Instability in Ukraine

Summary

The Political Scene | The New Yorker

Episode: Instability in Ukraine

Date: February 13, 2015
Host: Dorothy Wickenden
Guests: George Packer, Evan Osnos

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Overview

This episode centers on the unfolding crisis in Ukraine in early 2015, examining the recent Minsk ceasefire agreement, Russia’s role in the conflict, and the challenges faced by the US and EU in responding to Vladimir Putin’s actions. The conversation also explores broader foreign policy dilemmas for President Obama, the shifting dynamics between East and West, and the ongoing difficulty of crafting coherent responses to global crises.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Why the Minsk Ceasefire Is Unlikely to Last

(01:37–02:52)

• George Packer explains the lack of political will and leverage to enforce the Minsk ceasefire, pointing out that the separatists, emboldened by Russian support, are not incentivized to stop fighting.
• The Ukrainian government cannot accept the loss of territory, and Russia is both negotiating and actively fueling the conflict.

George Packer (02:05):
"Because the combatants on the ground don't want it to... the separatists have been gaining ground and there's no reason why they should stop now while they have the initiative... Russians are playing a really nefarious double game, negotiating in Minsk and lying in the face of European leaders about their own lack of involvement."

2. The Role of Putin and the Reality on the Ground

(02:52–03:34)

• Putin is not the sole creator of the separatists, but he is their clear patron; Russian intervention is decisively tipping the military balance.
• The West struggles to negotiate when Russia’s position is rooted in obfuscation and outright falsehoods.

George Packer (02:57):
"They are not entirely his creation, but he has stoked them. He is their patron. Without him, they simply couldn't hold their own against the Ukrainian government."

3. Angela Merkel Versus Putin—A Clash of Styles and Limitations

(03:34–05:08)

• Merkel is positioned as a formidable, analytical leader but faces inherent limitations: while she intuitively understands Putin, her tools are diplomatic, not military.
• Example: She explains Putin’s power plays as cover for Russia’s lack of economic and political strength.

George Packer (03:53):
"[Merkel] has a deep sense of his psyche... she said, you know, I understand why he does that. It's all he can do. He has no economy, he has no politics. He's just got this to show he's a man... Putin has the upper hand because he's willing to use violence. And for...historical reasons, Germany and Merkel are not."

4. Sanctions and Russia’s Economy

(05:08–05:46)

• Russian sanctions are biting, with economic difficulties mounting, but Putin’s popularity remains high and dissent among elites is only beginning to surface.
• The gamble: using aggressive tactics to demand international attention despite domestic suffering.

5. Transatlantic Unity—But Not a United Approach

(05:46–06:50)

• Evan Osnos discusses the nuanced, sometimes fragile unity between the US and Europe. While public displays show alignment, the US is more open to the idea of arming Ukraine than Europe is.
• Obama faces Congressional pressure but is clearly reluctant to provide lethal aid.

Evan Osnos (05:57):
"They tried as much as possible to say, we are going to go about this in lockstep. But...the Americans were more prepared to consider the idea of giving lethal aid...than the Europeans were."

6. NATO, Germany, and the Fear of Escalation

(06:50–08:29)

• Merkel’s position is clear—no military option in Ukraine, and NATO expansion to include Ukraine is unlikely due to the risk of escalation and Europe’s deep historical anxieties around Russia.
• For Germany, military confrontation with Russia is a nightmare scenario.

George Packer (07:01):
"Admitting Ukraine into NATO would require NATO not just to arm Ukraine, but to defend Ukraine. And then we would have the continent-wide war [...] that Merkel dreads and that Europe dreads."

7. Obama’s ISIS Authorization Request and Congressional Dynamics

(08:29–10:39)

• Obama sought Congressional authorization for action against ISIS months after starting operations. According to Osnos, this was primarily to provide political cover, not because he lacked legal grounds; both parties in Congress found the move unsatisfying.

Evan Osnos (08:56):
"He is acknowledging that because of the inability of the Congress to reach a consensus...he'll operate independently... It's a reflection in some ways of the sort of twilight war that this president has found himself engaged in on a whole series of fronts."

8. The Predicament of Samantha Power and Obama's Foreign Policy Team

(10:39–12:11)

• Samantha Power, closely linked to Obama, exemplifies the internal conflict between a desire for assertive humanitarian intervention and Obama's philosophical reluctance for foreign entanglements.
• The administration experiences frustration in dealing with actors like Putin and new-style global threats.

Evan Osnos (10:57):
"She over and over again found herself in the position, whether it was in Libya or in Iraq and Syria, of to some degree trying to persuade the president to take more action, while at the same time...not trying so hard that she would undermine her political capital."

9. A World of Multiplying Crises

(12:11–13:10)

• The Obama administration is beset by concurrent crises: ISIS, Ebola, failed peace processes, and Russian aggression in Ukraine. The White House often finds itself fighting defensive, reactive battles rather than proactive ones.

Evan Osnos (12:27):
"If you step back, it really is an astonishing array of crises...every time they try to get themselves organized, that events come along and leave them fighting a rear guard action."

10. America’s Waning Influence and the New Global Order

(13:10–14:45)

• According to Packer, declining US will and capacity to shape global events has led to an uptick in unmanageable violence and authoritarian assertiveness by leaders like Putin.
• Obama is faulted for failing to offer a clear vision of America’s role, compounding this uncertainty.

George Packer (13:35):
"We're in a place now where the US simply doesn't have the ability or the will...to create structures, to create alliances that can keep this level of violence and of illiberality under control."

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On negotiations with Putin:

  "It's hard for me to imagine how negotiations are going on when one side's position depends on a stream of lies, but I suppose that diplomats can do just about anything." (George Packer, 02:52)

• Merkel’s read on Putin’s psychology:

  "He has no economy, he has no politics. He's just got this to show he's a man." (George Packer recounting Merkel, 03:53)

• On the challenge for the West:

  "Putin has the upper hand because he's willing to use violence. And for a lot of deep historical reasons, Germany and Merkel are not." (George Packer, 03:53)

• On US-European tensions:

  "The Americans were more prepared to consider the idea of giving lethal aid to Ukrainian forces...than the Europeans were." (Evan Osnos, 05:57)

• On global instability:

  "Every time they try to get themselves organized, that events come along and leave them fighting a rear guard action." (Evan Osnos, 12:27)

• Elie Wiesel to Samantha Power after the murder of journalist James Foley:

  "Samantha, the winds of madness are blowing." (as quoted by Dorothy Wickenden, 12:11)

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Episode Timeline (Timestamps)

• 01:14 — Episode and Panel Introduction
• 01:37 — Analysis of the Minsk ceasefire’s prospects
• 03:34 — Merkel’s approach and limitations
• 05:08 — Sanctions on Russia and domestic implications
• 05:46 — Obama-Merkel summit; US/EU strategies diverge
• 07:01 — NATO, Germany's historical perspective
• 08:29 — Obama seeks ISIS war authorization
• 10:39 — Samantha Power's influence and dilemmas
• 12:27 — Expanding global crises outpacing US response
• 13:35 — Reflections on waning US influence

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Summary

This episode delivers a sobering, nuanced examination of the geopolitical and domestic challenges arising from the Ukraine conflict and the limits of Western, especially American, influence in a world marked by crises and assertive authoritarian leaders. The conversation highlights the complex interplay between diplomatic efforts, historical memory, internal political pressures, and the evolving dynamics of global power. Listeners walk away with a deep appreciation of the strategic frustrations and moral ambiguities facing policymakers—and the persistent uncertainty shaping the international order.

Transcript

[A]

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[B]

This is the Political Scene, a weekly conversation with New Yorker writers and editors about Politics. It's Thursday, February 12th. I'm Dorothy Wickenden, executive editor of the New Yorker.

[C]

Russian aggression has only reinforced the unity of the United States and Germany and.

[D]

Our allies and partners around the world.

[C]

And I want to thank Angela for his strong leadership and partnership as we've met this challenge.

[B]

That was President Obama speaking alongside Chancellor Merkel at the White House on Monday, where they met to discuss strategy before the summit talks in Minsk about the war in eastern Ukraine. George Packer and Evan Osnos are here to talk about the US And Europe's continuing struggles against Putin. George the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine did agree last night to another ceasefire, but why does it seem unlikely to last?

[C]

Because the combatants on the ground don't want it to. Because the separatists have been gaining ground and there's no reason why they should stop now while they have the initiative. Because the Ukrainians just cannot accept that there's going to be whole areas of their country that become autonomous, which is what the Separatists want and because the Russians are playing a really nefarious double game, negotiating in Minsk and lying in the face of European leaders about their own lack of involvement, when in fact they're heavily involved and have tipped the balance in favor of the separatists in the last couple of months. So this just isn't the political will and the leverage to enforce a ceasefire. And without that reality on the ground, whatever has been put on paper, 13 point protocol in Minsk sounds something like a fantasy of Hollywood. It's just evanescent.

[B]

The separatists, in effect, would be under the control of Putin. Is that right?

[C]

They are not entirely his creation, but he has stoked them. He is their patron. Without him, they simply couldn't hold their own against the Ukrainian government. Last year, Ukraine was close to defeating the separatists. And now the separatists have seized the Donetsk airport. They are about to take a rail hub, a port. They have the military initiative right now, and that's entirely because they're getting heavy weapons and troops from Russia, which puts has been denying. And it's hard for me to imagine how negotiations are going on when one side's position depends on a stream of lies, but I suppose that diplomats can do just about anything.

[B]

Well, I want to ask you about Merkel because you recently wrote just a terrific profile of her a few months ago in the magazine. She is, as you said, the most powerful woman in the world. She's tenacious, she's fiercely intelligent, she's made her way in large part by outwitting seemingly entrenched political leaders. But she seems to have more than met her match in Putin.

[C]

It's interesting because she really knows Putin. I think she has a deep sense of his psyche, his frailties, his insecurities. There was a story I was told by a German journalist about how during a meeting in Sochi in 2007, Putin allowed his black lab into the room during a photo op with Merkel. And Merkel's terrified of dogs. She was bitten. Once the dog sniffed her, she froze. And later the German press corps, who were furious with Putin, her about it. And she said, you know, I understand why he does that. It's all he can do. He has no economy, he has no politics. He's just got this to show he's a man. So that's her political view, her woman's view, her very cold, analytical view of Putin. But on the other hand, right now, Putin has weapons, Putin has soldiers. Putin is willing to use violence. And Merkel and Germany and Europe are Not that is a basic fact that can't be wished away. And for that reason, although Merkel is tactically brilliant and has kind of cornered Putin with sanctions that very few people thought Europe would agree on, that has been a real achievement of the transatlantic alliance. Nonetheless, Putin has the upper hand because he's willing to use violence. And for a lot of deep historical reasons, Germany and Merkel are not.

[B]

And what about the economy? The sanctions presumably are biting. Does that have no effect on him? His approval ratings seem to be high.

[C]

Well, what I read is that there are beginning to be some doubters in Moscow. I'm wondering whether Putin has led them to a dead end. Oil prices are tanking, and that hurts Russia badly. The ruble's value is plummeting. His economy's in a shambles. Putin has forced the world to pay attention to Russia and to deal with Russia in a way that only a leader willing to use violence sometimes can achieve. And that is the great gamble Putin has made.

[B]

Evan, how does all this look from Washington tell us a little bit about the meeting between Obama and Merkel and the extent to which they are in complete agreement, as he seemed to indicate, in how to handle Putin and Ukraine?

[D]

Well, they did come out and present very much a united front. After all, the opportunity for Vladimir Putin to see signs of disagreement between the two would be a terrific gift. And so they tried as much as possible to say, we are going to go about this in lockstep. But it was pretty clear to anybody who was following it closely that the Americans were more prepared to. To consider the idea of giving lethal aid to Ukrainian forces, giving weapons than the Europeans were. Merkel paid lip service to the idea that all options were on the table. But that's really a negotiating strategy. You can't say anything otherwise when you're about to sit down in Minsk with Vladimir Putin. But the reality was Obama was facing pressure from Congress to consider what it is the United States can do. In the end, I don't think there was any question that Barack Obama did not want to get into the business of sending weapons to Ukraine.

[B]

And, George, what does Merkel think? There's been a lot of talk about the threat posed by the instability in Ukraine to NATO and to the Western alliance. What does Merkel think about that, and how alarmed is she?

[C]

In the past, she's been very hesitant about expanding NATO right up to the borders of Russia. She switched positions in 2008 during the war in Georgia, at first opposing Georgian entry into NATO and then tentatively saying it was possible. But of course, Georgia never did become a member. And I think it's very unlikely that Ukraine is going to become a member because it would be such a counteraction to what Merkel is trying to achieve, which is peace through diplomacy. And admitting Ukraine into NATO would require NATO not just to arm Ukraine, but to defend Ukraine. And then we would have the continent wide war, or at least a war that is the biggest in Europe since World War II, that Merkel dreads and that Europe dreads. We have to just remember what Germany and Germans think when they look at Russia and what they think is a country in which they bear a tremendous historical burden of guilt and which throughout the Cold War was poised to obliterate them. And even today, Russia, you know, which is extremely weak politically and economically militarily, dwarfs Europe. So the military line, which is so easy for American congressmen and senators to champion and to make fun of Germany's weakness, is a nightmare for Germany and just a non starter. It was Merkel's position from the very beginning when Crimea was annexed, that there would be no military option.

[B]

All of this raises questions about the changing dynamic between east and West. Russia and the US Back opposing forces in the Sunni, Shia wars in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. And ev. And I just pulling back a little bit. On Wednesday, Obama retrospectively asked Congress for authorization to fight against isis, including a request for limited missions on the ground. Why is he doing that now and what does it reveal about the balance of power between the White House and Congress?

[D]

Yeah, this is a very odd moment in foreign policy policymaking because you have nearly five months after the United States began this air campaign in Iraq and Syria, the President is now going to Congress to seek authorization to do what he's already doing. What's odd about it is that, you know, they put this off for purely political reasons. They didn't want to take this to Congress before the midterm elections in November. But it's really to provide political cover for the President because if things go badly in Iraq and Syria, he needs to be able to say that this was all duly authorized. The reality is that he doesn't actually, at the same time that he's asking for it, he's saying, I don't really need this authorization. I have legal justification under the 2000 approval that Congress gave to George W. Bush to conduct war against terrorism. So it's a moment where in effect, he is acknowledging that because of the inability of the Congress to reach a consensus to meet him on the foreign policy issues that he thinks are important, that he'll operate independently if he needs to, but he's willing to seek their approval. And as a result, Congress has recognized that this is not a bill that, for one thing, they want. Neither side is particularly fond of this. Hawks think that this would potentially constrain the ability of a future president, president to be able to conduct war in the role of commander in chief. And then there are liberals and constitutional scholars who say actually that the language of this bill is giving him way more power than he really should have. So from a political perspective, from a legal perspective, this is an unattractive moment, and it's a reflection in some ways of the sort of twilight war that this president has found himself engaged in on a whole series of fronts.

[B]

And that leads right into my next question, which is about Samantha Power, the US Ambassador to the UN Whom you wrote about recently. She is very close to Obama, and she has helped to shape his foreign policy as he has helped to shape hers. Where is she right now on the issue of the use of force against isis?

[D]

She's been in a complicated position from the beginning. She'd written a Pulitzer Prize winning book called the Problem from Hell, which was an argument in favor for assertive government action to protect civilians overseas. And she went into a government with a president who was philosophically and strategically much less interested in getting involved in foreign conflicts that don't have an immediate American interest. And so she over and over again found herself in the position, whether it was in Libya or in Iraq and Syria, of to some degree trying to persuade the president to take more action, while at the same time not to not trying so hard that she would undermine her political capital in the White House. And it's put her into a real predicament. So in some ways, her experience has been a total reflection of this president's ambivalence about America's role in the world. You see that reflected in the way that he's approached the Ukraine, where clearly he has no interest in seeing Vladimir Putin redefine the boundaries of postwar Europe. At the same time, he's not willing to expend American blood and treasure to stop it. This has been, for him, I think, a series of frustrations. And for the people on his foreign policy team who can't really point to very many successes in the world, it's been frustrating as well.

[B]

She told you about a conversation she had with Elie Wiesel, who told her after the journalist James Foley was executed, Samantha, the winds of madness are blowing. And I just thought that was a chilling distillation of everything the administration and the rest of the world is facing right now.

[D]

Yeah, if you step back, it really is an astonishing array of crises. You've got this strange mutating terrorist, terrorist threat in Syria, in Iraq, which seems to have no strategic or ideological ambition other than to kill as many people as possible. You have an Ebola outbreak which is now on the wane, but for a while was showing us how poorly coordinated we can be as a world when we're trying to respond to an immediate crisis. You've got a failed peace initiative in Israel, a standoff with its prime minister. You've got Russian aggression in the Ukraine. So in case after case, the White House has found itself on the defensive. But it has been over and over again a case where every time they try to get themselves organized, that events come along and leave them fighting a rear guard action.

[B]

GEORGE Last May, in a speech at West Point, Obama described the United States as an indispensable nation in the fight against terrorism and in supporting our allies and then talking about military action. He said, just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail. So what about his policy in dealing with jihadis and for that matter, with presidents of other countries who really play only by their own rules?

[C]

The world picture that Evan just described in pretty dark colors is the inevitable consequence of the waning of US influence. And there are many reasons for that. Some of them were probably inevitable. Some of them were imminently avoidable. But we're in a place now where the US simply doesn't have the ability or the will to, to not to dictate to other countries, but to create structures, to create alliances that can keep this level of violence and of illiberality under control. And instead we have a whole lot of both out of control conflicts and leaders who are asserting their own political identity on a kind of defiance of what the west, the US and Europe have always claimed to be the norms, the international norms. What can Obama do about that? What can a US President, any US President, do about that? Perhaps there are rhetorical things that he should have been doing all along. He can certainly be faulted for a muddled picture of what the US stands for and what the US wants to see in the world.

[B]

Thank you. Both George Packer and Evan Osnos are staff writers at the New Yorker. George is also the author of the Assassin's Gate, about American war in Iraq and the unwinding and inner history of the new America. Evan recently published Age of Ambition, about the new China this has been the political scene from the New Yorker. This podcast is produced by Jill Duboff and Alex barron. For new yorker.com I'm Dorothy Wickenden. America is changing and so is the world.

[D]

But what's happening in America isn't just a cause of global upheaval. It's also a symptom of disruption that's happening everywhere.

[A]

I'm Asma Khalid in Washington, D.C. i'm.

[D]

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[A]

Every weekday, we'll bring you a story from this intersection where the world and America meet.

[D]

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[C]

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[D]

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