Summary: "Lawrence Wright and Dexter Filkins on the Resurgence of Al Qaeda"

Podcast: The Political Scene | The New Yorker
Date: January 11, 2014
Host: Dorothy Wickenden
Guests: Lawrence Wright, Dexter Filkins

Overview

This episode examines the resurgence and evolution of Al Qaeda, particularly its re-emergence in Iraq and Syria. Host Dorothy Wickenden speaks with New Yorker staff writers Lawrence Wright and Dexter Filkins about the regional, political, and global factors behind Al Qaeda's renewed influence—focusing on the fall of Fallujah to ISIS, internal dynamics in Iraq and Syria, the legacy of U.S. policy, dangers to the West, and the broader tectonic shifts in the Middle East.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Fall of Fallujah and Its Symbolism

• Resurgence of Al Qaeda: Both guests remark on the symbolic and strategic importance of Al Qaeda’s black flag flying again over Fallujah, scene of a major U.S. military victory in 2004.
• Marine Reaction: Filkins describes hearing from ex-Marines about their dismay at seeing Fallujah lost again, noting the city's significance and the high American toll in its earlier battles.
• Quote (Dexter Filkins, 02:16):

  “It was an incredibly bloody battle. I think at the end of it, there were 600 Marines wounded and about 100 killed... And this week, once again, the black flag of Al Qaeda was raised over Fallujah, which is pretty depressing, I think, to everyone involved.”

2. Roots of Sectarian Violence & Policy Failures

• Internal vs. External Factors: Filkins highlights two primary drivers: the spillover of the Syrian civil war and the Maliki government's alienation of Iraq’s Sunni minority.
• Debate Over U.S. Responsibility: While some, like Senator McCain, blame the full U.S. withdrawal for Iraq's unraveling, Filkins sees partial merit but attributes broader causes.
• Quote (Dexter Filkins, 03:54):

  “I'm sympathetic to Senator McCain's argument. I think what you're seeing could probably have been prevented if there had been Americans there, but they're not. And so, yeah, here we are.”

3. The Evolution and Splintering of Al Qaeda

• Al Qaeda’s Internal Divisions: Wright details the fraught relationship between Zawahiri and new figures like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, reflecting enduring power struggles.
• Historical Background: Lawrence Wright recounts Zarqawi's legacy as an especially brutal jihadi whose successor, Baghdadi, now leads ISIS—often at odds with the central Al Qaeda command.
• Quote (Lawrence Wright, 04:57):

  “Zarqawi was the jihadi commander in Iraq responsible for more deaths than any single individual in that whole terrible conflict... he was constantly bridling because of Al Qaeda's attempts to control his extremely violent behavior.”

4. Regional Support and Internal Islamist Conflict

• Funding Sources: Baghdadi’s ISIS reportedly receives funds from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, even as the region wrestles with the excesses and backlash of radical Islamism.
• Jihadi Civil War: Wright explains how jihadi factions, particularly in Syria, are fighting amongst themselves, with Zawahiri and Baghdadi sending rival representatives and troops.
• Quote (Lawrence Wright, 05:55):

  “There's a reaction against Islamism all across the Islamic world. At the same time, there's a proliferation of these radical groups... Even within jihadi circles, there's a kind of civil war going on.”

5. U.S. Military Aid, Dilemma Over Apache Helicopters

• Aid Controversies: Obama’s proposed delivery of Apaches to the Iraqi government is hampered by fears Maliki will use them against domestic political opponents, not just Al Qaeda camps.
• Quote (Dexter Filkins, 07:08):

  “There’s a kind of feeling that if they actually had the Apaches, they could do some good... But I think the concern is that Maliki will use these against his civilian opponents.”

6. Al Qaeda’s Tactics and Inter-Faction Dynamics in Syria

• Contrasting Approaches: The Al Nusra Front, once part of Al Qaeda in Iraq, has learned to ingratiate itself with local populations, while ISIS repeats harsh tactics that alienated Sunnis in Iraq.
• Quote (Dexter Filkins, 07:48):

  “What’s interesting is that the Al Nusra Front appears to have learned from their mistakes in Iraq, and they've been much more careful about ingratiating themselves to the locals.”

7. Radicalization and Threats to the West

• Foreign Fighters: There is grave concern about Americans and Europeans being recruited in Syria, later returning home as potential terrorists.
• Historical Parallels: Wright draws connections to the "blowback" from Afghanistan’s conflicts, when returning jihadis sowed unrest in their home countries.
• Quote (Lawrence Wright, 09:26):

  “The parallel is Afghanistan... those people were coming home and sowing revolution... America has also had a number of Americans... go to Somalia and are now going into Syria.”

8. Intelligence Failures & Post-9/11 Security

• Controversy over Metadata Collection: The validity of mass phone-data collection is questioned, especially given prior intelligence-sharing failures between agencies.
• Institutional Weaknesses: Despite reorganization post-9/11, lapses persist due to human error—evidenced by the "underwear bomber" case.
• Quote (Lawrence Wright, 10:35):

  “The CIA and the NSA knew about Al Qaeda's presence in America and simply didn't disclose that information to the FBI. This is one of the lingering mysteries and outrages of 9/11.”

9. Iran’s Regional Role and U.S. Diplomacy

• Sunni vs Shia, Saudis vs Iranians: Filkins describes the broader power struggle, with the U.S. potentially finding some common ground with Iran over the jihadi threat in Syria.
• Limits of Iranian Moderation: Filkins is skeptical that President Rouhani has the power to change Iran’s Syria policy despite slight détente with the West.
• Quote (Dexter Filkins, 14:11):

  “There's a kind of a regional struggle... not just between Sunni and Shia, but also between Iran on one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other... a convergence of interests between the Iranians and the Americans over Syria and over the jihadi threat.”

10. Unintended Consequences of the War on Terror

• At Home (Wright): The transformation of America into a "security state," with intrusive intelligence powers and loss of privacy.
• Abroad (Filkins): The unraveling of the Middle East's post-WWI borders, emergence of region-wide sectarian conflict, and the rise of non-state groups.
• Quotes:
  • Wright (17:31):

    “We've become increasingly a security state. We surrendered quite a lot of our privacy... it's very difficult once you award these kinds of powers to government to retrieve them once they're given.”

  • Filkins (18:15):

    “What's developing in front of our eyes is this very terrifying kind of regional war, sectarian war, that is basically stretching from the Iranian border all the way to the Mediterranean... the kind of post-World War I settlement which created the modern Middle East, it's fragmenting, it's falling apart.”

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Filkins on Fallujah’s Symbolism:
  “Once again, the black flag of Al Qaeda was raised over Fallujah, which is pretty depressing, I think, to everyone involved.” (02:16)

• Wright on Zarqawi:
  “Zarqawi was the jihadi commander in Iraq... responsible for more deaths than any single individual...” (04:57)

• Filkins on Nusra & ISIS Divide:
  “Al Nusra Front appears to have learned from their mistakes in Iraq, and they've been much more careful about ingratiating themselves to the locals.” (07:48)

• Wright on Intelligence Failures:
  “The CIA and the NSA knew about Al Qaeda's presence in America and simply didn't disclose that information to the FBI. This is one of the lingering mysteries and outrages of 9/11...” (10:35)

• Wright on the Security State:
  “We've become increasingly a security state... once you award these kinds of powers to government, to retrieve them is very difficult.” (17:31)

• Filkins on Regional Collapse:
  “What's developing... is this very terrifying kind of regional war, sectarian war, that is basically stretching from the Iranian border all the way to the Mediterranean...” (18:15)

Key Timestamps

• 01:30 — McCain's criticism of Obama on Iraq withdrawal
• 02:16 — Filkins recalls 2004 Battle of Fallujah and the city’s recent fall
• 03:54 — Filkins discusses blame and inevitability of Sunni rebellion
• 04:39 — Wright on Al Qaeda’s internal split and Zarqawi’s legacy
• 05:55 — Regional support for ISIS and jihadi in-fighting
• 07:08 — Filkins on U.S. Apache helicopters, Iraqi politics
• 07:48 — Filkins on Al Nusra Front, lessons learned from Iraq
• 09:26 — Wright on the risk of American/European jihadis returning home
• 10:35 — Wright on pre-9/11 intelligence failures and surveillance
• 12:11 — Wright on ongoing flaws in intelligence communication
• 14:11 — Filkins on Iran’s role and possible U.S.-Iran cooperation (and limits)
• 17:31 — Wright on unintended consequences: the American security state
• 18:15 — Filkins on the collapse of the Middle Eastern order

Tone and Style

The discussion is sober, informed, and reflective—balancing deeply-reported analysis with the personal observations of seasoned war correspondents and researchers. The tone oscillates between analytical and somber, particularly regarding the unanticipated fallout of major U.S. policy decisions and the human costs of conflict.

This summary provides a comprehensive guide to the episode’s key themes and insights, helping listeners and readers grasp the broad political implications, regional intricacies, and ongoing legacies of the war on terror and the ever-evolving threat of Al Qaeda and its offshoots.