Does Diplomacy Have a Chance of Ending War in Ukraine?

Summary

The Political Scene | The New Yorker Episode: Does Diplomacy Have a Chance of Ending War in Ukraine? Date: August 30, 2023 Host: Tyler Foggatt | Guest: Keith Gessen

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Overview

This episode dives deep into the ongoing debate about whether diplomacy and negotiations could realistically bring an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Host Tyler Foggatt interviews Keith Gessen, contributing New Yorker writer and author of the essay “The Case for Negotiating with Russia.” Drawing on Gessen's reporting and conversations with experts like Samuel Charap, the discussion explores both the practicalities and the moral dilemmas of seeking a diplomatic resolution, the shifting military and political landscapes, the complex role of the U.S., and the psychology of negotiation with Vladimir Putin.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. How the Prospects for War Termination Have Shifted (01:17–05:29)

• Last year, optimism surged in Ukraine and the West as Ukrainian counteroffensives reclaimed significant territory.
• Gessen explains that "war termination" studies suggest conflicts generally end when one side lowers its demands—but this hasn’t happened in Ukraine:

  "When one of the sides starts doing better, their minimum demands increase...what was happening last fall was the Ukrainian counteroffensive that was going incredibly well..." (03:18–03:52)

• Currently, Ukrainian advances have slowed, and negotiations are back in the policy debate.

2. Samuel Charap and the Korean War Armistice Model (05:29–06:58)

• Samuel Charap argues for a ceasefire similar to the Korean War’s armistice: fighting ends, but claims aren’t recognized.
• Charap’s logic: this freeze, while not ideal, would be better than ongoing high-intensity war.
• Gessen outlines the controversy: such an armistice might leave Russian-occupied areas as de facto Russian, even if not de jure.

3. Three Areas of Disagreement about Negotiations (06:58–12:23)

a. Does Negotiating Show Weakness?

• Fear that even discussing negotiations signals Western fatigue and emboldens Putin:

  “Does Putin see that as a sign of weakness?...Will Putin...interpret that in a way that's going to make him harder to deal with?” (07:34–08:14)

b. Can Ukraine Actually Win Militarily?

• Divergence among experts: some see stalemate, others believe continued Western support could deliver more gains for Ukraine.

c. Would Putin Comply with Any Deal?

• Deep skepticism over whether Putin would stop at current gains:

  “There’s a lot of evidence that he won’t stop...he will not stop until Ukraine is defeated.” (11:00)

• Charap’s proposed measures to discourage further aggression include monitored withdrawal zones, drone surveillance, and sanction snap-backs for violations.

• Gessen underscores the moral cost: “...in this scenario, you do leave parts of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces. And we have a great deal of evidence that what goes on...is really horrible. You know, it is torture chambers, it is deportations...It’s horrible.” (11:45–12:23)

4. Controversies around Territorial Concessions (12:23–15:21)

• The idea of freezing the front lines without Ukraine formally ceding territory remains deeply unpopular in Ukraine—though a minority argue for ending the war to save what remains.

• Gessen: “If we thought that Ukraine could take this land back...I don't think we'd be having this conversation at all.” (14:28–15:04)

5. U.S., Ukraine, and Divergent Interests (15:21–18:15)

• Charap frames U.S. and Ukrainian interests as overlapping but not identical.
• The U.S. has its own strategic imperatives—some believe Russia has already been “defeated” in strategic terms due to sanctions and global isolation.

  “...from the U.S. perspective, the Russian defeat has already taken place, like, optically.” (16:33)

• Risk that a prolonged war could turn Russia into even more of a rogue state.

6. War Momentum and Escalating Stakes (20:57–23:25)

• Foggatt and Gessen discuss how wars develop new reasons for their own continuation—compounding the difficulty of ending them.

  “...the regime has put a lot of eggs in this basket of this war and has begun to really mobilize the population for a kind of long term confrontation...” (20:57–21:24)

• Atrocities (like Bucha) have hardened Ukrainian attitudes against negotiation.

7. The Elusive March 2022 Peace Deal (23:25–25:15)

• Early negotiations in 2022, including a proposed Russian withdrawal and Ukrainian pledge not to join NATO, broke down over lack of Western security guarantees—today these offers look more attractive in hindsight, but their sincerity remains uncertain.

8. Can You Ever Trust Putin? (25:15–26:59)

• Gessen is unequivocal: “He has broken every deal that, you know, he has made, certainly with Ukraine...So, no, there is nobody that would want to rely on the good word of Vladimir Putin.” (25:15–25:49)
• Question becomes whether Putin can be swayed by “incentives and disincentives.”

9. Internal Russian Dynamics: Prigozhin’s Death and Regime Stability (26:59–29:53)

• Prigozhin’s mutiny and recent death indicate instability but also may consolidate Putin’s power.
• The U.S. and Russia both “wait for collapse” in the opposing camp—either regime change in Russia or a split in the Western alliance.

10. Ukraine Support and U.S. Politics: Realignment and Uncertainty (29:53–32:59)

• Growing partisan divide in the U.S. over Ukraine support:

  “It is a kind of a sort of rearrangement in American politics. Right. Where traditionally the Republicans during the Cold War were the more hawkish party...that really changed in 2016 with Russian interference...” (31:29–32:59)

• Trump’s association with Putin has deeply colored public and party attitudes.

11. Who Decides When to Seek Peace? U.S. Leverage and Agency (32:59–35:46)

• The key question: Does the U.S. hold the reins, or is the decision ultimately Ukraine’s?
• Gessen: “We are the most powerful country in the world...for us to pretend like we can't talk to Ukraine about how this war ends, that's disingenuous and kind of an abdication of our responsibility.” (34:35)
• Ultimately, Ukraine must decide—but U.S. encouragement or pressure may prove pivotal.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On War Termination:
  “One of the two sides has to change their demands, their minimum demands. And at the time that was not happening, the demands were too far apart.”*—Keith Gessen (03:14)

• On the Limits of Negotiation:
  "The distinction between an armistice and a peace deal is that you aren't making a permanent deal where you're saying, yes, these are Russian territories, you're saying, we will stop fighting, but, no, we do not acknowledge Russian dominion here because this is our land." —Keith Gessen (13:13)

• On Western Perspective:
  “From the U.S. perspective, the Russian defeat has already taken place, like, optically... there is a danger that Russia becomes even, even more of a rogue state than it now is...” —Keith Gessen (16:23–17:25)

• On Putin and Negotiated Peace:
  “I don't think anyone, no one that I talk to thinks, oh, you know, you could take Putin at his word, and that that would be the basis of a deal.” —Keith Gessen (25:15)

• On Atrocities and Public Opinion:
  "After the Russian army withdrew from the towns around Kiev, and Ukrainian forces and journalists went into those areas, Bucha, Irpin, and saw what had happened there, negotiations which had been taking place after that, they more or less broke down." —Keith Gessen (22:32)

• On U.S. Responsibility:
  “For us to pretend like we can't talk to Ukraine about how this war ends, that's disingenuous and kind of an abdication of our responsibility.” —Keith Gessen (34:35)

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• How war termination theory applies to Ukraine: 02:24–05:29
• Samuel Charap’s negotiation framework and Korean comparison: 05:29–06:58
• Key debates: weakness, military prospects, Putin’s motives: 06:58–12:23
• Territorial questions and their controversy: 12:23–15:21
• U.S. vs. Ukrainian interests and consequence for Russia: 15:21–18:15
• Russian war aims, atrocities, and negotiation breakdowns: 20:57–25:15
• Early 2022 negotiation offers and breakdown: 23:25–25:15
• Trustworthiness of Putin: 25:15–26:59
• Russian internal instability and Prigozhin’s death: 26:59–29:53
• U.S. political realignment and polarization on Ukraine: 29:53–32:59
• Who controls the peace process—U.S. or Ukraine?: 32:59–35:46

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Conclusion

The episode offers an unflinching look at the complex, often agonizing calculations behind calls for negotiation in Ukraine. Gessen carefully untangles the spectrum of policy positions, the evolving military dynamics, the moral costs of freezing conflict, and the tricky interplay between U.S. leverage and Ukrainian agency. While the answer to whether diplomacy stands a chance remains open, the conversation clarifies just how tangled—and consequential—the decision will be.

Transcript

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[B]

You're listening to the Political Scene. I'm Tyler Foggatt and I'm a senior editor at the New Yorker. It's been 18 months since Russia invaded Ukraine. In that time, we've seen the annexation of four Ukrainian territories, the rise of the Wagner group, and the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive, and then a less successful one, which is currently ongoing. Meanwhile, the US has engaged in what seems like a proxy war with Russia, providing $30 billion in weapons training and intelligence to Ukraine and then imposing extensive sanctions against Russia. But some foreign policy experts are starting to question this strategy. Keith Gessen is a contributing writer to the New Yorker, and he has been covering the war in Ukraine since its beginning. He has just written a piece titled the Case for Negotiating with Russia about the analysts who are pushing for diplomacy over warfare and why it's the US that could ultimately decide how this conflict ends. Hi Keith, thanks so much for being here.

[C]

Hi, thanks for having me.

[B]

So you wrote an essay last September titled How the War in Ukraine Might End. I'm wondering if you could talk a little bit about the sort of potential outcomes that people were imagining, you know, back last September. And, you know, what has sort of changed in the war since then. You know, how the situation has kind of unfolded since you wrote that original piece.

[C]

Sure. So that was a piece about people who study what is known as war termination. So you know, how wars end. A lot of political science work over the centuries is really focused on how wars begin, and quite a bit less is really focused on how you end a war. So the main kind of lesson from war termination for this conflict was, or any conflict was that one of the two sides has to change their demands, their minimum demands. And at the time that was not happening, the demands were too far apart. And one of the kind of dynamic things that happens in a war is that when one of the sides starts doing better, their minimum demands increase. The side that is doing worse, their minimum demands might go down or move in the direction of negotiations and peace, whereas the other side begins to feel more optimistic. So what was happening last fall was the Ukrainian counteroffensive that was going incredibly well. They overran Russian troops in the Kharkiv region, and then they slowly and methodically forced a Russian retreat from Kherson. So at the time, there was a tremendous amount of optimism, you know, both in the west and in Ukraine, that, wow, we can mount an offensive operation. We can really push the Russian army back. So that was a moment of, well, okay, you know, let's see what Ukraine can achieve through military means. And now, as you say, we're almost a year later, and now we're, you know, in the midst of another Ukrainian counter offensive, and this one is not going as well. We're still in the middle. So it's a little, you know, no one is really comfortable making predictions about what's going to happen. But clearly this has not been the same sort of success. The Russian defenses are much better prepared. They have these kind of endless minefields that the Ukrainian army is moving through very slowly. And so now the question that sort of is posed in the article is what happens at the end of this counteroffensive? What should the position of the US Be? Should we start thinking about urging or discussing with Ukraine a possible negotiation? Probably not to end the conflict, but at least to freeze it.

[B]

So your most recent essay focuses on a man named Samuel Cherup. It seems like he is definitely encouraging some form of negotiation. And I'm wondering if you could explain a little bit. Basically, when he makes the case for negotiating with Russia, what does that actually mean and look like in his view?

[C]

So he's talking about a ceasefire, essentially, that becomes a peace. And the comparison that he uses most often is the Korean War. You basically have what is known as an armistice. So the two sides agree to stop fighting. They don't recognize each other's claims. So I think technically South Korea and North Korea are still in a state of war, but the fighting stops. It's obviously not the world's best situation. North Korea, not anyone's idea of a good neighbor. But at least the fighting has more or less stopped, and now for seven years. So the argument the Cherub is making is, wouldn't that be better than continuing this conflict at this level of intensity? And then the article describes kind of the various disagreements around that position and what other people think of it.

[B]

Yeah, I mean, is it as simple as that? I mean, does Cherub think that both sides would be amenable to something like that at this point? Because it seems like a lot of the discourse surrounding the concept of negotiations that there, you know, there's been a lot of sort of focus on the idea that Ukraine would have to commit to not trying to join NATO and, you know, that Ukraine would probably have to cede, you know, the territories that Russia has supposedly annexed to Russia formally. I mean, could it just be as easy as dropping weapons and agreeing not to fight anymore, or would there have to be just major concessions?

[C]

Well, there's kind of three areas of disagreement that are prompted by Cherup's position. One is, if you are initiating some form of negotiation, does Russia. Does Putin see that as a sign of weakness? Right. Are you then essentially kind of ceding to Russia that you are going to give up, that you're going to stop the pretty significant support of Ukraine that you have been providing for the last year and a half? Yeah, so. So there's this kind of argument about, you know, what does it even mean to kind of initiate this process? Will Putin, you know, interpret that in a way that's going to make him harder to deal with?

[B]

Yeah. Like, do you only even sort of consider negotiating once you realize that you will probably lose if the fighting continues? Like, is negotiating exactly like a sign of weakness or just a sign of inevitable defeat? It seems like Cherup would argue that, no, that isn't necessarily the case. But I feel like when we think about negotiations in the US at least, that's often. That's what my mind first jumps to. Naturally.

[C]

Yeah, it's very complicated because the US Is a party to the Conflict, right? Yeah. You know, we don't have troops there, but we are obviously very supportive of Ukraine. We've sent a ton of weapons more and more as time goes on. So what would it mean for the US to start down this path? Cherup would say, well, no, look, all wars end in some form of negotiation. So to start kind of talking about this and thinking about this does not, to his mind, does not signal defeat or weakness. But the second question that you brought up is, and the second kind of area of debate is, what is the military situation and can Ukraine win? And that's, you know, we don't know the kind of military experts. Some say, well, this is a stalemate, right? This, you know, Ukraine given, you know, the weapons that they have, given the resources that they have given, the kind of limits that the west, and in particular the US has asked Ukraine to kind of keep within. No, they can't. The idea that they're going to push all Russian troops out of Ukraine is impossible. Others say, well, actually, let's give war a chance. Let's see what they can do. Let's continue providing support. One kind of subset of that argument is this is relatively painless to us in the West. The Ukrainians are doing the fighting, we're providing weapons and other kind of support, but we're not dying. And in the process, we. They're tying down a major adversary, that is Russia. So as long as Ukraine wants to continue to fight, then we should let them. So that's a kind of debate about the military situation. And the third debate, which you also brought up is what will Putin's reaction be? Will Putin actually stop? Can you imagine a situation where he is satisfied with, for example, freezing the line of contact where it is more or less right now, or where it is at the end of the current counteroffensive? And there's a lot of evidence that he won't stop, right? That he will not stop until Ukraine is defeated. Cherub's argument is that you could create a situation where you have a ceasefire and you make it really hard and really kind of unappealing to violate that ceasefire. You say, look, we're going to move all our heavy weaponry back 10 miles from one another. We're going to have drones monitoring this line of contact. If Russia observes the terms of this ceasefire, they will get sanctions relief, which is something Russia very much wants. And if they violate the terms, then the sanctions will snap back. In terms of the kind of bigger question, and I think it is a really painful question, and the source of the intensity of this argument is that in this scenario, you do leave parts of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces. And we have a great deal of evidence that what goes on in places that are occupied by Russian forces is really horrible. You know, it is torture chambers, it is deportations. It is deportations of children into Russia where they are given to other families. It is random killing of civilians. It's horrible.

[B]

So, and sorry, just to clarify. So, I mean, part of it seems like Cherub's idea of a ceasefire. I mean, would it just solidify the borders that have been created by the war, like the territories that Russia has taken, those would, in fact, stay with Russia?

[C]

Well, I mean, so I think the argument, you know, one actually, Ukrainian politician named Adistovich, you know, recently kind of compared this, and he was sort of floating this idea, a kind of similar idea is you say it's like the two Germanies one. Right. So you kind of acknowledge that there's a partition, but the idea is that over time, through political means and through a kind of changing geopolitical situation, you eventually bring the country back together. Right. So you could imagine a future Russian government that was not like the current Russian government and that would want to return these territories. Ukraine would not acknowledge. And Ukraine will never acknowledge Russian sovereignty over those territories, nor should it. So the distinction between an armistice and a peace deal is that you aren't making a permanent deal where you're saying, yes, these are Russian territories, you're saying, we will stop fighting, but, no, we do not acknowledge Russian dominion here because this is our land.

[B]

I see. I mean, would you say that the, you know, sort of. That kind of, like, treatment of the territories, you know, not. Not acknowledging that they, you know, are under Russian sovereignty, but also, you know, not trying to take them back and just kind of maybe not actively seating.

[D]

Them, but kind of like passively seating them for the sake of the. The war ending? I mean, is that the place where Cherub's ideas start to get kind of controversial? I mean, I would imagine that in Ukraine that that is the sort of idea that would really prevent people from ever really being that interested in negotiating. And were it not for those territories, I feel like I can see a lot of people who would be very interested in the war coming to an end.

[C]

Yes, I mean, absolutely. That's. That is the kind of. That is it. That's the problem. And, you know, there. There are people in Ukraine who make this argument they are in the minority. But look, there's also a lot of Ukraine that is not occupied and you know, do we want this war to end so we can start rebuilding that part of Ukraine? And it gets back to the kind of second realm of disagreement that we talked about, which is if we thought that Ukraine could take this land back, you know, in the next few months, I don't think we'd be having this conversation at all.

[B]

Right.

[C]

It is partly a question of, well, okay, what if it can't? Or what if they can, but it takes five years or 10 years, and how much pain is that going to impose on the rest of the country and on the people doing the fighting?

[B]

Yeah, I mean, when you put it that way, it seems like Cherub's ideas are kind of extremely rational. I feel like you always kind of need people in foreign policy circles to be arguing on the side of peace and looking for ways to end the war and to sort of bring violence to an end. But at the same time, it doesn't seem like, you know, even in the United States, that this is an idea that's really, really been embraced at all. I mean, could you talk a little bit just about, like, how his ideas have been received?

[C]

I mean, you know, it should be said that it's hard to separate sort of U.S. interests and kind of the U.S. position from the Ukrainian position. His argument much of the time is about, you know, what is the American interest in this situation, which is largely the same as the Ukrainian interest, but not entirely.

[B]

How do they differ?

[C]

Well, you know, the US Has a strategic interest in a Russia that is less aggressive, you know, that isn't innovating its neighbors. And I think there's a kind of. There's a legitimate argument about whether that the message has been sent that kind of aggressive wars of choice are not going to be kind of welcomed by the, you know, by the US by NATO. And, you know, he makes the point that the kind of. From the US Perspective, the Russian defeat has already taken place, like, optically. No, the kind of very real damage to Russia in the form of sanctions, in the form of the fact that Europe is, you know, genuinely weaning itself off Russian energy. You know, all, you know, Nord Stream pipeline that had been so. Nord Stream 2, that had been so controversial for so many years, has been blown up, and there's no interest in, you know, rebuilding it. So a lot of, like, you know, genuine, tangible damage that's going to take years. You know, even if the conflict were to start tomorrow, it would take years for Russia to kind of get back to the place where it was two years ago. So that's quite real. And you know, and that happened, you know, and he says, well, that happened by April 20, 2022. So that happened more than a year ago. And since then, you know, again, from the US Perspective, the gains have been marginal. And in fact, you know, again, from the US Perspective, there's, you know, there is a danger that Russia becomes even, even more of a rogue state than it now is, a state with absolutely zero stake in the international system. You could argue that Russia is already there. But yeah, from the US Perspective, this looks a little bit different than it does from the Ukrainian perspective.

[B]

We'll have more with Keith Gessen on the political scene from the New Yorker in just a minute. America is changing and so is the world.

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[B]

So when you talk about just the.

[D]

Ways in which Russia has, you know, real damage has been inflicted on Russia during the sort of the time of.

[B]

War, it reminds me of, I think.

[D]

There was a sentence in your the essay that you wrote in September about how the war in Ukraine might End where you sort of talk about how it can almost be harder sometimes to negotiate the ending to a war once the war has begun. Because there are basically reasons for war that arise during the, the actual conflict. I mean, do you think that this is an example of that happening? I mean, do you think that it might even be harder now for Russia to agree to some sort of peace, just given how well the Ukrainians were doing, at least at the beginning of the war and just all the things that you listed. But it seems like on one hand they're in a worse position now than they expected to be. And so that could, you could see that as reason for them wanting to negotiate. But on the other hand, I can just imagine them being so sort of angry and embarrassed that there's almost more of an incentive to keep fighting and to win whatever win means at this point.

[C]

Absolutely. You know, I mean, at this point, the regime has put a lot of eggs in this basket of this war and has begun to really mobilize the population for a kind of long term confrontation, existential confrontation, not so much with Ukraine, but with the West. That's how the war is sold in Russia. So it begins to take on its own momentum. And I mean, one of the things about Prigozhin, which was sort of interesting was his criticism of the war was on the one hand that it was launched under false pretenses, this kind of idea of denazification. Prigozhin, in his final kind of hours was saying that was all a lie. But he also felt that the war was not being prosecuted aggressively enough. There is, as one person, Russian analyst I spoke to a few months ago, called it the party of more war in Russia. Right. So there is this kind of momentum that happens. And, you know, when we talk about what this kind of ceasefire armistice would look like from the Ukrainian side, you know, would this be enough for Putin, having announced that this was an existential war against the west, having announced that the Ukrainian government was run by Nazis, you know, does taking a chunk of Ukrainian territory constitute a victory that he could sell plausibly to his population? Maybe, but maybe not. And certainly from the Ukrainian side, just the Russian atrocities have made them understandably, much less willing to come to any sort of negotiated peace. After the Russian army withdrew from the towns around Kiev and Ukrainian forces and journalists went into those areas, Bucha Irpin, and saw what had happened there, negotiations which had been taking place after that, they more or less broke down. The kind of support for them in Ukraine really dropped after people saw what had happened under Russian occupation.

[D]

What do we know about what those negotiations looked like before they were dropped?

[C]

There's a lot of disagreement about what exactly happened. And we know that there was a deal that looks quite appealing from where we are right now, roughly that Russian forces would withdraw from the areas that they took after February 23, and that Ukraine would promise not to join NATO. And, you know, as. As one former Ukrainian official that I spoke to, you know, said. He said, you know, back then, Bakhmut was a beautiful city. Mariupol was a city that was still under Ukrainian control. You know, if we could go back to that moment, I think we, you know, we'd want to. But, you know, the questions about that deal are, well, from the Russian side, was it genuine? Was Putin really prepared to do that? We don't know. He has claimed subsequently that he was, but we. We don't know that. And the kind of sticking point from the Ukrainian side was that in exchange for not joining NATO, they wanted real security guarantees from the West. And at the time, it wasn't clear that the west was prepared to provide those security guarantees.

[B]

Yeah, this question of whether Putin would.

[D]

Actually honor a deal seems like kind of the big one. I mean, you mentioned that there are ways to make sort of breaking a deal very unappealing, you know, like, if you're lifting sanctions, putting them back down, that sort of thing. But is it wrong to suggest that Putin might be uniquely difficult to negotiate with? You know, just this question of whether can we even trust the person we're negotiating with. Would he ever honor a deal?

[C]

Yeah, I mean, I think the answer is absolutely not. He would not. I mean, I don't think anyone, no one that I talk to thinks, oh, you know, you could take Putin at his word, and that that would be the basis of a deal. I mean, he has broken every deal that, you know, he has made, certainly with Ukraine. Right. He has not honored the 1994 Budapest Agreement whereby Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons. Russia was a signatory to. Very important signatory.

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

You know, arguably, he did not implement his responsibilities under Minsk, the Minsk agreements that were reached in 2014 and 2015. So, no, there is nobody that, you know, kind of would want to rely on the good word of Vladimir Putin. The question is, you know, can he be swayed by incentives and disincentives? Right. And something Cherub says, look, if Russia is intent on undermining Ukraine and continuing to destroy Ukraine, no matter the cost to Russia, that's a terrible situation. And there's not much more that we can do about it than we've done already.

[D]

Yeah.

[C]

If Putin is totally insensitive to costs and he has shown some serious cost insensitivity, then, yeah, this just has to go on. The question is, is there a situation where you could create some kind of arrangement where continuing the war becomes less attractive? I mean, I think that's what we're arguing about.

[D]

I see you mentioned Prigozhin earlier, the head of the Wagner mercenaries, and, you know, was big news last week that he, you know, that he died in this mysterious sort of plane explosion. Plane crash, would you call it? But I guess.

[B]

How does.

[C]

Looks like a plane explosion.

[D]

How does.

[B]

How does Prigozhin's death change the calculation that Cherub is making, if at all? I mean, do you think that his, you know, the fact that he is no longer going to be a part of this. Part of this effort, and that the. The Wagner group, which was once, you know, a very sort of pivotal part of the Russian fighting force, now that they don't really have a leader? I mean, do you think that that is going to sort of change the situation on the ground at all in a way that might sort of change.

[D]

The calculation for whether or not it's time to negotiate?

[C]

Not as far as I can tell. You know, I think of, I mean, again, to step back a little bit. Like, the situation is very dynamic in a way, because we, you know, Ukraine and the west is kind of waiting. You know, some people think that, including some people in the US Government, think that if. If we keep this war going, if Ukraine keeps fighting, it will weaken Russia to the point where the Putin regime may collapse. Right. So we're always looking for signs of that happening. And certainly Prigozhin's mutiny, while not a sign of imminent regime collapse, was certainly a sign that things were not stable inside of Russia. And I wrote a piece about that when it happened, talking to people, and one former CIA analyst who had had a 10% chance of regime change, she went up to 20. So it wasn't like a significant move. But still. Still kind of a lowish probability. And on the Russian side, they keep waiting for the Western coalition to collapse. Right. And, you know, they're looking for signs of European disunity. They're looking for signs of, you know, as one person put it to me, you know, Putin has every reason in the world to wait until November 2024 to see if Donald Trump is elected or some other Republican who has a very different position on US Support for Ukraine. So there are all these kind of contingent factors. But so far, this kind of hope that the Putin regime would collapse so far has not taken place. Arguably, the assassination of Prigozhin certainly makes Putin seem a little bit more secure than he was, you know, two months ago.

[D]

Yeah.

[C]

You know, and meanwhile, we do have, you know, we had this Republican debate the other day, you know, where there were arguments over Ukraine. And clearly the Republicans are split on Ukraine, some with kind of, you know, Mike Pence and Nikki Haley have a more kind of traditional Republican position on supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression. And then you have this kind of more Trumpian right. Which wants to, you know, send our military resources to the southern border and into Mexico rather than Ukraine. First of all, first of all, Mr. Ramaswamy, you have 30 seconds. Mr. DeSantis, I wish you well in your future career on the boards of Lockheed and Raytheon. But the fact of the matter, Boeing came off of it. But you've been pushing this lie, you've been pushing this lie all week, Nikki.

[D]

To go and defund Israel. You want.

[C]

Okay, let me address that. I'm glad you brought that up. I'm going to address each of those right now. This is the false eyes of a professional politician. There you have it.

[D]

You're watching America less than. You have no foreign policy experience.

[C]

And it shows. And you know what? You know, and it is an open question, as some people I talked to said, you know, look, the US Presidential election is not going to be decided by the war in Ukraine. That's not kind of top priority for most voters. But that, too, is a kind of dynamic situation in U.S. politics.

[B]

Yeah. Are you surprised by how sort of support for.

[D]

Support for the Ukrainians has kind of polarized along party lines.

[C]

Yeah. I mean, it is a kind of a sort of rearrangement in American politics. Right. Where traditionally the Republicans during the Cold War were the more hawkish party in terms of confronting the Soviet Union. And the Democrats constantly had to prove their toughness with the Soviets. And there was a significant portion of the Democratic Party that really was eager for better relations with the Soviet Union and kind of peaceful coexistence. And I think that really changed in 2016 with Russian interference in the US presidential election and a clear Russian preference for Trump. And, you know, in a way, I think in US Politics, it's almost like it's not so much that Trump was an agent of Putin, it's more like Putin was an agent of Trump. So, you know, Putin has just become so associated with, with Trump that, you know, for Democrats, he is, you know, a real enemy. And, you know, and obviously there are many other very valid reasons for thinking of him as an enemy. But, yeah, I do think that's a kind of interesting and novel kind of realignment in American politics. And you see the more traditional Republicans, you know, looking almost out of step with their party as they look out of step in a lot of other ways, too.

[D]

So one last question for you. I mean, it's something that I've been trying to sort of figure out in terms of the US Ukraine dynamic, when we talk about Ukraine and Russia negotiating, how much of that is supposed to be driven by the US I think that we all imagine a deal between Ukraine and Russia sort of being brokered by Zelensky and Putin. But to what extent is this something where Zelenskyy would have to reach the conclusion that he is ready to start peace talks and then the US Is supporting him in this effort versus the US Kind of deciding that it's tired of sending weapons and supplying Ukraine with intelligence and then kind of encouraging Zelensky to move forward with some kind of negotiation or peace process?

[C]

Yeah, that's a great question. One former National Security Council staff member, Georgetown professor Charles Koopchan, he called it a searching conversation that the US Will have to have with its Ukrainian counterparts. Obviously, if Zelensky wanted to enter into some form of negotiation, I think that would be welcomed in Washington mostly. I think there would be some people who actually would not welcome it. Cherup would say, well, look, we are very involved in this. We are the most powerful country in the world. We don't have boots on the ground, but we have a huge stake in this. And for us to pretend like we can't talk to Ukraine about how this war ends, that's disingenuous and kind of an abdication of our responsibility. So, you know, I think somewhere in between. Right. And Chab says this too, like, you can't force Ukraine to stop fighting, but you might want to start talking about it, you know, and also start. Something we haven't talked about is kind of the arguments within the US Government, Right. Where the Department of Defense is not entirely thrilled about sending quite so much weaponry to Ukraine when, you know, we're supposed to be preparing for a potential conflict with China. Right. So there are these kind of bureaucratic or, you know, other kinds of, you know, incentives and arguments that are in play. Yeah, I think. I mean, I think, you know, ultimately Ukraine has to decide, but, you know, the US probably does have a role to play in kind of talking to them. About it.

[B]

Well, thank you so much, Keith.

[C]

Thank you.

[B]

Keith Gessen is a contributing writer at the New Yorker. You can read his essay, the Case for Negotiating with Russia on newyorker.com now this is the political scene from the New Yorker. I'm Tyler Foggit. The show is produced by Michelle Moses with support from Sydney Cobb. Our executive producer is Stephen Valentino. Our theme music is by Alison Layton Brown. Enjoy the rest of your week and we'll see you next Wednesday.

[C]

Right now, we are living through some of the most tumultuous political times our country has ever known. I'm David Remnick. Each week on the New Yorker Radio Hour, I'll try to make sense of what's happening alongside politicians and thinkers like Cory Booker, Nancy Pelosi, Liz Cheney, Tim Waltz, Ketanji Brown Jackson, Newt Gingrich, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. Charlamagne, tha God, and so many more. That's all in the New Yorker Radio Hour. Wherever you listen to podcasts from prx.