Podcast Summary
The Political Scene | The New Yorker
Episode: Evan Osnos, John Seabrook, and James Surowiecki on the Chinese Hacking Scandal
Date: May 31, 2013
Host: Dorothy Wickenden
Main Theme
This episode explores the escalating issue of Chinese state-sponsored cyberattacks on U.S. military and corporate infrastructure, examining the broader context of U.S.-China relations, the implications for business and national security, and the strategic calculations both nations are making as Obama prepares for a summit with China’s new President, Xi Jinping.
Key Discussion Points & Insights
1. The Scope and Impact of the Chinese Hacking Scandal
- Recent Revelation: A Pentagon-prepared report shows Chinese actors have accessed designs for over two dozen advanced U.S. weapons systems, including missile defense, combat aircraft, and ships (02:10).
- Quote: “The Chinese have saved themselves about 25 years of research and development.” —Evan Osnos (02:47)
- The Pentagon insists, “we think these systems are sound,” but strong concern remains about technological parity and future threats.
- Escalating U.S. Rhetoric: For the first time, the U.S. is “prepared to start naming China specifically and identifying it as the greatest threat” in cybersecurity (02:54).
2. The U.S.-China Relationship at a Crossroads
- Diplomatic Language: Xi Jinping’s comment that relations are at a “critical juncture” is diplomatic code for a pivotal, strained moment (03:17).
- Strategic Distrust: Both sides have deep suspicions of each other's intentions. There’s recognition of “an opportunity to try to change the trajectory of this relationship, maybe even a reset” (03:45).
- The upcoming desert summit between Obama and Xi is seen as a chance to establish some real, direct communication (04:30).
3. Intellectual Property Theft and Its Consequences
- Two Types of IP Theft:
- Simple piracy (e.g., software piracy)
- Trade secret and commercial espionage through hacking
- Business Complicity: American businesses feel compelled to engage in China, often accepting the reality of IP theft as the “devil’s bargain” of market access (05:09).
- Quote: “The balance may have shifted and that this issue of the theft of trade secrets is becoming more and more important to American businesses.” —James Surowiecki (05:58)
4. The Long History (and Mutual Complicity) of Espionage
- Industrial espionage is far from new—historically, even the U.S. benefited from it, most notably in the growth of its textile industry (06:18).
5. Why Is America So Vulnerable?
- Lack of Standards: There are no mandated cybersecurity standards for private companies or defense contractors, partly due to political opposition to regulation (07:17).
- Detection Gaps: Most companies don’t know they’ve been hacked until told by the FBI—who may withhold details to protect sources and methods (07:52).
- Quote: “We just haven't really been serious enough about imposing safety precautions.” —John Seabrook (08:47)
- Technological Shifts: The move to mobile and cloud computing has further exposed vulnerabilities (08:58).
6. Willful Blindness and American Hacking
- The U.S. may refrain from clamping down on hacking because “we are also doing our share… and we would then have to stop it ourselves.” —John Seabrook (09:31)
- Both countries publicly accuse each other while seeing themselves as victims as well as perpetrators (10:47).
7. Cyberwarfare and Asymmetry
- Chinese Perspective: “China sees itself fundamentally as the weaker side… And in that context, the weaker power will do whatever it needs to do.” —Evan Osnos (11:01)
- Cyberattacks are likened to "guerrilla warfare"—the weapon of the underdog in a digital era (11:22).
- Journalistic Lived Experience: Evan Osnos notes that, living in Beijing and reporting on sensitive topics, “there are names I just won't put into a laptop… because I have no reasonable assurance that it's safe.” (12:09)
8. Corporate Security Strategies and “Hacking Back”
- Traditional “citadel” cyber defenses (strong walls, firewalls) are now seen as inadequate.
- New mindset: Accepting attackers will get in, so focus on disrupting them, setting traps, or even retaliating (“hack back”)—although that is illegal (13:15).
- Interesting Note: Chinese hackers “aren't the elite hackers in the world… It’s more like a death by a thousand cuts.” —John Seabrook (14:12)
- The truly elite hackers are from Eastern Europe and Iran, who are more interested in financial crime or state-sponsored terrorism (15:04).
9. Potential Policy Responses: Tariffs and Legal Changes
- New Proposals: Jon Huntsman and Dennis Blair suggest tariffs or legal means to allow companies to strike back against Chinese theft (15:29).
- Effectiveness is questioned: “The economies are so interwoven… there is a little bit of a kind of element of mutual assured destruction…” —James Surowiecki (16:51)
10. High Stakes: The "Pivot" to Asia and the Search for a “New Type of Great Power Relationship”
- U.S. Objectives: Secure Chinese acknowledgment of the problem of commercial hacking, and seek cooperation on North Korea and Iran (18:00).
- Chinese Objectives: Want assurances that the U.S. is not emboldening regional rivals (e.g., Japan), and—on a grander level—seeks recognition of “a new type of great power relationship,” with space for China in the Pacific (20:13).
- Historical Analogy: The Monroe Doctrine cited as a historical parallel—China today may be where the U.S. was in the 19th century, seeking to assert regional hegemony (21:51).
Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments
-
On the scale of Chinese hacking:
“The Chinese have saved themselves about 25 years of research and development.”
—Evan Osnos (02:47) -
On business realities:
“Doing business in China has always been a kind of devil's bargain, because... some of your intellectual property is going to get stolen.”
—James Surowiecki (05:09) -
On vulnerability and policy failure:
“We just haven't really been serious enough about imposing safety precautions.”
—John Seabrook (08:47) -
On mutual hacking and moral ambiguity:
“We are also doing our share of hacking and we don't necessarily want to clamp down on it because we would then have to stop it ourselves.”
—John Seabrook (09:31) -
On U.S.-China asymmetry:
“China sees itself fundamentally as the weaker side of this relationship… as long as China's military spending is still only about one quarter of what ours is… this is the way that it can try to close that gap.”
—Evan Osnos (11:01) -
On adapting as a journalist in Beijing:
“There are names I just won't put into a laptop and I won't put into email because I have no reasonable assurance that it's safe.”
—Evan Osnos (12:09) -
On the “hack back” debate:
“There is this kind of growing sentiment that we should hack back.”
—John Seabrook (13:36) -
Policy caution:
“The economies are so interwoven… there is a little bit of a kind of element of mutual assured destruction there.”
—James Surowiecki (16:51) -
On strategic realignment:
“What Xi Jinping is looking for from President Obama is what the Chinese are calling a new type of great power relationship.”
—Evan Osnos (20:42)
Noteworthy Timestamps
- 01:33 – Obama’s stance on Chinese cyber threats
- 02:10 – Details of the Chinese breach of U.S. weapons systems
- 03:09 – “Critical juncture” in U.S.-China relations
- 04:50 – Intellectual property theft and implications for business
- 07:17 – Debate on why American systems are so vulnerable
- 10:47 – The U.S.’s cyber activities and China’s perception
- 12:09 – Osnos on his day-to-day cybersecurity calculus in Beijing
- 13:36 – Corporate debate about striking back at hackers (“hack back”)
- 15:29 – Huntsman/Blair recommendations for tariffs and retaliation
- 18:00 – U.S. objectives in the “pivot” to Asia
- 20:13 – Xi Jinping’s goals and the “new type of great power relationship”
- 21:51 – The Monroe Doctrine and regional hegemony analogy
Conclusion
This episode delivers a nuanced look at how Chinese cyber-espionage is shaking the foundations of U.S.-China relations in a moment of deepening distrust and technological vulnerability. The hosts dissect the commercial, military, diplomatic, and historic factors at play, underscoring both the urgency and complexity of finding a new modus vivendi between two economic and military behemoths—at a time when the stakes, from technological supremacy to global security architecture, could not be higher.