The Political Scene | The New Yorker

Episode: Family Feud
Date: May 12, 2016
Host: Dorothy Wickenden
Guest: Benjamin Wallace-Wells

Main Theme

Exploring the shifting terrain of "family values" in American politics during the 2016 presidential election.
Executive editor Dorothy Wickenden and staff writer Benjamin Wallace-Wells delve into how Democrats, particularly Hillary Clinton, are increasingly embracing and redefining the language of family values, a rhetorical ground historically dominated by Republicans and the Christian Right. The discussion tracks how politicians, activists, and voters all interpret and deploy this concept in a rapidly changing social and economic context.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

The New Politics of Family Values

• Traditional Ownership:
  • Historically, family values were a central plank of Republican and Christian conservative messaging, framing the family as a fixed social anchor under threat from change.
• Democratic Reframing:
  • Clinton’s messaging spotlights gender equity, pay, childcare, and work-life balance—pivoting from moral panic to a vision of the family as an "agent for social change" (02:14–03:23).
  • Quote:

    "Rather than...the family described as a sort of social bulwark that is under threat from social change...the political idea of the family belongs to the Democrats, and the way you hear Clinton in that ad talking, the family there is a sort of vector for social change." – Benjamin Wallace-Wells (02:56)

  • Clinton’s campaign ad brands her as a grandmother and highlights her legislative work for children and families (01:32–01:53).

The Republican Dilemma: Lost Ground and New Messages

• Declining Relevance of the "Nuclear Family" Ideal:
  • Republicans face a public that no longer sees itself reflected in the old father-mother-and-two-kids archetype (03:23).
• The Charles Murray Influence:
  • Murray’s Coming Apart (2012) identified breakdown of “civic virtues” among poor whites—roping together questions of class, morality, and family collapse (03:33–05:04).
  • Despite Murray’s appeal among conservative intellectuals and politicians like Rubio, the emotional resonance with working-class whites was seized by Trump, who shifted the blame from moral failure to economic adversaries ("the Chinese").
  • Quote:

    "It wasn't any of those programs...who won the affections of the white working class. It was Donald Trump who basically said, you know, I'm not worried about moral decay. Nothing you are doing is wrong. The problem is Chinese, and we're going to go get them." – Benjamin Wallace-Wells (04:40)

The Christian Right’s Crisis of Identity

• Internal Division over Trump:

  • Russell Moore of the Southern Baptist Convention publicly denounces Trump’s nativism, bigotry, and indifference to “traditional family” norms (05:04–07:08).
  • Moore and some young senators (Ben Sasse, Tom Cotton) are cited as seedbeds for a potential anti-Trump, renewed social conservative movement.
  • Moore stops identifying as “evangelical," reflecting a growing discomfort with the political co-option of the term.
  • Quote:

    "There is...at the heart of the Christian right something interesting happening, feeling that religion has maybe been a little bit badly used in the public sphere." – Benjamin Wallace-Wells (06:57)

• Catholic Church Under Pressure:

  • Changing demographics (more Hispanic), sex abuse scandals, and papal reforms reshape the role of religion in shaping family values politics (07:23–08:04).

Personal Morality Versus Public Policy

• Trump’s Attacks on Clinton:
  • Trump leans heavily on personal invective (“Crooked Hillary”) rather than policy or moral crusading. His previous nicknames (“Little Marco,” “Lyin’ Ted”) surprisingly stick (09:14–10:57).
  • Wickenden questions whether Trump, twice divorced and “not particularly observant,” is a credible messenger for attacks on Clinton's personal morality.

Economic Anxiety Replacing Moral Judgement

• The End of “Compassionate Conservatism”:

  • Programs like abstinence-only education under Bush, originally aimed at moral uplift, increasingly seem condescending to working-class whites (13:12–14:54).
  • Trump’s appeal: He does not blame voters for family breakdown, instead blaming systemic/structural issues.
  • Quote:

    "One of the things that has really fired the Trump phenomenon is a kind of affront at condescension that white working class people are being talked down to by the media, by liberals...maybe those people sort of know what's best for them." – Benjamin Wallace-Wells (13:55)

• Rising Identification as “Working Class”:

  • Gallup numbers: 15 years ago, 1/3 of Americans called themselves working class; now it's 1/2 (11:20).
  • Issues like child care and pay equity are no longer only “women’s issues” or “poor people’s issues”—they resonate up the economic ladder.

Gender, Class, and Electoral Coalitions

• Hillary Clinton’s Distinctive Appeal:
  • Strong support among married white women—a group Republicans (Romney) won in 2012, but Trump struggles with (14:54–15:26).
• Voters' Distrust:
  • Both major candidates are widely distrusted, but in different ways—Trump for lack of religious or familial standing, Hillary for historical scandals and accusations of dishonesty (09:14–10:57).

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the seismic shift in family politics:

  "The political idea of the family belongs to the Democrats...the family there is a sort of vector for social change. It's not a static bulwark anymore, and I think that's pretty significant."
  – Benjamin Wallace-Wells (02:56)

• On Trump breaking conservative “moral decay” narratives:

  "It was Donald Trump who basically said, you know, I'm not worried about moral decay. Nothing you are doing is wrong. The problem is Chinese, and we're going to go get them."
  – Benjamin Wallace-Wells (04:49)

• On Russell Moore's disenchantment with “evangelical”:

  “The word evangelical had come to lose its specificity and power.”
  – Paraphrased from Benjamin Wallace-Wells (06:40)

• On the changing meaning of “working class”:

  "[America] moved from about one third...to one half identifying as working class. That's a pretty remarkable change."
  – Benjamin Wallace-Wells (11:20)

• On Trump’s appeal to working-class white voters:

  "...maybe those people sort of know what's best for them. Best of all. And Trump...has not said to those people, there is something morally wrong with you that needs to be fixed. And he has said, you're doing fine."
  – Benjamin Wallace-Wells (14:12)

Key Timestamps for Important Segments

• 01:32–01:53: Clinton’s “family values” campaign ad
• 02:14–03:23: Democrats seize the language of family values
• 03:33–05:04: Charles Murray, class, and the GOP’s loss of moral resonance
• 05:23–07:08: Russell Moore, the Christian right, and anti-Trump sentiment
• 09:14–10:57: Trump’s focus on personal attacks and voters’ distrust of both candidates
• 11:20–13:01: Class shifting in America and the broadening salience of child care, pay equity
• 13:12–14:54: Economic roots of family stress vs. moral judgement—Trump’s new ground

Tone & Style

• The conversation is analytical, thoughtful, and measured—typical of The New Yorker.
• Speakers use policy analysis, cultural references, and statistics to illustrate subtle shifts in political and social dynamics.
• Candid and sometimes lightly incredulous (e.g., at the speed of social change or the stickiness of Trump’s nicknames).

Summary

This episode provides a sharp, nuanced look at how “family values”—once the linchpin of Republican identity politics—have become an unlikely rallying cry for Democrats, as economic pressures, cultural shifts, and the rise of Trumpism force a re-examination of what “the family” means in American electoral life. Through Clinton's campaign, the emergence of anti-Trump social conservatives, and broader demographic and cultural shifts, the episode captures a moment of profound transformation in political rhetoric and identity.