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The Pete Quiñones Show
The Complete Francis Parker Yockey Episodes w/ Paul Fahrenheidt
09:32:35
9 Hours and 33 Minutes PG-13 This is the audio to the eight episodes Paul and Pete recorded covering Francis Parker Yockey's writings. Episodes: 742, 752, 787, 888, 938, 979, 980, and 983. https://www.youtube.com/@TheOldGloryClub...
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- [00:00]
A
Yeah.
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B
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- [00:32]
A
I want to welcome everyone back to the Pete Quino show today. I am here with Paul Fahrenheit. How are you doing?
- [00:39]
B
Very well, Pete. Thank you for having me on.
- [00:42]
A
Whenever somebody appears for the first time, I always ask them to tell a little bit about themselves. So as much as you want to give, of course.
- [00:50]
C
Well,
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B
many of your listeners who are unfamiliar with me, a couple of the key things is that I was born and raised right outside of the imperial capital of what we now call the global American empire. And my whole life I've pretty much spent around federal government types, contractors, under secretaries. I went to school with the children of senators and, and you know, state department officials and all that. So like, you know, especially in Virginia, that is the, that is the, you know, the, the big thing once you get up in the region in Northern Virginia that I come from. And you know, growing up I was kind of a neocons. Neocon and as many were. And just coming around in 2016 with Donald Trump, I just started shifting and questioning and Internet culture and particularly like the 4chan meme culture started getting me into this right wing thing. And, and I kind of, I've been kind of consuming content in the background for pretty much my entire adult life, if not before my adult life, since I was in high school really. And only recently have I started to do any sort of what's called content creation. You know, for, for those of you who are unaware, I am, I am a substack writer. I, I don't really tend to flatter myself by calling myself an outright writer. I am a substack writer and I put out articles once. My most recent article was on the south and it was, it was released to a very good reception. But I don't just write nonfiction. I write short stories, I write poems. I've actually, my mentor, Thomas777, I've written a story set in his steelstorm universe that many people liked. And I'm, I write poetry. I, I, you know, and I put, I Try to put as much of it out on my sub stack as possible. In addition, I've done some writing for a up and coming online publication called Praxarchy. That's P R A X A R C H y dot com, where you can find. Actually you can find one of my articles on Yaqui himself and his conception of race and several other things. Parallelism, Spenglerian theory and the like. I have a Twitter which, you know, most people can find me on, but I am, I'm really just a serial guest. I don't have any massive audio content other than my own podcast. But that's kind of a general picture. I mean, I forgot to mention I served in the United States military for a couple of years, which I, which I did removed over the vaccine mandate. I saw the collapse of Kabul in 2021. From a God's eye view, I saw everything. And you know, that's kind of this sort of crossing of experiences. You know, even though I'm a bit of a younger man and a newer up and coming content creator in this thing, I try to bring, you know, the perspectives I have and the perspectives I hear from people better than to try to, you know, bring the truth out and, and demonstrate what, why we're all here and why we all like take the risk of, of having these ideas and these views. So that's, that's kind of generally me in a nutshell.
- [04:08]
A
And you seem to write a lot about Americana.
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B
Yes, yes.
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A
Culture more so.
- [04:17]
B
Not just, not just culture because for me Americana is a metaphysical thing. You know, America is a spiritual concept more than it's just a nation. Like, you know, God manifests his will through various ways. And I believe the creation and in many ways the degradation or the allowance of degradation of nations is one of the ways that, that God manifests creation on, on Earth. And you know, for me, I believe that America is vital, at least in this current time, in order to. The act of continuing creation. Therefore, in order to know this, this most, what I think is the most vital thing on planet Earth, America, I try to understand it through every possible angle you can. Whether that's culture, whether that's language, whether that's sociology and society, whether that's literature, whether it's music or architecture or cuisine or geography or folktales or all of that everything media, even, even, even the most kind of profane and, and soulless sort of media productions, you can kind of find a reflection of America in it as, as corrupted and base as it is. And this is, I think beyond vital in order to properly understand the place that America has in the world and the sort of destiny it has to fulfill. And that's why I focus on it so much, because it's. To me, it's a. Well, that never seems to end in terms of giving insight and teaching us in these spheres why we do these things and why we believe these things.
- [06:05]
A
Awesome. Thank you. That was a great explanation that I've heard you talk about before on Thomas's show. But the. Yeah, thank you.
- [06:16]
C
Thank you.
- [06:17]
A
All right. I invited you on because recently I sat down and read a print book for the first time. Well, I read print books all the time, but they're usually short. I sat down and read a print book for a 600 page book for the first time in a very long time and it floored me. And I didn't know much about the author beforehand, but I quickly got to know a lot about him. And like you had mentioned before we started recording, I was just like throwing quotes out there. I was taking pictures of quote of pages and putting them on Twitter and taking, just taking random quotes and putting them on Twitter. What do you know of the man? Like just his life. Francis Parker Yaqui. Yes.
- [07:05]
B
So Francis Parker Yawkey is. To call him interesting would be an understatement. You know, the man himself, he was born in Chicago September 18, 1917, to a, to a Swiss, German and Irish background. He was, he was raised in the Catholic tradition. I don't believe he was practicing. And he, he grew up through the, through sort of the post war period of the United States, watching the general degradation of it. He was a concert level piano player like he was, he was a brilliant piano player and he could have easily done that. And, and Willis Cardo talks about this in the introduction to the 1960 version. 19. I don't think it was 1960, but the second edition of Imperium, the COVID that most people will know. And Yaqui got into a car crash in his youth that kind of prevented him from, from being able to play piano as well as he used to. And a little anecdote that comes from this period when he was playing piano was that he was at some college dean's house and he know, I guess he just started playing the International on that dean's piano and he got kicked out. And, and so Kevin Coogan, who's this crank biographer in, in the 90s, while writing stuff about Francis Parker Yaqui, takes this and basically takes the conclusion from that that, oh, he was a communist in his youth, which I think is complete and utter nonsense. I mean, I think, I think, you know, Yaqui was just a troublemaker like a lot of, you know, young men are, and he just, he just wanted to cause some mischief. And so that's, I guess that's the, that was one of the easiest ways to do that in the, in the 1920 after the, you know, in the wake of the first red scare. But, but yes, Yaqui attended, you know, a number like almost, I think seven or eight different colleges. You know, eventually. He eventually graduated from Arizona State, his undergrad, and then he went to Notre Dame for his law school. These are kind of the two most important ones he went to. And he graduated law school from Notre Dame cum laude in the 1930s, which is extremely impressive. That was back when, that was back when standards for law school were extremely high. I think his IQ was tested somewhere around 170, which is like genius level.
- [09:41]
A
That's far beyond genius. Oh yes, that's two standard, that's two standard deviation deviations above genius.
- [09:48]
B
Yes. And he, he, he was just extremely competent in pretty much everything, I mean except for being tall because he was 5 foot 8. But he, whether it was law, he, he never lost a case. I, I, I legit in the, in the years, I think in the, in the decade at which he was a trial attorney in the greater Chicagoland area, he mostly did cases on insurance, but I don't think he lost a single case that he argued. And, and you know, oftentimes he would, if he, if he didn't have political motivations, he would actually try to self sabotage himself as much as possible in order to sort of keep in this, in this weird sort of monasticism because he, he lived entirely politically. He would try to self sabotage himself while arguing cases that did not have any, any ties to his politics and his politics. You know, one of the interesting things about America in the 1930s that often kind of gets brushed over, especially in the U. S. History class is at least not 10, at least not in a tangential way, but largely throughout the public's perception was that in the 1930s you had a ton, a ton of what we would call far right organizations today that were just everywhere widespread and socially accepted. You know, you had Charles Lindbergh's America first movement in the order of 76. You had the deutsche Americana shabooned, which was even in its day kind of looked at as like a bit of, a bit of crowd sympathizers, but they were socially accepted. You had Bill Pelly's silver legion you had the Black Legion, which was a clan offshoot in the Midwest. You had the clan itself. You had, you know, talking about religious organizations. You know, the Masons were very politically active and they were, you know, they tended to be very right wing, at least in behavior, if not numb intention. Knights of Columbus as well. You had, but, you know, and, and, and you had just all these, you know, Huey Long, Father Charles Colon, whose radio show, I believe, garnered 3 million. It was either 3 million or 30 million. It was one or the other. Either way, it was a massive. It was, it was the most popular radio show in America. And you know, his radio show was literally just railing against what he called the Money Changers and the bankers, which is a certain group of people. And this was, this was like the most popular radio show in America at the time. And, you know, you had Father Charles Smith, you had Huey Long in Louisiana running his sort of populist opposition to, to the mainstream Democrats. You had the precursors to the Dixiecrats. You know, I could keep going on and on and on and just listing all of these things, all of these movements, all of these parties that existed in the United states in the 1930s that were explicitly right wing. And what happens after 1939. Wells Thomas has explained in your, in your show with how the US Entered in Pearl Harbor. You know, Lindbergh said, Roosevelt got us in through the back door. And so, as you know, the United States was now at war with the quote, unquote, far right world. Well, all of those fifth columnists at home needed to be smoked out. And so after the Second World War and the sort of beginning of the social engineering of the Nuremberg world order, you see all of these, you know, homegrown and native movements in the United States that were completely normal, that were completely accepted and that were generally engaged with, all of a sudden are wiped off the face of the earth. And, and Yocky himself, he existed actually at both ends of these, at, at, you know, in the 30s he was a young up and comer. And in the 50s, he was very much sort of one of the only figures after the war who, you know, had the courage or foolhardiness, I suppose, to, to keep upholding these ideas. In the 30s, he, he largely did writing and speaking. He appeared at a America first convention under the pseudonym Francis Parker. He was billed as a, as a international law expert from the University of Virginia. Both of which were lies. I mean, actually, no, the latter was a lie. The former was true. Because Yaqui probably understood international law oxymoron as that is better than anyone. In addition, his first written piece was published in Father Colin's periodical called Social Justice. I forget the title of that piece. But he did legal work for the Silver Legion, he did legal work for the Deutsche Americanische Bund. And all throughout the 1930s he was very, very active in these far right political circles. Come the war he, he tries to stay out of it. But after 1941 he did kind of what was expected of, of every man at that time socially, which was enlist in the United States army, enlisted in the 42nd Infantry Division in Kalamazoo, Michigan, was sent to basic training, underwent that. I, I don't, I do not know what specific job training he got while he was in the army because you know, if you go into like these dog tag databases, you can actually find his name, his serial number is known, his rank was private because he enlisted. But, but after he undergoes this initial training period, he goes AWOL for about four to five months down in Mexico. And what he was doing was that even as early as in the 1930s, he was turning himself into one of these OSS intellig types. Another notable man who was a confidant of Yaqui, very similar sort of worldview and pedigree is H. Keith Thompson. Harold Keith Thompson, who was another one of these very far right figures. He was in correspondence with European royalty, old money, New York type WASPy. He joined the United States military during the war and, and the whole time H. Keith Thompson was a, a double agent. He, he was a, I think he, he was taken on by sd, which was SS intelligence. And actually later in his life he would never swore oaths of loyalty because you know, he said that he only ever wanted to swore one oath of loyalty in, in his life and that was to, to Adolf Hitler. And H. Keith Thompson becomes a very close, confident of Yaqui around this time and even, even later on. But, but basically Yaqui after, after getting back from being awol, he kind of tricks this army psychiatrist into giving him a medical discharge, you know, off of psychological reasons or whatever. And, and then for the rest of the war he goes around the country providing intelligence to, to what we would call Axis intelligence assets. He went to, he was in Peru with a, with an Italian intelligence agent giving information on US merchant shipping. It is very, it is very likely that Yaqui actively contributed to the success of the Kriegsmarine during the Wolf Pack part of, during the War for the Atlantic, because the Kriegsmarine was very, very able to coordinate with these intelligence assets and understand where These US Merchant convoys were coming because as Thomas pointed out, you know, after Lend Lease, the United States was essentially in the war and all but name we were escorting these, these, these British fleets with US Merchant ships and US Navy assets. And, and so you know, I, the, the, the Kriegsmarine did, did exactly what I believe was right and proper in that situation. But after the war, you know, Yockey returns to, he's, he's in Chicago, he's a well known lawyer and right around when Nuremberg starts picking up. Yocky is a relative unknown by the United States government. He's actually kind of a, kind of a small fish and they don't really, they don't really know much of his background. So they needed all of the lawyers that they could have gotten for the Nuremberg trials. And Yaqui among many others was hired to kind of write trial reports. He wasn't on the ground arguing or in the, in the courtroom rather arguing evidence, but he was there to write trial reports for, for the, the second string Nuremberg trials like the doctor's trial and, and other other such, you know, lesser you know, tier two Nazis or second string Nazis as they were called during this time. He befriends General Otto Reamer who is the single individual responsible for saving Hitler's life during Operation Valkyrie because he was the one in command of I think the Wehrmacht reserve at the time. I could be wrong on this, but he actually, he, he is a, if you've seen the Tom Cruise movie, he is actually in the movie. He is who Himmler shows up. It's his headquarters that Himmler shows up at and he is the one who decided not to carry out the order to mobilize the Wehrmacht reserve to arrest all of the SS people and essentially coup the Nazi government. And so, and so Yaqui very much befriends Yaqui, speaks fluent German, he spoke several languages I think, and, and he befriends General Reamer and you know, does everything but like in like gives him evidence and, and, and, and works with him and several, several other individuals from this sort of third right crowd because Yaqui, and you'll see this in some of his earlier writings, but Yocky kind of saw the whole thing as just one big scam, one big degradation. Desecration of law. It was, it was a joke to, to make an understatement. It was, it was, it was literally ex post facto, you're guilty of laws we are now making up. You know, Garing, Garing of all people I think did the best to kind of Just dismantle the entire argument. That's why he, you know, Thomas will talk about this as well, but, like, you know, Nuremberg was such a joke in how the. The United States Judge Advocate General Corps and the civilian lawyers they brought over were just, you know, climbing fences halfway through trials, making up evidence. It was a kangaroo court if there ever was one. And Yaqui would not kind of, he would not stick with the message. He wouldn't write trial reports the way that his superiors wanted him to. So he, you know, he was kind of given an ultimatum. It was just like, well, write these reports the way we want you to write them or get the hell out. And he's like, all right, well, I'll see you. And. And so this is around, I think, 1946. So he goes to England. He's. He's making travels all across Europe at this time, working with, working with what would later elements that would later become Otto Raymer's Socialist Reichs Parti, which was, you know, the best way to describe it was almost exactly the Nazi party immediately after Nuremberg. And it got, I think, something like 30 electoral support in the first election. It was the first party banned by the German federal government under the joke of a constitution that is the Grun Gazettes. But he, he makes acquaintance with Oswald Mosley and several of the former individuals within the British Union of fascists. And in 1948, Yaqui goes to British Bay, Ireland, a very isolated village with a single hotel. And over the course of, I think a year, a little bit less than a year without notes, writes that 600 page paperback. I believe you read Imperium entirely from memory, entirely off the top of his head, and takes it and presents it to Sir Oswald Mosley. And he says to him, I will publish this under your name. And Mosley kind of looks at him and he, and he says, thank you very much. I appreciate the compliment, but no. And Mosley never read Imperium. He never even glanced at the thing Yaqui was offering. But several of his underlings did. Several of his, of his fellow. Of his fellow travelers, of his confidants look through Imperium and said to Mosley, what the hell are you doing? This is brilliant. This is, this is amazing. This is revolutionary. And you're, you're just kind of spitting in this guy's face. And this is kind of, this is one of the primary events that kind of caused the, the irrelevancy of Mosley post war because he, he, you know, he was very much willing to get with the program of The NATO agenda and the anti Soviet sentiment. So Yaqui publishes it under his, under a pseudonym, Ulik Varange. And it only, only I think 1000 copies were ran of the first edition. I have never seen nor laid hands on a first edition edition of, of Imperium. But it was published in two volumes. The first one is, was bound in I think brown leather. The second one was bound in black leather. But they, they are exceedingly rare and imperial. But they all sold out within like two weeks of publishing. And, and okay, so after this, Yaki goes around and kind of turns himself into this self made homespun intelligence asset. He works anywhere and everywhere for anyone that he believes will support his political views. He goes to Egypt and works for Gamal Abdul Al Nasser who was, who was, you know, head of the, head of the anti British, I think they were the Arab nationalists, forgive me, Middle Eastern history is not one of my areas of specialty, but I do know a little bit of Nasser. And Yaqui starts publishing this anti Zionist propaganda because this is around the time when the state of Israel is being set up. You have the war for Israeli independence and, and Yaqui greatly grew to admire Nasser like he, very much. He saw in Nasser kind of the type of man that he believed was needed to stand again this, this, this growing, what we, what we would eventually call global homo. But he doesn't stay with Nasser for more than I think a year or so. He picks up and then he, I think actually vis a vis Nasser doing him a couple of favors. He was able to get behind the Iron Curtain. He was present like in the courtroom watching the Slansky trials, which is when the, the Czechoslovak government convicted 11. There were 12 people on trial and 11 of them were Jewish. And so the Czech government convicted these, these 11 Jews as being traitorous and corrupt. And it was over the course of that trial and I believe his extended stay within the behind the Iron Curtain
- [26:21]
C
that
- [26:23]
B
Yaqui came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was the lesser evil as compared to the growing United States empire. And he, he talks about why in, in the book Imperium itself, but his correspondence kind of drops off after he goes behind the Iron Curtain because obviously if you're, if you're U.S. national and you're working behind the scenes in, you know, four, your nation's primary geopolitical adversary, obviously you would not be writing things down and that which you would be, would be very quickly disposed of. So he, he leaves the Iron Curtain. Right. Thomas believes, and I, I agree with him that, that he became an Asset either for Czechoslovak or East German intelligence. This whole time he's publishing pamphlets in German. He's having his printing presses raided and destroy the germ by the West German police. He's trying to keep up networks of, of friendly people politically. But he's flying back into the United States in 1960 and he, he flies into believe Los Angeles Airport and his suitcase gets sent to the wrong place. So the airline attendants open up the suitcase to determine whose it is and they find I think five or six passports, several different identifications, names, information, all this other stuff. And so Yaqui, who is staying at a friend of his, a, a Jewish rabbi actually in Oakland, is, is arrested and brought to the San Francisco County Jail in which he is, he is brought before he's held for a fifteen thousand dollar bail which is ludicrous for, for passport fraud. I have, I have read through the, I think all six volumes of the FBI's files on the individual Francis Parker Yockey. And this was intentional. This was, this was very intentional. They were keeping tabs on him for a very long time, interviewing his close friends, his family, character associates and all that. And, and he once, once they got him for that, they, they, I think they knew that they weren't, they weren't going to let him go and I think he knew that they weren't going to let him go. So over those 11 days he becomes acquainted with Willis Cardo who I think, I don't know if it was him that started the Institute for Historical Review or, or, or someone else, but Cardo is, it becomes very influential within the later American far right and Yaqui and him have a very close acquaintanceship and Yaqui kills himself with the cyanide capsule he kept in his shoe 11 days after incarceration in order to protect his political contacts, which he, which he put in the, in his suicide note. And you know, Willis Cardo gets his hands on a copy of Imperium and publishes it, publishes a second edition of it, which is the edition most people are familiar with. And if Yaqui was not caught and was not forced to or did not choose to, to take the Yama, take the more noble route than being kind of paraded and possibly lobotomized because they did that back in those days, it's very likely that he would have lived on as long as an individual like H. Keith Thompson did, possibly even into the early 2000s. But, but that's, I know that was, that was a bit long, but that's kind of the, that's kind of a detailed summary of Yockey's lifes and. And going ons.
- [30:29]
A
Sure. And I don't know if we have the time to do it, but at least we could get started. And if we don't have the time, if you'd come back, that would be great. Let's start getting into a little bit of his political thought. Because as you've already talked about, people read this, Mosley's. People read this, and they were like, this is insane. There's nothing like this anywhere else. And I think that really the only thing that they could have compared it to at the time would have been Spengler. But it was. He had taken a step beyond that.
- [31:04]
B
Yes. No, that's. That's. That's exactly how to. How to describe it. Imperium is. Is. If I had to recommend one book that any young or not so young individual who's getting into the far right, who's getting into, you know, this side of things, whatever you would call it. Whatever it's. Whatever it's.
- [31:34]
A
The safe term is dissident right now.
- [31:36]
B
Yeah, dissident. Dissident, right. These spheres are. Thing. The Cosa nostril, whatever, the 5,000 names that we have for it. If I had to recommend a single book and you only had to read one, I would recommend Imperium. And this is because Imperium, not only has Spengler, not only has Yaqui, but its metaphysics are drawn almost entirely. Not, Not. Not entirely. Yaki has his own. His own precepts, but drawn largely from the Evolian framework. His theory of politics is exactly Carl Schmidt's. His theory of history is Oswald Spengler's. His theory of individual influence is Thomas Carliles. All right. Yaki Yaqui brings together so many thinkers. Right. That we now kind of hold up. You know, his legal theory is Joseph de Mestras. He brings them all together in the way that I think only an American could. And he. He creates this amazing synthesis between all of these ideas. All right? It is a. It is a manifesto. It is a. It is a book for law. It is a book of historical theory. It is a book of political. A political conception. It is a book of racial metaphysics. It is a book on religion. It is a book on any of these things. Yaqui touches on it. It's a book on economics. Right. And. And this is. This is the one book I would recommend for all of those reasons. He does write it as a. He intends it to be the sort of sequel to Decline of the West. Spengler was Yockey's biggest single influence. When Yaqui traveled around in his suitcase, he would keep a copy of. He would keep a copy of Decline of the west in the original German, both volumes. He would keep a copy of man and Technics in the original German of the hour of decision, of the essay Prussianism and Socialism and I believe one or two other texts Spengler wrote. But. But these were the only texts that Yaqui kept on his person at all times, more or less. I think there's a. There's a very distinct reason for that. In no uncertain terms. Yaqui calls Spengler the philosopher of the 20th century.
- [34:01]
C
The, the. The.
- [34:02]
B
The 20th century is the century of Spengler, Tyaki. And Yaqui really, he, you know, even in his own terms, he really only claims to be kind of following along in that tradition and going further. But what he does is he focuses on things, you know, that, that Spengler missed, including race, including, including politics, including
- [34:26]
C
the.
- [34:27]
B
The years from 1933 until 1945, which are extremely important and needed, needed to be understood, needed to be put into a Spenglerian framework. And matter of fact, even, even. Even in the, in the first, in the first paragraph of the forward of Imperium, Yaqui pretty much outlines exactly what this book is. And he says this book is different from other books. First of all, it is only in form a book at all. In reality, it is a part of the life of action. It is a turning point in European history. Notice that word he uses there. European history, a late turning point, but a real one. There is nothing original in the content of this book. The book itself only is original. The craze for originality is a manifestation of decadence. And the decadence of Europe is the ancestor, is the ascendancy rather of the barbarian. Right? What Yaqui does, particularly in this four, but throughout the book is he tries to bring an end to what he sees as the petty nationalism, as the small space thinking, as the minor politics, as the self defeating, you know, as the self defeating degradation, the self defeating decline that European civilization has undergone over the past couple of hundred years. And the way he tries to set forth, the framing is that he tries to set forth the entirety of Europe. And this doesn't just mean the continent of Europe itself. It also includes the United States and South Africa at least bore South Africa and, and Canada and, and everywhere really, where, where whites settled in, in such. In such numbers as to become the majority, at least to create their own cultures there. These are all extensions of Europe, right? And how Yaqui is trying to. Framing it in the way, as I tried to repeat, only an American can do. He tries to make all of these disparate components aware of each other. He tries to. He tries to make the Frenchman understand that he comes from the same well that the German comes from, that the Australian comes from, that the Norseman or Northman Norwegian, sorry. That the Norwegian comes from, that the Scot comes from, that the American comes from. Not just the American, but that the New England Yankee and the, the Southern. The Southern planter, all of these people come from the same source, come from the same well. And Spengler talks about this. He calls this Faustian civilization and decline of the West. But Yaqui kind of takes it a step further. Yaqui isn't speaking purely in Niyama in the abstract. He's not speaking purely in theory. He's outlining the sort of what we would now call pan Europeanism. I just. I kind of just call it pan Westernism because I don't. It's not geographically limited to the continent of Europe. It is, it is all one continuum with, with different, different component parts of that continuum, but it is one continuum. And that is the most important thing. And you can get this off an initial reading even of just the forward of Imperium, that is the most important thing Yaqui is driving towards.
- [37:54]
A
Well, I wanted to get into a little bit of it because there's. The ideas that are in here are not ideas that you're. You're not going to get them in school. I guess it depends. Depends what school you're going to go to. But one thing that jumped right out at me in the first section, which is called the 20th century historical outlook, is the two aspects of history. And in the first paragraph he says history is the record of fulfilled destinies of cultures, nations, religions, philosophies, sciences, mathematics, art, forms, great men. Only the feeling of empathy can understand these once living souls from the bare records left. Causality is helpless here.
- [38:43]
B
That's absolutely correct. What, what Yaqui is kind of trying to say in this passage is that all of these things. He outlines what Spengler calls his high culture. Right. This isn't any one thing. This is, you know, this is individuals, great men. This is religions, this is philosophies. This is forms of mathematics. This is ways of organizing militaries. This is all of these things, artwork, poetry, styles of both planning cities, right? Settling people. All of this, all of this comes from the sort of. These sort of interior or interior internal feeling of the Individual men that were animated to manifest the spirit in the world. And in order to understand these, these destinies, these fulfilled destinies, I'm going to get into what that means. But in order to understand these fulfilled destinies with empathy, that means you need to understand that it was a soul that created these things, using men, using humans as its tools to create these things. Right? Yaqui further defines a Spenglerian high culture in it is a collective soul. It is a collective animating force held by a common group of people. It's almost a Jungian collective unconscious. And car. And yeah, Carl Jung was a massive influence on Yaqui. There are several Jungian theories within imperium and. But this collective unconscious is only limited to those which Yaqui later introduces another term in the, in the work. People of race. This is limited to people of race. Race is not something you are, it's something you have, right? It is, it is something that, that, that separates the higher kind of, of. Of human type versus human as animal. Man is animal. It's, it's, it's, it's a higher form of consciousness, right? And in order to understand, like for example, if you take the Egyptians, in order to understand the ancient Egyptians, you need to understand that these were a people with an animating force, with things that move them, with primary symbols, with evocative, evocative ways of being that we as, as Faustians, as Westerners could not even begin to comprehend because we were not grown, nor did we have our soul formed and brought down to Earth in that geographical region around the Nile. We did not live to see the, the, the, the events, the, the highs, the lows, the, the formational consciousness of the Egyptian people. Same thing for every high culture between the beginning of time and where we are now. Empathy is understanding that, well, these people did have this animating spirit and we can only even begin to grasp at it from these bare bones concepts from these records that they leave the word fulfilled destinies. I said I was going to get into that. A destiny in the Spanglerian sense that a Yaki is using is a lifespan, right? So say you have a, say you have a seed, say you have an apple seed, right? And you plant that in the ground. And left to its own devices, left to its own devices with everything going right and it getting plenty of sunlight,
- [42:09]
C
water,
- [42:11]
B
all of this other stuff, that seed will grow into a massive apple tree and then it will rot away and die. This is if, if left to its own devices, if left with, with everything that is Sufficient for will become that apple tree. This is the fulfilled destiny, is the fulfilled life cycle of a culture. All right? This is the same for like, take an individual human being, right? A human being, when they're born, they have an infancy, they have a childhood, they have an adolescence, they have an adulthood, and then they have a decline into old age and death, barring any sort of outside force interrupting that or ending that prematurely. That is the destiny of a human being, a high culture, a civilization, a des. A way of being. Even a religion within that civilization, even within that historical epic, even within the life of a great man, all of those have the same cycle. This is not to say, especially in the terms of religion, this is not to say that a religion is true or false. Yaki even says this. Yaki says religions are above the words true or false. That's not a. That's not a value you can place upon faith. Faith is. Faith is the internal. I'm going to get a lot of hate for saying this, but, you know, as from how I interpret, how Yaqui is trying to say it's. Faith is the internal means in which a high culture interprets the metaphysic. Faith is. Is the internal means in which a high culture uses to express that particular aspect of its soul, its relation with the grander. With the grander. Creation. You know, as I say, God and creation, this is how God manifests his will. And so all of these things have a. Have a beginning, a middle, and an end, basically, is the right way to say it. So, you know, an art form. An art form is brought into being by, you know, a genius. It's always a genius who does this. The genius in religion is called profits. And genius just simply means originality. It's brought into being. And there's a certain finite level of possibilities. There's endless potential. But by. By manifesting that potential, that. That particular art form, that. That particular faith, that. That particular means of history has, by bringing it into the. By bringing it into the material world, you actually have to spend that potential almost as if it's like a currency. And there is a. There is a set limit of possibilities of art forms. Take classical music, for example. It's kind of brought into being by Bach. Bach kind of starts to create the initial concepts. There were people before him, obviously, but Bach is the first, like, primary genius, right? That kind of. Kind of creates what we now call classical music, right? Then you have, you know, Vivaldi and other such people. But then. Then Mozart comes. Mozart comes. And just over the course of his short 30 year life entirely creates the concept of classical music just out of, not out of nothing, he has component parts, but just completely off of his. The force of his own genius summons into being this, this, this art form, this way of being that becomes the highest art form achieved by the west, which is its classical music. After Mozart. Right. Like Mozart essentially just creates 90 of what we call classical music today. After him you have Beethoven who comes in and fills out about you know, 5%. And then, and then you have other individuals like maybe a single symphony that they wrote is, is entered into the canon. Then you have the death of classical music with Wagner where Wagner comes along and kind of reaches the, the end, the final, the final possibility that you can portray classical music in which is in the, the beginning of the Romantic era, in the beginning of, of, of of romantic music. And then after that it just, it's, it's not classical music anymore. It's a fulfilled art form that people, that people are, they're creating stuff under its name, but the only way that they're creating is by actively refuting what the art form used to be. Forgive me if that's a bit, if that's a bit convoluted, but that's, that's the best way I can describe what Spengler and Yockey are talking about by fulfilled destinies. It's that same principle applies to everything to economics, to mathematics, to philosophy, to religion, to all of it.
- [46:39]
A
Yeah. I think anyone who sits down to read this who has believes in God, believes in, you know, isn't a materialist. Part one is probably what hooks you in. I could see a lot of people who aren't taken aback because like he has a section here on Darwinism and he says, he calls Darwinism a grotesquery. He says the whole grotesquery of Darwinism and of the materialism of the entire 19th century generally is a product of one fundamental idea. An idea which happens also to be non factual to this century, even though it is a prime fact. A century ago that one idea was that life is formed from the outer. And then he says, he asked the question what is life? And he says life is the actualizing of the possible. The possible turns into the actual in the midst of outer facts which affects only the precise way in which the possible becomes actual but cannot touch the inner force which is expressing itself through and if necessary in opposition to the outer facts.
- [47:52]
B
This is exactly correct. Yes. And that's kind of, that's the passage that defines this whole thing. I was kind of grasping At. And this kind of just, Just. Just shows the genius of Yaqui and how in a single passage, he can just summarize all of these ideas that I'm struggling to articulate. Yes, it is. It is the life is the. The fulfillment of the possible, as he says. It is the manifesting of the inner spirit in the exterior world. It is not vice versa. It is not outside factors. Nature is nature as we describe it. It is not a continual act of forces acting on everything within nature. Nature is actually a very delicate balancing act in which several niches and several combinations of niches need to be filled, including that of a higher conscious being, including that of a higher conceptual force which can act and change nature and can transform it and can play around with those niches. And that comes from a level beyond, like above. Above this sort of material plane, however you define as above. Right. Acting down onto it, manifesting itself onto it. This is almost kind of the proving ground for. For Platonic concepts. Is. Is what. Is what I believe Yaqui is trying to say here. And yes, that's. That's exactly it. That's exactly. You know, that's exactly what. What was being outlined. You know, it's. Every art form, every civilization, every high culture is one of these concepts, is one of these possibilities trying to. To bring itself into being in this world, in this plane.
- [49:29]
A
I wanted to jump forward to the part on Marxism because something that I've really been trying to touch on for a while is what exactly is ideology and what is its purpose? What's the practical use of ideology? And in the section on Marxism, he says the 19th century was the age of individualism. The 20th and 21st are the ages of socialism. No one has understood if he thinks this is an ideological conflict. He says ideology itself means the rationalizing of the world of action.
- [50:14]
B
Yes, yes. And he talks about this in my. In my favorite part of Empyrean, my favorite chapter, which is the. The articulation of a culture. Ideology is. Is inherently tied to the nature of the zeitgeist. Zeitgeist being spirit of the times. That particular passage he was talking about comes from Spengler, particularly in the essay Prussianism and Socialism. In that essay, Spengler outlines that socialism as people are using it is kind of a bastardization.
- [50:48]
C
Right?
- [50:48]
B
It is not Marxism. Marx, you know, he says Marx was the godfather of. Of socialism, but it's. It's, you know, Marx. Marx was no more. No more had anything to do with bringing socialism into being than. Than anyone else. Like it was just A manifestation of the times. All that socialism is, is kind of a, is a, is a way of reconciling this post industrial world, this world of, of, of. Of massive material mobilization. Socialism is the means of reconciling that world to a sort of pre industrial paternalistic, almost feudal way of living in which, you know, you have the man at the top who looks after the needs and the, and the best interests of those beneath him. This sort of, this is this sort of recreation of like the feudal barony, the feudal lordship. And you know, I'm. This is not a, this is not a. What's the right word? This is not a condemnation nor is it a endorsement. Endorsement, yes, of it. This is simply just how it is. Right? You, you have a niche that needs to be filled. Some people feel like the paternalistic way of organizing the world is the correct way. Some people do not believe such. And socialism as it has been formed is the paternalistic way of organizing the world within the context of the, the zeitgeist of the 20th and the 21st century. And Marx had nothing to do with that. Like, Marx was just some dude who wrote a book that people animated by an inner spirit held up as, like, this is everything we believe in. In half the time they didn't even, they didn't even read the book. They just kind of parroted the points and they acted according to how their internal instinct made them act. And that's, that's all, you know, to sort of answer your initial question of ideology. That's all ideology is, is, is the means of acting with a certain view within the, within the Zeitgeist. It's whatever bells and whistles, whatever aesthetics, whatever decorations you put onto that rationalization, right? Like the difference between like, oh, I'm a, I'm a, you know, traditionalist, integralist, Catholic, or I'm up, you know, National Socialist with Prussian socialist tendencies or something like that. It does, it doesn't matter. That's all, that's all just a, a flavoring, a putting through your own lens the, the, the, the nature of acting within the current Zeitgeist. I believe that the current Zeitgeist is actually shifting and shifting very, very quickly as, as Yocky predicted it would. As, as, you know, as recently it started, the shift started in 2016. Trump is a. Trump is a lot more important of an individual than people make give him credit for. And this is despite him. This is not because of him and, but the, but the era of Trump, the epic of Trump is just a transition from the Zeitgeist of the Nuremberg world order into, into the. What Yaqui calls the resurgence of authority. And, and that I believe will be the ideology of the next stage is. Is what Spengler calls Caesarism. The coming of these big strong men and this reorganization of politics along the lines of the politics of blood as opposed to the politics of money.
- [54:11]
A
The paragraph that has the line ideology itself means the rationalizing of the world of action ends where he's drawing a distinction between an ideal and an idea. And what he says here is the time has passed away in which men would die for an abstract program of, quote, unquote, improving the world. Men will always be willing to die, however, in order to be themselves. This is a distinction between an ideal and an idea.
- [54:46]
B
This is, this is, this is exactly what I'm. What I'm trying to get at here as well, is that men will die in order to manifest what the Zeitgeist demands. What, what they're. You know, people always say we're not blank states, we're of our circumstances. Well, you know, your circumstances is your biology, is your soul, is. Is your means of manifesting right. In order to be yourself, you need to live out the destiny put forth to you by the time, by the era, by the place, by the blood that you have all of these combined and by the ideas that you feel compelled to act with. Right. And this is, this is explicitly limited to that higher type of man, that man of race that I outlined. This is, this is. This is only something that. That higher men have to worry about. Lower men just don't think. Lower men just kind of are pushed like, like, like matter, like, like animals, like anything else. That's not to. That's not to. That's not to, like, look down upon them. That's just the role that they fulfill. But higher men, which Yaqui says is no more than, I think, 300,000 of the entire world population very, very, very rarely changing. It might have even been half of that. I think it was 150,000. This is, this is what they will die for, is to be. Is to be themselves is to. Is to fulfill the zeitgeist is to. Is to act how they are supposed to act, given the set of specific circumstances they find themselves in. And I think the reason to die, I think the reason to. To. To. To go out and fight and risk and live and become yourself will become more and more and more apparent as the years get on. And, and as you see around yourself in the world, as things start to get worse and you know, the hard times come on again.
- [56:48]
A
I want to go on to the section on Freud because this is important stuff.
- [56:55]
D
I'm just gonna.
- [56:56]
A
There's a section here I want to read, but there's a one off sentence here. That is great. He says Freudianism is the black mass of Western science. It's just a quick little aside, but there's one thing he says. Here he goes. Darwinism was the popular outlook that the meaning of the life of the world was that everything else was trying to become man, animal, and man was trying to become Darwinian. Marxism means the meaning of all human life is that the lowest must become the highest. Freudianism, the meaning of human life is sexuality, actual, optative, conative and otherwise. All three are nihilistic culture. Man is the spiritual enemy. He must be eliminated by animalizing him, biologizing him and making him economic, sexualizing him and diabolizing him. That was like when I was reading it, that stopped me in my tracks as much as the first time I ever read Engels talking about revolution. And Engels described what a revolution looked like better than anyone I've ever read. But this just stopped me in my tracks. I took a picture of it and put it anywhere I could.
- [58:16]
B
These are all these things that Yaqui outlines. Freudianism, Marxism. These are all part of what is the acid that eats away at a. At a high culture. The, the sort of, the sort of refutation of it. The. In many ways the challenge that gives it meaning, the challenge that it must overcome. Because specifically, he's speaking in the context of Western civilization. Western civilization, Faustian man is premised entirely upon the fact that all things can be known and understood and all things must be known and understood. What? Marxism? What Freudianism? And forgive me, could you, could you imagine the third, the third form again, slipped my mind.
- [59:08]
A
Yeah. Marxism, Freudianism, Darwinism.
- [59:11]
B
Darwinism, yes. What all three of these things are meant to do is to kind of
- [59:17]
C
almost
- [59:19]
B
change the perception within the Western man's own framework that nothing can really be understood because he is the issue. What Freudianism does, is. Is. Freudianism seeks to make everything, you know, well, everything is just a product of the individual's viewing of the situation, or everything is a product of the individual's repressed sexual desires. Right. It's. It's this armchair psychologizing. It's this reduction, it's this dismissiveness. Right, that's. That's another key word. Reduction, right. Marks Marxism. What it does is it reduces the man to economic unit it makes him. It makes him a. A. A number on a spreadsheet. Not a. Not a. And this is culture man, not a. An actor who has. Who has an internal soul, who has an internal spirit that he must be fulfilling. Right. Darwinism. Darwinism is the refutation of the internal soul and the internal spirit outright. It is the. It is the making of, you know, all processes, all things that humans believe, all things that. That culture man understands about the world. That was all made by exterior forces. They are not his. They were forcibly developed by his internal biology in order to adapt to survival situations. Well, that kind of takes all the meaning out of life, doesn't it? Like that, that kind of. That kind of reduces. Like. If that's the system of ethics you want to go with, well, then you can't justify anything beyond living like a Cretanist coward scraping for all the food he can get. And this is what it's all meant to do is.
- [60:50]
D
It's a.
- [60:51]
B
You know, this is actually actively pushed by another term Yaqui uses called culture distortion. And this is. This is what it's meant to do. It's meant to kind of knock the high culture off of its tracks. It is. It is meant to. It is meant to retard to. To prevent this. This. This high culture from manifesting its destiny, from. From. From actualizing itself in the same way that diseases, whether they be cancer, whether they be cholera or other sorts, is meant to. Is meant to slow life, is meant to prevent it from undergoing its proper process of destiny, of living, of actualizing.
- [61:34]
A
Well, we're a little over an hour now, but there is one more little thing from. There's one more paragraph. It's a small paragraph from this section on Freud and tries to sum up psychology here. And he says the greatest repository of psychology of all is history. It contains no models for us since life is never recurring, once happening. But it shows by example how we can fulfill our potentialities by being true to ourselves and by never compromising with that which is utterly alien. And God, if we're not dealing with that right now, where it seems like everything that is shoved in our face is against nature and, and is 100 years ago, people would have been rebelling in ways that aren't happening right now.
- [62:31]
B
Absolutely. This is. This is completely correct. It's. It's hard to put into words because. Because it's just. It's. It's so widespread. It's. It's so. I. I'm. I'm. I don't even know how to. How to even begin to start outlining the nature of the forces stacked against us of, of. Of that which is meant to, to. Without using all of this sort of yakiite terminology, without trying to, to.
- [63:04]
A
To.
- [63:05]
B
To use a bunch of these, these strange technical words that many of the viewers may be unfamiliar with, what it, what it really is, is.
- [63:13]
C
Is
- [63:15]
B
preventing us from being who we are, preventing us from living how we know we are supposed to live. And that is not compromising that which makes us ourselves.
- [63:33]
D
Right?
- [63:34]
B
It doesn't. This is beyond ideology. This is beyond, you know, whatever particular flavor of right wing politics or, or whatever politics you have. You know, honestly, I've said this many times, but like now, if you call yourself right wing, that's just a, that's just a means of calling yourself sane. That's, that's what it's come to me is that you're a person who is, who is in touch with who they are and what is conducive and what living is supposed to be. That is, that is. That is the best way to describe what being a man self actualized is.
- [64:10]
A
Yeah, I couldn't say it any better. All right, so we did a. You went over the man, his history, and we just did like a real quick overview of part one, which is a 20th century historical outlook. If you'd like, we can come back and we can keep doing overviews of the, the next four sections. Oh, of course.
- [64:33]
B
Okay, I'm happy to come on whenever you'll have me.
- [64:35]
A
Cool. All right, well then plug again, plug again and tell everybody about Substack and whatever else.
- [64:41]
B
Yes, you can find my, my work on Paul Fahrenheit. That's H e I d t paulfahrenheit.substack.com you can find me on Twitter at cavking Paul. You can also find my work on some of my earlier work where I actually go into depth on them. I have one ARC article called the Yaquiite Conception of Race in which I go into depth as to what Yaqui's view on, on, you know, race, both biological and metaphysical is. And that's generally the places you can find me. You can find me as a serial guest on, on my mentor Thomas's Mind Phaser podcast. I'm there, I think pretty much every episode. You can find me on streams done by. I was actually, I just did a four hour stream, my good friend Closington a week ago and you can, you can find me every. Also I have a paid podcast on my sub stack called New world signals. It's $5 a month in which I go into deep aspects of Americana with my various guests.
- [65:46]
D
So that's.
- [65:46]
B
That's generally all the places you can find me.
- [65:49]
A
I appreciate it. All right, till the next time. Thank you. I want to welcome everyone back to the Picanone Show. I am here again with Paul Fahrenheit. How are you doing, Paul?
- [66:02]
B
I'm doing excellent, Pete. Thanks for having me back.
- [66:05]
A
Not a problem. Not a problem. I think people wanted this to continue. And you, you were doing some traveling. That's awesome. So was I. And basically my idea for this was, well, the last time you went over who the man Francis Parkeyake was. And then I started picking out parts from little sections from part one to comment on. But there is a section in, I believe this is part two, called Political Organisms and War. And this is a particularly important part to me because when you start to understand that the arguments against war, the moral arguments, the morality arguments against war are basically very new, but they are used as a weapon by those in charge and by certain groups that then you realize, okay, well, what exactly was the purpose of war historically? And how did we get to this, to where war is about morality and right and wrong and each evil and all the words that we're hearing. You can just look at the things that are being thrown at somebody like Putin right now because, you know, Putin just invaded Ukraine because he's a madman.
- [67:31]
B
Well, yes. And where Yaqui is coming from and where this general line of thinking comes from in terms of classifying the moral. Moral arguments against war as a weapon of war themselves. Right. You can kind of trace this back to a sort of Spengler quote. And the Spengler quote, I believe, is, peace is a desire, war is a fact. And history has never paid attention to human needs or desires. And anyone who wants to, like, seriously, like, even glance at history must sort of come into it with the mindset that war is the general state of it for most of it, like peace. Peace is kind of a breather from contiguous war. Right. But not war in the sense that, you know, most people understand it. Not war in the sense of, like, the anomaly of the 20th century or even the anomaly of the 18th and 19th centuries. This sort of, you know, industrialized meat grinder type conflicts that are really a new innovation. Really going back to finding that. Finding their origins. And I think the 30 Years War is where they can. They can find their origins in this sort of mass mobilization in, like, impressment officers coming to villages and rounding up all of the military aged Men and impressing them into regiments and basically throwing them to get slaughtered by cannonballs. This is all, you know, relatively new and it's not what war has been for the, for the majority of human history. And, and generally in the basic state of, of human existence, war is generally the conflict between small sort of bands. I can even give you a number, usually around 30 in number, going all the way back to the, for those of you into Indo Aryan studies, the Aryan Koryos that would, that would expand their tribes from around the Caucasus eastward into the steppes in India and westward into, into Europe. Right. This is, this is generally how war is, is fought, is between, you know, as Bronze Age pervert would call menerbunds, small groups of tight knit young men, usually around ages 18 to 25, going out and essentially just existing like a band of mercenaries would or a band of raiders or a band of bandits and all that. And it's even reasserting itself in the 21st century. It started reasserting itself in the latter half of the 20th century with the special Forces groups, particularly the Green Berets and the Navy Seals concept, where you have these sort of small tight knit bands, especially with the Green Berets just kind of sent into theaters to do things, to make alliances, to bribe, to do anything essentially to achieve political goals. And so that is what the fundamental basis of non industrial warfare is. And I know this is kind of a little bit of a departure to what we're going to talk about in the next couple of minutes, but that's just a foundation I wanted to give to the audience. So everyone kind of has a picture in their mind of the two kinds of warfare we were talking about.
- [71:02]
A
And one of the reasons I wanted to bring it up and specifically do this one is because a lot of the audience is or has come out of libertarianism. And one of the hallmarks of libertarianism is being anti war. And a lot of the arguments against war are made from a moral standpoint. But if you understand how certain groups use moral judgments to do some of the worse things in history, things that were done in Germany post World War II. And I mean just the Treaty of Versailles, the whole Treaty of Versailles is just a punishment because the fourth country into the war was so bad. This is something that people have to understand that when you're using moral arguments in politics and you're using them specifically for war, you're basically playing into who you would consider to be the enemy's hands.
- [72:09]
B
That's completely correct. And this sort of weaponized Moralism is actually a product of the zeitgeist of the late 19th, early 20th century into the mid 20th century. This, this zeitgeist of small space petty nationalism, which Yaqui talks about in other sections. This sort of result, not, not natural to the European spirit. I think, I think it was a outside force imposed upon it by culture distortion. Because if you look in earlier wars, like you look at the Hundred Years War and the Frenchmen and the English nobles, whenever one would capture the other, they were treated very well with chivalry, they were welcomed around campfires. And it was, it was, it was basically a understanding that, that these are not existential enemies. These are. I think the Greeks also had a way of differentiating. There are two Greek words that escape my mind, but one referred to a sort of, to a. Just a rival, like a fellow city state. You know, we're fighting them and we're killing them, but they're, they're fellow Greeks, so we're not like pulling out all the cards. And then there was another term to refer to existential enemies like, like the Persian Empire. Like, you know, these people are not, you know, are not entitled to the rights we would give to fellow, to fellow Greeks and need to be eradicated, else they will do the same to us. Right. And so in the late 19th and early 20th century, right, this, this sort of, this differentiation between the two kinds of enemies, between basic sort of rivals, like oh, well, it's not like if France takes over England, they're going to eradicate all of the Englishmen or vice versa. Right. That's just, that's just kind of understood. That is subverted and changed to oh, the French need to eradicate all of the Englishmen or all of the Germans or whatever in order to secure our own exist existence or whatever like that. And that's a very non Western, a very culture distortion way of thinking.
- [74:21]
A
Yep. And maybe one of these episodes we'll get into culture distortion because that's an amazing part of the book that you're not going to find that in a lot of places.
- [74:34]
B
No, not at all.
- [74:35]
A
All right, so for people who want to read along, go to your
- [74:41]
D
table
- [74:41]
A
of contents and look in part two. And this section is called Political Organisms and War. And I'm going to start reading and much like my readings in the past that people have liked, Paul can just interrupt at any time he wants to comment and you know that I'll do the same. I'll just stop. So I'm going to start reading Political Organisms and War. A Political unit has a juice belly. The. I'm terrible at pronouncing Latin, and he uses a lot of Latin. So everybody who's yelling at me right now, please, please back off. A political unit has a juice belli. The organic right to make war on the enemy. It has determined not moral right here. This organic right is a thing independent of morality, even though also the strictest scholastic philosophers gave to political units the purely moral right to wage war. But it is in a purely political way that the word is used here. The right to make war is a part of the habitus of the organism. The existence of a political unit, the determination of an enemy, the making of war, the maintenance of the inner peace, the declaration of the inner enemy, the power of life and death over the life of all subjects. These are merely different facets of politico organic existence. They cannot be separated. They are an indivisible whole. Insofar as they can be defined at all. They can also be so in terms of each other. In the exercise of its power to make war, a state disposes of the lives of its own subject and of those of the enemy. The bloodshed is not a life requirement of a state, but occurs merely as a part of the process of acquiring power. The state directly seeking power is not the one that brings about bloodshed and war. No politician whatever would make war against another unit if he thought it would submit to incorporation without a fight. Thus, war is always the result of resistance and not of political dynamism. War is not normative. It is existential. Only in the entire panorama of the history of the high cultures. I doubt that there has been a case where the ruling stratum of political unit ever decided that first of all it wanted war and then cast about for somebody upon whom to make war. It would not be political.
- [77:18]
B
What's important about those first two paragraphs here is Yaqui is drawing upon two seminal thinkers of the Western political traditional. In the first instance, in the first paragraph, Yaqui essentially describes the concept of sovereignty as laid down by Carl Schmidt. Sovereignty is agency, right? Agency unrestrained. A political unit is a sovereign unit, a unit capable of having the power of life and death over everyone within itself. That is a political unit, right? That does not mean it one day wakes up and decides to kill everyone in itself. Because, as he points out in the second paragraph, that would not be political. It would be. It would be against the entire purpose of being for that political organism, right? Which is. Which is more important than any sort of moral argument that could be made like how terrible it would be to kill all those people. Well, no, like if that political unit kills all the people under it, exercises that power, then it essentially ceases to exist. It commits suicide, right? And that's, you know, inherently and antithetical to the, to the whole point of that political existence. In the second paragraph, Jaqui points out another great thinker of Western tradition, which is Carl von Clausewitz, the foundation of all modern military theory, right? And particularly the quote, the aphorism of Clausewitz. War is simply politics by other means. Politics as defined by the previously mentioned Carl Schmitt is simply the struggle between the friend and the enemy. That is the term, that is the means. Why Yaqui defines politics is friend versus enemy. Politics cannot be defined in any other way. It is simply what your friends want, what your enemies want. How those two things, conflict is politics, right? And so politics between friend and enemy is almost, it does, does not have to be war as a matter of fact, war in the sense, in the sense of a sort of existential war or even a, even a more kinetic war, right, is generally the last, the last option, right? Because it takes. War is one of the most resource, I think it is the most resource consuming phenomenon that can be done by societies. You know, you need men, you need equipment to equip those men, you need rations to feed those men, you need mental power to direct those men, to train them, to discipline them, to fight on the battlefield. You need, you know, you need civilians supporting this behind them. You need all of these things, all of these things going into war, right? Make the objective of a war, make the, the, the mission what you are hoping to achieve. Let's say, for example, you're trying to take a border province like one political unit, say the Kingdom of France is trying to take a border province from the Kingdom of the Netherlands, right? Well, if it costs France more to equip the armies, to train the armies, to send them up to take that province and to, to defeat the resistance put up to them by the Netherlands, then that, that war is not useful in the first place like that. What them gaining that province, whether it be for resource reasons, for national prestige reasons for anything like that would, would be counterintuitive. It wouldn't be beneficial to them, right? And this is something that, that you can sort of recognize when you achieve political wisdom, which is another concept Yaqui speaks about in other parts of the of imperium, right? So this is, this is, this is essentially what Yaqui is defining sovereign political units with agency working out their conflicting Interests through various means of which war is always the last, but never the never the impossible option, but it's never wanted. For the reasons I have outlined, I will continue.
- [81:26]
A
Nor is the mere power over life and death generally jus vitae ak nessus the hallmark of a political organism. Many states in history recognize this power to be in family units. Old Rome gave it to the paterfamilias. Some states have allowed the master power over the life of the slave. Most states have permitted the victim of an imputation of dishonor to contest for the life of his vilifier. Many states have recognized the right of blood revenge among clans, although this reaches the very frontier in this matter and is seldom found and then only in peace. It is thus quite conclusive that politics as such seeks no monopoly of taking life. Politics at its highest potential. War takes life only because resistance requires it. Politics is activity in relation to power. I actually used that quote on the last episode. It was politics is activity in relation to power. And there is only one way organic instinct behaves towards power. It seeks. More metaphysically, this is the relation between the soul of a man and the soul of the high culture, on the one hand, and the habitus of the beast of prey, on the other hand. Although it permits subjects in certain cases which it determines in accordance with the law of sovereignty to take life, the state never permits subjects to make war. If a group of subjects assume this power, a new state has arisen. If the right of blood revenge turns into clan warfare, the state must intervene for its existence is involved. That is why, in all states engaged in serious politics, the right of blood revenge is abrogated. The right to make war in the process to dispose of life is purely political. No church could possibly ask its members to die for the church. This is quite different from insisting that martyrdom is preferable to apostasy unless it is becoming a political unit. In critical times, many churches, such as Abu Berk, Abubak's Abu Berk, such as Abu Becker's Islam. How do you pronounce it? It's Becker, right?
- [83:53]
B
I. I think so. I think we call him Abu Bakr now. But it was, you know, there's.
- [83:57]
D
There's.
- [83:58]
B
There's been spellings different. I'm not an Islam expert, though.
- [84:01]
A
Okay. In critical times, many churches, such as Abu Bakr's Islam, have become states. But then they are no longer churches, and they are ruled by the political way of thinking and its basic inner, organic demand for more power, and no longer by the religious imperative of salvation
- [84:18]
B
and Conversion, that's actually something. That's something that's very important, a very important distinction to make, right? A church. A church is a way of being. It is not something that calls itself a church, right? A church is primarily dedicated, as I think I talked about last time. A church is primarily dedicated to the high culture's means of realizing the metaphysic, right? A church is primarily concerned with spiritual matters, right? It has hierarchy, it has structure, right? But it is. It is primarily focused around that. Once that hierarchy and structure of that church, the priests, the bishops, the cardinals, all of that other, you know, or equivalent, right, Turn to political matters, that is matters of interests, of friends and enemies, right? Once a church turns into that, it is no longer a church, even though it may call itself a church. It may still do the rituals. It may still have its people in the hierarchy calling them priests. It is a political unit at that point, right? This is actually. This is actually a concept that Dostoyevsky talks about in the Brothers Karamazov, in which. I think it's. There's a conversation between all the characters early on in the book, and I think either it's. It's Yvonne, I think, who makes the point in the, in the conversation that if the church rules the world, if you make the world ruled over by the church, then it is no longer the church, it is the state, right? And that. That is the. That is the key concept behind a. Behind this point that Yaqui is making, right? And Yaki Yaki very much read and loved Dostoyevsky, and he references him several times in this book. This is a. This is, this is why people on this side of things, or people who disparage the separation of church and state. Church and state are two metaphysically separate concepts. You cannot have one and the other simultaneously, Right? You can only have one, be one or the other, right? And. And this, this will find a way to. To manifest itself. And this is a point that Yaqui makes earlier in, like, I think two paragraphs ago, when he talks about the disputes between, um, blood and clans. Just a small little note on that. War is the hallmark of sovereignty. War is the. The sort of. Even down to the. The symbol of sovereignty in parliament in the United Kingdom is a mace that sits in the center of the House of Commons, right? And that mace is a symbol of sovereignty, of the power of the crown. The reason that it is that mace, it is a weapon is because war, to quote Clausewitz again, is simply a duel. It is a duel between, at its simplest concept, it is a Duel between two opposing parties, between a friend and an enemy, and it is a duel, is meant for one party to impose his will on the other party by physical force. And this doesn't mean that every time someone picks up a rock or swings a fist at someone else, that that is a war, but that is metaphysically the basis it can get. And so if you have, let's say two clans, if you have two families that, you know, get into a blood feud for one reason or another, right? And it gets to the point where they're openly fighting each other at the expense of the state, the state must intervene to prevent that. Otherwise those two families have become two states in and of themselves. Right? So this is all sort of what I'm. This is all sort of leading to the point that I'm. That that sovereignty is all vested within warfare and the right to warfare and the right to combat and conflict.
- [88:13]
C
Right.
- [88:16]
A
I'm going to go on. It would be cruel and insane to ask men to die in order that the remainder would have an unimpaired or higher standard of economic life. When war is motivated by an economic idea, the economics vanishes into the war political situation. That is, the test of success is the political one. The method of waging it is not reviewed as to its cost. The means used always are military, political. The leadership is always political and would be so even if exclusively economists were used as the war leaders. Their thinking would indeed be curious, but it would not be economic. Politics and economics are two different directions of human thinking and are hostile to one another. For this reason, no true politician and no true warrior would ever, with full consciousness carry on or fight a war for an exclusively economic motive, no matter what grand opportunities it offered for personal distinction. Economically motivated wars like the American war of secession, the English Opium War, the Boer War, were of necessity presented to the participants under an untruthful propaganda.
- [89:36]
B
This is, this is, forgive me, this is just a reinforcement of my earlier point. He, he brings up economics too, right? Politics is a metaphysically separate concept from everything from, from economics, from theology, from art, from all this other stuff, right? As, as Yaqui said in this paragraph, right? Even if you had, like all of the generals or all of the, Even if you abolish the title general and you put economists in charge of all of that army, those economists would be fulfilling the metaphysical role of political leadership, right? Even if they, they weren't thinking necessarily politically, they are no longer economists, right? That is, that's sort of. That's the same logic applying to a church versus A political organism. Right. If you have all of the priests in charge of an army, they are no longer priests, right? They are something else. And that's just a reinforcement of the earlier point Yaqui made.
- [90:32]
A
It's very logical. And again, arguments that are to be found in very few places. Economics lacks the strength in itself that is pure economics to rouse men to the level of action where they will risk their lives. This is because economics presupposes life and merely seeks ways of securing, nourishing, perpetuating the life. It simply does not make sense to buy life with death. When death becomes a possibility, we are no longer in the sphere of economics. If economics wants a certain war, it can only bring it about by political means. And then also we are no longer in the sphere of economics morality.
- [91:15]
B
I don't want to interrupt you too much, but that's an important. For the libertarians in the audience, this is a very important paragraph for. To be considered, right? Pete, you know as well as I do that one of the primary foundations of libertarian thought is upon economics, whether it be Austrian or otherwise, right? But economics in its purely metaphysical sense is simply, as Yaqui says, the nourishment of life. Or as a Bronze Age pervert says, the matters of the stomach. All that economics is concerned with is, is even, even down to your personal life. You wake up, should I have a cup of coffee today? Where should I eat lunch? Should I even eat lunch? Should I eat breakfast? Should I do all this other stuff? How much sleep should I get? What other. You know, all of this, all of these considerations, these are all economic considerations, right? This is. Economics is merely the distribution of resources in order to propagate life, as long as life can be propagated, given the resources. Resources, right. And this is, this is why a large problem that many libertarians run into is that when they base their foundation of their thinking upon economics and they try to raise economics as a metaphysical thing, number one, they're no longer talking about economics, even if every other word is about von Mises or otherwise. They are trying to make a political and, or metaphysical concept based on these economic foundations which are, or these, these, these words that generally refer to economics. But as I made the point earlier, they're no longer talking about economics. And that's why I think they run into a lot of issues with people who aren't really predisposed to only talk about economics. Is that economics exists, as Yaaki points out in this paragraph, really only just to propagate life. It's not a, It's Not a higher principle, it's not a means of self fulfillment which men would die for. And that's just something I wanted to point out.
- [93:14]
A
I'd like to add that basing economics, like if you were to try to base a society purely around economics and you realize that the economic economics is basically your for sustenance, it's to, it's to survive, then you've not only based, left out anything metaphysical that the society could be based upon, but you're also leaving out cultural, because there is nothing metaphysical or cultural about economics. Unless, I mean, I know that there are some people out there who've tried to do like spirit economics and stuff like that, but it's, it's completely fringe. But yeah, if you are looking to base your society 100% around economics, then it's going to be competing against metaphysics and culture.
- [94:16]
B
And in the realms of metaphysics and culture and politics, it is impossible for economics to win because that's not a realm that it is suited metaphysically to fight in.
- [94:28]
A
Morality has often been put forward as the motivation of war. And many wars have been waged in the name of morality. This however, does not make sense. This is not according to any western system of morality, for states are not within the purview of morality, which is valid only for individuals. Furthermore, the materialistic morality of the 19th century Denounced war as murder. Therefore, when protagonists of this type of morality and they continue to exist and to do so demand a war, to stop war, it is an obvious fraud. The most any man can do about stopping murder is to refrain from murders himself. But these morality warriors have not done that. A morality war is impossible not only from the moral side, but from the war political side. War is not a norm. One cannot fight against it. War is an existential disjunction, not a system or an institution. There is no rational aim, program for economic, moral, aesthetic or any change, no ever so correct norm that would justify one in killing. To adopt war in politics is in fact to abandon the other things. One can retain non political ideas privately, but if they become public, they vanish into the political. The result is politics dressed in moral clothing. Do you want me to keep going?
- [96:00]
B
No, actually this is something. This is a good thing to comment upon. This is the problem with Imperium, like, like we were talking about before the show. It's like every, every sentence is something I could, I could speak for five minutes about.
- [96:11]
A
You have to underline.
- [96:13]
B
Yeah, exactly. But, but it's very important what I'm. What Yaqui talks about in these Two paragraphs here. The point he makes that morality has been put forward as the motivation of war. Further on, when he says, I'm. Where is it? War is not a norm. One cannot fight against it, right? This is, this is like I'm a. This is like fighting a war against. Well, I'm actually going to say it and everyone's going to be like, oh, well, these are historical things. This is like fighting a war on poverty or fighting a war on, you know, death or fighting a war on getting old or fighting a war on, like people who like to talk to people or something like that. It's like you can't, you can't get rid of this. Like. Like this is all just fundamental aspects as to how the world works, as to how it exists, as to how it is structured fundamentally, right? You can't eliminate scarcity, you can't eliminate conflict and strife. You cannot eliminate, you know, faith. You can't eliminate all of these other things because they are inbuilt. It's like, it's like trying to improve a. I'm not a. Forgive me for all of you coders in the audience, I do not know anything about computers. It's like trying to improve a operating system by deleting its core code, right? You can't do it because, number one, you can't do that within its own operating system without breaking everything, right? And number two, it wouldn't benefit anyone to do it, right? So this is why, you know, the Nuremberg world order is really just a. An inversion, an inversion of all of reality and why all of these, you know, LBJ's were on poverty, you know, the war on. Even the war on drugs, right? Even the war on Vice. Like, vice is something that fundamentally exists and you can't eliminate it, right? It's, it's, it's, it's all. It all sources back to this sort of, you know, what some call utopian, what I call the Luciferian hype, right? That is, that is what morality, as people say it has been defined today is all based around, is around this bringing about of a perfect world. Make even, even the phrase making the world a better place, right? That sounds really innocuous on the surface of it, but what that inherently contains within it is the idea that the world is not fine the way it is not fine the way God has created it. And forgive me for bringing religious arguments into this, but, you know, the world as it has been structured, with all of these fundamental core concepts behind it, cannot be improved because that is how it was Created, right? The idea that one can improve it, that one can make it better, can make it run better, is inherently Luciferian, Is inherently, you know, and this is the problem with the Faustian man, right? This is one of his vices, is that he believes he can improve the world.
- [99:29]
C
World.
- [99:30]
B
And to try to kind of bring it back to this.
- [99:34]
C
This is.
- [99:34]
B
This is in this particular context that Yaqui is speaking about. This is what morality has been used as the weapon to do to eliminate all political wisdom, all metaphysical wisdom, which at its very basis is to understand that the world is an immutable, unchangeable, unchanging place. Until I'm.
- [99:58]
A
Until God decrees such, I'm going to keep going. Another fact emerges about politics mixed with morality. There are first two possible mixtures, that of the Cromwell Torquemada type, on the one hand, in which also the politician believes that he is actualizing morality by his policies, and the Lincoln Roosevelt type, in which the morality is purely a deception. In the first case, in proportion as the politician thinks morally, his politics is faulty. Thus, Cromwell refused in 1653 a Spanish alliance which would have been highly advantageous to England because he abhorred the religion of Spain. His conduct was, of course, nonetheless politics, for he made with France the same alliance he refused with Spain and received considerably less from it than Spain had offered. In the second case, where it is not taken seriously, as in the case of Roosevelt, it is not morality at all and is repulsive to honor. Thus, morality in politics makes bad politics if taken seriously, and if used cynically, it dishonors him who uses it. The question may be asked why moral vocabulary is imported into politics in this age of absolute politics. The answer is that it is done quite deliberately and politically. It is elementary that politics does not include with the idea enemy any subsidiary content of malice or hatred. Hatred is private. It occurs between antipathetical persons out of their own private hostility. Even though this terminology is different from that of Hegel, the idea is identical. He spoke of the hatred of the public enemy as being undifferentiated and totally free from personality. This is no longer hatred. In the primary meaning of that word. War is between states. And when the enemy state is overcome, what overcome means is a reflex of the age, and in an age of absolute politics means total incorporation of the other state. There can be no more war. Enmity ceases. And if there ever was any animosity of any kind, it must cease now. Since it was directed, if it was political against the enemy state, that enemy state is gone. But if the Population. But if the population of a state has been given exclusively propaganda to the effect that the war was not political but for moral, humanitarian, legal, scientific and other reasons, this population will regard the end of the war as the beginning of unlimited opportunities of oppressing the population of the former enemy state. Moral propaganda thus stands forth in its nakedness in the 20th century. It is a means of fighting a war after the war, a war not this time against a state with the weapons in its hands, but against the survivors of the. The defeat herein is the true significance of a phenomenon that mystified many persons at that time. I refer to the concentration camp propaganda against Europe which was developed to its full height after the Second World War. This propaganda was solely for the purpose of a war after the war, thus not a true war, since there was no opposing unit, but an attempt to rouse extra European populations and extra European armies of occupation to ever renewed ferocity and personal hatred against a defenseless European population.
- [103:42]
B
All right, so those are three very large paragraphs and it's. I'm going to try to answer them with as much brevity as I can in the first paragraph, in which Yaqui differentiates between the absolute moralist infused politics and the morality, as I guess front politics typified by Cromwell in the former case and Lincoln and Roosevelt in the latter case. In the former case, this is the kind of idea of mixing, I guess, how could you say this? Like, like there's a reason you don't talk about religion at work, not because it's for the benefit of other people, but because it really just has no place there, right? Like maybe, maybe when you're, when you're off hours, it has a place there. But that's because you're all there cooperating towards a common end that is kind of separate from, from, you know, church, state politics, all this other stuff, right? What, what Cromwell does and what. I would also put forth the, the prohibitionist movement, the temperance movement, all of these great, these great moralizing efforts brought about by, you know, Anglos first and foremost, though they're not uniquely, they're not uniquely sinful. In that case, it kills political wisdom. You know, he brings about the, the example of Cromwell refusing an alliance to Spain at the height of its power and then taking an alliance with France even though Spain and France had similar religions, similar, you know, all this other stuff. But Spain was materially and politically better suited than France was to England's interests. Right? And so basically what infusing morality into politics does is it makes you into a Fucking idiot. It makes you into someone incapable of recognizing what is politically expedient to the ends of your friends and what is what is most detrimental to the ends of your enemies, right? On the other hand, right, with the. With the Lincoln Roosevelt type of allowing morality to be a front for cynicism, right? This is the opposite problem arises is
- [106:02]
C
which
- [106:05]
B
you have no. You have no real. You have no real principles for fighting. You're simply doing it entirely for robbing and for personal gain and for. For means, not political, right? And. And it. And it. What it does is it drags down the concept of a higher being, right? That. That Yaqui talks about of culture man. Culture man does political ends in order to realize himself. He does all of his ends in order to realize himself. His higher ambition, his higher. His higher way of being, right? With the Faustian man, it is achieving infinite space, right? It is this thing that is above material desires or other such things in which all of your efforts are directed towards, right? When you have pure cynicism in politics, not Machiavellianism because Machiavellianism is actually the perfect medium, right? But pure cynicism in politics, that is when you go back to being a sort of man as animal man is overly concerned with his stomach, right? There is no higher purpose. There is no higher being. It is just. It is just acting to enrich yourself for no end. The second paragraph in which he talks about the differences of concepts of hatred. Hatred is a personal thing. You know, you can't hate someone or something you do not know, right? You can feel like you are threatened by it. You can see it as a threat. But that is different from hate. Hate is when someone has done something or not done something to arouse personal animosity within someone, right? That is. That is what the original definition of hatred was. It was between two individuals or two groups of individuals who know. Know each other personally. It's like the one person you know better than your friend is your rival.
- [108:02]
A
Is.
- [108:02]
B
Is.
- [108:02]
C
Is.
- [108:03]
B
Is someone who. Is someone who has done you wrong. You know, there's a. I heard this on Stain Haynes Stream with. With Prudentialist recently about how there was this professional wrestler who said someone who likes you will. Will come to your show to shake your hand and someone who hates you will drive three counties over to scream at you from the best seat in the House, right? So that's. That's what Yockey is talking about when he talks about hatred, right? Hatred is in many ways more. More intimate.
- [108:30]
C
More.
- [108:31]
B
One of the closest ways you can be to someone than.
- [108:35]
A
Than.
- [108:36]
B
Than. Than friendship.
- [108:37]
A
Right.
- [108:38]
B
And that's not what. That's not what happened in the. In the age of absolute politics in the 20th century. Right. Hatred was distorted, was. Was sort of turned into a. Into a resentment, a sort of envy. Right. Which he starts getting into in the third paragraph in which extra European forces, which can be defined as the colored world that Spengler talks about in the hour of decision. Basically any part of planet Earth that is not the European high culture, that is not the west, sort of arousing within them their natural resentment, their natural envy, their natural desire to tear down and. And. And essentially holding that up as this moral good, disguising it in. In. In. In moral terms to bring down these evil people doing evil things. And Thomas talks about. I think Thomas talked about this in your show when he. The idea of unconditional surrender as absolute insanity to the Third Reich. Unconditional surrender is the. Is the epitome of this.
- [109:47]
C
It is.
- [109:49]
B
It doesn't matter what you do or what you say. We're going to keep attacking you and attacking you and attacking you until we get tired. Right. That is not politics. That is.
- [109:58]
C
That is.
- [110:01]
B
That's something else.
- [110:03]
A
I had a thought, but I need to flesh that out before. I don't want to flesh it out while I'm talking. I'll just be stuttering more than I normally do. I'm going to continue. Thus, a moral war to end war develops in actuality into an endless war. A war for humanitarian purposes develops into a war to exterminate by starvation the population of the former state. A war against concentration camps results in bigger and more numerous concentration camps. This must be so in an age of absolute politics. For obviously moral reasons for a war. We are not necessary. We are not necessary in such an age. No, let me read that again. I apologize. This must be so in an age of absolute politics. For obviously moral reasons for a war are not necessary in such an age. Propaganda cannot bring more men onto the battlefield than can the spirit of the age. Therefore, he who is using the vocabulary of morality wishes to import into the struggle a viciousness that the spirit of politics alone cannot develop. Proudhune observed. Whoever says humanity wishes to deceive only politics shows the real meaning of war. Economics, aesthetics, law and the other forms of thought cannot supply its meaning. For war is politics at its highest intensity. The political meaning of a war is that it is waged against a real enemy. To be justified politically, the war must be an affirmation of the political organism or for the saving of the organism. To expend human life in any other war is distortion of the destiny of the state and treacherous dishonorable killing of the soldiers and civilians who die in it. The decision as to who is the enemy must be made by statesmen who embody the national idea. And and if it is not, the result is political distortion. In the language of politics, a just war is only the one waged against a real enemy. It is immature thinking to suggest that military men should decide in such matters. It is possible for a politician to be also a soldier. But a soldier does not become ipso facto a politician. In Rome, all statesmen, generally speaking, were ex commanders, but they had gone into the field as part of their political careers. Caesar embarked late in life upon the military career. But how many professional soldiers could have gone into politics with corresponding attainment? In matters of politics, soldiers are circumstanced the same as the populace in general.
- [112:54]
B
So these three paragraphs are a conclusion to this section and a further recapitulation, a reinforcement to the main point that Yaqui writes this entire book to essentially elaborate upon which is the fulfillment of the national idea or the inner concept, right? Or of self actualization, self fulfillment, self realizing, right? To realize the mission within oneself, within the idea of a high culture, of a civilization, of a nation, right? So a war to end all war develops into an endless war. Because it is fundamental for political wisdom in order to understand that war is a aspect of reality, right? War is. Is something to be accepted. And you can only have peace when you accept that fact, right? Otherwise you are in denial about the endless war that has been fought since 1945. And, and another key point that Yaqui says in that paragraph, Propaganda cannot bring more men onto the battlefield than can the spirit of the age. Propaganda can't convince someone to go to war. You can't put up a I need Uncle Sam needs you poster or something like that and convince someone who wasn't already considering the possibility or didn't already feel like it was something they needed to do, right? This is why the. The concept of the draft is. Is abhorrent. Because what it does is it essentially just forces people up into, in, or I guess maybe, maybe Yaaki would argue the draft is another manifestation of the spirit of the age. But just on its head, the concept of the draft is. Is disgusting. Because what it does is it brings up people who aren't meant to participate in a military struggle and then forces them to participate in that military struggle, which leads to even further strife. But like, like If a man feels, you know, if a man of higher purpose, intellectual or non intellectual, right. If a man who understands himself and understands what he needs to do, feels like he needs to go fight, he will fight it. Is it. That's just, that's just part of what he wants to do, of what he needs to do. Right? No poster, no, no clip, nothing like that can, can force him to do that. Right? And third in that paragraph, Proudhon, who is a, I think he was a
- [115:40]
A
Marxist thinker, says whoever says Narco commun. It was like an anarcho communist, I think, or a mutualist, I, I can't remember right now.
- [115:50]
B
He was one of, he was one of that late 19th century milieu of weirdos. And he says, whoever says humanity wishes to deceive there, I'm going to use a domestra quote. Joseph Demestra said, I have never met a human. I have met Russians, I have met Frenchmen, I have met Savoyards, I have met Germans, but I have never met a human. Right. The concept of human is an abstract concept. It does not exist, not even in, honestly not even in biological classifications, I think, because in order to, to avoid, to avoid getting your show to too badly hit, let's just say, throws out the concept of subspecies anyway. But that's, that's the whole point is it's like, you know, this, this idea of improving humanity is back to this Luciferian utopian culture concept of world improving, of making the world a better place, of perfecting.
- [116:51]
C
Right?
- [116:52]
B
Which is, which is foolish and impossible because it goes against the fundamental basis of existence and reality.
- [116:58]
A
Right.
- [116:59]
B
These last two paragraphs, you know, only politics shows the real meaning of war. And from there he goes into the relationship between the military and the political aristocrats, which is generally the term used to apply to those whose thinking is political and military. Because military is subservient to the political. It is within the political. But there's a reason clause that said war is politics by another means and not politics is war by another means. Right? Because that would be putting the cart before the horse, right?
- [117:34]
C
War.
- [117:35]
B
War is inherently political. And that's why you have so many generals, not just within the west, but within all of human history. Getting military experience and then going into politics. Right? Or politicians getting military experience and going back into politics. That's because the two fields are inherently related. But soldiers in the purest sense of the term exist really only to prosecute war. They can't just because they are good at, you know, using their weapons, they're good at coordinating with other men does not inherently predispose themselves to understanding the friend, enemy distinction of politics. Right. And this is, this is why it's like Yaki says in the final paragraph that military men, right, should not be put in charge of political matters for the same reason you don't put economists in charge or, or churchmen in charge, because it would be like, it would be like having an engineer run a, run an engineering firm. It's not, it's not a good idea because the engineer thinks purely professionally and not in the wider business sense, if that metaphor makes sense. Right. But you can have a, you can have a head of a business firm who knows who was an engineer at one point and knows, knows the professionalisms of the firm. Right. It's, it's, it's, it's really just a difference in the, in the two modes of thinking. Right. And, and that's the whole point Yaqui is kind of trying to drive towards is that the political are those who are, those who understand the higher mission are those who understand the higher purpose of the Faustian high culture of the west, of Europe in order to realize it using the means of force, of diplomacy, of politics. And that's what sort of the, the last three paragraphs are, are trying to drive towards.
- [119:30]
A
I think it's interesting that some just take it back to libertarians, because that's where I came from. A lot of them will be able to look at modern libertarianism. The Libertarian Party, what the Libertarian Party was before some people recently took it over, was very left wing, very progressive. What I like to say was they were using libertarian means to achieve progressive ends. And yet when it comes to. And it wasn't until I read this book that I realized that the whole idea of arguing for morality and war comes from the left, comes from the far left. It comes from those who want to have these. What he says, thus a moral war to end war develops in actuality into an endless war. So those arguing that. I was listening to Orin McIntyre talking to Glenn Greenwald earlier, and Glenn Greenwald was arguing that war historically in the United States always comes from the right. Well, that's technically, that's not true. And when you really start to take apart how morality is something that everyone thinks is a good thing, and yes, it is in your personal life, it goes back to the non aggression principle. The non aggression principle is for your personal life. It's not for your political life. It has no. People like Sam Francis and James Brennan would laugh at you if you talked about the non aggression Principle. I mean, even people older going back further, Machiavelli would have laughed at you if you would have started bringing in the non aggression principle into politics. That's a joke that you have been deceived by the left and they're in charge and they make the rules and they change them on you all the time. And I think that's why this book, particularly of any book I've ever read, has been able to take what are thoughts that are going in every direction and is able for you to focus. And then you can look and you can see with tunnel vision, with almost absolute vision what the world is and how it used to run and now how it is come. You can see the complete distortion of what the world is at this time. And I know I've said this a lot in the last couple years, but libertarianism does not have an answer for this. It is, it will deceive you. It will, it is deceiving you if you think that you can understand how the world actually works by reading those works. Maybe Hoppe, because Hoppe has read the juvenile and has read a lot of the, what would be considered the neoreactionary kind of base books and writers that you should be reading, but for people talking about anarchy and things like that, you better incorporate the real world into that or else you're just, you're, you're out in left field somewhere and you're just. I don't know what it is. It's just like shooting a Nerf gun into the sky and expecting to kill your enemies and to destroy your enemies, ran over.
- [123:15]
B
To restate that Spengler quote I said at the beginning of this show, peace is a desire, war is a fact, and history has paid no heed to human wants and desires. Right? The idea, the idea that you can separate yourself from conflict, that you can keep yourself away from it, that you can, you can rise above it is not just foolish. It is, it is downright dangerous. Because if, if, you know, if, let's say, you know, a man is walking up to your house with a loaded gun, do you just sit there and you say, I'm not going to fight this? All right, well, if that's what you do, well, then that's, that's not, that's not like taking the high ground. That's surrender is what that is. That is, that is not even putting up a fight. That is not even resisting in any way, shape or form. And then that man walking up to your house with that gun can do exactly what he intended upon Doing without any sort of interference on your behalf. That is, that is the, the largest problem I've had with things like the non aggression principle. Because when war, when war presents itself to you, you must make a choice and that choice is whether to fight it. Because the choice is between fighting it and submitting. Those are, those are your two choices. You cannot make a third choice. You must resist or you must submit.
- [124:51]
A
Right?
- [124:52]
B
You know, even that's it. Those are your two choices. No, no, like you can't be neutral, you can't rise above it. You can't do all this other stuff. You either resist or you submit. Those are, those are the two choices. And this idea, this sort of, this, this, this, this corruption of, of those two choices into like, oh, well, we're going to end you needing to make that choice. You, that comes from, as you said, the far left. That comes from these, these, these progressive means by libertarian ends. But more so than that, I've, I've used the word Luciferian quite a bit on this program and I would like to define what I mean by that. If you look at the story of Lucifer as the, as the greatest angel, the greatest of God's creations, and then the pride that came with that of believing itself to be greater than creation, right? That is, that is what the, the, the Luciferian concept comes from. It goes further, the idea that you can create creation better than creation, right? That you can create a abstract world separate and above the world that from once you came. That is what the far left wants to achieve. That's what, that's what global homo wants to achieve. Global homogenization, that is what culture distortion wants to achieve, right? It's this idea of creating a purely artificial world, a purely abstract world. Not beholden to realities, not beholden to creation, not beholden to God, right? This is, this is deus ex machina is the Latin phrase to describe this God from the machine, essentially trying to reinvent the wheel, to reinvent God, to recreate the world we live in in order to conform to their desires, their strange wants and urges and, and, and worst primal aspects. That's what they're going for and that's what we're fighting against. And that's what I mean when I say Luciferian.
- [127:14]
A
Yeah, it's, it's kind of hard to talk to. People have asked me over the past couple of days, it's like, so I mean like, how do you talk to people that you used to hang out with? And I'm like, actually people would be shocked at the amount of people who really understand the direction, the path that I've taken. They won't say it out loud, they won't say it on Twitter, they won't say it on Facebook, they won't announce it, but they will whisper it in my ear when they see me. And I think that people are starting to understand that a lot of what they've been taught is just infused with naivete. And I don't discount the fact that it could have been on purpose. It just. At this point, when you look at the world, when you look at especially what the world has become since 911 and especially in the last 24 or 25 months, it is very difficult for me personally to deal with people still holding on to this morality of, well, you know, I don't care that these people are evil. I'm not going to resort to something evil to stop, you know. And I mean that argument is. Could be used for self defense. It's like, well, I mean, somebody breaking into your house with a gun is evil. Well, I mean, the act of repelling them. I've heard people make the arguments that it's evil. Not a lot of people, but there are pacifists out there and there are people who are your enemy who are telling you that and just being able to focus and understand something. That another part in Imperium that really shook me when I read it was Yaqui talking about how power is a constant. That power doesn't disappear, it's just there. It's just a matter of who has it. You're not going to be able to destroy that power ever.
- [129:29]
C
Ever.
- [129:29]
A
It is a. It's like air. Air could be destroyed depending on, you know, the earth going off its axis, whatever, but it's, it's just there and to. There are a lot of people out there and I'm one who used to make the argument that if we just get rid of that power, that power is immoral. If we just get rid of that power and no one can wield that power, then we can live free. And it's so weird to get to a place where you're just like, how delusional was I? How deluded in my thinking was I? And those arguments are just so awful intellectually. And you know, I consider myself to be an intelligent person. And it's like, it's just, it's really, really odd. It's really odd to. To get to this place where I can't see the world any differently now. And the only really things that change for me are reading more and just basically fine tuning at this point. Really the only thing now is solutions on how do you get out of this? I have some, but I have a couple, but they're not perfect. And it seems like everybody who wants a solution wants it to be perfect because they don't want to try. They don't want to. Failure is. I don't know, Failure is anathema to people. I've failed a thousand times at a thousand things and it's helped me. But yeah, I'm going on a rant again, too. It's very frustrating, especially when I read things like this that basically spell everything out so clearly as to the reality of the world we live in. And then to continually have answers thrown at me or explanations for why things are happening that I used to give but are so far out of the realm of reality at this point. It's frustrating and it's embarrassing. It's embarrassing to know that I used to make some of the most insane arguments. And yeah, that's a good thing. Good thing about having a Facebook account that is still active from years ago is all these memories come up every day and you can look back and go, what the hell was wrong with me at this point? Where was I? And was I doing any damage by putting this information out there? It's an odd point right now. We're at an odd point in history that I think a lot of people think has happened before. Oh, this history just repeats itself over and over again. I think this point's pretty different and pretty unique.
- [132:35]
B
There was a lot there and I agree with all of it. I have a very similar story myself of sort of. I was never libertarian in the sense that some other peoples were, but I was, you know, one who was engaging with liberal ideas and to a certain extent saw himself as a liberal at one point. And yeah, I mean, this idea of how do we fix this, how do we solve it, that is. I think that's the next big question. I think we're, as I said last time, there's an epical shift happening. And I think as a part of this epochal shift, there will be no more going into old texts of reviving thinkers. All of that will be a thing of this epic we're still in, but is very quickly ending. Right. I think, I think in many ways, honestly, I think Yaqui has been the final answer all along and others related to him. He's been the last thinker. People, people are going to need to consume, people are going to need to engage with in order to get the proper tools and go into the next epic, into the next zeitgeist, which will entirely revolve around action, around solutions, around realizing these ideas that we've been having, that we've been debating, that we've been theorizing that we've been improving.
- [134:04]
C
Right.
- [134:05]
B
And you know, this is, this is partially what my whole grand trip across the United States was supposed to start realizing was interacting with people in the real world, speaking with them in the real world, sharing ideas, proposing solutions, figuring ways that we can, that we can work within this system to accomplish, accomplish keeping the Eye of Sauron off of us while building our own strength. Right. That's been what all of this is geared towards. And you know, I mean, that's. That's what the future is going to have. That's what the future is going to be, is going to just be gentlemen discussing with each other ways that they can go about reversing the damage caused of taking that power that is always there and using it in order to restore. Restore the world as it is supposed to be.
- [135:11]
A
Well, it's going to be quite a ride. It's going to be saying quite a ride actually makes it sound trivial, but it is going to be. It's going to be a hike, it's going to be a haul, and hopefully people can get prepared for it. And the answers, I mean, I have a couple, I've talked about them, but even those, they're not going to be perfect. They may not even work. But people want answers and you try to provide, you try to be able, at least if you're educated on what's happening and you're not delusional about what's happening, the answers that you try to come up with with can be closer than the people who just have no idea what's going on at this point. So. All right, why don't you give your plugs and we'll end the stream.
- [136:10]
B
Yeah. Thank you very much for having me once again. And the audience can find my substack. Paulfahrenheit.substack.com I haven't written a bunch because I was traveling, but I have a whole bunch of articles I'm currently working on finishing to kind of recap and give my. Give the sort of mental vignettes of each of each place I went to. And hopefully I'll. Hopefully I'll have a podcast episode coming later. In addition, you can find me on Twitter avking Paul. You can also find a link to my telegram chat and channel on my Twitter pinned to the Top. I mean, other than that, I don't think there's anything else.
- [136:57]
A
Thank you for this and very soon, let's do this again.
- [137:03]
B
It would be my pleasure and honor.
- [137:05]
A
Thank you, Paul. Take care. Now I want to welcome everyone back to the Picanho Show. Returning to talk more about Francis Parker Yaqui and read him Paul Fahrenheit. How are you doing, Paul?
- [137:19]
B
Doing very well, Pete. Thanks for having me on again.
- [137:22]
A
Of course, of course. So we are going to read the section of Imperium that is called the Articulation of a Culture. Why don't you give an introduction and talk a little bit about this?
- [137:37]
B
Yes. So the Articulation of a Culture is actually my favorite single chapter from Imperium. I've read through Imperium front to back at least three times. I've referenced different sections more times than I can count. And each time I always return to the Articulation of a Culture because the great thing about this chapter is what it essentially does is it entirely condenses the sort of Spenglerian view of history, but also Yaqui adds his own sort of, his own understanding of it with, with eyes to different theories of history, including, including the sort of world systems theory that was later popularized by figures such as Nickname Land. And the whole point of this, the whole point of this chapter is in basically as short of a time as possible. Yaqui is attempting to, to outline how civilizations work, how, you know, the phases they all go through, the beginning, the end, the, the, the landmarks that come with each phase. And he's attempting to synthesize it and apply it to the paths of the West. Any he does what he does, unlike a lot of historians that are outlining a system, he uses quite a few specific examples that aren't necessarily mentioned very often within, within discourses on this topic is, is. Is he uses specific examples as landmarks as means of referring to these different parts of a stage, as these different parts of a phase of the life cycle of a civilization. And that's why I think this chapter is among the best at Imperium.
- [139:20]
A
All right, I'm going to get this up on the screen and I'm just going to start reading. And as with all of my readings, jump in when you want to. All right. The articulation of a culture, the nations, thought forms, art forms and ideas which are the expression of the development of a culture are always in the custody of a comparatively small group. How large this group is, how easily it can replenish itself depends on the character of the culture. In this respect, the classical culture is instructive. Its ideas were one and all. Exoteric Socrates conducts his philosophizing in the Agora. In our case, the picture of Leibniz and Descartes carrying on such activity would be ludicrous in the extreme, for Western philosophy is the possession of a very few. But any culture, even the exoteric classical, is restricted for its full expression in whatever direction, to certain levels of the populations in its area. Culture is by its very nature selective, exclusive. The use of the word in the personal sense. A cultured man describes a man out of the ordinary, a man whose ideas and attitudes are ordered and articulated. Cultured in the personal sense means devoted to something beyond oneself and one's own domestic well being. In the 19th century world picture, with its atomistic mania, only individuals existed, nothing higher. Therefore the word was used to describe a picture practitioner or appreciator of art or literature. But patriotism, devotion to duty, ethical imperative, heroism, self sacrifice are also an expression of culture. Primitive man does not evince them. A war is just as much an expression of culture as a poem, A factory as a cathedral, a rifle as a statue.
- [141:28]
B
Those are two very, very, very important paragraphs to kind of focus on. What is, what does Yaqui say in the first paragraph? Well, Yaqui compares the example of Socrates to Leibniz and Descartes, Socrates and his successors, by virtue of their practicing philosophy, they would be out in public talking to people just on a regular market day, just on, in some sort of forum in the bath house and all this other stuff. You know, this would be the equivalent of, let's say, going to Buffalo Wild Wings on a Friday night and talking about, you know, men of race and, and the ethical imperative of Western Christianity as compared to Eastern Christianity. It's not, that's not what you do here, right? The west, the west as at least compared to what Yaqui is referring to in that first paragraph, he's making reference to what Spengler calls the Apollonian high culture, the sort of Greco Roman civilization as a separate concept from the northwestern European Christian Faustian post Charlemagne civilization. It's a lot more top heavy as compared to the, as compared to the Greco Roman within the Greco Roman, the, the, even the, the quantitative, the quantitative number of people within the Greco Roman high culture was simply smaller.
- [142:54]
A
Right?
- [142:57]
B
And by virtue of that, by virtue of that, not only that, but their internal expression of culture, their whole means of displaying philosophy, of displaying ideas of, of. What Yaqui starts talking about in the second paragraph is far more in interaction with the rest of the people. Because there's a much higher baseline, you know, that the average, let's just say the average iq, the average receptivity to culture amongst the Apollonian high culture was much higher than it is in the Faustian, right? In the Faustian high culture, the Western European high culture, it's much lower. As a matter of fact, it's, it's baseline. Like, you know, we talk about midwits, we talk about normies. That has always been the case within the Western high culture. It wasn't so much the case back in the days of Leibniz or Descartes, but it still was the case. Like, you know, we, the Faustian high culture very much has this idea of the elites versus the proles which wasn't, wasn't so much emphasized as much in, in say Greco Roman civilization or even, even, even the Magian high culture. But you know, that's neither here nor there. And so when you think about it, you know, Leibniz and Descartes, they were doing their philosophizing in a solitary room at a desk with no one disturbing them. They were, they were alone, they were soul atoms wrangling with the, for D. For Descartes he was wrangling with the concept of, of God and the individual and for Leibniz he was wrangling with actually the same thing. And both of them were, were figuring this out through mathematics. And so when you think about it like Leibniz or Descartes couldn't go to a pub or a tavern and say Amsterdam or somewhere like that and just start talking about I think therefore I am or something like that and expect the average peasant to understand it. You know, this is, this is why a lot of people get caught up in, in the, in the Christian narrative of, of the west is there's really the Christian there. You know, Moldbug talks about the two story state. That's also an interesting thing that's always existed within the West. Even Christianity itself is kind of a two tiered religion. There's the, there's the version of it that the masses are taught, that the masses are told, which isn't false. It's not a false version of it, it's just simplified. But then there's this super complex esoteric version that's taught to priests, to learned scholars, to clergymen of other sorts, to government officials, all of that. And this is where Yaqui in the second paragraph starts articulating this concept that he gets to later in the, in the section which is called the Culture bearing stratum. The culture bearing stratum. If you're thinking about a high culture like a human body, right? You're thinking about a high culture like a human body. Think of the culture bearing stratum as the brain, as the consciousness, right? The brain is the seed of consciousness. It that the brain isn't the whole body, right? The brain isn't, you know, on its own, it can't really do anything. It has to use all aspects of the human body to perform an action. However, comma, the brain is that which controls what the body does. Without the brain, the body collapses upon itself because it's just matter at that point. And this is kind of, this is the metaphor to sort of keep in mind as we go further on into it, that, that this is what the culture bearing stratum within every high culture fills as especially even more so that of the west because of how top heavy and how much of a high barrier to entry into it. There is one last thing before we go on. I want to point out that final sentence he says in that second paragraph. A war is just as much an expression of culture as a poem. A factory as a cathedral, a rifle as a statue. Within, you know, dissident right discourse, oftentimes we fall into the trap that culture is only that which is beautiful, only that which is art, music, literature, anything like that. But really an expression of culture can be anything, right? Take the artisan who, who take the artisan who creates a piece of furniture, right? That's an expression of culture. It may not necessarily be art in the same way, but that specific way he creates that couch, he creates that chair. That ottoman has been dictated by the styles and techniques of the culture of his fathers that developed them over the process of the development of the high culture, which is, you know, internal coming out, external. It's the same thing with, with a factory. A factory is just a different version, is just the, the modern version or at least a industrial version of something which existed in age beforehand, right? Especially within the Faustian culture. Same thing with a rifle, right? And so that's, that's kind of like, like, like don't get trapped in this sort of. Much as I love the, the points that Ted Kaczynski makes, don't get so much trapped in this like the modernity. The modern world is all evil and all of it is like luciferic or whatever. Some of that is true, to be sure, but, but really all that. A lot of these things are especially machines are just expressions of things that existed earlier Within a culture.
- [148:10]
A
All right, moving on. A high culture, in the course of its fulfillment, acts in all directions of thought and action and on every person within its area. The intensity of its action in a given direction depends on the culture soul. Some of the cultures have been passionately historical, like the Chinese, some completely ahistoric, like the Indian. Some have developed massive techniques like the Egyptian and our own. Some have ignored techniques like the classical and Mexican. The intensity of the impression of the culture on individuals is proportional to their receptivity to the spiritual impressions. The individual of small soul and limited horizon lives for himself because he understands nothing else. To such a man, Western music is merely an alternate up and down, loud and soft. Philosophy is mere words. History is a collection of fairy tales, even the reality of which is not inwardly felt. Politics is the selfishness of the great military conscription, a burden which his lack of moral courage forces him to accept. Thus even his individualism is a mere denial of anything higher and not an affirming of his own soul. The extraordinary man is the one who puts everything else before his, before his own life and security. Even as he faced a firing squad, William Walker could have saved his life by merely renouncing his claim to President of Nicaragua to the common man. This is insane.
- [149:50]
B
Before we go into the next paragraph, what the reason, and the next paragraph very much outlines this sort of. This point. This point we're making. Yaqui contrast the culture bearing stratum to, let's say your average sports fan in Buffalo Wild Wings on a Friday night. What he's doing right now is he's describing your average sports fan in a Buffalo Wild Wings on a Friday night. Because to that person in that restaurant who has no idea about anything other than like sort of his vague internal feelings, he is. He's in. In many ways he's like plant life. He's like plant life or he's like deer or any other sort of thing. You know, he just kind of exists. Exists. He kind of exists and is completely shaped by the. By the.
- [150:35]
C
By the.
- [150:36]
B
What's. What's the right way to say this? The external expressions of the culture. He doesn't. He doesn't know why he wears this Buffalo Bills jersey. He doesn't know why he's drinking beer or why the beer is called pilsner or why he's eating mozzarella sticks or. Or a burger. He doesn't care. No, nor care why any of those things are called, what they're called and why they came to exist. He simply does. He acts right. He has no moral principles, right. He'll get caught up in a, in a rush of emotions like the rest of the crowd does. You know, this is why, you'll see people, you know, a good example of this is actually if you look at the United States during their entry into World War I, not so much their entry into World War II, but they're entering into World War I. You see all sorts of war fever going, going off. You know, people are talking about how, you know, they're gonna, they're gonna go out and they're gonna kill all of them single handedly. Because in many ways that is a intoxication of feeling. It's a nationwide intoxication of feeling. That's why these people so often abuse drugs, you know, this is why you see such a fentanyl problem within middle America. Because these people don't understand. They cannot internally, inwardly make themselves feel things. They are entirely shaped by external, external factors. So this is why they, they become alcoholics. They think drinking is the sole purpose of their lives. They think doing drugs is the sole purpose of their lives. Going to football games, etc, etc, etc. That is, that is why, you know, Yocky is taking such pains to, to differentiate this type of person from the type of person he is talking about in this chapter. The member of the culture bearing stratum
- [152:21]
A
continuing the common man is unjust, but not on principle. He is selfish, but is incapable of the imperative of Ibsen's exalted selfishness. He is the slave of his passions, but incapable of higher sexual love. For even this is an expression of culture. Primitive man simply would not understand Western erotic if it were explained to him this sublimation of passions into metaphysics. He lacks any sort of honor and will submit to any humiliation rather than revolt. It is always leader natures who revolt. He gambles in the hope of winning, and if he loses, he whimpers. He would rather live on his knees than die on his feet. He accepts the loudest voice as the true one. He follows the leader of the moment, but only so far. And when the leader is eclipsed by a new one, he points out his record of opposition. In victory he is a bully, in defeat he is a lackey. His talk is big, his deeds small. He likes to play, but has no sportsmanship. Great thoughts and plans. He castigates as megalomania anyone who tries to pull him up and along the road of higher accomplishment. He hates. And when the chance offers, he crucifies him like Christ, burns him like Savonarola, kicks his dead body in the Square in Milan. He is always laughing at the discomfiture of another, but he has no sense of humor and is equally incapable of true seriousness. He denounces the crime of passion, but eagerly reads the literature of such crimes. He herds in the street to see an action and enjoys another sustain that blows the blows of fate. He does not care if his countrymen are spilling blood as long as he is secure. He is everything mean and unheroic, but he lacks the mentality of an Iago or Richard iii. He has no access to culture, and when he dares, he persecutes anyone who has nothing delights him more than to see a great leader fall. He hated Metternich and Wellington, the symbols of tradition. He refused as Reichstad to send ex Chancellor Bismarck a birthday greeting. He makes up the constituency of all parliaments everywhere, and he invades all councils of war to advise prudence and caution. If beliefs to which he was committed become dangerous, he recants they were never his anyway. He is the inner weakness of every organism, the enemy of all greatness, the material of treason.
- [155:06]
B
So this is. That's just a paragraph essentially, just explaining further, explaining further, elaborating the common man as Yaqui explains it. And you know, I'm not going to beat a dead horse here, but, you know, he says it in no uncertain terms there. This isn't a scheming Machiavellian whose selfishness is his utmost priority, you know, this is not Iago or Richard iii, Shakespeare's two most famous antagonists. They're not. They're not like, they're not selfish cowards, in a cool way, I suppose is the right way to say They're. They're the kind of person that will beg you not to kill them if you, if you threaten their life. And then the second you turn your back on them, they'll turn on you to try to kill you. And, but, but like, it's, like it's. It's the same way as you.
- [156:00]
D
What's. What's.
- [156:01]
B
What's the right word to use to describe children? Children. There you go. These are people who never stop thinking like children, who never, never order their cell themselves internally because they can't order themselves internally. They are moved by their passions. They're feminine. That's another way of describing it. But you know, that's not to damn women, because there are a select few of women who are capable of ordering themselves or are capable of sublimating themselves to a man who can order themselves. This is. This is what Yaqui's Talking about this is not the culture bearing strata and this is not the high culture. This is just humanity at its base state. Humanity is an animal that will ensure its own survival through any means, fair or foul, without any sort of outside interference. This is humanity. Man is nature. I guess man is animal. The fifth day of creation, I suppose, which is the right way of describing this.
- [156:59]
A
It is not such human stuff that an exacting high culture can use to further its destiny. The common man is the material with which the great political leaders in democratic conditions work. In earlier centuries, the common man did not attend the cultural drama, it did not interest him. And the participants were not yet under the rationalistic spell, the counting mania as Nietzsche called it. When democratic conditions proceed to their extreme, the result is that even the leaders are common men with the jealous and crooked soul of envy that to which they are not equal. Like Roosevelt and his coterie in America, in his cult of the common man, he was deifying himself like Caligula. The abolition of quality smothers the exceptional man in his youth and turns him into a cynic.
- [157:52]
B
That last sentence, I'm not going to talk for 45 minutes, but that last sentence there, the abolition of quality smothers the exceptional man in his youth and turns him into a cynic. I think this sentence describes the phenomenon that we see within dissident movements entirely. You know, whether it's us in the dissident right, those on what you call the dirt bag left, you know, even people closer to Normicon right, many of them are black pilled, as we would call it. They're black pilled because they feel as though there's nothing that they can do. Because they understand that in many ways they are exceptional, whether it be vis a vis intelligence, wisdom, strength, anything else as compared to their fellow men, but because, because of how the system is set up to promote the common man, to promote this, this disgusting human stock. These people who can't even, These people who can't even understand why they're called humans or why they, why they exist. So they become cynical, they become black pill because they feel there's nothing that can be done done about it. Because they have the intelligence to realize how much the odds really are stacked up against them. And therefore they kind of smother their own genius in the crib. You know, this is why I actually think that dissident movements were, were such an important thing to develop, even if they have kind of gone off the rails. Because even though you can already see the common man has infiltrated these dissonant movements. It's like, wow, you said the same take, you wrote the same Twitter thread about, you know, monkey in a cage jerking off or something. Amazing. But, but that's the thing. It's, it's.
- [159:31]
D
It's
- [159:34]
B
in the, in the way things are set up now. The member of the culture bearing stratum, who in other ages would have been recruited, would have been trained, would have been specific, his talents would have been utilized so that he could further the ends of the organism, which means his material needs would have been taken care of. He wouldn't. He might not have been rich, but he would have certainly didn't need to worry about where to eat. He would have been trained how to do something meaningful and he would have taken pride in that, in that sort of, how should I say, in that sort of talent that he has. And he would have done great deeds to further the end of the society. And I'm not just talking about artists being patronized by wealthy nobles. I'm talking about great generals, would have certainly been recognized, would have certainly gotten friends amongst, amongst the military establishment, amongst other wealthy benefactors and even the wealthy benefactors, some people would have had a talent for making money and a talent for recognizing talent that they could then back. Right? This is also a part of the culture bearing stratum which actually Yaqui talks about later in the, later in this, this, this passage, the role of a macinos of the patron. Right? That's actually an important cultural role. And you are a member of the culture bearing stratum. If you're like this millionaire who all you do is you just pay for people better than you to do things, that still makes you a part of the culture bearing stratum. Anyway, that's just kind of what I wanted to say is it's like Yaqui describes the, the, the thing that makes dissidents usually the, the human stock of the next elite.
- [161:07]
A
In earlier centuries, there was no suggestion anywhere that the masses of the population had a part to play. When this idea does triumph, it turns out that the only role these masses can play is the passive one of unwieldy building material for the articulate part of the population. What is the physical articulation of the body of the culture? The more exacting the nature of the cultural task, the higher the type of humanity required for its performance. There is in all cultures a spiritual level of the entire population called the culture bearing stratum. It is this articulation of culture populations alone which makes the expression of a high culture possible. It is the technique of living the habitus of the culture. The culture bearing stratum is the custodian of the wealth of expression, forms of the culture. To it belong all the creators in the domains of religion, philosophy, science, music, literature, the arts of form, mathematics, politics, technics and war, as well as the non creators who fully understand and themselves experience the developments in this higher world. The appreciators. So within itself, the culture bearing stratum is articulated into creators and appreciators. It is in general the latter who transmit the great creations downward. Insofar as this is possible, this process serves to recruit the higher material, wherever it appears, into the culture bearing stratum. The process of replenishment is continually going on. For the culture bearing stratum is not hereditary in any strict sense. The culture bearing stratum is a purely spiritual level of the populace of the culture. It has no economic, political, social or other hallmark. Some of its most luminous creators have lived and died, in one example, Beethoven and Schubert. Other souls, equally creative but less rugged, have been strangled by poverty. Chatterton. Many of its creative members go through their lives entirely unnoticed. Mendel, Kierkegaard, Copernicus. Others are mistaken for mere talents. Shakespeare, Rembrandt. The culture bearing stratum is not recognized by its contemporaries in any way as a unity, nor does it recognize itself as one. As a stratum it is invisible, like the culture it carries. Because it is a purely psychic stratum, it can be given no material description to satisfy the intellectuals. Even the intellectuals would admit, however, that Europe or America could be thrown into a material chaos from which it would take years to emerge if the few thousands in the higher technical ranks were removed. These technicians are a part of the culture bearing stratum, although it is not merely occupational. Technicians, of course, like economic leaders or military leaders, play purely subordinate roles in the culture drama. The most important part of this stratum at any one time is the group which is the custodian of the highest idea. Thus, in Dante's time, emperor and pope were the two highest symbols of reality, and it was in the service of one another of either one of these symbols that their leading members of the culture bearing stratum were then to be found. The highest symbolic force was then transferred to the dynasties, and dynastic politics claimed its lives during its centuries. With the coming of enlightenment and rationalism, the whole west goes into a crisis of long duration. And not less does the culture bearing stratum. It was split even more than usual, and only now, after two centuries, Is it possible to restore its basic unity? I say more than usual, for it must not be supposed that the culture bearing stratum ever was a sort of international, a freemasonry. On the contrary, it supplied leaders on both sides of every war and every tendency.
- [165:18]
B
So the reason I had those sort of three paragraphs read through without stopping is because this is essentially, this is Yaqui's description of the culture bearing stratum. He outlines more or less every, every part of it, right? For those of you, for those few of you who might have been at my, at my speech during the US Event in Nashville back in February, I emphasize this by having a visual example of a pyramid cut in half, right? The culture bearing stratum is the top part of the pyramid, but there's still a line that cuts it in half, right? And he gets into what this line cutting them in half is in part two of this section. But what he's talking about here, you know, the, the culture bearing stratum, it's not a genetic thing, or at least it's not purely genetic. It's not hereditary is what he says. It's like you can't. Just because you're a noble, you're the XX, whatever, does not mean you're a part of, of the culture bearing stratum. Nor is it like an occupational. You don't suddenly become a part of the culture bearing stratum if say you become a engineer, right? You don't become a part of the culture bearing stratum if say you go to college for X profession, Y profession, becoming a pilot, something like that. In many ways you could just be following along the, the, the, the path outlined for you by the culture, by the higher, by the actual parts of the culture bearing stratum. It's also not really a big club. It's not a club the way you would think of a club in which there is membership right there. It's a club of clubs, I guess you could say clubs, you know very much. The Freemasons were likely a part of the culture bearing stratum, but they were only one part of it. You know, the Freemasons were directly opposed to say the Knights of Columbus, which were probably another part of the culture bearing stratum, right? It's. This is, and this is why I refer back to the sort of the paragraph, the pyramid, not the paragraph, the pyramid cut in half. The pyramid cut in half is both sides of the culture bearing stratum. The, what Yaqui will later outline is the forces of innovation and the Forces of tradition. I'm not going to get into that right now, but it's like you need to be on. It needs to be understood that people who fulfill roles within the culture bearing stratum can come from quite literally anywhere. You know, people talk about genetic freaks born to like dirt poor peasant farmers, right? That's the, that is the spirit of the civilization, of the culture expressing itself through those, through those unconventional means. You know, this is why rigid caste systems based on things like ethnicity, based on things like occupation, which is what we have now, based on things like family connections, titles, etc are insufficient because you can have an individual of very low birth but very high talent. You know, you can have someone who is born to a peasant father and a peasant mother who had probably an IQ of 60 each with like an 180 IQ who absolutely completely revolutionizes whatever field he goes into, right? You can have someone born to say two parents with 160 IQs each who's a freaking social, who doesn't understand anything and can't do anything, right? Like this isn't something that you can, that you can predispose. Sure you can, you can take a lot of the risks. I'm not saying, I'm not saying high IQ people shouldn't have kids with each other because on average you generally will, that generally will propagate itself. But it's not the same thing, right? You find members of the culture bearing stratum wherever members of the culture bearing stratum are present. It's not something, you know, you can't give it a material description other than it, other than that sort of like X factor, that sort of internal motivation, that vitalism, that, that connection to this, to a connection to the high culture, the spirit of the culture, the, the, the, the metaphysical images kind of pressing down onto the material plane from whatever higher planes they come from, right? And that's what the high culture is. They are the bearers of culture. They are the, they are those who, they are those who maintain it. And the consequences of them maintaining it end up being the societies from which they're a part of. And you know, things like expressions of dress, things like cuisine, things like popular music, things like governmental systems. All this other stuff is just an expression of their work to maintain these ideas. And when Yaqui says the, the highest group of people is those who are the custodian of the highest idea at any given time. And he gives, in the Middle Ages he gives the Pope and the Emperor, that's the Guelphs and the Ghibellines that was the highest expression of culture during that time. He talks about dynastic politics. The highest expression of culture during the 17th, 18th centuries were those who served the Bourbons or the Habsburgs or the stewards or. Or whatever other dynasty you can think of for the 19th century. That's when the idea of democracy comes about. You know, the democracy enlightenment mania.
- [170:46]
C
The.
- [170:47]
B
Believe it or not, during the 19th century, the highest ideal was democracy, was individualism, was materialism, and the greatest talents were found in that service. In the 20th century, at least the early 20th century, the highest talents were found supporting another idea for the 21st. That that conflict that happened in the 20th century, and Yaqui talks about this later, has not yet been resolved. The 21st century, as with the 20th century, is what you're going to see as the resurgence of authority, right? People talk about Caesarism and all that. Well, that's a part of this, right? And think to yourself, who was the individual within the past, say, 10, 15 years that held the highest idea? It was Donald Trump, obviously. So the greatest talents of this age, right? The greatest talents of the current time we have. And the members of the culture bearing stratum of the high culture find themselves in service of Donald Trump and of Trump's consequences. This is why I emphasize his importance. Like there. We would not be sitting here having this conversation with as many listeners if it was not for Trump. Like there, there. There is no. There is no dissident, right, alt, right, right wing without Trump. And that's because he was the individual selected by the high culture to bring these ideas back into popular consciousness and to prepare the ground for whatever comes after him. So that's the point I wanted to make, kind of summarizing what I'm. What Yaqui's talking about here.
- [172:23]
A
2. Within this stratum, there is a constant struggle between tradition and innovation. The strong vital part naturally represents the new forward development affirming the next age. It is the function of tradition to assure continuity. Tradition is the memory of a superpersonal soul. It must see that the same creative spirit of the grand past is present at each innovation. The crisis of rationalism places the same frightful strain on the higher stratum that it does on the entire organism. The step forward democracy is affirmative in the last analysis, because. Because it is an historical necessity in the life of a culture, as we know from history. But it is a difficult, difficult step for men to take who have given their lives to construction and creation. For to mobilize the masses is to destroy the step from culture to civilization is a fall. It is the onset of senility. For this reason, leaders have center. Leaders whose center of gravity was on the side of culture resisted the revolution of democracy with all their power. Burke, Goethe, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Metternich, Wellington, Carlyle, Nietzsche. The culture bearing stratum, articulated into creators and appreciators, is invisible. As such, it corresponds to no economic class, no social class, no nobility, no aristocracy, no occupation. Its members are not all public figures by any means, but by its existence, the stratum actualizes a high culture on this earth. If a process had existed by which members of the stratum could be all selected, the extra European forces would probably have exterminated it in an attempt to destroy the West. The attempt would not have succeeded, for this stratum is produced by the culture. And after a long period of chaos, a generation or two, depending on circumstances, this cultural organ would have been again present, including in its numbers descendants of the invaders who would also succumb to the idea. The possibilities in this direction will be more thoroughly examined later.
- [174:46]
B
So what Yaqui is outlining in those two paragraphs is basically the 19th century. A lot of people, a lot of people, you know, radical or not radical perennialists, radical traditionalists, I guess is the right way of saying it, the sort of return crowd, the people who. One of the biggest questions that they ask is, where did everything go Wrong? Was it 1945? Was it, you know, earlier than that? Was it the invention of Christianity? Was it learning how to write? And I will give everyone a date so that we can resolve this question once and for all. Everything went wrong in the 19th century. It went wrong in the 19th century. Before the 19th century, more or less. Everything had a continuity with, with itself. And it was more or less understood that everything had a continuity. Right? You, you see murmurings of, of discontent before that, but these are fairly easily squashed. Like the Cathars, the Hussites, the various Christian heresies which really, if you look at them, they were just incest, earth mother sex cults that people got really, really, really violent about. The Protestants are different. That's, that's different. That was more or less the reassertion of a previous culture idea which already existed. And I'm not going to get into that now, but the, the point of this is, is that everything went wrong in the 19th century. The 19th century is the external expression of the consequences of the Enlightenment, which was the immediately preceding movement. The Enlightenment, as it's called, was basically the, the onset of mobilizing the masses of this idea of mass democracy, of the common man, as it's called, being the fundamental focus of society. Because what, what doing this does is destroy. It's just like. It's just like, you know, here's, here's a metaphor. Here's a metaphor so that, you know, you and the audience can understand what I'm kind of referring to. Pete, you ever build Legos in your life? You ever have Legos when you were a kid?
- [176:59]
A
Absolutely.
- [177:00]
C
Okay.
- [177:01]
B
Yeah. And I'm sure many of the audience members had, like. I'm pretty sure all of them did. So let's say you're building. You're. You're just building something, right? You're either following the instructions on a LEGO set or you're. Or you're building it yourself, right? In order to build something else. In order to build another. Let's say you're building a. A castle with your Legos. Well, in order to tear down that castle and to build, say, a spaceship, well, you need to tear down that castle. You can't. You don't have the bricks available to build that spaceship if you're letting them sit over there in that castle, right? And let's just assume you can't just go out and buy another LEGO set for whatever reason. So you have to tear down that castle. You have to destroy it. You have to destroy it in order to have the bricks back into their fundamental aspects in order to rebuild themselves into something else. This is the process of what's called creative destruction, right? And that's what the 19th century was. The 19th century was the unleashing of these democratic mass common ideals. The death of culture. The, the, the pedestrianization of culture. Romanticism and all of that other stuff was a means of bringing culture back down, making it inaccessible, making it largely unknown. The 20th century was the consequence of those processes. Because what happens when you do that is you have the deadliest century probably in human history, at least that we know of. And so in the 21st. In the 21st century, we're kind of looking back on the consequences of that. And we're thinking, okay, how do we rebuild this? This is actually why it's such an exciting time to be alive. And everyone and everyone listening should consider themselves blessed to be alive during this time is that this is. As much as you may think that Western civilization is collapsing. It's on its last legs. The barbarians are at the gates. Da da da da da da da da. Stop listening to Tucker Carlson. It's. It's Tucker Carlson. Is collapse porn. And I would recommend for the sanity of the audience, just not to listen to it on a regular basis. Believe it or not, we're actually. I'm actually optimistic. I'm more optimistic about the future of the west than I've ever been. Because you're seeing this revival, you're seeing this reinterpretation of culture, not just in the disciplines of previous era eras that directed it, but in and of itself. People are finally understanding the fundamental truth of all culture, especially Western culture, and the consequences of this. And here's the thing.
- [179:33]
A
The, the.
- [179:33]
B
As he was talking about innovation and tradition, we are the forces of innovation, believe it or not. Like, like, like. We are the people who are right now because things have degraded to such a point. It's an innovation to restore culture. It is something new to bring back culture. The forces of tradition, in the sense of the conservatives, are actually the wokes, the progressives, the libtards, the whatever the heck you want to call them, because they're holding on to this idea of mass democracy, of. Of degradation, of lack of culture, of pure objectivity of no shape or form, that sort of feminine, feminine aspect. And so what makes it so important for us to continue doing the work that we're doing is that we need to understand how we're going to tear down that castle, this crumbling castle that is the ideas of mass democracy, of, of. Of cutting off your dick, of giving your kids all sorts of medications. We need to understand how we're going to tear that down and what parts of that we're going to use to rebuild Western high culture. So that's the point he's driving towards.
- [180:37]
A
In a political age, it is natural that the best brains go into politics and war. Those who are equal to renunciation and sacrifice are the heroes of this realm. War politics is preeminently the field of heroism, and the sacrifices in this realm are never in vain from the cultural standpoint. For the war itself is an expression of culture. Considered from the rationalistic standpoint, it is stupid to devote one's life to an idea, any idea whatever. But once again, life with its organic reality, does not obey rationalism with its urge to mediocrity. Thus the best are culled from every generation and impelled into the service of the culture. The noblest of all are the heroes who die for an idea. But everyone cannot be a hero, and the others live for an idea. An invariable characteristic of this level is its spiritual sensitivity, which brings it more impressions than the others receive. This is coupled with More complex internal possibilities which order the volume of impressions. It can feel the new spirit of the age before it is articulate, before it triumphs. This also describes all great men. And one reason so many perish violently is that the promulgated things which were ahead of their time, these men lived in a world more real than that of the realistic people. And these same realists are outraged and burn the Savonarella whom they would follow unquestioningly a generation or two later. This vital plane is only a psychic cultural unity during the long centuries of the culture. But with the coming of the late civilization, mid 20th century, the dominant idea, the entire culture, is political. Napoleon's politics's destiny is even more true now than when he said it. The two ideas of democracy and authority stand opposed, and only one of them belongs to the future. Only authority represents a step forward. And thus the strongest, most vital creative elements of the culture bearing stratum are found in the service of the resurgence of authority. It has become political, cultural.
- [182:59]
B
And this is, this is a recapitulation of the earlier points, the earlier points we made. And Yaki Yaki is describing this idea as. It's like, you know, the, the 20th century is the consequence of creative destruction. Well, now, now we stand opposed to creative destruction, all right? That we've had enough destruction. We've had enough destroying the old ways of doing things. Now we need to, now we need to re. Bring culture back about again, right? And this is, this is why what we do is so important, is because without us, we are doing the service of the high culture. We, we have been basically conscripted, whether we wanted to or not, by the high culture in order to do this work, right? And so because of this, if we don't do our work, if we don't oppose the left in all areas, if we don't oppose the, the old conservative reactionary regime of all men are hereby created equal, right? If we don't oppose that and say, and bring about a sort of a resurgence of authority of not all men are created equal as the, as the prime directive of the next age, then the culture dies. High culture dies, basically. And so, and so this is what Yaqui is talking about. Like he, he, this is not the first time something like this has happened. You know, during the Protestant Reformation, the greatest minds of that age, you know, were working with either the Protestant reformers or with the Catholic Church and the Counter Reformation. And he talks, he brings example of Savonarola, who was the. I don't know if it was Giovanni Savonarola was his name, but he was, he was a. I don't know if profit was the right word to describe him, but he was a. He was a Dominican friar, right, from the area of Ferreira in Italy, Girolamo Savonarola or Jerome Savonarola. And he basically goes to Florence during the Renaissance era and basically kind of takes over and establishes a sort of John Calvin radical Christian state. But this was before the Reformation occurs, right? This was like, this was, I think, 10 or 20 years before the Reformation occurs. And he essentially the. The Medicis, who were the, the Republican, later turned noble family that ruled over Florence, had to flee the city because Savonarola basically gets them, gets the city into this religious frenzy, right? And in many ways this is like right at the end of the, of the Renaissance. So he does. His famous thing is, I don't know if you've ever heard the, the phrase Bonfire of the Vanities. Yes, that comes from him. Because what this was was basically a burning of all of this religious art, these religious icons, this beautiful Renaissance art of all these Christian saints and all that. It's the burning of that. And you see similar things with the sort of iconoclasm brought about by many Protestant movements later. The problem was, is that Savonarola was a little bit too early. He was a little bit too early, and so he kind of took it too far too fast, right? And so when he took it too far too fast, basically the Pope excommunicated him and the people of Florence were really worried because they didn't, you know, they didn't want their souls. So they basically, they put him by the trial by fire, which I think is also a. Also comes from him. He willingly said, you know, I will walk through this fire, and if I walk through this fire unscathed, God has protected me and I am supposed to bring about this, this new era of Christianity. And if the flames take me, then, you know, then I was false or something like that. And he dies, he dies walking through this fire. But the thing. And that ends, that ends Savonarola's sort of reign in, in Florence. And then Medici's come back and everything's back to normal. But, but that doesn't end the, the spirit, that doesn't end the consciousness of what was brewing. Savonarola was one of you. Count how many reformers. You know, you've got Jan Hus in Bohemia about a century prior. You've got John Wycliffe a little bit earlier than Jan Hus. You've got the Cathars, like I say, you know, so. So Savonarola is kind of like the final expression of a. Of a heresy against the Catholic Church, of an attempt at reforming the Christian faith outside of the Catholic Church or vis a vis the Catholic Church. Before Martin Luther, who was the one everyone knows was. Was the mo. Was. Was the guy who actually started the Reformation. But, you know, during the period of the Reformation, everyone was a Savonarola. Luther himself was considered a Savonarola, as was John Calvin Menno, who the Mennonites come from, Jacobus Arminius. All of these other reforming figures were basically cult leaders in the way that Savonarola was a cult leader. And so what, you know, this is. This is what Yaqui is referring to. Savonarola was just a precursor. He was ahead of his time. Had he been born or done his thing 20 years later, there would probably be a form of Christianity called Savonarolan Christianity or something like that, or Florentine Christianity. But the problem was, is he was too early. And this is what Yaqui talks about with the high culture. You can look at what we're talking about right now. I don't think we're early. I think we're right on schedule. But, you know, take people like Sam Francis, like Yaqui, like Oswald Spengler, like other people, they are ahead of their time. They are ahead of their time, and they're outlining the next thing, and they are killed because they exist in the world of 50 to 100 years in the future. Right? We're just kind of picking up what they predicted 50 years ago, and we're on schedule. Right? And so this is. This is kind of what I'm driving towards with this point, is that, you know, all of the great visionaries, all of the great men, you know, Napoleon, when he says politics is destiny, right? Napoleon is the entire story of the Faustian man wrapped up into one individual. And that. That's. That's kind of what Yaqui is referring to here, is that it's like. Is like all of the visionaries, all the great men, can see the next age and the age after that and all this other stuff in ways that most people, even smart people, can't.
- [189:36]
C
Right?
- [189:37]
B
The poets are usually the first one to see it. Right? But that's the whole point with all this thing is this like. Is like culture goes through phases, and we are coming upon the age that people like Sam Francis, like Yockey, like Willis Cardo, like, you know, Alan de Benoit, like all these other earlier, you know, thinkers predicted. And so. And so this is why reading Yaqui is so important, because it gives you an idea as to what is coming. Not so much in the next hundred years, probably in the next 50 years, maybe even earlier, within our lifetimes.
- [190:13]
A
Since the culture bearing stratum has its highest importance in an age like the present one, when quality reasserts itself against quantity, it must be defined now as precisely as possible. The notion of mere prominence must be disassociated strongly from the idea of belonging to this stratum. Wagner, Ibsen, Cromwell, none of whom were prominent until middle life, were nonetheless in this plane of life and thought in their previous years. The notion of prominence is related to the idea of the culture bearing stratum. In this way. Every man who is prominent in any field, and who also has inner gifts of vision, appreciation or creativeness, naturally belongs to this stratum. Prominence, however, may be the result of accident of birth or fortune. And Europeans have seen two periods in recent history, after the first two world wars, when nearly all the ruling politicians in Europe were simply common men thrown up by chance and the distorted life of the higher organism. The culture bearing stratum has its highest importance now rather than in previous centuries, because it is a relatively tinier minority. The vast increase of numbers in Europe it tripled in population in the 19th century, did not increase the numbers of this stratum, nor of higher natures generally. This stratum was as numerous in the time of the Crusades as it is now. It is simply the way of culture to choose minorities for its expression. Multiplication of population is downwards. The tension between quantity and quality grows greater with the increase of numbers, and the culture bearing stratum acquires a mathematically higher significance. The tension can be suggested in figures. There are not more than 250,000 souls in Europe who constitute by their potentialities, their imperative, their gifts, their existence. The culture bearing stratum of the west, their geopolitical distribution has never been entirely uniform. In that nature, in that nation which the culture chose for the expression of the spirit of the age, as it chose Spain for the expression of ultramontanism in the 16th and 17th centuries, France for the rococo in the 18th century, or England for capitalism in the 19th, there was always a higher proportion of the culturally significant than in countries which were not playing the lead. The leading cultural role. This fact was known to the extra European forces in their attempt to destroy the Western civilization after the Second World War, and was utilized as far as it could be within the limits of expediency. The real purpose behind the mass hangings, mass looting and mass starvation was to destroy the few by destroying the many.
- [193:14]
B
So this is, this is extremely important and this is extremely important to think about, right. Yaqui gives us a number. 250,000 people. The culture bearing stratum is never more than about 250,000 people in all times, in all ages. I don't know what the population of the earth was in 1948 when he wrote this. It was probably. It had probably just broken a billion. We currently have 7 billion people on this earth, probably more. Right. And yet that number has remained unchanged. Right. And so this is why, honestly, there's probably more than 250,000 people who generally consider themselves within the dissident. Right, right. I mean, this, it. This is something I have to tell people in the audience, right? Like if you are one of. If you believe yourself to be one of these 250,000 people and be honest with yourself, you know, if you just by virtue of your internal feeling, your understanding, your. Your. The combination of your intellect, your physical talents, your charm, all this other stuff, right. It's actually now it's easier than in any other age. It is easier to become a significant, important individual. You could go out and probably make millions of dollars just with a basic understanding of the stock market and your. And your individual internal feelings, right? Like, like, like this is one of the things I think Nietzsche says. He says one of the best things about democracy, right? Or one of the only good things about democracy. I suppose one of the redeeming factors of democracy is that it makes the rise of the great man all the easier because just. Just by virtue of your competition, if you have a functional intellect and a. And a integrity, a willingness, a desire to do things the way things are supposed to be done, this is easier than any other age, right? And yes, as Yaqui says, you know, he says, look like as quantity increases, the. The battle becomes even greater, right. You know, as more and more and more and more people get born on this earth, right. The culture bearing straight and becomes more and more and more of a minority, right. The stakes become higher and eventually, just like boiling something in a pot, it will reach a breaking point. It will reach a point where you need to. The. The way things are are completely unsustainable and you will have some sort of cataclysm, whether it be a natural disaster or a war or something similar. Finally, before we continue, in that last part of the paragraph, Yaqui describes how the culture bearing Stratum for different ages has favored different places. Yes, he is completely correct. The distribution of people on the planet who are a part of this culture bearing stratum is never uniform, right. They're usually concentrated in one place or another place. He talks about Spain with ultramontanism, which is the idea that the Pope is the end point of all existence. In a nutshell, within the, the 16th and 17th centuries, right? But Spain lost its cultural prominence with the rise of France, specifically with the Treaty of The Pyrenees in 1628, which marked the end of the, of Spain as the dominant power in the sort of beginning of France's rise. Then you have the rococo dynastic politics, the, the Louis XIII sort of the Three Musketeers idea of what you could then see as the, what you could then see transfer into the, into the 18th century with, with, with the, the Bourbon family, with the Seven Years War, with the Enlightenment, with the kind of peak, the peak of this absolutism, right? The absolutism then transitions into the mass democracy brought about by Napoleon basically kicking down the gates and then by England capitalizing on Napoleon's idea, no pun intended, capitalizing on Napoleon's ideas and then becoming the dominant power of the 19th century and of mass democracy, which it then exports worldwide. However, you know, the, the 20th century, which Yaqui does not outline the highest. The nation in which the culture bearing stratum was concentrated in the 20th century was Germany. Germany was where it was concentrated lesser extent because both of those nations were born in the 19th century as the opposition to England. Both Italy and Germany, they didn't exist as their, their current form until the 19th century. And with the, now that the, the culture bearing stratum in the 21st century there, it's definitely not in Germany anymore and it's definitely not in Italy anymore. There's only one place where the culture bearing stratum has, is left. And I think, you know, this is, this is kind of the whole point of my account. The culture bearing stratum is currently concentrated within America. America is the geographical concentration of when, of where rather the people who want to uphold the west, the people who want to uphold culture, who want to return it, bring it back about. This is the last place where we're compared to the rest of the earth, where they are being born now. And this is why the culture has selected America as the stage for the next act, for the act of Caesar, for the, for the Faustian Western culture. And that's just something I wanted to
- [198:30]
A
emphasize the last sentence in the previous paragraph, it clearly says that the reason for the basically the implicit. The implementation of. I guess people would say, well the Morgenthau plan really wasn't implemented. But I mean we saw it clearly. The reason to kill and to basically destroy these people and put them on 500 calorie a day diets was to basically try to get rid of anyone who was a part of the culture bearing stratum in Europe. Is that correct?
- [199:07]
B
It is completely correct. In addition, this is why you see things like Operation Paperclip. If you couldn't, if they couldn't kill the culture bearing stratum in, in Europe, they would incentivize them to leave Europe basically. And this was, this was all intended by the high culture, which is really just the way God manifests his will through historical processes like, like this. This was how the high culture was to be shifted or the focus of the culture bearing stratum was to be shifted to America. And keep in mind, you know, it's not. The culture bearing stratum is not a purely genetic thing. It, you know, many of the, many of the people actually who were the kids of the thousands of, of of lower level Nazis brought over to the United States by the Operation Paperclip and other and other similar programs, they all work for the regime now that in many ways they are the regime. In many ways they are the forces of tradition, of the promoting the things we have Now. They're not the sole group, but they're one of the groups. And so yes, as Yaqui outlines, the real purpose behind the mass hangings, mass looting and mass starvation was to destroy the few by destroying the many. And they're trying to do the same thing in America right now, completely unsuccessfully because the federal government's authority is, is just falling apart by the day. Individual parts of the federal government, the different states are asserting more and more and more sovereignty and they're more and more and more becoming in league with each other. You could see this, I've talked about this in my second American Civil War articles. But you know, just, just off the cuff they've. This is in like the self def. The, the Second Amendment League of all these states that signed agreements to uphold the Second Amendment, the 13 states that petition the Supreme Court to review the election. Right. You are very much seeing dividing lines being drawn along the culture bearing stratum within the United States. And the forces of tradition are Team Blue. The forces of innovation are Team Red. Right. And this is why Team Red will inevitably triumph because innovation always beats Tradition, because it is simply the young new
- [201:21]
A
idea of the next age that must become the tradition. After it is implemented, exactly the same
- [201:28]
B
fate will befall us. The same fate will befall our children.
- [201:31]
C
We will.
- [201:32]
B
We will become the. The previous age, we will become the.
- [201:36]
D
The.
- [201:36]
B
The tradition, the conservatives, and we will be unseated by the next idea, right ad perpetuum, until the high culture dies and a new one is born. Even with the process of a high culture dying and a new one being born. So that's. That's. That's the whole way to think about this. And that's not. That shouldn't be discouraging. This gives you your role. This tells you what you're supposed to do.
- [201:57]
A
The articulation of the culture has three aspects. The idea itself, the transmitting stratum, those to whom it is transmitted. The latter comprise the vast numbers of human beings who possess any refinement, what's whatever, who maintain a certain standard of honor or morality, who take care of their property, who have self respect and respect the rights of others, who aspire to improve themselves in their situation, instead of pulling down those who have enriched their inner life and raised themselves in the world. They are the body of the culture of vis a vis, the culture bearing stratum as its brain and the idea as its soul. In each person who belongs to this numerically large group, there is a quantum of ambition and appreciation towards the creations of culture. They furnish the instruments by which creators can carry out their work. By this means they give significance to their own lives, a significance which the underworld would not understand. The role of the. How do you pronounce that? Is that Maecenas? The role of a Maecenas is not the highest, but it is of cultural value. Who knows whether we would have Wagner's greatest works but for Ludwig ii? When we read the results of a great battle, do we always realize that it was not simply a chess game between two captains, but that hundreds of firm officers and thousands of obedient men died to write this line in history, to make this day and date forever remembered? And when a threatened sack of society is put down by the police and army, the casualties on the side of order, thus give by their deaths a high significance to their lives Also, not everyone can play a great role. But the right to give meaning to his life cannot be taken from a man.
- [203:53]
B
I want to. I want to say something real quick. I know we're. I know we're going a bit long, but that last sentence. Not everyone can play a great role but the right to give meaning to his life cannot be taken from a man. This is, this is like, this is not like, you know, morally. This is like metaphysically as if like, like, like no one can take away your ability to give meaning to your own life. Whether this means, whether this means getting shot and killed by a police officer over a principled stand or dying from a mob, from, from refusing to stand down to a mob, all of this other stuff to that, that right can never be taken away from you by anyone except for yourself, right? When you cow to the authorities, you know, when you, when you do all this other stuff, right, perhaps you're, you're making a decision to, you know, there is, there is a line to draw between, you know, not dying on a stupid hill and making a stand. But you'll know when your moment to make the decision is. Everyone knows it inherently. Whether you recognize it is up to you. And yeah, that's, that's, you know, this is. To my earlier point, he talks about Messinas, the appreciators, the culture bearing stratum divided into, divided into creators and appreciators. The appreciators are, as I said earlier, the, the, the rich people, the, Those who are materially prosperous, like Ludwig ii, like Maecenas, who patronized culture in culture, not just artists, not just musicians, not just all this other stuff, but great generals, great organizers, you know, great economists who, who ensure that their society kept functioning properly, right? Great technicians to, to create amazing technological innovations. That's what the role is, is. It's like you are a part of the, the high culture. And anyone, really anyone who's just a generally good and upstanding person who looks to improve their life without stepping on anyone else unnecessarily, who looks to, who looks to take care of that which they own, who looks to improve the lives of those around them. That's also a part of the culture bearing stratum. You know, he talks about the soldiers, he talks about the police officers. I'm not talking about those corrupt gangsters that they currently have in uniform now to extort citizens. I'm talking about the small town police officer who arrests an ATF agent because he's harassing someone who lives in his community. These are all part of the culture bearing stratum. It is those who put something higher than their own life and well being
- [206:28]
A
gonna move on and don't worry about time. But beneath all this is the strat. Is the stratum totally incapable of cultural attainment. Even the most modest, the mob Can I pebble Underworld, profanum vulgus, the common man of the American cult. These preside at every terror. Listen wishfully to every Bolshevik agitator. Secrete venom at the sight of any manifestation of culture or superiority. This stratum exists at all stages of every culture as the peasants wars, the Jacquerie, Wat Tyler, Jack Cade, John Ball, Thomas Muntzer, the Jacobins, the Communards, the Spanish militiamen, the mob in the square in Milan are there to show as soon as a creative man makes his resolve and proceeds with his work somewhere else, in a dark envious soul there rises a crooked determination to stop him, to smash the work. In his later years, the nihilist Tolstoy gave perfect expression to this basic fact with his formula that not even one stone should be on top of another. The slogan of The Bolshevik in 1918 was also illuminating. Destroy everything. In our age this underworld is in the possession of the class warriors, the rear guard of rationalism. It is thus working from the larger political viewpoint solely for the extra European forces. Previous rebellions of this stratum were all doomed because of the unity of the culture, the pristine vigor of the creative impulses and the lack of external danger of such crushing proportions as exists in this age. Its history is not yet over with. Asia has use for this stratum and plans for it.
- [208:18]
B
This is, this is basically, he's outlining the revolts of the common man which has existed in every single age. He gives a whole bunch of examples, talks about the mob Ghanai pobo underworld. These are, these are various, various historical examples he uses to describe this same concept. You know, the Peasants wars in I believe, Germany. Yeah, the Peasants wars. This was a revolt during the, during the Protestant Reformation where the peasants in Germany believed, oh, the nobles, we're gonna, we're gonna overthrow them all with. Because God says so. And even, even, you know, even Martin Luther himself wrote something saying like, yeah, these peasants are crazy. You have free reign to slaughter all of them, right? Wat Tyler, Jack Cade and John Ball were all, were all peasant rabble rousers in England who basically whipped the peasants up into a frenzy to try to overthrow, to try to overthrow the English Crown, the English government entirely. You know, you have the Levelers who are a similar Christian heresy that existed within England, who sought to make, they were called the Levelers because they sought to make everything equal. They're like, you know, there's no such thing as nobility. Nothing can exist outside of how God is ordained. We're all equal in the eyes of God. Thomas Munser was a. Was a theologian, I think, leader of the. Of the German peasants during the Peasants Wars. You know, everyone knows who the Jacobins were. The Communards were those who set up the Commune of Paris during the. During the. After. Immediately after the Franco Prussian War, the Spanish militiamen of the CNTFAI and other anarchist groups that fought during the Spanish Civil War, and the mob in the square in Milan. He's referencing those who were there to jeer at Mussolini as he was killed, you know, those who weren't, those who were too cowardly to jeer at him while he was alive. Because those, the ones who jeered at him while they, While he was alive were those who were principals, were those who stood for something. But no, the mob in the square in Milan, they were completely fine to accept any humiliation from Mussolini. And now that Mussolini is dead, oh, look at us. We're gonna, we're gonna jeer at him. Look at how manly we are. We sure showed him. And, and that's the thing, you know, this is what he's talking about. He's talking about how there's this inherent desire within the underworld, within the masses, to tear down everything. And it is a necessary part of any high culture to unleash that desire to tear things down so things can be rebuilt. But at the current juncture, we are at the extra European forces, those who exist outside of the high culture, who seek to bring down the high culture, right? Asia as the example. This is why I, I support neither China nor Russia. They are both civilizational enemies, because simply, if we look at the Carl Schmidt, friend, enemy, distinction, they are outside of my civilization, therefore they are enemies, right? I have no ill will towards them. However, I do not support them. And so the extra European forces are attempting to do what they attempted to do in 1945, which is destroy the Faustian high culture, the culture bearing stratum, by destabilizing the one place where it exists being the United States. That's why they're flooding it with immigrants, they are distorting the culture, corrupting the children, et cetera, because by doing this, they are able to destroy the few, by destroying the many. And they're getting diminishing rates of return on this. More and more people across the United States are listening to shows like this, are reading books, are reading Yaqui all at once, it seems. You know, it's amazing how in the past three, four years, you can now talk to a generally intelligent person, mention someone like Evola or Spengler, and he'll odds are he'll actually know it. I had a conversation with a cat captain in the Iowa National Guard about Julius Evola, which was interesting to say the least.
- [212:20]
C
But.
- [212:21]
B
But this. This is the point.
- [212:22]
C
Like.
- [212:22]
B
Like culture, you know, history is. Is. Is the movement of extreme action with long lulls to extreme action to another long lull. Right. You know, even. Even Lenin. Lenin, who was a part of the culture bearing stratum, said there are decades where nothing happens, and there are weeks where decades happen. And you can always sense that they're coming because things start accelerating, things start getting faster. You can start to see this upswing in. In. In. In cultural vitality, in standing for principles and all this other stuff until it eventually reaches the culmination in some great cataclysm. And then the cataclysm comes to an end and it's a falling action back into a lull with the new order. You know, this is. This is Hegelian dialectics. This is the hero's journey. This is all this stuff. It is a cyclical process, and that's what's happening now. And that's what this chapter, what Yaqui outlines and why reading Yaqui is so important. Because America will be. I'm saying this is God's honest truth. There's no ifs, ands, or buts. America will be where the future is decided. It is the stage where everyone relevant is living now. Now, everyone relevant is attempting to control America one way or another, because America is the means by which history will fulfill itself in the current age, in the next age, I don't know. But in the current age, it is here.
- [213:50]
A
Yeah. We also see it amongst people that we know personally, who are doing everything they can to educate themselves, not only in political theory, but learning more about art, learning more about history. It seems like people, even if they can't articulate this, even if they've never read this before, even if they've never been able to put this together in their own minds, they're doing it instinctively. And that points to something beyond the material.
- [214:26]
B
Yeah, that's completely true. And you're gonna. You're gonna see. This is the best way to say that. You're gonna see this kind of infect all modes of thought. Like all modes of thought will conform to this new idea. It will not be Protestantism goes one way, Catholicism goes another way. It will be Catholicism of the old age, Protestantism of the old age, and both of them of the new age. Right? That's how this will work.
- [214:52]
C
Work.
- [214:53]
B
And as it has been. For every other culture, there will be some sort of Caesar, whether he comes as a conquering military hero or as a captain of industry or both, or as a politician. Perhaps Trump. Perhaps he will come in much the same way Trump did. I don't think Trump is him. I think Trump is more of a. Is a good. Someone's described him once to me as a Crassus wearing Caesar's cloak. I think that's a. That's a good metaphor. But I think Trump is just a premonition of things to come. Even if. Even if, say, Trump is just the man of the moment, he's just the. The brothers Gracchus or the. Or the Crassus or the. Or the Sola or the. Or the Marius or whomever else, whatever other metaphor you want to draw. He is the. He is the. Murmuring. He's the trailer. I guess you could say he's the precursor to the main event that is coming, I believe, within our lifetimes.
- [215:52]
A
Give your plugs and we'll end it.
- [215:55]
B
Yeah. So you can read my substack on Paul fahrenheit.substack.com that's F A, H R E N, H E, I D, T. A lot of people forget the D between the I and the T. You can follow me on Twitter at cavking Paul and you can follow my telegram channel, and it is called Hotel Fahrenheit, spelled the same way. Thank you very much for having me on, Pete.
- [216:19]
A
I appreciate it, Paul. Every time. Thank you. Want to welcome everyone back to the Pete Quinones Show. It's been a while since we did. We've done this. How you doing, Paul?
- [216:29]
B
I'm doing very well, Mr. Pete.
- [216:31]
C
How are you?
- [216:32]
A
I am doing very well.
- [216:34]
D
So
- [216:36]
A
it's really odd. I think you probably saw the person on Twitter who was like, hey, wouldn't it be great if you and Paul. Paul did another yaki reading? And it had just so happened like. Like maybe a few hours before that we had scheduled this.
- [216:51]
B
Yeah, something like that.
- [216:52]
C
Yeah. It's like.
- [216:54]
B
It's like a psychic message gets sent out and everyone knows.
- [216:57]
A
Yeah, yeah. All right, let me share. Let me share screen on this. All right, so this is the section in part one. Is it in part one or is it part two?
- [217:12]
B
It's in part one.
- [217:13]
A
It's in part one called the Nature of Politics. And I reread it this morning, and I was just like, all right, yeah, this is. There's no better time than now to read this. So as per normal, I'll just Start reading and stop whenever.
- [217:30]
B
All right.
- [217:30]
A
So. Yep. So, Francis Parker, Yaqui. This is the section on the nature of politics. First, what is politics? That is politics as a fact. Politics is activity in relation to power. Politics is a domain of its own, the domain of power. Thus, it is not morality, it is not esthetics, it is not economics. Politics is a way of thinking, just as these others are. Each of these forms of thought isolates part of the totality of the world and claims it for its own. Morality distinguishes between good and evil, aesthetics between beautiful and ugly, economics between util and in util. In its later purely trading phase. These are identical with profitable and unprofitable. The way politics divides the world is into friend and enemy. These express for it the highest possible degree of connection and the highest possible degree of separation.
- [218:45]
B
So you can see here Yockey is using the Schmidian definition of politics. Carl Schmidt was very popular in the time. He was actually. Carl Schmidt was a contemporary of Yacht Schmidt, actually. Also, I think Schmidt had a copy of Imperium in his library, and Schmidt had a. He was very selective with what he put in his library. It was the German edition, though. But a lot of people have blamed Yaqui for. For plagiarizing Schmidt. In essence, he does not credit Schmidt, even though he is using Schmidt's theory. And anyone familiar knows he's using that theory. Willis Cardo once put forward, or I think it was Willis Cardo. He's either that or Revelopia. I was one of those dudes who were writing on Yaqui. They put forward the fact that, oh, he was only plagiarizing Schmidt because he couldn't credit Schmidt in this day, in any book you published whatsoever, because that would be like. That would be like putting, like, Alex Jones or something as a credit. I'm trying to think of an equivalent political figure because I can't say Kevin McDonald, because no one knows who he is outside of us. I can't say, like. Like, maybe. Maybe the bell curve guy. What was his name again?
- [219:55]
A
Charles Murray.
- [219:56]
B
Yeah, maybe Charles Murray. But like. Like, basically, Schmidt was Persona non grata with anything that was publishing back in the time Yocky was writing this. So Yocky decided to lift the theory without crediting him. But that's. That's essentially the frame Yocky is arguing from.
- [220:12]
A
Yeah, I interviewed Paul Gottfried recently, and he went right into Friend, Enemy. I mean, probably being the. The top Schmittian scholar in the world.
- [220:25]
B
Yeah, it's. It's a powerful frame, for sure.
- [220:28]
A
Yeah.
- [220:29]
C
All right.
- [220:30]
A
Political thought is as separate from these other forms of thought as they are from each other. It can exist without them, they, without it. The enemy can be good, he can be beautiful, he can be economically utilizing. Business may, Business with him may be profitable. But if his power activity converges on mine, he is my enemy. He is that one with whom existential conflicts are possible. But aesthetics, economics, morality are not concerned with existence, but only with norms of activity and thinking within an assured existence.
- [221:13]
B
Yeah, he's basically making the point here that politics is destiny. I think that's even the title of one of his later sections, Politics as Destiny. But you know. Yeah, this is, this is kind of the Schmittian sort of understanding of things and that politics, you know, politics and warfare being kind of synonymous. Politics is the means of continuing out existence and then all of these other things, aesthetics, economics, morality, etc, all sort of follow from that assured existence, as he's saying there. So he's kind of, he's kind of in, in, in this worldview, in the Schmittian worldview that Yaqui's working with. He's kind of writing this whole thing essentially to say, look, politics is the first order assumption. In other words, it is a, it is security. When the army, when we were clearing a patrol base, whenever we were clearing an area to set up a patrol base, our first and we, we would settle it down. A patrol base is basically when you have an infantry platoon sitting in one area. Whenever it's kind of like it's a temporary base, but like it's, it's occupied for longer than a couple of hours and shorter than like 36 hours. And we conduct missions from it and things like that. But whenever we're setting it up and we're resting and all that, we have these things called priorities of work, priority work. Number one is security. We always make sure that there are a certain number of guns pointing downrange, including, you know, our machine guns, small arms and all that to keep the base about as covered as you possibly can. And then there's stuff like weapons maintenance and then things like food, like sleep. Sleep is the last priority. It's needed, but not all the time. So this is kind of like this is the same logic that Yaki is working with. Just in a, in a theoretical context, security is ensuring that your existence is continued. If you are not secure, then your existence is not guaranteed to continue. And so you can't argue about things like economics, aesthetics, et cetera, you know, so that's, that's kind of the logic. He's Using with this.
- [223:13]
A
And I would almost say that the modern left, quote, unquote, understands that politics is power, but the right defaults to aesthetics, economics and morality and makes that what's most important to them. And that's why they lose.
- [223:32]
B
You know, in. In a strange way, it's because we believe we're the side of truth. We think truth simply will never die. And however many of us get killed in the process, it doesn't matter. There will always be others who come after us. And there is a sort of security in that. And to be honest, I don't even think that's necessarily wrong. Right. It's just. It's just, you know. Yeah, you're right. That's why the right kind of acts the way it does is because they're kind of. They're kind of assured that they are. Are right as it are. But, you know, we. Because we live in a fallen world, being wrong can win
- [224:06]
A
onward. While as a matter of psychological fact, the enemy is easily represented as ugly, injurious and evil. Nevertheless, this is subsidiary to politics and does not destroy the independence of political thinking and activity.
- [224:22]
B
Yeah, real quick. I don't mean to keep interrupting you and talking. I want you to. I want you to get this.
- [224:26]
C
But this is a.
- [224:26]
B
This is a key thing. Politics. Yaqui is saying this. Politics is not ideology. Ideology is how you're making the other guy look. All right, ideology may follow from politics, but ideology is really just. It's just cargo. Culting symbols is. Is all it is. It's. It's. It's. It's making your enemy shape into a symbol to fit an already agreed upon goal. Politics is figuring out the goal.
- [224:53]
A
The political disjunction concerned as it is with existence is the deepest of all disjunctions and thus has a tendency to seek every type of persuasion, compulsion and justification in order to carry its activity forward. The extent to which this occurs is in direct ratio to the purity of political thinking in the leaders. The more their outlooks contain a. Moral, economic or. Or other ways of thinking, the more they will use propaganda along such lines to further their political aims.
- [225:30]
B
Yeah, that's the. That's the point I made earlier.
- [225:32]
A
Yep. It may even happen that they are not conscious that they are act. That their activity is political. There's every indication that Cromwell regarded himself as a religionist and not as a politician. A variation was provided by the French journal which fanned the war spirits of its readers in 1870, with the exception that the I. I actually looked. What is it?
- [226:00]
B
It's a nickname for French soldiers, right?
- [226:03]
A
It's. I think it's kind of like the hairy ones.
- [226:05]
B
Yeah, hairy ones. It's like the French version of Doughboy.
- [226:09]
A
Yeah. So a variation was provided by the French journal which fanned those. The war spirit of its readers in 1870, with the expectation that the Poyus would bring carloads of blonde women back from Prussia. On the other side, Japanese propaganda for the home populace during the second World War accented almost entirely the existential, that is purely political nature of the struggle. Another may be ugly, evil and injurious and yet not be the enemy. Or he may be good, beautiful and useful and yet be an enemy. Friend and enemy are concrete realities. They are not figurative. They are unmixed with moral, aesthetic, or economic elements. They do not describe a private relationship of antipathy. Antipathy is no. It is no necessary part of the political disjunction of friend and enemy. Hatred is a private phenomenon. If politicians inoculate their populations with hatred against the enemy, it is only to give them a personal interest in the public struggle which they would otherwise not have. That's really important.
- [227:26]
B
Yeah, it's. It's like. It's like propaganda ideology is meant to further drive in a nail that's already kind of guided, you know, it's like, it's like, you know. What is, what is Yocky talking about here? Yockey is talking about political disputes. What is political disputes, Mr. Pete? Let's say someone hypothetically, you know, is trespassing on your land. You have a dispute with him because he is trespassing on your land. That is a political dispute because he is.
- [227:56]
C
He is.
- [227:57]
D
What is it?
- [227:58]
B
He is threatening the continuation of your existence. The moment he ceases trespassing on your land, your. Your political dispute with him has ended because he is no longer, you know. Now, legal dispute is another matter, but I mean, like in the. In the purely political sense, right? It's. It's someone. It's someone who is standing by virtue of per. Whether they're pursuing their best interests or not, the. Whatever path they are pursuing results in a threatened and a threatening of the contingency continuation of your existence. That's all that politics is. And this is what Yaki is arguing it from these, these. These categories are even further simplified into friend and enemy. You are your friend. Whoever is with you is your enemy. It's, it's, it's. It's that simple.
- [228:47]
A
Between super personal organisms, there is no hatred. Although there may be existential, Existential struggles, the. The disjunctive the disjunction love, hatred is not political and does not intersect at any point with the political one of friend enemy. Alliance does not mean love any more than war means hate. Clear thinking in the realm of politics demands at the outset a strong power of disassociation of ideas. The world outlook of liberalism, here as always completely emancipated from reality, said that the concept enemy described either an economic competitor or else an ideational opponent. But in economics there are no enemies, but only competitors. In a world which. Which was purely moralized, I. E. One in which only moral contrasts existed, there could be no enemies but only ideational opponents. Liberalism strengthened. Liberalism strengthened by the unique long peace 1871-1914 pronounced politics to be atavistic. The grouping of friend enemy to be retrograde. This of course belongs to politics as a branch of philosophy. In that realm no misstatement is possible. No accumulation of facts can prove a theory wrong. For over these theories are supreme. History is not the arbiter in matters of political outlook. Reason. Reason decides all and everyone decides for himself what is reasonable. This is concerned however, only with facts. And the only objection made here to such an outlook in the last analysis is that it is not factual.
- [230:43]
B
Yeah, this is, this is a, this is a common thing. And this is something that, like Schmidt and the. And the Schmittians, those interested in power politics are more. Are more interested in. I was listening recently to. To Patrick Casey's recent show with. I think his name is like. Was it like James Bronsky or something like that? And he's talking about what he calls a studiology, which is. I could executiology, I could completely be making this up, like butchering this, but I don't really give a. No offense intended, but you know, whatever. And this is kind of what he's arguing is that it's like, look, all societies, all societies have this sort of power political process. You know, power political processes isn't just entirely what is factual.
- [231:28]
C
Right.
- [231:29]
B
You know, liberalism as a system. As a system, this is no different. It's just the thing is that liberalism strength as a system is that it constantly keeps obfuscation around the. The activities of power political facts. Whether that has benefits or it doesn't. I mean the history will decide. But, but yeah, like this is, you know, politics is fact.
- [231:53]
C
Like.
- [231:55]
B
Mr. Pete, let's go back to our earlier example. Dudes trespassing on your land. Is it a fact that he is trespassing on your land?
- [232:01]
A
Yes. All right.
- [232:03]
B
Is it a fact that I'm, that, you know, you will defend your land because it is your property and your right up to the most extreme level of escalation, if possible.
- [232:14]
A
Yes.
- [232:15]
B
So, you know, you, you see him, you ask him to leave. He says he's not going to leave. Then he starts walking towards you briskly and reaching for something. What are you going to do?
- [232:25]
A
Put him down?
- [232:26]
B
Exactly. You know, that's, that's. These are all facts. These are not like, you're not sitting there.
- [232:31]
C
The.
- [232:32]
B
None of this is like theories. You know, you don't sit there like coming up with ideas like, you know, oh, what's. What, what, what motive. What is motivating him to do this? No, this is entirely. You're not, not thinking. You're entirely in the moment when this is occurring. It's like, okay, a foreigner here, not supposed to be here. I have, you know, I have tried the diplomatic approach. I've tried like a, a. I've tried to show a force that is on a lower level, right, which is asking them to leave. That's a display of force. If that doesn't work, you then go to the next highest display of force. Then there's the ultimate display of force, which is, you know, the taking of a life. These are, this is, this is what Yaki is talking about. It's just arraying of facts. You can scale this up from a single dispute of someone trespassing on someone's land, all the way up to basically two nations fighting an existential conflict with each other.
- [233:22]
A
Enemy, then, does not mean competitor, nor does it mean opponent.
- [233:26]
D
In general.
- [233:28]
A
Least of all does it describe a person whom one hates from feelings of antipathy. Latin possessed two words. Hostess for the public enemy, inimicus for the private for a private enemy. Our western languages, unfortunately, do not make this important distinction. Greek, however, did possess it and had further a deep distinction between two types of wars. Those against other Greeks and those against outsiders of the culture, barbarians. The former were agons, and only the latter were true wars. An agon was originally a contest for a prize at the public games, and the opponent was the antagonist. This distinction has value for us because in comparison with wars in this age, intra European wars of the preceding 800 years were agonal, as nationalistic politics assumed the ascendancy within the classical culture. With the Peloponnesian wars, the distinction passed out of Greek usage. 17th and 18th century wars in West Europe were in the nature of contests for a prize, the prize being a strip of territory, a throne, a title. The participants were dynasties, not Peoples, the idea of destroying the opposing dynasty was not present. And only in the exceptional case was there even the possibility, possibility of such a thing happening. Enemy in the political sense means thus public enemy. It is unlimited and it is thus distinguished from private enmity. The distinction, public, private can only arise when there is a super personal unit present. When there is, it determines who is friend and enemy. And thus no private person can make such a determination. He may hate those who oppose him, or who are distasteful to him, or who compete with him, but he may not treat them as enemies in the unlimited sense.
- [235:35]
B
So I'm gonna, I'm gonna make one small, you know, disagreement with Yaqui here. He's saying that. He's saying that wars throughout most of European history were generally agonic and not, you know, not existential. I agree. Except for two instances when Cromwell was fighting in the English Civil War that was, you know, that was very much religiously motivated. He was not fighting an egonic enemy. And I also believe that the 30 years war kind of just, kind of just devolved into that. It got to the point where no one really knew why they were fighting anymore, but they were, there were, there were 100% exterminations going on in the 30 years war. And what differentiates those two wars from other wars and also makes them very similar to the wars of the 20th century that Yaqui will talk about later, is that they were primarily religiously motivated wars. They were wars in which theology, because theology is the one thing that, you know, is theology is one of those things that I think even more so than culture that can. Although I'm kind of talking out of my ass here once we get into this point, because I'm not sure where this sits, but this is my. Like, Yaki is correct, generally, like, you know, in the 18th century. Yeah, most wars, you know, the 18th century was actually kind of a reprieve from what the. From what the. What the 17th century was. The 17th century was like, terrible. Probably the worst century to be. To be alive in generally. But, but, but anyway. Go ahead, Pete.
- [237:15]
A
The lack of two words to distinguish public and private enemy also has contributed confusion in the interpretation of the well known biblical passage Matthew 5. 44 and Luke 6. 27. Love your enemies. The Greek and Latin versions used the words to referring to a private enemy. And this is indeed to what the passage refers to. It is obviously an adjuration to put aside hatred and malice. But there is no necessity whatever that one hate the public enemy. Hatred is not contained in political thinking. Any hatred worked up against the public enemy is non political and always shows some weakness in the internal political situation. The biblical passage does not adjure one to love the public enemy. And during the wars against Saracen and Turk, no pope, saint or philosopher so construed it. It certainly does not counsel treason out of love for the public enemy.
- [238:17]
D
Yeah.
- [238:17]
B
Like, before we go on to part two of this, of this section, Pete, like, you know, I'm going to keep. This is going to be the metaphor we're going to use throughout the show. All right. You know, you see a stranger on your land that you know nothing about dealing with. You hate him?
- [238:30]
A
No, I mean, it's not, that's not the, the emotion that comes to mind.
- [238:34]
D
No.
- [238:34]
B
Yeah, it's like, it's like, what is this thing doing on my land? I want him off my land or I want to, I want a damn good reason as to why he's on my land. You know, and like, that's, that's like, that's not hate.
- [238:46]
C
Hate.
- [238:47]
B
Hate in many ways is like a, is like a confusion of emotions, right? Like, you know, politics is extremely rational. It's like, it's like, you know, person on my land. Escalation, escalation, escalation. Okay. Situation resolve one way or another. Then the emotions come flowing back because they're kind of put to the side. And that's kind of. Once again, this is the point Yaki's talking about, right? Like, you know, the commandments of God within the Bible aren't like, aren't stop functioning as a human being in a area of limited space. It's like, you know, it's like, keep, keep. It's, it's just general, it's general conducts of morality. It's not like, make yourself a, you
- [239:30]
A
know, and then I look at this. Any hatred worked up against the public enemy is not political and always shows some weakness in the internal political situation. I mean, the, when you see the way that not only the, this state, but this, their apparatus and the press, you know, talk about a Putin or someone like that, the fact that they have to use words like evil is. It shows weakness. It shows that they're grasping for any way to get the people to support them because they know that they're on such shaky ground as it is that they worry that they won't have the support.
- [240:17]
B
No, no, that's totally true. And, and that's why I'm. When you think about, when you think about politics as like the Kissingers and the Bismarcks and the Philip ii And all these great, like, grand geostrategic thinkers who are moving pieces around like they're pieces on a chessboard. That is the, that is the pinnacle of strength of a geopolitical entity. When it's cut, when it's literally just a game to them, you know, it's just like, oh, we've got an object. And it's totally dispersonal. That is when geopolitical entities are at their strongest and have their strongest leadership. But when it's like, when it's like, basically you have to, you have to get the commissars to rile everyone up into a frenzy, that means they're, they're not going to go and fight, you know, or they're not even really going to do anything if they're not riled up into that frenzy. Frenzy, you know.
- [241:12]
A
All right, part two. Every non political human grouping of whatever kind, legal, social, religious, economic or other, becomes at last political. If it creates an opposition deep enough to range men against one another as enemies. The state as a political unit excludes by its nature opposition of such types as these. If, however, a disjunction occurs in the population of a state which is so deep and strong that it divides them into friends and enemies, it shows that the state, at least temporarily, does not exist. In fact, it is no longer a political unit since all political decisions are no longer concentrated in it. All states, whatever, keep a monopoly of political decision. This is another way of saying they maintain inner peace. If some group or idea becomes so strong that it can affect a friend, enemy grouping, it is a political unit. And if forces are generated which the state cannot manage peaceably, it has disappeared for at least for the time, at least. If the state has to resort to force, this is in its, this in itself shows that there are two political units, in other words, two states instead of the one originally there.
- [242:42]
B
So, so that's actually, I like this passage and I kind of want to. Want to focus on it for a little bit. Right. You know, this is, this is extremely important. A state is the whatever. No, he's defining a state here. It's the political unit that has the monopoly on force, which is the monopoly on politics and political decisions, I. E. They are the sovereign, they are where the buck stops. And this is why, you know, taking over local governments is. Or at least, or at least having an influence in local governments is, is extremely important because I've been posting maps like this recently where it's like the NATO empire versus the United States within the United States. And I'M like, look, y', all, like the federal government as we understand it is like an archipelago. They have no real power. You know, in theory they can go anywhere, but like they have no real power outside of their general islands. Right? That's where the quote unquote state exists. Right? So really, once you get a little bit too far outside of D.C. and its suburbs, you're kind of, you're kind of somewhere else, especially if you're out in the, in the, in the sticks. And so, you know, if, if, let's say, if, let's say two, two families get into a dispute and some piss ant county and the government, federal government, don't really even care about getting involved, then that state exists nowhere in that county. That county is, is divided between the two states of those two families having the dispute. Hatfields and McCoys and all that. And so that's why, like your sort of modern understanding of a state is. It's a really hard K line to disrupt. But like the modern understanding of a state as like this thing that is always and everywhere is just, is just. Is one of these. Is one of the worst innovations, I think, that has occurred and is just generally not accurate.
- [244:29]
A
I think that this paragraph here, if more people on the right understood exactly what Yaqui's saying and internalize this, they'd get past the whole civic religion idea that the United States has to and always has to be one. Because if you take this at face value, I mean, I don't even know that we have two political units. I think we have more than two. And they're obviously at war with one another or the two that's most obvious is the regime. It comes down on anyone who disagrees with it or who they may refer to as semi fascist people who. They say that about people who question elections. Not the 2016 election, of course, but the 2020 election. But yeah, this is. We, we don't have a state. I don't think we've had a state for a very long time. We've had more than one. There's just a. One that has. One right now is philosophical, and the other one is power.
- [245:43]
C
Is.
- [245:44]
A
Has power.
- [245:47]
B
No, no, yeah, no, completely, completely correct. And. And it's like the thing about political decisions, right. You know, when I say acts of force, people immediately think to the most extreme thing, which is displays of violence. And yes, that is the implicit, that is the implicit sort of understanding whenever you make an active force. Hey, whenever I, whenever I like, like even, even down to the level of if I, if I Tell my hypothetical child to do something. I don't have children, but I'm using this example. If I tell my child to do something like, you know, go outside and rake the leaves or whatever, the implicit threat of violence always exists if disobedience is. Is displayed, right? And, yeah, there's nuance that exists with that. But that's like.
- [246:37]
C
That's.
- [246:37]
D
That's.
- [246:37]
B
You know, this is. Then this is the Schmittian idea. You know, It's.
- [246:41]
C
It's.
- [246:41]
B
It's all sovereignty and friend, enemy, you know, so. So it's like if the federal government sends you a letter saying, you know, hey, get off your land or we're gonna do this, and you just don't. And then nothing happens for, like, four years. Then, you know, they just sent you a piece of paper that had, like, some mean words on it. And, you know, you basically said, come and take it, and nothing happened. You know, that's.
- [247:06]
D
That's.
- [247:06]
B
That's what the Texans did when Mexico said, give us your cannons, you know, Although in that instance, the Mexican. The Mexicans did come.
- [247:16]
A
All right. This raises the question of the significance of internal politics within a state. We speak of social politics, judicial politics, religious politics, party politics and the like. Obviously, they represent another meaning of the word. Since they do not contain the possibility of a friend enemy disjunction. They occur within a pacified unit. They can only be called secondary. The essence of the state is that within its realm, it excludes the possibility of friend enemy grouping. Thus, conflicts occurring within a state are by their nature limited, whereas the truly political conflict is unlimited. Every one of these internal limited struggles, of course, may become the focus of a true political disjunction. If the idea opposing the state is strong enough and the leaders of the state have lost their sureness. If it does again, the state is gone. An organism either follows its own law or it becomes ill. This is orga. This is organic logic and governs all organisms. Plant, animal, man, high culture. They are either themselves or they sicken and die. Not for them. Not for them is the rational and logical view. Which says that whatever can be cogently written down into a system can then be foisted onto an organism. Rational thinking is merely one of the multifarious creations of organic life. And it cannot, being subsidiary, include the whole within its contemplation. It is limited and can only work in a certain way. And on material which is adapted to such treatment. The organism is the whole, however. The organism is the whole, however, and does not yield its secrets to A method which it develops out of its own adaptive ability to cope with non organic problems it has to overcome. Secondary politics often can distort primary politics. For instance, the female politics of petty jealousy and personal hatred that was effective in the corporate court of Louis XV was instrumental in devoting much of French political energy to the less important struggle against Frederick and the little French political energy to the more important struggle against England and Canada and India and on the seas. Frederick the Great was not beloved by the Pompadour and France paid an empire to chastise him. When private hostility exerts such an effect on public decision, it is proper to speak of political distortion and of such a policy as a distorted one. When an organism consults or is in the grip of any force outside of its own developmental law, its life is distorted. The relation between a private enmity and a public politics it is circumstance to distort is the same as that between European petty statism and the Western civilization. The collectively suicidal game of nationalistic politics distorted the whole destiny of the west after 1900 to the advantage of the extra European forces.
- [250:53]
B
So towards the end there he gets into kind of what the whole point of Imperium is, which is way too much to get into now. But I like that thing he's talking about with the court of Louis the 50. I've been using this metaphor for quite a lot recently is like, you know, the what, what we're living under right now at least in the United States is basically, you know, with Joe Biden in, in office, we're living under the court of Louis the 15th. Like, you know, the court of Louis XIV. Louis XIV was competent, right? You know, yeah, his, he was a tyrant, but he was a competent tyrant. Competent tyrants don't tend to get their heads chopped off. That's why Charles the First got his head chopped off. Not only was he a tyrant, he was incompetent as also Charles the First totally deserved it. Charles the first, his son was okay though, but Cromwell, Cromwell was a very competent tyrant. Cromwell was a tyrant, to be completely sure, but he was, he was competent, as was Louis xiv. He invented this whole system to keep his French nobles basically perpetually doing these humiliations rituals as a part of being a noble that would totally keep them contained and underfoot. But the thing is, is that he left Louis XIV sized shoes once he died and Louis the 15th was not able to fill those shoes. And so they talk about this, what is it, the female politics of petty jealousy, right? You've got all sorts of examples throughout all sorts of empires, whenever, whenever the women in the court, because you have to understand, empires are actually very small things, run in a very small ecosystem. In the imperial capital, you know, Washington D.C. is a very small ecosystem. Although, you know, it's arguable that D.C. is a colonial capital. But I digress. But you know, in the, in the Ottoman Empire they had something similar too. After the death of Suleiman the Magnificent, you had, who was like the last in like a culmination of like 10 good, good sultans in a row. Like, like From Osman the first, like there were 10, like just great competent monarchs in a row. And I think that's why the Ottomans were able to, were able to expand as fast as they did. They just had, they just got lucky 10 times in a row. And then after that it kind of started going the other way for them. You had what was called the Sultanate of Women and that was when the, the sort of imperial harem just started controlling what was going on in the palace. And they kind of collaborated with the eunuchs to kind of obfuscate state functions and all this other stuff. That's kind of what happened In Louis the 15th and kind of what's happening now. Y' all ever noticed how many women we have in government? It's funny, it's crazy. The more women you put in government, the crazier government gets. Who would have thunk it? And yeah, that's totally correct. Like France made in this. And he's talking about the Seven Years War where France was fighting Prussia and England. You know, the rational decision were would be for England to have committed more, more soldiers to, to French Canada instead of just like fighting this stupid continental war against this basically backwater kingdom that is Prussia, you know. Yeah, yeah, Everyone talks about now how great Prussia is, but you know, then pros was pretty much just a backwater kingdom and everyone hated Frederick for some reason or another. And so they're like, you know, dedicated state resources. This is like going to the, going to Afghanistan to try to, you know, teach women how to read. That's the equivalent of what this is, you know. But anyway, I don't want to talk for, for too, too long, but basically, yeah, it's like, it's like if you want to think about politics, think about how you would play a game of Civilization 5 or EU4 or something like that. That's politics, you know. Oh, it makes the most sense to attack this small border kingdom because they have very little army and no allies. I should take them and take their Territory, okay, this is rational. Then you do it and you get a desired outcome. That's politics, you know, oh, I probably shouldn't attack this kingdom because they've got an army twice the size. As a matter of fact, I should ally them or ally one of their rivals, you know, if, in case they got the idea to attack me. That's what this is. That's all politics is, you know, rational thinking. Should I go into work today and say you to my boss?
- [255:12]
A
All right, part three. The concrete nature of politics is shown by certain linguistic facts which appear in all Western languages. Invariably, the concepts, ideas and vocabulary of a political group are polemical, propagandistic. This is true throughout all higher history. The word state, class, king, society, all have their polemical content, and they have an entirely different meaning to partisans from what they have to opponents. Dictatorship, government of laws, proletariat, bourgeoisie. These words have no meaning other than their polemical one. And one does not know what they are intended to convey unless one knows also who is using them and against whom. During the Second World War, for instance, freedom and democracy were used as terms to describe all members of the coalition against Europe. With an entire disregard of semantics, the word dictatorship was used by the extra European coalition to describe not only Europe, but any country which refused to join their coalition. Similarly, the word fascist was used purely as a term of abuse, without any descriptive basis whatsoever, just as the word democracy was a word of praise but not of description. In the American press, for example, both during the 1914 war and the 1939 war, Russia was always described as a democracy. The house of Romanov and the Bolshevik regime were equally democratic. This was necessary to preserve the homogeneous picture of these wars which this press had painted for its readers. The war was one of democracy against dictatorship. Europe was dictatorship. Ergo, anything fighting Europe was democracy. In the same way, Machiavelli described any state that was not a monarchy as a republic, a polemical definition that has remained to this day. To Jack Cade, the word nobility was a term of damnation. To those who put down his rebellion, it was everything good. In a legal treatise, the class warrior Carl Renner described rent paid by tenant to landlord as tribute. In the same way Ortega Igassette calls the resurgence of state authority of the ideas of order, hierarchy and discipline a revolt of the masses. And to a real class warrior, any navi is socially valuable, but an officer is a parasite. During the period when liberalism ruled in the Western civilization and the state was reduced theoretically to the role of night Watchmen. The very word politics changed its fundamental meaning from having described the power activities of the state, it now described the efforts of private individuals and their organizations to secure positions in government as a means of livelihood. In other words, politics came to mean party Politics. Readers in 2050 will have difficulty in understanding these relationships for the age of the party of, for the age of parties will be forgotten then as the Opium War is now.
- [258:47]
B
So I want to, I want to kind of talk about all this, right. You know, in the previous paragraph he's talking about, you know, different, different polemical descriptions of, you know, he's like, oh, democracy was used to describe the Romanov and the Bolsheviks. And this is getting into what we were talking about earlier. Ideology as kind of like a means of reintroduction enforcing a poor political ideology. Ideology is always like, is like a, a cope, as it were, or a crutch to kind of, kind of paint over poor political decisions or political decisions that don't withstand a lot of scrutiny. Right. You know, I'm sure, I'm sure if, if someone, if, if Teddy Roosevelt, for example, in like 1912 or like 1914 went to the American people said, hey, let's go fight the Kaiser. Because we go over to Europe and fight the Kaiser with all these monarchies, then all of Europe will be in our pocket and we'll just bankroll all of them and America will be the most powerful country in the world. You wouldn't have needed ideology for that. Like, like if it, that's just. And you know, some may say, and, and yeah, maybe that would have been, you know, short sighted and people would have critiqued him for it. But that's what, that's what power politics is. But instead, instead it's like, you know, all this ideology about, you know, especially in the Second World War, oh, you know, we're fighting to preserve freedom and democracy and all this other stuff. Whenever, whenever you're fighting for something intangible, you know, it, the reason you're fighting doesn't really stand up to a lot of scrutiny. Like you know, in the early aughts, in the early. I really do think that the Bush administration would have had more success in Iraq if they had unironically said, yeah, we're just there for their oil and their, and other shit. Like that's politics, that's a political decision. You know. And like I said, it's harsh, but it's just the way the world is, you know, like, like the, the strong, the way of the world is for the strong to oppress the weak. It just is what it is. And he's, you know, and, and pretty much any, anyone who's trying to do anything with politics if they're in a weak position. Jack Cade was the leader of an English peasant revolt. He, Wat Tyler was also another one. You know, peasant revolts are by their nature weak. And so he had to use a bunch of ideology to keep the peasants
- [261:08]
C
fighting
- [261:11]
B
anyway, like, but moving down here to like the second paragraph as a part of that, like when, when liberalism ruled in Western civilization, the state was reduced to the night watchman. That base, what that basically meant is the competition of states as individuals. Right. You know, there is. The government is just like another job you can have. And maybe it has prestige or whatever, but it's like, you know, and to be honest, I don't want to say that that was anarchy because actually one of the most orderly periods in American history was when. Was when pretty much everything just had no state and everyone was a state unto themselves. And maybe there's something to go into that, but I don't think that can. I think that can only exist in very specific instances with, with security being just so much assured by two oceans and, you know, the US Navy and other things like that. But yeah, like, party politics is really just like the parties are the two states. In the United States, there is no US Government. There's like. But even then there is, there isn't even really like, like, like a two countries in the United States, there's like, you know, this, this strange one. There's basically the federal government and everyone else, you know, there's the federal government, it's loyal state government lackeys and everyone else that's kind of like, that's kind of what it is now, you know. And you know, if you're, if you're somewhere like, let's say in the Deep south, you're not really under the rule of the federal government. And a lot of people there breathe easier because they're not. Because they just. That's generally what their quality of life is.
- [262:42]
A
When he says that in 2050, the age of parties will be forgotten, I mean, the age of parties is basically gone. I mean, there are political parties in this country, but for the most part both are wedded to the culture distorters that came in in the early 20th century and they answer to them. So he's not wrong. He's just not. It's just people haven't figured out yet that the, for the most part, the two parties that they see have basically Become one. And they are. They're both living. And most of the people in this country, too, are living under the spirit of this age. And the spirit of this age is what Thomas talks about, the Nuremberg regime, what Adorno talked about in the authoritarian personality, and where basically, even if we don't realize it, we ascribe to it. Most people ascribe to it. And the government, the. Both the two parties in charge definitely ascribe to it.
- [263:54]
B
Yeah. And a mutual friend of ours, Christopher Samash, I've said this on a couple of other streams. He's been saying recently that the culture war is over. And it's over because basically you are on the side of the federal government or you are not. Like, it's, it's over because everyone realized that anything the federal government does is astroturfed and anything that is, like, organic, the federal government opposes. Right. You know, so it doesn't really matter if you're like a dirt bag leftist. I'm not saying this because I like them, the leftists. I hate them all. But like, you know, we got a more pressing problem right now with the fact that basically the federal government is labeling anyone who doesn't have, like, triple vax or goes to diversity seminars but isn't like, is it like a Malcolm X diverse person? You know, they're labeling us. They're basically labeling a good 50% of the country domestic terror threats. Right. So, so that's, that's, that's just how it is. Right.
- [264:54]
A
You're either.
- [264:56]
B
And if that's the case. Right. Then the federal government is doing that because they don't have power over the people. They are labeling threats. And that's actually a really good thing. You know, whenever people get freaked out that the federal government is like, taking some more, like, unbelievable power, I'm like, good. They're spreading themselves thinner. They have reduced their area of operation. You know, you want, you want to. It's really easy to find out the areas where the federal government has authority. Just, just look at a map of where. Of counties and localities where gun bans exist or gun restrictions of any kind. Exist, exist. You know, if that's. There you go. Those are the battle lines. That's where it exists. But anyway, we still got some more to go.
- [265:40]
A
Sure. All right. All state organisms were distorted, sick in crisis. And this introspection was one great symptom of it. Supposedly internal politics was primary. If internal politics was actually primary, it must have meant that friend. Enemy groupings could arise on an internal political question. If this did happen, in the extreme case, civil war was to result. But unless civil war occurred, internal politics was still in fact secondary, limited, private and not public. The very contention that inner politics was primary was polemical. What was meant was that it should be. The liberals and class warriors, then as now, spoke of their wishes and hope as facts, near facts or potential facts. The sole result of focusing energy onto in inner problems was to weaken the state and its dealings with other states. The law of every organism allows only two alternatives. Either the organism must be true to itself, or it goes down into sickness or death. The nature, the essence of the state is inner peace and outer struggle. If the inner peace is disturbed or broken, the outer struggle is damaged.
- [267:09]
B
That's what I want to kind of. I want to. I want to hit on that real quick because, you know, it makes sense that if things are bad at home, then we're not really going to be focusing on abroad. If your house is on fire, you're not working about. You're not thinking about buying the plot next door. You know, Kierkega guard also says this. You know, we go inward to go outward, right? Well, you can't go outward until you've got a satisfactory situation inward, you know, until you've got a satisfactory contentment and security even in your personal life with where you're at with the decisions you've made. You either make peace with your bad ones and, you know, celebrate your good ones and then come to a sort of resolve and go forward, you know. And this is the same is true for, like, power politics, right? You know, if a country has a sort of. If the political disputes happening within a country are extremely minor and like, not existential. Existential, you know, number one, they tend to get solved a lot more frequently and a lot more satisfactory if the stakes are simply lower. Number two, you're a lot more potent when dealing with external enemies. You know, the. The fighter, the boxer that goes in the ring and wins is the boxer that wins the battle in his own head before he steps in the ring. That's why. That's why in his later fights, Ali just started sucking because he just, you know, a lot of boxers were that way. You know, they just. They just started succumbing to personal trauma and whatever circumstances and consequences they created in their own lives. Same thing in country music singers and things like that. But anyway, it's the same thing too, with, like, the course of states, right? You know, no one really thinks the United States is powerful politically in the way it used to be. And let's say even the early aughts because right now we, we've been fighting a, like what, like a how long now? An eight year long culture war. And even if it is kind of ended. It's not ended though, like, like the culture war, I think between right and left has ended but now like now like the, I don't know what the next war is going to be called between you know, lackeys of the government and everyone who is not in the government. I don't know what that's going to be called but like that's, that's gonna, you know, this whole American peaceful world order that has led to things like, like 20 million plus. I don't know how many people are in Nigeria right now, but it's a lot. And, and led to things like, like one day Amazon delivery and secure supply chains and all this other stuff. Like, like, you know, the, the more insane the US gets, the higher the stakes get drawn in the internal politics of the United States. As Yaki said, the extreme case being civil war. Even if it is secondary, the less potent generally the United States will be on the world stage. And so even two second rate powers with second rate economies like Russia and China can, can still basically muscle the United States out of former spheres of influence, but wouldn't have even been thought of even two decades ago.
- [270:11]
A
What I see on the home front is the, the regime in power are the revolutionaries and the people who you know, they consider to be the enemy. We're the counter revolutionaries.
- [270:27]
B
And, and if that's, if that's the framing you want to put it in, I mean, yeah, that's certainly a framing you could have. I mean we do, I think everyone in the United States does agree that our government is not like a government of the United States. Everyone knows that whoever is in charge, it is not the American people as in so much as the American people can be in charge or at least, at least an elite that is at least recognizable to the American people. You know, it's, it's, and there's a lot of different opinions as to who that elite actually is and what the goal actually is. But you know, I think it would be absolutely insane how quickly most of our problems would be fixed if we actually had patriots and gut in government like elite or otherwise, people who cared about the future and had a stake in the future of the United States if they were in government and wanted to create better conditions. Most everything that we have now would be more or less either alleviated or fixed, you know, and trickles down, like, you know, you get people. People at the top doing good things and people at the bottom doing good. Well, anyway, I'm not. I'm just saying that it's like, look, you know, whatever winning entails, I think winning entails, you know, ending this sort of pointless internal crisis that happened over, you know, reasons of culture distortion and just, you know, bringing us back to. Bringing us back to a path that we're supposed to have.
- [271:52]
A
All right, all right, last paragraph. Yes, sir. The organic and the inorganic ways of thinking do not intersect ordinary classroom logic. The logic of philosophy textbooks tell us that there is no reason why state politics and war need even exist. There is no logical reason why humanity could not be organized as a society or as purely. Or as a purely economic enterprise or as a vast book club. When I read that the first time, it made me laugh. But the higher organisms of states and the highest organisms, the high cultures, do not ask logicians for permission to exist. The very existence of this type of rationalist, the man emancipated from reality, is only a symptom of a crisis in the high culture. And when the crisis passes, the rationalists pass away with it. The fact that the rationalists are not in touch with the invisible organic forces of history is shown by their predictions of events before 1914. They universally asserted that a general European war was impossible. Two different types of rationalists gave their two different reasons. The class warriors of the international said the international class war, socialism, would make it impossible to mobilize the workers of one country against the workers in another country. The other type also with its center of gravity in economics, since rationalism and materialism are indissolubly wedded, said no general war was possible because mobilization would bring about such a dislocation of the economic life of the countries that a breakdown would come in a few weeks.
- [273:54]
B
So this is my problem with, like Austrians and other people like that. Like, economics is downstream from law. Law not only is culture downstream from law, economics is downstream from law. Law is downstream from politics. Therefore, economics is downstream from politics. Right. You know, it's. It's literally. It's all politics. You know, maybe, maybe, you know, Bronsky gentleman I was talking about earlier, he had this theory that wealth is one to one for power, which could be true, to be completely honest, at least in the system of the United States. But, but, you know, power has more than one means. Power could be how many soldiers you have at your disposal or however many, you know, means of whatever the unit of force exercising is, is. Is power. All right? And, you know, there's various ways to do that, but I mean, my whole. My whole thing with it is, man. My whole thing with it is, Mr. P. Is just. Is Just that, like, you know, people react to what the authorities in their life tell them to, right? They get. People get socialized this way. You're socialized to listen to your father or your mother, right? Or basically your parents. And then from the socialization to listen to your parents, that logic carries over to, like, socialization outside the household. You listen to cops, you listen to, you know, lawyers, judges, other people like that because they're authority fake years. Because, you know, basically this is one automated system of social trust because in the rearing of children and the orienting of people to the. To existence, we can't reinvent the wheel every single time. So we have to. We have to, you know, model our systems off of what we learn in our earliest days, you know, and the chain goes all the way up to God. Like, I'm pretty sure this is how God instituted things. You know, he wants us to obey things. And so the logic you've heard, follow it all the way up, you eventually get to him, okay, obey. Obey him. But, you know, and then, Then. But then you start getting ideas. Well, I don't need to obey anyone on the chain between me and him. And that actually, that doesn't like, make the chain. That doesn't make the chain obsolete. It just puts you in a place where you could be at the top of the chain because there is no one in between you and him. Anyway, I don't want to. I want to get into that, because I do think that cast mobility is as such of a thing, if. If the individual's destiny is that. That there are people who are destined to fall in caste and there are people who are destined to rise in cast, much as high cultures are destined to do whatever they do. But I mean, you know, that. That's kind of the whole point of this here is. It's like.
- [276:32]
A
Is.
- [276:32]
B
It's like politics is the continuation of existence. It's security. It is existential security, I. E. It is you being able to physically continue your life against those things which. Which threaten the continuation of your life. That is politics, you know, and that's. That's what Yock is talking about here in this section.
- [276:54]
C
And it's.
- [276:54]
B
It's a relatively simple. And I think that it's a definition that stands up to the. To the classroom of history. And it's a definition. I think that, you know, scholars like Dr. Gottfried and, and others have kind of taken to be the center point of their assumptions on the world. And I think the best assumptions of the world come from this kind of, of this kind of understanding of what politics is.
- [277:15]
A
The second group that he talks about there who want economics to be at the forefront, we tried that. And then you'll still have people who will be like, no, well, real economics, laissez faire economics has never been tried. The whole socialism has never been tried. Ideology has never been tried because ideology cannot exist in reality. Burnham wrote that very, wrote a section in Suicide of the west very clearly that proved that to me beyond a shadow of a doubt. Ideology is created in a lab. And as soon as something breaks out of a lab, it gets hit with reality and then it falls to p. Ideology falls to pieces because it wasn't created in reality. The whole thing that economics can, you know, if we get our economics right, you know, then we could be, we could become self ordering. When are you going to get your economics right? What's it going, what's it going to take? And do you have to get rid of all hierarchy? Anyone who likes hierarchy? Well, then you're at the, you're with the first people and you should be marching with the international. There is just, it's about power, it's about culture, it's about a high culture. And when people of a high culture decide that power is something that's important to them and they start to pursue it and start to put in motion that which they hold on to, then we will see change.
- [279:00]
B
Yeah, it's true. And you know, like, and this is the thing, right? You know, if power is the most important thing in society, right, which I mean, you know, and even outside of society, power is the most important thing. And I'm making, I'm talking exclusively non theological. I know real life is theological, but this is, this is, in many ways we're kind of going against what Yaki says, but this is even talking in politics, in a purely political brain. Is, is, is in the realm of theory because you can never predict what the will of God is. You know, Terry, Terry Davis, which is a controversial opinion, once said it's totally normal for the strong to dominate the weak. It is a act of God to have the weak dominate the strong. And if you set up a society in which the weak perpetually dominate the strong, then basically you're kind of affronting God. And, and I mean, you know, so, so theological disclaimer aside, like, you know, if power is the most Important thing. More important than economics, more important than science and technology and, you know, all of this other stuff. If power is the most important thing, then, you know, it should be the number one thing we focus on. Not the only thing it. But the number one thing we focus on. If it's the number one thing we focus on, then we have to understand what is it. And that's why I, I recommended that that gentleman keep calling. I keep wanting to call him Charles Bronsky, I think it's James Bronson, I don't know.
- [280:34]
C
But he's.
- [280:34]
B
He was recently on Patrick Casey show, talks about his theories of power and that he's actually turning it into a measurable science using certain metrics. And it has some promise. I don't know if I agree with all of it.
- [280:46]
C
It.
- [280:46]
B
But it certainly does have some promise to it. And. Yeah, like, like, if, if this is what we're gonna do, maybe we need to under. If we understand what power is, all right, then maybe we need to, we need to understand how power works. And if we understand how power works, we know how to kind of start inserting ourselves into its workings and then start mastering its workings. You know, that's, that's, that's how it is.
- [281:15]
A
People will say that, you know, people who have no power, people who are poor, people who are weak, they have, you know, they have no rights. And you know, Nietzsche would say, yeah, you have the right to be dominated. So, yeah, you have to have, you have to figure out how to, how to get power or get your friends in power.
- [281:37]
B
Yeah, it's true. And you know, and a lot of guys on the distance dissident, right, like, you know, the vaccine mandate being the primary thing, the fact that you said no to that and if you're still unvaccinated to this day, you know, that kind of shows that you actually do have a modicum of power, right? Because power at the end of the day is having power over the pressure around you and having the wisdom to navigate that situation. So I do think that there is, that there is some good human capital here that can be, that can be utilized in a qualitative sense. It's just, you know, power needs to be understood in order to apply the qualitative capital to it, in order to utilize it. And that's, I think, I think the big question of the day now isn't so much what are we? It's more of what is power and how do we use it?
- [282:24]
A
All right, what do you want to plug and talk about?
- [282:26]
C
Anything.
- [282:27]
B
I mean, well, Because I haven't done this on your show yet. Most all of you know about my substack, my Twitter. My substack is the Fahrenheit family archives. My Twitter is at Cav King Paul on Twitter got a telegram called Hotel Fahrenheit. Deleted the chat recently because to be honest, it was more than I was interested in. But if you go on my Twitter page and pinned underneath my profile is the is my most recent collection of short stories that I have compiled and published called A Country Squire's Notebook. It is available on Gumroad for PDF for $16 and 7 cents. It is a collection of seven short stories set in my sort of rarefied, reconstructed fantasy, mystical version of my home state of Virginia. I've been told nothing but good things about it and I'm hoping that all of you will enjoy it. It's also possible, I'm not going to presume, but it is possible that that Antelope Hill will be publishing it as a physical copy if they decide that they would like to publish it. Because I've, I've contacted them and they seemed, they said that they were interested in looking at it. And so if that's the case, then a physical copy will be available soon should they decide to publish it. But otherwise, that is the one thing I have to plug. Check it out. The forward was written by a good friend of mine, T.R. hudson, who's also around these spheres. And so that's kind of, that's all I really got to plug for the moment. Also subscribe to my good friend Pete Quinones. Become a premium subscriber, give him money, do all of these things.
- [284:02]
A
Oh, and also tune in to the Old Glory Club when you, when you get a chance.
- [284:07]
B
I completely forgot. You've just totally showed me up. Yes. Do the Old Glory Club subscribe. Follow all of the things.
- [284:14]
A
Yeah. YouTube channel for. Let's see if we can keep that. And the substack which is becoming. Getting a lot more on there. Paul, I appreciate it. Thank you very much.
- [284:27]
B
Thank you very much, Mr. Pete. I'm happy to come back whenever you'll have me.
- [284:31]
A
Absolutely. Thank you.
- [284:32]
B
Yes, sir.
- [284:35]
A
I want to welcome everyone back to the Picanone Show. Returning for Another reading of Mr. Francis Parker Yaqui is Mr. Paul Fahrenheit. How are you doing, Mr. Paul?
- [284:46]
B
I'm very well, Mr. Pete. You know, I just noticed it right this second. But we're the, we're the two apostles, Peter and Paul. Reading. Reading Imperium. I love whenever we get to read whenever we get to read Imperium, because I was telling you before we got started, like, you know, this is my favorite book, at least in this sort of scene, and I, I never get a chance to talk about it. So I'm really glad whenever you asked me to come on and we can do one of these. One of these little reading sections.
- [285:11]
A
Well, I appreciate that. And I think the reason I picked this one is because when we first became acquainted, you pointed me to an article that you had written on Yaqui's conception of race, which I think has been taken down from that website. I looked for it recently, and it was something that helped start me down the road of looking at race differently and looking at looking at high culture and comparing, you know, having the. What he's. What we'll talk about when we're reading this. His two different conceptions of what race is.
- [285:48]
B
Yes, sir.
- [285:50]
A
All right, so let me get this shared up on the screen.
- [285:54]
B
And are we going to do it like we usually do? You read a section and I'll. And I'll comment on it.
- [285:59]
A
Yes, that is exactly how we're going to do it. And let me expand this. Boom. I'll try.
- [286:05]
B
I'll try to keep my. Because this is a longer section or a longer chapter, rather. I'm going to try to keep my ramblings as short as possible. But, you know, you all know me. It's. It's not going to be short.
- [286:17]
A
All right, so this is someone, Someone
- [286:19]
B
once told me, real quick. Someone once told me, I read this in a book. There was a line in this book that stabbed me in the heart. And it said, with the Irishman's need to tell someone something.
- [286:33]
A
Well, it's nicer than what Irish people usually get that's fair. Criticized for. So this is from Imperium by Francis Parker Yaqui. It is from the cultural Vitalism section. And this section is called Race, People, Nation, state. The 19th con. The 19th century concept. Concepts of race, people, nation and state are exclusively of rationalistic, romantic provenance. They are the result of imposing a thought method adapted to material problems onto living things. And thus they are materialistic.
- [287:07]
D
Mean.
- [287:08]
A
Materialistic. Materialistic means shallow as applied to living things. For with all life, the spirit is primary and the material is the mere vehicle of spiritual expression. That's a great sentence. Just saying that the spirit is primary and that the material is basically used to express the spirit.
- [287:34]
B
Why does, why does DNA program every single. Like, you know, DNA is an every living thing on earth. Mr. Pete. Right. How does DNA know. And it's like what, like 99 similar across, like something across like. Or is like 60 similar between like a tomato and a human being or something like that? You know, how does DNA know to make everything into a thing?
- [287:58]
D
Right?
- [287:58]
B
You know that.
- [287:59]
D
And this is.
- [287:59]
B
This is a little bit of Platonism is. It's like.
- [288:01]
C
Is.
- [288:01]
B
It's like there are ideas and up in the sort of world of forms that, you know, we imagine God to kind of either exist in or exist above. But like. Yeah, that's kind of. That's kind of what this is. The, this is the whole conception of race Yaki is speaking of, is that like you can. You can. You know how, Mr. Pete, if you keep cutting a pie slice and you can keep cutting it into infinitely smaller and smaller and smaller and smaller pieces in theory. Well, this is. This is, I mean, all the way down to the individual, right? All the way down to the individual human being, right? You can divide the quote, unquote, human species. And there's a little bit of Darwinism, but like Darwinism, I think Darwinism gets misunderstood by a lot of people. The idea of classifying species within like certain large groups and then smaller groups and smaller groups and small. That's just kind of intuitive. You know, some species are far closer to each other than others. But it's like even within human beings, like the fact that human beings are the only mammal on Earth, the only large mammal on Earth with zero subspecies. I don't know. Anyway, all right.
- [289:12]
A
Since these 19th century concepts were rationalistic, they were basically unfactual. For life is irrational, unamenable to inorganic logic and systems and system. It's systemic. I'm sorry.
- [289:26]
C
Systemization.
- [289:27]
A
System. Systematization.
- [289:29]
B
Systematization. Oh, shoot.
- [289:31]
C
That's a.
- [289:31]
B
That's a system. Keep going.
- [289:33]
A
Sorry. I read this this afternoon. The age upon which we are entering and of which this is formulation is an age of politics and hence an age of facts. The broader subject is the adaption, health and pathology of higher cultures. Their relationship to every type of human grouping is a prerequisite to examining the last problems of cultural vitalism. The nature of these groupings will therefore be looked at without preconceptions, with a view to reaching their deepest meanings. Origin, life and interconnections. Material inanimate objects retain their identity through the years. And thus the type of thinking suited to dealing with material things assumed that the political and other human groupings in existence in 1800 represented something a priori, something of the very essence of permanent reality. Everything was regarded as a creation of one of these peoples. This applied to the arts of form, literature, state, technics, culture generally. This view is not in accordance with historical facts. The first concept in order is race. The materialistic race thinking of the 19th century had particularly heavy consequences for Europe when it was coupled with one of the early 20th century movements of resurgence of authority. Any excrescence of theoretical equipment on a political movement is a luxury and The Europe of 1933 through 2000 can afford none. Such Europe has paid dearly for the romantic concern with old fashioned racial theories and they must be destroyed. Excrescence is like a.
- [291:35]
B
It's a scatological term.
- [291:37]
A
Yeah. It's. Well, it's also something I. I think it could be like a. A fungus, something that grows out and is not, is not natural. Something to be cut out.
- [291:46]
C
Yeah.
- [291:47]
A
Scatological works.
- [291:49]
C
Yeah.
- [291:50]
A
All right, Part two. Race has two meanings which will be taken in order and then their relative importance in an age of absolute politics will be shown. The first meaning is an objective one, the second subjective. The succession of human generations related by blood have the clear tendency to remain fixed in a landscape. Nomadic tribes wander within larger but equally definite bounds. Within this landscape, the form of plants and animal life have local characteristics different from transplantations of the same strains and stocks in other landscapes. The anthropological studies of the 19th centuries of the 19th century covered a mathematical presentable fact which affords a good starting point to show the influence of the soil. It was discovered that for any given inhabited area of the world, there was an average cephalic index of the population. Cephalic refers to head like head shape, the shape of someone's head. More important, it was learned through measurements on immigrants to America from every part of Europe and then on their children born in America, that the cephalic index adheres to the soil and immediately makes itself manifest in the new generation. Thus, long headed Jews from Sicily and short headed ones from Germany produced offspring with the same average head measurement, the specifically American one. Bodily size and span of growth were two other characteristics in which all types whatever. It's all types, whatever in America. In America, Indians, Negroes, white men were found to have the same average, regardless of average size and growth span of the countries or stocks from which they came. In the case of immigrant Irish children coming from a country of a very long growth span, the response to the local influence was immediate.
- [293:58]
B
So Yaqui is basing that assertion upon an essay Carl Jung wrote when he was visiting the United States. He was like, he was like watching a bunch of guys leave a factory or something like that. And he gasps and he's like, my, my God, I didn't know that there were so many of you who had Indian blood in them. And then his companion kind of looked at him and said, I wouldn't say there was a single drop of Indian blood between any of those men. They look, they're probably mostly Scottish or English. And this is kind of, this is a theory that, you know, this is a theory that I think deserves a lot more investigation because I'm not necessarily convinced of its, of its truth, the way Yaki is asserting it. But there is certainly something to it. You know, the idea, the idea that like the soil, the, you know, because different, different places quite literally have different soil compositions by measurement. Even if it's like minutely different. Different, you know, like p, you know, the, the Black Belt of Alabama has an entirely different soil composition than let's say the, the Chaparral in Texas. Right. It's like, it's like. Sorry, I'm probably, I'm probably, I probably use the. But anyway, that's the whole point is it's like, it's like this whole, there's different compositions of soil. The Llano Estacado. That's what I was trying to say. I think the Chaparral is a rainforest somewhere. I apologize, but the Llano Estacado and the Black Belt of Alabama have two entirely different soil compositions. Same thing. You know, I, I, I found this out when I was going to the US Event this year. Cringe Walker told me, because. Cringe Walker was in the car with me. Cringe Walker told me that the Appalachian Mountain chain was actually the exact same composition as, as the Scottish Highlands. It was part of the exact same tectonic plate. It, it's, it peaks above the ground in the Scottish Highlands and in the Appalachian Mountains, but then it like dips under the earth all the way through the Atlantic Ocean before it peaks out again. And so that was, that was super interesting to me. So it appears, it appears that not only do people and, you know, that's the, the Appalachian Mountains are where the highest proportion of Scots Irish people settled in the United States. You know, so I really do think that there is something to, what is being asserted here is that it's like the soil, not only does the soil have an influence upon which groups of how the groups of people look upon. Like, for example, if people were to come to the United States, they start elongating, getting larger physiognomies, etc, but also I think it kind of controls where groups of people not counting outliers settle. You know, like, there's a reason that the Midwest German settled in the freaking Midwest, which resembles Brandenburg. There's a reason you can't find any Americans with any real, like, English ancestry. Once you get further than 10 miles inland from the coast. You know, it's. It's things like that. I. I don't know, Pete.
- [297:04]
A
Yeah, I mean, no, it's interesting when, When I was reading this this morning, I was taking some notes in the column and just a lot of question marks, something. Yeah, it would be good if someone could pick up on that again. But of course, we're in an age where things like this would be considered pseudoscience. And I really don't believe that. Believe it is.
- [297:24]
B
Hey, we got. We got ecologists and geneticists to. To like.
- [297:28]
C
We.
- [297:28]
B
We got more of them than you could shake a stick at. But if any of you are listening, I want you to start investigating this. This immediately.
- [297:36]
A
From these and other facts, both comparatively new and of ancient observation, it is apparent that the landscape exerts an influence on the human stocks within its bounds, as well as on the plant and animal life. The technic of this influence is beyond our ken. The source of it we do know. It is the cosmic unity of the totality of things. A unity which shows itself in the rhythmic and cyclic movement of nature. Man does not stand out of this unity, but is submerged in it. His duality of human soul and beast, of prey is also a unity. We separate him thus to understand him, but this cannot disturb his unity. Nor by separating in our thoughts the aspects of nature can we destroy its unity. The moon cycle stands in a relationship to many human phenomena of which we can only know what, but never how. All movement whatever in nature is rhythmic. The movements of streams and waves, of winds and currents, of appearance and disappearance of living individuals, of species, of life itself. Man partakes of these rhythms. His particular structure gives these rhythms their peculiar. Their peculiarly human form. The side of his nature that expresses this connection is race. Race in a man is the plane of his being which stands in relationship to plants and animal life and beyond them to the great macrocosmic rhythms. It is, so to speak, the part of man that is generalized into. Absorbed into the all, rather than his soul, which defines his species and sets him off from all other forms of existence. Life manifests itself in the. In the four forms. Plant, animal, man, high culture. Distinct though each is, yet it is related to all the others. The animals, subject as they are to the soil, retain thus in Their being a plane of plant like existence. Race is the expression of the plant like and also of the animal like in man. The high culture, by being fixed for its duration to a landscape, retains also a connection with the plant world. No matter how defiant and free moving are its proud creations. Its high politics and great wars are an expression of the animal and human in its nature. Some of the totality of human character. Good.
- [300:18]
B
Yeah. So I mean, what he's trying to say here is. So Yaki. Yaki's done this earlier in the book, but he's trying to outline that there's sort of basically four levels in terms of sophistication of human life or not human life of life on earth. Plants being the most simple, animals being the animals being slightly more sophisticated. Man or what he calls man as animal being even more sophisticated. And then the high culture being a sort of sophistication above man. And this is, this is a lot of his German ideal influence. German idealism influence coming in. This idea that human beings when possessed by ideas, those ideas it themselves kind of take on a life of its own. That's kind of what he's talking about here. And the high culture is sort of the highest kind of this, of this concept coming out of this German idealist tradition.
- [301:12]
A
Some of the totality of human characteristics are soil determined. Others are stock determined. Pigmentation is one of the latter and survives transplantation to other areas. It is not possible to list all of even the physical characteristics according to such a scheme, for the data has not been gathered. But even so it would not matter to our purpose. For the most important element, also in the objective meaning of race is the spiritual. Some stocks are more. Some stocks are undoubtedly more highly endowed than others. In certain spiritual directions, spiritual qualities are as diverse as physical qualities. Not only average height of body varies, but also average height of the soul. Not only skull shape and stature are soil determined, but so must be some spiritual properties. It is impossible to believe that a cosmic influence which puts its mark on human bodies passes over the essence, the soul. But so thoroughly mixed have all the stocks been or so repeatedly skimmed by history that we can never know original soul qualities of landscape types of the racial qualities of a given population. On the spiritual side, we could never know which are soil bound and which have been produced by the amalgamation of stocks through the generations.
- [302:38]
B
Okay, this, this I actually slightly disagree with because I actually think we, we do have a very good idea as to. As to what original. And this, this is of course I don't want to distract from It. But I think there is actually. We have a really good idea of what was more original of a. What is it? What was more original of a human type and what has kind of been produced by sort of mixing over time. And some are more obvious than others. Like for example, we all know that, that anyone on the subcontinent is the result of the mixing of the ancient Aryans and the Dravidians. And you know, it's the same thing with Latin America with, you know, the indios versus high caste Europeans. So, you know, it's like, it's like a lot of these. I, I really do think, I think it's, it's. We have a lot more information and maybe it's maybe because Yaqui was writing in 1948. So there's been like the Human Genome Project or. Yeah, the Human Genome Project has been a massive thing, which basically. You guys want to know why leftists are going so crazy right now? Is because the. Am I, am I saying the name of it incorrectly? Is it. Was it the Human Genome Project? What was it?
- [303:49]
A
Which one?
- [303:50]
B
When they were trying to map. They were trying to map the human genome.
- [303:54]
A
Yeah, that was. Yeah, it was Human genome project. Okay, 2002, 2003.
- [303:59]
B
Yeah. And this was. And people forget how recent all this leftist hysteria is, but like back in like the 90s and early 2000s, Pete, it was really common and almost even accepted to talk about how race and IQ are correlated. This was back when the bell curve was very popular and all that. And so, you know, like, you know, look, human genome basically shattered any I. Any ideas of, you know, any one human family and stuff like that. So now this is old hat, but, you know, Yocky didn't have a lot of this, so that just a smart, A minor disagreement is that, you know, Yaki, this is a great work with a lot of great stuff in it and a lot of great principles. And it's just, you know, when Yaqui is making some of these assertions, he didn't have a lot of data that we have now. Keep going.
- [304:46]
A
Gotcha.
- [304:46]
D
All right.
- [304:48]
A
To a practical century like this and the next. Origins and explanations are less important than facts and possibilities. Therefore, our next concern must be with race as a practical reality rather than with metaphysics. To what race does a man belong? We know at first glance, but exactly what sign tells us this cannot be materially explained. It is accessible only to the feelings, the instincts, and does not yield itself to the scale and balance of physical science. We have seen that race is connected with landscape and with stock Its outer manifestation is a certain typical expression, a play of features, a cast of countenance. There are no rigid physical indicia of indicia. Sorry of this expression, but this does not affect its existence, but solely the method of understanding it. Within wide limits. A primitive population in a landscape has a similar look. But closer scrutiny will be able to find local refinements, and these again will branch down into tribes, clans, families, and finally individuals. Race, in the objective sense is the spiritual, spiritual biological community of a group.
- [306:12]
B
This is kind of. I was talking about earlier in the. Earlier in the stream was that like, you know, if you take a bunch of human. If you take a bunch of individual humans together there. A culture is more, more than just the sum of the individuals. In a town, especially the more homogeneous you make it. It's kind of like a. It's, it's, it's, it's. It's something more than the sum of its parts. And that's kind of what Yaki is describing here. The spiritual biological community of a group.
- [306:39]
C
There's very.
- [306:40]
B
The biological component of it is vital, and he talks about this, but it's mostly.
- [306:45]
C
It is.
- [306:45]
B
It is the spiritual component as well, that makes it more than just a collection of biomass in a particular location with similar gene structures.
- [306:55]
A
Correct?
- [306:56]
C
Yep.
- [306:57]
A
All right. Thus races cannot be classified other than arbitrarily. The materialistic 19th century produced several classifications of this arbitrary kind. The only characteristics used were of course, purely material ones. The skull form was the basis of one, hair and speech type of another, no shape and pigmentation of another. This was at best mere group anatomy, but did not approach race. Human beings living in contact with one another influence one another and thus approach one another. This applies to individuals where it has been noted through the ages in the fact that an old married couple come to resemble one another physically. And it applies to groups as well. What is called the assimilation of one group by another is not at all merely the result of commingling of germplasm, as materialism thought. It is mostly the result of spiritual influence of the assimilating group on the newcomers, which is natural and complete. When there are no strong barriers between the groups. The lack of barriers leads to the disappearance of the racial boundary and thereafter a new race is raised present the amalgamation of the two previous ones. The stronger one is influenced usually but slightly. But there are various possibilities here, and an examination of them belongs properly to a subsequent place. Part 3 We have seen that race, objectively used, describes a relationship between a population and a landscape and is essentially an Expression of cosmic beast. It, its prime visible manifestation is the look. But this invisible reality expresses itself in other ways. So the Chinese, for instance, smell is a hallmark of race. Certainly audible things, speech, song, laughter, also have racial significance. Susceptibility to disease is another racially differentiated phenomena. The Japanese Americans and Negroes have three different degrees of resistance to tuberculosis. American medical statistics show that Jews have more nervous disease, more diabetes, and less tuberculosis than the Americans. And that in fact the incidence of any one disease shows a different figure. For the Jews, gesture, gait, dress, are not without racial significance, but the face. But the face is the great visible sign of race. We do not know what it is that conveys race in the physiognomy, and attempts to reach it by statistics and measurements must fail. This fact has caused liberals and other materialists to deny that race exists. This incredible doctrine came from America, which is veritably a large scale racial laboratory.
- [309:56]
B
I want to, I want to focus on that sentence real quick. America, which is veritably a large scale racial laboratory. That's, that's actually, that's actually one of the best descriptions of the United States I've ever heard in my entire life, you know. Yeah, they call it the American experiment for a reason. Because basically America is where quite literally anything and everything has been tried. It's kind of this great free for all zone. But yeah, you know, he is correct in that it can only come from the United States. And I mean, you're seeing, you're seeing, shoot, man. Like, you know, when I go to the gym, I'm like the whitest looking dude in there with like a couple of other guys. But like all of even like the, the white people in the gym look kind of racially ambiguous. And everyone else, I, I don't know whether they're like Hispanic or, or what they are, but all I know is that they're all like some shade of brown. You know, it's like in this, that, you know, Pete, you know, you know exactly what I'm talking about, right? Like, like this really racially ambiguous looking individual where you don't know, kind of like there's some kind of brown, but you don't know what like, kind of mix they are.
- [311:09]
A
Sort of like the rock.
- [311:11]
B
Yeah, it's like, it's like, okay, are you Pacific Islander? Are you Filipino? Are you. What, what is this? So, yeah, and that's, and you know, people were talking about the, the star of Snow White or whatever we were reading about her. And it's like Colombian mother, Polish father, and I'M like mix only New Jersey could create.
- [311:34]
A
All right, Be nice. Okay, I'm going to continue. This doctrine really only amounts to a confession of total inability of rationalism and scientific method to understand race. Or subjected to order of the type of the physical sciences. And this inability was known before by those who have clung to facts and resisted antifactual theories. Suppose that a man were to familiarize himself thoroughly with the measurements. Length of nose, brows, chin, width of brow, jaws, mouth, etc. With every face he knew. Until he could fairly well say from a new face what its measurements would be. If he were then given a set of measurements merely written down as such. Does anyone think that even such a specially trained person could form any idea in his mind. Of the racial expression of the face from which the measurements were taken? Of course not. And the same is true of any other expression of race. Another important objective aspect of race finds an analogy in the fashions of female physiognomy. Which come and go in late. In a late urban civilization. When a given female type is held up as an ideal. It is a fact that the kind of women who. Who are sensitive. The kind of woman who is sensitive to this sort of thing. Very soon develops the facial expression of this type in the domain of race. A similar phenomenon exists. Given a race with a certain distinct cosmic beat. Its members develop automatically an instinct for racial beauty. Which affects the choice of mates. And also works on each individual soul from within. So that this double impetus forms the racial type pointing toward a certain ideal. This instinct for racial beauty, needless to say, has no connection with the decadent erotic cults of the Hollywood type. Such ideals are purely individual intellectual and have no connection with race. Race, being an expression of the cosmic, is informed throughout with the urge to continuity. And a racially ideal woman is always thought of quite unconsciously. As the potential mother of strong sons. The racially ideal man is the master who will enrich the life of the woman who secures him as the father of her children. The degenerate eroticism of the Hollywood type is anti racial. Its root idea is not life continuity, but pleasure. With the woman as the object of pleasure and the man as the slave of this object.
- [314:16]
B
That's kind of insightful. You know, he talks about. What is it? He talks about like, different sort of facial expressions as time goes by amongst women. Which is something I've definitely noticed. I. I don't have any specific examples.
- [314:35]
A
It's just.
- [314:36]
B
Just a general comment on that.
- [314:40]
A
All right, where am I? Okay, I think they started 124 the. The. The talk about the degenerate eroticism of the Hollywood type is anti racial. How when a. The racially ideal man is the ma. The master who will enrich the life of the woman who secure him as the father of her children. And how it's basically the exact opposite where in Hollywood the woman is in charge and the man now just becomes a stage slave of his own impulses.
- [315:12]
B
Yeah, he's describing what we call the longhouse. This sort of instinct that Yahi would categorize under his man as animal category, like the sort of earth mother fertility cults is kind of like this lower form of life.
- [315:30]
A
This driving of a race towards its own physical type is one of the great facts with which we. One cannot tamper by trying to substitute ideals of amalgamation with types totally alien, as liberalism and communism try to do during the reign of rationalism. Race cannot be understood if it is inwardly associated with phenomena from other planes of life, such as nationality, politics, people, state, culture. While history in its advance may bring about for a few centuries a strong relationship between race and nation, that is not to say that a preceding racial type always forms a subsequent political unit. If that were so, none of the former nations of Europe would have been formed on the lines they were. For example, think of the racial differences between the Calabrian and Lombard. What did they matter to the history of Garibaldi's time? This brings us to the most important phase of the objective meaning of race. In this age, history narrows or widens the limits of race determinacy. The way this is done is through the spiritual element in race. Thus a group with spiritual and historical community tends to acquire also a racial aspect. The community of which its higher nature partakes is transmitted downward to the lower cosmic part of the human nature. Thus, in Western history, the early nobility tended to constitute itself as a race to complement its unity on the spiritual side. The extent to which this proceeded is still apparent wherever historical continuity of the early nobility has been maintained to the present day.
- [317:19]
B
And he's talking about right there the. Sorry, he's talking about right there the myth, although it's. It was largely based in reality too. But it's like, you know, the idea of. Like the French, the Gobino. Arthur de Gabano talks about this, of how the French aristocracy constituted itself as an entirely different race from the French peasantry. The word. This is where the word Nordic versus Alpenoid kind of gets thrown out.
- [317:43]
A
An important example of this is the creation of the Jewish race that we now know in the millennium of ghetto existence in Europe. Leaving to one side for the moment, a different world outlook and culture of the Jew. This sharing by a group, whatever the basis of its original formation as such of a common fate for centuries will hammer it into a race, into a race as well as a spiritual historical unit. Race influences history by supplying its material, its treasures of blood, honor and strong instincts. History in turn influences race by giving to units of high history a racial stamp as well as their spirit, as their spiritual one. Race is a lower plane of existence in the sense that it is closer to the cosmic, more in touch with the primitive yearnings and urges of life in general. History is the higher plane of existence, where the specifically human and above that, the high cultural, represent the differentiation of forms of life. The method of racialization of an historical unit, as the Western nobilities were racialized, is through the inevitable cosmic rising in such a group of an ideal physical type. And the instinct for racial beauty, which work together through the germ plasm and inwardly in each soul to give this one group its own look that individualizes it in the stream of history. Once this community of fate departs through the vicissitudes of history, this race vanishes also, never to appear again.
- [319:22]
B
You know, kind of on this is. It's like, what is this racialization of a historical unit? And basically every. Every so often you have this group that comes about and differentiates itself physically. And then it dissolves, disappears. The example that comes to my mind immediately is. You ever seen those like ancient Sumerian kings who had these like, cylindrical beards? You know what I'm talking about?
- [319:47]
A
I know exactly what you're talking about.
- [319:49]
B
And you, it's just. You never see them anymore. You know, you. It's. It's. I don't know. I don't know if it's. If it was such a way of, like that. Of how they groomed it, but it's just that's, that's. That's an example that kind of passed away with them.
- [320:03]
A
Yeah, yeah. Egyptian too. Seems like some, like the pharaohs. A lot of the pharaohs had beards that were in the same style as well.
- [320:12]
B
Exactly. Yeah.
- [320:14]
A
Part four. From this point, the fundamental misunderstanding of the 19th century materialistic interpretation of race appears clear and distinct. Race is not group anatomy. Race is not independent of the soil. Race is not independent of spirit and history. Races are not classifiable except on an arbitrary basis. Race is not a rigid, permanent, collective characterization of human beings which remains always the same throughout history. The 20th century outlook based on based on facts and not on the preconceptions of physics and mechanics, sees race as fluid gliding over history, over the fixed skeletal form determined by the soil. Just as history comes and goes, so does race with it bound in a symbiosis of happening. The peasants now tilling the soil near Persepolis are of the same race as those who planted or roam there a thousand years before Darius, regardless of what they were called then or what they are called now. And in the time between, a high culture fulfilled itself in this area, creating races now gone forever.
- [321:25]
B
This is kind of like. This is, this is the another thing that Yaki talks about. Like what he's describing here is what's called the fellaheen, you know, a sort of what is it like? Or, or, you know, you could see it as the sort of the French, the French peasants as opposed to the French nobility. You know, it's like, it's like there is a sort of perpetual people tied to a soil that never kind of vanish. You know, they're a lower people. They are not a. They're not capable of high artistic achievements just simply because that's not what they are. And then these high cultures are very small aristocracies of, of race, as Yaqui puts it, who differentiate themselves in such a way of, of. Of what is it? Soil, spirit and history and physical differentiation. And then it vanishes away. Like none of the Persians of, you know, of Darius's day live around where Persepolis sits now. None of the Romans of Caesar's day live really in Latium anymore. You know, that's kind of, you know, even if genetically there are still markers there. It's, it's, it's like, it's like, you know, when Tony Soprano says you're looking at the Romans, like everyone knows that's just not true because the Romans are gone forever, basically. You know, they were a. They were a flash of. Of, you know, they were a flash of historical moment and then passed away. Like every other high culture passes away, you know.
- [322:53]
D
Right.
- [322:53]
A
And I think we all know this instinctively. It doesn't matter if an Englishman. An Englishman now, what does an Englishman now share with an Englishman of, you know, 400 years ago? Maybe DNA.
- [323:12]
D
Yeah.
- [323:13]
A
Do they share a culture? Yeah. The last era, the confusing of names which you. Which with unities of history or race, was one of the most destructive made by 19th century materialism. Names belongs to the surface of history, not to its rhythmic cosmic side. If the present day inhabitants of Greece have the same collective name that the population of the same area had in Aristotle's time. Is anyone deceived into thinking that there is a historical continuity or racial continuity? Names, like languages have their own destinies and these destinies are independent of others. Thus, from the common language, it should not be inferred that the inhabitants of Haiti and those of Quebec have a common origin. But this result would occur of necessity if 19th century methods were applied to the present, which we know as well as to interpretation of the past from leftover names and languages. The inhabitants of Yucatan today are racially the Same as in 100 A.D. even though they now speak Spanish and then spoke and now vanished tongue. Even though they have a different name now. From then in between occurred the rise, fulfillment and wiping out of a high culture. But after its passing, race became one once more. The primeval simple relationship between stock and landscape. There was no high history to influence it or for it to influence. In the time of the Egyptian culture, a people called the Libyans gave their name to an area. Does that mean that whoever inhabits this are this are from then unrelated to them? The Prussians in the year 1000 AD were an extra European people. In 1700, the name Prussia described the nation in the Western style. Western conquerors merely acquired the name of the tribes. They displaced that which went under the various names of Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Jutes, Varangians, Saxons, Vandals, Norsemen, Danes came from the same racial material, but the names do not show it. Sometimes a group gives its name to an area so that after it is displaced, the old name passes to the conquering group. This was the case of Prussia and Britain. Sometimes a group takes its name from an area like the Americans.
- [325:43]
B
That's a, that's another thing. This is why when I, when I, I get into arguments with people and I say that Americans are a living culture because they are, you know, there Pete. There are plenty of Americans alive today. And you know, America as a conception itself, itself, you know, it's part of this sort of great continuity. Its origins are Anglo Saxon largely, generally with you know, other, other little things thrown in. But it's, it's specifically the Anglo Saxons when just thrown into the soil of the United States basically.
- [326:19]
A
Yeah, yeah.
- [326:20]
B
Anyway, keep going.
- [326:21]
A
I, no, I agree and yeah, I, I'm to trying. Trying to put together some thoughts on writing a paper about what American is. Actually my idea of what American is examining some, some other writers from, from history, some other thinkers. As far as the race history symbiosis is concerned, names are accidental they do not indicate any sort of inward continuity by themselves. The same is true of language. Once the idea is grasped that what we call history really means high history, that this is the history of high cultures, and that these high cultures or organic unities, expressing their inner possibilities in the profuse forms of thought and happening which lie before us. A deep understanding follows of the way in which history uses whatever human material lies to hand for its fulfillment. It puts its impress on this material by creating historical units out of the group, hitherto often very diverse biologically. The historical unity, in harmony with cosmic rhythms governing all life from plant to culture, acquires its own racial unity, a new racial unity removed by its spiritual historical content from the former primitive, simple relationship between stock and soil. But with the departure of high history, the fulfillment of the culture, the spiritual historical content recedes forever and the primitive harmony resumes its dominant position. The previous biological. The previous biological history of the groups taken by a high culture played no role in this process. Previous names of indigenous tribes, previous wanderings, linguistic equipment, none have any meaning for high history. Once it sets upon its course, it starts, so to speak, from a clean slate. But it remains this way also in its ability to take in whatever elements enter into its spirit. New elements, however, can bring nothing to the culture. It is higher individuality and thus has its own unity, which cannot even be influenced other than superficially by an organism of equivalent rank and f and a and a 40 fortiori cannot be changed in the slightest in its inner nature by any human group. Thus any group coming within the area of a culture is either within the spirit of the culture or without it. There is no third alternative. Organic alternatives are always only two life or death, sickness or health, forward development or distortion. When the organism is put off its true path by external influences, crisis is bound to follow. Crisis, which will affect the entire life of the culture and will often involve the destiny of millions in confusion and catastrophe. But this is an anticipation, participation. The objective meaning of race has other aspects important to a 20th century outlook. It has been seen that races, meaning here primitive groupings, simple relationships between soil and human stock, have different gifts for historical purposes. We have seen that race influences history as well as the converse. We come to the hierarchy of races. Part 5. The materialist could of course, not succeed with all their attempts to make an anatomical classification of races. But races can be classified according to functional abilities, starting from any given function whatever. Thus a hierarchy of races can be based on physical strength, and there is little doubt that the Negro would stand at the Top of such a hierarchy. There would, however, be no point in such a hierarchy because physical strength is not the essence of human nature in general and even less of culture, man in particular. The fundamental impulse of human nature, above the instincts towards self preservation and sex, which man shares with other life forms, is the will to power. Very seldom is there any struggle for existence among men. Such struggles as do occur are nearly always for control, for power. These take place within couples and families, clans, tribes and among peoples, nations, states. Therefore, the basing of a hierarchy of races on strength of will to power has a relation to historical realities. Let me keep going.
- [331:14]
B
Yeah, I mean, in this. In this part, I think it's best to have him kind of speak for himself.
- [331:19]
A
Yeah. Such a hierarchy can have, of course, no eternal validity. Thus, the school of Gobanow, Chamberlain, Osbom and Grant was on the same tangent as the materialist who announced that there is no such thing as race because they could not discover it with their methods. The. The mistake of the former was to assume the permanence backwards and forwards of races existing in their time. They were treating races as building blocks, original material and ignoring the connections of race and history, race and spirit, race and destiny.
- [331:57]
B
So here he's. He's talking about. When he mentions Gavin O. Chamberlain, Osborne and Grant, Arthur de Gabano and Madison, Grant being the two I'm more familiar with. He's talking about These sort of 1920s capital P, progressive, eugenic sort of race types, you know, and he's. Yaqui is essentially saying that, like, look, these guys are wrong because they assume that the races that existed in their time have existed perpetually. And they also placed too much of a primacy on the biological as opposed to the. As opposed to the historical, spiritual and. And inner destiny portions of race. What Jaqui is outlining here,
- [332:42]
A
I'm going to keep going. But at least they recognize the existing racial realities of their time. Their sole mistake consisting in regarding these realities as rigid. Existing rather than becoming. Existing rather than becoming. There was also in their approach, a remnant of genealogical thinking. But this sort of thinking is intellectual and not historical. For history uses the human material at hand without questioning its antecedents. And in the process of using it. This human material is placed in relation to the vast mystical force of destiny. This remainder of genealogical thinking tended to create divisions in thought between culture peoples, corresponding to no division in actuality. The further materialistic tendency developed to extend. Extend the principles of heredity which Mendel had worked out for certain plants to this to the subject of human of human race. Such a tendency was doomed to be fruitless. And after almost a century of barren results, it must be abandoned in favor of the 20th century outlook, which approaches history and its materials in the historical spirit and not in the scientific spirit of mechanics or geology. Nevertheless, the school of Gabono at least started from a fact, and this brings it much closer to reality than the learned fools who looked up from their rulers and charts to announce the demise of race. The fact was the hierarchy of races for cultural purpose. The fact that this fact was the hierarchy of races for cultural purposes. In their day, the word culture was used to designate literature and the fine arts, as distinct from this, from the ugly, brutal things like economics, technics, war and politics. Hence, the center of gravity of these theories was on the side of intellect, Rather than on the side of the soul. With the coming of the 20th century outlook and the clearing from the air of all materialistic romantic theories, the unity of culture was perceived through all of its various manifestations of arts, philosophy, religion, science, technics, politics, state forms, race forms, war. Therefore, the hierarchy of races in this century is one based on degree of will to power. The classification of races is also arbitrary from the intellectual standpoint, Just as much as one based on physical strength. It is, however, the only one suitable for us in this age. Nor is it rigid, for the vicissitudes of history Are more important in this realm than hereditary transmitted qualities. There is today no Hindu race, although there once was. The name is a byproduct of an accomplished history and corresponds to no racial group. Nor is there a Basque race, a Breton race, a Hessian race, an Andalusian race, Bavarian race, Austrian race. Similarly, races existing today in our western civilization Will also disappear with the advance of history over them. The source of a hierarchy of races is history. The forces of happening. Thus, when we see a European population with its own racial stamp, The English hold down a population of hundreds of millions of Asiatics for two centuries with only a handful of its own troops, as the English did. India, we call that race, one with a high degree of will to power. During the 19th century, amid 300 million Asiatics, England had a tiny garrison of 65,000 white troops. The mere numbers would mislead if we did not know that England was a nation in the service of a high culture, and India a mere landscape with primitive millions teeming in it. A landscape that had been also at one time the area of a high culture such as our. Such as our own, but had long since returned to its pre cultural primitivity. Within the ruins and monuments of the past. Knowing this, we know thereby that the source of this stern will to power is at least partially in the force of the destiny of the culture of which England was an extreme expression. When we see a race like the Spanish send forth two bands like the Cortez and Pizarro and read of their accomplishments, we know we are in the presence of a race with high willpower. With a hundred odd men, Bizarro set out to overcome an empire of millions. The project of Cortez was of a like boldness and both achieved military success. It is not a slave race that can do such things. Aztec and Indo were no and Inca were no raceless populations, but were themselves the vehicle of another high culture. A fact which makes these exploits almost incredible. The French race in the time of the Revolution and Napoleonic wars was in the service of a cultural idea. The mission of changing the whole direction from culture to civilization, of opening the age of rationalism. The enormous force which this living idea went to the armies of France is shown by the 20 year succession of military victories over all the armies that repeated coalitions of all Europe could throw against them. Under Napoleon's personal command, they achieved victory in more than enough. In more than 145 out of 150 engagements. A race equal to such a test was one of high willpower. In each of these cases, the race was one created by history. In such a unit, the word race contains the two elements the stock, landscape, relationship and the spiritual community of history and cultural idea. They are, so to speak, stratified. Beneath is the strong primitive beat of the cosmic rhythm in a particular stock. Above is the molding creating driving destiny of a high culture. When Charles of and when Charles of Anjou beheaded Corrigan the last Hohen stock. I always get this one.
- [339:18]
B
Conradin the last Hohenstaufen emperor.
- [339:22]
A
The last hohenstaufen Emperor. In 1267, Germany disappeared from western history as a unit within of political significance for 500 years, reappearing in the 18th century in the double form of Austria and Prussia. During these centuries, the high history of Europe was made by other powers, mostly with their own blood. This meant that in comparison with the vast expenditure of blood over the generations of the others, Germany was spared. To understand the significance of this fact, we must go back to the purely biological origin of races of Europe. Part six. The primeval population streams which came out of the north of the eurasiatic landmass from 2000 BC right down to 1000 AD and after were probably of related stock barbarians called the Cassites conquered the remains of the Babylonian culture about 1700 BC. The next century, northern barbarians, called Hyksos by the Egyptians, threw themselves at the ruins of the Egyptian civilization and subjected it to their rule in India. The Aryans, also a northern barbaric horde, conquered the Indian culture. The populations which. Which appeared in Europe over the millennium and a half, ending 1000 AD under the various name, under the various names. Franks, Angles, Goths, Saxons, Celts, Visigoths, Ostrogoths, Lombards, Belga. Is that Belgae?
- [341:04]
B
Yep, you got it.
- [341:05]
A
Norsemen, Northmen, Vikings, Danes, Varangians, Germani, Alamani. Alamani. Two tones and other names are all of similar stock. It is very probable that the conquerors of the older civilizations eastward were of similar stock with the western barbarians who threatened Rome for centuries and finally sacked it. The great sign of this stock was blondness. Wherever today blonde traits are found, Elements of this northern stock have at least some past time found their way. These northern barbarians conquered the adventure.
- [341:42]
B
Okay, so, yeah, so this is something, what Yaqui is describing here, he's describing, of course, the Indo European migrations which occurred a couple of thousand years before the birth of Christ. And he hits on something very insightful, is that it's very likely that there were earlier invaders who founded east more eastern high cultures. For example, there's I think, a significant amount of evidence that the Yellow Emperor who founded China, as we understand it, was blonde. Like that was the reason he was called the Yellow Emperor. You know, it's the same thing with the Aryans in India, although that was much later. But like, you know, Yaqui is just describing. And once again, this is because he. A lot of these archaeological findings did not occur until much later, but they serve to even further vindicate Yaqui rather than, rather than contradict him. Because the Yamnaya, what are called the Yamnaya migrations or the Indo Aryan migrations, are actually one of the more recent ones. Prior to them, there was the Celtic migrations, which were of the exact same stock, even though they had red hair prior to them. There were even earlier migrations of this same group of people as early as very possibly 8,000 B.C. some say even earlier than that. So, so, you know, what Yaki is describing here is that it's like any, every high culture that comes into being on earth very likely comes from some related stock of these sorts of people.
- [343:22]
A
It certainly seems so. When you, when you really start examining this and nailing this down from everything that I've been Reading Lately, these northern barbarians conquered the indigenous populations of all Europe, constituting themselves an upper stratum supplying the leadership, fighting men and laws wherever they went. Thus they represented the ruling stratum in the territories now known as Spain, Italy, France, Germany, England. Their numerical proportion was greater in some places than in others. And with the rising of the western culture circa 1000 A.D. it was on this strong willed primitive stratum that the idea took hold. From having been the conqueror of fulfilled civilizations, this doc now was itself selected to fulfill the destiny of a high culture. That which distinguished this primitive biological population stream is its strong will. It is also this strong will, and not only the inner idea of the culture itself, that contributes to Western history the unique forcefulness of all its mana, of its manifestations in all directions of thought and action. Think of the Vikings in the gray dawn of our history, reaching America from Europe in their tiny ships. This is the sort of human material which contributed its blood to the Western races, peoples and nations. It is to this treasure of being that the west owes its prowess on the battlefield. And this fact is known all over the world, whether it is theoretically denied or not. Ask any general in any army whether he would rather have under his command a division of soldiers from Pomerania or a division of Negroes.
- [345:11]
B
Unhappily Funny, funny, fun fact on that Good. During World War II, the there was one infantry division that the United States army fielded, the 92nd Infantry Division, also called the Buffalo Soldiers. They fought in the Italian theater and they were the worst performing infantry division of all of the infantry divisions in the European theater of operations. It was not just the European theater, but the entire in both theaters speakers they were just that bad.
- [345:45]
A
No comment. Unhappily for the west, the Russian populations contain also a strong strain of this northern barbarian stock. It is not in the service of a high culture, but stands to us as did the Gauls to Republican and Imperial Rome. Race is material for events and it is available to the will to the will to annihilate as freely as it is the will to create. The northern barbarian stock in Russia is still barbarian. And its negative mission has given it its own racial stamp. History has created a Russian race which is steadily widening its racial boundaries by taking up into it and impressing with its historical mission of destruction the population streams of its vast territory and the hierarchy of races based on will to power. The new Russian race stands high. This race needs no moralistic propaganda to fan its militancy. Its barbarian instincts are there and can be relied on by its leaders. Because of the fluid nature of race. Even the hierarchy of races based on will to power cannot succeed in ordering all races now existing. For instance, would the Sikhs stand above the Sengolese or below the American Negroes? Above or below the Aymara Indians? But the whole purpose of understanding the varying degrees of will to power in different races is a practical one and applies in the first instance to our own Western civilization. Can this knowledge be used? The answer is that not only is that not only it can, but it must be if the west is to live out its lifespan and not pass, and not to pass into slavery to Asiatic annihilation hordes under the leadership of Russia, Japan or some other militant race. Before this information can be applied with full insight and with no danger of old fashioned misunderstanding, the subjective meaning of race must be examined. And beyond its ideas is con. Connoted by terms, by the terms people, nation and state. Thus ends the chapter.
- [348:05]
B
It's a, it's a. I wasn't commenting so much there at the end because there, there wasn't much I could say beyond what he was saying. Like, you know, I guess I could just restate it. Yaki is essentially describing here is that the, you know, when he uses the word history a lot. I think the proper way for the audience to understand history is something that Thomas once told me was that history is the cunning of God's reason. You know, history is, is basically, you know, if you want to see how smart God is, you just go study history, right? And then that gives you a thousand examples of how just intelligent God is, and you only like, start to scratch the surface. And so it's like, and so it's like, how could a group of a hundred, essentially bandits from this, you know, barbarian warlord kingdom in the Iberian peninsula conquer an empire of millions twice? You know, how could that happen? How could the British empire hold India as a stable populace underneath their rule with 65, 000 soldiers? You know, how could all of this occur? All of this occurs simply because
- [349:29]
D
history
- [349:30]
B
demanded it for the continual writing of the story, you know, and because it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it, it worked because essentially God just said, yeah, this is how it's going to happen for a little while. And I'm going to give these people the gifts necessary through whatever earthly means. Those gifts are endowed upon people in order to achieve this kind of, this kind of high cultural status. You know, in Yaki outlines how, how there were sort of different phases of western high culture and different branches of the of the Western high culture tree had prominence at different times. In the early, early days it was the Germanic medieval Holy Roman Empire, which Spain then fulfilled. Then you had the Italians as the antithesis, the French as the antithesis. You know, and you know, the, the English with their ideas and in essence and all the way up until the germans in the 20th century is that it's like different branches of this same sort of tree all had primacy at different periods and shaped kind of the path and I guess filters of Western high culture during their period of primacy. And then they passed away and another branch took over and it kept going like that. So I mean, but like other than that, it's like. And Yaki's. Yaki's essentially saying. And one of the things Yockey talks about in other chapters is the idea of culture distortion. All right, that is the big thing Yocky adds to the kind of the Spanglerian Toynbee thesis of high cultural cycles is that hey, a high culture doesn't have to either, you know, mummify or collapse in fiery death. It could actually get like a viral pathogen that kind of start, that starts basically giving it amnesia, that starts sapping very slowly or very quickly the historical self definition of that culture. In much the same way that a virus hijacks healthy cells and turns them into virus factories. You know, that's, that's, that's kind of what Yaqui is talking about here. And he's basically saying is that the understanding of this must be used because basically if the west continues falling to this sort of cultural pathogen, the barbarian peoples, which he exemplifies as Russia, the Japanese, the Chinese, the various oriental peoples, will basically place. Will basically place the Western European peoples under total slavery.
- [352:16]
A
Maybe one of these days. I know you informed me before we started recording that you're about to get a lot busier and recordings could be, you know, more infrequent, but we'll probably have to be pretty careful about it. But read his section on culture distortion because that's when you can really paints a picture that if you, if you have eyes to see and ears to hear you, you know, basically you'll understand what happened in the last 80 years
- [352:54]
B
if you put it on Odyssey. We can talk freely about it.
- [352:57]
A
Yeah, well, I don't put anything on YouTube anymore. So I put like a 30 second clip and then I put Odyssey. Odyssey links and Odyssey Rumble and Bitchute Links Rumble. It could get even spicy for, for Rumble. But yeah, that would hopefully it would open people's eyes because Once you read that section, you pretty much have an idea. And I think what's very interesting about this section right here is he's writing this in 48, and by 54 and 55, he's basically saying he chooses Russia over the United States, Which is.
- [353:42]
B
Well, you know, he. He did say that. And that's a point of disagreement I have with. That's a point of disagreement I have with him. I understand why he says it. And in, in addition, he says that generally in pamphlets he was writing too. He wasn't writing originally in English. He was writing them in German to, you know, Third Reich survivors. That's the same thing with the enemies of Europe, too. Like, you have to understand is like Imperium was a book he wrote originally in English for an Anglo American audience. The Enemy of Europe and other later publications he wrote in German for a basically Reich exile audience and German resistance audience. And so he takes different tones because ya knew how to shoot.
- [354:36]
A
He.
- [354:37]
B
He made propaganda for Gamal Abdul al Nasser. Like, he knows how to switch the tone based upon who he's writing to. But I do believe that Yaqui did not like him. And H. Keith Thompson had similar opinions of how the United States is basically just totally. It's totally, like, done. It's washed out. There's no other option. It's compromised. And maybe it's because I think they didn't look at it or think about it within their own system that whenever a high cultures. This is something Yockey says elsewhere in the book. Whenever a high culture's populace is hollowed out, if, like, someone tries to kill all of it, you know, within a generation or two, it's back because history demands it to be present. And so it will simply just create new individuals to take up that mantle. And I think that's happening in the United States right now. You are starting to see, you know, just the shift in the culture. You are starting to see. I, you know, Yaqui talks a lot about the culture bearing stratum. This is generally the. These are the group of people of race who possess race. When Yaqui talks about race, he doesn't talk about it as a trait that, that you are born with, but rather a trait you possess by virtue of refinement, of being a part of culture, of understanding culture, of living culture, you know, of, you know, listen. Being able to listen to a Bach piece and feel some kind of emotion from it and understand it in. And understand it at the same time, you know, or reading a line from a novel and getting this amazing Mental vista or looking at a piece of Rembrandt and understanding what Rembrandt was trying to say with it. That's, that's what culture is. And you're starting to see that in the United States more and more. And that's because I think quite simply the high culture of the west demands it to exist somewhere. And it's found that America is probably the only place that it will exist. And so America, you know, Yaqui talks a lot about how the western high culture has been a progression from the medieval Teutons to the Spaniards to the French to the English, to the Germans. And I believe that either the conclusion or the beginning or perhaps both will be with the Americans. And that's, that's why I, I pushed this so much.
- [357:05]
A
All right, what do you have to plug? You better get it right this time. I don't want to have to correct you.
- [357:12]
B
You're all good. Subscribe to the Old Glory Club. Follow the Old Glory Club. If you're interested in joining an Old Glory Club chapter or creating an Old Glory Club chapter, you need five members, you know, who are not previously affiliated with the Old Glory Club. Please email the T H E Old O L D Glory G L O R Y C L U B Club mail.com that's theoldgloryclub gmail.com Send us an email. Or if you just want to get in contact with other anons who might be in your area, we're trying to do this. We've already gotten about, we've got maybe four chapters in the works right now in all sorts of places across the United States. We've got several other ones in the process of being filed. You know, ladies and gentlemen, if, if you, if you want to be a part of something fraternal of something where the people have basically been pre vetted by everyone else, where we can kind of automate social trust within this sphere, join the Old Glory Club. Both myself and Pete are members. I'd say it's one of my proudest memberships that I hold and I'm, you know, and I really. If any of you all want something to do with that, please do that. In terms of me personally, buy my book A Country Squire's Notebook. It's a collection of short stories on my gumroad. Yeah, I mean that's the, I mean my Twitter and my sub stack maybe, but I don't do anything on my sub stack and my Twitter is a garbage pit. So, you know, you could, you could, you could do those if you'd like and subscribe and follow all of these. Pete's stuff. Give him money. Give him money. Give them. Yeah, I want all of your spare income going into Pete's bank account. He's got a lot of things he's got to pay for.
- [358:58]
A
The new house is quite the expense. But I don't want to say money pit because it's a, it's a beautiful home, but it's like, you know, you know what it's like.
- [359:12]
D
Yeah, sure.
- [359:13]
A
I appreciate that though. And please go subscribe to the Old Glory Club substack. And if you can, if you have it, subscribe monetarily too. It's the articles, just constant, constant content coming out of there. And this will be coming out tomorrow, Thursday and we'll be doing a live stream at, at 8pm Eastern like we do every Thursday night and going over the, going over the week's news and usually something completely insane and irrational that we can all laugh about.
- [359:51]
C
Foreign.
- [359:52]
B
It's a great time. Pony Express Radio, the number one, the number one American group based podcast on this scene right now.
- [360:00]
C
Take a look.
- [360:01]
B
Check it out. It's great. We've got, we've got great aesthetics, we've got great humor, we got great guests. Really, the Old Glory Club is, is I'm, I'm really proud that we've gotten it going and I'm really proud that it's gotten such a great reception. So it's, and it's here for all of you. So if you want to be a part of it, just contact us and will help you out.
- [360:20]
A
And I can't wait for the first event
- [360:24]
B
in the works.
- [360:25]
A
Appreciate you, Paul. Thank you.
- [360:27]
B
Thank you, Mr. Pete. Have a very good evening.
- [360:31]
A
I want to welcome everyone back to the Picanono Show. We're going to talk more about Yaqui. So who am I going to have on but Paul Fahrenheit? How you doing, Paul?
- [360:41]
B
Thank you, Mr. Pete. You know, it's, it's, it's, it's like, you know, I like being the sort of, you know, Sam batch. Used to make the joke that he was the Warren Zevon of the, of the, you know, Rebel Yell podcast. And I, I like to think I'm kind of like your, your Warren Zevon of the Pete Quinones Show. You can always just call me to talk about more Yaqui and I'll always, I'll always be there.
- [361:05]
A
Yeah. Well, we're going to get into a section of Imperium today that's entitled Cultural Parasitism. But before we go And I think this is a good way to start. And I know you can do this. It won't take you too long to do this. Can you explain to everybody, before we get into this, the difference when Yaqui talks about culture and talks about nation, the difference between those two?
- [361:30]
B
Yeah. So when Yaqui uses the word culture, he's generally referring within the Spenglerian context to the sort of high cultural civilization, which is more of a metaphysical thing. It's a spirit that manifests itself. When he's talking about the nation, he's using it in the sort of. In the Greek word ethno sense. That's kind of what he's referring to. So it's sort of like the higher ideal form of the civilization itself, the sort of the form of being. And then the nation is the. Is the genetic stock.
- [362:04]
C
That makes sense.
- [362:05]
D
That up.
- [362:06]
A
All right, all right, let me get into this. Let's start sharing this. And of course, this is such a weird. It is not sharing directly. All right, there we go. Enough of my complaining. All right, Stop me whenever I think we said before we started this. We're gonna. This is six sections, and we're gonna work on getting three knocked out today and look at three in the future. So two for the price of one. Yeah. It's from Yaki's imperium on the section of culture parasitism. In the chapter on the outlook on politics, the condition in which persons thinking privately affect public affairs was called parasite politics. The example was given of Lady Pompidou throwing France into a war against the Great Frederick because he had dubbed her with an uncomplimentary name before all Europe. In this war, France lost its overseas empire to England because it was fighting in Europe and. And devoting less effort to the great Imperial War than to the local European war. This is the usual result of parasite politics.
- [363:11]
B
I'm gonna stop you after this first paragraph because this central thesis is the most important idea throughout this entire section. All right, this is Yaqui basically, in essence, describing what he means by culture parasitism. And what that is is you are using the state. You are using public sort of enemies, public issues, public political issues, as a stick to resolve your own private. Which is out of whack. It is totally out of order. As a matter of fact, it's kind of, you know, in a properly ordered. You had a Mahler and. And woe on recently. I love their podcast. They talk a lot about headship and a properly ordered civilization. In a properly ordered civilization, private affairs are Always put to the side are always subsumed whenever public affairs come about, whenever you have the reverse. That is a very confused and a very. Let's just say it's a compromised political system. And he gives the example of France in the middle of the 18th century. The Seven Years War essentially killed France as a world defining great power. And, and ensure that instead of France, England would be the world defining great power. And I mean of course history only ever goes one way. There's only ever one line to history. But you know, this, this was caused by Lady Pompadou essentially influencing the court with her petty envious bs. And this is, this is, this is what Yaqui is talking about when he talks about culture parasitism. Is certain sections within any given state using their private resentments or was it using the state and the functions of power to resolve their private resentments instead of. For the good of what you would call the. I guess the commonwealth or the polity or the whole. Which is what everyone is thinking of in any well ordered society. You have any thoughts on that, Pete?
- [365:11]
D
No.
- [365:11]
A
That's great. That's great. Yeah. This is. We clearly seen today and I think anyone who's has been noticing what's going on probably has an idea where this is headed.
- [365:24]
B
Yeah.
- [365:24]
A
So.
- [365:25]
C
All right.
- [365:26]
A
A nation is an idea, but it is a mere part of the greater idea of the culture which creates it in the process of its own actualization. But precisely as a nation can be the host of to groups and powerful individuals who think in complete independence of the fulfillment of the national idea, so can a culture. Everyone is familiar with parasite politics in a nation and everyone understands it when he becomes aware of it. When the Greek Capodistria was. Was it capodestria capitalistria?
- [366:01]
B
I think, I think so.
- [366:02]
A
Was secretary for Foreign affairs in Russia. He was not expected to execute an anti Greek policy during the Boxer Rebellion in China, no Western power thought of giving a command to a Chinese general. In the American war against Japan 1941 through 45, the Americans did not use their Japanese conscripts. Just as Europe discovered in the first two world wars that it could not use Slavic Bohemians against Russia. American generals would not dare to use their Mexicans against Mexico or their Negroes against Abyssinia. Nor in a period of war preparation against Russia would a known Russian sympathizer be given public power in America. Much less would Americans turn over the entire government to known Russian immigrants.
- [366:49]
B
Okay, I. I know we're only like three paragraphs in Pete, but this is one of Those that like, there are just so many ideas. That specific line there. When the Greek Capodistria was Secretary for Foreign affairs in Russia, he was not expected to execute an anti Greek policy. In the absolute insanity world we live in now, the United States sort of, at least the United States government sort of expects foreign powers to like, at least pretend to be against their own interests or not even, not outright say it, but like basically pretend that they're country's best interests are whatever the United States wants. Like, not only are you supposed to play ball with the United States and give us what you want, you actually have to pretend that what we want is actually the best thing for you too. Which is insane. And it's, you know, it's one of the, you know, there's the famous Thomas, you know, Thomas saying about America forcing you to negotiate with Hillary Clinton in a pantsuit. Like, you know, Caligula forcing you to salute his horse. That is why so many people have so much resentment towards the United States. And the thing is, is it's, it's not, it's. Once again, it's not the people, it's, it's the fact that our government is overrun. And it didn't used to be this way. Even in the Cold War, it didn't used to be this way. This is a new development. Like, you know, when Kissinger was running the White House, he didn't, he didn't pull stuff like this. You know, back when the WASP establishment was in, they weren't doing stuff like this. They understood realpolitik. This is new. This is ever since I think like the 19, you know, nine. I think since the Soviet Union fell, this is what's been the case. But anyway, keep going, Pete.
- [368:38]
A
Yeah, I think since the Soviet Union fell, it's just a totally new paradigm. Famously, Pat Buchanan was like, okay, time to take care of America, build our economy. Let's be that light to the world. Let's be the strength in the world. Let's not be, let's not be the police of the world. And they just went from one enemy to the next. They went from the Soviet to Islam.
- [369:05]
C
Yep.
- [369:07]
A
All right. A phenomena of this type reflect the general fact that a man and group remains what it is, even though taken into another group unless assimilated. Assimilation is the demise of a group. Quad group. The bloodstream of the individuals comprising it continues, but the group is gone. As long as it was a group, it was foreign.
- [369:31]
B
You know, I'm going to just throw in a quick example of that. That's how the, you know, people talk about all the tribes of Israel. The tribe of Judah was just one tribe. There was the northern tribes and then like the tribe of Judah and the kingdom of Judah. That's how the Assyrians basically exterminated. I think it was, it was 10 tribes. It was the 10 northern tribes. Yeah, that's how they basically ended all of them was they picked up some of them and put them elsewhere and they brought in foreign peoples and mixed their bloodlines and created the Samaritans. The, the Samaritans were a wholly novel people. And that's why the tribe of Judah looked down on them at the time of Christ, is because the Samaritans were essentially mudbloods mixed with people from deeper within the Assyrian empire.
- [370:19]
A
Correct. In our examination of race, we saw that physical differences are no barrier to assimilation, but that a cultural barrier is. Examples are the Baltic Germans and the Volga Germans, cut off in primitive Russia, Chinese and Japanese in America, Negroes in America and in South Africa. The British in India, the Parsis in India, the Jews in the Western civilization and in Russia, the Hindus in Natal.
- [370:46]
D
Cultural parasitism arises in the same way
- [370:49]
A
that parasitism arises in politics. A parasite is simply a life form which lives in or on the body of another life form at its expense. It involves thus the direction of the part of the energy of the host into a direction alien to its interest. This is quite inevitable. If the energy of an organism is being spent for something other than its own development, it is being wasted. Parasitism is inevitably harmful to the host. The host increases in proportion to the growth and spread of the parasite.
- [371:25]
B
Well, what, what's a virus, Pete? You know, a virus is not a living thing. It's essentially a line of corrupted code. And what it does is it hijacks cells within your body and changes them by rewriting their code and turns them into virus factories. It's this exact same thing here. A virus is a parasite and it's to your own detriment.
- [371:48]
A
Any group which takes no part in the culture feeling, but which lives within the culture body necessarily involves a loss to the culture. Such groups form areas of anesthetic tissue, as it were, in the culture body. Such a group, by standing outside the historical necessity, the destiny of the culture inevitably militates against that destiny. This phenomenon is in no way dependent on human will. The parasite is spiritually without, but physically within. The effects on the host organism are deleterious both physically and spiritually. The first physical effect of non participating groups within the body of A culture is that the numbers of the culture population are thereby reduced. The members of the alien group take the place of individuals belonging to the culture who thus never come to be born. It reduces artificially the numbers of the culture populations by the numbers of the parasitic group. In animal and human parasitism, one of the numerous effects on the host is the loss of nourishment. And cultural parasitism is analogous. By reducing the number of culture individuals, a culture parasite is depriving the cultural idea of the only form of physical nourishment. It needs a constant supply of human material adequate to its life task.
- [373:18]
B
This is, I think, one of the best ways to describe what he's talking about. You know the saying, you can take the boy out of the hood, but you can't take the hood out of the boy.
- [373:28]
A
I know that very well.
- [373:29]
B
Yeah, you can take a bunch of Indians and put them in South Africa, but they're still gonna, like, turn South Africa into, like, a corner of India, because that's their coding. That's what they are. That's what they do. Doesn't matter. Like magic. Dirt is not a real thing. Human beings are possessed by larger culture forms which their genetics are also possessed by in service of. Because when God created the races, he created them with different ways of doing things. And that's inherent to them. They, you know, that's why. And. And there's levels to this. But basically, you know, when. When yaqui is talking about when something is parasitized, right, there is finite resources. There is a carrying capacity of populations within a certain area. All right, when the United States brought in all of the immigrants of the world, that ended the world that ended sort of the world of the 20 of the 1910s, this brilliant age, if you just look at the photographs, everyone looks like they're super fit. Everyone was basically 140 IQ, it seems all of this other stuff that ended once mass immigration started, because these other groups, while some of them, some of them were a lot closer to the cultural idea of the United States and could and were of a similar enough genetic stock that they could somewhat change themselves. And the United States was blessed to basically be almost entirely Northwest European Protestants, which, if you take a bunch of Swedes and put them in England, they're going to do fine. If you take a bunch of Germans and put them in, like, Holland, they're going to be fine. You know, if you take a bunch of, like, Dutchmen and put them in the United States, they're going to be fine. These are not, not Foreign cultural ideas to each other. There's slight variations, however, you can tweak those variations. It's within the same sort of, you know, range, if that makes sense to you, Mr. Pete. But if you take a bunch of, let's say, you know, and, and even the meds, to a certain extent you could, you could say they're on the borderline, but even the meds to a certain extent could do this. Not to the same degree as a northwest European, but to a certain extent they could. This is just a matter of how much they can. If you take someone from the east, if you take a bunch of Slavs, they can't, they don't do it the same way. They're still weird, they're still wacky. You know, if you take a bunch of Chinamen, you know, the United States. The only law banning a specific ethnicity in the United States ever was the Chinese exclusionary acts. They were the only ethnicity ever specifically banned from entering the United States. We passed two of them. Them, we did two of them. And so what Yaki is saying by this is that by them taking up this physical space geographically within this sort
- [376:25]
C
of area,
- [376:29]
B
by, by them doing that, they prevent life forms, what was it they prevent, like people who would have been of the native culture from being born in the first place. This is like for example, DEI and certain slots being taken away from those who are not as materially wealthy within. Universities have prevented very smart and intelligent young guys who are old stock Americans from getting the education that could develop their intelligence, that could make them into whatever it was that they could have then done to contribute to the culture. This is what cultural parasitism is. It replaces them with, you know, it replaces them with just, with just foreign, foreign entities who don't, aren't a part of the same cultural mission. They have their own cultural mission coded within them and they're just advancing it and just absorbing as much materially that they can to advance their own cultural mission. And so that's what Yaki is talking about here is it's basically you're giving ground that is then being turned against you and used against you.
- [377:39]
A
Well, he's going to get, he's going to expound upon it a little more, even more. Here it is only in the light of recent studies of population trends that this anti reproductive effect of immigrating groups is established. Thus from comparative study of American population trends, it emerged that the 40 million immigrants to America from other continents from 1790 up to now did not serve to increase the population of America. At all, but only to change the quality of it. A super personal idea, clothed as it is with the force of destiny, must fulfill its life task. Its life task. And if that if this involves populations of a certain size increasing at a certain rate, these externals will come into existence. Materialism found itself with with the data of population trends on its hands, but no explanation for them. These data showed for the western nations gradual increases rising rapidly to a peak and then a stabilizing and slow falling off the curve that describes the population movements of nations. It is the same curve, roughly speaking, in each case will be found also to describe the population movement of a high culture. At the stage where a high culture passes over into civilization, the stage marked for us by Napoleon, the increase of numbers is rapid and rises to figures which dwarf anything previous. The same spirit of the age which externalized the whole energy of the culture into massive industrialism and technics, great revolutions, gigantic wars and unlimited imperialism also called these numbers into being. The life task of the Western civilization is the mightiest the world has ever seen and it needs these numbers in order to accomplish it. It culturally parasitical groups are not available to the idea. They use the energy of the culture inwards and downwards. Such groups constitute weak spots in the body of the culture. The danger of this internal weakness increases in direct proportion as the culture is threatened from without. In the 16th century, when the existence of the west was threatened by the Turks, it would have been perfectly evident that to every Westerner that large inner groups of Turks had there been such were a serious menace. A second way that culture parasitism wastes the substance of the culture is through the inner friction that their presence necessarily creates in the body of the Arabian culture. Around the time of Christ, a large number of Romans was present. Their cultural stage was that of late civilization, complete externalization. And the cultural stage of the the Aramean population which was there at home was that of their earliest cult of of the earliest culture. The tension which naturally engendered racial, national and cultural finally culminated in the massacre in 88 BC of 80,000 Romans. This brought on the Mithridatic wars in which more hundreds of Thousands perished in 22 years of fighting. Another phenomenon closer to our times is that of the Chinese in California. The racial tension between the white and Chinese populations there during the 19th and 20th century resulted in mutual persecution, hatred, riots and bloody excesses. The negro population in both America and South Africa has been occasion of similar outbreaks of hatred and violence on both sides. All these incidents are manifestations of Culture of culture, parasitism, the presence of a group which is outside the culture totally. These phenomena have no connection whatever. As the analytic approach to rationalism thought with hatred or malice on either side, rationalism always looks downward. It saw merely a group of individuals on both sides. If these individuals were massacring one another, it was a desire of these particular individuals at the particular time to kill one another. Rationalism didn't understand even the simple organic phenomena of a crowd, much less the higher forms of people, race, nation, culture. It never occurred to the liberals that since These tensions throughout 5000 years of history had always manifested themselves thus, that there was any, that there was any necessity at work. Liberals could not understand instinct, cosmic rhythm, racial beasts. To them, a race riot was a manifestation of lack of education, of tolerance. A bird flying over a street disturbance would understand it better than the materialists, for they voluntarily adopted the viewpoint of the earthworm and held it with determination. So, far from these excesses being the result of malice and hatred, the contrary is true. Demonstrations of goodwill and tolerance actually increase the tension between totally alien groups and render it more deadly. Focusing attention on the differences between utterly alien groups works these differences up into contrast and hastens outbreaks. The closer the two groups are brought into contact, the more insidious and dangerous grows the mutual hatred. Theoretically, it sounds perfect to say that if each individual is educated to tolerance, there can be no racial or cultural tension. But individuals are not the units of this type of happening. Individuals do not bring these things about. Higher organic unities do this and impel the mere individuals. The process has nothing to do with consciousness, intellect, will, or even emotions. In its inception, all these come into play only as a manifestation of defense on the part of the culture against the alien life form. Hatred does not begin the process, nor does tolerance stop it. This sort of talk is applying the logic of the billiard table to superpersonal organisms. But the logic is out of place here. Life is irrational, and so is every one of its birth, growth, illness, resistance, self expression, destiny, history, death. If we wish to keep the word logic, we must distinguish inorganic logic from organic logic. Inorganic logic is causal. Is causality thinking? Organic logic is destiny thinking. The first is aware, illuminated, conscious. The second is rhythmic and unconscious, unconscious. The first is the laboratory logic of physical experimentation. The second is the living logic of the human beings who carry on this activity and who are in no way amenable in their lives to the logic which they apply in their workshops.
- [384:29]
B
So I let you go through pretty much the rest of that chapter there, because those Examples and those points I've been bringing up, Yockey, essentially, he hits on all of them throughout that he. He further elaborates all this stuff that, that we're kind of hitting on as well. What yaqui means in the sense of, you know, just to kind of refresh the viewer. He's using the Spanglerian FL framework. When he says destiny, he's not talking about, you know, like, he's not talking about, I guess you could say, this sort of Calvinistic line of existence. That's not necessarily what he's talking about. What he means by destiny is the Spenglerian way of saying it, which is, you know, the destiny of a sapling is to become a tree. It is assuming the natural progression of someone or something's life, if uninterrupted by outside events. Those outside events are called incident within the Spenglerian framework, necessarily. In addition, when he separates in that last paragraph between organic and inorganic logic with inorganic logic, that's sort of Anglo empiricism. That which you can replicate. That which basically you're, you're. You're completely. You know, there's, there's no. I always get these confused. Pete. Deductive reasoning is when you assume nothing. Right?
- [385:53]
A
Deductive is when you're deducing something.
- [385:58]
D
Yeah.
- [385:58]
A
You're just looking at the. You're just looking at the evidence.
- [386:01]
C
Yeah.
- [386:01]
B
You're just looking at the facts. There's no, like, you're not trying to prove anything a priori, all right? And that's, you know, that's Anglo empiricism. That's kind of the. That's. There's no like, like. And the problem with that worldview is that, you know, it, it just removes any application. You're just basically wrote, reciting things, you know, and you're not like, putting them together in such a way as to achieve. As to achieve evidence and as to achieve an argument one way or another. Right. An argument is inductive reasoning. You have. You assume the argument is true and then look for evidence to prove it.
- [386:39]
A
It.
- [386:40]
B
All right? That's natural. That's. That's how almost everyone does everything. You assume something to be true and then look for evidence to either prove or disprove it. All right? You don't just find evidence in a vacuum. And that's why, you know, that's why, you know, those of us on the, on the right, we have a much more instinctual understanding of politics and nations and things like that because we, we just take existence for granted. We take creation for granted. You know, in many ways we trust that it's a real thing. More the leftists, in many ways, this is why transhumanism is so popular over there, is they think in this very sort of gnostic sense of nothing is real, you can't trust anything, which is actually a very insecure point of weakness. And Yaki's going to touch on a little bit of this further on. But, you know, but this is like, you know, this is what. When, when we talk about vibe shifts, Pete. Right. You know how sometimes on the timeline, the timeline just has a certain theme of the day for whatever reason or like certain news stories comes out or just certain topics are being talked about today for some reason. Or you just see or feel like, hey, there's like the air, like the death of. The death of Floyd. You know, the overdose of Floyd. That was a, like, people talk about how that was the moment reality shattered. That's. That was a huge vibe shift. Musk's Twitter, massive vibe shift.
- [388:15]
A
Yeah.
- [388:17]
B
Imagine how crazy it is, Pete, that Twitter is the current most important arena of the culture form.
- [388:26]
A
Yeah, I'm saying this all the time. I'm saying that you used to say that Twitter isn't real life. And maybe it's not real life in your personal life, your day to day life, but in your political life, Twitter is real life.
- [388:39]
B
And if you don't have some sort of following or if you're. Or if you don't have a following, if you're not a part of some sort of network, then you have no influence. You know, Twitter is basically, it's. It's where the policy of the future will be decided. And it's actually, I think it's a good thing because it's forcing people to live a lot more historically than they had been when mass media basically took away all agency. But yeah, anyway, we can keep going into section two.
- [389:09]
D
Sure.
- [389:09]
A
All right, section two. The most tragic example of culture parasitism for the west has been the presence of a part of a nation. From the Arabian culture scattered through the entire body of the West. We have already seen the entirely different content of the nation idea in that other culture. Nations that were state, church and people all in one. The idea of a territorial home was unknown. Home was wherever the believers were. Belonger and believer were interchangeable ideas. This culture had attained to it its late civilization phase, while our gothic west was barely emerging from the primitive. You see this in the south where you come upon a church and then either next to the church or behind the church is a cemetery. And people who go to church on Sunday look over at that cemetery and they're like, my relatives are buried there. They have a. An idea of it, of that my family is not only tied to this land right here, but also our faith is tied to it because this is where they rest. And, you know, that's something that.
- [390:26]
D
That's.
- [390:26]
A
That's living historically and that's lost to most people at this point, I'm sure you would agree, right, Paul?
- [390:31]
B
Yeah. And that's not a. That's not a refutation of what is it. When Yaqui himself, as far as I know, he was raised Catholic. I don't believe he was practicing. I don't know if he was a Christian. He does. He has a very good familiarity with the Bible, quotes it. I'm not sure about the state of his personal faith life. And if he was an atheist, you can kind of basically say everyone in this time, the 20th century is the most atheistic century in human history. And essentially what Yaqui is grasping at in Imperium is Christendom. He's trying to recreate Christendom with different stuff. Basically. That's the. That's the spoiler of all of Imperium is Yaqui essentially just wants Christendom back. And I think that's a good thing to want back. I want that back, you know. But, yeah, you are right. The Western expression of Christianity, you talk about the. The churchyard and the cemetery next to the church. Yeah, that's a lot different from, you know, from even, you know, I mean, he talks about the. The Magian culture. When he says Arabian, he's talking about the Magians, where Christianity came from. And just because Christianity, you know, Christ came during that period within Yaqui's framework, doesn't refute the eternal truth of the Christian religion. As a matter of fact, it reinforces it. The fact that this religion, the. That the statements of this faith can cross high cultural forms is actually one of the best proofs to its eternal truth is that it is entirely independent of culturals, of. Of culture being things. It can. It can continue its existence in an authentic form in all of them. And you see this with how the west adopted Christianity.
- [392:14]
A
They.
- [392:14]
B
They maintained its central truth claims, but they executed those central truth claims in the way that they understood how to. In the Magian culture, they did not place an emphasis on burying bodies. This is largely because they lived in a desert. They did have boneyards. They did. They. There were places that they would bury people, but for the most part, they would practice Crematorial. You know, they would practice crematorial. What is it? What's the word for disposing of body? Crematorial. Funerary rights. Correct me if I'm wrong, Pete, you know the Bible better than I do. But right before. Right at the end of the book of. What's the book right before the book of Joshua, when Moses dies.
- [393:08]
A
Deuteronomy.
- [393:09]
B
Okay, yeah, right. At the end of Deuteronomy, when Moses dies, they burn him. They don't bury him, they burn his body. And that was the common right. We. While we have cremation in the west, it's kind of. We don't consider it normal. It's kind of like. What's normal. What we all imagine when we all die in the Western sense is we get buried and there's a gravestone.
- [393:33]
C
Right?
- [393:34]
B
That's. That's the Western expression of funerary rights. And that plays into a lot of different things. Anyway, we've kind of gotten on this. We can. We can keep going now.
- [393:41]
A
Sure. Into the tiny hamlets. There were no cities of the awakening West. These finished cosmopolitans built their ghettos. Money thinking, which seemed evil to the deeply religious west, was the forte of this highly civilized alien people. Interest taking was forbidden by the church to Christians, and this conferred a monopoly of money on the strangers. The Juvengasse was a millennium ahead in cultural development of its surroundings. And that just translates literally into Jew alley and just basically ghetto. The legend of the Wandering Jew arose at this time expressing the feeling of uncanniness that the Westerner felt in the presence of this landless stranger who was everywhere at home. Although it seemed to the west that he was nowhere at home. The west understood as little of his Torah, Mishnah, Talmud, Kabbalism and Yasida as he of its Christianity and scholastic philosophy. The mutual inability to understand generated feelings of alienness, fear and hatred.
- [394:51]
B
I will disagree with one thing. Yaqui said. The west did understand the Torah. If the Torah as referring to the. The Pentateuch and the. The Old Testament books. The west actually did understand that many theologians that particularly specialized in that area.
- [395:11]
A
The hatred of the West. Yeah, the hatred of the Westerner for the Jew was of religious motivation, not racial. The Jew was the heathen. And with his civilized and intellectualized life, he seemed Mephistophelian, satanic to the Westerner. The chronicles of that time record the horrors which the contact of these two utterly alien groups begotten. Jews were massacred in London on the day of coronation of Richard I In 1189, the next year, 500 Jews were besieged in York Castle by a mob and to avoid its fury, resorted to cutting each other's throats. King John had Jews imprisoned, their eyes or teeth plucked out and Hundreds butchered. In 1204, when a Jew in London forced a Christian to pay him more than two, I think that would be shekels a week or not shekels, it would be two. What is. What is the. The British? Yeah, yeah. A week on a loan of 20. Mob Action killed 700 Jews. Crusaders for centuries massacred whole Jewish populations of towns when they stopped on their way to the wars in asia Minor. In 1278, 267 Jews were hanged in London, accused of of clipping coins. The outbreak in 1348 of the black Death was attributed to the Jews and massacres were the results all over Europe. For 370 years. The Jews were banished from England until readmitted by Cromwell. Although the motivation of these excesses was not racial, it was race creating what. What did not destroy the Jews made them stronger and separated them further from ever, further than ever from the host peoples, physically and spiritually. During the centuries of our Western history, the problems and developments which roused fundamental excitement in the west did not touch the problemless Jew whose inner life was passed into fixity with the completion of the culture which created this Jewish church, state, people, nation. Empty for him were the conflict of empire and papacy, the Reformation, the age of discovery. He looked upon them purely as a spectator. His only question was what they might mean to him. The idea of his taking part in them or making sacrifice for one side or another never came up. The British in India looked upon disturbances among the indigenous populations with the same eye. In his ghettos distributed over Europe, all was uniform. The food prohibitions, the Talmudic dualistic ethics, one for the goyim and another for the Jew. The legal system, the runes, the phylacteries, the ritual, the feeling. His Sufism, his Asidom sect, his Kabbalism, his religious leaders like BAAL Shem, his Zadokism are equally unintelligible to Westerners. Not only unintelligible, but uninteresting. The Westerner was absorbed in the intense conflicts of his own culture and did not observed, except in relation to himself, the life of the Jew in his midst. Not until the externalized fact sensitive 20th century did a Western culture notice the Jew as a cultural phenomenon. In Gothic times, until the Reformation, it saw him as a heathen and usurer, in the Council Reformation, as a shrewd businessman in the Enlightenment, as a civilized man of the world, in the age of rationalism, as a fighter in the van of intellectual liberation from the bonds of the culture and its traditions. The 20th century. Good.
- [398:48]
B
So, so real quick, kind of on this, what When Yaqui says they were the product of a more complete culture. The problem with the Western, getting the Western mind to understand this, Pete, is that the Western mind is obsessed with technics, all right? We are all obsessed with technology. We think technology equals sophistication, all right? And this is actually a large part of the reason why the, you know, this, this particular group has been a problem for as long as they have been. And that's because they are, they are essentially. Imagine if you took a bunch of 19, you know, 70s, high finance, New York WASPs and then put them into, I don't know, pre city state, Rome, them, all right? They would probably act much the same way. And that's because they come from a really highly sophisticated time now. They would probably act a little bit differently. But you, they are. It's like taking.
- [399:53]
C
It's.
- [399:54]
B
They were essentially modern people that you put in a pre. Modern context. And they didn't stop being modern people. They were. What is it? They, they were, they were. They had all the hallmarks of a civilizational age of materialism. There was no real cultural mission for them other than continued existence. And that's the problem. Once the cultural mission is fulfilled, then this is why high cultures die. Once the cultural mission is fulfilled, then it's only raison d' etre's continued existence. And then it of course breaks apart and is overwhelmed by another cultural group with a different cultural mission. The same will happen to the west one day. But you know, this, this group of people did this, acted like this, but as the west got more sophisticated, not just in terms of techniques, but also in terms of what technics are really just a matter of scale. That's the only thing technics really decide is on what scale you can do something. The fundamentals, once they reached the same, same sort of moral understanding of the world as the, the Jews did. This is actually why the sort of counter revolutions of the 20th century occurred. And I think he'll, he'll talk about this a little bit later actually. Matt. Yeah, he's going to talk about that in the next paragraph. Let's go.
- [401:20]
A
The 20th century saw for the first time that he had his own public life, his own world, down to the details. It realized that the comprehensiveness of his outlook was the equivalent of its own in breadth and depth, and therefore alien in a total sense, which was never before suspected in its previous centuries. The viewpoint of the west toward the Jew was limited by its stage of development at the time. But with the 20th century and its universal outlook, the entirety of what has been called the Jewish problem is seen for the first time. Them, not race, not religion, not ethnic ethics, not nationality, not political allegiance, but something which includes them all separates the Jew from the West. Culture. Culture embraces the totality of world outlook. Science, art, philosophy, religion, technics, economics, erotic law, society, politics. In every branch of the Western culture, the Jew has developed his own taste and preference. And when he intervenes in the public life of the Western peoples, he conducts himself in a distinct fashion, namely in the style of the public life of the Jewish church, state, nation, people, race. This public life was invisible to the inward west until the 20th century. Like all nations at the end of their civilization, the Hindus, Chinese, Arabs, the Jewish nation passed into a caste system. The Brahmins in India, the Mandarins in China, the Rabbinate in Jewry are three corresponding phenomena. The Rabbinate were the custodians of the destiny of the Jewish unity. When free thinkers appeared among the Jews, it was the duty of the local rabbinate to prevent a schism. In the case of Uriel Da Costa, a free thinking Jew of Amsterdam, the local synagogue had him imprisoned and subjected him to such persecution that he finally took his own life. Spinoza was excommunicated by the same synagogue and an unsuccessful attempt was made on his life. Large bribes were offered him to return to Judaism and when he refused, he was cursed and pronounced anathema. In 1799, the Hasidim leader in Eastern Jewry, Senior Salman, was handed over by the Rabbinate to the Romanov government after a trial by his own people, much as the Western Inquisition turned over convicted heretics to the state for disposal.
- [403:57]
B
So I know we've got one last section left, but I want to kind of comment on this is that, you know, this is sort of essentially the raven. It keeps everyone else to in line.
- [404:05]
C
The.
- [404:05]
B
What is it? Most of the quote unquote, like average, average Jews, if they were kind of taken outside of this rabbinic tradition and then just put within, you know, just entirely amongst Westerners, I guarantee you they. And this happens all the time. You could see instances of this happening all the time. They become, they get basically recruited because their soul is filled with a different cultural mission. And a lot of the time they have mixed in genetics from that same people. That makes that yearning even stronger. And these people will cease to be Jews other than genetically. And even that kind of goes away after a while. This happened in Nazi Germany. Actually. A good example of this is Erhard Milch is. I think what was it was. It was Rosenberg's first name.
- [405:03]
A
Alfred.
- [405:04]
B
Alfred Rosenberg. Yeah. Like, both of those dudes had, you know, Jewish ancestry of a significant amount. And they essentially. They did not act like it. They essentially became. They were recruited into the Western mission because they were taken out of that. And really, this is. This. This tells you about how dead of a culture this is, is that it's basically their rabbin it or how do I say it? Their rabbinate keeping them all in line, you know, and this is why when we mentioned this before the show, when the disputation of the Spanish figured this out early on, the disputation of Tortosa is actually the best way to kind of get rid of this group of people is you basically take their sort of rabbinate and make them look like a bunch of fools in front of them, and they lose because the power that they have over their own people is fear and. And ignorance. And basically the. The same power that the Pharisees had over them in the time of Christ is these people are holy because they say that they're holy. And we've raised you your whole life to believe they're holy. And, you know, it's hard to go against that kind of coding. You know what I mean?
- [406:11]
A
Yep. No, 100%. All right, let's. I think we're just about got a couple more paragraphs here for part two. The contemporary west did not even see these phenomena and would not have understood them if it had. It looked at everything Jewish with its own preconceptions, just as Jews looked at the west in terms of its advanced outlook. The Parsi in India is another fragment of the Arabian culture strewn abroad among aliens. The Parsi possessed vis a vis his human surroundings the same superior business acumen as the Jew in the early West. His inner life was entirely apart from the aliens around him. His interests were different in every way. In the disturbances and revolts during the centuries of the British Raj, the Parsi took no part in the same way. The Thirty Years War, the Succession wars, the conflict of Bourbon and Habsburg did not in any way touch the Jew. Difference of culture phase creates complete spiritual insulation. The attitude of the Jew towards Western tensions was that of Pilate at the trial of Jesus to pilot. The religious issue there involved was utterly hidden. He belonged to a civilization in its last Phase a thousand years away from the religious excitement of his own culture. With the stirrings of rationalism in the west, however, saysura is marked with it marked in this collective life of that part of Jewry cut off in the Western culture. Part 3 Around 1750, a new spirit, new spiritual currents begin to move in the West. English sensualist philosophy assumes the ascendancy over the European soul. Reason, empiricism, analysis, induction, this is the new spirit. But everything becomes folly when examined in the light of reason, unleavened by faith and instinct. Erasmus had demonstrated in his malicious work in Praise of Folly that everything is folly. Not only greed, ambition, pride and war, but church, state, marriage, childbearing and philosophy. The supremacy of reason is hostile to life and brings about a crisis in any organism which succumbs to it. The culture crisis of rationalism was a part of the destiny of the West. All previous cultures have gone through marks the turning point from the inwardness of culture to the externalized soul life of civilization. The focal idea of rationalism is liberty, which means liberty from the bonds of culture. Napoleon liberated war from the style of Fontenoy 1745, where each side continue courteously invited the other to fire the first shot. Beethoven liberated music from the form perfection of Bach and Mozart. The terror of 93 liberated the west from the idea of the sacredness of dynasty. Materialistic philosophy liberated it from the spirit of religion. And ultra rationalism then proceeded to liberate science from philosophy. Waves of revolution liberated the civilization from the dignity of the state and its high traditions into the dirt of party politics. Class war was liberation from social order and hierarchy. The new idea of humanity and the rights of man liberated the culture from its old pride of exclusiveness and feeling of unconscious superiority. Feminism liberated women from the natural dignity of their sex and turned them into inferior men.
- [409:53]
B
So Yaqui, you know, when he's talking about the. The sort of the life of the culture here, the life cycle, the destiny of the culture, culture, what happens is, is that there's this great rationalist crisis point where the civil, where the culture decides to sacrifice all of those things which it. Which are its own unique expressions, which required a lot of form, a lot of resources, a lot of time, a lot of effort. People, people at this period lived and spent their whole lives learning how to properly carve something, you know, which is absolutely ludicrous to us today that's thrown out in replacement of basically a sort of anything goes moment. This is why so many people point to the French Revolution is where the point where everything went wrong. But that's because that's the natural life cycle of a civilization. Something like the French Revolution always happens. All right. Now when the civilization reaches its point of Caesarism and you get to the point where there is a generation that kind of understood what was lost and attempts to recreate that earlier cultural period right at the end, through the remaining. Through the. Basically the technics, the mass scale of civil. Of late civilization. And some of it, it's a sort of false recovery in a certain way, but it is, it does to those inhabitants who are living through. Seems like it's a sort of silver age, if that makes sense to you, Mr. Pete. And this is what. This is what our. You know, if you're on the dissident, right, listening to this, this is what your cultural mission is. This is what we're trying to do.
- [411:33]
A
Anacarcis Kloots organized a deputy, a deputation of representatives of the human race which presented its respects to the revolutionary terror in France. There were pigtailed Chinamen, black Ethiopians, Turks, Turks, Jews, Greeks, Tartars, Mongols, Indians, bearded Chaldeans. Actually, however, there were Parisians in this. They were Parisians in disguise. This parade had thus, at the very beginning of rationalism, a double symbolic significance. First, it symbolized the idea of the west that it now wished to embrace all humanity. And secondly, the fact these were disguised Westerners showed the exact amount of success that this, this intellectualizing enthusiasm would have a killer line. Yeah, the Jew had of course, seen these things coming. Persecution does not diminish intelligence and awareness of one's surroundings. As early as 1723, the Jews had acquired the right to possess land in England. And in 1753 they acquired English citizenship, only to have it revoked the next year on the. On the petition of all the cities. In 1791, they were emancipated in France. And in 1806, the great Sanhedrin was summoned by the Emperor Napoleon, thus giving official recognition to the existence within the west of the Jewish nation state. People. Only one thing prevented the new situation from being as idyllic as the new liberal sentiment would have would have it. 800 years of robbery, hatred, massacre and persecution on both sides had roused within the Jewish traditions of hatred of the west even stronger than the old Western hatred of the Jew. In its new outburst of generosity and forgiveness, the west renounced its old feelings. But the Jew was unable to reciprocate. 800 years of resentment were not to be removed by a New Year's resolution on the part of the alien West. Superpersonal organic unities were here opposed. And these higher unities did not do not share with human beings things like reason and sentiment. Their life task is hard and colossal and excludes feelings of tolerance, except as a symptom of crisis in a great battle of this kind. Human beings are, in the last analysis, mere spectators, even though they play an active role. Human malice and desire for revenge play only the smallest, most superficial part in such conflicts. And when they appear, they are the mere expression in the individual of the higher incompatibility, deep and total. Between the super personal ideas,
- [414:16]
D
the new
- [414:17]
A
movements, capitalism, industrial revolution, democracy, materialism, all were tremendously exciting to the Jew in the middle of the 18th century. Already he had sensed their potentialities and had fostered their growth in every way. His position as the outsider forced him to act secretly. And the secret societies of the Illuminati and its offspring were his creations, as their kabbalistic terminology and ritualistic equipment show. More than 2/3 of the estates generals, which paved the way to the French Revolution in 1789, consisted of members of these secret societies committed to undermine the authority of the state and introduce the idea of democracy. The Jew responded to the invitation of the west to participate in his public life, but it was impossible for him to lose his identity overnight. And so he had from now on two public lives, One before the west and one before his own. Nation, state, people, church, race. With the crumbling of the old Western traditions, before the onslaught of the new ideas, the Jew forged ahead. The Rothschilds became what would have been simply fantastic to both sides. A century before barons of the Austrian Empire in 1822, Jews penetrated the English bar in 1833, and a Jew was knighted by the queen, the first one in 1837. The west acceded to to the duality of the Jew, and a statute and a Statute of Victoria relieved Jews elected to municipal office from taking oaths. Jewish members of parliament appeared from the 40s onward, and a Jew became Lord Mayor of London in 1855. All of these things were resisted by traditionary elements of the west, and on each occasion the Jew gained the triumph. The experiment of tolerance was visibly failing on both sides. The amount of power and importance of the Jew was g Jew was gaining was shown by the incident of the boy Martara. The child was forcibly taken from his Jewish parents, ordinary private persons by the Archbishop of Bologna in 1858, on the plea that he had been baptized by a serving maid. In the same year, the French government officially urged restoration of the boy to its parents. The next year the Archbishop of Canterbury, bishops, noblemen and gentlemen of England signed the petition presented by Lord John Russell asking return of custody to. Asking a return of custody of the child. The persecution continued. There were outbreaks in Bucharest, 1866, Rome, 1864, Berlin, 1880. Russia through the whole century and into the 20th century. This persecution in Russia was an index of the strength of the Jew in the Western nations. Protest petitions, committees sought to alleviate the lot of the Jews in Russia and to obstruct the government of Russia. The pogrom in Ukraine after the Russo Japanese War in 1905 caused the American government to break off diplomatic relations with Russia. And that's pretty interesting because I think most historians, even Jewish historians would say the, the, the. When the Jews really started to come to America was about 1880. So in, in 25 years they had gained enough clout with the American government to cause the American government to break off diplomatic relations with a country halfway around the world over an incident that happened locally in a shitty little part.
- [418:01]
B
Well, and the, the other thing too is that it's like, look, this is kind of this section right here. A lot of people like to lay at the feet of America the unique evil of Zionism. But what this is showing right, or, or the wider Anglosphere. But what this is showing right here is that this was a problem in the entirety of the West. You know, America being a part of the west and extension of the west was no unique or no different. All right? In America, being a colony people is always about a hundred years or so culturally behind everywhere else, right? We haven't even left the 20th century yet in America. However, what is it? What is it? This is also a good thing because the America is replaying the 20th century in real time. Like was it, you know, people, people are comparing it every. People call it vi America for a reason. But it's like, look, you know, you can't make this up. You know, you can't make up how similar the same trajectory is happening and everyone knows what the conclusion is like we've turn to almost quasi normalizing mentioning this kind of stuff in public. So you know, as a matter of fact, America not only is like uniquely at fault in many ways, they're probably going to be the one redeeming force that ends this once and for all. I hope, at least, Lord willing, I hope so too.
- [419:28]
A
Hatred or intolerance in no wise explains the numerous unfortunate results attendant upon the Jewish dispersion through the Western nations. The hatred on both sides was a mere result the more tolerance was talked about, the more attention was focused on to different the differences, sharpening them into contrasts. The contrast led to opposition and action, either covert or open, on both sides. Nor is it an explanation to blame the Jew for failing to assimilate. This is blaming a man for being himself. And the notion of ethics does not extend to what one is, but only to what one does. The Jewish problem is not to be explained ethically, racially, nationally, religiously, socially, but only totally culturally. From having seen at each phase only the aspect of the Jew which his own development permitted him to, Western man now sees the whole relationship for his own cultural unity is uppermost in Western man. In Gothic times, he saw the Jew as different only in religion, because the west was then in a religious phase. In the Enlightenment, with its ideas of humanity, the Jew was seen merely to this, to be socially different. In the materialistic 19th century, with its vertical racism, the Jew was regarded as merely racially different. In this century, 20th century, with the wet, with the west passing into a unit of culture, nation, race, society, economic state, the Jew appears clearly in his own total unity, a complete inner stranger to the soul of the West.
- [421:07]
B
And so this is kind of like, this is what I mentioned earlier, Yahi kind of restates it here. We have only, as of the last hundred years or so, reached the level of societal development that the Jews have. And for the first time in the entire history of them being parasites on our civilization in the sense of, as Yaqui defines it, we are now at the same level of development as they are. We are right at the end point of, you know, where the west is now. Sort of. What is it? The west is its own cultural unity of culture, nation, race, society, economics, state. All right, Western culture, you know, is, is, is. And this is why I have such high hopes for America, Pete, is because America is the Western unity. America is sort of the. The culmination. And in addition, on top of that, I also believe it's serving as the fertile ground for a new high culture which will be completely different from the West. I have no idea what it will be yet, but, you know, I think it will be something entirely different from the West. But I don't know, Pete. I mean, we've. We're going to come back to a part two, but this is kind of, this is kind of a good way to. I guess this is a good way to sort of, you know, for the re. For the listener to have in mind is that we are now, you know, you know, you know, you know, how the Jews are kind of like their race and their religion and their way of organizing. It's all like one. It's all rolled up into one. You can't, they can't be one without being them. All right, we're reaching. We're about at the same point, you know, you can't be Western without being a Christian, without believing in capitalism of some sort or some kind of market economy. I know, you know, there was, there's some, been some recent chatter about that, but, you know, some sort of market form of economy without believing in some sort of. Even if you don't call it democracy, some kind of system of government in which the interests of. In which the interests of
- [423:35]
D
everyone.
- [423:36]
A
You can have an economy without usury.
- [423:38]
B
Yeah, exactly. And you can have a sort of a government where rights and privileges are given without, you know, having demo. Because, you know, a lot of people, you know, was it. The west doesn't organize itself like a sort of, you know, Eastern warlord monarchy. In Western monarchy, the. The king is very much playing balancer between the various interests of his society beneath him. It's not like this sort of, you know, warlord state that you find in an Oriental society. But all of this, all of this is kind of coming together as like one sort of cultural unity. And you can't be Western without being all of those things. And for the first time in our history and really at the scale needed to solve the problem within the. Because all this played out in Germany a century ago. The Germans were the first to reach this sort of unity. Now America is about to hit that same point that they did. And the difference is that America is at the scale that they weren't, I think in order to, to really bring this, this whole story to a conclusion. But we still have a whole half to go. What do you think of that, Mr. Pete, you have any thoughts on that?
- [424:56]
A
Yeah, but I will add this, and it's something that I've been thinking about recently and I've run by a couple people, and we need to go back to having that one person in charge who's. We can blame, who, who, who's willing to act as an autark. And a lot of people will argue that America is not ready for that. And I will argue that Trump was the proof that he, that they are the people who voted for Trump, the people who wanted Trump, wanted him to come in and wanted him to be a bulldozer and wanted him to do things by fiat, wanted him to act as an autark. And I really honestly think that so you have this quote, unquote libertarian who's just elected president in Argentina. Why did they elect him there? Because they're expecting him to step up and they're expecting him to just eliminate this. Eliminate this department. Eliminate this department, get rid of this, Tear the government away, tear it down to its smallest size, and to bring them back to, you know, what they. What they once were long before the. I'd say things really went to shit for them, the Great Depression. And they really. I don't even think they've recovered since the Great Depression. I think we're ready for that. I think that the people who, the people who see the direction that we're in, that we're going in, if change isn't made, if somebody doesn't make change, decides to step up and make change, realize that they're okay with one person coming in and doing that. I think a lot of people also DeSantis revealing himself as being one of the chief philosemites on the planet. The, you know, before that, he showed himself as being basically a. A monarch, a. A king in Florida. And people love it. I think that the people who are making the argument that especially people on the right are not ready for somebody to step up and, and to be Caesar. They, they need to examine a little closer what's happening around the world. I mean, Germany is about to outlaw the second most popular party in the country because that's the direction that that party is going.
- [427:43]
C
Yeah.
- [427:44]
B
And I mean, to be honest, and
- [427:46]
A
vox and, and the vox party in, In Spain, I mean, one of their leaders was just shot in the face in the street.
- [427:54]
C
Yeah.
- [427:55]
A
Yeah. This is the way things are going and they, and the people on the other side realize it and they are scared. Yeah.
- [428:05]
B
You're not wrong. And, but the thing is, is like, I guess on a sort of actionable point, you know, in 19, I think 26 or whatever, there was, you know, there was. There was a member of the Nazi Party who said, we have no idea when the great leader will come. That's only up to God. All we can do is forge the sword to give to him when he does come. And that, and that member of the, of the Nazi Party at that time, he was a newly admitted member and his name was Adolf Hitler. But, but, yeah, and, and, and, but that's the thing is, it's like, you know, I'll leave it with this Mr. Pete.
- [428:54]
C
Right.
- [428:55]
B
You know, if, if you're a young guy or a younger guy who's still kind of planning on what to do with your life. If you're thinking about going to law school, see, see if you can do that. Because whoever comes is going to need people who know the system of laws and know exactly, exactly what and how to cut out. If you're thinking about being an engineer, go do that. Engineers are going to be needed. If you're thinking about creating artistically, do that. We're going to need new cultural ideas expressed in, in high cultural forms. You know, if you're thinking about joining the military and once all this dies down, this is once, once this, I mean, it's already dying down. Pete, we're not going to do anything in Israel, you know, I mean, now, tomorrow we may go to war and I'll have egg on my face. But, but it's been quiet for a couple of weeks and so, you know, that's the good. Yeah, we're not going to do anything. Now is probably the best time to go into the military if you want to write your own ticket, because they are so hurting for people that you can pretty much go anywhere, do anything. I'm not saying to do this to support ZOG or whatever, but, but these are cultural institutions which will survive zog. You know, we're still going to have a US army after this, you know, regime is gone. We're still going to have a U.S. code of laws. We're still going to have a U.S. u.S. Government. Right. And the best way for you to prepare yourself, to lend yourself to that great effort is to go out and do what it is you feel like God is telling you to do.
- [430:23]
A
Yeah. Yep. Yep. Do not, do not shy away from becoming professionals because we're going to need, going to need you. But I would say that if what you want to do with your life doesn't, if you feel compelled that you want to do something with your life and it doesn't include college, that you don't need college for it. You can skip that, skip that and go and do what you, what you need to do. But I used to be one of those people who said, you know, I don't want our, you know, our guys shouldn't be anywhere near the schools. But I really honestly think that the. We need elites and a lot of people look upon elites and they want to see what their education is. And that just goes towards, just there's credibility issues there too. But also if you're going to be an engineer, if you're going to be a lawyer and everything, you're going to need to do that. And that's where where our guys need to be. We need to be taking over these, bringing our influence into these institutions and throwing a monkey wrench into them. At least if it's just for a little while, you know, at least if it's just personally rattling some cages, you
- [431:44]
B
need to be, you need to be prepared to fulfill whatever minor part of the cultural mission it is that you need to do. You know, and in order to do that, especially if it requires education, you need to get educated. But there's, as you know, there's more than one way to skin a cat that. And you're right about that.
- [432:00]
A
Pete, I know you haven't been doing a lot of content creation lately because of wonderful things happening in your personal life, but is there any, is there anything that you, you wish to promote? And I'll make sure to put anything in the show notes.
- [432:18]
B
Well, first and foremost, subscribe to the Old Glory Club. If, I mean, if you've been listening to Pete's show and you're not subscribed to the Old Glory Club, I don't know what to tell you at this point because I know for a fact he promotes it. Not just when I come on. Because, Pete, you're a member. You know, like it's. And, and the Old Glory Club is it. For those of you who, who don't understand, this is a, it's a vital piece of the cultural mission of what the United States is. Needs to undergo. The Old Glory Club is extremely vital to this, what we're trying to get done here. So if you want to be a part. And now, just right now subscribing, we're, we're trying to get chapters set up. We're trying to get the first one or two established so we have the model for everyone else to follow. That's why we may not have been responding to you anons. As quick as possible. We've gotten some chapters we're trying to get off the ground first. And then once we get those off the ground, we'll have a working framework as to what establishing one is supposed to look like. And then it'll happen very quickly. But we've also put out the content I have been doing. Mr. Pete, I've been putting out on the Old Glory Club substack. I recently released an article about Toby Keith behind the paywall. Toby Keith is apparently a lot. I didn't know this. I, I suggested as a meme. I looked into it. I'm like, oh, he's extremely important within the cultural struggle of America. So I put, I released an article about Toby Keith behind the Paywall. And also Grant Brooks and I did a review of the movie Cars, and we released it, I think yesterday. And so that's out on the Glory Club substack now. So go check that out when you're done checking that out. Go. I recently did a podcast episode with T.R. hudson and J.L. mackey on the Double Dealer podcast. They're a Southern literature magazine. I've been published in there before. It's a great group of guys. And if you want to listen to me, rail on the south for about an hour and 30 minutes and slay a bunch of sacred cows to the south and particularly right wing Southerners. Not, not in the way some people do it. It's, it's, it's from, it's from a pro Southern perspective. Go check that out as well. And finally, if you want to read my. Now that was, you know, ostensibly about my book. I'm about to recommend. If you want to read my collection of short stories, Country Squire's Notebook, Google that, buy it, read it. You know, that's, I know that was a lot, Mr. Pete, but that's, that's, that's all the stuff I've got going on right now.
- [434:49]
A
I'll have the links for that. I know I have the links for your book in, in the previous episode, a couple previous episodes we've done. And I'm sure I have the Old Glory Club in there. I'll take care of all of it. All right, Paul. Until the next time.
- [435:02]
D
Thank you.
- [435:03]
B
Thank you, Mr. Pete.
- [435:05]
A
I want to welcome everyone back to the Pican Yellow show doing part two of Cultural Parasitism Yaqui with Paul Fahrenheit. How you doing, Paul?
- [435:15]
B
I'm doing great, Mr. Pete. Thank you for having me on yet again. Let's finish this up, all right?
- [435:20]
A
Yeah, let's not waste any time. Let's share this and get it going. Oh, Don, I am a professional. A professional what? I actually shut down. I think I actually like turned off the. Or exited out of the yaki,
- [435:46]
D
you
- [435:47]
B
know, only, only the highest quality content creators, folks.
- [435:50]
A
Oh, we, we are the best here, aren't we?
- [435:53]
B
Yeah, we're just like Gillette Paris.
- [435:58]
A
All right, here we go. I found it not so difficult. I'm not going to edit this out. Normally this happens a lot more often than people realize, but I usually edit it out so.
- [436:10]
B
Well, this is, this is the stuff that people, that people tune in for. They love the little mess ups and authentic little moments.
- [436:17]
A
Yeah. Let me see. Okay.
- [436:18]
B
What they don't know is that we planned this from the beginning to make the show seem more authentic.
- [436:23]
A
Yeah, there we go. All right, so we finished up part three in the cultural parasitism chapter. And now we are on part four. We're gonna do four, five and six, and that'll end it. And then at a future date, probably further down the road, probably. Probably into the new year, because you have stuff going on, we'll jump into the next chapter, which is cultural distortion. And I think that's when things really start to heat up in this book. All right, part four. The materialistic 19th century saw this phenomenon of culture parasitism only as nation parasitism. And thus it was misunderstood in each nation as merely a local condition. For this reason, the phenomenon in each country called antisemitism was only a partial reaction to what was a cultural and not merely a national condition. Antisemitism is precisely analogous in culture pathology to the formation of antibodies in the bloodstream and human pathology. In both cases, the organism is resisting the alien life. Both are inevitable, organically necessary expressions of destiny. In fulfilling the proper destiny combats the alien. It cannot be said too often that hatred and malice, tolerance and goodwill have nothing whatever to do with this fundamental process. A culture is an organism, an organism of a different class from man, just as man is an organism of a different class from animals. But the fundamental regularities of organic life are present in all organisms of whatever class. Plant, animal, man, culture. This hierarchy of organisms is obviously part of the divine plan, and it cannot be changed by a process of propaganda, no matter how continuous tolerance, no matter how self renouncing or self deception, no matter how complete.
- [438:33]
C
So let's.
- [438:34]
B
Let's restate what he's kind of talking about in these first two paragraphs here. So within the Yakian frame, we keep calling it the Yakian framework, really. It's the Spanglerian framework that Yaqui is kind of adding to. Just Yaqui is essentially updating the decline of the west after the Second World War. In the Spenglerian framework, there's a hierarchy. Was it. There's a sort of. There's plant life, animal life, and then human life or man as animal, above the. Above the animals themselves. And then. And then Spengler differentiates the next highest form of life as a sort of a culture or a high culture. And he treats this the same way that, you know, it's a very. And it comes from. It comes from Goethe's kind of naturalistic way of looking at the world. And so what Yaqui's talking about here. The, the phenomenon of what has been labeled anti Semitism was really just what your body does whenever. Of viruses in your bloodstream. You know, white blood cells. Mr. Pete. Attack any sort of foreign entity within your bloodstream in an attempt to eliminate it, to prevent it from, you know, hijacking your body. Hijacking. What is it? Hijacking cells? Red blood cells. And that's the same reaction because anti Semitism, it's, It's, it's. It wasn't so much as Yaqui is illustrating here as specific hatred or dislike. It's just the recognition of this is a foreign entity that is not only, you know, not only causing significant difficulty, but just disrupting the entire kind of equilibrium that existed prior to their introduction.
- [440:23]
A
Yeah, yeah, it's. And really reading these first two paragraphs out of. Out of the context of the first three sections of this chapter can lead people to make implications, and they're. They're not there. You have to read the whole thing in order to understand exactly what he's saying here. But I think you. You put it in a clinical way that it should be looked at because that's the way Yaki's writing it. So.
- [440:51]
B
Well, you know, and. Well, real quick, before you go on, let's. Let's like, review this real quick just for the listeners who may not have immediately listened to the part one. Why are this group of people foreign? Why are they foreign? They are foreign because they are essentially residual holdovers from a previous high culture. That's pretty much it. They are a completely separate cultural entity from us.
- [441:17]
A
All right?
- [441:17]
B
That high culture, as all high cultures do, died and they got shotgunned across the world. In part one, Yaqui talks about the various places that these people went and that they changed themselves, maintaining their intercultural sort of being while adapting to the various external cultural places they went. All right, so this is why that they are a foreign antibody or they're not an antibody, they're a foreign entity rather to somewhere like the west, because the west is an entirely different cultural entity. If you know, Mr. Pete, like 2,000 years in the future and the west has died as a high culture. But you have like some holdover people, peoples. Maybe they'll be looked at almost the exact same way by whatever later high culture comes. As we look at this group of people today.
- [442:04]
A
Yes, especially if they are. Especially of this cult. This leftover culture is taking control of certain means in which the culture that's existing at the time, that it's not contributing to that culture but it's basically disrupting it.
- [442:25]
B
Yeah, they're essentially living, you know, like we. We've talked about in the last part. They're essentially living as a parasitic entity siphoning off resources and positions that could be used for furthering that later high cultures cultural mission.
- [442:42]
A
Let's keep going onward. A treatment of anti Semitism raises questions which belong with culture distortion rather than cultures parasitism. And it may suffice to say here that antisemitism, again, precisely like the human pathological phenomenon of formation of antibodies in the blood, is the other side of the existence of culture parasitism. And is. Is only to be understood as one of its effects. Antisemitism is completely organic and irrational, just as. Just as is reaction to human disease. Cultural culture parasitism is the phenomenon of the total totally alien in coexistence with a host and is also entirely irrational. There is no reason for cultural for culture parasitism. On the contrary, reason would seem to dictate that the alien group dissolve and flow into the surrounding life. This would end all the bitter persecution, the sterile hatred, the wasted fighting. But life is irrational also during the age of rationalism. That's a. That's a great line. Life is irrational also during the age of rationalism. In fact, the only way rationalism can come onto the stage is in the form of a religion, a faith and irrationality.
- [444:00]
B
Yeah, and real quick on that point. You know, individual entities at the margins do oftentimes dissolve off this group and are taken up by the much larger high culture surrounding it. Erhard Milch is a good example of this. Alfred Rosenberg is another good example of this.
- [444:23]
A
All right, all right. The phenomenon of culture parasitism is not confined in a high culture to the mother soil of the culture. This is well shown by the history of America. America originated as a colony of the Western culture. This one sentence contains the whole fate of America. It sets in advance the limit to the potentialities of America. The idea of the colony must be examined. What is a colony? It is a creation of a culture. It is a work by its mere successful plantation. It is something spiritually completed. This is another way of saying it has no inner necessity, no mission. It is thus dependent for its spiritual nourishment on the mother culture. This is as true of America in the Western culture as it was of Syracuse and Alexandria in the Classical and Granada and Seville in the Arabian. While fruitful impulses can, albeit rarely, come from the periphery of the cultural body, they find their significance in their development in the culture center. The spiritual dependence of colonies is weakness. This weakness is expressed by lack of resistance to the culturally alien. And one would expect to find less organic resistance to the culturally alien in a colony. For the sense of cultural mission is not generally present at all, but exists only in isolated individuals or tiny groups at best. You want to stop and comment on that right there.
- [445:56]
B
I mean, you know, what is it? Let's finish up the paragraph because he kind of. He elaborates this more.
- [446:04]
D
Okay.
- [446:05]
A
The history of colonies shows us Syracuse is one example that culture crises, even autopathic ones, like the appearance of rationalism, produce greater effects in them. A colony can be more easily disintegrated because it lacks the articulation that the culture has. There is not, cannot be a culture bearing stratum in a colony. The stratum is an organ of the land bound high culture. The culture cannot be transplanted even though its populations migrate and remain in contact with the body of the culture. Colonies are products of a culture and represent life at a less complex and articulate level than the creating culture.
- [446:50]
B
So this is, this paragraph right here is where I disagree with Yocky. Yaki asserts here that, you know, when.
- [447:00]
A
The first time, when I reread this for the. For this, I. I had an idea. I had a feeling that you were going to disagree with this part.
- [447:08]
B
Yes. And that's. And that's. And here's the thing once again. The model Yockey is using I think is a very helpful and useful model. What is it? The thing is, is that when he. What is it? He brings up the example of Syracuse as a colony of the Greco Roman culture. Syracuse created some of the most. Was it. Syracuse birthed some of the most important individuals within Greek culture, If I remember correctly, I think it was Archimedes who is. Who is from Syracuse. I'm gonna fact check myself because I got a fact wrong last time and I want to make sure. Yes, Archimedes was one of the most important. What is it was one of the most important Greek mathematicians of all time, and he came from Syracuse. All right, So I disagree with Yaqui in this instance of how you cannot transplant the cultural mission of a culture bearing stratum from one place to another. Now, I believe it does change, given the different geography. All right, Yaqui believes, you know, Yockey believes, especially as he asserts in this paragraph, that a high culture is entirely limited to the geography from which it originates. If that's the case, it cannot exist anywhere outside of its origin point. I believe that has been disproven by the. Was it not by the example he uses Syracuse, but also by the United States. And as a matter of fact, I, you know, for example, Rome, Rome was begun its existence as a colony of Magna Gracchia.
- [448:58]
C
All right?
- [448:59]
B
That was the earliest recorded existence of Rome. Rome then proceeded to become the cultural center of the Greco Roman high culture in its civilizational phase, in its imperial phase. I believe that the same thing is occurring in the United States. While he is correct that the cultural mission is not as highly concentrated, is not as present, is. Is, you know, what is it is more easily overwhelmed. I do believe that is correct because of course, if you take a tree and transplant it across the ocean, it. I don't want to say it loses an amount of vitality, but it changes. It changes and its offspring change in reaction to the new geography. All right, While I believe, you know, I believe that that is the case, I do not believe that what is it that I'm out. That what is it that it is limited to the geography of the origination of the high culture. All right, so, you know, for those of you who say, you know, you can just read Yaqui and get all of my opinions, you're wrong. You have to. I, I've read enough of Spengler and I've read enough of Yaqui to know exactly where I disagree with them and where I think even within their own framework, they're incorrect.
- [450:13]
A
Well, the one thing that he said here about where does he imply the being more. Permissive when it comes to allowing other cultures which would be allowing immigration in a colony as opposed to the. To the mother culture. I think there is something to that.
- [450:41]
C
There is.
- [450:41]
B
Of course there is. You know, and the same was true in previous high cultures. At the same time, those places which were.
- [450:49]
C
What is it?
- [450:50]
B
Those places were colonies were set up are in many ways by their, you know, eventual minority status, they were able to much better define themselves, much better create themselves than they otherwise.
- [451:05]
D
Not.
- [451:05]
B
Not than they otherwise would have than they began as. As a colony.
- [451:12]
A
All right, Onward. The comprehension of this elementary fact has always been unconsciously quite common, complete in America and in the 20th century has been just as vehemently, consciously denied. American men of letters in the 19th century assimilated Western culture inwardly and were assimilated by it. The phenomenon of Edgar Poe has always generated wonder by reason of his complete mastery of culture thinking and total independence of his colonial environment. In its higher branches, American ballet has figured as a part of English literature and quite correctly, as regard most. As regards most of it, the poverty and Meagerness of American letters is attributable to the colonial fate. While its few great names are expressions of Western culture. Americans of all high call, of all callings through the past two centuries, insofar as they were or wish to be men of significance, have had their center of gravity in Europe. Irving Hawthorne, Emerson, Whistler, Frank Harris, Henry James, the finance plutocracy, Wilson, Ezra Pound. A tradition in America makes a European tour a part of education. Europe continued to possess spiritually those American elements with culture feelings or culture ambitions. In every generalization of organic subject matter, it is sought only to state the great regularity. The deviations always exist in living matter, but find their place only with respect to larger rhythms. Rationalist thought attempted to disintegrate organic thought, a thinking by concentrating on the deviating incidents in the attempt to destroy the great deep sweeping organic rhythm. It had not even the depth sufficient to grasp the wisdom contained in this. In the saw, the exception proves the rule. Even though it became the fashion in America after its appearance as a world power following the Spanish War 1898, 1899, to deny its spiritual dependence upon Europe, the fact continued to exist. By this time, we are not surprised when a culture fact shows its disregard of human wishes, intentions, demands, statements. America is a subject that needs to be treated separately as the culture disease of the west has given it a new significance in Western. In world politics. In this place, the presence of culture parasitism in America is the only aspect under consideration.
- [453:57]
B
So I've, you know, I've already kind of stated my disagreements with, with Yaki here. His. I, you know, honestly, Pete, what I think I need to do is, you know, how Yaqui updated decline of the west after World War II. I need to update Imperium after the end of the Cold War. You know, in, in short, was he's.
- [454:22]
A
He.
- [454:23]
B
Everything he quotes here is factually correct. All right. Oftentimes, American letters are considered as a part of wider English literature. At the same time, I've, you know, I'm pretty well versed in both of them. And American literature is different. It is quite simply different. It is, it is. It is different enough from English culture that you could in many ways consider it its own separate nation. And he also talks about its spiritual dependence on Europe. And he uses the Spanish war as kind of the great moment. He kind of. He kind of utilizes this as the moment that culture parasitism kind of took hold in America after America denied its spiritual dependence upon Europe. I believe if, ya. I think, you know, if, If Yaqui were Around today. And he saw the kind of. What is it? The kind of thinkers that were starting to get on the American continent now, particularly within that this political movement and the wider associated scene. I believe his opinion may be tempered somewhat. He may still hold it. But once again, I've already kind of stated my disagreements here, and this is. This is my most radical departure from Yockey, and it's always been since I first read him, is that, you know, Yaqui's opinion on America and my opinion on America are completely opposed.
- [455:48]
A
All right, part five. From the early 17th century onward, continuing to the early 19th century, slave trading brought millions of African aborigines to America. These form during the 18th and first half of the 19th century, a large, prolific and totally alien parasitic body. It is a good example of the cultural meaning of the term parasite that it has no reference to work in the economic sense. Thus, the Africans in America were economically important and after an economy was built on them, necessary in a practical sense. Class war made it the mode to refer to all persons other than the manual workers as parasites. This was a polemical term and has no community of any kind. With a phenomenon of cultural parasitism. The Negro in America was the expression of cultural parasitism despite economic utility.
- [456:50]
B
That's true. They've kind of been. What is it, you know, Nick Land calls it the most expensive commodity in history.
- [456:57]
A
Yeah. Cotton was the most expensive commodity in history. Yeah.
- [457:02]
D
And this is.
- [457:02]
B
This is something I will. You know, a lot of Virginia planters recognize this immediately after independence was that, you know, the. The institution gifted them by the British needed to go. James Monroe and James Madison and Thomas Jefferson and Charles Fenton Mercer all being amongst the prime. The leading. The leading individuals on what was called the American Colonization Society. Mr. Pete, if you're not familiar, the American Colonization Society was a nonprofit organization in the early 19th century that played the most vital role in the purchasing the land and setting up the country that is now Liberia.
- [457:50]
A
Okay, I didn't know that. Yep, I'll look that up. Cool. All right, let's keep going. The first result of the presence of such a cultural culture parasitic body is known. He displaced unborn white men in America by performing part of the life task. He made unborn millions unnecessary. And therefore this great mass of Africans has reduced the population of America by 10%. For at the present moment, 1948, the Africans make up 14 million out of a total of 140 million.
- [458:24]
B
You know what's funny?
- [458:26]
A
What?
- [458:26]
B
They haven't really grown more than that since.
- [458:29]
A
Yeah, about 3%. The fashionable materialistic way of explaining this displacement in America is to say that white people will not bring children into the world to compete economically with the blacks and their lower living standard. Naturally, economic obsession explains everything economically. But the facts of population trends show that the population of an organic unity follows a life path that may even be described mathematically. It is entirely independent of immigration, of the wishes of individuals and of non organic explanations given for it. The displacement of culture that is total and is not to be fully explained by economics. The colonial mentality, more thoroughly disintegrated by the rationalist crisis, has been able to oppose no effective defense to the increasing displacement of the white population. The vehicle of America's attachment to the west by the African, with equal inability either to comprehend or to oppose America has not resisted. While the rear guard of the Arabian culture, which was strewn throughout the west even at its cultural origins, has assumed larger numerical proportions and a vastly larger role than it ever had in Europe. Beginning around 1880, the Jews embarked upon what Hilaire Belloc aptly termed an invasion of the United States. The numbers alone would justify the figure. While they cannot be exactly given because of the fact that American immigration statistics reflect only legal origins, that is nation of legal allegiance. Nevertheless they can be approximated from a study of current American population figures and study of Jewish of the Jewish birth rate. How typical this is of the total incongruence between two different cultures that a mass movement of members of one can occur within the other culture and leave no statistical trace. The immigrant was asked where he was born. That was determining of everything. For 19th century materialism. It was supposed to fix his language, which then was supposed to govern his nationality. And nationality was supposed to preordain everything else. Such things as petrifacts of dead cultures. India, China, Islam, Jewry were regarded as nations in the Western sense of the word. In form, rationalism was definitely a religion, but a bloodless materialistic caricature of true religion. Religion is properly directed towards the great higher things of man's spirituality. But rationalism tried to turn things like economics, state, society, nation into the object of its own religious concern. America began its independent political existence as a creature of rationalism. Its politicians agreed to the proposition externally that all men were created equal, and even said that this was self evident. To call it self evident and thus dispense with proof was easier and perhaps wiser than to prove it. Proof would have spoiled what is actually a tenet of faith of a faith, and thus above reason. The religion of rationalism dominated America in a way that it was never able to dominate Europe. Europe always had resistance against rationalism based on tradition until the middle of the 19th century and after that based on anticipation of the coming anti rationalist spirit of the 20th century as exemplified in Carlisle and Nietzsche. But America did not possess the first because it had no tradition and had not the second, because cultural impulses and the culture forwarding phenomena come from the mother soil and are thence radiated outward. As the rationalistic religion of America came from England through France, America acquired even its section of Jewry from Europe once it had acquired its materialistic philosophy to both of which it succumbed. This was no coincidence. The word spread rapidly through the Jewish population of Europe that anti Semitism was less of a threat in America and that other opportunities, such as the economic were equal to those Europe offered the offered to the Jew. This was perfectly sound and was a tribute to the collectivist Jewish instinct. America did undoubtedly represent in the late 19th century, a country with the greatest possibilities for the Jew. From 1880 to 1950 approximately remember, no exact figures exist. Five to seven million Jews arrived in America. They came mostly from the Eastern or Ashkenazic section of Jewry. At the present time, the Jews in America number approximately eight to twelve millions. An exact figure cannot be given because the number is not reflected in any statistics, but most but must be approximated from religious statistics and study of the birth rate. At any rate, it is a considerable number and it displaces its own numbers of Americans from existence. The American writer Madison Grant in 1916 described how the Americans of the old stock was being. The American of the old stock was being driven off the streets of New York City by the swarms of the Jews. He called them Polish Jews. As the older custom was to give the Jews a Western nationality. Westerners thus used to differentiate between English Jews, German Jews and so forth. It was a compulsion of the Western civilization, civilization at that stage to see all other people outside the civilization in its own image. America, as the country most completely disintegrated by rationalism, exhibited the least understanding of the nature of the Jew. While they were always some people, while there were always some people in Europe. For instance, Carlisle, Even during the 19th century, who realized the total and not merely political alienness of the Jew, but in America, with its complete lack of tradition. There were no Carlisle's, no no de la Guards. Thus America decide. America decided in the middle of the 19th century that a Chinaman born in the United States thereby acquired exactly the same American citizenship as the white native population. Of European derivation. Characteristically, the decision was not made in a responsible fashion, but as the results of a lawsuit. This was in pursuance of an American custom of deciding political questions in a pseudo legal form.
- [465:08]
C
Form.
- [465:09]
A
Obviously, a regime which did not differentiate between Chinese and Native American Would oppose no political barrier to the Jew. And so, by 1928, the French writer on historical and world political topics, Andre Siegfried, could say that New York City had a Semitic countenance. By the middle of the 20th century, this development had gone further. And New York City, the largest city in America, perhaps in the world, was almost half Jewish in population.
- [465:40]
B
Everything he's describing here did happen.
- [465:44]
A
Yeah. All right, Part six. The final part of this chapter. America, with its total lack of spiritual resistance, Springing from the inherent soul weakness of a colony, became the host to. To other large culturally parasitic groups. The period of dense immigration, which had begun before the turn of the 20th century and in which the Jews came, brought in also many millions of Balkan Slavs. Between 1900 and 1915 alone, 15 million immigrants came to America from Asia, Africa and Europe. They came mostly from Russia, the Levant and the Balkan countries. From the Western civilization came a fair number of Italians, but the rest of the human material was from outside the West. These millions, by their very numbers, created phenomena of. Created phenomena of cultural. Of culture. Parasitism. On the edge of each group, individuals passed into the American feeling, But the groups continued to exist as such. This was shown by the existence of newspaper press for each group in its own language, unity of the groups for political purposes, geographical centralization of the various groups and social exclusiveness of the groups. In examining the nature of race, we saw that Slavs could be and have been assimilated by European culture populations. Two features distinguish the American relationship to the Slav and explain why Slavs have retained their group existence Even though surrounded by an American population under the influence of Western civilization. First, the fact of its colonial style of existence meant that America could not transmit to. Could not transmit to entering populations the forceful impress of the cultural idea that the Western nations on the mother. On the mother soil could. Secondly, the enormous masses numbering many millions created by their mere bulk of pathological condition in the American organism. Even if these millions had been an. Even if these millions had been of Western antecedents such as French or Spanish, they would have created a politically parasitic group. Naturally, such a group would have dissolved eventually, but in the process, it would have had a distorting effect on policy in America. Slavic groups, on the other hand, and masses of millions whose leaders are Allowed facilities of welding the group into a firm unity will only slowly, if ever, dissolve into the American host population. Under such conditions, America has other smaller parasitic groups, each of which displaces unborn Americans and calls forth the unfortunate displays of hatred and bitterness which waste and twist a super personal life. There is a Japanese group, various Levantine groups and the Russian group. Superficially, it might seem that the case of American of America militates against the 20th century view of race set forth above. But actually it does not. The American example is no criterion for Europe for being a colony. It is an area of low culture cultural sensitivity with correspondingly less cultural force and assimilative power. In other words, the power of adaptation is slightly is slighter than of the mother soil. The case of you good.
- [469:13]
B
Yeah, I just. The thing is, is that is that once again, if Yaqui's assertion that America is a colony and his characterization of a colony are correct, then all of this is correct. But I simply disagree that America is a colony.
- [469:30]
A
The case of America is not a case of assimilating too much. It is a case of not assimilating enough. Alien groups, whether merely potentially alien, such as a western group in another Western nation, or totally alien, like the Jew and a Western host, are parasitic only so long as they are groups. When they dissolve, the totality of the assimilating population has increased. The fact that this has come from immigration rather than from increase by birth surpluses of the native population is not important. The mere fact that they could assimilate shows that they were not alien in a parasitic sense. Nor must this be ignored in examining cultural culture parasitism in America. This American population during the 19th century assimilated many millions of Germans, Irish, English and Scandinavians into its own bloodstream. The 20th century immigration did not come mainly from these European countries. But to the extent that it did, complete assimilation occurs. In the case of the immigrant Germans and Irish. The Yankee armies in the war of secession employed them in great number and with great success. What never could have been done with culturally alien groups, example Jews or Slavs, America has been called the melting pot. This it is not, for the massive groups of culturally alien providence have not melted, but have remained distinct. I the first time I ever heard it referred to as a salad, that made the most sense to me.
- [471:05]
D
Yeah.
- [471:07]
A
Groups not culturally alien have assimilated at once, which means in one generation. And thus the 20th century view of race applies also to the facts of the American scene. These unassimilated groups in America comprise between one third and one half of the population of America. The Slavic groups are apparently slowly being assimilated. But even if they disappeared entirely, the remaining culturally parasitic groups would comprise a pathological condition of the utmost seriousness for America. The old fashioned view of vertical racism can derive no instruction from the case of America. For what we see there is not the mixture of races, but their non mixture. All of the parasitic groups have been torn loose from old landscapes groups, but have no new spiritual connections. Only the landless Jew who carries nation, church, state, people, race and culture within him has preserved his ancient roots. The phenomenon of cultural, of culture parasitism, even though divorced from ethics, is not outside the realm of policy. It does no good whatever to talk about culturally alien groups in terms of praise and blame, hatred or tolerance. Wars, riots, massacres, destruction, the entire waste of senseless domestic conflict, all the phenomenon which inevitably rise when a host entertains a culture parasite remain as long as the pathological condition lasts. Culture parasitism, by calling forth resistant phenomena, has a doubly injurious effect on the body of the culture and its nations. A fever is a sign of resistance to a disease in a human, but this does not confer a positive health value on the fever. Its sole value is negative and the fever itself is a part of the disease, Even though the saving part, resistant phenomena like the anti Japaneseism and anti Semitism and anti Negroism of America are as undesirable as the conditions they are combating. Similarly, European antisemitism has no positive value and moreover, it can, if exaggerated, easily develop into another type of cultural of culture pathology that aggrav that aggravated condition which may proceed also from culture parasitism under certain circumstances, namely culture distortion.
- [473:39]
B
So he gets into a large part of that in the next chapter, which we're probably going to go over in the future. I don't want, you know, Mr. Pete, we still got some time left and you know, I. I don't want this to just be, you know, what is it to just be? The Paul disagrees with Yocky show. All right. A lot of what he has stated here is correct.
- [474:02]
A
All right?
- [474:04]
B
America has taken in an unbelievable amount of foreign cultural forms, A lot of them, almost all of them being dead cultural forms. The Slavs he did suggest have more or less totally assimilated. There's, you know, I mean, the thing is, I would suggest to Mr. Yaqui, is that despite itself, all right, the cultural impact of these people has remained largely limited to up until. Was it to up until recently coastal metropolitan areas and also what is it? Also it's starting to become some interesting interior metropolitan areas. And he is correct in that so long as these entities remain within the United States, it will retain a sort of feverish influence upon the United States. That being said, you are beginning to see a rising cultural consciousness within the old, the founding stock of the United States. Yocky says elsewhere in Imperium that the cultural mission cannot be repressed for longer than a generation or two. Even if you. What is it? Even if you try to genetically replace the individuals that carry it.
- [475:27]
C
Right?
- [475:28]
B
It never. It's never 100 successful. And even the people who you've tried to kind of throw into a place will start joining the ranks of the previous cultural mission. The west has a cultural mission it has yet to complete, and it has gone for a very long time because the disease of rationalism has essentially broke down one by one, every single cultural resistance that the west had in the pre rationalist era of, you know, resisting foreign influences, resisting foreign entities. All right, this was the case in Europe. However, unlike Europe, which went through its entire phase of modernism and all that, America is a sort of, you know, at least a great part of it is a sort of preservation of many of the tendencies and abilities and attitudes of the Western high culture in a much earlier form. In a much earlier form. And this is. This is to its detriment when, you know, it just hit rationalism. Rationalism hit America much later than it hit most of Europe. America had no real counter revolution. The closest thing it got was the Civil War. And because of this breakdown in cultural barriers, it has gotten itself into the situation it currently finds itself today. What has been very interesting and what has been always hiding under the surface is that there always has been a sort of looming backlash that, you know, you first saw exemplified. You know, it dominated for a time. He mentioned Madison Grant. Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard. And trying to think. There was a third one, Brooks Adams, and also, to a certain extent, Henry Adams, the. The Adams brothers. They were all exemplifiers of the sort of WASP ruling elite, which was the closest thing to a reaction America had, you know, and so long as they were in charge, certain policies, you know, was it when after this first battle in the early 20th century, you had some of the most restrictive immigration acts passed ever in the United States. That was only undone with hart Cellar in 1965, which really kicked into overdrive this problem. So now, Mr. Pete, in the United States, white Europeans remain, you know, discounting certain. Remain the majority.
- [478:12]
C
This.
- [478:13]
B
What is it? This minority, by 2050 status is a prediction, but it is not real yet.
- [478:19]
C
All right?
- [478:20]
B
And America, specifically the founding stock of America, is starting to recognize what it is as a cultural entity more and more. First unconsciously, but more and more, more consciously. You know, we were talking about, we were talking before the show, it's almost mainstream now in the United States to name that them. If in the United States you can name them, all right, you can say who is causing this sort of culture, this culture parasitism and even this culture distortion that is the beginnings of this disease being gotten the better of, all right? Anti Semitism in the United States has always been bubbling beneath the surface, has always been in unspoken attitudes, has always remained within the body of the Western high culture that is found within the United States. It has, it has required a significant exertion of material means to retard that cultural mission with things like dispensationalism, with things like, you know, Holocaust studies and all of that. And as always, it can only retard the mission. It can only slow it down. It cannot stop it. And we are finding that this backlash is starting to bubble up, is starting to express itself more than has ever been allowed in American history since probably the 1920s and 30s. And like you saw with the skinhead movement and the militia movement in the 90s, it's always just waiting underneath the surface to come out.
- [480:16]
C
So
- [480:20]
B
compare this to the mother soil of the culture of Europe which Yaqui describes, the origin of the Western high culture, at least according to Spengler's framework. I believe they have been completely and totally dispossessed of any cultural status they once had. I've said, I've said as much on different streams before, but in the United States, it is not illegal to question certain things. And you are, you will not be arrested for mentioning certain things. It's starting to shift the other way in some places there as well.
- [481:06]
A
All right?
- [481:07]
B
This is a culture wide phenomenon. I believe that should success be found in the United States, should the cultural mission gain enough steam where it cannot be slowed anymore in the United States, I believe that the west will finally shake off this cultural disease and will be able to fulfill its cultural mission. And if not, then we'll have found a different way for a high culture to die. The first time a high culture has died in the history of high cultures. You know, high cultures usually die through petrification or through basically fiery destruction. This one will be a high culture that died from disease of essentially, you know, of. Of, of pathologies, basically bringing it under, if we were to use Yaqui's framework. Anyway, that's kind of the extent of my thoughts on the, on the chapter. If you have any comments on those. Well,
- [482:17]
A
I think what from the readings that we've done and especially the readings on race, when you, when you take into consideration that. People who have been exposed to European culture, who are Europeans by blood, who are Europeans by, by race, that they can come here and they can assimilate properly, yet people who have been in Europe and resided in Europe for 17, 1800 years before even many of those cultures were created, before they saw their genesis, they can't, it's just a, without dealing with that in a way of just basically, you know, what, what like AA would say clear them out or Jonathan Bowden would say clear them out. They gotta go. I don't see how we get past it unless they assimilate all, all of a sudden, you know, it's like Tim Kelly always says, he goes, they're gonna have to accept Christ or something because it's going to lead to destruction. You know, and like we've talked about, and I don't think. You mind me bringing this up on the air. What we talked about off the air is, you know, having Israel in a place for them to go is a good thing.
- [483:49]
B
Yeah.
- [483:49]
A
The fact is, is that they've set themselves up in a way that because of their centuries of, of being the victim and playing off of that victimhood, they, you know, I've said it and I, I know this, this is, you know, this seems cruel, but in 1948 and especially in 1967, they should have just gotten those people out of there. They should have just cleared them out. You know what we're talking about. Clear them out. You got to get the, these people just do not mesh with your culture. Get them the hell out of there, there, do what you have to do to clear it out and then you establish your own culture. But I think that these are, these are people who have become so. They rely so much upon their victimhood status that they need to keep these people around, abuse them every once in a while. And then when they fight back by owning the means of mass communication, they can go, look, look, we're trying to be nice to these people. We want to. Somebody shared an article with me from like 2016 where they were talking about building a man made island off of Gaza and transferring them to this island, giving their road, economy, their own airport, all of this and everything. And I'm like, they never meant to do that. That is just another way of saying, look, we want to do this, but these people can't handle it. We're trying everything we can. We're the victims here. Cry for us. I mean, I don't know where to. I don't know where this goes. I don't know how. How this ends, other than, you know, our friend Charles Haywood says this is, you know, and not specifically towards, you know, violence towards Jewish populations, but in violence in general.
- [485:44]
B
Yeah, I just.
- [485:45]
A
How does it. How does this play out?
- [485:48]
B
I mean, in terms of the broader cultural mission. Either the Western high culture manages to. Manages to fight its way through this disease by the grace of God, or it just simply succumbs to it. And we have in the books of history a new high culture, a new way a high culture can die. Which, you know, the pessimist in me would say the latter. Some might say it's too late and the ladder is already going to happen. I have to, you know, as long as I exist, I have to. I have to carry out the cultural mission.
- [486:28]
D
But
- [486:31]
B
you're right, Mr. P, in that, you know, this does not have a peaceful ending. You know, assuming there. There's no. There is no ending of this in any way, shape or form where some sort of action is not taken. All right, you know, recently, you know, I. I'll mention this before, but the political possibility of ending this is possible. It only lacks political will, but can be done. It can be done. There are outlets. It is simply a lack of creativity and a lack of will and a lack of ability to confront. All right, and that's just the holdovers of a world that was obsessed with economics and lower things. And that's just what happens in high cultures. If a. You know, everyone, everyone. It's so trite, you know. You know, every time you say Caesar on a doctor podcast, put a nickel in the. In the Caesar jar.
- [487:37]
A
Take a drink and. Take a drink and get alcohol poisoning.
- [487:40]
B
Yeah, but, like, that's. That's. It just seems to be. It's the only macro political way out. It's the only macro political way out.
- [487:52]
C
And.
- [487:53]
B
And. And I think it can be done. You know, we've talked about. There's various control valves, Israel being one, Liberia being another. Another. You know, it's not like these people are, you know, it's not like all of these people are not from countries. It's not like they don't have places to go back to. You know, my initial policy was, you know, I don't know. I mean, it's this, this has kind of been what America has tried to do is try to develop other places maybe with the implicit assumption that if they make other places rich, they'll leave and go back. But it appears that that's just imp. Possible and so perhaps more drastic things.
- [488:35]
A
I mean, it's impossible because what we're talking about, we're talking about culture. They don't have a high culture that those places don't have a high culture that can. And we can't transfer, transfer one there that causes them to be prosperous.
- [488:49]
B
Yeah, yeah, it's true. And I mean, and perhaps it took, you know, people have to understand these things is that, you know, this is a long term game, a cultural mission like the, the West's cultural mission. If you take Svengler slash Yaqui's framework properly, the West Cultural Mission began 1300 years ago, if not a little bit longer. If a high culture lasts about 2, 000 years, we've still got a long way to go. You know, we, we still have a. What is it we still have. We still, we're still in the fetters of the sort of rationalist era. You know, you saw a glimpse at what the future will be in the previous century. So long as the cultural mission isn't brought down before it reaches its own fulfillment in this coming century. You're already seeing trends extremely similar just change to this, to these different circumstances of the last century at a much larger scale. So, you know, I don't know. I'm an American who doesn't think America is an evil concept and thinks America is a cultural entity and thinks America has a right to perpetuate its own existence culturally. I believe that culture, it stems from English culture, but from a couple of others as well. I believe that. And, and I believe that because of the cultural similarity between all of those various mother cultures that were on the original coat of arms of the United States, America, given its unique geography, then developed a wholly new expression of Western culture. You know, and because of that, I, I don't believe that's gone. I don't believe that can die until the cultural mission is fulfilled. Build and Pete, you and I both know what the cultural mission is. The cultural mission is colonization of space. You know, believe it or not, Elon Musk is about as close as you can as you can get to someone who can fulfill the cultural mission. And it's no wonder he's starting to understand these things. But he came from another colony too. He came from South Africa, which is a sort of, if you want to see what the future of America looks like, assuming nothing different happens. You know, you look at South Africa, but I don't know. Mr. Pete, I have to be an optimist. I have to believe that my country has strength left in it, has culture left in it. You know, that given our little attempt to kind of of shift discourse, our little attempt on this scene to kind of bring these ideas back into the. For I have to believe that these results, which we are already seeing, old stock, heritage American, are starting to be used everywhere. And that denotes a waking cultural consciousness. You know, and with the invention of the Internet and with the disruption of the materialistic sort of, of means of mass media, as you see the generations get cycled out and the younger generation start learning more about the world, start placing them into more and more economically, politically, governmentally important positions, culturally important positions, I think that at the very least you will see a good shot at overcoming this.
- [492:34]
A
You know, we know that it is possible for governments, people within governments to make change. I have a substack coming out tomorrow where I talk about a few subjects, but I talk about Bukele in El Salvador. This is a guy who arrested 6,000 people in 10 days. And like almost immediately, the murder rate in this country dropped by half. He didn't even have. I mean, and this is just his. What is his native population? This is people in his native population. It's just will. But what I see with politicians today, especially politicians in the United States, is they are either either or. And, but either. And it could be both engineering the destruction or they are anticipating the destruction, so they're just looting the treasury and getting as much as they can. So how do we fix it? And at this point, I mean, really the only way that I can see that it can even be fixed a little bit is locally is people stepping up and fixing their, their local areas. You know, stepping up and doing that. You know, El Salvador is a much smaller country than the United States, and I think the smaller the better. But I think that's the only way, that's the way it starts. I, I don't know that waiting for Washington D.C. or waiting for Caesar is the way, I mean, I think we can have, you know, I think, you know, we can ride the tiger while this is going on.
- [494:32]
C
Yeah,
- [494:35]
B
yeah, I agree with you. I mean, it was, it's. I think Bukele is an example of, you know, how quickly this can, in fact, be fixed.
- [494:49]
D
Fixed.
- [494:49]
B
You know, and the example people, you know, this was probably a week or so ago now. So it's old news. But you know, when Gavin Newsome just cleaned up the streets of, of San Francisco unilaterally, you know, it probably took him even less time than it took Bukele, you know, just to make the city look like it was somewhat clean. And that's because he thought an important dignitary was visiting, you know. And so it's like, it's like the only explanation, the only explanation that we have for the actions of our government is that we are ruled by foreigners. That is the only. What is it? That's the only explanation for what we have. We are ruled by foreigners. And those foreigners continue their rule by eliminating the concept of foreigners altogether. And reality always reasserts itself. Mr. Pete and I really, I really am hopeful at least for the, for the future of my people. Maybe not economically necessarily, but in the sense of what they can do, I am, I am hopeful.
- [496:12]
A
Yeah, we have to be. If we give up, I mean, you know, there's a lot, you know, it's like Evelyn said, there's a lot we can do. There's, there's a lot we can do. But it may just be that the system is too far gone at this point. And he also got, no, I was
- [496:32]
B
just going to say about Yaqui writing it, writing that Yaki was writing in 1948, you know, that was probably the darkest time in the history of Western culture in this for, for people like Yaki, you know, So I think, I don't want to psychologize, but it's understandable why he took such a pessimistic bent at that time.
- [496:53]
A
Yeah, no, yeah, yeah. But you know, it's, it when we look at just recent history of our country, what have, what's happened in the last 20 years, 30 years, go back 40 years, go back 50 years and you see the decline, how fast it can just go right downhill. You know, it's, it's not unsurprising that people would get black pilled, but I think those are people who are black pilled on national politics and who are black pilled because they haven't decided to live. They've decided that whatever the politics is at the time is for, I don't know for, I don't know for what reason. They don't have faith, they don't have, you know, they aren't living historically, which, you know, most, most people aren't. They just have nothing and they've decided that they're, they've given up on anything, on everything. But you know, one thing that I can Save from, you know, living, living where I do and being around people that I'm, I'm around now. You know, people who've lived in this area for whose families have been here for 200 years, 250 years, settled this area. I, it's hard to be black pilled around here. It's hard to be black pilled when you're around people who actually know what living historically is. They can't, they can't articulate it to you. They're just doing it.
- [498:33]
B
It's. You can't be black pilled if you're in culture. You know, that's the, that's the key thing missing is that, you know, almost none of the younger generation have culture, you know, and, but culture, culture is something that you achieve. It's not something you're born with. It's something you gain by understanding and you steward, you know, it's, it's, it's, it's something. And my mass media and other stuff like that is actually a means of, of totally in a, about as fast of a period as possible. Imagine if it were turned the other way. Imagine if people were blasted with, by state edict, nothing but, you know, culture on a regular basis, you know. Yeah, it wouldn't make, it wouldn't make the stupid smart, but it would completely change the tenor of how things are going here, you know, and, and, and this is, this is the thing I always want to try to emphasize to people. It's absolutely ludicrous how fast almost all of this can be fixed.
- [499:40]
A
Yeah, yeah. I mean, and the, just the two examples, the one example I gave, the one, the one example you gave me can, can be turned, can be turned around immediately. Be turned around immediate. I mean, not immediately. It'll take some time, there'll be pain. Line. The line is going to go. The line may go down for a while. You know, it's not, you know, the, the libertarians and the classical liberals where if the line goes down, that means that everything's going to hell and we got to do everything to make sure get back to where the line goes up. Oh, if you improve the culture, the line will go back up.
- [500:19]
B
They're relics of a previous age.
- [500:21]
A
Yeah, I mean, liberalism and libertarianism is, I mean it is basically it's gone, it's done. That's. We're not entering, that's not the age we're entering in. And I hate when libertarians argue that, well, libertarianism hasn't been tried. And then you have somebody like Melee in, in Argentina who's talking about using libertarian. No, he's, he's not talking about using explicitly libertarian means. He's talking about like, I mean, becoming an autark. Is that what libertarianism is? Libertarianism is, is all of a sudden about monarchs. He's talking about doing, doing things by fiat.
- [501:11]
B
Oh, the irony.
- [501:13]
A
It's, I mean, you know, and you know what? I want him to succeed. I want him to do right for his people. I think it's going to be extremely difficult considering the guys that we live in. But I want it, I want it for them. And I understand why so many people in the United States look over, look at Argentina and they're like, I wish we could be like, I wish we had someone like that. I understand why so many Americans, especially in the MAGA and the conservative movement, worship Israel because they see a, a society with closed borders. They seemingly like their own people. They have a national identity and everything and they wish they could have that here. I get it. I wish, I wish we had a president like Bukele here. I get it all.
- [502:06]
B
We have one waiting.
- [502:09]
C
Well,
- [502:14]
B
He's, he's, he's, he's coming back. It's, he's coming back. His, his story is not over yet, guys. I mean, look, and here, here's the thing. Like, he's the best we got. He's, he is literally the best we've got. You know, and you know, mister, Mr. Pete, we've talked about this, I think on the Old Glory Club streams too, but like, like his, it really does. If I asked you right now, do you think Trump's story is over?
- [502:40]
A
Oh, no, no. I want to see him. I want to see him win the election. I don't want to see him in jail because I don't want to see that for anybody who hasn't committed a crime. But imagine him winning the presidency from jail.
- [502:58]
B
Imagine. I'm. It's like that scene in the man of, in the man was a, It's a stupid show. But I'm just reminded when, when, when the character imprisons Reinhard Hydric in jail and he lets him out and he's super apologetic. But anyway, it was a trick. But yeah, I mean, imagine that. Im. I mean, what if, what if, what if Trump needs to be jailed after, let's just say a pooch that was failed and then he writes a, was it. And he writes a, a award winning political pamphlet called the Art of the Struggle.
- [503:35]
C
And,
- [503:42]
B
And he's appointed speaker of the House after an unfortunate, after the President and Vice President, unfortunately, die.
- [503:51]
A
Well, I don't know. You know, you. You hope to see a change in the culture of the people first.
- [504:01]
C
Yeah.
- [504:01]
A
So I think that's what elites. Elites look for. That's why I think that, you know, what we're seeing now with this, the rise of the noticing and things like that. I mean, it's been a year since. It's basically been a year since Kanye went off the reservation.
- [504:19]
C
Yeah.
- [504:20]
B
And crazy to think that that happened. That's already a year ago.
- [504:24]
A
It's a year ago. Yeah. It was December 1st, but at the
- [504:27]
B
same time, it was only a year ago.
- [504:30]
A
Yeah. And look at what's happened. You know, what did. Stalin's. Was it Stalin who said sometimes. Sometimes nothing happens? Decades and decades and weeks and things like that?
- [504:42]
B
It was Lennon. Yeah.
- [504:43]
A
Yeah. Lennon. Yeah. Yeah. But. Yeah, Lennon was much smarter than Stalin.
- [504:47]
C
One.
- [504:48]
A
But the. If. If you would have told me a year ago that Twitter would be like it is right now, I thought you were insane. You taught me. If you had told me a year ago that people who were saying a year ago, Twitter isn't real life are like, Twitter is the public square. It is the political. It's the. The political realm. I mean, I. Who could have foreseen it? I know I didn't.
- [505:25]
B
It's crazy how things can change.
- [505:27]
C
And it's.
- [505:28]
B
And it's.
- [505:29]
C
It's.
- [505:29]
B
It's. Yeah, it's just. It's just crazy how.
- [505:34]
C
How.
- [505:35]
B
How fast things can change, you know, people. And this is. This is the greatest great lesson that, you know, the. The greatest quote of all of Spengler, not optimism is cowardice. That's. That's. I think that's, you know, that. That kind of plays into the Stockdale paradox a little bit. I don't know if you're familiar with. With that. That whole sort of optimism is cowardice kind of thing. To me, optimism is acknowledging the grim reality of your situation and having faith you'll succeed regardless. That's what optimism is to me.
- [506:07]
A
Me.
- [506:08]
B
It's not deluding yourself into thinking that things are all just going to be a.
- [506:13]
C
Okay.
- [506:14]
B
It's. Things can be okay if I can make it through this, you know, that's. That's what. And that's faith. That's faith. But one of the other great Spangler quotes is this. You know, history is not this. And I'm paraphrasing here, I'm not actually directly quoting him, but history is not. Not a slow and gradual change. It is constantly oscillating from catastrophe to catastrophe.
- [506:48]
D
Yeah,
- [506:51]
A
yeah, it's. It really. It seems like you're only going to get real change when there's a state of exception. Yeah. And that's when a disaster is happening.
- [507:07]
C
Yeah.
- [507:09]
A
So, yeah. All right, let's leave it there. We could keep going.
- [507:15]
B
Probably could.
- [507:17]
A
But remind everybody, plug anything and we'll get out of here.
- [507:23]
B
Old Glory Club, if you're not subscribed already, I don't know what to tell you. I mean, just, just, just, just do it. And join the restoring of American culture and the West's cultural mission with the Old Glory Club. My stuff. I mean, I mean, I've been off Twitter and telegram past couple of days. If you want to follow me at Calf King Paul, go ahead. If you want to buy my collection of short stories, a Country Squire's notebook on my gumroad, that's. I mean, like, all of Pete's stuff. Listen to all of Pete's shows. Read all the links. Substack back.
- [507:57]
A
Yeah, I'll have a link to all this stuff.
- [507:59]
B
Give, give, Give Pete all of your money. You know, if you're listening on Spotify, if you've all. You probably already heard the, the stop halfway in the episode where he's like, this is the part where I tell you how you can support the show. You're gonna get two of those. You're gonna get two of those today. Except it's coming from my map, my mouth.
- [508:17]
A
All right, Give, give to the show.
- [508:21]
B
I love. I love Pete's show, guys. Like, you know, I don't just come on here, you know, because, you know, Pete's my friend and I like him and I like talking about yaki. Yeah, that's all true, but I like Pete's show. I listen to his stuff. So, you know, you know, I mean, give him your money so he can keep doing this.
- [508:37]
A
Well, I appreciate that, Paul and I will link to everything so people can check out the Old Glory Club and possibly go buy Paul's book and support him. If we're not supporting each other in this, in this area, in this group, in this little world that we've created, no one else is going to do it. So let's support each other. I appreciate it, Paul. I appreciate all the. The kind words. Thank you.
- [509:07]
B
Of course, man. Thanks for having me on.
- [509:10]
D
I want to welcome everyone back to the Pican yo show. We're going to do this one really fast. We're going to follow right up on culture parasitism with culture distortion and maybe even culture retardation. If we can have the if we have the time. How you doing, Paul?
- [509:27]
C
I'm very well, Mr. Pete. How about yourself?
- [509:29]
D
Doing good. Doing good. Thank you for making the time to do this. I know that you're. You're on your phone making concessions today, but thank you. Thank you.
- [509:39]
C
Well, I. I hope. I hope the audio quality is good enough for the listeners. I've gotten some complaints about my microphone, actually. And. And when I do my Twitter spaces, sometimes I do them on my microphone and then I do them on my phone speaker. And everyone always tells me that when I do them on my phone speaker, the audio quality is better. So I guess that's everything you need to know.
- [509:59]
D
This sounds pretty damn good. All right, let me share the screen and jump right in. All right. Gonna start right now. Culture distortion the mighty destiny of a high culture. Has the same power over the culture organism as the plant. Destiny over the plant, the human destiny over a human being. This power, vast and inwardly undeniable though it may be, nevertheless is not absolute. It is organic. And an organism is a relationship of an inner to an outer. A microcosm to a macrocosm. While no inner force can prevail against the destiny of the organism, Outer forces sometimes can, on all planes of life. Bring about disease and death of the organism. The microorganisms that penetrate into the body of a man. Bring about illness for reason of the fact that their life conditions are entirely different from those of the man. Their welfare means his doom. They are an outer force, even though they are working from the inside of the human organism. Outer is thus seen to be a spiritual and not a spatial term. Term, that is outside, which has separate existence. No matter how it may happen to be physically every. Everything with one destiny is one. Anything with another destiny is other. It is not geography which determines, but spirituality. In war, a traitor within the fortress. May be as valuable to the besieging army as half of its numbers. He is outer even though he is within. Life is the process of actualizing the possible. But life is multiform. And organisms, by actualizing their own possibilities, destroy other organisms. Animals devour plants. Plants destroy one another. Human beings lay waste entire species and slaughter millions of animals. High cultures, by their existence. Evoke negative impulses from outside populations. Those who do not share this culture feeling. Which confers such unquestioned superiority on its possessors. Instinctively determine to annihilate it. The more powerful the pressure of the high culture on the outer populations, the more nihilistic is the negative feeling which forms in the underpopulations. The more extensive the Culture expansion geographically, the wider it spreads through the world, the wider it spreads through the world, the eternal will to annihilate.
- [512:34]
A
Among the extra cultural peoples, life forms
- [512:37]
D
are hostile to one another. The fulfillment of one is the demise of a thousand others. This is another way of saying that life is war.
- [512:47]
C
So with these two paragraphs here, those top two paragraphs that Yaki is talking about, we have to kind of return to. As always, we need to remind the listener the framework Yahi is working from within. This is the Spenglerian framework, which looks at, at a high culture as an organism unto itself. It's a super personal organism that's above the level of man as animal. Man as animal is, you know, like yourself and me, Mr. Pete. It's two people with individual lives. And he kind of. He talks about this later on in the piece, but when, you know, he'll talk about destiny a lot and he'll define that later on. We're not going to get into that right now. But in essence, when an organism seeks to actualize itself basically to become what it is, to realize its potentials, this is always at the expense of other organisms. You know, he concludes that line by saying, this is another way of saying that life is war. Life is war. In order for a human being or any life at all to perpetuate itself other than plant life life, you need to kill and consume other organisms. All right? By killing and consuming other organisms, you basically give yourself the life energy to continue living. That's how. That's just. This is fundamental aspects of reality. The same thing is true for high cultures. You know, for a human being to live, to grow old, to get a profession, to make some sort of imprint on the world, to do something with their life, they need to do that. For a high culture to reach its logical conclusion, to reach the perfection of all of its culture forms in all of the various fields, art, science, mathematics, philosophy, history, warfare, economics, et cetera. It needs to do this at the expense of other cultures of other peoples.
- [514:44]
D
All right?
- [514:45]
C
And so this is. This is what Yaqui is talking about. And this is the frame that we're getting into. And this is happening in various times in world history.
- [514:52]
D
Okay, moving on. A high culture is no exception to this great life regularity. Its existence destroys other forms. And on the other hand, throughout its entire existence, it is engaged in an existential battle against the outsider. On this high plane of contemplation, the attempt to distinguish between offensive and defensive, aggressive and resisting is seen near, is seen dearly to be nonsense. It is a pseudo legal trick of rationalist conjurers lost in hyper intellectualism and hostile to life. Defense is aggression. Aggression is defense. The question of who strikes first in a war is on the same level of as who strikes first in a boxing contest. The 20th century leaves all this cant, stupidity, hypocrisy and legalistic leisure domain behind it as it strides forward to a century of warfare, the most powerful and unrelenting of all war this hitherto. But as it faces its most trying period, the period that will demand every fiber of its spiritual reserves and every atom of its physical resources, it is gravely ill. It is suffering from culture distortion. Culture distortion is the condition in which outer life forms are warping the culture from its true life path. Just as a human illness may render a man or to combat, so may a culture illness. And this is precisely what happened to the west after the turn of the 20th century. Culture distortion must be clearly understood by the western civilization.
- [516:38]
C
So kind of reminding us of our previous couple of parts. Culture distortion is actively caused by culture parasitism. What is culture parasitism? Culture parasitism is whenever you have a foreign entity within the body of a culture. All right, this is, you know, we've used the metaphor, Mr. Pete, of a virus entering the. Entering a human body. That's a foreign entity. It distorts the functions of the cells that it comes in contact with, which are a part of the body of the organism. Right. The same thing happens with, with, you know, culture parasitism when any individuals of a foreign culture, of an external cultural force are within the body or begin distorting the body of another culture. And this, you know, by siphoning off, off the resources, the talent, the human lives that cultural parasitism does, it then causes culture distortion. Think of culture distortion the same way you would think of a tumor. All right, what is a tumor? A tumor is incorrectly. It's a massive concentration of incorrectly replicating cells. Those incorrectly replicating cells are siphoning off, off all of the resources that the rest of the body needs in order to function. And they're funneling it essentially into nothing, as a matter of fact, into less than nothing, into something that actively harms the rest of the organism. Does that make sense to you, Mr. Pete?
- [518:10]
A
Yes, absolutely.
- [518:12]
D
All right, let us continue. It has already been seen that the word outer does not have a geographic meaning when used in the domain of the organization. The phenomenon of culture distortion is the result of outer forces at work within the body of the culture, participating in its public life. And policy, directing its energy to problems that have no relations to its inner task, turning its forces, physical and spiritual, to alien problems. A moment's thought show the impossibility of such a culture illness arising during the time of. Of the strict culture, before the turn of civilization. During those days, the forms of the culture in all directions of life were so highly developed that they not only required highly gifted souls to master them, but they mastered these souls in the same process. No European thinker, artist or man of action could in the 17th century have tried to focus European energy onto Asiatic thought, art or action forms. Such a thing might have existed as an imaginative possibility, but it is doubtful whether it was possible in actuality. At any rate, it did not occur for 800 years in the west, except in its rudimentary beginnings. We cannot see Cromwell Oxensterna or Olden Barnevelt concerning himself with the restoration of the Abbasid dynasty in Asia Minor, or the driving out of the usurping Manchus from the ruins of the Chinese Petrifact. But if a European statesman had successfully directed Western energy into such a totally alien, sterile enterprise, it would have been culture distortion. If an artist had managed to turn Western oil painting into the style of Egyptian linear painting or of classical sculpture, that would also have been culture distortion. Future volumes of Western history philosophy in the 20th and 21st centuries will trace out fully the superficially distorting effects in architecture, literature and economic theorizing of the classicist mania introduced by Winkelmann in the 18th century.
- [520:25]
C
So what Yaqui is talking about here, he is naming basically forms that these sort of cultural tumors, if you will, can take shape. You know, what does it have to do with Western culture that we're trying to restore the Abbasids or drive out the mansion? Choose. That's not a Western thing, all right? Its consequences upon us are entirely material. It is outside of our cultural horizon. It only becomes something we care about when it enters our body of the culture and siphons our resources away from our primary objectives and goals towards other ends. All right, let's. Let's talk about something more modern. Mr. Pete. The DEI push is a cultural cancer. It siphons resources, human capital, physical capital, physical land itself, space in academia and other cultural organs. And it turns them in an entirely self killing sort of way. Holocaust studies is another one. Liberalism. Liberalism in its. In its sort of outs, taken outside of where it was invented by, outside of itself, as a phenomenon of the way the English organize themselves. Liberalism in the sense of rationalism. Rational liberalism, not the rights of Englishmen, which is a Western culture form. Rationalism in and of itself is also is the greatest of these cultural tumors because it's actually inherently life. Denying it does not further any sort of was. It does not further any sort of cultural goals. It actually seeks to siphon off resources in this pursuit of pure objectivity, whatever that is, in order to basically perpetuate its own existence at the expense of the wider body of the culture. Any thoughts on that, Mr. Pete?
- [522:16]
D
No, I think your. Your examples are perfect. I'm sure when I was reading that people came up with other examples on their own. So. All right, let's push on. They will also list the innumerable distortions arising from culture parasitism during The Rationalist period, 1750 to 1950, of the various life aspects of the west, artistic, religious, philosophical, scientific and in the realm of action. This work is concerned with actions and directs itself mainly to the phenomena of distortion of the present and the immediate future, that is the next hundred years. In the presentation of the articulation of a high culture, it was seen that not all of the population in the culture area is available to the idea. This is quite exclusive of parasitic phenomena. The higher physically more sensitive stratum which bears the culture idea and translates it into progressive actuality, is completely available to the idea. But the availability is progressively less as one moves downward in the body of the culture. Downward means of course, not economically or socially, but spiritually. Thus a man from the lowest possible spiritual stratum may be found in a high position, like the monster Marat. Such individuals belong to no other culture, even a dead one of the past, and apparently are members of the culture. But in their souls they wish to destroy all formative life. Their motives do not matter, for their orientation is obvious. Such individuals who make up a whole large stratum of stratum during these centuries
- [523:57]
A
are simply below the culture.
- [523:59]
D
They are only physically within the body of the culture. They express themselves in England in the phenomena of the order of Wat Tyler's rebellion and Jack Cade's Rebellion in the 16th century Peasant wars in Germany in the French Terror of 1793 and the Commune of 1871 when Germany existed as a 19th century nation. The stratum below the culture was known as Der Dusht Michel. Phenomena of this type must be, must not be confused with culture parasitism. Things like the Michelle element which exists all through Europe and not only in the former German nation, as simply below. But they are, but they are not per se alien. They are an organic part of every Culture. But parasitism occurs only fortuitously and not with necessity. The Michelle element of a culture is not a pathology and is not a culture menace in itself. Its sole danger is that it is serviceable to the will to annihilate. Whether this springs up autopathically as in liberalism, democracy, communism, or exopathically, as in the case of the extra European forces which brought about during the age of world war, is the nadir of the western civilization.
- [525:20]
C
So with Yaki. Sorry, so Yaki is talking about here is. I'm trying to think of, you know, Mr. P. I think the best example to use talking about this is like talking about a human body and then scaling it up to a culture. I'm trying to think of what. What is an equivalent thing. The first one that comes to mind is sort of body fat. Excess body fat. Excess body fat is not a virus, all right? It's not outside of your cultural body. It's not something foreign. It's something that's like dead weight and is actually oftentimes actively harmful to you. I'm sure people who know more about biology than me can come up with something that is, you know, not. Not foreign to your body. But it is still, you know, harmful to your body if it gets overproduced and the rest of your body actually fights to reduce your own body's production of this as much as possible. But what culture parasitism is, is when. Once again, I have to keep emphasizing this word, Mr. Pete, because we've all been conditioned to be really afraid when we say this. When something foreign enters into your bloodstream, enters into your body, body foreign. All right? That is the key thing here. It is something that is another organism entirely. All right? That is what culture parasitism is and what cult, what causes culture distortion. It is when a foreign entity starts hijacking the functions of your body. Not just the refuse that your own body produces or that is found within your own body.
- [526:58]
D
Right? And when he mentions that it can spring up autopathically as in liberalism, democracy, communism, basically, it's liberalism. Just a very crude example. Well, we need every immigrant. Diversity is our strength. And why shouldn't people be allowed. I mean, borders are just man made constructs.
- [527:26]
A
People should be allowed to cross borders.
- [527:29]
D
It's crude, but I mean, that's exactly what he. It's exactly what he's talking about is you're allowing somebody from another culture to come in and are they buying? Are they becoming a part of the strat. Stratum. Does that make sense?
- [527:47]
C
Yeah, it Does. And, you know, and the thing is, is that another part of that is that both communism and liberalism are inherently, you know, they're, they are Western culture forms. They are anticultural in their bent, but they find their origins in the West. They, they play on Western assumptions, Western worldviews. As Yaaki talked about in a couple of previous chapters, Westerners actually, you know, if you, this is, you know, no culture is perfect. Every culture has flaws. Westerners are extremely fascinated by the foreign. And, and you can take advantage of this, as has been done by the extra European forces. You can take this to a certain extent. But liberalism and communism in their ideological assumptions are culturally Western. They are just, they're like an autoimmune disease that the west just self generates, essentially. If that makes sense to you. Mr. Pete.
- [528:47]
A
Yeah.
- [528:47]
D
A friend of mine said that Western Europe, Western Europeans have a pathological altruism.
- [528:58]
C
That's their greatest weakness. And that's, and that's really, you know, this is the thing Yaqui is talking about here is that earlier in the section he talked about how the extra European forces will take advantage of everything. And as the West's desire to fulfill itself increases, their desire to destroy the west increases one to one with the it. So, you know, the, the more we expand across the planet, the more we actually turn everyone who is not us against our expansion. All right, it's one to one. And, and this is kind of, and,
- [529:33]
B
and they will use.
- [529:35]
C
Because they're not, you know, you have to understand this. Yaki keeps emphasizing this throughout the chapter. This is not born out of hate. Hate is personal and emotional. This is not hate. And these people, these foreigners, they are not stupid. And they do understand us to the point where they know what our strengths and what our weaknesses are. They know what battles to fight us on and what battles not to. And that's why the subversion has to be such. It has to be subversion over a long period of time.
- [530:04]
A
All right, Onward.
- [530:06]
D
In that very situation, the European Michelle showed its potentialities for destruction. One section of it worship the primitivity of Russian vandalism. The other the spiritual putrefying disease of Hollywoodism. It was solely by virtue of this European Michelle stratum that the extra European forces were able to split Europe between them physically and spiritually. This European Michelle, with its attachment to the formless, brought Europe down before the barbarian and the distorter in its supreme hatred of grandeur and creativeness. It even allowed itself to be formed into military movements within Europe to sabotage Europe and work for the Military victory of the barbarian during the Second World War. After the war it learned that its fate was after all bound up with the creative forces of the culture. For this element was starved, frozen and looted along with the collective body of Europe. Europe in the gruesome aftermath of the victory of the barbarians and distorters.
- [531:11]
C
So you know, the second World War, Thomas, you know, on a lot of your recent series Thomas will often say the west went down in 1945. And that's kind of the key pivotal moment you have to understand here is that this was a two pronged force coming from two different directions. The Soviet Union was the more obvious traditional barbaric foreigner element. You know, as Spengler says in the hour of Decision, Eastern hordes equipped with Western technics. But the distorter from the further west which had hijacked the United States by this point was far more insidious and could even appear. It could even slip past most Europeans uncanny valley defenses as appearing almost quasi European in its organization and its rhetoric and its ideology. Both of them were necessary to bring down Europe. If it had just been one or the other, it would have resulted in either a European victory or at the very least a stalemate. However, both of them were utilized simultaneously to, to bring down European civilization in the mid century conflict. So that's kind of what Yaqui is talking about here. I have no, I'm trying to think.
- [532:33]
B
I mean, I don't know if you
- [532:34]
C
could say the Soviets themselves were culture distorters. I mean, Hollywoodism, Wow, I wonder what he means by that. Hollywoodism is far more of a good example of what the culture distortion is because it's taking at least the outward appearance of western cultural forms and then slightly tweaking and manipulating them into other directions.
- [532:55]
D
Understood? All right, part two. The destiny of a living organism must not be confused with the entirely opposite idea of predestination. The latter is a causal idea, both in its religious form of Calvinism or in its materialist form of mechanism and determinism. Destiny is not causal but organic necessity. Causality is a form of thought, but destiny is the form of the living. Causality claims absolute necessity, but destiny is only inner necessity. And every child who is accidentally killed at play shows that destiny is subject to outer incident. Destiny merely says if it is to be, it will be this way and no other. Every man is destined to grow old, but many will not fulfill this destiny. Let no one claim to understand the destiny idea if he regards it as
- [533:48]
A
a sort of hidden causality, a form
- [533:50]
D
of predestination
- [533:53]
C
so this. I know I just talked for a little bit, but this is an extremely important paragraph that you have to grok in order to understand the Spenglerian assertion of what destiny is. So when Yaqui uses the word destiny, everyone's mind immediately goes to this sort of Calvinist God, preordained everything which is unequivocally true. That's in Romans 8. Go find that. However, you know, that's not a Calvinist exclusive thing. The Calvinist didn't invent predestination. All right? What he's actually talking about here is a sort of very organic way of looking at life. All right? It's an organic way of looking at life. Mr. Pete, if you plant a sapling in your. In your lawn, and assuming nothing bad happens to it, what will that. Let's say an oak. SAP. Sapling. What will it eventually grow into?
- [534:49]
D
It will eventually grow into an oak.
- [534:51]
C
Exactly. That is what destiny is. Destiny is if this sapling that I've planted gets adequate sunlight, adequate, you know, nutrients from the soil, adequate water, it will then become itself. It will become the fully actualized version of itself, which is a fully grown oak tree. It's the same thing with a human being. What will. What will a man become if he gets adequate food, water, shelter, mentorship, teaching, etc. He will be. He will go from a boy into a fully formed man, and then he will eventually grow old and wither and die. That is what destiny is and what Yaqui is talking about here. It's the same thing for a high culture. A high culture begins in its nascent stages as, like, you know, if you want a really good book that kind of outlines what the early Western high culture looked like, read Henry Adams's Mont St. Michel and the Chartres. That is probably the best single description you will get of the earliest iteration of the Western high culture, which Henry Adams writes about when he's writing about specifically Norman civilization at particularly the landmark of Mont St. Michelin, which is. I think you. Mr. Pete, you may disagree with me, but I think the biggest microcosm of Western culture. I don't know necessarily about Western civilization, but the biggest microcosm of Western culture is actually Mont St. Michel itself. It's. It's just the whole of the west encapsulated into like one single landmark, one single thing. And Henry Adams has this great line. What is it? It's, I think, war and peace, church and state, God and man, all are made one at Mont St. Michel. And that is the epitome of the sort of Western culture soul is that sort of unity between these seemingly conflicting elements in this one beautiful expression. I know I'm, you know, sucking the air out of the room here, but. But this is extremely important to understand. When Yaqui says, a child who gets killed at play. Yeah, he's obviously not going to grow into a man. That's called incident. Within the Spanglerian framework, it is an incident that a teenager gets into a car crash and never becomes a college football star. It is an incident that a sapling gets chopped down in after a few years of its planting to be made into a fence or something like that. That's incident.
- [537:25]
B
You can't predict that.
- [537:26]
C
You can't control that. And the same thing occurs to Western high cultures. There was a Mesoamerican Western high culture in Latin America with the Aztecs and the Incas that was kind of strangled in the crib by Cortez and Pizarro. That's an incident, all right. This has happened to high cultures in the past. And so when Yaqui is describing the Western high culture here, it is the destiny of the Western high culture to actualize itself along a certain path. Assuming something like culture parasitism and culture distortion does not end that goal. I've talked for a lot. Let's keep going.
- [538:07]
A
Okay.
- [538:09]
D
No, I think that was important, though, because it explained. It explains a lot. And I think that not having a.
- [538:17]
A
A working knowledge of Calvinism and predestination,
- [538:22]
D
just to be able to relate that
- [538:27]
A
to
- [538:30]
D
things other than. Than Scripture, than soteriology, harms people.
- [538:38]
A
They don't really.
- [538:40]
D
They don't understand destiny. They think that everything has to be changed, that everything. That if things aren't changing, they're not getting better. And I think this paragraph right here,
- [538:55]
A
hopefully, and everything that we're reading will help people realize that that's not true when it comes to culture.
- [539:02]
C
Well, the thing is, is, you know, just like with a tree, and I
- [539:05]
B
know we got to keep going, but,
- [539:06]
C
like, culture is an organic thing, like a tree. You don't need to. To actively contribute to changing it. It will change without you intervening. You don't need to actively force your child to grow into a man. That'll just happen on its own. You just have to nurture it and preserve it and steward it and try to add something to it in your little way, as you can not just seek to totally, like, revamp the whole course or try to think you can completely reinvent something and make something that has one nature entirely contrary. To its own nature. All right.
- [539:43]
D
At the beginning of this treatment of the subject of cultural vitalism, it was said that if the extra cultural forces had succeeded after the second World War in destroying the entire culture bearing stratum of Europe, the stratum would have once again been present in 30 to 60 years. The statement was of course, hypothetical, for this did not occur. The mere fact that someone is writing and someone is reading this is proof that they did not succeed. The basis of that statement was the tremendous, ever youthful vigor of high culture. The west has a future, and this future must be inwardly fulfilled. Inwardly is distinguished from outwardly. For whether or not the west fulfills its outward potentialities is as much a matter of incident as it is of destiny. The inner future of the west contains many necessary developments, such as the rebirth of religion, the attainment of new heights in technics and chemistry, perfection of legal and administrative thinking, and others. These could all be fulfilled under a permanent occupation by barbarians from other, other continents. The grandest mightiest side of life, that of action, of war and politics, would express itself in such a regime in inexorable, continuing, bitter revolts against the barbarian.
- [541:03]
A
Instead of planting the flag of the
- [541:05]
D
west at the Antipodes, it would be reduced to trying to free the sacred soil of the west from the heel of the primitive. It was therefore no causal predestination thought when it was said that the culture bearing stratum would reconstitute itself, even though every one of its contemporary members were entirely wiped out by scaffold tribes trail trials.
- [541:27]
C
So he was talking about Nuremberg there, which Yocky actually got hired on to try. But also what he's talking about is a lot of people, if they look into Yaqui, they find very quickly that he supported a Soviet victory in the Cold War over the United States. Nevertheless, he believed it would not occur. He supported a Soviet victory because the Soviet Union, the Russian high culture, was a very very. Or the Russian nascent high culture is a very primitive one. It has not yet begun to develop itself. And he believed that a sophisticated high culture cannot be extinguished by a primitive high culture, because the primitive high culture only occupies them militarily, which is the most primitive way. And it's actually the easiest one to overthrow, as we have seen in history. He actually brings up the example of the culture distorters, or, you know, the. The example of the culture distorters is kind of what he's thinking about when he's talking about this, because like it or not, they were a. They were the fulfillment of A. And they were far more sophisticated in cultural terms than the Western Europeans were. That's why they weren't able to be extinguished by the Western European civilization, because they were the fulfillment of the earlier Arabian high culture. All right? They were a perfected high culture that reached its peak. That was left over within the earlier Western high culture. The Westerners are now at a similar level of sophistication to them. But this was not the case in the 19th century, even the early 20th century. But that's why he supported the Soviet Union over the United States, because he felt that primitive occupation could be recovered from culture distortion was much harder to recover from.
- [543:19]
A
Well, that'll. That just blows civic nationalists, people who
- [543:26]
D
grew up in knowing that the Soviet
- [543:31]
A
Union was the ultimate evil. It just blows their minds.
- [543:34]
D
They don't.
- [543:35]
A
They don't realize that the real ultimate evil was here all along.
- [543:40]
C
Well, you know, I don't know if I would call them ultimate evils, but it's like, you know, it's. It's the matter of, you know, to the high culture.
- [543:48]
D
I mean, to.
- [543:49]
A
To. To the formation of a high culture.
- [543:51]
C
Yes. Yeah, that's true. I mean, the thing about it, though, is, is like. And the way I look at it, Pete, what's easier to recover from? Getting punched across the face or bone cancer?
- [544:03]
D
Yeah, getting punched in the face.
- [544:04]
A
Yeah,
- [544:07]
D
obviously, you'll be back. Yeah, that's back within five minutes.
- [544:14]
A
All right.
- [544:14]
D
Contained in that statement was this. Either the west will fulfill its tremendous world embracing destiny of unlimited absolute imperialism, or else all this energy will go into warfare on European soil against the alien and whatever European elements he finds serviceable to him. As is true of all wars, hatred is disassociated with the necessity of this process. Wars do not come from hatred, but from organic rhythms. The choice is not between war and peace, but between a culture forwarding war or a culture distorting war. If Europe remains under the outer forces, they will be sending their soldiers into a graveyard. For the might of the west is not to be annulled by a mountain of propaganda mass armies of occupying soldiers, nor by millions of traitors in the Michelle stratum for two centuries. The streams of blood will flow irrespective of the wish of any human being. It is the nature of superpersonal organisms
- [545:12]
A
to express their possibilities.
- [545:14]
D
If it cannot be done in one
- [545:16]
A
way, it will be done in another.
- [545:18]
D
This idea conscripts men, and it discharges them only by their individual death deaths. It has no legal hold on them, no formal allegiance, no threat of court Martial, Its claim on them is total. It is a selective conscription. The higher a man's gifts, the stronger is the bond which the idea lays on him. What have the barbarians and distorters to oppose this? Against their murderous Russian slaves, their savage negroes, their hapless go home conscripts from North America, Europe pits its unconquerable super personal superiority. Europe stands at the beginning of a world historical process. The end is not in sight. When or even whether complete success will
- [546:01]
A
come is not visible.
- [546:02]
D
Perhaps before it is over, the outer forces will immobilize the swarming pollulating masses of China and India against the body of the Western civilization. This kind of thing does not affect the continuation of the conflict, but only its size. It is absolute, absolutely necessary to the continuance of the subjugation of Europe that the outsiders have large numbers, whole societies, groups, strata, remnants of dead 19th century nations of domestic European populations available for their purposes against a united Europe they could never have made their way in. And only against a divided European Europe can they maintain themselves. Split, divide, distinguish. This is the technique of conquest. Resurrect. Old ideas, old slogans now quite dead in the battle to turn European against European. But work always with the weak culturalist stratum against the strong bearers and appreciators of culture. They must be tried and hanged. This availability of the under strata of the culture to outside forces is one type of type and the most dangerous
- [547:14]
A
of that form of culture pathology called culture distortion.
- [547:17]
D
It is closely related, however, to another type called culture retardation.
- [547:24]
C
And that's the next chapter. You know, it's funny, it's funny. Yaqui predicted this in 1948 because in our current day we are starting to see the mobilization of the polulating masses of China and specifically India against the Western European forces. Isn't it funny, Pete, that all of a sudden Indians are entering politics everywhere?
- [547:49]
D
Now I've made, I think I made this point in an OGC stream. I said that you look at Nikki Haley and Vivek Ramaswamy in a debate for US President up on stage and am I the only one who looks at the British, who looks at the British Isles and goes, oh, they're trying to do that here.
- [548:12]
C
Yeah, it's exactly the case there. And I mean Britain is the experimental ground. If they can try to make it work in Britain, they bring it over here and try to make it work here. I think the thing about it is, is that the extra European forces have to rely more and more and more on these foreign populations because There are fewer and fewer and fewer individuals within the Western populations. Gen X was the first. You know, a lot of people like to. On Gen X, I really, I really. Gen X. You know, Thomas himself may get mad
- [548:49]
B
at me for this, but the more
- [548:50]
C
I look into Gen X, the more I realize, man, these people were so unfairly maligned. And I look at the cultural circumstances they had to deal with.
- [548:58]
D
They're.
- [548:58]
C
They're the largest generation. They were the first generation, like all the skinheads were Gen X. You know, at least their counterculture was the first one to start bringing back some actual culture into the West. I digress. But you are seeing, especially amongst younger people, more and more and more of a break from this, from the ideas of culture distortion now. They're much weakened, especially with the Zoomer. Zoomers don't know anything about anything, all right? But they do know who's responsible for most of the problems in the West. They can tell you that.
- [549:32]
A
That
- [549:34]
C
at least one portion of them can. So.
- [549:39]
B
And, you know, maybe.
- [549:40]
C
Maybe it's even too west to. To. To west. Too late to save the west, but we can still save some sort of remnant of it or reverse engineer some
- [549:48]
B
continuation of it with an attempt to
- [549:51]
C
continue the cultural mission even in a small section of the world. I have to be optimistic about this. A lot of people, you know, bring up that Spengler quote, optimism is cowardice. And they try to say that, you know, oh, it's already over, or I'm
- [550:06]
B
delusional or something like that.
- [550:07]
C
But, you know, look, I'm, you know, it's not a question of black pilling versus white pilling. It's a question of we can't. And Yaki says this earlier, and we, we can get through culture retardation, I think, before the end of the stream, because it's only, I think, four pages. But what is it? We can only control the West's internal, or at least whatever remains of the Western culture soul, their internal constitution. All right? If America is to be its own culture soul, it'll be a far flung
- [550:38]
B
thing away from here.
- [550:39]
C
For now, all we can do is work with what the west is. We need to get ourselves internally realigned to our own cultural path. We can't control external incident. If we all die in a war against the teeming third World masses, then. And we can't control that, that's all
- [550:54]
B
up to the will of God.
- [550:55]
C
But what we can control is internally what we are. And that's what Yaqui was trying to bring about, was trying to remind Us
- [551:03]
D
of
- [551:06]
A
all right, let's move forward to this.
- [551:08]
D
And this. This is actually rather short.
- [551:09]
A
I don't even think it's four pages.
- [551:11]
D
So culture retardation as a part, as a form of culture distortion.
- [551:17]
A
In the study of the articulation of
- [551:19]
D
a culture, the ceaseless battle between tradition and innovation begins. This is normal and accompanies the culture from the feudal union to. From the feudal union to Caesarism, from Gothic cathedral to skyscraper, from Anselm to the philosopher of this age, from Schutz to Wagner. The unending struggle that takes place within the form of the culture and is thus not a disease form. For even the conflict itself in each case is strictly cast in the culture mold. It occurred to no one during the period 1000 to 1800, when engaged in a battle against another Western idea, that he must prevent it from realization even at the cost of destruction of the culture. To be specific, no European power and no European statesman would have delivered all Europe to the barbarian merely in order to defeat another power or statesman. On the contrary, when the barbarian appeared at the gates, all Europe opposed him as it finally united against the Turk. At the moment of the of greatest danger, after the defeat of the European army at Nicopolis at the turn of the 15th century, the Osmanli Sultan Bayezid swore an oath that he would not rest until he had turned St. Peter's into a stable for his horse. At that period of Western history that was not to be, the total domination of the west by the outer forces of annihilation had to wait until almost the middle of the 20th century. It only came about because certain elements in the west preferred to ruin all Europe, rather than allow Europe to pass into the next cultural stage, the resurgence of authority. Any such historical phenomenon as this does not appear in a moment. The beginnings of this terrible division of the west are found in the origins of rationalism. Even in the wars of the Austrian succession, there is a new ferocity which presaged the coming split. In that war, the Allies actually planned completely to partition the territory of the culture nation of Prussia. Participating were to be Sweden, Austria, France and Russia. It is true that during the Romanov regime from the 17th to the 20th century, Russia figured as a nate, as a state and nation of the Western style. Nevertheless, they were. There were open misgivings on both sides. And there was a difference between partitioning of Asiatic borderland like Poland, and between Western powers and Russia, and the sharing of the mother soil of Europe with Russia.
- [553:51]
C
So what Spangler is kind of talking about here in the 20th century, Spengler, not Spangler. Sorry, Yaqui. It might as well be. He's just restating Spengler. I was thinking he's just restating Spengler here. But yes, it's like, you know what Yaqui is talking about here first in that first part, he was talking about how Europe united against the Turks. He also says it would be irrational for one part of the civilization to completely abandon the whole civilization just to shame another power within that civilization. Thomas makes this point. This is what Great Britain did, all right? This is what Great Britain did in the 20th century. And that's because Great Britain was possessed in clinging on to this dead cultural idea of nations from the 19 century, this very rationalistic idea from the 19th century. That's what caused them to do it was ideology was being possessed by a earlier culture idea. And using that, it's like, it's like, you know, it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter if we. If we've got browns in London, we check we're not speaking German only. And that's kind of the. That's kind of the, you know, mindset they take with it is, you know, well, at least we aren't speaking German. And it's like, like, huh, you know, and it's. It's taken this long. Mr. Pete, I guess for the true folly of that decision in the twilight of the lives of the men who fought the war, I challenge you to find One World War II veteran who looks at the war today and doesn't think, maybe, maybe we were misled in this. And there's probably some. But a lot of World War II veterans, and you see this a lot like, you know, I'm disgusted by the world that, you know, that this war created. And you can hold those veterans to account for going and fighting at the same time. You know, it's pretty difficult to withstand an onslaught of culture distorting propaganda when you have no real cultural strength to resist it. So I don't know, this is. But this is what happened in the 20th century. And you know, and there he starts. You know, he starts, like, there were threats of this before the 20th century, like with the supposedly European Romanov Russians that he talks about.
- [556:12]
A
All right?
- [556:14]
D
In the battle of the dynasts and traditionalists against Napoleon, the tendency went further. And in 1815, at the Vienna Congress, the Tsar, with his troops occupying half of Europe, a fact of which he frequently reminded the European monarchs, was able to pose as the savior of the West. Thus the first in wound and England were actually on the verge of the culturally pathological. When they pushed their battle against a Western sovereign, Napoleon to the point where they admitted Russian troops to European capitals. It is, however, quite certain that the western veneer of Russia was determining in that matter manner. The first. The. The first Urbund and Pitts. England would not have admitted a nihilistic Russia or the Turk to Europe as a means of defending, of defeating Polian. And they're with themselves. But the tendency did not stop there. In the First World War between the two European nations, both in the 19th century style, England and Germany. England again embraced Russia as an ally and painted the Romanov despotism as a democracy before Europe and America. Fortunately for the west, there was a counter tendency. And when the Bolsheviks started his westward march after the war, he was thrown back by a Western coalition. Before Warsaw in 1920, in the armies against Bolshevism were Germans, French, English. But yesterday's enemies today united against the barbarian. Even the Americans sent two expeditions against the Bolsheviks. One to Archangel and one to Eastern Siberia. During the period of Preparation of the Second World War 1919-1939. It appeared at several moments as though
- [558:00]
A
the coming war would take the form
- [558:02]
D
of a struggle by certain. By certain of the powers of the West. For the west was still divided at that time into a collection of tiny states against Russia, while others of these petty states would remain neutral giving economic assistance. Such a moment occurred in June 1936 when the leading four among these petty states signed a protocol embodying a general understanding amongst themselves. This protocol was never ratified. No less than 20 separate efforts were made between 1933 and 1939 by the bearers of the 20th century idea to affect a general understanding with those of the petty states still in the grip of the 19th century idea, which was already by then manifesting rigor mortis. Naturally, the leading elements of the culture bearing stratum in this. In these latter petty states were in contact with a new idea. But certain elements were opposed by reason of their spiritual insensitivity, their materialistic shallowness, their neg. Their negativistic jealousy, their firm roots in the past. And to put the. To put the most important reason last, by reason of their material interest in the perpetuation of the 19th century type of international and domestic economy from which they alone were profiting and from which the Western. The entire Western civilization was suffering. These latter elements decided to allow the division of Europe between Asia and America, rather than to embrace the future of the West. When the struggle between tradition and innovation, the old and the New, natural and normal in every culture reaches this degree. It is culture pathology. This form of culture pathology is definable by the intensity of the hatred of
- [559:49]
A
the future of the culture.
- [559:50]
D
It shows it reaches the point of self destruction. Rather than giving up the rigid past to the vigorous future. When the conservative elements come to hate the creative elements so intensely that they will do anything to encompass their military defeat, including self destruction, it becomes culture treason and is classified as an acute form of culture pathology. The hallmark of this culture disease is solely the question of degree. Every new idea in the culture has been opposed in architecture, music, literature, economics, war and statecraft. But until this horrible outbreak of culture sickness in the 20th century, the opposition to the creative had never attained a totality that can only be adequately decided. Described as maniacal, culture path, culture pathological also was the base and servile buckling throughout the Second World War of this subwestern element to the parasitic forces and barbarian forces to which it had voluntarily submitted in its hatred of Europe and its future. With unforgettable dishonor, it threw millions of Western soldiers to the Russian savages to disappear forever into the unmarked graves of Siberia. This Michelle element cooperated with and aided the barbarian enthusiastically and naively gave him all its secrets. But the same barbarian accepted all the aid without thanks and returned for its suspicion, sabotage and hatred. The Michelle element of the west went down with the defeat of the west and its passing under the barbarian and the distorter. The pathology of cultural retardation had had, in this case, tragic consequences for the representatives of the past as well as
- [561:32]
A
for those of the future.
- [561:33]
D
Actually, they are more tragic. For in the battle for the past against the future, the past is doomed. Eventually the idea of the future will triumph inwardly, even if its external destiny is frustrated. Mechanism in politics will give way to the future, just as mechanism in biology
- [561:50]
A
has long since yielded.
- [561:53]
D
The idea of individuals having power over the gigantic economies of superpersonal organisms is doomed. And this is one of the things that subwestern future hating elements wish to save for themselves. Materialism. Their world outlook has given way almost everywhere in the west to historical skepticism, which will make way for mysticism and the rebirth of religion the most they have.
- [562:17]
C
I want to stop you real quick on that. So historical skepticism lasted honestly all the way up until the early 2000s people.
- [562:25]
A
Pete.
- [562:27]
C
It was only beginning about when Yaqui was brought about. But this is where postmodernism kind of comes about. And all this we're.
- [562:35]
D
And.
- [562:36]
C
And even with that was with the 1960s and the hippies you actually already saw the seeds of neo mysticism. We're getting to the point where mysticism is now, you know, you know, remember Pete, that like in the early 2000s, how common it was to meet people who just said, yeah, I'm an atheist. Atheist. Now everyone is like, oh, well, I'm not religious, but I'm spiritual. That's, that's the, the transition. You know, atheism is untenable and has been humiliated. And it was the idea of the past. Mysticism is becoming. What is it? I'm already in, in, in podcasts like Stone Choir, like what I'm. What Ryan Turnipseed is doing. We're starting to see a new, serious Christianity rebirthing itself. And eventually the rebirth of religion will bring the west, at least internally. We can't, you know, that won't remove all the foreigners overnight, as a lot of people like to point out. Yeah, but we'll get there. You're starting to see this rebirth. And I, I, this is why I'm optimistic, because Yaqui outlines this. The rebirth of religion is actually what will bring us back into line, I think, think with the sort of culture path that we're supposed to go to.
- [563:55]
D
Well, I don't know if this is a reaction to Francis, but I mean, surveys that have been done recently within the Catholic Church show that in the
- [564:06]
A
past five to seven years, the overwhelming majority of priests that are people that
- [564:10]
D
are becoming priests are conservative. I know my priest is conserv.
- [564:15]
A
Is conservative as all get out.
- [564:17]
D
So, I mean, everybody wants a point to point to Francis. Yay. But no, look at, look at what the youth are doing.
- [564:25]
A
Look at what the, look at what the young leadership is bringing in.
- [564:29]
D
And that is, to me, that is a metaphysical reaction to what has been
- [564:35]
A
seen since, you know, Vatican II in the case of, like, Catholicism.
- [564:41]
D
So though, yeah, Ottawa. Yeah, all right. The most they have salvaged from the general destruction is an accumulation of small personal advantages for themselves. To show their appreciation, the barbarian and the distorter have appointed them their deputies in Europe. How symbolic it was that the puppets who were placed in the formerly important positions in Europe after the Second World War were old men. They were even old, biologically speaking, but spiritually, they were two centuries old, rooted in the dead parliament, Parliamentaristic past. It did not matter to the new rulers of Europe that the, that these superannuated appointees lacked vigor and creativeness. This is, in fact, precisely why they were chosen. Think of Biden. Anyone with vigor of any sort was carefully scrutinized by the New rulers. Lethargy coupled with oratory was preferred to the. To the will, to accomplishments. Suns. The stream of the 19th century patriotic verbiage. This is the result of cultural retardation. Without it, the outer forces could never have succeeded in grinding the flower of Western culture under the heel of their primitivity and stupidity.
- [565:57]
A
That's such a great line.
- [566:00]
D
It played, however, only a subordinate role. The study of pathology of any of other organic life forms, plant, animal and human, offer numerous examples of simulinity of disease in which the damage done by one promotes the spread of another. The sim. The simultaneity, sorry, of. Of pneumonia and tuberculosis in the human organism is but one case. The more serious disease which was running its course contemporaneously with the culture retardation illness and which was promoted by the latter condition, was an aggravation of culture parasitism which becomes culture distorting when the parasite takes an active part in the
- [566:45]
A
life of the culture.
- [566:48]
C
Yeah, I mean, that's to kind of. To kind of restate this. This is Yaqui basically saying, you know, even. Even within an organism that is, you know, culturally distorted in. It still kind of follows along its own life path. And what is it The. The. The power people have to understand this is that no culturally conscious high culture, no. No entity that is aware of what it is, can be brought down by culture distortion because the antibodies are too well built up. This is why when Yaqui said at the beginning of the first passage. Passage, this kind of thing didn't happen in the 17th, 16th and 15th centuries
- [567:35]
B
of Europe and even before that, because
- [567:38]
C
everyone was really well aware of what Europe was. What is. Well, what really is Europe? All right, what is Europe? It's best understood, the European high culture is best understood as the idea of Christendom. All right, of all the nations that partook in Christendom and there are. Are sort of half Slavic mongrel nations that kind of are counted in that as well. Croatia is one. Bohemia or the Czech Republic is another one. Poland is a third. You could argue the Baltic countries as well, and Finland and Hungary, who are kind of. And they're all on the borderlands of foreign entities, but you could consider them Western at least Western enough. But to. For it to mean anything and they're also small enough that, you know, it doesn't really matter. But that is what needs to essentially, and that's what Yaqui's advocating for, needs to be revived is a sense of Western sort of. How could you say, a sense of Western unity of. Of Neo Christendom. And that'll come with the rebirth of religion about the time of Caesarism as well. That's. And that's all that he's talking about here. The extra European forces, at least the culture distorters. They were at their most powerful at the period of rationalism, of materialistic economies, of economies of scale, of all this other stuff with the 20th century nation states. That was the high watermark of their power. Their power is degrading every single year. Anyone with eyes to see can see this. This is why I don't understand black pillars. Like Musk is out outright stating this because I believe Musk is possessed by the cultural mission of the west, which is conclusion is space colonization and exploration. So this is, this is kind of what is it? This is, this is what needs to be done. This is what our goal within the cultural mission is. If you're listening to Pete show, if you're listening to me, talk your ear off. You are possessed by the cultural idea of the west, which is not, you know, which is subordinate. Subordinate to the will of God. It's like you are carrying out the Western cultural mission by listening to this, by propagating these ideas, by teaching your kids, you know, and that's what's necessary, that's what needs to be done. And it's. And really the battlefield is starting to shift into our favor because they've, you know, their idea, the culture distorters ideas. Their power is entirely held by the ideas of the past. The ideas of the future are really the ideas that went down in the 20th century just restored in a different context. Maybe it won't be to the same heights, maybe it won't be in the same area, but it needs to be. And that's kind of, you know, once again, I try, I really try, Mr. Pete. And I know there's a lot of people who, you know, they don't, A lot of people don't like where I come from, especially with how friendly I am towards America. But you, Thomas, will say this on your streams a lot. You got to take the geopolitical and the cultural situation as it is, all right? We, most of us are in America. That's the place where I think we have to start pushing, all right? And there's a lot of our friends in Europe, they have to push where they are too. I think if we don't do this, if we don't keep doing what we have been doing, the extra European forces will win in and the European high culture will go down whenever the next Spengler is born with the next high culture. And he'll look at, he'll find out high cultures as well. Just like, you know, every culture has had a high cultural thinker. When he finds the western high culture, he'll buy. He'll be like, oh, the western high culture, they died of basically culture parasitism and culture distortion. That's what killed them. You know, the Romans were just brought down by fire and flame. The Mesoamericans were strangled in the crib, the Arabians mummified, the Egyptians mummified, the Indian and Chinese mummified, and the Western died of disease. I don't want that to be the case. You know, we can't control whether outside forces caused that to happen, but we can control inside forces, you know. Anyway, I know that was a lot, Mr. Pete, but that's, that's where I stand on this.
- [571:55]
D
Well said. And I think that's where we should end. I think everybody appreciates your time today,
- [571:59]
A
especially since you're recording this in outside
- [572:04]
D
of your normal, normal lodgings. And I will make sure to link to your book. I will make sure to link to the Old Glory Club and continue to promote the hell out of that. But Paul, thank you as always. And once you get past some great, great happenings in your life.
- [572:27]
A
Life.
- [572:28]
D
Let's pick up and keep reading this and push forward to looking at a
- [572:34]
A
more detailed explanation of what Yockey saw happening.
- [572:38]
C
Hey, I'm fully committed to the cultural idea, as are you, Mr. Pete. Our lives are basically in service to this and it's not going to end until we die. So, yeah, whatever, whenever, you know, I guess you could say the incident affecting my life. Life comes to, you know, comes to a conclusion, we can go back along the path of our own destinies, as it were.
- [573:00]
A
A beautiful incident for sure. Thank you, Paul.
- [573:03]
D
Take care.
- [573:04]
C
Thank you, Mr. Pete.