The Gulf War 1990–91 w/ Thomas777 - Complete

Summary

The Pete Quiñones Show

Episode: The Gulf War 1990–91 w/ Thomas777 – Complete
Date: August 10, 2026
Host: Pete Quiñones | Guest: Thomas777

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Episode Overview

This episode is a deep-dive historical and geopolitical analysis of the Gulf War (1990–91), the closing years of the Cold War, and the Middle East’s shifting power structures. Historian and revisionist thinker Thomas777 joins Pete to contextualize the Gulf conflict within the collapse of the Soviet Union, the legacies of the Iran-Iraq War, the rise of political Islam, and the true objectives of the US and its globalist project. The discussion challenges mainstream narratives, explores the strategic logic of Saddam Hussein, evaluates American policy rationales, and reflects on lessons from postwar decision-making.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The End of the Cold War and the Collapse of the Soviet Union

[01:30–15:30]

• Planned Societies and Their Limits:

  • Thomas begins with the inability of top-down planned economies, like the Soviet Union, to innovate and adapt, particularly as the information age dawned.
  • Quotes Francis Parker Yockey's prescience: “Yockey was suggesting that the Soviet Union would not exist at the turn of the millennium, like as constituted in 1950.” (Thomas at 01:59)
  • The elimination of market price mechanisms in the USSR led to stagnation and reverse engineering, rather than true innovation.
  • Reference to the foundational work on cybernetics, and its relevance to geopolitical demise.

• The Cold War as Global Shaper:

  • Every post-WWII state was shaped by the bipolar contest—many policies and state formations were defined reactively.
  • Iraq, like others, was positioned amidst global ideological confrontation.

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2. The Iran-Iraq War as Prologue to the Gulf War

[17:21–34:38; 56:24–62:56; 75:47–90:59]

• Arabism vs Regional Hegemons:

  • The long-standing balance of power between Turkey and Iran is described as the regional organizing principle.
  • Saddam's attempt to create a genuine Arabist bloc was shaped by this enduring struggle.
  • He deliberately avoided overt sectarianism to keep the Ba'ath Party broad and inclusive.

• The 1979 Islamic Revolution and Mecca Grand Mosque Seizure:

  • These events reshaped regional politics and security thinking.
  • “Nobody really foresaw Islam becoming this power, this animating principle... The seizure of the grand mosque changed everything.” (Thomas at 17:21)
  • Saddam felt existentially threatened by the rise of Shia Iran and grassroots Islamic revival, which upset conventional Cold War calculations.

• Iran-Iraq War Realities:

  • Iraq’s use of chemical weapons (with NATO origin agents) led to mass Iranian military casualties.
  • Both sides suffered irreparable losses: “Neither Iran nor Iraq ever recovered from it because, you know, you don’t recover from eight years of total war.” (Thomas at 29:18)
  • Mainstream narratives about “madman” Saddam are simplistic—his war aims were limited and rational from a regional power perspective.

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3. The Gulf War – Strategic Calculations and the International Context

[39:53–55:21; 62:56–75:47]

• Collapse of Cold War Frameworks:

  • With the Soviet Union dissolving, old doctrines (like the Carter Doctrine) were suddenly ambiguous, challenging for regional actors like Saddam.

• US Domestic and International Constraints:

  • Post-Vietnam War America was anti-interventionist and had no tradition of deploying large forces since 1973.
  • It was no foregone conclusion that the US would go to war for Kuwait—in fact, Saddam likely doubted it.

• Bush 41’s Political Mastery:

  • Thomas highlights the extraordinary skill of George H. W. Bush in assembling a diplomatic and military coalition, including Soviet acquiescence.
  • “What Bush accomplished... is something that I believe will very much guarantee Bush 41's legacy as at least the students, like serious students of political theory and of government as well as war and peace.” (Thomas at 51:13)
  • Bush is compared favorably to Nixon and Truman as an executive.

• The UN and International Law:

  • The Gulf War functioned as the UN Security Council was supposed to, with near-global buy-in.
  • US National Security Directive 45 and its open emphasis on oil and regional stability—conspicuous, not secret.

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4. Saddam’s War Aims and Tactics; The Iranian Factor

[75:47–101:38]

• Rationality of Saddam’s Moves:
  • Saddam’s quick seizure of Kuwait was calculated, not reckless. He underestimated US resolve.
  • As the war went poorly, Saddam launched Scud missiles at Israel seeking to fracture the coalition.
  • Notable moment: “Saddam was craftier than people think… As the air campaign began, suddenly Iraqi planes appeared in Iranian airspace. The entire remainder of the Iraqi air force literally flew to Iran.” (Thomas at 101:38)
  • The goal may have been to suggest a new Iraq-Iran axis and create further dilemmas for the US.

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5. The Decision Not to Remove Saddam (Why Not “Regime Change”?)

[109:25–115:13]

• Realist Restraint:

  • James Baker and Bush opted not to remove Saddam, seeing no clear benefit:
    • “Like, it’s not clear what people think that would have accomplished. You kill Saddam, and then what?” (Thomas at 109:25)
  • Fear of sectarian chaos or a vacuum benefiting Iran-backed factions.
  • The Ba’ath Party was more than just Saddam; its removal wouldn’t guarantee peace or stability.

• Contrast to 2003:

  • Later US intervention is criticized for lacking this restraint and nuance, leading to chaos.

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6. Big Picture: Historical and Strategic Lessons

[90:59–118:08]

• Why "It's About Oil" Is an Oversimplification:

  • The geopolitical system and regional order—not mere resource extraction—was at stake.
  • “It’s always been very above board that, you know, these things [access to oil] play into strategic decision making.” (Thomas at 75:47)

• Propaganda and the "Arab Street":

  • Operating in a complex information environment, both coalition and regime narratives aimed as much at public opinion in the Middle East as in the West.

• Coalition Diplomacy:

  • Keeping the Arab world on board was key—US included Saudi generals in command as a gesture.
  • Attempts by figures like Osama Bin Laden to offer their own solution show alternative political energies at play.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the Soviet System’s Weakness:

  • “If you abolish the price mechanism... you’re essentially always reverse engineering whatever your adversaries are able to construct and innovate.” (Thomas at 01:59)

• On Popular Narratives:

  • “This idea that Saddam was this deranged maniac and he only enjoyed the largesse of the United States... that's garbage for all kinds of reasons and only illiterates think that way.” (Thomas at 17:21)

• On Post-War Policy and Oil:

  • “Much of the world is dependent on Iraqi oil and is highly vulnerable to Iraqi threats.” (Thomas citing Bush, at 90:59)

• On Removing Saddam:

  • “It’s like you kill Saddam Hussein... okay, so then you got some Salafi government in the Sunni triangle fighting an Iranian Hezbollah-backed Shia element. Basically you have the Iraqi civil war but 10 years earlier.” (Thomas at 109:25)

• On Executive Leadership:

  • “Bush was an incredible political operator, and he was an incredible chief executive within the boundary rationality of command.” (Thomas at 51:13)

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Timeline of Important Segments

• 01:30 – Opening analysis of post-Cold War twilight, collapse of USSR, and planned societies
• 17:21 – The significance of the Iranian revolution, Mecca mosque seizure, and the Iran-Iraq War
• 29:18 – The war’s human and strategic costs, and why Iran and Iraq never recovered
• 39:53 – Saddam’s mindset, chemical warfare, & regional security outlooks as the Cold War ended
• 51:13 – US domestic constraints, assembling a global coalition, Bush’s leadership
• 56:24 – The technical chronology of the Gulf War: Desert Shield to Desert Storm
• 62:56 – The Carter/Bush doctrines and the significance of Security Council approval
• 75:47 – Saddam’s war aims, coalition-building, and the politics of oil
• 90:59 – Bush’s rationale for intervention as laid out in official directives
• 100:05 – Saddam’s use of Scuds against Israel; the intrigue of the Iraqi Air Force’s move to Iran
• 109:25 – Why regime change wasn't pursued in 1991
• 115:28 – Thomas plugs his ongoing work; Pete previews upcoming topics

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Final Thoughts & Next Steps

• Thomas and Pete highlight the complex realities and rational strategic calculations often omitted from standard histories of the Gulf War.
• The episode closes with Thomas’s projects and an announcement that their next series will tackle the Spanish Civil War.

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Further Reading & Platforms

• Thomas777 on Substack: real.thomas777.substack.com
• Future episodes: Covering historical revisionism, Spanish Civil War, and philosophy of power

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This summary captures the essential context, insights, and substance of the episode for listeners and researchers.

Transcript

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[Pete Quinones]

I want to welcome everyone back to the Pete Quinones show. We got a good one today. Thomas, let's talk about, well, finishing up the Cold War series. You know, they jump right into conflict in the Gulf. So you wanted to talk about the Gulf War, what some people call Gulf War one, number one and. Yeah. So why is this such a compelling topic to you?

[Thomas]

There's a few things I want to cover too that are related out of the gate. One of the guys on my timeline, he posed a question, he asked me because I, I mentioned that there's this essay that's very hard to find for some reason. It was, it was, it was Yaquis in the year 2000 essay where I made, I, I, I, I, I, I advise people to take note that, you know, Yaki was suggesting that the Soviet Union would not exist at the turn of the millennium, like as constituted in 1950. And this, this dude who follows us avidly, he's like, did he render like a similar diagnosis to the United States, like, you know, colloquially speaking? And I told him no, because generally that kind of thing is a fool's errand, you know, he's like, no, I understand that. That's not like a dumb question at all. Like it's impossible in short form. I don't like it, it's impossible to convey tone. I wasn't being flippant about that at all. It's a good question. But the reason why, I mean, Yaqui definitely in absolute terms would not have viewed and did not view the American system as long for this earth. But there's something peculiar about communism. I mean there's, there's all kinds of peculiar things about it, but it was more a contrivance than other ideological experiments. Like obviously, arguably it was the only true sort of top down sociopolitical experiment at scale that there really is, I think, not, not pressing for it, the Soviet Union, not just because of peculiarities of, you know, the epoch, you know, the, the 19th century into the, into the 20th century. It, but also just the process, the, the process of, of, of, of dialectic itself. You know, conceptually and philosophically as well as in, you know, concrete material developmental terms. There's processes that must be left to develop spontaneously in order, in order for any, in any, in order for any political structure at scale to sustain itself. Okay, like what do I mean by that? What really killed the Soviet Union in terms of its internal constitution was the Information age. Okay? If you abolish the price mechanism as sort of the signaling variable, as it were, for, for, you know, develop, for, for innovation and development, you're essentially always reverse engineering whatever your, whatever your adversaries are able to construct and innovate and develop. You know, like, why is that? Well, I mean, think about it like this. If I, if we corralled, if we created some think tank of say like, you know, Elon Musk and you know, a handful of, you know, like, like top finance players, you know, like Goldman Sachs types, you know, and then, and then you threw some, you know, you threw some like applying engineering prodigies or applied engineering prodigies into that in our hypothetical group from like mit, you know, would, and you just told them, okay, like think of dynamic ideas, you know, would they eventually, would they eventually innovate kind of like the next big like telecom breakthrough or like the next, or the next kind of generation, you know, like electric car. I mean, I, that's not the way things work. Some variant of that was done vis a vis the Apollo program. And in military matters, that is the way things are done because you're, the data set you're operating from is the capabilities of the other side. The probable exigencies, you know, things relating to the theater that you're likely to fight in and you know, what capabilities are going to lend themselves to, you know, waging War in that theater. But I mean basically, you know, your data set is actual, is actual combat which generally in some capacity is underway in low intensity, you know, kind of in on every continent, you know, perpetually. But in terms like major wars, you know, basically once you're at war, I mean that's kind of your laboratory, okay, as it were. And that can't be over emphasized as the fundamental weakness of the planned economy. You know, when the Soviet Union did innovate a computer in the Eisenhower Khrushchev era, that was advanced as anything in the UK and in America, but you know, 30 years later there was a grand total of less than 5, 000 computers in the Soviet Union. Like why they didn't know how, they didn't know what function it was best suited to. You know, they had some sense in basic terms that this is fundamental to command and control. But you know, you can't just, you can't just predict like some kind of auger, you know, what role like new revolutionary new technology is going to be best applied to, in, in, in absolute terms, you know, for whatever purpose, you know, it now extrapolate that kind of stagnant tendency, that literally stagnant tendency, you know, kind of every conceptual endeavor. And you have Marxist Leninism, you know, and related to that, but not, you know, solely proximately caused by that is that the whole concept of you know, this, this, this, this intrinsically hostile labor and, and, and capital paradigm, you know, and the kind of the, the strange sociology of cities literally being, you know, barracks for you know, hundreds of thousands of, of of factory workers, you know, that sustain, you know, this kind of terrestrial like national manufacturing economy of value added exports like that, that belongs to a discrete moment in time and building a kind of entire socio cultural structure around that. You're dooming yourself to being kind of frozen in that, in that moment. You know, that's, that's the reason why. And I mean there's also in my opinion like spiritual matters. I mean that quite literally, you know, that make it not sustainable, number one. But also I identify glaring frailties within the system as it existed. Even to people who are basically secular, this was apparent. That's why even people who were not Catholic and not even religious, you know, very much behind John Paul II and you know, his efforts to, to you know, weaken the, the, the grip of the party state specifically on Poland, but in, in all the captive nations as they were called, you know, that had with a Communist party at a sole claim the power, but that's, that's why even, even thinkers, far more kind of orthodox in their thinking than Yaqui understood this. George Kennan, who I have a whole lot of respect for, as I think people know, he made that point again and again and he was criticized for it roundly by, you know, what was then the equivalent of deep state types and, you know, Zionist types who just hated the Soviet Union for their own kind of ethno sectarian reasons. You know, same people who, we've got this kind of sanguinary hatred of Russia today, but also just guys who, you know, they're, they're all kind of raisoned. Detroit and the way they made a living was by discussing the Soviet Union as this, you know, perennial and immutable and just insurmountable feature of the strategic landscape. You know, if you're, if you're a second rate academic, but you've, you know, but you've, you found a, a very profitable niche for yourself as this kind of public intellectual who's, you know, protecting the country from this insidious threat. I mean, think of it as kind of like this, the geostrategic equivalent, like a Dr. Fauci. You know, that's what Sovietologists were. Okay, like, are they, were they gonna, I mean, I think a lot of these people didn't have any meaningful understanding of, of the situation or of communism, but even those that did, they, they had no interest in, in, you know, raising the possibility that this system has an expiration date. You know, not to be flippant about it, but the book Cybernetics by, by Weiner, it was published in 1948, and that term is something that centered people's vocabulary from, you know, science fiction and stuff. But it's an actual, it's a meaningful term in, in, in neuroscience and in applied logic and, you know, AI and all kinds of interdisciplinary fields that relate to decision making, particularly that which, you know, involves the interface of a human decision maker and a machine in various capacities. Okay, I, I raised that, I raised that text because again, it, the first, the first edition was published in 1948. From really, really, the die was cast in terms of the Soviet Union's fate immediately after the cessation of hostilities in World War II. That's not to say that it was inevitable the Soviet Union was going to lose the Cold War. Not at all. I made the point, and the first one to make the point again and again that the Soviets very were very well situated in strategic terms to win the Cold War and arguably detente. The raison d' etre for that was in part, you know, that fact. And it was the, the Washington establishment coming to terms with the reality that, you know, Warsaw Pact was winning on the battlefield. So I'm not suggesting the contrary, but my point is again to kind of bring it back that, that there were basic frailties and peculiarities in the Soviet system and you will not find, you will not find another example of a literally like planned society in that way. And this is, this is the point from where Yaqui was speaking, Moving ahead. In a large measure, with some exceptions that I think are kind of obvious to everybody and that don't really need to be fleshed out discreetly. Every state, every modern state, you know, that emerged as at least a nominally independent sovereignty after the Second World War was created by the dialectic of the Cold War. Okay? Even those states that adopted a third positionist orientation, they were doing so in dialogue with the Cold War contra the ideological paradigm they're in which they viewed as they're existentially menacing due to them being forced to pick a side in what could very easily become, you know, a general nuclear war, you know, or owing to, you know, fear of a kind of cultural contamination that pretty much everybody formally aligned with either the, you know, the NATO or the socialist camp ran the risk of, as they availed themselves to, you know, the kind of, kind of openness to the, you know, to, to, to the one superpower or the other. Iraq was no exception. To understand why America went to war with Saddam's Iraq, it's that what I just described needs to be accounted for in basic terms beyond the superficial and to understand why America was sort of so focused on Iraq.

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[Thomas]

The Iran erratic war was the progenitor of what became the Gulf War of 1991. If I could bring it up on my screen, I bring up the notes from Saddam's meeting with his war cabinet on the eve of War in 1980 before giving the order to go to war with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Basically everybody from, you know, these, these Arabists like Saddam was these, these pan Arab, you know, nationalists to you know, you know, to these radically pious, you know, Salafi types, you know, like Bin Laden, you know, to, you know, to Zionists in, in Israel, to, to these American Cold War functionaries like Rumsfeld, Nick Cheney, the thing they all agreed on in geostrategic terms was that the sort of natural power arrangement in the near east, It's a struggle between Turkey and Iran for read, for regional supremacy. That, that's what's precedented, you know, for a millennia, going back to when, you know, it was the Ottomans who, who defeated the Mongols in the near east and purged them for all time. You know, thus the, the caliphate being a Turkish caliphate, not an Arab one. Iran, despite being a basic kind of like inward looking civilization and it is in some ways a civilization unto itself. It is a huge country with a very powerful heritage and culture. Doesn't matter anybody who's kind of tuned into our, you know, partisan community, I shouldn't need to elaborately make that case, but just in raw strategic terms at least, you know, accounting for limitations of power projection capability. There's this great potential in Iran, okay? And Saddam again, being very much a creature of the Cold War, conceptually he was trying to accomplish what Nasser had failed to do and create a genuinely Arabist block, you know, with the Ba'ath party as the, as the catalyst. But he had to tread very carefully with, you know, adopting any appearance of sectarian prejudice or motivation. The Iraqi Ba'ath Party, it had Christians in key places. Tariqa Z is one of them. It had Shia in. In high roles, particularly some in the military. But at base, it was a Sunni party. It was a party of the Sunni minority. Okay, Saddam. Saddam's grievances with Iran went way back. The Algiers Agreement that had been signed with the shop was considered this kind of victory. Of types, interestingly. And it had allowed both Iran and Baghdad to save face with these kinds of territorial swaps that seem to be the kind of remaining conflict dyads, potentially between the two countries. The Iranian revolution changed everything. You know, we talked before about how nobody really foresaw Islam becoming this power, political force, this animating principle. You know, particularly the late Cold War was still very much the Cold War. Arguably, there's a more kind of earnest ideological bent in, you know, 79, 80 than there had been any time prior to, you know, the Eisenhower era. But this was not something anybody was really thinking about. And the seizure of the grand mosque also in 1979, wherein these radical Salafis, you know, occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca for weeks, you know, demand. Demanded the abdication of the House Assad for, you know, being at odds with. Being at odds with. With Allah and a false Muslim. The. They went as far. The. The Grand Mosque occupiers. They went as far as to claim that their leader. I can't remember his name off the top of my head, I'd have written down. They went as far as the claim that he was the Mahdi, you know, the messianic historical figure who would emerge, you know, as. As prophesized by Muhammad. I mean, so this was. This was profound stuff underway. Okay? People who have a kind of cynical view as well as others who just, I think, have kind of an incomplete understanding owing to their own probable conceptual biases as regards religious belief. Just generally, they had to look at this as no big deal, or they look at it as Saddam just being terrified of some kind of general uprising in Iraq. Not even so much against the bath party, but just this. This kind of radicalized Islamic consciousness, you know, sweeping him and his comrades aside. I don't really think that was it. I think there was great fear. The kind of the. The fear that, you know, sectarian minorities have of the pogrom wherever they. Where. Wherever they're situated where, you know, that's a realistic possibility. I think some had a more nuanced view of it than simply, this is something that needs to be quashed lest, you know, it kind of become the defining ideological currency of the Arab speaking world. On some level, I believe, like all Sunnis and Sam was a Sunni Muslim, they felt even more gravely affronted at the concept of an Iranian Shia caliphate than, you know, they had been centuries prior at, you know, the inception of a Turkish caliphate. So all these things conspired to kind of Kareem Iran, Iraq towards war. And the United States and NATO, particularly the Bundest Republic, were very much behind this. I made the point again and again, you know, and again I can't cite precise numbers because I can't call up my notes, but the. There's around 50,000 people who, who died owing to Iraqi chemical weapons assaults on Iran. Most of them were soldiers. Despite what, despite the impression people have owing to, you know, this, you know, the kind of endlessly repeated narratives about the Kurds. And those people did die. I mean, there was plenty of civilian attrition, but it was primarily military attrition. About 20,000 of that number died outright in the field. You know, these were Iranian troops who were hit with chemical munitions. A lot of nerve agent and then modern nerve agent. Nobody was really sure like what it would do. A fair amount of this nerve agent was procured from NATO countries. Iranian soldiers were treated in Europe, in Scandinavia, some in Germany, some of the Benelux countries. I mean, part of that was genuine Doctors Without Borders, like doing their thing. Part of it was a hot war in Europe. Definitely chemical weapons. They're not obsolescent, they're actually quite utile, depending on the, depending on the battle space. And a general, a general war between NATO and Warsaw Pact in 1980. It's almost, I mean it's a foreign conclusion that chemical weapons would have been used. So the world is watching the Iran Iraq war, okay, for all kinds of reasons, some of which, you know, some of which owing to very concrete, very kind of purely military matters, others relating to the political ones. And this idea that Saddam was this deranged maniac and he only enjoyed the large guests of, of the United States and the Bundesligan Republic and London because the Iranians were even worse deranged maniacs. I mean, that's garbage for all kinds of reasons and only illiterates think that way. But also Saddam's Iraq was a brutal state. It was a gangsterish regime. But I mean, a lot of regimes were like that. A lot of regimes are like that. America backed the ultimate mega cytal gangster regime in World War II. Instaling Soviet Union So it's not really

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[Thomas]

Iraq was remarkable in the sense of how, where, where and when it was historically situated and you know, the kind of the, the, the, the global power plays that became involved in, in a very direct and, and catastrophic capacity. But there's not something like weird or extreme, excuse me, in any sense that Saddam Hussein enjoyed the backing of, of the US and, and certain key NATO players. And it's the minutes from the meeting between Saddam and the bath war council. What amounts to the bath war council. He's talking about restraints like not in, not, not in like a Ronald Reagan kind of way or something. But he's saying like we don't want a wider war than what we need in order to, you know, situate ourselves in the position we want to be. Contra Iran. You know, we don't want this to turn into a prolonged war. We don't want it to become a wider war where among other things, God forbid Iran could you know, potentially shore up sympathy of, of, of, of other Muslim states. You know, like, these are not, there's not like the ramblings of some idiot or it's not, it's not. So it's not some beleaguered dictator who's suing for war in lieu of the status quo because that's his only path of survival, you know, and that's key, you know, and it's also, Iran fought a lot better than anybody thought. And obviously they hung on for almost a decade, you know, getting pounded by the Iraqi army that was throwing everything it had at them, quite literally. America was saying in the epoch, State Department and CIA and I think Defense Intelligence probably had a more realistic grasp on things. But it's the same nonsense they always say about states and regimes. They don't like that this regime is about to fall apart. Everybody is starving there. The revolutionary government has no popular support. The moment, you know, the moment hostilities commence, you know, they're all going to surrender and the regime is going to collapse. I mean, this was, you know, this, this is always the alibi. But it's incredibly, it's, it's remarkably foolish in the case of Iran. You know, like I, this is probably the only time you'll hear me cite Foucault in a praising capacity. But he, he wrote this dispatch, one of the few kind of purely like journalistic, at least in structure, you know, dispatches he ever released for, at least for wide publication. It was about the Iranian revolution and it was frankly insightful. And he said, this is a genuine third way. This is a genuine popular revolution, but it's not something that's just going to burn itself out, so to speak, once the immediate capitalist revolutionary fervor is, is gone. You know, he's like, for better or worse, these people have, these people have a very highly developed vision for what they are trying to do. It is in fact precedented. It's, you know, it appeals to a wide swath of people. You know, demographically, this is something that needs to be taken seriously know. And he was speaking obviously in the context of, you know, as Dayton was ending, okay. But he was kind of a lone voice in the wilderness. And it's weird. I mean, aside from the fact that, you know, he was kind of a latter day to sod and a lot of what he produced, in addition to just being, you know, kind of grossly morally offensive and obtuse, it was just plain like not insightful and it was wrong, particularly on matters of, you know, power politics and kind of human affairs in. As of a political nature. But whatever reason, he was absolutely right about that. Okay. I. That perhaps warrants some speculation at some point in a dedicated capacity, but he was absolutely right. So the Iran Iraq War became just like a disaster. You know, neither Iran nor Iraq ever recovered from it because, you know, you don't recover from eight years of total war. Okay. And if you do, eventually you're not the same. Particularly, I mean, when you're, when you're talking about the, when you're talking about both Iran and Iraq in the late 20th century, like, at scale, like, though it's, it's. It's like what I just stated is a constant pretty much regardless, you know, but particularly, particularly for states of that of that size, Iran was a lot bigger than Iraq. My point is neither was a superpower or anything. Yeah, I'll see what can be done. Yeah, I'm sorry about that. I was like. I'm trying to think of, like, exactly where I was when I left off.

[Pete Quinones]

Yeah, the last thing you said was you were talking about Iran and Iraq, and I wrote down your last words that I heard. It said neither was a superpower.

[Thomas]

Right. Nevertheless, there were. The decisions they made stood to be impactful on the global scale. Okay. It. And I don't know if it were. I don't know if the recording picked up or not. I made the point that Saddam, although he was very careful not to characterize the conflict in sectarian terms, owing to the reality that, you know, his party was a Sunni majority party and a sea of, of Shia Muslims, but also that would have compromised, you know, his entire raison d' etre and political life, you know, which was they create a genuine Arabism writ large as a mobilizing catalyst. And whether people, whether the, you know, and, and the Iraqi bath tried to care whether, whether Saddam himself, whether it was the Ministry of Information or whether it was the war cabinet, they tried to characterize it as a, As a racial conflict, especially as things went bad after 1983. You know, were the Arab people, like, fighting like the Persian other or like the Azeri, know, alien? Whether, like Iraqi people, like, bought into that anyway or not? I don't really think they did. It didn't matter. They definitely were afraid of Iranians. They definitely, they definitely viewed revolutionary Iran. Again, you know, the, the history of the near east is domination by the Turks, by the Iranians, Persians or, or both. And even people who would have been. Basically had no issue in. In ethno or racial terms with Iran. You know, the this emergent Islamic tendency as, as a catalyst for, for political action and as a truly, you know, significant power political catalyst on the world stage. Any Arab would have felt affronted by that. Like this, you know, this should not, like the Persians should not be leading this, this, this charge, you know, or that. No, you know, the, the first true Islamic state, you know, should, you know, should. It should be the, it should be the, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, you know, like it can't, it can't be this, like this, this Shia, you know, this Persian Shia state, you know, of Ayatollah and, and, you know, and, and mullah elders and things like it, you know, so there was very much that too. And neither Iraq nor Iran ever recovered because you don't recover from a conflict like that. And you know, that's why I, I set the stage for this because it's so important. Going into August 2nd, 1990, people pretend like Saddam Hussein was like this idiot or like some deranged madman. He was neither of those things. And because I think I finally got my notes back so I can check this document. I want to do the minutes of Saddam talking to his, to the bath war cabinet on, on the eve of war, you know, just before the 22nd of September 1980. He's talking about how the Alers, the treaty of Alers, you know, that basically allowed Iraq to preserve their honor and you know, that the Shah was a man we could work with, you know, but all bets are off as revolutionary regime. However, Saddam continued to, he kept emphasizing over and over again this has to be a limited war. We've got to limit our objectives, military and political. This cannot be allowed to turn into a quagmire and nor. We've got to make it clear that this is, you know, an effort to create, you know, a level, a livable strategic balance for Arab people. This is not some open ended war of conquest against Iran, you know. And, and again he, he had the full support of, in, in military terms, you know, of, of the United States, the Bundest republic, you know, and basically the key players in NATO for a reason.

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[Thomas]

you know, it's. I don't know if it recorded me or not. Did I. Wait a minute. I don't know if it was recording me. When, when I talked about that seizure, the Grand Mosque, did it record that?

[Pete Quinones]

No.

[Thomas]

Okay. Saddam, like everybody else in the world, his eyes were on Saudi Arabia, on Mecca in 1979, as well as the Islamic Republic of Iran. The seize of the Grand Mosque by this, the besieging militia. They call themselves the Ikwan al Ikwan, which is a reference to the, to the, the, the, to the. Basically, the Bedouins under their arms who had played a part in establishing Saudi Arabia. They seized the Grand Mosque from November 20 to December 4. They declared that their leader, Al Qahtani was the Madhi, literally the Mahdi, you know, like the, the messianic figure in Islamic theology who, you know, who ushers in Islamic victory. You know, they, this was something nobody saw coming. I mean, not if you looked at, it's like, okay, if you could look at, if people were disposed to look at the Iranian revolution as this kind of outlier phenomenon and look at Shia Islam is kind of a strange thing. Or look at the Shah's regime as this kind of brutal police state that, you know, people were looking for something to grasp onto as a catalyst to bring it down. You couldn't, you couldn't suggest that about the siege of the Grand Mosque and the fact that, you know, this was happening in the Sunni world as well, this kind of burgeoning Islamic consciousness that was translating to, you know, real direct action and war and peace terms. This changed everything, you know, and this also, this is again, why Saddam, he was cautious and not characterizing the conflict with Iran as a sectarian conflict. You know, and basically, I mean, that was pragmatic. I Mean, obviously, because the Iraqi bath was a minority party of. And although they had Shia, they had Christians, Luke Tariq Aziz was a Christian in their ranks, they couldn't well afford to be viewed as, as. As sectarian bigots. But, you know, there's those who welcome that kind of thing, even against odds that would appear insurmountable owing to bloodlust or whatever else it. So again, I mean, this idea that, that Sanam was just this, like, maniac or this buffoon does not, the historical record does not bear that out as what I got into. I think right before I cut out a couple things. You know, about the only time.

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[Thomas]

This is probably the only time I'll ever say anything praising about Foucault. But Foucault, he wrote this dispatch on the Iranian revolution because he was in Iran when it was underway, and it was incredibly insightful. And again, I know it's hard to believe that Foucault penned anything, particularly something that was like, you know, then contemporaneous to the kind of strategic situation and the burgeoning kind of, you know, political culture of radical Islam. But, you know, he said, look, this isn't a flash in the pan sort of thing phenomenon. You know, it's not. It's not just a typical, you know, revolutionary tendency dressed up in the language of Shia Islam for cosmetic reasons or, or because they, you know, they want to keep the Soviet Union out as much as they do, you know, as much as they want to evict the Americans, you know, from. From pulling the strings in Tehran. You know, it was very authentic, it was authentically felt, and it represented something different that, you know, theretofore was not part of the. Part of people's conceptual horizon. As detente came to an end, you know, there's profound things underway. And all of this coupled, again, with the fact that every Arab with, you know, a political consciousness and with a concern in, you know, historical terms for the fortune of his own people, a revolutionary Iran or just like an irredentist and, and militarized Turkey, these are very ominous things. You know, the. The Turkey and Iran are sort of the natural hegemons regionally. That's one of the reasons why, like, people are obsessed with Lotur and Iran. You know, whether it's these. Whether it's these kind of cynical Cold War fossils who stuck around like Rumsfeld and Cheney, whether it's, you know, Zionist types, these kind of, like, rabid Zionist bigots like Netanyahu, or, I mean, like the, the, like the Arabist you know, bath revolutionary types like Saddam was. You know, there's a reason why the Israeli fixation in Iran like deteriorates on certain points of policy vision and just like naked irrationality. Okay. But generally it's not, it's, it's not without precedent to view again the, the real like power players in the region as, as Turkey and Iran. But going into August 2nd the, as things started to go really poorly on the battlefield for Iraq. August 1983 is when Iraq deployed chemical weapons for the first time in a battlefield capacity. All told, throughout the war in 1991 CIA released its documents and so so did defense Defense intelligence on the Iran Iraq war. It's pretty much agreed by all parties about 50,000 Iran took about 50,000 casualties only to chemical weapons. About 20,000 of of those casualties were Iranian soldiers killed outright. You know, just like when they were hit or like minutes afterwards. The Iraqis made liberal use of nerve gas, nerve agent mostly Taboon and Sarin. And make no mistake, despite what people say, chemical weapons remain very utile depending on the nature of the engagement and the battle space. And you better believe that it was clear to everybody on both sides of the Wall, you know, NATO and war war planners alike that if and when war came to Europe there would be liberal use of poison gas. Okay? So strong attention was paid in both, you know, in both the Eastern bloc and, and NATO is the, what the impact was of chemical weapons on, on, on modern infantry. It, I mean again I guess I dropped that because it, and much and much if not all of these chemical munitions were were supplied by NATO countries. Okay? It, this is not some like rogue state action or something of that sort. But it. This is this, this was where Saddam was. This was the mindset, okay? This was the conceptual situatedness of Saddam. The Iraqi bath, kind of like the Arab street generally and the several Arab speaking Muslim majority countries going into August 2nd, 1990. Also what had to have been on Saddam's mind. The Soviet Union still existed in August 1990, but the Berlin Wall was no more. The Cold War was, was over. There was still a huge potential for crisis and arguably the world was, you know, there was tremendous danger afoot owing to instability and the fact that not any kind of meaningful disarmament had been accomplished, particularly as regards nuclear forces, unless you count the Intermediate forces Treaty itself. But the Carter Doctrine, you know, which, the Carter Doctrine, which you know, stated in no uncertain terms that any Soviet attack on any state in the Middle east, basically any hostile deployment, the, the United States would, would treat that as an attack on its vital interests, you know, and it would, it would, and it would meet the attack with proportionate force. Okay, but the Carter doctrine, absent the Soviet Union doesn't really make any sense, you know, and it's not like there was some precedent for America just intervening in the Middle east just on, just on basic terms, you know, around its own terms. So from the perspective of Saddam, forget

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[Thomas]

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[Thomas]

There was that too, you know, and finally, you know, America only ended the military draft in 1973. The last time America deployed forces into an open ended combat situation was Vietnam. The Democratic Party, their platform consistently was hostile to military industrial interests as a matter of course. The revolution in military affairs. First of all, people like, like the, the common man or woman are kind of, are kind of ignorant of military affairs anyway. But they had, they had no concept of Rema. They had no concept of what was different about you know, waging a counterinsurgency war with conventional elements like in Southeast Asia in a Cold War context which axiomatically limited the operational environment. They have no concept of why that is radically different than waging a conventional war in the desert against a country like Iraq. But their Americans were basically not enthusiastic about, about, about military deployments and this idea of, you know, just Congress signing off on some open ended deployment to wage a general war with Iraq, you know, to liberate it, to liberate a country that was, you know, this kind of oil chic kingdom like that. It was not for an inclusion that, that America willing to go to war. In fact, most people viewed it as unlikely that America would deploy, you know, at scale to, to accomplishes that. And finally what was essential, even if the political will was there in America, even if, you know, public opinion was 100 behind it, even if there's a consensus on the Beltway, even before a shot was fired in anger, you still want, whoever that, you know, was in the Oval Office would literally have to finesse a coalition that quite literally had, you know, the Arab world 100 behind America as well as also them in the Soviet Union agree to Stand down. Okay. Now, I'm not gonna sit here and pretend like Bush 41 was a good guy or that we should like him or that, you know, he was a man worthy of your high esteem or anything like that. Okay? But Bush was an incredible political operator, and he was an incredible chief executive within the boundary, rationality of command. Okay? What he accomplished, I. I could see Nixon pulling it off, okay, Within a different context, but there's nothing short of remarkable. And that. That is something that I believe will very much guarantee Bush 41's legacy as at least the students, like serious students of a political theory and of government as well as war and peace. And that's one of that. That's why I speak of Bush and what I know people attack me sometimes. It sounds just good natured, ribbing for what appears to be, you know, some kind of, like, praise of, like, Bush. And I mean, understandably, like, why would anyone say nice thing about the Bush family? But, you know, I. It doesn't matter what his politics were in this context. We're talking about the essence of executive decisionism and all of that. Let's. Let's take up the Gulf War proper in another episode. Okay. If you're okay with that.

[Pete Quinones]

Yeah.

[Thomas]

I'm sorry if it's on my end. I mean, I'm sorry. On my end, like, the Zoom got fubar. I'll hop on my dad's machine.

[Pete Quinones]

Or like, it's been fine since. It's been fine since you shut it down and restarted.

[Thomas]

Okay. Yeah, I'll. We can even convene this weekend. I don't feel pressured. We'll record for the next series. We'll commence that anytime you want, even if it's like, Monday. But I wanted. I want to do a part two to conclude Golf War one. Okay. And, yeah, that's. That's dope. And I'll. I'll make sure that. I'll do whatever I can, make sure it's not an issue with, like, Zoom freezing my stuff or whatever problem. Okay. Yeah. Thank you, Pete.

[Pete Quinones]

All right, man, I'm gonna. I'm gonna cut it now, and we'll talk about recording that second one over the next couple days.

[Thomas]

Definitely.

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[Pete Quinones]

Thanks, man.

[Thomas]

Yeah.

[Pete Quinones]

Want to welcome everyone back to the Pican Yana show. Thomas is here to Finish up this quick two episode. The Gulf War of. Was it 90 to 91? I was alive for it.

[Thomas]

Yeah, it was. The Iraqi assault on Kuwait was August 2, 1990. Desert Shield became Desert Storm on January 17, 1991, cessation of hostilities was in March of 1991, but an incredibly impactful event for all kinds of reasons, and it acquits President Bush in the historical record. Again, I. People misconstrue what I mean by that. I'm not endorsing Bush's character or saying that I share what was his policy vision for the world, which in a lot of ways was a more restrained iteration of. Of. Of what the New Dealers saw as, you know, kind of the ideal configuration of world order. I, I think Bush 41 had something in common with Harry Truman, frankly. He was a better warlord, I think, just like a more capable guy, you know, but he. That's kind of the way to understand his policy vision in very basic terms. Okay. His view for complex interdependence and, and globalism was different. I mean, part of that owed to the different epochs in which they, you know, were ascendant in terms of their own role. But part of it was just, you know, Bush had a unique. He had a unique concept of what globalism would look like. That, that. And again, I'm not. I want to qualify this because people misunderstand. You know, I'm talking about the boundary rationality. I'm judging these things in the boundary rationality, the goals of these actors themselves. Okay? And I'm juxtaposing that with the total kind of insanity and. And nonsensical like, non policy that is, you know, characteristic today of the regime. You know, it's not even. It's not even so much today that, you know, the point. Putting on word like there was. There was no foreign policy. You know, there was. There was just this bizarre, destructive kind of scattershot, you know, collection of. Of. Of constellation of like, military adventurism, you know, against the enemies of Israel and against other just kind of random states that, you know, owing to some discrete interest group and their ability to bring pressure or to, you know, localized economic interests, you know, was targeted for destruction. But beyond that, there literally is no, like, meaningful foreign policy. I mean, the point again and again to people that people like Mike Pompeo or like Nikki Haley, like, these people really are morons. Like, not. They're not acting, you know, they're not dumbing down their language conceptually to try and appeal to like, the common man or woman. Like they really are like idiots. Like, they have no. They have no concept at all of. Of. Of the world and power political or anything like that. So Bush, Baker, Scowcroft, even Cheney. And Cheney's a terrible person. But again, you know, we're not talking about the character of these people. Oh, I have had no luck lately.

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[Thomas]

You know, they, they stand out and they come kind of like the, the, the contrast emerges in high relief, proverbially speaking. But it's also too the, the Gulf war other than Korea, other than Korean war, it's really the only case of the United nations functioning as it was intended function. Okay, so for Marvel that reason too. And of course like in the Korean War, the Soviet Union was boycotting the United Nations. So I mean, that's why the security council was able to bypass what would have been, you know, an inevitable Soviet veto over the resolution to defend the Republic of Korea. The fact that Bush was able to get, I mean you got to look at it like this, okay. From 1970, de facto, from 1973 onward, the Middle east became a conflict dyad, the traversing of which by hostile deployment by their, you know, the United States or Warsaw Pact would have led to world war iii. It was, it was declared de facto a vital U. S. Sphere of interest in 1973, you know, when, when it appeared as if the Soviet Union was going to deploy to relieve the Egyptian army and prevent their destruction. You know, the United States then elevated the DEFCON 3. The Soviet Union in turn deployed nuclear warheads to the port of Alexandria. They weren't married to their launch vehicles. They never came ashore. And Gromiko and Usinov undoubtedly. But grammy go for certain advised, advised version of the, you know, to, to prepare for war basically, you know, to deploy. What was Warsaw pack's version of their rapid reaction force which, which technically was like a paratrooper elemental. And nobody was like using parachutes by then, you know, but it, they were. The Soviet Union did have an equivalent of a rapid reaction force that deployed basically like you know, the 82nd Airborne. And that element attached to it did for the, the bright star exercise biannually. But I digress. But the point is Middle east policy as regards war and peace became formalized by the Carter doctrine, you know, and Carter declared in no uncertain terms,

[Pete Quinones]

you

[Thomas]

know, when, when the red army assaulted Afghanistan that, you know, Any. Any Soviet ingress into the Middle east would. Would be treated an act of war, you know, against the United States and its allies. And so the fact that Bush was able to. The fact that. The fact that he was able to get the Soviets to sign on to a massive US Deployment to the Arabian Peninsula, and the fact that he was able to do so, able not just to facilitate that, but to get the Soviets to agree to that deployment for the purpose of. Of. Of engaging what had been a Soviet client state. That's incredible. Okay. And it's. This is a very delicate minuet, and something we covered earlier in the series is that, you know, Gorbachev, whatever people can say about him, and I know a lot of patriotic Russian guys like, like hate him. And I'm sure if I was Russian, I'd have strong feelings about him too. Like, I'm not saying that's misguided. It's not for me to say that it's their country and it's their culture. But what I will say is this and what I do think I'm entirely qualified to say. Gorchov wasn't just this kind of. He wasn't just a cipher. He wasn't a stooge. You know, he wasn't just. He wasn't some marionette just kind of, you know, stumbling into poor policy decision after poor policy decision and being like, let around by. By the Bush White House. That's not true at all. And that's one of the reasons why he was, you know, basically sandbagged and removed from office, you know, by. In part by. By Washington. So there's no. It was not. What I'm getting is there was not some guarantee that. That Gorachoff would have acquiesced to this. But also, even if Gorge off had been, you know, a cipher in the order of what I described, there was still. There was still the remainder of the party apparatus. There was, you know, a hardline element that, you know, had to be placated. You know, there's the people who became, you know, the. The Yeltsin faction that, you know, which is complicated because Yeltsin in a lot of ways was that he was. He was exactly that. He was a cipher. But he. But he too, was accountable to people within the Soviet apparatus, particularly, you know, decision makers within the national security apparatus, which has. Which, as we've established in concrete policy terms, had outsized clout and power, you know, even. Even more so than. Than in the United States at kind of the peak of. Kind of the peak of. Of cold War, hostilities, you know, so it's that that's got to be acknowledged. Both you know, it's an indicator of effectiveness again within, within the bounds of you know, the policy decision, the policy challenges on the table and, and the possible decisions rendered therein, but also of Bush 41's ability to finesse this stuff. And I know, I know again I can't, I, I apologize very sincerely for, with the fact that it was my machine that you know, had a screwed up connection or whatever last time. So forgive me again if I'm repeating this myself. But another thing that I think has to be acknowledged is Saddam Hussein was a more complicated figure than is often acknowledged too. He really was. And some of the things he did that at the time respond as being, you know, just, just fools errors or you know, him being cast as, as simply nothing more than a tin pot dictator who is more prone to, who's less risk averse than, than most of them. That's really, that's really not the case either. There's a reason the Soviet relationship with Iraq was always troubled. For a time the, this, the Iraqi, the Iraqi diplomatic mission was, was, was, was banned from East Berlin because they taken it upon themselves to, when opportunity presented itself to murder people that they, they wanted dead like other Iraqis. I mean like there's this one Iraqi Communist Party functionary and Iraqi intelligence under like diplomatic cover literally threw him off a roof in East Berlin. There was some, there's some student dissident type who was, was cozy with you know, the communists, but who was you know, an anti Saddam zealot. And uh, some Iraqis uh, pulled up next to him when he was, you know, on foot around Karl Marx alley, pulled him into a car, he disappeared and then he, he washed up on a riverbank, you know, with evidence of extreme torture and all kinds of horrible mutilation, you know, having, having been dead for weeks and, and, and you know, stored somewhere. So finally like finally, you know, finally East Berlin was like, you're not, you're not doing this anymore. You know, you're, you're gone. And just the fact that the bath is, were, you know, actively actively at, at war with the communists in some basic way. I mean I'm talking about like within Iraq as they were consolidating their monopoly on power. I mean this, that, that's, that axiomatically caused tension. But nevertheless Iraq was a, the Soviet Union never had a true Arab client state. The only communist Arab state was South Yemen, the short lived South Yemeni state. And it was it was short lived, not because it didn't have legitimacy. Something that's fascinating to me now in, in, in the Yemen war there is a faction down there that is, is identifies as like the South. So they identify as like the legacy of the South Yemen armed Forces, you know, and they're, they're very much like, it's kind of like post Marxist but, but, but, but radically left wing militia, you know, and I find that fascinating. But my point is that the Soviets could not pick and choose. You know, the Middle east was not Africa. The Middle east was not Asia. They and it certainly wasn't Latin America. You know, they couldn't pick and choose. You know, like what Arabs Arab state. They wanted to, you know, they wanted to give privilege a position in, in terms of material support and, and informal clientage. You know, they like Communism just was not taking root in the near east, you know, just wasn't even when it had real currency in, in other theaters at comparable stages of development and everything else. So you know, Saddam also. We talked about the situation of Iraq going into um, the Iran Iraq war of 1980. Um, the Iraqis had signed the Algiers Agreement with the Shah in 1975. This had to do with you know, territorial disputes and other things. You know, typical kind of the typical kinds of things that you know, provoke interstate rivalry or more it's kind of act as like a catalyst or like a superficial and immediate rationalization where within paradigms that you know, there's already like immutable hostility between state actors. Iran and Iraq have always kind of been desperately at odds. Okay. In, in political terms, you know, Iran is rarely at war like open war, but I mean they're, they're constantly at, at war and a, in, in you know, a in a subtle and, and sort of hidden capacity, you know, unconventional capacity, but nevertheless, you know, they've always been at odds with Iraq in the modern era, post Ottoman era after World War I. But the, the and as you know that's not entirely without objective rationale. You like we talked about the reason why the Israelis like the, the American State Department, you know, Zionist all in sundry as well as you know formerly Arab nationalist types like the Bathus, you know like Arabis types and what remains that element today, but also you know, radical, you know, Salafi types. They, they, the, the two kind of poles of, of of of of hard power in the near east has always been Turkey and Iran, you know, and the Arabs kind of find themselves between these, these, the, the, these alien elements, you know, and when the as Islam became this kind of animating catalyst, most remarkably one, you know, for, for Sunnis obviously was a, you know, the effort, the jihad against the Soviet Union and communism in the midst of the assault in Afghanistan. But the, the true, the first true Islamic state was Iran. And the fact that, the fact that it was a non Arab, non Sunni culture that produced the first truly Islamic revolution, that was remarkable. But it was also, it was, it was also, it was also alarming. You know it meant that, it meant that, it meant that power bases within Islam, within the faith itself and particularly like you know, revolutionary practice therein. You know, it shifted. You know, there was a seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979 in, in, in Saudi Arabia and that was impactful too. But again, much as they might have animated the kinds of guys who you know, went to join the, the holy war against the Soviet Union, you know, that wasn't the House Assad wasn't about to collapse. You know like it wasn't, it didn't, it didn't spark this kind of, this like kind of wildfire tendency, you know that, to provoke Sunnis under arms to, to duplicate what happened in Iran. You know, like nothing like that. It. And not without, not without cause. You know, Iraq is a, is a majority Shia state and you know have, the Shia are a minority globally within Islam but they're, they're an extraordinarily potent minority and that's, that, that's their, the Shia heartland is, is really Iraq in the Arab world, you know, I mean or in terms of raw population. Okay, you know the, what's going on everyone?

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[Thomas]

The, the Iraqi bath party. They were, they were ecumenical in a real sense. You know, Tariq Aziz himself was a Christian. The bath party was a Christian. The core of, of of Arab baism in Iraq, in Syria it's a totally different thing, you know was, it was a Sunni political culture, all of these things. There was an internal logic strategically, I mean to Iraq preemptively assaulting Iran and Saddam. If you read the notes from Saddam speaking to his war council or what would have been like the bath National Security Council. It's equivalent, you can tell that it's not a decision that's being made flippantly. And the immediate catalyst, you know, as we said, like the, the Algiers agreement was signed with the Shah. Tehran immediately declared after the revolution that, you know, we're not, we're not bound by any, any treaties that, you know, were signed by the, by the imperialist government. You know, that's, that's over with. So it was, it's not as if a conciliatory posture was being struck with, you know, with, with Baghdad. It. And really the tenor of Saddam's appeal to the war council is, you know, if we let this go now, essentially allowing ourselves to be extorted and if we're going to set, if the precedent being set, you know, of, of at first impression with the revolutionary regime in Tehran is that, you know, we are available to be extorted. You know, he's like how, how would that look and how would that look to the Arab people? You know, not just in Iraq, but theater wide, you know, and it's also, well, how would that look to the Soviet Union too? Who frankly again, despite the, despite the, their kind of troubled friendship, it was a genuine concord of necessity and you know, the, the I, I Iraq, Iraq needed Soviet material support in order to remain a viable military power. And if confidence was lost, if Moscow's confidence was lost, you know, they simply would have looked elsewhere. Admittedly it was a shallow pool of potential clients, but nevertheless, you know, there was precedent for the Soviets didn't just desperately continue to sustain regimes that weren't viable or that, or that would not be able to, when, when critical circumstances emerged, you know, be able to mobilize and, and be able to be able to wage war, you know, and in, in at least a nominally effective capacity. So this had, you know, I raised that because again, like it's the people people claim because you know, they kind of selectively choose to cite like late Iran Iraq war, like propaganda of, you know, out of Baghdad where you know, they're, they're emphasizing that, you know, the, the Iranians are a different race. You know, they're, they're, they're Persians or they're a series and they're not like us and saying like see, Saddam was just like this madman who just invaded Iran for no reason or he did so out of, you know, out of you know, kind of quasi racialist like you know, tendencies of bigotry or, or because of like tech fury hostility to the Shia. I mean, I, that's really not true. And I mean whatever, everybody's an armchair general, you know, so it, and nobody, nobody chooses to treat these things, you know, as they, as decisions would have been rendered like in the epoch and at the critical moment of decision where, you know, the, the, the awareness of the situation, you know, would have been restricted to what was then apparent and emergent. And I'm not saying like Saddam was like a good executive or something, but I'm saying that he was, he was, he was more competent than is acknowledged and he was in a very unenviable, unenviable position. I think at some point it was inevitable Iraq would find itself at war. But that's more kind of a, that's kind of a more complicated and wider topic. It, Getting back to the, getting back to our topic. I raised the Iran Iraq war a lot because it's, it's important for, for all kinds of reasons of context, really. The rev. Not, not really, not just to the politics of the near east, but relating to the cold War, relating to, you know, the sectarian hatred and darl Islam, you know, relating to the revolution and revolution in military affairs, the reemergence of chemical weapons being utilized and applied, know, like tactical capacity on the battlefield. It's really, it's really fascinating. But getting back to Mr. Bush 41. What Bush did immediately after, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. On August 20, he issued U. S. National Security Directive Number 45. Okay, the relevant parts stated, and I'm quoting here, unless indicated otherwise, U. S. Interests in the Persian Gulf are vital to national security. These interests include access to oil and security and stability of key friendly states in the region. The United States will defend its vital interest in the area throughout through the use of US Military force, if necessary and appropriate, against any power with interests inimical to our own. Going off the record, this is important to me at least because you know how like the Michael Moore types are constantly talking about how our policy in the Middle east is driven exclusively, quote, by oil, which doesn't make any sense. But it's also like they act like it's some kind of secret or something that, that, you know, American executives have pretended like, you know, energy policy and domination of, of, of key oil reserves in the near east by hostile powers. If they've, it's always been very above board that, you know, these things play into strategic decision making, you know, so I've always like wondered about that, like why that I, I, I've sort of like Idiots. And it's not like I, I had nothing nice to say about Bush 43. You're about the Iraq War. You know, it's not like I was sitting here like cheerleading meddling in the Middle east, but like they're acting with some Trump Carlo. It's about oil, man. It's like what does that even mean? Like, if you wanted to, if the United States was going to act like some like 19th century, like empire and just go around grabbing, you know, rubber plantations and, and petroleum fields, you know, why not invade Venezuela? You know, like why, why, you know, you don't need to go all the way to Iraq to like steal oil or whatever. But I digress. The but what's significant about National Security Director 45 is that even as the, as the Cold War was ending, it was based. Bush was reiterating the, the Carter Doctrine. You know, like he's saying the Carter Doctrine is still operative. He was signaling to the Soviet Union too, because obviously it wasn't clear like what, like how they were going to. How Moscow was going to respond, you know, moving forward. And it wasn't clear at all. Know it. And in a roundabout way had, you know, had the Supreme Soviet or had the, or had, you know, kind of the inner party, specifically that which was tethered to the Ministry of Defense, had they kind of gone into revolt against perestroika, they could have utilized, you know, with America's looming mass intervention in the Middle east as their catalyst to kind of bring down the Gorbachev regime and circle the wagons of water. And that. That's a fascinating counterfactual. The fact that it didn't happen again is a, is a credit to Bush41's ability to finesse in, in a, in a bona fide way. And again, the fact that, the fact that Gorbachev was able to pull that off on the other side in, in concord with Bush, I mean, it's a testament to the Gorbachevs, frankly, like genius as a politician. You know, if the man was a fool or a cipher that he would never have been able to accomplish that. The. I'm not, I'm not going to quote verbatim because that's. Now it's, it's redundant and boring with tears. But what's fascinating is like through the remainder of, of the Declaration, Bush sites United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 and 662 as, as his authority for intervention, you know, which was like it's according to the letter of the law, like such that it can even be said that, you know, war and peace decisions are bound by the law in the way that, you know, could be said, stated to be, you know, within the borders of. Of a sovereign dominion. But, you know, Bush. Bush had all the authority he needed from Article 2, you know, from the president of the Carter Doctrine. And so long as Congress was willing to, you know, was. Was willing to float the bill and not otherwise, you know, revoke his ability to see the policy through. I mean, that's. That's the only authority Bush needed. But he was. He was very much proceeding as a diplomat in. In. In. In prosecuting this war. And I say that in the most positive terms there are. You know, it's just. It's noteworthy because most executives would not have done that. Even ones who were really kind of. Even some abortion successors like Clinton liberal types, they wouldn't have characterized it that way, you know, even if. Even if they wanted to. Even if. Even if they wanted to kind of finesse what they were doing as. As in the interest of, you know, this burgundy global community or whatever. So this is very interesting with. Within the. For the time and the moment, within that epoch and for what Bush aimed to accomplish, that was absolutely the correct strategy. I just find it really interesting. I mean, this. This may like, bore some people to death, but it's. It's. It's fundamentally important to the topic. And it's also. It's. It's important just in more global terms like figuratively and literally. Again, what the Bush 41 people wanted to see through. They wanted to. You got to look at the Cold War as. As among other things, you know, in structural terms, not just power, political ones. You know, the. There never was a. There never was a formal peace treaty signed with Germany. You know, that's one of the reasons why, you know, like the. The two Germanies were able to exist in perpetuity, in apparent perpetuity after the war. What Bush was aiming to do, he was aiming to create the configure this. This globalized, truly globalized polity as envisioned by, you know, the New Dealers and to a lesser degree, people like Truman, you know, and see that through to fruition, like actual fruition, wherein, you know, military action would essentially other than, you know, things that truly are, you know, kind of like Posse Comitatus matters like civil unrest within the. You know, at the local and. And downscaled level, you know, other than. Other than those obvious exceptions, you know, any military action would. Would be carried out through the United Nations Security Council, you know, where the permanent U N Security Council, you know, would be kind of like the higher house, you know, or the, or the cabinet of a world government, you know, the General assembly would be kind of like, you know, the, the, the World Congress, the world House of Representatives or world House of Commons, you know, and you have, you have a rotating executive, you know, who's more sort of like a global Prime Minister than a president because real power lies in the Security Council. But this is what Bush was aiming to do, you know, and however we feel about that, the degree to which this was just like utterly pissed on and sabotaged, you know, from the Clinton administration onwards in favor of just like anarchy is, is, is insane. It's completely insane. And what's more insane is that nobody talks about it. It's as if it's never happened. That the current situations, the current strategic situation is just some kind of accident of fate or like it's some, just like some immutable development because other states just aren't reasonable or something. It's just incredible that, that people, that people feel this way. I do want to cite a couple more points of the memoir.

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[Thomas]

Those are, and I quote Bush stated incident, you know, to explicating why intervention to eject Iraq from Kuwait constitutes a vital interest. Quote. Much of the world is, is even more dependent on Iraqi oil. Much of the world is dependent on Iraqi oil and is highly vulnerable to Iraqi threats. To minimize any impact that oil flow reductions from Iraq and Kuwait will have on the world's economy that will producing nations do what they can to increase production to offset these losses. And that's important too because again the, the OPEC embargo of 73 like America coming to terms, America in the UK coming to terms with the House Assad, that, that, that, that created a, a reliable kind of configuration wherein like all the major petroleum producers, you know, they had a vested interest in, in, in, in proceeding peaceably and they were afforded, you know, limited ability to, to, you know, to carry out a price fixing regime which they do to this day. But the fact wasn't that, you know, Iraqi oil is so important or that, you know, anyone or that Iraqi oil like funds anyone critical, you know, state actor or, you know, constellation of things. It's that it would where Iraq able to, you know, attack another, export another, another OPEC state and dictate regionally, you know, what political concessions would be required for continued access to Iraqi petroleum. Even if America could maintain good offices with Iraq, no problem, the other Arab states would not have been able to. And that would have been profoundly destabilizing just on, just structurally. I mean, Saddam would have recognized that. I don't think Saddam was some marvel villain rubbing his hands together and saying, you know, now I can extort money for oil. But he recognized exactly what the structural implications of this were. And I, I believe from like where the Iraqis were sitting, like their idea was like, well, this needs to be reconfigured anyway, you know, why? And especially without the Soviet Union, you know, it's like, what are we just going to let. Is OPEC just going to become kind of the, this kind of like Cooley, this kind of like Cooley enterprise? Like behold in the United States? You know, I don't think I'm speculating too much here. You know, again, I, this, this becomes apparent like as you, as you deep dive into, you know, what the, what the incentives were and the motives were and the viewpoints were of the respective actors, you know, like Arab and, and Western in the, you know, the Occidental perspective versus the Arab perspective is like writ large here in a lot of ways. Okay, like corny as that might sound to people. But moving on the Bush was very, he was very emphatic and not just for appearance sake, but in a real kind of concrete capacity of declaring that, you know, U.S. forces and assorted other elements, you know, whether they're, whether they're, you know, whether they're British, whether they're French, whether Italian, whether it's, whether, whether they were talking about, you know, Syrian forces and the Syrians. Hafez Assad came heavy to support Bush. And I mean that's another thing too, like after, like America, like basically America's best ally in the Middle east should be serious, like what, what's America been doing for 20 years, like trying to annihilate Syria. But Bush made it clear that, you know, the coalition military element are guests in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia first and foremost. He included Saudi general officers in the decision making process, even if it was just kind of like nominal and for appearance Sake because these guys frankly didn't have the experience, you know to really, to really bring command presence to bear. But there were Salafi elements, including Osama Bin Laden himself who approached the royal family and said like look like let me or let us you know, like, like raise an army of, of the righteous as we did to fight the communists and like will. And will like eject, you know, the Iraqi army ourselves. We don't need you know, we don't, we don't need, we don't need, we don't, we don't need infills on our, on our soil, you know, and not just on our soil but on the soil. We're like the Prophet tread, you know, and we don't need you know. You know this is basically like a Jewish war and they're you know, it's become that way because it's, it's not to, it's not to liberate, you know, Muslims from, from Bath is tyranny. It's about you know, it's about, it's about monetary intrigues and, and power political ambitions of of. Of non Muslims. And. That could have gotten traction not not with the, not with the House Assad, but you better believe with the Arab street, you know, so the, a lot of the ridiculous kind of propaganda that you know, the, the like literally these like man samuel firms that were retained like you know, draft these like atrocity stories and things. A lot of that that wasn't just you know, for the sake of you know, kind of stirring up war fever in America. Like that was really already kind of burgundy that I believe that was for though that was for the court of world opinion and particularly for, for you know, the, the Arab street, you know and, and and encouraging them to identify America and the coalition as this kind of savior element that was best suited to combat this great evil that had befallen the kingdom potentially and that was already engaged in gross acts of a terrifying nature in Kuwait. So I mean there's a lot here, you know, it wasn't just a matter of this wasn't aside the fact it was the first open open ended military deployment since the Vietnam War. It was the first, it was the first real operational test of, of, of the, of the post rema, you know, rma, Relative Military Affairs, Army. It all those things. It was, it was the first major, it was the first major conflict of the, you know, of, of the post Cold War era. I mean the, the Cold War was in the process of ending at that point. I mean, yeah, the wall had Come down. But you know, the Soviet Union still existed like this, was this kind of arrived at like the worst possible time, you know, but that's, you know, war arrives like the seasons, doesn't it? But that, but a lot of what was going on, you know, on the, on the propaganda side and the cult, the cultivation of narratives and things like that, a lot of that was, was Bush Baker, you know, and the American White House, American State Department, like speaking of the Arab street or signaling to them, you know, in, in, in, in ways that I, I don't think. Even if, even if the foreign policy establishment, even if they weren't conceptually illiterate these days, I don't, I don't think they have the ability to do that just like creatively or you know, in terms of their like psychological aptitude or anything like that. I, I just, I just couldn't, I can't see it happening. Even if there weren't absolute at, at the helm. How long we've been going like. Forgive me, about 40. Okay, yeah, I'll speed it up a little bit. The real. I realize that we gotta, we gotta move on so we can get into the. Go ahead.

[Pete Quinones]

Well, hit me up with this because I think you already mentioned it, but one of the big, and I remember this when it was happening, one of the big contentions, one of the big things that they made a big deal out of and it was, was Saddam launching the Scuds just into the Israeli population.

[Thomas]

Yeah, I'm glad you raised that. Saddam was craftier, I'll tell you too.

[Pete Quinones]

I had, I had a Jewish girlfriend at the time and she had spent a lot of time in Israel and knew a lot of friends there. So yeah, that was a fun night. That was, that was a fun night when that started.

[Thomas]

Oh yeah, the. Well, I, Saddam was craftier than people think. And something very strange happened at the onset of hostilities after, you know, January 17th onward. Um, the, you know, the, the, the onset of Desert Storm was a massive air campaign which the, some, there's some military types who say that it, it should have just been a full on combined arms assault and that it was.

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[Thomas]

You know the weeks long error campaign was, was wasteful and wise. You know civilian attrition they're talking about and, and a waste of time frankly. I, I'm not going to get into that and I'm not super qualified to discuss that. But as, as by the last week in January the coalition had, had, had had flown something crazy like 23000 sorties over Iraq and occupied Kuwait. They'd, they've been dropping these 2,000 pound bombs on Iraqi airfields that were more accurate than their destructive power was greater than people had anticipated. So the Iraqi error element was like taking a serious beating. And I think they, they lost 22 planes in, in tactical aerial combat. You know the, and these were these, these, these were French, Italian and, and Soviet aircraft and they even had some MiG 29s like the MiG 29 Fulcrum that was, that was packaged for export. It was, it, it was not the same as the, as the, the Soviet Air Force's model. It was an inferior model or stripped down in some way. But the point is it was a MiG 29 like this wasn't. I, I raised that for clarity. You know the Iraqis they weren't, they weren't flying around a bunch of 1950s planes or something. Okay. It, so as this on January 26th, something very strange happened. Suddenly Iraqi planes, they started appearing in Iranian airspace. Like at first it was just like a few of them but then it became clear that they were going to Iran in dedicated flight patterns. Wasn't like a handful of defectors or something. You know, at first it was about 20, then it was about 60 and there was over a hundred. And the entire remainder of the Iraqi air force literally flew to Iran. And this one U.S. pentagon official at the time who asked not to be named and you can still find the, you still find the, the article online. Google it. Right before we went live he said to a kind of frightened New York Times Journal, he said I really hope that this is not Saddam Hussein's like Molotov Ribbentrop pact moments because we could have a real problem. And the Iranians had no intention of collaborating with Saddam. I don't even think they had any diplomatic context yet at that point. But I think Saddam absolutely wanted America to think that and I think he absolutely wanted America to launch some like mass assault on Iran incident to thinking that you know, I, at the time, I remember some of these guys like were saying that, well, Saddam's an idiot. He should have thrown his whole air force at a carrier battle group and tried to sink what he could. You know, the people are talking about as if it was like the Argentine air Force, you know, like, like, like knocking out British CR in the Falklands. It's like not at all comparable. And like I said, I'm throwing those airplanes at, at a carrier battle group. They just would have gotten like slaughtered. It would just, would have been like a fireworks show and like that'd be the end of it, like. And he knew that. So that coupled with you know, yeah, the, the ability of Bush and Baker to, to stand down the Israeli government. But also those are the days of like Yak Rabin man and stuff. Like you didn't this like this like demento Zionist element. It's not like the Israeli government was ever any great shakes, but it was a lot more rational then, you know, and there's far more of a concord in the occupied territories. You know, the, it was, it was kind of, it was kind of a rare moment of relative calm, you know, so it was a constellation of all those things. But yeah, I understanding either of those things in isolation. Either the, the launching of Scuds at, at Tel Aviv or you know, the, the appearance of the Iraqi air force or remain of it in Iran. I think those things have to be understood together. And it's also, you know, once I, I made the point of people too. I mean not especially about the second World War, but about all conflicts. You know what, once, once you're in a war, once you're in conditions approaching war, you can't just say like, you know what, I'm gonna put the brakes on this and, and like stop everything.

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[Thomas]

Like Saddam was saying after he rolled the dice in Kuwait. I don't think, I don't think Saddam thought that the America would do anything. I think he thought the British would. But I think, I think he recognized it's like it wasn't 1982 anymore. Even if it were and don't get me wrong, like, the fact that British could fight the Falkland War was incredible. Like, I, I take my hat off to him. They could not have carried out that, that campaign or similar campaign on the ground against the Iraqi army, you know, and logistically this would have been impossible. So the notion was that, you know, this is basically, this is basically a low risk enterprise in terms of a wider war. Once it became clear that was not the case at all, it's like, well, it was too late. Saddam could have gone all in, assaulted Saudi Arabia and continued until he, you know, hit the, actually hit the Gulf and like, seeing if he could hold it or he could have just like held fast and you know, hope that the coalition would fall apart before the onset of hostilities or if it did not, hoping that, you know, some kind of situation, a theater wide anarchy, you know, and, and, and a wider war, you know, would have forced America to kind of come to terms, you know. But this idea that, you know, this idea that you can just like Saddam, everybody else could just kind of like pull the plug on hostilities and just be like, hey, I give up now, or like, no, that's not how things work. But yeah, I, your, your lady friend, I'm sure, I'm sure that was an insane freaking experience she had or friends had or whatever, you know.

[Pete Quinones]

Yeah, that was pretty much the end of that. I was at that point, another, another question, I guess it would, which may be something that you wrap this up on is know, why didn't they take out Saddam? Then

[Thomas]

the Baker view. And Baker really was kind of on the political side. Baker was kind of in the driver's seat. I, it wasn't clear. And Baker made this point in, in the years before 2, before 9, 11, in, in the years during the Clinton administration, you know, after the Gulf war and before 9, 11. Like, it's not clear what people think that would have accomplished. You know, like, it's like you kill, you kill Saddam Hussein. I mean that, I mean, first of all, like, you lose the appearance of lawfulness because he's going around like whacking people, number one. Number two, it's like, okay, so then you got some, you got some Salafi government in the Sunni triangle, like fighting like an Iranian Hezbollah backed like, you know, Shia element. And basically you have like the Iraqi civil war, but like 10 years earlier, you know, and it's like the, I, I don't, I think it's moronic when people are like, well, Saddam was like, Arabs need like, you know, some brutal dictator to Keep him in line. Like that's just like hard thinking and they don't even know like what they're talking about when they say that. But it's also. Nor do I think, nor do I think Saddam is a, was a, was like a great man, but he, he wasn't any worse than, you know, a lot of other, A lot of other kind of, kind of dictator strongman types who, you know, who, who America has found it perfectly okay to live with the, the, I mean he, Saddam Hussein thought that, but it's also too like again, Saddam was. He, Saddam's like recklessness over the, I mean during, when the, when the Cold War was ending, like everybody arguably was being reckless, you know, in some way or another in terms of like second rate power in terms of lesser powers like that. I mean, but it's not like what, why kind of became this, like this, like this like bad guy standing for everybody was kind of weird because like he just wasn't that important, you know, and he wasn't somebody if America too, like if they'd want to do, if America hadn't didn't totally have its head up its ass in the Middle east even during the Cold War, which is like, you know, again, Iran is, Iran is going to be the dominant geostrategic power in the region. Okay? Just, he is saying like our policy to Iran since the Shah was deposed is we're going to shriek over and over again that you're evil in bed. Like, that's not, that's not policy. You know what I mean? Like some, like an intelligent US Regime would have done whatever it had to do, you know, to kind of finesse the Iranians into doing what we wanted, you know, while at the same time, you know, building up Iraq as a meaningful bulwark, but also one that, you

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know,

[Thomas]

Within the region and that you know, wasn't too, wasn't too easily discredited in terms of its, its optics and things. And that very easily could have been account. Not very easily in absolute terms, but in political terms that definitely could have been accomplished. But even aside from the politics of it, you know, killing, killing Saddam Hussein would not really have accomplished anything. And the bath party, despite what people say, it's very different in Syria. The, It's a, I mean they're literally like at odds with one another, you know. And, and I mean at the Assad family, they're, they're, they're, they're a great people. They really are. And Bashar Assad is a hero and his father was a Hero. Okay, I, but that aside, the bathism is a real thing. It's not this like contrivance or something that would just fall apart if you removed, you know, kind of the, the linchpin dictator, you know, who, who's kind of ideological clothing is, is the aforementioned contrivance. If, if Saddam was just kind of like summarily killed. I mean, I think the US lost a lot of credibility with when they finally did like available in this kangaroo court proceeding, frankly. And then isis, ISIS executed the judge who, who had him hanged. And I, and they, they made a tape of it. It was in one of their like ice music videos. You know, it's like an arrow. I said, this is the judge. And then like, you know, you see a guy like blowing his head off. And that didn't make me happy. I'm not happy when anybody dies. But I didn't feel sad that I, I, I, I think judges are kind of pieces of anyway, but I, that, that guy didn't like feel bad for. Okay, but point being, I don't, I don't understand why people think like, okay, like if they, I think it's like, it's like some old movie or something. Like me, Saddam Hussein is, is like, he's like some hive mind. And if like you shoot Saddam Hussein, like all the Arab automatons just like drop dead or fall over like, like Disneyland automatons when you kill the power or something. I don't know. But that's, but that's why the, the whole way that Operation Iraqi Freedom went about was very weird. Just like the planning, when it finally did come to fruition, the planning was just very bad, you know, and it didn't really make a lot of sense. We could cover that another time. Yeah, I, I, I, thanks for accommodating me. I thought it was important to do a deep dive into some, into this, into the subject of the Gulf War before we moved on. So I hope, I hope everybody got something out of it worthwhile and we

[Pete Quinones]

can always come back to, come back to this for a one off and discuss, discuss a little more. So last time I didn't have you plug anything. So what do you got going on?

[Thomas]

I've actually been really, really busy, like recording content far and wide with all kinds of people who've wanted me to record with them, which is dope. I'm gonna try and corral all that like out of the website, you know, which is pretty, the website's pretty much done and you can access it. I'll if, if you wouldn't mind. I'll be added to the comments.

[Pete Quinones]

Sure.

[Thomas]

At some point. But other than that, I'm working on getting the channel launched. I'm sure people probably think it seems like this is taking forever, but it's just me and, and my, and my crime partner, Rake. So, I mean, it does take time and we want to do it right. But it is on, it is on track to launch, you know, like this month. So other than that, I've been getting back to my long form writing. I've got some articles that are appearing in print form. You know, you can find me at. I'm still on Burb app, although I'm kind of looking to disengage from that. The summer moves on. You can find me on substack subsex, kind of my home. It's also where the podcast is. It's real. Thomas777.substack.com you can also find me on T Gram. You know, I'm all over the place, man, but that's, that's what I got going on. And we're, you and I are doing our thing and that's, that's huge. And people responding to that very, very well. And that's, it gives me a huge lift, man. Like, I'm very honored by that and I, I owe that to you, man, for providing this format and, you know, kind of thinking through this, like, thinking through this kind of this, this kind of organizational structure that we do. So. Yeah, thank you, man. This is very great.

[Pete Quinones]

Oh, no problem. And then in the next couple days, we'll be getting together to drop episode one of Spanish Civil War, something I've been, basically every waking minute I've been diving into and just getting, getting up to speed on.

[Thomas]

No, that's great, man. People are very excited about it and it's a topic near and dear to my heart and to any revisionist or like anybody with, you know, with, with fascist sympathies or like hard right sympathies. It's a fundamentally important, you know, part of our heritage, ideological heritage and spiritual heritage too. So, yeah, I'm very stoked, man. I'm very stoked.

[Pete Quinones]

All right, man. Thank you very much. Appreciate it.

[Thomas]

Likewise.

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