Evan Osnos and Jiayang Fan on the Hong Kong Protests

Summary

Podcast Summary: "Evan Osnos and Jiayang Fan on the Hong Kong Protests"

The Political Scene | The New Yorker
October 14, 2019
Host: David Remnick
Guests: Evan Osnos, Jiayang Fan

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Overview

This episode features a deep dive into the ongoing 2019 Hong Kong protests, the Chinese government’s response, and their international implications. Host David Remnick speaks with New Yorker staff writers Evan Osnos, just returned from Beijing, and Jiayang Fan, freshly back from Hong Kong, to shed light on the emotional landscape, political complexities, and global reverberations of Hong Kong’s demonstrations for greater autonomy and democracy. The episode also explores the differing perspectives in Hong Kong and Beijing, U.S. policy regarding China, and how leaders like Xi Jinping and Donald Trump shape the crisis.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

The Emotional Tenor and Nature of Protesters (02:43–04:58)

• Who is protesting?
  • Jiayang Fan notes that about 80% of Hong Kong protesters are middle- or working-class people, ranging from 20 to 75 years old. Most support freedom in Hong Kong but are undecided on how far they’re willing to go.
  • The “frontline protesters” (those seen in Western media, dressed in black and sometimes using violence) make up a small minority.

“They feel just so strongly that they are there to support the freedom that they have understood to be part and parcel of Hong Kong society.” — Jiayang Fan (02:54)

• Evolution of demands
  • Protests began over a controversial extradition law but grew into broader demands, driven by accumulated anger after the failed 2014 Umbrella Movement and fear of Hong Kong becoming “just another mainland city.”

Beijing’s Framing of the Protests (05:01–07:55)

• Beijing’s Perspective
  • Evan Osnos describes the stark contrast: in mainland China, the protests are framed not as a fight for ideals but as a “separatist movement” aimed at breaking up Chinese territory, tapping into historical anxieties about national sovereignty.

“The subject of Hong Kong and its protests has nothing to do with idealism or with young people… It is described in Beijing consistently as a, quote, separatist movement.” — Evan Osnos (05:26)

• Possible futures
  • Osnos sees no indication that Beijing will accommodate protester demands. A Tiananmen-style crackdown is unlikely due to Hong Kong’s financial importance and China’s international image, but China will keep applying incremental pressure.

Fears of a Tiananmen Scenario and Protester Psychology (07:55–09:11)

• Some young protesters, especially on the front lines, see themselves as risking everything, even inviting international attention should a repressive military response occur.
• There’s widespread concern about the proximity of PLA (People’s Liberation Army) soldiers and the possibility of a violent crackdown.

Surveillance and Protest Tactics (09:11–10:50)

• High-tech repression
  • Protesters protect their identities meticulously, even covering their ears, fearful that advanced AI may identify them from physical features.
  • Osnos recounts how protesters attacked “smart lampposts”—symbols of China’s surveillance ambitions.

“These are the perfect expressions, the physical expressions of China’s future governance model.... Technology allows that now.” — Evan Osnos (09:50)

• Xi Jinping’s longevity
  • Osnos connects this surveillance culture to Xi’s drive to prolong the Communist Party’s rule, now surpassing the Soviet Union’s duration.

Xi Jinping’s Consolidation of Power (10:50–12:22)

• Cult of personality
  • Fan credits Xi’s anti-corruption campaign with building public support while eliminating rivals. Internal Communist Party factions are seen as his greatest threat. Xi has built a powerful mythology around himself as the only leader who can restore China’s stature.

“He has convinced the people that only, only he can lead the country into superstition, power status. The transition really from the century of shame...to a nation that will ultimately outdo the United States.” — Jiayang Fan (11:39)

Comparing Xi Jinping and Donald Trump (12:22–13:54)

• Osnos outlines the stark differences in background and leadership style. Xi is methodical, cautious, and distrusts Trump, whom he finds “utterly mystifying.”
• Trump’s unpredictability and disregard for established diplomacy have unsettled Chinese officials, who now approach the U.S. with “total and complete self-protection.”

U.S. Response and Hong Kong Protesters’ View (13:54–16:16)

• American and British flags
  • Protesters wave these flags to attract U.S. attention, hoping for support. However, when asked about Trump’s lack of action, a protester tells Fan she’s focused on ensuring U.S. policymakers understand the situation’s urgency.

“All I need is for some of the politicians in Washington to see.” — Jiayang Fan quoting a protester (14:57)

• Trump’s silence and Beijing’s view
  • Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing camp appreciates Trump’s transactional approach, seeing his lack of interest in human rights as advantageous for their agenda.

Chinese and Russian Election Interference Contrasted (16:16–18:11)

• China’s restraint
  • Osnos explains that while China has hacked U.S. campaigns for intelligence, it hasn’t disseminated information or sown chaos like Russia, preferring stability in the U.S. over chaos that could generate backlash.

“China would be much happier to watch the United States go through its own paroxysms of political disorder than to risk the possibility of engendering some American backlash by actively intervening.” — Evan Osnos (17:59)

Who Does China Prefer in U.S. Elections? (18:11–19:42)

• Fan suggests China views Elizabeth Warren warily as firm on human rights, Bernie Sanders as more hands-off, and generally finds Biden familiar. The CCP historically prefers Republicans for their business orientation, but Trump’s unpredictability leaves Beijing uneasy.

“This Republican president has scrambled the circuits to such a degree in Beijing that they really don’t know.” — Evan Osnos (18:59)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the emotional reality in Hong Kong:
  “There was just this rising panic that Hong Kong was becoming like another mainland city utterly under the thumb of the Communist Party.” — Jiayang Fan (04:45)

• On Beijing’s historical narrative:
  “Any Chinese person will tell you that the country, over the course of history, has been invaded and has been carved up. And so by talking about it as an assault on Chinese territory, that’s tapping into a very deep political well.” — Evan Osnos (05:38)

• On the trade-offs of a violent crackdown:
  “If they went into Hong Kong today with tanks...this would devastate a financial capital that is very important to China’s economy...and more importantly, would devastate China’s effort to try to establish itself on the global stage as an alternative to American leadership.” — Evan Osnos (07:10)

• On Xi’s grip on power:
  “The greatest threat to a political leader is not actually the people protesting or...the economy, but other rivaling factions trying to topple him.” — Jiayang Fan (11:13)

• On U.S. protesters’ outlook:
  “In this war, there is no one who’s powerful enough to save Hong Kong, except possibly the US.” — Hong Kong protester, via Jiayang Fan (14:24)

• On Chinese election hacking:
  “It never weaponized the information...It really used it for intelligence gathering purposes.” — Evan Osnos (17:31)

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• [02:43] — The social makeup and motivations of Hong Kong protesters
• [04:01] — How protest demands broadened over time
• [05:24] — Beijing’s official narrative and anniversary context
• [06:40] — Assessment of Beijing’s response to the protests
• [07:55] — Fears (and limits) of Tiananmen Square-style escalation
• [09:11] — Protester strategies vs. Chinese surveillance
• [10:50] — How Xi Jinping consolidated and sustains power
• [12:36] — Xi vs. Trump: differences in leadership and diplomacy
• [13:54] — American/British flags at protests & U.S. reaction
• [15:28] — Pro-Beijing perspectives on Trump’s policies
• [16:37] — Chinese views on interference vs. Russia
• [18:11] — Beijing’s preferred outcomes for the 2020 U.S. election

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Language and Tone

Throughout the conversation, both guests draw on personal experience and a sobering, analytical tone. Jiayang Fan conveys the tension and anxiety on the ground, while Evan Osnos gives a broad, geopolitical view. David Remnick’s questions are probing and reflective, maintaining a balance of empathy and intellectual rigor.

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Conclusion

The episode provides a nuanced exploration of the stakes in Hong Kong, the rigidity of Beijing’s response, and the complexity of U.S.-China relations. It clarifies that the protests are both an intensely local fight for freedoms and a flashpoint in the geopolitical contest between China and the West, playing out against the backdrop of rising surveillance, political uncertainty, and shifting global power.

Transcript

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[Jiang Fan]

I'm Dorothy Wickenden.

[David Remnick]

On today's Politics and More podcast, David.

[Evan Osnos]

Remnick talks with New Yorker staff writers.

[David Remnick]

Zheng Fan and Evan Osnos. They'll discuss the ongoing protests in Hong Kong and the response from the Chinese government. Donald Trump has made China one of the defining issues of his presidency. He seems to have done everything he can to provoke China. He's ignited a trade war. He's escalated tensions over North Korea and much more. And yet, instead of backing the pro democracy protesters in Hong Kong, Trump has reportedly told President Xi Jinping that the United States would remain silent about democracy as they worked out their trade deal. The protests in Hong Kong against Beijing's rule have been going on now for months. Combined with slowing economic growth across the country, they've created a political crisis for Xi Jinping, right at a time when the Communist Party is supposed to be celebrating its 70th year in power. The situation is more serious than anything since the Tiananmen Square uprising a generation ago. Two of our staff writers are recently back from China. Evan Osnos and Jae Yong Fan Jiang, you just Got back from Hong Kong, and I want to get a sense first the emotional tenor of what's going on in the streets, what kinds of people are participating, and what's the feeling out there?

[Jiang Fan]

I would say 80% of the participants are middle class, working class. They range in age from probably 20 to 75. The folks I spoke to feel just so strongly that they are there to support the freedom that they have understood to be part and parcel of Hong Kong society. I think many of them are undecided about how far they're willing to go, and most of them would claim they're not what's known as frontline protesters.

[David Remnick]

What does a frontline protester mean?

[Jiang Fan]

Right. A frontline protester is the ones that have been featured so prominently in Western media, the ones wearing the gas masks, clad in all black. They occasionally throw the Molotov cocktails and resort to more extreme measures. I think it's really important to point out that that's a pretty minor fraction of the overall community of protesters.

[David Remnick]

Now, my understanding is that this began with fairly limited demands. It had to do with extradition, for example, and with time, that has broadened. And do these protesters have the sense that they can keep apart from Beijing indefinitely?

[Jiang Fan]

When I pose that question to protesters, many of them don't have a very clearly defined, defined answer. And I would dare to say that many of them probably don't even know themselves. What they do feel is the anger that comes from the failure of the umbrella movement, which happened in 2014, over this fight for universal suffrage that did not succeed, and this accumulated sense of anger and grievances that have not properly been met in any way. It's important to say that Hong Kong was never a democracy, even under Britain, but they felt that this was the direction in which they were moving. So there was just this rising panic that Hong Kong was becoming like another mainland city utterly under the thumb of the Communist Party.

[David Remnick]

So real fear of being sucked in.

[Jiang Fan]

Exactly.

[David Remnick]

So while Zhang was in Hong Kong, Evan, on the front lines and dodging Molotov cocktails and the rest, you were in Beijing for the 70th anniversary of the revolution. How were the Chinese officials that you were talking to talking about Hong Kong? And how was the Hong Kong drama playing out on the Chinese media?

[Evan Osnos]

Well, the contrast really couldn't be more stark in Beijing. The subject of Hong Kong and its protests has nothing to do with idealism or with young people who are trying to create economic opportunities for themselves or to hold off Beijing's control. It is described in Beijing consistently as a, quote, separatist movement. They think of it as an attempt to try to divide Chinese territory, which, after all, is this very visceral, very specific accusation, because any Chinese person will tell you that the country, over the course of history, has been invaded and has been carved up. And so by talking about it as an assault on Chinese territory, that's tapping into a very deep political well. And they were doing that to a great extent recently because, after all, they're celebrating 70 years of the People's Republic of China. And one of the ways that they're doing that is by saying we have been able to pull together the country in ways that previous governments never had. And that means resisting things like these protests in Hong Kong.

[David Remnick]

And how has Xi Jinping handled the protests? Do you expect that the crackdown will become more violent, more stringent than it's already been?

[Evan Osnos]

Well, I would not expect that they're going to give in to the protesters demands. Frankly, there was just no indication in Beijing, and anybody that I've been talking to involved in the sort of strategy about this subject, thinks that China is ready to make a deal with Hong Kong. But the obvious fear, the thing that people have been worried about is some sort of repeat of the events of 1989, when China cracked down on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square and you had a massacre in which students and other people in the city were killed. But at the same time, there are very real pressures, I think, that are on Xi Jinping not to handle it the same way they handled it in 1989. If they went into Hong Kong today with tanks, for instance, as they did in Beijing, this would devastate a financial capital that is very important to China's economy. It's got a stock market larger than London's, It's a big source of foreign currency. And more importantly, it would devastate China's effort to try to establish itself on the global stage as an alternative to American leadership. And so I think the more likely scenario is that China will keep up the pressure and gradually use its sheer weight and persistence to try to grind down the resistance of protesters in Hong Kong.

[David Remnick]

Zhang, do you think that people in Hong Kong expect a Tiananmen Square type scenario to take place, or do they feel that that kind of pressure is not on them, that they can go much farther?

[Jiang Fan]

Some of the folks I've talked to certainly think that that is a possibility. There is this sense of Shenzhen right across the border and there being People's Liberation army barracks there, and also an increase of troops Even stationed in Hong Kong. I think also among the young, this sense of nihilism, this feeling that if the tanks really do roll in, let the world see how brutal the communist regime is. And this is, I would say again among the 20 to even, you know, 10% of the, of the frontline protesters who for better or worse, command a lot of attention because they're the ones who are, you know, some of them are talking to Western media and they're the ones throwing the Molotov cocktails.

[David Remnick]

One of the things that's most striking watching these protest is the sense of the extensive surveillance network that the Chinese government has put into play. How are the protesters able to get around that or not?

[Jiang Fan]

You'll see in pictures that they are so fully armored in, you know, scarves, masks covering every part of their body. I mean, and you have to imagine these are 90 degree days in Hong Kong and they're covered head to toe, even their ears. And I've been told it's because there is worry or suspic that the AI is so advanced that even the shape of one's ears can be monitored.

[David Remnick]

And that's true, that's paranoia or true.

[Jiang Fan]

I think AI is quite sophisticated. I'm not sure to the extent that the ear shapes can be monitored, but that sense of fear is warranted.

[Evan Osnos]

I believe there was a very telling moment when the Hong Kong protesters started to attack the smart lampposts, as they're called. These are the obviously the sort of nodes of surveillance that have cameras and listening equipment and so on. And they're in their own way, these are the perfect expressions, the physical expressions of China's future governance model. It believes that in the future it can optimize the powers of a one party state by doing what an old analog state never could. It could never listen in on every conversation. It could never track people as they moved around a city. Well, technology allows that now. And that's one of the ways that this government imagines that it's going to try to extend its longevity. I mean, it is, after all, at a very acute moment in its own history. It's, it's been in power 70 years, it's surpassed the longevity of the Soviet Union, but it is acutely aware that one party states do not have a long lifespan. And so Xi Jinping's personal determination is to try to, in some sense, prevent the inertia of history from coming down. On top of it.

[David Remnick]

Zhang Xi Jinping has, for all intents and purposes, made himself president for life. I don't see it any other way. What conditions allowed him to consolidate power so swiftly and effectively?

[Jiang Fan]

I think early on, his corruption campaign, which really won the hearts and minds of the citizenry across China, was a very astute way to fight political enemies. I think when he came to power, he realized that there were still lingering factions. And one has to understand that even within the Communist Party, there's a lot of infighting. And the greatest threat to a political leader is not actually the people protesting or even, you know, the economy, but other rivaling factions trying to topple him. I think he also very deftly nursed this cult of personality. He thinks that he really is, you know, a national deity. He has convinced the people that only, only he can lead the country into superstition, power status. The transition really from the century of shame that China has experienced, at least in the Chinese narrative, at the hands of foreign powers, to a nation that will ultimately outdo the United States.

[David Remnick]

Well, journalists are known, of course, as great mind readers, so I'll let you exercise that, that capacity here. How does Xi Jinping see a figure like Donald Trump?

[Evan Osnos]

Take the two of them, put them side by side for a minute. Xi Jinping began his career in the very center of party power, grew up in Beijing. His father was a senior party leader. Xi Jinping spent his entire career essentially moving up the ladder of obscure party posts until eventually, you know, at one point, he was the head of the feed association in a rural province. He makes his way up, becomes governor of provinces, and then finally gets his chance by keeping his mouth closed. He never let onto his peers what he believed never created a lot of enemies in the system. And using that method, he made his way to the top. Now look at Donald Trump. They are in every conceivable stylistic and personal way different. And I think Xi Jinping looks across the table at Donald Trump and finds him utterly mystifying. One of the things that's happened over the last two years is that everything that Chinese diplomats and politicians had come to believe about how American politics works has been chucked out the window. And so Xi Jinping has no trust in what Donald Trump tells him. He doesn't trust him on the trade war. He doesn't trust him on these assurances of one thing or another. And so he's coming from a position of total and complete self protection first. And do not rely on the United States for anything.

[David Remnick]

It was so interesting to me. I was watching on television some of these protests, and you see occasionally an American flag being waved or a British flag being waved. And at the same time, President Trump has been absolutely silent about these protests. He's not said one word of encouragement or praise or pro democratic sentiment. Zhang, how is that being received on the streets of Hong Kong?

[Jiang Fan]

I asked one of the protesters who was wielding the American flag, I asked what her intention was. And she said, in this war, there is no one who's powerful enough to save Hong Kong, except possibly the US and we need to make sure the US Knows how exactly critical the situation is here. And then I followed up with a question about Trump and what she thought of Trump's response. And she said, I can't get bogged down the details right now. All I need is for some of the politicians in Washington to see.

[David Remnick]

But surely they're aware that this is a president who does not press human rights issues on the Chinese leadership, has not mentioned democratic values to the Chinese leadership. If anything, his greatest emphasis lately, besides trade, which is a big issue, is to get the Chinese, as with other countries, to investigate the Biden family.

[Jiang Fan]

Which is why I think some of the pro Beijing folks that I spoke to was really, is really encouraged, frankly, that Trump won the election instead of Hillary and the sense that this is not a concern for Washington and that at the end of the day, Trump is only interested in making a deal and human rights was never high on his agenda. So when push comes to shove, especially with the trade war, the fact that Trump might be looking for leverage or for kind of pawns, that Hong Kong just might be one of, you know, the cards that he has to play, I think many of the pro Beijing folks I talk to are fairly happy that Trump is in command right now.

[David Remnick]

Just recently, Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, said, China will never interfere in the internal affairs of the United States and we trust that the American people are capable of sorting out their own problems. In this context, I'd ask you both, does that mean that they're likely to take a pass on investigating the Bidens or interfering in the 2020 elections?

[Evan Osnos]

I think, yeah, they do not particularly want to get involved here. I think this is one in which I will take them at face value. And I'll give you one data point.

[David Remnick]

Why does that make them different from the Russians? The Russians seem to love to thrive on idea of chaos in American public life as a result of, or at least partly as a result of their interference in the election and by extension Trump's victory. Why would the Chinese not feel the same way? Chinese thrive on something else.

[Evan Osnos]

Well, China loves the fact that the United States is engaged in these kinds of obviously paralyzing internal fights. That's just been very helpful to China on the world stage. But at the same time, China is prudent about not wanting to provoke any more response than it needs to. And I'll give you a useful bit of history on this, which is that China actually, we know this. This is not a hidden fact. China hacked into the 2008 campaign according to US intelligence agencies, but it never weaponized the information. It never used it, it never pushed it back out into the public sphere the way that Russia did what it did. It really used it for intelligence gathering purposes. It hoovered up this stuff and held onto it for its own sense of trying to predict what was going to happen. China would be much happier to watch the United States go through its own paroxysms of political disorder than to risk the possibility of engendering some American backlash by actively intervening.

[David Remnick]

Zhang and Evan, if you had to guess, who were the Chinese rooting for to win the presidential election and why?

[Jiang Fan]

I think that Elizabeth Warren is someone that China would not want to win the election. The sense that she is someone who seems to have convictions about human rights and someone who will not let China get away with what it does within its borders, I think is worrying. I think someone like Bernie Sanders is someone who can be more attractive because Bernie at least doesn't seem to have much interest in getting involved.

[Evan Osnos]

Evan in general, the Communist Party prefers Republican presidents in the United States because they're in a sense, more likely to be business oriented, they're gonna be pro trade and so on. But this Republican president has scrambled the circuits to such a degree in Beijing that they really don't know. And they're in some sense, they're edging towards the known quantities. They've worked with Joe Biden as a vice president. They feel a little bit more familiar with him. He's frankly one of the only names that they really know out of this field. So they're watching it very carefully. But they are, at this point, totally undone by Donald Trump, and they don't really believe that he would be a reliable counterparty.

[David Remnick]

Evan Osnos and Jiang Fan, I know you're still suffering from jet lag coming back from China. My thanks to you.

[Evan Osnos]

Thanks, David.

[Jiang Fan]

Thanks so much.

[David Remnick]

Cheung Fan and Evan Osnos both are staff writers and you can read all their coverage of [e-mail].

[Katie Drummond]

What the hell is going on right now and why is it happening like this? At Wired, we're obsessed with getting to the bottom of those questions on a daily basis. And maybe you are, too. I'm Katie Drummond, the global editorial director of Wired, and I'm hosting our new podcast series, the Big Interview. Each week I'll sit down with some of the most interesting, provocative, and influential people who are shaping our right now. Big Interview Conversations are fun.

[Evan Osnos]

I want a shark that that eats.

[Katie Drummond]

The Internet, that turns it all off, unfiltered and unafraid.

[Evan Osnos]

So in a lot of ways, I try to be an antidote to the unimaginable faucet of reactionary content that you see online. To the best of my ability, every.

[Katie Drummond]

Week we're going to offer you the ultimate luxury of our times, meaning and context. True or false? You, Brian Johnson, the man sitting across from me, one day, at some point as of yet undefined in the future, you will die. False. Tell me more. Listen to the Big Interview right now in the same place you find WIRED's Uncanny Valley podcast. Subscribe or follow wherever you get your podcasts.

[Jiang Fan]

From. PRX.