to honor the. The London Treaty. It was essentially the French putting it to him like this. They said, like, look, you know, you're talking about German ships assaulting French ports, you know, in and across the English Channel and, you know, transversing British territorial waters at will and probably attacking and. Or appropriating neutral ports in Belgium, you know, and if. If London will tolerate that, the Royal Navy can't be said to be Lord of the Seas any longer. And that had a lot to do with it. But the prospect of a general civil war in Ireland with an officer corps, with a. With a loyalist officer corps in mutiny, that was a very real, very, very real possibility. That's basically what I got at long last for the political configuration of forces and motives that led to the Great War. At long last. In the next episode, we will cover the Western Front, the one subsequent, the Eastern Front. In the final episode, we'll do the aftermath, and we'll do the aftermath slash Versailles, slash, you know, the Wilson administration intervenes, you know, in the American Expeditionary Force lands in Europe. But, yeah, that's about all I got for now.
- [365:13]
Pete
Awesome. Awesome. Remind everybody where they can find your work and we'll end it.
- [365:18]
Thomas
Yeah. You don't mean, like, end it, right? You mean just, like in this episode. You can find me. You can find me in my website. It's thomas777.com it's number 7H Omega 777. You can find me on X at real capital R E a l/ number 7hws777. You can find me on substack. That's where the podcast is, too. The podcast. The new season is dropping in a day or two. It's literally being edited right now. I promise it's real Thomas777 that's substack.com. a lot of good stuff is in the can, trust me. And yeah, that's that's all I got for now.
- [366:09]
Pete
If you go to the comments on any of the videos that any of these videos that I do with Thomas, they're there's a link to the Show Notes page and everything Thomas just mentioned, I got links for it there. So. Thanks, Thomas. Appreciate it. Always.
- [366:24]
Thomas
Thank you, Pete.
- [366:26]
Pete
Want to welcome everyone back to the Pinot Show. We are returning with Thomas 777 and we are picking up again on the World War I series. So, Thomas, where are we going today?
- [366:40]
Thomas
I'm going to continue to talk a little bit about causes and kind of the dominant schools of thought on what led to, you know, the advent of actual hostilities. Like, there's a few different thoughts on that, you know, and I'll first let me pick up and frame our discussion, you know, in in context. Topically. It, I think where we left off previously was quite literally, you know, the close of July 1914, you know, and it's my position which I think is inarguable. Even people who are even people who are, you know, basically hostile to German perspective, like AJP Taylor, he's a heterodox historian, but he's uncompromising hostile to, you know, the German case, as it were. You know, even he acknowledges that it was the Russian general mobilization order that was not obviously, that was not the sole proximate cause, but it was the essential immediate cause of the onset of hostilities. It was July 28, 1914. That was when the Russian chief of staff, Januszkevich, he advised the czar that what was euphemously referred to as the period preparatory to war must be superseded by formal mobilization announcements, which initially was only a partial mobilization order. But again, that didn't matter the scope and scale of the Russian Imperial army and the state of its infrastructural capabilities to, you know, prepare that army for combat. It was it didn't matter if it was, you know, a quote unquote, partial mobilization or, you know, a complete or an order for full preparations. Know, the fact is that the capability was there and owing to conditions as they were, it was a constructive declaration of war. You know, the way they tried to finesse that, in addition to announcing that this is only a partial mobilization, they signaled to Berlin that this was only directed against Austria, you know, owing to this alleged Austrian assault on Serbia from the Danube, which was something of a gulf of tonkin rationale, everything else aside, just as a side note, Belgrade from the Danube at the time was an incredibly hardened target, and its fortifications were essentially immune to all but the heaviest artillery. So, I mean, just that this is obviously pretextual. Aside from the fact that the idea that Russia viewed the Habsburg army as some grave threat, I mean, that's absurd too. I mean, just owing to the parodies involved. And finally, the whole issue in terms of the German ability to defend in depth, to say nothing of the cultural and racial affinity for Austria, you know, even if that had been an honest dispatch, and if Moscow's only intent was to neutralize the Habsburg army, you know, and defend the integrity of Serbia territorially and politically, that wouldn't matter. You know, Germany's ability to defend its eastern frontier depended upon the Habsburg Empire remaining intact, you know, in terms of its. In terms of its territorial structure, you know, and that should have been obvious. Was that an alibi that the Russians were merely suggesting for. For cosmetic reasons? I mean, people have said that. But for what purpose? You know, to protect the historical record. That's not the way statesman think in the moment, at least not when you're talking about the decision to issue orders that very possibly can lead to a general war. Sergey Sezenov, he was the Russian foreign minister. He'd received word, he was the first Russian official to receive word of Austria's declaration of war on Serbia. He immediately conferred with the French ambassador, Palilog, late afternoon, and Palilog apparently declared full solidarity, you know, with the Russian cause if the Russians were to go to war against the Austrians, which was a foregone conclusion by that point. Kind of conventional wisdom is like, oh, this is. This is what caused World War I. It was the secret diplomacy and this reckless sort of willingness to abide these diplomatic structures that the purpose of which had been to keep the peace, you know, in structural terms. And obviously once that peace was no longer possible, these structures were redundant. So that was kind of the refrain in the aftermath of the war was, you know, see, this is why. This is why conventional diplomacy is misguided. And, you know, it was. It was this. It was the irrationality of, you know, secret diplomacy that led to hostilities. I don't personally accept that whatever France did or didn't do, I mean, them in Germany would have been at loggerheads the moment Berlin mobilized anyway. And aside from that, whether Russia stood alone or whether the Entente remained intact as intended, it wouldn't have mattered. I think the personages involved or just positive. And I don't accept the great man theory of history at all. I think that's a Whiggish conceit. But I do accept that when you're talking about the command of forces at scale, as really is only possible in later modernity and specifically in the 20th century where there was this unprecedented convergence of industrial military and political power, like the man in the role of warlord, actual potential, his tendencies amidst crisis can be dispositive and often are. And I can stroll that up with examples subsequent to 1914, throughout the 20th century. I mean, this recurs again and again. It was this weird phase that, you know, prior to machine learning, truly kind of sidelining human decision makers, while at the same time traditional decision making had broken down by which there were certain safeguards of an institutional nature insinuated into power structures of scale by which, you know, an individual personage, by virtue of his kind of discreet characteristics, could impact the decision to go to war or to suit for peace, you know, but also, I mean, I'm a Hegelian at base, so I, I. There's a certain bounded rationality to the structural explanations within the context of warfare. But if we're talking about ultimate causes, I think it's somewhat misguided. As it were, though, bring it back to 1914. Janice Giveic Chief of Staff he subsequently ordered that July 30 would be the first day of general mobilization. He called upon the Tsar, secured the Czar's signature on the order of her full as well as partial mobilization. You got all the relevant ministers signatures according to, according to this may be apocryphal. Supposedly the Minister of the Interior was this kind of Orthodox mystic. He made the sign of the cross in the way that old believers do, you know, like behooved God to help the Russian people and then, you know, provided his signature as well. And like I said, I believe this is when the die was cast. Strategically, it was also unnecessary. In addition to the, the quote unquote bombardment from the Danube by the Habsburg Navy, this idea that if Russia didn't intervene immediately, that Serbia would somehow be threatened. Serbia is an incredibly difficult terrain to fight in. It's got an incredibly game population, you know, this caused the Wehrmacht terrible problems from 1941 to 1945, among other things. This is why the prospect of a general war in the Balkans in 91 to 95 like seems so ominous. It wasn't just because of the potential for general escalation, you know, is it especially owing to the initial response of the players involved, you know, Helmut Cole contra Yeltsin and Bush and Baker and their desire to kind of salvage the post perestroika vision that had been shattered by the decisions of the aforementioned chiefs of state. But there's no possible way that within days or weeks the Hasbro army could subdue Serbia. I mean, worst case scenario, a localized war. The Habsburg army would be locked in a quagmire with Serbia regulars basically in perpetuity, which would call upon, you know, obviously the great powers to, you know, relied on the Hague Convention or on this I'm going to ad hoc diplomacy regime in order to resolve hostilities. This was not a critical matter of strategic importance. Again, there was a question of masculine honor and racial honor. And obviously that's something to take seriously, particularly as we discussed when, you know, in the case of royals having actual executive authority, you know, but the czar, the tsar and the Kaiser had amiable relations, basically, you know, not only were they related, but, you know, this wasn't. Despite the kind of tragedy of geostrategic circumstance that puts the German Reich as it existed and Russia at loggerheads. There wasn't, there wasn't this kind of ongoing political culture of hostility as there was, you know, in London, contra Berlin. There was, there was no reason why, you know, the Kaiser, had he not taken this kind of firm and absolute line on the issue of Serbia. It's not as if there would have been some kind of officers revolt or, you know, if he would have found himself sidelined. So that's, that's, that because, so that's important, you know, because I know that the rebuttal then is now, particularly now considering the unfortunate state of things in power, political terms, I mean, you know, like Russia stands with Serbia and Slavic people stand together. And it absolutely, you know, figured into the equation. But again, it was not, it was not a critical juncture in military or political terms. To drive that point home. Austria had approximately 48 combat ready divisions. It estimated that at the very least about 28 of these would have to be deployed to subdue Serbia. Obviously, in the mind of war planners in Vienna, you know, who were very much, very much took their cues from Berlin and the German High command in von Moltke, the understanding was that at least 20 divisions would have to remain to defend Austria, Hungary proper, and in turn you know, allow Germany to defend in depth, particularly because Germany at that point had not mobilized at all. Okay, so again, Even the full brunt of the Habsburg army would not have been able to overrun Serbia within days or weeks. But that wasn't even on the table owing to strategic realities, you know. And the Habsburg army, I mean they were game. They had some good officer, good officers. But there's a reason why, for example, Hitler had no interest in serving in it, you know, and it wasn't, it wasn't just, you know, the eccentric Mr. Hitler, Herr Hitler and his love for, you know, the Vaterland. It. They were not a crack army, you know, and they certainly, they certainly weren't some diversified force, you know, that had a proper, you know, mountain division or something that, you know, could wage a war effectively against Serbia regulars, you know. And Serbia was. The Serbian interior was mountainous, wasn't is mountainous terrain at that time. It was full of impossible, impassable roads, you know. And this was, this was late autumn. We're talking about that the campaign absolutely at the very least would have, would have continued to. So I mean, you're talking, you're talking about a winter war against Chetniks in, in the mountains, you know, I mean it's, come on, that's, that's, that's a recipe for disaster, you know, certainly not something that's going to lend itself to a blitzkrieg outcome. And this proved to be exactly the case. Frankly, this isn't just academic. In 1915, before the true stalemate set in on in the west, The Eastern front was a very different situation. Regardless, we'll get into that too. But the, the full brunt of German, Austrian and Bulgarian combined arms fell on Serbia from three different directions and it took two months to conclude the campaign. Okay, so, you know, this isn't, this isn't academic. The German declaration of war came down on it come down on Saturday. Russia had followed suit on Sunday, August 3rd at 7pm is when military censorship and the formal state of war was declared throughout the Russian Empire. Russian High command was basically optimistic. The reason why Russia took such horrendous casualties in the east and that doesn't. The reasons why are complicated. And as we'll get into next episode, what had been convention. What was then conventional wisdom about, about infantry assault gleaned basically from the Franco Prussian War and the Boer War. Obviously the scale, particularly the latter, wasn't really applicable, but such that lessons could be extrapolated, those kinds of tactical doctrines were basically effective. There was a highly mobile war in the east and there was huge casualties, okay. But for reasons different than on the Western front, the Russian army didn't collapse, but it wasn't really competent for defending against massed artillery on the open step where you can't fortify the same way was possible in the west, largely for geographic reason. Largely for geographic reasons. But there's logistical problems too. But the basic confidence of the Russians it owed and I'm going to butcher this it owed to what they called the Bolshaya Voinaya programas the great military program which had been launched around a year previous. It aimed to cut Darwin's mobilization time to 18 days, shore up logistics, be able to rapidly reinforce that field army like as they absorb attrition. And the British, the British army's military at the shay who'd been observing this, he issued this report that suggested that the Russians, in a general war, the Russians would be able to absorb attrition and reconstitute and equip their forces such that if the Germans moved on Paris, they'd be leaving Berlin undefended. And then ultimately the Russians like assuming that their lines held, you know, presume, presuming like a von Schliefen type attack, the Russians absorb the initial German assault. If they could absorb that, they could reconstitute the counterattack would attrition the German army to the point that if the Germans moved on Paris simultaneously, Berlin would be left undefended. Russia could smash German lines and be in Berlin or at least threatening it at this, at the, at the city's gates literally before the Germans reached Paris. That seems absurdly optimistic considering all relevant variables and probable forces in being based on what was known. But this was, this was kind of taken for granted. Like people, people took this seriously, including the German high command. You know, I know that it's conventional wisdom in academe as well as among war college types that oh, the Germans weren't afraid of the Russians and that, and this is extrapolated I think from their desire to kind of at all costs preclude people from accepting the reality of the situation in 1941. You know, because their, their claim is that, oh, Russia's, Russia was never a threat to anybody. You know, Stalin certainly had no designs in Western Europe. This is German militarism because otherwise it's just not rational that people could reach the conclusions that they do in good faith. But the idea was like, long story short, for our purposes on this issue, the idea was in London, in Paris, in Berlin and in Moscow and St. Petersburg that the Russian army would, would, would perform exponentially better than it did. Okay, the kind of one prominent pessimist was Peter Denovo de novo. He was the Minister of the interior and he was the chief of the secret police. He had a very, very profound sense of Foreboding not just on grounds the obvious potential for catastrophe as regards the military situation. He realized, being the top kind of policeman, that the czar's mandate just generally was weaker than the court recognized, particularly in Moscow and St. Petersburg because these people never visited the countryside. And he stated in his diary that if the war went badly, quote, a social revolution in its most extreme form will be unavoidable. Now this is remarkable, okay I think because he's the one figure in Russian official who was essentially saying we better win this war and win it fast. We're going to be looking at a red revolution. The improbability of Lenin's success was what shook the world is conventional wisdom. And it. Don't get me wrong, I think Lenin was probably the most cable like political soldier, partisan who ever lived. But at the same time it goes to show you the degree to which the degree was like Russia before, like the czar's regime was uniquely ill suited, like notwithstanding Russia's unique problems, it was uniquely ill suited to managing a territory the size of the Russian Empire. I don't really think such a state would have been manageable before. Like before, before the mid 20th century probably. You know, that's one of the reasons why Stalin did what he did. You know, Stalin exterminated anybody who could force some kind of apocalypse paradigm shift of such. The story that cat bullet him and his comrades of power. But that's, that's a topic for another day. Romain Roland, who was, he was this Swiss polymath and kind of this favorite of the international literary set at the time, kind of a Newt Homson type except people don't like Hobson anymore because he basically wrote, he basically wrote a eulogy to Hitler like we got like the Nobel Prize for literature. But Roland, he said that Russia essentially like lost its mind culturally since the death of Tolstoy. And there wasn't really critical voices, not just in the court of the czar but you know, basically in, in, in in kind of Russian cultural life. He wrote on August 3rd that that essentially though that that like the collab literally the collapse of civilization was afoot and that Europe will never recover from, you know, the, the. Spangler was another Auger in that regard. I think although his, the natural German pessimism, you know, the idea of. I'm sure people dismiss that including his basically sympathetic biographers as well. You know, you've gotta, you've got, you've got to consider that. You've got to consider like the German worldview, you know, and Germany was always, you know, one step away from crisis. So you know, and presumably, you know, the chauvinistic German will always talk about, hey everybody, lady luck here. And we're celebrating America's 250th birthday. Now all summer long I'm going to be celebrating by playing on spinquest.com which is an American owned social casino. It obviously features over a thousand slot games and live blackjack, live craps, live bubble craps. Head on over to spinquest.com get yourself a $30 coin pack for just 10 bucks. Spin Quest is a free to play social casino. Visit spinquest.com for more details. You know, the destruction of Germany and the destruction of Europe as synonymous, which they are, I might add. But I, I think that Spangler had a more worldly, figuratively and literally perspective than that. But, but this wasn't, but this was in whether you're talking about political, military or cultural life, this was abs. This wasn't just a minority opinion. It was, it was based like a minority of, of one, you know, in these respective endeavors. These, these sort of, these sort of endeavors in which these men found themselves. I mean, you know, you're talking about literally a handful of people who saw the writing on the wall. You know, there was not, there was not any understanding that this is going to be a catastrophe. You know, and again, I realize as we talked about, you know, in Europe, Contra America, the 19th century was not very much happened and the only, you know, the, the Crimean War and, and the Franco Prussian War were localized conflicts. But there wasn't, but I mean the war between the states and America, there'd been a lot of Europeans, mercenaries and observers, you know, who'd been on the ground here. World, world media, such that it existed at the time was focused on the war between the States. There was an understanding that emergent combined arms had laid people to waste by the tens of thousands. So it's peculiar that people could think this way, but they did it. And I say that because, I mean lady, people never understand military matters. I was talking to my dad, but they don't want to go about because I was pulling a bunch of stuff on kind of the craziness about that was banning, you know, about the 1991 Gulf War, you know, crazy casualty predictions and just really misguided stuff. But so I mean it's not, there's nothing, it's not unprecedented or something for the commentariat to get it totally wrong on the evil war. But it's almost always the opposite. They almost always say the sky is falling. You know, they pretty much never say, you know, this. This will resolve itself within weeks. And, you know, there's not going to be meaningful attrition and civilian life won't be impacted. You know, particularly when you're talking about total mobilization of, you know, every major power at scale. I mean, it's. It's just. It's crazy. But let me.
- [397:09]
Pete
Let me ask you something that you, you mentioned before.
- [397:11]
Thomas
Yeah.
- [397:12]
Pete
Why do you think so many people in Russia got it wrong that they didn't see it coming? They didn't see Bolshevism coming?
- [397:21]
Thomas
There's a. There's a basic backwardness to Russia. You know, it wasn't just, I mean, like we talked about before, I mean, yeah, the Kaiser had real power in Germany, but it was Hovig, it was Moltke, it was, you know, the top German industrialists, you know, who had the real power. You know, the, you know, King Edward and King George and even later, you know, and even. Even subsequently, the Queen, you know, in the uk, like, had to have clout. Had and have clout. But Moscow was the only combatant state where you literally had a king, you know, who had the same. Who had. Who wielded the same authority on war and peace matters and everything else, you know, as a European monarch would have, you know, 500 years previously. There's a basic incongruity there, you know, in terms of the management of. Of power politics. And even if, you know, even something that's in the contemplation, even some kind of peasant revolt or something, which was not alien to the Russians, they couldn't conceptualize the emergence like a vanguard proletariat animated basically by, you know, a German dialectical paradigm, because I think it seemed too alien. That's part of it. But the war also, it's, you know, I. Lenin, in some ways was a great opportunist, I think, as the situation totally deteriorated at the front, you know, and the Russians were looking. Not just the Russians were willing to, you know, get out of the war at all costs. I mean, thus the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. But it's also. Any kind of catalyzing influence would have been adequate, you know, to the people who are literally starving, you know, in. In the field. I think that's why. But it's complicated. Russia doesn't make a lot of sense to accidental eyes. Like, I don't. People constantly ask me, and, I mean, I don't speak Russian and I'm not some. Yeah. I'm not like A Russian expert, like at all. But I write a lot about the Cold War and stuff. So they asked me what, they asked me why like the Soviet Union just rapidly deteriorated and came apart. I mean people are like, okay, well you know, like, and drop off as early as, you know, like 1981, 82 was saying like we're dealing with a systemic crisis. You know, people make the point that like okay, Aldrich Ames, he sold out all the human intelligence assets that, you know, CIA and defense intelligence had. So the west was blind as what was going on in Moscow. It's not the whole story. You know the, that's why like a lot of, that's why there was like a, there was a pretty vocal minority, not just the cranks. I mean you remember because you know, you were an adult when it happened, like when the wall was coming down, people like, oh, this some kind of like communist ruse, they're going to give up east of Germany. Then they're going to reconstitute, you know, because there's no way the Soviet Union is coming apart suddenly. But it did like what weather state does that happen to? I can't name one. You know, it doesn't make a lot of sense. It's the way the Russians proceeded in 1914 didn't make a lot of sense. You know, like, like again, it's Putin today. In some ways I think he's a terrible warlord. In other ways, you know, the Russians are, the Russians have these, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The Russians have been like pumping all kinds of money into it. So now it's got big cloud in Africa and the Russians are all over the Central African Republic, which is basically a field of diamond mines and their proxies are winning there. You know, it's not an accident that the Russians were very active in Yemen because the Orthodox like stand with, they, they stand with the Shia and the Alawite and the fibers and stuff. I mean there's, there's a highly sophisticated, very unusual kind of veld polity that's being pursued by Moscow today. That on its face doesn't seem to make a lot of sense.
- [402:21]
Pete
But could he be looking to flood the market with diamonds and take out the tribes diamond?
- [402:30]
Thomas
That's entirely possible. Yeah. But it's also diamonds, Diamonds are less volatile than gold, silver and platinum. Something that's. So if you can, if you own the Central Admin Republic and you kick the French out, which they've done, you stand a profit. But like long term. Yeah, like if, if, if some kind of goyish Russian Conglomerate or you know, some kind of tribe conglomerate, but that's basically adjacent Moscow, albeit for cynical reasons. You know, kind of like becomes like the global diamond cartel. Like yeah, that'll particularly as the Russians try and get people off the dollar, they'll give them like bargaining power, you know, at scale. But the point is I think I know something about power politics and if you put me in the role of, you know, like Metch or Kissinger, like James Baker, I think I do better than a lot of men. I would not at all pursue the course that like Putin and like Lavrov are. You know, I'm not even saying it's like foolish because in some ways I think there's like a subtle if not brilliance, like inspired creativity there. But it's not, it's not what I, or I think your most other people, accidental people would, would, would consider to be like appropriate priorities and, and the correct course. You know, like, and again, I think I've got a longer view than most Americans. Like, I know I do because that, that's why, that's why people, you know, act like I don't know what the I'm talking about. But you know, it's hard to say. That's the big but I mean the 20th century is the story of, is the story of communism, you know, like it really is. That's why I'm always setting Hobbs bomb as an important thinker. What however, like literally and figuratively ugly he was, he was important in terms of that, that paradigm. You know, I mean that, but that's, that's the cutting of reason. So I mean, and I mean that's hailing, you know, and that's assuming you're a God fearing individual. I mean that's, that's the hand of providence in history. You know, sometimes there is no why. I mean that's the best answer I can proffer. I really, that's kind of a non answer. But you know, again, like people say too when they talk about the origins of the First World War, like Norman Davies made the point that the discussion of it almost sounds like the way like engineers need to talk about the Titanic or something, you know, like, well, why, why did this happen? Was it a structural problem? Was it, you know, was, was it pilot error? Because you know, there had, there had to be some discrete reason because massive ocean liners cross the Atlantic every day and nothing happens. That's something the wrong way to look at it. You know, in the first World War it's always, oh, it was secret diplomacy and structurally this is why something like the United nations or the League of Nations is essential, because otherwise states rely on self help, you know, and that only comes in the form of cultivating military capabilities and then mobilization at scale. And that makes war more power possible, more probable, if not inevitable. But that's nonsense. I mean, like, look at the Cold War, you know. You know, again, I. I believe in the cutting of reason in the hand of providence, but unfortunately, the collection of personages, among other things, in critical roles in 1914 led to disaster. One of the reasons, One of the reasons I defend Kennedy, I mean, I don't have reason to defend him in policy terms or anything. And one reason I especially defend Matt Mira in the Situation Room during the Cuba crisis. Basically, like the one advisory voice telling Kennedy this doesn't matter in strategic terms. Don't listen to these people was McNamara. Everybody else, including Strategic Air Command to the man of Curtis LeMay, who was an incredibly intimidating personage, was saying, you've got to assault now, you've got to assault now. You know, at all costs. We've got to assault now. You know, it was only McNamara who. I advise people to watch the Errol Morris documentary or biopic, rather McNamara, a bigger old Morris fan. But even if one is not, you know, you can see how emotional McNamara gets, you know, decades after the fact, talking about Kennedy. You know, he has. He tells Morris to stop the camera from it because it's clear he's about to cry. You know, he. He was Kennedy's closest advisor man, other than his brother, obviously. You know, if McNamara is not in that room in October 1962, a nuclear war happens, in my opinion. You know, like, I'm not saying people need to, like, bow down and say McNamara is great, you know, he prevented the deaths of 80 million people or whatever. But my point is that that's really the only reason why things went that way. It's not because there's some profound structural characteristic of nuclear weapons that like, make people behave rationally because, oh, that's unthinkable. People do unthinkable all the time. People are monsters, you know, like, they're not. They, they don't care about attrition at scale at all. It doesn't mean anything. I mean, I mean, it does, you know, like, but it. In those capacities, it doesn't. Nobody's, Nobody's saying, like, it's not like in the movies where people, like. I mean, you might have, like, you might have individual missile years. I think it's poignant in like, war games where there's the, there's the guy in the minute man silo, and he's like, you know, his, his colleague, you know, pulls a gun on him, the force, I'm going to turn his key because I'm not going to kill 80 million people. I mean, yeah, there's, I don't, I mean, that absolutely is, is realistic, but at command level, like, nobody's saying, like, oh, I can't kill 80 million Russians like them. You know, I mean, that's. So that's, you know, if, if the czar's chief of, if his chief of staff, you know, if the Imperial army chief of staff isn't who he is in 1914 and he says, look, this is going to lead to a quagmire. We can't win, or, you know, this is going to provoke a revolutionary situation. And you know, frankly, your majesty, your mandates are tenuous. And presuming that man had the clout and the favor of the crown to speak that way, then, yeah, things go a totally different way, you know, or, I mean, even if, I know people claim that, you know, the murder of Ferdinand was like a pretext, it wasn't a pretext. Ferdinand was a respected guy. Cold blooded murder is a terrible thing. People didn't like the Serbs anyway. Like, I'm not saying that to be punitive. Like, I mean, it's just true, you know, you, there's a. Out. We, we, we don't, we don't know this because other than older folks, you know, the last time political homicide was a thing was the 1960s. Like, it outrages people, you know, particularly, you know, when you're talking about the personages of, of monarchs and, and their heirs. Like people identify with them personally. Like if you, I mean, even to this day, man, like, like, if you go around like it's holding the queen, like Englishmen get mad, you know. Exactly. You're selling the Virgin Madonna or like their mom or something. You know, like it's, it's not a minor thing. Like, it's, I mean, even, even today, I mean, there's like dudes who, there's people who like probably come to blows me say about Donald Trump. I find that incredible. And like, I don't dislike Donald Trump, but I mean, like, incredible people want to defend his honor. But I mean, the fact is, like, it's not like this idea that, this idea that, that, that Austrians and, and you know, Germanic adjacent people would be outraged by this. Like that. Why, why does that seem like a contrivance or like a pretext, but but yeah, that, you know, the. I like, forgive the tangent, but yeah, my point is like, it's not, you're not going to find some, some structural proximate cause for the Great War. And it's also too, I mean, the reason, like also invoking Haswom again, but also, you know, Hegel obviously and Nolte, you've got to look at 1914 and 1989 as events in like a single epoch and nexus of causality. You know, they're not like discrete conflicts that, you know, were emergent from some common operative factual patterns, but basically occur in like isolation relatively. They're part of the same conflict. You know, why and how it resolved the way it did is complicated in very broad terms, it owes the properties of mind at scale, in my opinion. But you know, again, you. If people want to pose a question, you know, why, why, why why did the guns of August, you know, why were they loosed in 1914? Well, I mean, you, that's, you're posing a question like, why did the 20th century happen? You know, that was just the opening syllable. I'd argue too, when, you know, again, your point kind of oblique to your question about the Bolshevik Revolution, the, I mean, the conditions that made that possible emerge from the Great War. I mean, it's kind of like a chicken or the egg thing. You know, obviously like left Hegelians and, and like Marxist type historians, like they'd always say, like, oh, well, you know, the capitalist structure, when it enters crisis mode, you know, it sues for war, you know, for. Because, you know, because it kills off the proletariat. You know, it takes the pressure off of, you know, the, the labor surplus and things, you know, but it also allows, you know, like a restructuring of access to captive markets for, you know, these regimes and states that enjoy it, diminishing access to the sum total of global capital and being. And I mean, that's nonsense as characterized by them. But there is in fact common causality in basic historical terms between revolutionary imperatives and, you know, the arrival of, of states of general war. You know, they're not, they're not separate phenomenon, you know, at least not in my opinion. You know, that's not, that's not some cop out like, oh, war is war or something at all. But, you know, they, it emerges from the same nexus of causation, at least in general terms. But I'm rambling, so I'll bring it back here in a minute Also too. I mean, kind of, I think I mentioned in our last episode on the Great War. The. The question raised. The question emerged, not ironically, in Vienna. It seemed to be von Moltke, you know, who was chief of the General Staff, who was not just issuing guarantees, but speaking for the Kaiser's government, which led, you know, which led the Habsburgs, including Franz Joseph himself, to pose a question like, who's making decisions in Berlin? You know, is it Hovig? Is it the Kaiser? You know, is it. Might have. Has everybody been sidelined in favor of von Moltke? And is there a junta in place in all but name, you know, and this wasn't. People characterize this in the most punitive terms, some of whom, again, AJP Taylor, he's got a somewhat sympathetic, albeit a less than sympathetic is not the word. He used the course of German policy and power, political terms, to basically be unremarkable in terms of that. From the time Prussia was conquered, from the indigenous elements there to the time, you know, to September 3rd, 1939, there was this basic continuity of policy and decisionism in Berlin. He didn't view the national associate revolution as changing that. At the same time, he viewed the military as having outsized power. You know, I think that's the wrong way to understand it if you're talking about. A crisis regime. You know, again, I just invoke the example of Kennedy's administration in October 1962, the very fact that Curtis lame and Strategic Air Command possibly could have decisively impacted the decision to wage nuclear war. When you're talking about a modern state and decisions at scale of a military nature, you're talking about people being sidelined who are outside of the military command structure, just by definition. You know, I make the point all the time that Carter essentially, like, returned in, in actual terms, the power to wage nuclear war to the civilian executive. And it required the creation, not just of, you know, a kind of moral and understanding to sustain that structure, but it required the marshaling of all kinds of technological command and control elements to create this apparatus where that could be seen through. Like, what I'm getting is that it's not this, like, natural state of things, okay? By definition, a chief executive in a modern state. A lot of his job is delegation. And nor is that more profound or pronounced than on military matters, because it can't be any other way, you know, And I think. I think people who contemplate the anthropological aspect of human decision making in highly scaled circumstances under conditions of technological modernity don't really realize that the reason why von Moltke was running around doing this shuttle diplomacy with. With Allies and potential adversaries alike is because it's going to come down to him in de facto terms whether or not the Reich went to war or not. You know, it didn't matter who was putting pen to paper figuratively or literally on a war declaration. So I think I, that's important to keep in mind. Okay, People, I don't. Was the German general Staff predisposed to war? I mean, in geostrategic terms? Yeah, because they have to be. Germany's always outnumbered and it's always beleaguered. You know, the. I was reading about the Battle of the Somme incident. The first Battle of the Somme or the Battle of Albert. The first phase was the first. The British called the first phase the Battle of Albert. At least they used to, you know, the Battle of the Somme. In one day, the UK took 20,000 dead. The Germans took about a third of that. But the Somme was one of the first combined arms assaults against German lines, which is interesting. I think people have a, this idea of World War I with the Entente powers as having this kind of like complex coordination. They didn't. And that was one of the reasons why there were so many catastrophes. The Central Powers did a lot better with that. But the, the German general staff issued what amounted to a no retreat order to the, at the Somme. And after the fact, the, the commanders on the ground said we had no choice because if our lines had broken, everything would have collapsed, you know, and we had no reserves to reconstitute like we had to. We had a way to stand and fight or die, you know. So, I mean, extrapolate that to the situation on the eastern front after 1941. And it's the same thing, you know, it's not, oh, Hitler was a maniac. He refused to let people withdraw. You know, I mean, this. I, I'm sure some people are going to dismiss that as like apologia for, you know, because, because I like the Third Reich and stuff, but it, You don't have luxuries in terms of this kind of smorgasbord menu, adverbially of, of how you proceed at war when, you know, you, you basically occupy an indefensible, an indefensible territory, which is what Germany is. The. Christopher Clark wrote a great book called Iron Kingdom about its history of Prussia. It's really fascinating. I highly recommend it. But, you know, Europe itself is basically an indefensible peninsula. You know, like the fact that it existed at all into the modern age is pretty remarkable. And the only the Only way it did was essentially by, by cultivating a certain aptitude for warfare and adaptability therein. You know, there's not margins for error. And it's somewhat comical to me when there's like these kinds of like laymen or these like armchair historian guys or even like academics. They're like, they're second guessing like the German general staff who, you know, and their DNA is essentially like a thousand years of knowledge on how to prevail in a Ross and Free so that your civilization doesn't end. But it's like these fools like know better somehow or like they've got some like moral qualm with, you know, how these things are, are decided. But be it as it may, you know, it's also too. There wasn't, there wasn't ambiguity about how the Germans would respond to a German mobilization order. And Holvig, who again I've made the point, I think he's other than Franz Joseph. I think he's about the most sympathetic kind of like political personage of the epoch. He specifically instructed the German ambassador in St. Petersburg to warn Sazonov that Russian mobilization will be treated as a declaration of war. If this wasn't already clear to everybody, just based on precedent and practical reason, you know, I mean this was literally issued as this is our policy statement. If you mobilize, we are going to go to war. July 29th. Wilhelm had personally appealed to the Tsar in English, interestingly, which, I mean a few, there's a few possible reasons for that. English was becoming something of a default diplomatic language at that point. I view it more as a, you know, a. This is like a sign of simple respect, basically like urging him to come to some kind of solution short of war. Okay. You know, in the. I raised this because Wilhelm was not an admirable man in history. You know, like I said, there's a reason why. There's a reason why Hitler felt about him the way that he did as well as many other people. But you know, this idea that, you know, he was either. I read it might have been Ian Kershaw, I can't remember. Like somebody claimed that like, you know, one of these cards that like one of these kinds of like Tory story entitlements claim that like, oh, you know, when as like the Russian army was mobilizing, you know, the Kaiser Wilhelm was like vacationing in his villa or something. There's like this concept of him either as this abject buffoon was totally disengaged or as this kind of like warmongering brood. I mean, neither of those things is true. Like, yeah, it's unfortunate he was at the helm, but you know, he was, he was doing everything within his mandate, including calling upon his kind of fellow, his fellow aristocratic brethren, to sue for peace at the hour of decision. That's the whole reason why these royals, who were related by blood, were insinuated throughout the continent and beyond. I mean that's, you know, it was for this kind of familial, familial diplomacy, like, like corny and, and quaint as that sounds now, but I mean, he, you know, I don't, I don't know what, I don't know what the German should have done in terms of claiming the moral high ground here. Such thing can even be discussed. And again, as a power politics, I mean, the refrain is always like, oh well, you know, the, the Entente powers were, they were attacked. I mean again, war is not a schoolyard fight. It's not like who squeezed the trigger first? And you're not, there's not some moral imperative like wait to be attacked. You know, if, if you're pointing a gun at my face and I find a way to take the high ground and shoot you first. I'm not like a bad guy for like not waiting for you to shoot me. I mean, like, it's not, that sounds ridiculous, like reducing things to such metaphors, but that's quite literally the way things are characterized like in the English speaking world. Like, oh, you know, this is like a schoolyard fight and like you hit me first. I mean it's, it's, it's ridiculous. It's, it's literally like, it's like mentally stunted to think that way. And we'll get into this next episode. The UK's involvement. In political terms, it wasn't this positive, but in battlefield terms, I believe it's what created a stalemate. And the question of why emerges again and again. You know, it's, I mean, I think it was a, I think it was a culture like his decades long, kind of poisonous culture of kind of abject and basically irrational hostility to Germany, as well as the fact that an empire that is being compromised just by fatigue and complexity and scale is always in need of kind of a coherent policy course which by the 20th century really wasn't possible anymore. So like identifying a continental adversary in which to direct all of these energies towards, you know, like in the short term solved a lot of problems. But you know, London's claim is always, oh well, you know, Germany violated Belgian neutrality But I mean, Hovig made the point even before the evil hostilities that the case of Belgium there would have to be some kind of like recompense for the Belgians. And when the Germans did assault, interestingly, the Belgians seemed very well equipped to wage an asymmetrical war. Forget whatever plans you have this weekend because you're staying at home and playing on spinquest and there's never been a better time to sign up than right now. New users get thirty dollar coin packs for just ten dollars. All the table games you love with hundreds of slot games and real cash Prizes. That's at spinquest.com S P I N Q U-T.com Spin Quest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. They imposed quite a lot of attrition on the Kaiser's army. There were some horrible instances of friendly fire on the German side owing to the way some of these. Battles resolved. But I mean I, I, when you, when you border France, who for a millennia is the traditional, traditional enemy of the German states, declaring yourself to be this, you know, non aligned neutral and anyone who crosses your border with hostile intention is somehow committing an act of gross rapine, I mean that seems highly specious at best. But aside from the kind of moral cant, and even if it's in good faith, this kind of traditional Anglophone belief and the integrity of, you know, structures tailored to regularized outcomes, it doesn't, it doesn't truly explain why the British willing to piss away like tens of thousands of men for a few yards gain against the German army for like, for what? I mean that doesn't, you know, in the case of, the case of France and Russia, it was a foregone conclusion in a way that it wasn't for the UK is my point. You know, it's, it doesn't really make any sense. We should probably tackle the Battle of the Somme like on an episode and two itself. Maybe we'll do that next time. But the General von Falkenhayn, he was the German war minister, He thought that there's some kind of localized war would be possible. He was hoping that Berchtold, who was the Habsburg foreign minister, would deal directly with the Russians, persuade them to accept the offensive against Serbia as a localized war. Von Moltke essentially vetoed that. He said, look, you know, first of all, Moscow's not going to listen. Moscow and St. Petersburg aren't going to abide what we want. Secondly, he said, this is an issue of capabilities. Von Molka, in some ways is very much like a forward looking general staff officer. You know, it doesn't, you know, it doesn't. The decision point is, you know, when these capabilities are emergent and in situ, we can't speculate about human intent. And that's, again, that's, that's the way, I mean, that's the way everybody came to think about warfare, including, you know, the U.S. joint Chiefs of Staff during the Cold War and everybody else. Yeah, I think I'm gonna wrap it up now, man, if, if that's, if that's agreeable. All good, man. Yeah, yeah, yeah. We'll get into the battle of the Psalm and the American and like how that set the tone of, of combat and, and a whole. And maybe we'll go a little longer and get into like the situation, domestic situation in America and how Wilson got his war mandate and how that, you know, ultimately was decisive and the outcome of hostilities. But yeah, that, that'd be great.
- [434:14]
Pete
All right, Please give your plugs.
- [434:16]
Thomas
Yeah, for sure, man. You can find me at substack and again, like fresh content is coming. My workflow got interrupted and set back by about four weeks. I apologize for that. But the season two of the pod is coming as well as other stuff I've promised. You can find my substack on my podcast@realthomas777 substack.com you can find me on x@real capital r e a l underscore number 7h1s777.com you can always find me at my website. It's number 7h1s777.Com if you want to throw cash away, My Cash app ID is number 7H777. And yeah, that's all I got, man. Thanks everybody for being patient about the fresh content. Again, it's coming. I'm. We're like a two man operation, so I mean, stuff takes time and this winter has been somewhat difficult on my health, but I'm on the men.
- [435:36]
Pete
I appreciate it. Until the next time. Thank you.
- [435:39]
Thomas
Yeah, thank you, man.
- [435:40]
Pete
I want to welcome everyone back to the Piano Show. Returning. Going to do a little bit more of this World War I series. How are you doing today, Thomas?
- [435:50]
Thomas
I'm a little bit under the weather, so like I indicated before we went live, if it seems like I'm experiencing brain fog or something, it's not because I've got early onset Alzheimer's or something. Just be aware of that. I want to talk about the American internal situation, not just the Wilson administration and the intrigues therein, which were substantial, you know, particularly involving the personage at Colonel House. Wilson himself is really kind of unfairly maligned by everybody. Like, people on our side. I'm not going to speak for you. People are, like, adjacent to, like, my belief structure. They view him as the father of, you know, utopian progressivism and globalism. I don't think that's true. Okay. People on the. People on the left hate him because, you know, they view him as this big kind of racialist on grounds of, you know, the fact that he. He very much pandered in some sense to the. To nativist elements, you know, who were gaining a lot of clout in terms of their ability to mobilize, you know, and get people in the polls and things. You know, Wilson was the only. Was a university professor, you know, that was. That was literally like his. His vocation, you know, and a man like that, unless he was very much insulated from people who saw fit to sort of manipulate his lack of experience in delegating authority in the way that such things are done in Washington, you know, any man who did not have the advantage of such things was going to be misled in key capacities. And I think some of that is the case with Wilson. And finally, people forget, you know, Wilson's 14 points were actually, I mean, unrealistic as they may have been. They were premised on a commitment to not punishing Germany and not punishing the constituent elements of the Habsburg Empire and not, you know, assigning war guilds. You know, Wilson was disgusted when it became clear that, you know, both Paris and London essentially wanted to pick the bones of a permanently prostrate Germany and, you know, divide up the world between each other because suddenly, you know, formerly Ottoman dominions and German holdings in Africa and Asia were up for grabs. So it was, you know, he and Wilson. I think the war killed him. Wilson died shortly after. You know, he felt like he'd been made a fool of for. And he. He took. Unlike a lot of modern executives, he took responsibility for the American war dead, which were substantial. Okay, I. It was horrible. And I don't. I don't want to turn this episode and next episode which we're going to deal with America. I don't want to turn this into some hagiography of Wilson, okay? I'm not saying Wilson was a good president, but the situation is more complicated than people will allow. And. But today I don't want to get some. I don't want to get into the character of Wilson. Today, we'll do that next time and we may go for a third episode, unless people are figuring out World War I, because I want to deal with the battlefield situation and the American expedition expeditionary force, which is a fascinating topic and it's very important because that, that was the game changer in battlefield terms into the bull Revolution. But the key, the key to understanding why America became involved in World War I. As I've indicated before in our discussions, it's one of the rare instances where high finance can be said to have had this positive impact on the decision to go to war. I find it incredibly irritating. I call it the alibi, the simpleton. When people, there's a fools, half educated fools who invoke Smedley Butler quotes and say war is about bankers and banking. And that's like, that's the alibi the simpleton. It's really, really annoying and really, really just misguided. However, JP Morgan and some other concerns quite literally were bankrolling London's war effort. And based upon what they were being told from the onset of hostilities until about mid-1915, when it became clear that a real quagmire was emergent, they were being told that this war would resolve within months and Allied victory was basically guaranteed. And one of the ways the Crown was able to sell that narrative is because that's basically what, that's basically what military authorities outside of Germany, interestingly, were saying, okay, this is something of a consensus. That doesn't mean it's okay to gamble on the outcome of a war with, with Americans, America's financial system. But I mean, the degree to which the degree of the decision to go to war was in part a bailout of Wall street, like that is true. That's the one instance of the 20th century that's true. But the other part of that, The other part of that equation has to do with the situation in, in, like the internal situation in America and these intrigues specifically in America and Mexico, which is why the Zimmerman Telegram was a big deal. For those that don't know. I'll explain what the Zimmerman Telegram is in a minute, but first I want to say it's cast by a lot of historians, both revisionists and court historians alike, that the Zimmerman Telegram was somewhat pretextual as it causes belly. Or that it was like, or that it was like the, the communique issued by Wilhelm to Paul Krueger congratulating him on, you know, taking on waging his guerrilla campaign against the British Crown. Okay, it was a lot more significant than that. It Wasn't a matter of pride or clout or of Washington, D.C. not wanting to abide insults from what they viewed as a belligerent foreign power. America and Mexico, for all practical purposes, were at war, okay, from definitely from 1910 until the early 1920s, and arguably from the time of Spanish American. From the close of the Spanish American war until about 1930. You know, this idea that. This idea that Mexico is just kind of this, like, troubled backwards state, but it's a benign place. That's not true at all. And Pershing, obviously, who. I think Pershing is probably the greatest American military commander who ever lived. And he was a logistics genius. And the interstate highway system was something that he designed. And Eisenhower, who's his protege, was able to implement in policy terms as well as corralling the engineers and capital to make it happen. But Pershing's most prestigious command before the Great War was the Pancho Villa expedition. And that was considered a big deal. It was. It was viewed as in, you know, essential to American national security to bring the border situation under control. You know, it's. I mean, which. Which is fascinating, or it should be. You know, the more things change, the more they stay the same. And that's. That's something I point out to people some years back. Now, Trump didn't articulate his position well, but when Trump was talking about the situation on the border, like, nothing's really changed. Like, this idea, like, oh, Trump's saying mean things about Mexicans or Spanish Americans or whatever, or Latinos, whatever, that's not really the way to interpret it. Like, however you feel about Trump, whatever you feel about the situation to the south, it's an ongoing national security quagmire, okay? And immigration is part of that. But it's structural and political as well. And conceptually, people seem to have a blind spot there. People who live in the Southwest certainly don't. But I think people who aren't proximate to the situation, odd as that might seem, considering that the world's big kind of one place because of, you know, the availability. Availability of up to the minute situational awareness. Nevertheless, you know, it's not something people really think about. And, you know, the. The situation with the. With the Caloa cartel and whatever is going to replace it. And I think something isn't in the process of replacing it. I mean, that's a national security matter, too. It's not. It's not just because people getting addicted to. Addicted to narcotics is bad. It's. You're talking about. You're talking about a hostile non state actor, you know, based in Mexico that essentially can bring to bear the, the hard power of many states, you know, that is a law unto itself and huge slots of territory adjacent to the continental United States. Anybody talking about it like it's a law enforcement problem or just an immigration problem, that's horribly misguided. But bring it back to where we need to be. Wilson's declaration of war. Wilson, when he, he, when he asked Congress for a declaration of war against the German Empire, he addressed Congress on, on April 2, 1917 and he, he resoundingly was, he was resounding, yes, there was a partisan divide, gave him a war mandate. Now this is interesting, okay, because the Lusitania, which was almost two years previous when Lusitania was sank, there were people, there was a substantial minority of, of, of people who, who were clamoring for a war declaration. Then, you know, it and Will, I mean it wasn't just because Wilson campaigned on, literally on a platform of keeping America out of, out of a European war. But, and it wasn't either just that the Lusitania was what was in fact carrying arms. And I mean this was scandalous not just because it placed people's lives in danger at scale, you know, without their knowledge of it, you know, and civilians at that, you know, including women and children. But it would have compromised kind of America's entire claim to moral credibility with respect to the combatant states, you know, not just, it's, you know, kind of like nominal allies at that time in the, in the Entente, but contra the, contra the, you know, the Habsburgs, Habsburg Empire, you know, Germany and, and the Ottomans. But. What, you know, as we talked about before too, I think we mentioned it in the context of Nixon's 1968 election. Wilson in Wilson's first term, he did not have a particularly strong mandate. You know, he'd run against, he'd, it had been a four way contest, you know, and that like Theodore Roosevelt ran as an independent. There's a socialist candidate, his name alludes me. And again, forgive me for being kind of foggy. And there was the incumbent, William R. Taft. So there was always kind of a Wilson and the commander in chief role was not particularly strongly situated. So if he was just going to go, if he was, if he was just mining for some kind of clout or if he was looking for a way to kind of insinuate himself as an Article 2 warlord had plenty of opportunities to do it, okay? He didn't, he didn't need to rely on The Zimmerman telegram as, as some kind of pretext or as some kind of, as some kind of Gulf of Tonkin raison Detroit, if you want to look at it that way. Okay, this was genuinely impactful. Now, the immediate catalyst, with approximate catalyst, the German High command had announced on February 1, 1917, it would. It would resume unrestricted submarine warfare in the North Atlantic and in the ports and in enemy ports in the, in the Mediterranean and as well as territorial waters and contiguous zones. The rationale for this being what I just said. You know, they said, look like, you know, you're, you're loading, you're, you're loading civilian vessels with arms, you know, and that, that means that everything is a target. And is that legitimate? Yeah, I think so. But that was the, that was the, that's what Wilson designated as the immediate catalyst. But he'd broken off diplomatic relations with Berlin upon discovery of the Zimmerman telegram. And I think that that's kind of like the key to this entire. That's the key to this entire kind of nexus of causation. The most diplomats initially believed the Zim telegram was some kind of forgery by, you know, the, the proverbial war party in America. But it wasn't. And it being clear it wasn't because the Kaiser's representatives admitted every word of it was accurate and that it had and that what it had been reported over the international newswire was a word for word translation. Now, the message itself, it was dispatched on January 17, 1917. It came in the form of a coded telegram that was dispatched personally by Arthur Zimmerman, the St. Secretar in the Foreign Office. He was second only to the Foreign minister. Okay. The message was conveyed to the German ambassador to Mexico. Heinrich von Eckart Zurman sent the telegram in anticipation of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany, obviously. So, I mean, that, that can raise the question as to whether it was presumed that America would simply issue a war declaration in the wake of that. I mean, that's an interesting question on its own. Right, but there's indications that the, the, the imperial, the German Imperial Navy seemed to believe it was a foregone conclusion, you know, that, that a declaration from the Welsh administration was imminent, a declaration of war. But with the telegram instructed, it instructed Eckhart that if the United States appeared certain, you know, to, to, to enter the war, he was to approach the Mexican government with a proposal for military alliance and Germany would essentially fund the efforts. Now, mind you, again, this, this was a situation where America and Mexico were already in like a Low intensity conflict, you know, so this was not like a boat from the blue suggestion or something that you know, was out. There's something that suggested like a change in the status of relations or something. It represented a willingness to drastically escalate an already like an extant condition of hostilities. But I think that, I think that that's important. The language of the telegram as follows was quote, we intend to begin on the 1st of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following. Make war together, make peace together. Generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you. You will inform the President of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States of America is certainly. And add the suggestion that he should on his own initiative invite Japan into immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves. Please call the President's attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our submarines now offer the prospect of compelling England in a few months to make peace. Signed Zimmerman. Now, the Mexican border war, just to put it in context, It was the last, it was the last true war fought on American soil. Its predecessors obviously being the Revolutionary War, The War of 1812, the Mexican War and the War between the States. The Indian wars were an ongoing ethnic conflict obviously that in my opinion didn't resolve until 1920, but that was distinguishable from you know, a Westphalian war between state actors. So I mean the fact that, I mean regardless of the, regardless of the relative power of Mexican forces and being or Mexican mobilization potential United States like regardless of that it was, it was tying America down in theater and it was waging war on America on American soil. In part. I mean this was a serious matter, you know, and particularly from the beginning of the Mexican Revolution in 1910, the US army was stationed in relative depth along the border and on several occasions engaged the Mexican army. The height of this came in 1916 when Pancho Villa attacked the, the border town of Columbus, New Mexico. And in response was the Ponia Expedition under command of Pershing in the Northern Mexico. You know, the, the, the mission objective of which was to, was to, was to, was to find and capture or kill Bono Villa. And although it was not captured, the expeditionary force did locate him. It engaged the, the rebels under his command and it killed a couple of his top Officers via himself escaped. The American army returned the United States in January 1917, among other reasons, because it became clear that they were going to have to deploy, deploy to Europe. And like everything was changing. But Pancho Villa at this point had become like a national hero. And like a lot of Mexicans were like looking to join a revolutionary cause against the gringo because they viewed it as like this big victory. They're like, hey, you know, we, we ran a raid into, you know, into New Mexico and we, you know, and we terrorized America in its own backyard, know, and then we fought off the U.S. army when it, when it, you know, when it, when it tried to chase down, when it tried to chase down Poncho Villa, you know, so I mean, they, we can't be stopped, you know, on our own turf. And I mean this kind of, this kind of nonsense. But so I mean, obviously the Germans are thinking seriously, you know, if the. It does, it does beg the question, did the Kaiser and or Holvig and or von Molta, I mean, whoever was actually reviewing the strategic situation in terms of the hard variables, did he or they think that Mexico had the forces in being the gumption, the political will, the organizational kind of ability to, to truly like recapture what had been lost in the 1846, 1848 war. I don't know if they did or not, but just the very fact that Mexico was in a position to mount such an expedition, even if it was a disaster, I mean, that would. America would have to prioritize that theater over any overseas deployment, you know, and forcing America into a two front war in the Southwest, like as they're taking mass casualties in Europe, I mean, that's, that would be a problem, you know, and even really all Germany had to do was tie America down enough so that it was incapable of stopping what became the 19th, the spring offensive. Okay, we'll get into that next episode. But you know, even after, even after, even after the American withdrawal in 1917, conflict on the border continued. You know, the US army continued to launch smaller operations in Mexican territory. Like we think, what we think of now is like almost like search and destroy missions that kind of like went on in Vietnam, you know, like chasing down gorillas, chasing on rebels who were raiding border territories, you know, things like that, trying to identify, you know, friendly, friendly non combatants, you know, among whom they've been moving and had been, you know, storing like food stuffs and weapons and ammunition for them. I mean, this was a dirty war, you know. Now what was a game changer here? And was one of the things that I believe was strongly catalyzing in terms of America and Wilson specifically getting a really strong mandate. Because initially there was a. Wilson had a strong mandate to go wage World War I when, you know, and he got a standing ovation in. In Congress when he usually. His speech when only months before, like, basically the country was totally opposed to intervention. And nobody can really explain why this is. But I think it comes down to what I'm about to describe. The, the battles of Ambos Nogales. The. The. The final conflict over Ambos Nogales was in August 1918. 1918. It led to a literal border wall between the two towns. It's one of those towns where, like, it's situated. There's one on, you know, the Mexican side of the border, one of the American side of the border. They both share a name. There's literally like a wall that was erected, you know, between them. So this idea that, like, there's never been like a border wall or whatever. There's lots of border walls along the Mexican American border. Mexican American borders, freaking huge, okay? But there were these periodic. There, these periodic, you know, rage on the Mexican side of new American territory. And reports emerged from the U.S. army not. Not just from, you know, not from Colonel House in the White House, you know, not from, you know, some newswire service, you know, not from the. Some. Some British newspaper, but from men in theater that these Mexicans are being led by German officers. Okay? And at that point, people who otherwise were reasonable, I think kind of took leave of reason and said, we are under attack by Germany. There's some dispute as to who these guys were. Like, were these guys just like European mercenaries? Yeah, that's possible. But I mean, I don't. I, you know, in. In context, I don't really see who else they would have been, you know, and frankly, the zur and telegram would have been kind of meaningless absent the presence of at least, you know, an advisory corps on the ground representing the Kaiser's army. Okay? So not just the prospect of, but possibly, you know, the emergence through late 1917, in the summer 1918, the emergence of an actual hot border war between the United States army and a revolutionary Mexican army, in part at least led by German officers. This. This was a game changer, okay. I think in an ongoing capacity. But this is also what came to be known as the border wars. Pretty much like if, you know, the, The Pon Expedition and basically everything, all. All these border conflicts, United States and Mexico, that ensued after 1910. They became, in the Time and in like you really until like the 50s they were known as the border wars. This was really the catalyst for, for shutting down immigration. Okay. I mean yeah, a lot of it was like Northern N. Part of it was you know the coalition that created kind of the 1920s clan of you know, Protestant northerners, you know, who, who viewed the cities as you know, being overwhelmed by, by Catholics who were creating these political machines and and, and and dispossessing them. Yeah that was a big, that, that was an ongoing thing and, and that very. By 1924. But nationwide the border wars really were kind of what motivated people go to the poll and say like enough is enough. Like shut this down. Like our we're. This is a grave like national security threat. Like these people are hostile. These people being you know, like Mexicans. They're you know we're at war. These people periodically like why the hell are we like allowing them just kind of you know, come and go as they please as if, as if they were friendlies or you know or, or, or just some kind of like contiguous polity or something, you know that maintain good offices with us. The. And it's also the another aspect of the border wars it Mexico either Mexico, whether Mexico itself. Happy birthday America. It's time to celebrate and play your favorite Las Vegas casino games by American owned spinquest.com what's better than fireworks and American pie? Hitting a blackjack in the palm of your hand and you won't lose your fingers. Over a thousand games including slots and live dealers and $30 coin packs are on sale for 10 so spin quest.com buy American players for American players Spin Quest is a free to play social casino boy where prohibited. Visit spin quest.com for more details. Was providing particularly small arms ammunition because artillery was basically exclusively manufactured in Europe because I mean it's a whole different matter like if you're, you're like you're if your artillery pieces are going to fire or not, you know not. It's not a question of quality but also like you know, you can't just, you can, you can't just mock up an artillery shell that's like basically, it's like that's like basically compliant with, with caliber and things, you know but it, but small arms, small arms ammunitions, there's a huge amount flowing from Veracruz to Germany and that was America. The US army occupied Veracruz early on during one of the anti rebel expeditions south of the border in 1914. So I mean the, this is the kind of Zimmerman telegram because I think people Think of it as like, why the hell was Berlin talking to the Mexicans anyway? And this doesn't make any sense. And like, on its face, it doesn't. But if you account for the fact that America was basically at war with Mexico, I mean, that's. It does make sense. And, you know, like I said, this is relevant today in a way that a lot of stuff we talk about isn't. I mean, it's all relevant in terms of meta history and, you know, psychologically how narratives are structured and things and as well as understanding, you know, kind of like where we're going, like, as a people, like our people, but just, you know, humans generally kind of like what their fortunes are in kind of the cycles of. Of historical development, but in kind of brass, tax policy terms, like what. What was going on literally 100 years ago on the border is still going on today, just with, you know, the sort of configuration of. Of opposing forces and, you know, the added. The added kind of horror of. Of. Of the narcotics trade and. And other things. You know, this is not. There's nothing new. You know, this is arguably it's. It's kind of like the permanent, you know, national security crisis in America is the Mexican border. You know, it's not. That's one of the reasons why it's so, like, bitch made in basic when fools like, oh, that's racism. And you don't like Mexicans. Like, it's. I mean, that's like. That's like. That's like. I don't even know what to say about that. I mean, I'm like, maybe even if, like, everybody in America, like, hated Mexicans, like, which I certainly don't think is the case, but, like, even were that the case, that's not. That's. That's not what we're talking about. We're talking about the crisis of the border. You know, I mean, it. I mean, like, nobody really likes each other. Okay. Like a. Frankly, across. Across, you know, lines of race and culture. Okay with. With. I mean, at macro scale. I mean, but. But that's. Yeah, that's. That's what. That's kind of what I wanted to do. That's kind of what I wanted to cover today. And like, again, I. Like I said I'm sorry for making this kind of brief and, uh. I'm sorry for being kind of like, foggy in the mind. Like, it's, uh. This week's been kind of, uh. This week's been kind of rough. So.
- [469:32]
Pete
No,
- [469:35]
Thomas
wrap it up, if that's okay with you. And I'll pro, I promise. Yeah, I promise. I'll, I'll bring more to bear. Like when we record again in a few days.
- [469:44]
Pete
Yeah, no problem at all, man. Do some quick plugs and we'll get out of here.
- [469:49]
Thomas
Yeah, yeah. People have been very generous in helping me out. I put out a call for help with some of my production expenses as well as like, human talent to help me with like, editing and stuff. And like a whole bunch of people. Like there's like a deluge of people. Like helping with both. Like, that's, that, that's incredible. I've got huge love for you people. That's fantastic, man. But that, that's not just a great relief to me, man. But it means, like, my workflow is actually coming together. I will be dropping Fresh. I've been trying to do as much as I can with, with, with people who just like, invite me onto their pod because I realize, like, I'm not dropping fresh on my own and it's not a good thing. But I, I, I'm getting on top of it. I Season two of the pod is gonna launch. My long form manuscripts are gonna get done. My video content is going to appear. Thank you for bearing with me. I'm sure it sounds like a senile person or something and I'm always like saying this and then like it doesn't emerge. But you can find my pod and other good stuff at my sub stack. It's real, thomas777.subsay.com find me on X Real Capital Re A L underscore number 7 H O M A S 777. Find me at my website number 7 homas777.com and yeah, that's about, that's about all I got for now.
- [471:23]
Pete
All right. I know the next one's going to be great. We already talked, we talked about it previous, so.
- [471:27]
Thomas
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- [471:28]
Pete
Get ready for that one and we'll get it out. Try to get it out next week. All right?
- [471:31]
Thomas
Yeah, that'd be great, man.
- [471:33]
Pete
All right. Thanks, Thomas. Take care now.
- [471:34]
Thomas
Thank you, buddy.
- [471:36]
Pete
I want to welcome everyone back to the Picanono Show. I got Thomas before he escapes town and goes on the Lamb to do another World War I episode. How are you doing, Thomas?
- [471:48]
Thomas
I'm doing well. Something I wanted to touch on today before we get into the battlefield situation amidst the American intervention. You know, I made the point in the last episode. We were told when we were focusing on Wilson and his war mandate, or lack thereof, proceeding developments on the Mexican border. It's important to note that the American people, and particularly white America at that time, close to half of people had, you know, German heritage and whole or in part. But there was a tremendous divide between elite opinion and, and the American street. I mean, even more than there is ordinarily in policy terms or whatever. One of the ways this was cultivated was the, the uk, they were always masterful at kind of manipulating world opinion. I mean, that's one of the benefits of literally having infrastructure, cutting edge infrastructure as it then was, you know, on a third of this planet or more as they did, you know. And in those days, the news wire, we still use that term because it was telegraph like that's basically how until telex came about, that was basically the only way you transmitted data, you know, across, across the continental divide. And in 1914, in August 1914, what the British did was they deployed, they deployed a vessel called. Give me a minute, let me check my notes. So I don't. Yeah, it was the morning of August 5, 1914. This is something of a forgotten episode, which is crazy, especially considering how much media and the manipulation of data is so much everybody's mind these days. The ship called the Tulkania, it literally was outfitted with hooks, the corral, the undersea cables that led to the German ports of Emden, which was really the only, that was the only source of outgoing information from the German Empire to the Americas. Okay? The Royal Navy systematically cut every one of these cables, okay? From that point forward, any and all data coming out from the continent was going through the filter of British war sensors from casualty roles, you know, to, to the outcome of, of engagements on either front. Two and most significantly these reports about supposed German atrocities in Belgium, this is kind of the first instance of like a dedicated effort. I mean, in wartime, I mean true is the first casualty, right? I mean that's a, that, that's an overdone cliche. But this was the first really dedicated effort, you know, in a total sense to kind of cast the opposing force as committing systematic atrocities. And the claim was that, well, the Germans are in Belgium and they're committing mass rape of the women folk and they're putting to death every military age male. There's this famous story that made the rounds. There was, they claimed, oh, this like starving, you know, Belgian boy, he tried to steal some German rations to eat and you know, this, this, this heartless Prussian mercenit cut his hands off. The Germans responded to this by saying they appealed to America. At this point, American and German relations weren't yet in the toilet, they're like, we'll invite any of your media people to embed in the field with our army. And that's exactly what they did. And the report was that the Germans are constantly professional. You know, the Belgians seem like the civilian. The Belgian civilian population is not happy about them being there, but they seem to be tolerating one another grudgingly. You know, there's certainly. If for no other reason, then it would be a complete breakdown of discipline. There's certainly not mass rape of women and girls underway. And Clarence Darrow, he. He offered a reward. It was something like $10,000. He's like, I will pay $10,000, which is like a million dollars in today's money to, like, anyone who can locate the supposed Belgian kid with no hands, you know, and there weren't any takers, you know, so you had. Ridiculous as it might sound. And I mean, there was at that time, like, the east coast establishment, like, really did, like, rule America, even until the 60s. Like, my dad tells me that, you know, like, when he. When he went to the private sector and like, these big private firm, like, private sector firms, you know, they would send him around to, like, you know, because he was basically like a quant before that really became like a. A formal sort of profession. And, like, when people would ask where he was from, he's like, I'm from Los Angeles. And then it'd be like, well, you're based at Chicago. He'd be like, yeah, well, there's nothing going on there. Like, you know, it's like, look, so I'm, like, getting. Find yourself a job in Manhattan or basically, like, you're. You're pissing into the wind, and that's like poor folk. And, like, nobody talks that way anymore or, like, thinks that way. But it was like this till the 70s, basically. But in those days, like, the power. Like, the power in America, like the financial power, the cultural power, the political power, like, all clout, like, came from the east coast, okay? And all these fools had this, like, misplaced reverence for, like, for the British aristocracy. And they thought, like, Britain was just great. I mean, I'm basically, for all practical purposes, like, I'm. I'm Anglo Scottish myself, but that's a lot, you know, and I. I've got a lot of love for, like, orange Ulster and stuff. But, like, anybody who. Like, anybody who likes the British Royal family is a jag off. I mean, it's like, like, let's be serious. Nobody. I mean, like, now, at least around here, like there's like blue haired old ladies like breathlessly read about the royals. But like in those days, like anybody who was like arguably like middle class or above, like they, they acted like the English like walked on order, okay? So they were like very eager to believe that like oh, you know, the British are, are intervening because they, they have to. You know, I mean like even, I mean even by the onset about still is the Germans have been saying from jump that like look, this is secret diplomacy. Like London going back to the days that Disraeli, you know, possibly even without his knowledge when he was serving as Prime Minister, they told the friends that like they'd intervene like the minute they declared war on the German empire. Okay? But this idea that like, oh, we, you know, the, you know, the British Expeditionary Force, you know, they, they've got to save Belgium because you know it's, it's being put to slaughter by these, like by these savages from the east. Like people really believe that garbage, you know, so that's, that's important to consider. And like Wilson to his credit, you know, again, I don't think will, I mean it's easy to burn Wilson and effigy. And I made the point to one of the fellows on my timeline today where he's like, I, I. Why? He's like, I like what you and Peter are doing, but he's like, I gotta take exception. You're defending Wilson to say, look, I'm not defending Wilson. I think he was like a bad chief executive. That goes without saying. But the guy was not some Clinton liberal or some globalist. I mean, the guy re segregated the district. Number one. He was basically a white nationalist. Secondly, he went on record as saying that like these people in Washington who were calling for the Kaiser to be executed were like literally insane. You know, he's like, what are you, what's wrong with you? You know, And I believe the war killed him because he and the kind of naive they come into an act. A career academic, he really thought that, like, he really thought Paris and London were negotiating a good faith. And I go, they just want some kind of workable conflict resolution mechanism, you know, that abides, that abides the, the sovereign rights of all involved. And when he realized that they were treating Germany like a prostrate corpse and they were the vultures, you know, picking out the choice, the choice cuts, as it were. You know, he realized that there was 110,000American boys in the grave and you know, a several billion in unsecured credit that was probably never Going to be satisfied. You know, he'd been made a fool of and arguably tipped, helped tip the fortunes towards a kind of permanent structural instability in Europe. So that's my point about Wilson. It's not that people should like him or think that he was a good executive. It's that when, when people like Bill Clinton or like these, these fools like Pompeo or whoever invoke like Wilsonianism, like they, they don't know what the they're talking about. You know, like he, any like he'd be appalled by like their sense of, you know, ethics and things or lack thereof. But as it may, America's intervention is what, is what stopped the German offensives in their tracks. Germany was being bled white by the war. However, by 1917, 1918, the number of men coming of age for military service in Germany was. The ratio was favoring the German empire over their enemies after peace had been made on the Eastern front. And that freed up between 50 and 55 divisions to assault westward. So say the Allies had a problem would be a gross understatement. What is fascinating and we'll get more into this, the Germans hadn't even started developing a workable tank until the enemy had already fielded theirs. And they really, they never were able to field a model that, that was battlefield viable. So the final German offensive, Ludendorff's third offensive in 1918, this was infant. This was, this was infantry backed up by mass artillery. They had no tanks. And the fact that we think of Germany as being like the master tank builders and they are, I'd argue that, I'd argue that the Leopard 2 is the best tank on this planet today. Okay, but the, but the German, the German army was a low tech Army. And by 1917 the war is becoming a mechanized war. Hold on a minute, let me see if I can shut off this goddamn alert thing.
- [483:16]
Pete
When you're not on your own, equipment stuff just starts going haywire if they
- [483:20]
Thomas
keeps on pinging them. Sorry, forgive me for being like a old tard. Old. It's hard but like I. Yeah, but the, the PR. Yeah the PR collapse of Russia. It released over 50 divisions of infantry and obviously was in the mind of the German high command was you know, a mass offensive to finally break through to, to Paris, if not knock out the British army to take Paris. And Ludendorff believed that that was an NC move. And I think he might have been right. I mean it's hard to say, but presumably too if you know, if logistics were intact to sustain an assault on Paris, they Could they could push all the way to the coast. And that, that, that would have been for operatic purposes. The, the Allies would have had to sue for peace, in my opinion. I know there's people like, like John Key and argued otherwise. And there's guys, there's war garage types who claim like a Paris would just be a prestige objective. It would not have been especially in those days, in my opinion. But the. Despite the German. Despite the, despite the German infantry being gutted by attrition again, they had, they had numbers on their side without accounting for the American expeditionary force arriving battle ready as they were raising the clock. And what they lacked technologically, tactically, the Germans were way ahead of the curve. The kind of stuff pioneered by people like Rommel and by Ludendorff. You know, what, what the Germans called Stormtroopers colloquially. That was basically a blitzkrieg tactic. But with highly mobile infantry, you know, like you break through, you break through rapidly with smaller formations, absolutely loaded down with firepower. You force the enemy to fight on reversed fronts and then like reinforcements overwhelm the flanks and slaughter them. That's basically blitzkrieg without, without panzers, okay. And it was having a shock effect as intended on the British and French armies. And a point I made to people too. The French, the French. The French general ship was superior to people like Haig, who was a disaster inferior to Pershing in my opinion. But the French were very game and they were very innovative, but they, they sacrifice men in a way that most Western societies would find unseemly. So that, that's on the point. I think it's passed because there's other stupid things people like to say these days. But during, like the, during, like the, the neocon era, people. Oh, the French are a bunch of. It's like man, the friend. The French, The French had dropped 10,000 their own bodies to take like 30 yards. Like the, the reputation is the opposite that they're, that they're incredibly callous about their own manpower, to say nothing of, of the enemy. And you know, it was just. It was uniquely misplaced for people to say that because again, if anything, the trope should be the opposite. But the, the German high command, like, the thing to keep in mind is that the Germans had basically been in a holding pattern on the Western front. Their idea always was we've got to knock out Russia. That will give us breathing room. You know, that'll, that'll basically alleviate all of our problems post war, you know, the inability to break through in the west is not fine because it's bleeding us white. But one of the reasons for the complete kind of lack of movement after 1915 was because. Was because there was a, there was a Russia first sensibility. And as AGB Taylor pointed out, that's kind of always the, that's kind of always the German perspective. So this strategically, the entire, not just conceptually, but practically due to this, you know, rush of, if not fresh, like newly available infantry at division level. I mean that's, that's one of the reasons why it was a game changer. Okay. But it was a grave deficiency that the Germans had no tanks. The, the infantry had been re. Equipped with a large number of what we'd consider light machine guns. And that did like both of their firepower. And, and again, that's one of the reasons why like stormtroop tactics worked, you know, was. And that's one of the reasons America developed the Tommy gun. Like, you know, the Tommy gun became like, it became notorious. It's like a gangsters and a cop weapon. But I mean it was supposed to, it was, it was supposed to be an infantry assault weapon at range for clearing trenches. Like, the idea is that like you storm a trench and you've got like a drum magazine you can open up with 45ammo and you can just like, you can turn everybody basically into spaghetti. Like, I realized, I realized the submachine. Like submachine guns of that sort are obsolete. But it's, but I mean the machine, the Tommy gun is no joke, man. Like, like, like ripping full auto on somebody with.45 caliber, man. Like, I don't want to be in the receiving under that. What. But that's. And the Germans also were they, they relied heavily on poison gas. There's not. You'll find court historians to try and cast the. The German empire as like bad guys for using so much poison gas. All parties use, all combatants use poison gas. The Germans use it to make up for other deficiencies. And at Bella Wood, one of the reasons, you know, like I think we mentioned before the, or one of the other episodes, like the myth of Bella Wood, it's not just, it's not just like the US Marines like waving their dicks around or something. Like they, the Marines assaulted at Bella Wood in a way that the Germans weren't used to because generally by that time, after almost four years of war, when the Germans started popping off poison gas in mass quantities, like they were used to the enemy, like affecting a tactical retreat, you know, and then kind of like no man's land, like opening up like The US Marines like kept on assaulting and that's what the Germans were like what the, with these people. You know, I mean whether that was because like, I mean I think the Marines are uniquely trained for that kind of stuff frankly. I mean they've been fighting the banana wars in earnest, you know, like what became known as the Banana wars and places like Nicaragua and stuff. You know, obviously like the scale and scope of that and the savagery wasn't the same. But also I mean they, there's something too like institutional fatigue in armed forces after like years of like warfare I think. But the US Marines actually did carry the day at Dullah Wood and in the World War I era the U.S. army infantry and, and the U.S. marine Corps were serious badasses. That goes, that can't be denied. But the. Hindenburg and Ludendorf increasingly as the war went on, you know, Hindenburg was the supreme commander for all practical purposes despite whatever like the Kaiser's mandate supposedly entailed. Ludendorff was his chief of Staff. As the war went on the military increasingly got its way and it increasingly was able to set policy. Now of course during and after hostilities and adverse I the claim was like oh, the Germans kept up with this conflict and pushed these offensives at the 11th hour when they were defeated because it's you know, Prussian militarism of the sort that you know, we've got to fight to stamp out for all time. Like my rebuttal of that, you know like we've talked about in our Cold War discussions, a Strategic Air Command had really co opted war making authority from the civilian executive here in America. And that wasn't even during active hostilities. I realized nuclear weapons changed things. But this idea that somehow like democracies in a total war like oh, they're able to kind of put the brakes on the military from co opting executive decisionism, you know, in a way those other peoples aren't. That's complete. And the fact of the matter is it wasn't quite like the second war where you had, you had these lunatics like Churchill issuing crazy statements about not negotiating under any circumstances. But it wasn't clear what Paris and London would consider to be peace terms. You know, like it's, it's a hell of a lot easier to get into a war than it is to get out of one and had cooler heads at least in the sense that America seems to like to consider such things. Cool heads prevail and at Hovage somehow overwhelmed the, you know, the will of, of Hinberg or had he died or something? I mean, it's not clear what that would entail. Would he just, like, order the German army in the field to stop fighting? Like, what? He. Would he. Would he take a boat to London and be like, hey, let's stop all this? I mean, it doesn't, you know, I. By that point, it like. Like stopping fighting wasn't really an option. And also, even though the Germans hadn't converted to a full war economy in the way we think of it, they basically were on the brink of starvation. And we're on the break of, you know, freezing in the coming winter just due to no coal and heating oil. It got to the point where, you know, and Ludendorff said it no uncertain terms, to the, to the Reichstag, you know, look like if we don't capture some of these resources on the way to Paris in northern France, like, we're done. You know, we have no choice but to perpetuate this war now. You know, and that's something that. Something that's kind of like lost in the, you know, in America and even, you know, even during the Cold War because, like, much as in the Soviet Union, like, deprived as people were, like nobody was really starving, you know, like, it traditionally, if you wage war long enough, it gets the point. You have to keep going because then, you know, you've got to capture what you no longer have because it's all gone, you know, and despite. Despite the kind of refrain of these fools, you know, like, oh, war is a racket and war is for business. War is actually terrible for business. And nothing gets done unless the objective is to build, you know, tanks and, and, and, and nuclear weapons. And in the World War I era, like, you know, surface dreadnoughts that, you know, can muster massive firepower. It's not everybody's like, innovating anything that is making life easier. It's not only the things that actually need to get done. Like the business of life, I mean, is getting done. Like the army is getting everything. Your farmers are all, you know, getting their brains blown out on the Western Front. You know, you've got women and old people in your factories, and those factories aren't making stuff people need. They're making. They're making shells and, and, and ammo. You know, I mean, it's. It becomes like a crisis unto itself, you know, And I think that's something that people for some reason don't seem to grasp. Probably because they get inundated with like a Howard Zan in high school or something. But the emphasis of the German attack plan was speed, because it had to be moon. North had the necessary troops with the newly freed up divisions and he had a realistic plan. The plan was to assault in a broad front across about 50 miles and to assault in depth through use of the enormous weight of artillery, firing the heaviest possible loads and the most concentrated bombardments at short, medium and long range. Basically like lay down like an absolutely crushing deluge of shells over five to six hours, backed up by. In total, this was over close to 6,500 field artillery pieces, backed up by 3,500 mortars of varying caliber, which all told, had over a million rounds of ammunition assembled. The problem with this obviously is you can only do it once. And if this failed to break through, you know that you were. And of course, a lot of these shells, the explosive shells, were intermixed with all varieties of poison gas phosphagene, which is an asphyxiating agent. You literally choke to death on your own. Like your lungs fill with fluid and you choke and die. Particularly cruel is one thing the Germans took to doing. I'm not saying this is like cruel in a bad way. I'm saying it's just like nasty. They'd pop off teary ass shells. Teary ass shells could penetrate like the gas that, like the active agent, they could penetrate gas masks. So if you got hit with it, you'd rip off your gas mask for a leaf. Well, as soon as you did that, they start dropping mustard gas and phosgene. So like then you'd like choke on that. So this was this, this, this artillery assault, this mass artillery assault was basically unprecedented. Okay, over time, like at Eprin, at the Psalm, I mean, obviously there'd been like comparable volume of munitions deployed, but like not at this concentration at this short duration. Over this, over this concentrated an assault area. So the reasoning was sound. And the first of the. First of the. In the first of the. Of the. Of the spring of what beginning known as what came to be known as the spring offenses. And the president for this was the last offensive against the Russians in the Baltic. German had. German artillery had fired without preliminary registration or like range finding the calculations were tight enough that they could assault without warning. And this utterly devastated the Russians because all at once, all once these rounds like found their mark and just, and just, and just massacred them. Brooke Miller was, was Lou North's artillery wizard. And this was basically, this was basically like his innovation. You know, calculate as close as you can your range, fire from beyond visual range and when these shells start landing, by the time, by the time the enemy realizes he's got to withdraw or die, like he's already dead, you know, and immediately begin assaulting like with your infantry and like you're, you know, you're basically advancing over like thousands of enemy dead. And before, before the mainline resistance like knows what's happening, like you're already on top of them. And I mean you're going to eat a lot of attrition doing that, but you're, you're probably going to win just by sheer shock. This was, this was the idea and this is what, this is what was sold to Hindenburg and this is presumably what Hindenburg sold to the Kaiser, though it's not clear to what degree the Kaiser was clued in. Hanging out at the pool is great. Relaxing and playing Vegas style games on my phone at the time. Same, same time, drink in one hand and a blackjack in the other. It's all at spinquest. Over a thousand games including your favorite slots and table games. Be cool with this summer special new players get 30 coin packs for 10@Spinquest.com Spin Quest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. Like at the operational level of things I, I, I read different things from different people and Unlike World War II, after World War I man at General officer level were fairly tight lipped and then by the time, like by the time the second war they were basically all dead. You know it, it's an interesting and unfortunate kind of gap in the, in the record frankly. But the, as it, as it happened, the morning of the morning of May 27th, the, this mass concentration of artillery was brought to the front. The ammunition stock by that point was approaching close to 2 million shells, which was close to double what had been anticipated would be available. All these were fired off in just over four hours against 16 Allied divisions. Immediately out of the bombardment, 15 divisions from German 6th army assaulted. They were backed up by 25 more. They were assaulting uphill across a succession of ravines. The idea was smash the main line of resistance, reach the summit of the reach the summit of the ridge, continue down the reverse slope, annihilate the retreating OP4 and then halt when open country was reached is a preliminary to renewing the attack in the front in the north where the British army was concentrated and presumably knocked the British army out of the war. Ludendorff in the first two days was basically able to exploit this to pretty good effect. The next five days the Germans advanced to Chateau Thierry. I'm sure I'm butchering that pronunciation. This put the German army within 56 miles of Paris. So it basically worked. The problem was, where do you go from there? The British Army's not dead yet. And, you know, it's one or the other. Like, you either assault you. You either assault with everything you. You either assault with the full brunt of your offensive power and see if you can knock Britain out of the war. Or you, or you, or you drive straight for Paris. And Lundorff considered Paris to be too pretty an objective to forego, as it were, what the Allies did. The Allies began committing the reserves piecemeal as slowly as they could, without completely, you know, without. Without the mainline of resistance collapsing entirely. They were basically engaging as few fresh divisions at a time as they could. And by the time the American third and second divisions arrived, including the Marine Corps Brigade, which was the. The fair punk of American forces, they arrived on June 4th, and that's really what halted the offensive. That was the Battle of Belleau Wood. As we, I mean, the Belleau Wood was contested for a minute, but what we think of as the Battle of Belleau Wood is when these American reinforcements arrived again, the, the lead element was Marine Corps infantry and, and, and that, and the, and, and the, the race to Paris was no more. And by that point, I mean, it was. There was no, There wasn't the. There was neither the manpower nor the, Nor the will. You know, again, like the military. The German I command had captured as much clout as the military command element can in time. A total war. But they, you know, the, The. The. The Germany was. Was not gonna. Was not gonna tolerate another sacrifice on that order, even if were. Even were it possible. And it wasn't. There simply was not the manpower, the counter. It was the. On June 9, there was an effort to renew the offensive on the River Mots in an attempt to draw out the French reserves and annihilate them, but also to widen a salient that had developed westward approximately between Paris and Flanders. And the idea was to force the Allies to deploy piecemeal and then, you know, exploit those soft spots and salvage something. The original plan, but that, that was, that was. That was a pipe dream. And on the 14th of June, the American Expeditionary Force, backed up by those very French reserves, you know, just like, broke that attack basically, basically like at its mass into stage. And something else of note too is I'm a little sick, so that's why I keep coughing and sniffling and stuff. But 1918 was the famous Spanish flu which killed millions of people worldwide. You know, unlike Covid it was an actual epidemic. And this devastated the German army. It laid low probably between 300,000 and half a million German troops who already. Who's. Whose immune. Immune system is already depressed by like poor diet, breathing in poison gas. You know, like living in. Living literally like underground in the trenches. So the Germans were fighting a total war. You know, they were. Their population and military age males was rapidly dwindling and this deadly flu epidemic was like ripping through Europe and hitting Germany most hard and nora harder than at the front. So I mean there was. There was that the. And this was when it was on for clarity. It was the week of July 3rd that the Kaiser Kaiser the. The civilian government led by you know Hovig the at the German command all agreed that for Germany to survive it had a notch, you know, the column and its acquisition of territories in the east. It also needed Luxembourg. It also needed the French iron and coal fields, coal fields in Lorraine. And nothing short of that would. Could they end the war in the west like other otherwise Germany was done. So I mean it didn't. It. You know, this made this. This again like the longer the war went on, like the stakes became like more desperate. And that's something that people neglect because I. Wars of attrition like that aren't really possible anymore at scale. I mean attrition wars do happen. I mean Israel and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and his blood. I mean they're engaged in one now. But like at scale of national mobilization, you know, like wards of attrition like lasting years. I don't think they're possible anymore. But the. But Lunor for me committed to a military outcome despite, you know, the Reichstag. Basically a you know, a quorum it developed in the Reichstag even among what had been the war party that you know, there was not a mil. There's no longer a military solution to the conflict and to the crisis emerging from that conflict. The military wouldn't hear of it. And frankly I understand that because they like millions of them had died by that point.
- [511:32]
Pete
Point.
- [511:33]
Thomas
You know it. There was. There was 52 divisions remaining to mount in a final assault against the French. It. The French had advanced warning Sh. Man or Manin who really was kind of like the lion of the French and at least of their field marshals. He. His. The counterstroke that he mounted was really the death of the German army. They'd. They'd suffered enormous casualties. But again, I mean like the French always eat Attrition that we would consider to be unconscionable. And that's one of the things they paid for in the second War. You know, like, there was a. I mean, France was a divided society on the evil war. And I mean, there was many different things that work there. But even had it not been, like, there wasn't the friend. There weren't, like, military age men in France like to fight, you know, a. An attrition war against Germany, if need be, in 1940. There just wasn't. France never recovered from the Great War. Germany did. The UK Was somewhere in between, in my opinion. But that's. That's basically what I got for today. I want to get into. I want to get more into the internal situation of. Of the Americas and the degree to which Colonel House, who was not a colonel at all, he was a colonel like Colonel Tom Parker, but I like Colonel Tom Parker. Like, Colonel House was not cool like that. Like, he was an. But he was this bizarre figure who kind of became like, this minister without portfolio to Wilson. And he wrote science fiction stories, like, starring himself, where, like, he was this guy, like, he was the smartest man who ever lived, and he ended all wars and presided over, like, universal disarmament and became this, like, world dictator. I mean, that's, like, bizarre even for Washington D.C. you know? And, like, this guy was. This guy was advising Wilson on what was, like, sound policy in terms of, you know, like, real. Real, like, war and peace decisionism. Like, it's like, literally insane. But, well, someone.
- [514:15]
Pete
Someone who takes the last name Drew is Probably has to have insane delusions of grandeur.
- [514:25]
Thomas
Yeah, it.
- [514:27]
Pete
But.
- [514:27]
Thomas
Yeah, and I realized, like I said, man, I'm just. I'm just getting over being ill, as you can probably hear. So, like, forgive me if these last two episodes have been kind of brief comparatively. But we'll. We'll wrap up next when I get back from Virginia. We'll go over like an hour and a half, and I'll. I'll wrap up World War I. Or we do a live stream, man, or an addition too, if, like, where people can ask questions if there's stuff I'm leaving out, but, you know, again, give me. Because I've been.
- [514:55]
Pete
A live stream. Sounds good. We can. We can plan that one out.
- [514:58]
Thomas
Yeah, no, that's great.
- [515:00]
Pete
Do some plugs and get ready for your trip.
- [515:03]
Thomas
Yeah, for sure, man. I am in f. Dropping new content after New Year's. Like, I. Again, I'm sorry for the delay, man. Like, but I figure, like, nobody's really doing fresh now because it's. Everybody's doing their holiday thing. So, like, first week in January, I'm gonna drop like fresh content, like, you know, across of like everything I do. But you can find me on substack@real thomas777subs.com you can find me on X at capital R e a l underscore number 7h omas 777. I got a telegram channel. I don't know how long it'll last, but It's Thomas Graham number 7Hs Graham. I. It's. It's T me Peckerwood Dispatch. But I think if you search for Thomas Graham, like, you'll find it. So I'm kind of excited about that telegram are and I hate them. But I like. I like what gets done, like on the channel because obviously it's uncensored and like, a lot of people participate to keep it live. But that's where I'm at with things, man. And God willing, over Christmas I'm gonna work on these manuscripts that have been eluding me. And that's where I'm at with things in this life.
- [516:20]
Pete
All right, man, until the next time, safe travels.
- [516:23]
Thomas
Thank you.
- [516:24]
Pete
Okay, you ready? Let's just jump in with some questions.
- [516:28]
Thomas
Yeah.
- [516:28]
Pete
All right. Set on one of your podcasts today, Thomas said that most Americans who were alive at the time of the Civil War viewed it as a continuation of the war of Three Kingdoms. Can you elaborate on that a bit? I've never heard that before. Are there any chances of a full U.S. civil War series? Thanks. That's from Potato Mutt. $5 super chat. Thank you.
- [516:51]
Thomas
I didn't say most Americans who are alive viewed it that way. I said that in elite circles, people who contemplate these things in historical capacities as well as the people who can be viewed of as. Who can kind of be viewed as in the epoch. Happy birthday, America. It's time to celebrate and play your favorite Las Vegas casino games by American owned spinquest.com what's better than fireworks and American pieces? Hitting a blackjack in the palm of your hand and you won't lose your fingers. Over a thousand games, including slots and live dealers and 30 coin packs are on sale for 10 spinquest.com buy American players. For American players, Spin Quest is a free to play social casino. Boyd. Where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details. As sort of like the cultural scribes, this is the way they characterize it, okay? Like the American founding mythos originally. And if you read Hamilton and J, it's significant. They talk about Anglo Saxon dome, you know, bringing back presumably these kinds of, like, Germanic liberties that have been taken away by this Latin overlord class. Okay. That was very much kind of like the Northern perspective. I know it's popular now to say, like, oh, Puritans are a bunch of reformers and the radicals and, you know, look at John Brown. And it was like wokeism that caused the war between the States. That's not the case at all. All right. But this idea of round heads versus Cavaliers being transposed to the new world and these tensions ultimately causing the war between the States. That is true. Okay. And that's the way the people who put these things in historical context view it. Like the. The average guy was like a pig farmer. He wasn't like, watching the sunset and saying, you know, I'm a descendant of Oliver Cromwell and I don't like the Cavaliers. He wasn't saying that. But you better believe people like Robert E. Lee and Winfield Scott viewed that way. Yeah, you better believe. You better believe some of these, like, rabid abolitionist types viewed that way. That's what I meant. What was the thing about the question? Is there a chance of a Civil War, too? Is that the question?
- [519:00]
Pete
Yeah, Civil War series. No. Is there a chance.
- [519:04]
Thomas
Senior moment, a Civil War series. Yeah. There's probably better guys to talk about the War between the States. I mean, I think I know something. Okay. My main wheelhouse is the 20th century. If there's enough, if there's adequate demand for it, yes, I would be happy to do it. I mean, I basically take the cues from the subscribers and the viewers. You know, I mean, there's my own. I. There's a reason why I focus so much on the Cold War and interesting conflicts they're in and World War II and stuff. It's not just because I find those kinds of things interesting and it bears on some of my own research and my own work product. But I feel I'm more. I'm. This is an ego talking when I say I am more competent than most men to speak on those things. I literally have expertise in those regards. I'm not an expert on the work from the states. Okay. I'm, like, competent in it. But if you're looking for a war between the States expert, there are better guys than I to do it. But, yes, I would be willing to do it if you want me to.
- [520:02]
Pete
Okay. All right. This is. This is a question I had, but also one of the guys in the. In my private chat, Marshall Forward, had he said, will you Ever dedicate an episode to the. Of the World War I series to the Bolshevik Uprising as well as the Russian Civil War? Would you also possibly talk about Roman von Ungern? Steinberg's crusades were Annihilate. Yeah, the. The Sternberg. Sorry. The Bolshevik Red Revolutions,
- [520:33]
Thomas
the. The emergence of Communism. It's inextricably tethered to the conflict paradigm that caused World War I, but it's its own discrete set of occurrences. I don't. I don't like just. I don't. I don't like it when historians, revisionist or otherwise, just included as this kind of footnote to World War I, because it's a different thing. And. Yeah, the Great War and the fact that Russia was actively losing it and there was a mutiny in the field, yes, that was an essential catalyst, but it wasn't the sole proximate cause. And if you want to. And if you want to talk about Communism as a revolutionary imperative and as kind of the formative. And kind of as the formative, Like paradigm of the 20th century. Yeah, I. I think that's an important topic, but I. I conspicuously left it out of our World War I discussion for the reasons I just explicated. Sternberg I'd very much like to talk about, but I don't have the linguistic competence to do a whole series on Sternberg himself because this. This presence little in English or even in German on the man. He's very mysterious. What he represents, though he represents a tendency. He resonates like a proto National Socialist tendency, number one. Also, it's not an accident he was a Baltic German because they were the vanguard against communism in all kinds of ways. Like S.H. richter was of the same stock as was Alfred Rosenberg. But we can. That. That kind of. That the resurgence of mysticism. I don't mean that in a punitive way. That kind of theology reasserting itself actively in European man's conceptual horizon. These things that were thought to be long dormant, representative of the old gods, figuratively and literally reasserting itself. A sanguinary kind of Christianity that calls for blood and sacrifice and a warrior ethos. You know, a belief in. A belief in, you know, a belief in duty to one's race only to epigenetic memory giving life meaning, but also, you know, the understanding that, you know, men of race, you know, capital R being the architects of civilization and, you know, the kind of culture bearing cast that's essential to, you know, preserving it and thus enough. And us literally facilitating civilization, like all these things. All these things were what created the resistance to communism on every front and all these things, or instrumental in, in the emergence of figures like first and foremost Adolf Hitler, but also Mussolini, Sternberg, as we just mentioned, Mosley Kadrianu, you know, these, these, these pious warrior movements like that emerge in Spain. Oh, it's a side together, but it's like a topic unto itself. It's not just a footnote of the bullshit revolution. And the bullshit revolution is not just a footnote or like a side or like a secondary theater of the Great War. So, yeah, if, if you want to talk about. If you want to talk about the short century of 1914 to 1989 generally, and the meaning of communism and why it had the power to animate and shape human affairs in the way it did. And what. And, and, and what, and what. And why the resistance to it was, you know, and why it was so grounded in this kind of atavistic spiritual impulse. We can talk about that too, but that's a topic for its own series, I think.
- [524:40]
Pete
Okay, yeah, I was gonna just say that there is pretty much the war and how Russia was getting their, you know, getting their butt kicked, basically. I mean, that's what, that's one of the factors that allowed the revolution to happen. I mean, without say, Russia didn't get, say Russia wasn't involved in the war at all. And they were just. Yeah, they were out of it completely. They're just trading at the point. I mean, it's harder for that rebel. It's harder for the Bolshevik Revolution to happen.
- [525:10]
Thomas
Yeah, it's a necessary catalyst. And I think too, I think Lenin, I think part of his political genius. I mean, nobody's a true. Like Auger, but there are men who can discern patterns in the historical process as they're immersed quite literally within it. And Lenin was one of those guys. And that's not to say that Lenin KNEW World War I was going to happen, but it's pretty clear he knew something terrible was going to happen. You know, if. For another reason, if another reason. The tsarist regime was a total anachronism. And it wasn't just a case of, you know, oh, this is a corrupt regime that's kind of failing and it wasn't. Or just of case, you know, like the Ottoman Empire of. Well, you know, the center cannot hold, you know, because the, you know, it's. This, this institution is a. In its entirety is, Is a charade. I mean, it was. Those things were true too. But there was something punctuatedly violent on the horizon of the Russian empire. And that, that seemed apparent to anybody who was it all sort of politically sophisticated. And Lennon was an unusual guy even within that sort of narrow coterie from a little like that, in my opinion.
- [526:23]
Pete
Okay, this message came from Claude. He's saying, going, he's saying this is in reference to some of the stuff you're talking about Pre World War I, the build up. What's up with Bismarck's relative obscurity and lack of political interest prior to getting in bed with wealthy banking cartels. He said you described him as one of the great diplomats of the time. He agrees, but you'd like to hear more discussion on that relationship. Did he not see that he was setting people up for failure? And he mentions Emil Ludwig wrote a biography on him prior to World War II and he dedicated a lot of time discussing the Jewish influences on Bismarck.
- [527:01]
Thomas
Okay, I don't, I don't, I don't like this alibi of bankers. Like that's, that's something that's dumb, dumb shit. Okay, like, what I can say about Bismarck is this. Okay, for almost a century, Bismarck not only managed to keep the wolves at bay and Germany's enemies, he has not only to disincentivize them attacking Germany, but he disincentifies them, align with one another to conceivably undermine German interests. So I mean, at some point, like the proof is in. Is. Is in success. Okay? You know, it's the same. I had this argument with somebody late last night about Nixon and kissing during the Cold War. Like, you know, oh, like what was so great about Nixon? It's like, well, the fact World War III didn't happen for number one. I mean, sometimes the dog that didn't bark is, is what you point to as, as this positive evidence for, you know, a desirable outcome. You know, I mean, basically when we think about the modern state, number one, we, we're thinking about what Bismar created. He was literally the architect of these things. Okay, like, whether you think that's good or bad is neither here nor there. Okay. When Bismarck, Bismarck literally created the modern state in terms of praxis. Okay, Number two, again, the point I was making as a rebuttal of this kind of Anglophone myth of German militarism is there was, you know, well over half a century of peace, which is one of the reasons why the German officer corps was not particularly well situated to wage war 914 because the only men who shot fired in anger were elderly by that point. You know, and there's only a handful of them still Alive. But if you're able to quite literally disincentivize, again, not just, not just a direct assault on your territorial holdings, but you're able to disincentivize, you know, any sort of intention towards those tendencies, I think it's pretty clear you're a geostrategic savant. Okay. I mean again, whether within the boundary rationality of those things, whether you think that's a way to go, that's good or bad, that's. It doesn't matter. At some point we're talking about the executive role in the west in the post Westphalian order, you know, like results are all that matters. I don't mean an absolute terms when I'm in judging, you know, the greatness
- [529:31]
Pete
or,
- [529:33]
Thomas
or lack thereof of a chief executive. That's why, and like banking isn't some, isn't, isn't, isn't some tendency and there's some power unto itself. It's just not. Okay. I mean, yeah, obviously the financialism can mean, can be manipulated all kinds of ways. And if you've got people who harbor, if you have people whose interests and values and intentions are inimical to the national or racial interest, yeah, that's a disaster. But like, you know, like a, like, like a national currency isn't somehow just axiomatically bad? Like that doesn't make any sense.
- [530:11]
Pete
Got a 4.99 super chat here on YouTube. Other Rambo asks why do you. Why do you think so many significant Italians were quick to jump to war? Mussolini, d' Annuncio Marinetti. Italy didn't get tons out of the war.
- [530:31]
Thomas
Why was so many Italians should have to go to war in, in, in beginning with Ethiopia, I assume I, I run with that.
- [530:44]
Pete
Go ahead.
- [530:45]
Thomas
Okay. I mean the read about the Four Powers Pact, which ultimately after it was redacted and well after much of the body of the intended treaty was redacted, arguably its meaning was the opposite of what was originally intended. But the arbiter of the Four Powers Pact was Mussolini. This was around the time Churchill claimed that like Mussolini is like the greatest statesman of his, of his epoch. I think this was 19, I think this was 1934. 34, 35. But Mussolini was viewed as like potentially a great man and Italy was viewed as this ascendant power, like not globally, but absolutely the arbiter of power. Political occurrences in Central Europe as well as, you know, kind of the natural, the natural master of North Africa, contra France was viewed as being in decline. So anyone who believed in that, anyone who, anyone who accepted that hype and was with the fascist program, understood that there had to be some kind of direct action to back up that mystique and that purported mandate. So, you know, Italy flexing on. Italy flexing on Ethiopia, around Greece or deploying in the Mediterranean, contra France, which was its intended adversary, not the UK until that was really. Really wasn't. Until
- [532:27]
Pete
really.
- [532:27]
Thomas
It wasn't until the die was cast between Chamberlain and the furor that Mussolini, you know, became maximatically at odds with London. Arguably even then he was reluctant. But I mean, that's why. Because. And so too like in the pre. In. In the pre atomic age, 20th century, like direct action was viewed as. It was almost kind of like the consideration, like the blood consideration that like sealed intention. You know, there's something like very primitive about it. But it was I think one of kind of. I think it was one of the kind of like perennial holdovers that even. Like the. Even kind of like the mythologies of Westphalia and against kind of like the. The rationalism that came to. That came to predominate power political affairs, least superficially, that was one of those. That was kind of like one of the exceptions that stood out, you know, I mean, so that's why it's like you're not a real. If you can't deploy. If you couldn't deploy in depth in the 1920s and assert yourself in a colonial domain and like prove, you know, that you had like a modern military capability that included armor, by the way, by that point, that was part of it too. That included like armor and like, you know, what we consider to be like ground assault aircraft. Like, you weren't this way.
- [533:51]
Pete
All right, next question. And this one was from Claude as well. He said the assassination of the Arch Duke. Is this just a tragic coincidence of history? He dodges a bonafide assassination attempt only for his driver to coincidentally stop right next to another assassin who spur of the moment shoots the guy. This wasn't even plan A failed. Let's move to onto plan B. This is a complete serendipitous event. It screams improbability to me.
- [534:22]
Thomas
It's not a problem. Yet you had. You had a kill team locked and loaded within a small operational area waiting to spot a man around whom the events of the day were totally and completely oriented. You know, I mean, you ever been. You ever been in a big city, like when the mirrors like caravan goes by? I mean, is it. It's rather like impossible not to notice it. And in those days, especially Royals, like, the guy was in a Carriage with floorboards, like, standing up and waving to people, you know, and if you. If. I mean, that's basically how you was. That's basically how you. I mean, it's basically direct action 101. It's. I mean, it's like when. When. When the kill team murdered Paul Castellano, the shooters who actually hit him and Paul Bilotti right outside the steakhouse. They were four deep, you know, and then something like 50 yards behind them, you know, it was like their backup, 2 and 2. And then basically, like, on every. Every possible escape route, you know, they were like. You had men posted up the same way. I mean, you don't. You're gonna kill Ferdinand. I mean, you. You basically deploy the same way, you know, I mean, and it's. History's full of weird coincidences like that. I mean, that. That. That's. That's actually entire. Entirely straightforward. And Ferdinand, despite the fact that he was basically conciliatory towards the nationalities, you know, he had, like, the Chetniks absolutely hated him. And he had this rep. He had this reputation for being, like, very, very hardline and, like, very intolerant of the Eastern Slavs and. And of the Serbs and things, which was not really the case, but in the Hasbro empire, one had to kind of, like, strike this balance between, you know, appearing to be a sort of, like, ecumenical figure at unity and, like. And been, like, standing on business for one's own tribe and one's own people. Much as I. I've got romantic longings for Habsburg Vienna and think it's, like, cool, quite literally. Like, I realized there were, like, pathological things about it. That's one of them. But if you. If you break down. If you look at a map at scale, okay? And if you play around with a 3D model, especially, which I have done, of the kill zone where Ferdinand actually got a hit. It's not unlike where the manner and layout of how Kennedy got hit. Jfk. I mean, not rfk. This is perception that, like, this was like this wide open space. There's like, this crazy shot. Like, these people are basically on top of each other, okay? This is like. This was at intimate range, okay? And having your backup shooter or shooters be sort of, you know, quietly but conspicuously, like, hang around a cafe where they've got a direct. They got a. Where they got a basic direct line of sight. Forget whatever plans you have this weekend because you're staying at home and playing on Sports Spin Quest. And there's never been a better time to sign up. Than right now. New users get 30 coin packs for just $10. All the table games you love with hundreds of slot games and real cash Prizes. That's at spinquest.com S P I N Q U S T.com Spin Quest is a free to play social casino void where prohibited. Visit spinquest.com for more details to what's happening. But, you know, they're, they're remote enough that to not, you know, be made on site by any police or security element that it makes sense even if, even if it doesn't sound like it should on paper. Like, trust me on that.
- [538:34]
Pete
All right, so this question here, this is a question I got earlier. I don't, if it doesn't sound logical to you, I, I have no follow up on it. Was Germany sending Lenin back into Russia necessary for the Eastern front to down.
- [538:50]
Thomas
No, but it was a. But it was essential, an essential catalyst for the revolution to kick off in Moscow, in my opinion.
- [539:00]
Pete
Okay, this, that's from Logan. He has another one. He says, was there any real opposition resistance from Russians toward the Russian government as far as getting into the war?
- [539:12]
Thomas
I think so, yeah. But the political culture was such that if, if you didn't have even, even if you were like a businessman, even if you're like a Muscovite or a Petrograd, like businessman, you know, who had access to the, to the boyars or whatever or their equivalent, like they're. You still didn't really have any clout with the czar. So I mean, it was like you, there was a kind of futility to trying to mobilize public opinion, like even public opinion within, you know, like a narrow cast that actually had cloud and other domains. I think that kind of futility just sort of like disabused people of any inclination to, to try and affect change that way, you know, and it was like we talked about on, on the series Pete and I did. And one of the points that Norman Davies emphasizes, you know, the czar had real power. He wasn't the cipher and he wasn't a figurehead and he wasn't, he wasn't, he wasn't like the Kaiser either. Where, you know, in power political terms like what we think of as like Article 2, Command and Control terms, you know, he had real clout, but he was constantly butting heads with the chief of government. Like it wasn't like that. Like the czar. The czar truly was Caesar, you know, and that's not to say Nicholas was a particularly strong personality. But, you know, the, the power flowed from the office itself. So, I mean, that's. That's my take on it. I'm not like a ruse of a Russophile at all. Like, I mean, I like Russia fine, but I. I don't know anything about the culture from within. I can't read the language. And it's certainly not. It's certainly not. I'm not like a regional studies guy either. But in terms of what we can discern, there is a certain commonality in sociological terms to how modern military. Modern military organizations work, as well as how they relate to nominally civilian authority structures. Okay. You can derive certain principles from that that are basically constant, you know, adjusting for things, you know, like. Like cultural orientation and. And. And racial tendencies and things like that. So I think I. I don't think it's totally off base for somebody like me to identify Russia of 1914 as an outlier, you know, contra every other major power. It was, you know, within who. Who constituted the. The power paradigm. That's my take on it.
- [542:08]
Pete
Over on Odyssey, Yeomanry asks, what impact did the 48 rebel, the 48 rebellions have on Germany and its relations with the United States?
- [542:18]
Thomas
That's an interesting question. I think that it was. It made very little sense in absolute terms for the. The consolidated German Reich to be at odds with the United States. There are basic commonalities there. And I've made the point before that had the south won the war between the states, it's very probable that, like, a permanently divided United States, like the Confederacy would have allied with the UK And France and the Union would have allied with. With the German Empire. Germany was viewed generally by kind of like, the chattering classes as, you know, like the. As. Like, as like the progressive European country. Not progressive. Like, you know, we like lgbtq, and we all want our daughters to marry a black guy. Like, I mean, like, in terms of, you know, kind of like, advancing the human condition through certain kinds of intervention by public authorities, you know, it's like, oh, we got. We got pensions for, like, veterans and old folks. You know, we. We look after unwed mothers. You know, we. We. We've got, like, an education program, so people are basically literate, you know, from a young age. You know, we make sure everybody's fed, you know, like, basically, like basic welfare state stuff that was viewed, not incorrectly, as a German innovation. And I think, yeah, one of the reasons, even though, like, Marxism never took off in America, other than outside of, you know, certain radical quarters, I mean, like, actual Marxism, Leninism, I don't mean, like, just the left but there was a pretty committed subculture really until the end. And I think the origins of that were in people who post 1848 looked at, looked at Germany as like, you know, kind of like the intellectual center of Europe and the place that like progressive people look to, you know, for, for correct ideas. So yeah, I think, I think, I think that's what it is. Did the 1848 revolutions, were they, were they impactful, just generally like in global terms, figurative and literally? Not nearly as much as 1789, in my opinion, but yeah, it can't be discounted.
- [544:35]
Pete
What's your opinion of the book All Quiet on the Western Front?
- [544:43]
Thomas
I, I, I think it's kind of crybaby stuff. You know, I read it kind of like, it's obviously a lot more dignified and a lot more interesting than, than like, like Ron Kovic's like crybaby book. But it's still a crybaby book. I mean, like, I, I think it's, I think people should read Storm of Steel instead. I mean, I don't know, like I was World War I uniquely up, but probably, yeah, I mean, for the, for the common lines or, you know, the combat imagery, it was like literally in hell. But that's, I mean these things are in, these things are in God's hands. And like everybody dies of something. You know, I mean, some men are swept up by, by, by, by great wars. Not great, like awesome. I mean, like the Great War, like what, I mean, you can come at that philosophically and just kind of accept the human condition and you know, kind of look at the world, you know, the world's ultra sacrifice, essentially. And life is about suffering and retaining like your humanity quite literally and your dignity and your piety amidst that suffering, you know, or you can, or you can be some like, constantly aggrieved person who's, who views himself as, as being victimized by the brutal, various brutalities and injustices that characterize modern life. And I, I don't think it's a particularly manly look to opt for the latter. And yeah, I mean, I'm sure people turn around and say like, well, you didn't have to fight in World War I. No, but I've been through some. Okay,
- [546:21]
Pete
this, we got another five dollar super chat here on YouTube from Simeon Raban. And this might. What's the context of Kaiser Wilhelm saying second, saying I bitterly regret the favors I showed the prominent redacted bankers.
- [546:36]
Thomas
I mean, the Kaiser is very much in debt from Jump. I mean he was, Wilhelm was, was just kind of A crummy guy. I mean, I was making the point of people. There's a reason why Hitler basically went without crossing the line in, into a domain that would have been unseemly. Like Hitler basically disrespected him, you know, and, and deprived him of, of, of what would ordinarily be kind of, you know, the state honors granted to a former king, let alone one who served as a warlord during his tenure. But Wilhelm was, he was just, he was just kind of a crummy guy and a bully and he, he was also a spendthrift, but at the same time he did inherit a great deal of public debt. Okay. And he lamented that for good reason. And despite his reputation as a, like Wilhelm's wife, apparently like wouldn't even let Catholics like in the house. You know, to what degree like that was enforced. I mean, I'm sure it depended on the kind of personage involved and like what their pedigree or status was. But you know, these, these, these were not, these were not ecumenical people. And I, for all of his faults, I mean Bismarck wasn't a traitor or anything. And I, I think he, as much as he could within his own limitations. I think he put the German people first. I think he realized the implications very profoundly of the monarchy literally being in a hawk, you know, to a cast of hostile financiers that for the kinds of reasons Hannah Arendt talked about, were able to bring power to bear on people in punitive ways beyond merely the financial and depriving them of unsecured lines of credit, you know, to wage their wars and everything else. I, I think the context is exactly what it sounds like. You're just being sensible.
- [548:55]
Pete
Potato who asked a question earlier said, do you see the Armenian genocide and also the Irish Civil War, the Irish Free State movement and everything as footnotes to World War I not being able to happen unless World War I is happening.
- [549:12]
Thomas
The Armenian genocide. Yeah, the situation with the Irish in the United Kingdom was more self contained. And it seems odd because if you're, I mean, I realize I'm like an old person now, but you know, really from, really from the 60s and 70s today. And not just because I live in Chicago where there's a lot of Irish people. Ireland kind of features in people's minds conceptually that really was not the case like in the first half of the 20th century. And it wasn't even supposed that Ireland was viewed as like a backwater. Mean, that might have been part of it for people who had disdain for Irish people or whatever. But what happened in the UK was kind of seen as a sort of like self contained thing, you know, like, like the uk, discreet from the con. The UK and Ireland is discret from the continent that this doesn't matter like geography or, or them being physical islands, you know, like conceptually they really were considered kind of a part. In part. Did that give Britain a free, did that give the British crown a free hand in being somewhat brutal towards like other white people in Ireland in a way that wouldn't have washed on the continent? Maybe, yeah. But the case of the Armenian genocide, it was Max von Schubner Richter who fell at, on November 9, 1923. You know, he'd actually locked arms with Hitler as they charged the police cordon and Richter was shot and as he fell he dislocated Hitler's shoulder. Hitler said that Richter was the one man who was, who wasn't replaceable, who fell at the bureau pooch. You know, he's like, that man was like, he was like, he's like, he was like the intellectual backbone of the party. You know, he's like, he, we needed him. But Richter, Richter was a rich, was a Baltic German and he'd, he'd fought the free core against the Bolsheviks in the Russian Empire and he deployed, he deployed to the Ottoman Empire as a liaison. After he served on both fronts, then he employed into Turkey and he saw what was going on and he reported back to the German Consulate. He's like, you know, do you know what the, do you know what the young Turks are, are doing here? And the German consulate's like, look, like whatever happens, you know, like we, we got to get along with these people, these people being the Turks, you know, and moving forward, especially we know the Allies we can get. So don't like, like basically stop it, like stop publicizing this, you know. So Richter started anonymously kind of alerting Catholic charities and what have you to, to these, to these, to these instances, okay, which apparently, and I'm sure there's Turks listening or whatever, like they'll correct me. It strikes me as kind of a Rwanda like situation. A combination of ad hoc categorical slaughter and more organized efforts towards ethnic cleansing in areas of operation that were already affected by, by military engagements. I'm not here to like cat shade on anybody or something like that, but obviously some very horrible things happened, as is the case in Rosenkrieg. But it's significant that Richter, you know, who not only was a National Socialist, but he was one of the earliest party ideologues. I mean he's the guy who found this to be so against precedent and alarming and in need of, if not remedy. Because that's kind of a naive way to characterize such things in need of awareness of the reality of it, you know. And I suppose it's essentially modern character, you know, if from inception, like these intentionalist historians claim that the NSDAP was essentially this like genocidal criminal conspiracy, well, that seems a little bit strange that somebody like Richter would, would characterize events like the Armenian genocide in such ways. But the reason why he was able to, I mean, I realized the Ottomans were all for all practical purposes like finished by then, you know, not, not just as, not just as a political structure and culture, but as a combatant, as a parting of bad to the Great War. But the, the, the, the, the chaos of the world situation absolutely facilitated that. Yes. Otherwise like it would have, it, it would have drawn massive attention in my opinion. So yeah, I realized that was a long answer.
- [554:43]
Pete
The accusation that members of the tribe went to, went to the Brits and said, give us the Balfour Declaration. If you give us the Balfour Declaration, we'll get you. We'll get the United States into World War I.
- [554:59]
Thomas
That was, that was implied, definitely. That was the, that was the understanding. I mean, otherwise. Otherwise what? Otherwise what was the percentage in those days? You know, I mean, it wasn't. Despite the way people characterize things, even in, even in basically progressive corridors, it's not like there's some like, love for Zionism or some like love for Jewish people, you know, and certainly, I mean, somebody like Churchill, I know people make a lot of the fact of like, oh, you know, Churchill was, was writing anti Semitic editorials. You know, it's like, okay, you gotta take with a grain of salt anything Churchill said at any given time, you know, kind of depended on whose patronage he needed. But at the same time, that was basically, that was basically Tory opinion. Like, I don't accept it was anti Semitic, but it was like, why, why do we owe these people anything? You know, it was, and things were possible in the United States just weren't in the UK like even, even to this day the UK system is peculiar. Contrary the United States and the rest of Europe. I think, I think, I think the English and Scottish and Irish guys who contribute will acknowledge, like, not only is the monarchy still have clout like in, in. In subtle and unofficial ways, but there's, you can't. There, there, there's. There's a, There's a peculiar way in which policy gets implemented and the way in which, you know, people are wooed and like the way guarantees are made. It's not really like the United States, but it's complicated because I think that even I, I, I basically agree with David Irving. You know, like, Irving said that a, this obviously, obviously like, you know, Zionist lobbying was an essential proximate cause of the entire like kind of constellation of factors that, you know, brought the UK to general war with Germany, but it wasn't the sole proximate cause. And after, after Disraeli, who was the last PM who really had a kind of sensible in, in realist strategic terms position in Germany, like there was genuinely, there's genuinely crazy things like bandied about, you know, and that had, that had nothing to do with, within those sectarian interests and, and the ability of Zionists to co op policy quarters. Like, I emphasize that aspect because it's like a tip. It's, you know, it's considered like a taboo to discuss that and people trying deliberately like redacted from the record. So it's important that it be insinuated back into the record and emphasize for that reason. But it wasn't, it was, it wasn't like the driving engine, like in the case of Churchill personally, like, yeah, like that, that was who he was beholden to and he was an essential aspect of how events ultimately developed. But again, like it wasn't reducible to that single variable.
- [558:26]
Pete
Here's a question that we hear a lot going back to the Armenian revolution. Just real quick, do you think the young, did the Young Turks have a makeup of Sabbathian conversos using the skin of one enem to genocide another enemy?
- [558:42]
Thomas
There may have been a, an aspect of that, but again, I, I don't see any indication that was, you know, the sole determinative factor or motivating element. I mean, there's something about the modern state that requires ethnic cleansing at scale. If one derived its mandate from, you know, exigencies of war, you know, either like a missed war conditions, extant war conditions, or amidst conditions where, you know, such development into active hostilities is always possible. And you know, again, that's, that's the source of, you know, the sovereign mandate of whoever is able to capture it. So that's always, there's going to be, no matter who we're talking about in terms of population, no matter what region of this planet, like no matter what, you know, kind of the kind of unique precedence or indicated in the indigenous political culture, we're talking about the first half of this century, you know, like things suggestive of Ross and Krieg or of, you know, like racial survival. This stuff's going to have an outsized significance. It's not because everybody was crazy or everybody was a racist in those days because they didn't have enough, you know, multicultural education. It's just the world situation was. Was. Was strangely and violently unstable in a way that basically never ever happens. It's not to say these things aren't important, otherwise obviously they are. I mean, they're anything when existential characters by definition capital I important. Arguably more important than anything else. They were talk. We're talking about pure politics. But this being literally at the forefront of, you know, political conceptual life. I mean that. That's not normal, okay? But it owes the world situation the time.
- [560:56]
Pete
So the, the conditions in Weimar are. A lot of people talk about the Treaty of Versailles and how that set it up. Was. Was Prussia liberalizing in the late 1800s to open the door to the kind of things, the. The kind of debauchery and the kind of degeneracy that help lead to that?
- [561:20]
Thomas
I mean, I don't think so because it was way too much of a pietist kind of culture. And you know, I don't. I don't accept the canard of German militarism. But one thing that can't be denied is, you know, the reason, the reason why Frederick ii, Frederick the Great, rather. There was. There was a couple Frederick II s, but we say Frederick II and the German mean Frederick the Great. It wasn't just Hitler who revered him. You know, he was considered to be kind of like the model other than Bismar. He was kind of considered like a model, you know, like modern German executive. Okay. And he, he held out the Prussian army as, as the model German institution, you know, not because like militaries are so great, but because it was, you know, it, it quite literally, you know, like the Prussian socialism was considered to be exemplified, you know, by the army. You know, obviously it's distinguished from, you know, a proletarian socialism of the lower orders and things. But also, you know, the understanding that Prussia was not. Didn't develop organically in the sense of. It's just where people found themselves tens of thousands of years ago. And then, you know, a, you know, the, like, like a culture developed therein just because of its sort of natural kind of like natural like rootedness that overcame the people there. You know, like it was. It was essentially a wasteland with almost no arable soil. It was populated by hostile indigenous elements who weren't really brought into the kind of civilizational fold in some cases, until the, until the later Crusades, you know. So, I mean, there was a pioneering sense of self among the Prussians, you know, like, not unlike there was an old America, you know, and for similar reasons, you know, was, was, was revered. So I don't see how within a culture like that you can ever. I mean, there's other pathologies that emerge in cultures like that, but this kind of like liberalizing debauchery. They were talking about the deterioration of authority and public conduct and codes of honor and like, the role of violence in, in guaranteeing and enforcing masculine honor. I don't really see how that kind of stuff can be emergent. And I think about Weimar and the whole point that people like the Stahl home and like the National Socialist head and even the KPD had in some, albeit for like, cynical reasons, like this stuff wasn't really natural. Like suddenly there's like pornography everywhere. Like suddenly, suddenly you've got guys, suddenly you got guys in, in legislative chambers saying, like, you know, we need to allow prostitution because it's just natural. And like, why pretend it's not? I mean, this stuff is very. These are like social revolutionary imperatives that were calculated to kind of dilute what theretofore had been kind of taken for granted as, you know, essential components of public morality. You know, and obviously, like, this is very much duplicated in the, in the bundest republic and particularly, and you know, the, the. The. What became the Allied occupation zone in Berlin. But so, no, I don't, But I also don't accept, so I don't accept this view that progressivism as we think of it is just this inevitability. There's just like this con here on the right. It's just this constant rear guard action, you know, to try and plug holes in the proverbial dam of public morality. But it's a feudal thing. And I just. That's kind of like the Russell perk view. Like, I don't accept it. And that's one thing that's like, about conservatism on its own terms. That's kind of outside the scope.
- [565:38]
Pete
Okay, well, I think we're gonna end it right there. So. Ran out of questions. Is there? What else are you going to plug?
- [565:47]
Thomas
I mean, basically I find like one of the things that, I mean, I guess if there's a silver lining to my workflow as I've wanted it to proceed, being interrupted, is that I've had opportunity to catch up on these long form manuscripts that long last, you know, the third volume of my science fiction series, Steelstorm, that's basically ready to go. I've got to talk to my ERSW publisher, earthwell and longsuffering publisher, Imperium Press, who are great guys, by the way. I don't just say that because they're nice enough to publish my stuff, but I. That I finally managed to complete that. And this political theory book specifically on the Nuremberg system, you know, from 1949 to today, that's close to being completed. And I'm excited about that. Not just because it feels like an accomplishment, but I. I don't plan to go anywhere anytime soon. But when. When approach is 50 or 60, you know, thoughts of mortality do loom like, a little larger than they did when one was 20 to 30. And I do fear, like, dying before some of these things are done. So be looking out for those in the spring. I plan for them to drop, assuming there's not an issue with editing and I don't need to shop for a printer, which sometimes I do going to politics. But, you know, that's those kind of the big things on. On my agenda. And I promise the video content is coming. I've got a lot of it. It's just not edited. Like, I literally have like, lots of video and I'm shooting more this weekend and I. I feel like I'd be doing already a disservice. I'd be doing a brand the disservice if I just like, release this stuff, like with no wedding at all. That, that would. I. I wouldn't feel right about that. But. So, yeah, thanks for bearing with me. And again, I'm sorry for the, for the delays that I'm sure seem endless by this point.
- [567:52]
Pete
No problem. Lady of Shalott came in late and said, listening on a windy beach in Southeast Australia, walking the puppy. Really hope everyone had a good, great Christmas.
- [568:00]
Thomas
No, it's great. She's a dear. She's a dear friend of ours.
- [568:03]
Pete
Yeah, I guess we got one last question and Tommy Riley says, what are your thoughts on Wyndham Lewis development after World War I?
- [568:13]
Thomas
I mean, I specifically, I don't. I don't know what this. I'm certainly not an expert on Wyndham Lewis. I've read very little of his stuff. I don't. I don't have anything. I don't really have anything to add. I mean, you probably know more than I do about the man and the topic.
- [568:28]
Pete
Yeah, I mean, I read his book, the book he wrote on Hitler. And it was just at the time, it was basically a biography and talking about what he was doing.
- [568:37]
Thomas
Yeah, I've never read his stuff. I mean, I've read like exteriors, but I've never. Yeah, I, I, I, I, I'm not qualified to say.
- [568:45]
Pete
Yeah. All right. Well, thank you always, Thomas. And thank everybody for tuning in. Appreciate, we both appreciate it.
- [568:54]
Thomas
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