Philip Gourevitch and Dexter Filkins on Obama’s national-security team.

Summary

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Podcast Summary

The Political Scene | The New Yorker

Episode: Philip Gourevitch and Dexter Filkins on Obama’s National-Security Team
Date: June 7, 2013
Host: Dorothy Wickenden (Executive Editor, The New Yorker)
Guests: Philip Gourevitch, Dexter Filkins (Staff Writers, The New Yorker)

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Overview

This episode dives into President Obama's shifting national-security team amidst deepening challenges in Syria, particularly as the Assad regime gains ground with help from Hezbollah and its Iranian backers. Staff writers Philip Gourevitch and Dexter Filkins join host Dorothy Wickenden to examine American policy dilemmas, the regional consequences of the Syrian conflict, and what new appointments—Susan Rice as National Security Adviser and Samantha Power as UN Ambassador—mean for the administration’s approach, especially as the civil war threatens to destabilize the broader Middle East.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Current State of the Syrian Civil War

• Hezbollah’s Critical Involvement
  • Dexter Filkins details the decisive battle for Kusair, a Syrian border town, explaining why Hezbollah intervened so forcefully:

    "In order for the big supply line, which basically starts in Iran and goes to Damascus and then goes into Lebanon, where Hezbollah is, in order for that axis to kind of keep working, they had to take Kusair at any cost."
    — Dexter Filkins [02:15]

• Filkins stresses that Hezbollah’s survival is now intertwined with Assad’s, and this marks a new phase, with Hezbollah “all in.”
• Philip Gourevitch contextualizes Hezbollah as an Iranian proxy with an avowed anti-Israel agenda. [03:20]

2. U.S. Diplomacy and the “Late” Search for Negotiations

• Discussion of Secretary of State John Kerry’s remark that the U.S. was late to push for a political settlement. Gourevitch asserts Assad never intended to leave and always saw the war as existential:

  "Assad ... heard Obama say, assad must go ... and he realized nothing was going to happen that was going to be absolutely forceful."
  — Philip Gourevitch [03:38]

• Gourevitch and Filkins agree that Russia is playing a duplicitous game at international talks, using negotiations to mask a lack of real progress towards a settlement.

  "It's kind of like, you know, one way to keep fighting is to keep talking."
  — Philip Gourevitch [04:57]

3. Obama’s Options in Syria: The “Then What?” Problem

• Filkins describes the administration’s central quandary:

  "We can take down the Assad regime, probably ... But then what? It’s the then what that they can't really get around. Nobody can answer that question right now."
  — Dexter Filkins [06:16]

• The growth of jihadist and Al Qaeda-affiliated groups among the rebels (e.g., Al Nusra Front) makes U.S. intervention more perilous.
• The complexity of the opposition and risks of weapons falling into extremist hands feeds U.S. reluctance. [05:51]

4. Escalating Sectarian Divide Across the Region

• Filkins paints a bleak picture of a widening Sunni-Shiite conflict from Iran through Iraq and Syria into Lebanon, describing a “terrifying prospect” of regional conflagration:

  "You really have the possibility of a Sunni Shiite conflict stretching ... all the way to the Mediterranean."
  — Dexter Filkins [07:22]

• Gourevitch echoes the fear that the unraveling could not have been easily prevented by outside actors. [08:19]

5. Humanitarian Toll and U.S. Policy Debates

• The staggering casualties and massacres challenge America’s ideals versus the reality of action:

  "Are we allowing the frustration of limited military options to ... SAP our energy for looking for every other kind of option?"
  — Philip Gourevitch [09:05]

• Filkins highlights the domestic political calculus: U.S. leaders face little political reward for intervening (citing lack of backlash over inaction in Rwanda or credit for Libya).

  "It’s kind of lose, lose if you're the president and you're looking at these things."
  — Dexter Filkins [10:26]

6. Obama’s National-Security Team Revamp: Rice and Power

• Susan Rice and Samantha Power, both advocates of humanitarian intervention, are joining pivotal security roles. Filkins notes:

  "You're definitely going to have a different conversation going on inside the White House ... But ... it's the president's foreign policy ... the president does not want to involve himself in Syria."
  — Dexter Filkins [11:05]

• Even with confirmed use of chemical weapons (the “red line”), Obama’s caution persists because intervention risks unleashing further chaos or chemical weapons proliferation.

  "The current situation is better to have this murderous, nearly genocidal regime in power than to have a power vacuum in chaos in Syria."
  — Dexter Filkins [12:32]

7. Profiles of Rice and Power

• Rice’s past inaction on Rwanda haunts her, but Gourevitch argues she remains a political realist despite interventionist leanings ascribed to her and Power.

  "Susan Rice has said that she's been haunted by America's very clear decision not to act."
  — Philip Gourevitch [14:14]

• Power’s activism on Darfur and her shift from journalist to policymaker could shape her approach at the UN. Gourevitch expresses curiosity about how her advocacy will translate to action:

  "We will see as she emerges as a spokesperson for the administration, how her particular tone and style ... merges with what it's like to be actually exercising power and representing the United States."
  — Philip Gourevitch [15:39]

8. Final Thoughts on Long-term Regional Risks

• Filkins concludes with the administration’s overriding concern:

  "The longer that the war in Syria goes on, the more likely it is that it spreads ... the waves are just coming off the war in Syria. ... That fear ... is going to weigh on the administration to do something about it."
  — Dexter Filkins [16:50]

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• 01:15 — Episode introduction, context
• 02:04 — How the battle for Kusair changed the war/Hezbollah’s critical role
• 03:38 — Assad’s existential calculus and lack of exit strategy
• 04:27 — Realpolitik at international Syria talks
• 05:51 — Risk calculus for U.S. arms to rebels, the "then what" dilemma
• 07:22 — Rising sectarian war from Iran/Iraq through Syria/Lebanon
• 08:51 — American humanitarian ideals vs. limits of intervention
• 10:02 — Political risks of intervention in U.S. foreign policy calculus
• 11:05 — The meaning of Susan Rice and Samantha Power’s promotions
• 12:32 — The chemical weapons “red line” and Obama’s choices
• 14:14 — Background and influence: Susan Rice and Rwanda, Samantha Power’s advocacy
• 16:50 — The risk of the Syrian war spilling over the region

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Notable Quotes

• "In order for the big supply line, which basically starts in Iran ... to keep working, they had to take Kusair at any cost."
  — Dexter Filkins [02:15]

• "Assad must go ... he realized nothing was going to happen that was going to be absolutely forceful."
  — Philip Gourevitch [03:38]

• "We can take down the Assad regime, probably ... But then what? It’s the then what that they can't really get around."
  — Dexter Filkins [06:16]

• "You really have the possibility of a Sunni Shiite conflict stretching ... all the way to the Mediterranean."
  — Dexter Filkins [07:22]

• "Are we allowing the frustration of limited military options to ... SAP our energy for looking for every other kind of option?"
  — Philip Gourevitch [09:05]

• "It’s kind of lose, lose if you're the president and you're looking at these things."
  — Dexter Filkins [10:26]

• "You're definitely going to have a different conversation going on inside the White House ... but ... the president does not want to involve himself in Syria."
  — Dexter Filkins [11:05]

• "Susan Rice has said that she's been haunted by America's very clear decision not to act."
  — Philip Gourevitch [14:14]

• "We will see as she emerges as a spokesperson for the administration, how her particular tone and style ... merges with what it's like to be actually exercising power."
  — Philip Gourevitch [15:39]

• "The longer that the war in Syria goes on, the more likely it is that it spreads ... That fear ... is going to weigh on the administration to do something about it."
  — Dexter Filkins [16:50]

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Tone and Concluding Impressions

The conversation is marked by candor and caution, reflecting both the moral agony and realpolitik of U.S. deliberations, and skepticism about whether new personnel will alter the fundamental trajectory of a policy mired in dilemmas. There is respect for humanitarian ideals, but a sobering recognition of complexity, limited leverage, and unintended consequences.

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Transcript

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[Dorothy Wickenden]

This is the Political Scene, a weekly conversation with New Yorker writers and editors about Politics. It's Thursday, June 6th. I'm Dorothy Wickenden, executive editor of the New Yorker. Three weeks ago, President Obama spoke about the civil war in Syria in a joint appearance with Turke Prime Minister.

[Dexter Filkins]

We both agree that Assad needs to go. He needs to transfer power to a transitional body. That is the only way that we're going to resolve this crisis.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

But since then, the Assad regime has made further inroads against the rebels and Obama has just reshuffled his foreign policy team. Filip Gurevich and Dexter Filkins are here today to talk about the implications of these changes. Dexter, One key difference in the past week, I mean it's particularly apparent in the past week is the increased involvement of Hezbollah fighters in what's happened.

[Dexter Filkins]

Well, there was just, you know, this week we had this enormous battle or the end of an enormous battle in Kusair, which is a Syrian town, which is really close to the Lebanese border. And if you look at a map, the reason why it appears that The Assad regime was willing to do anything to take it back from the rebels. And the reason why Hezbollah got involved is because it's basically right on a road that leads right into the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon, where Hezbollah's base is. And so in order for the big supply line, which basically starts in Iran and goes to Damascus and then goes into Lebanon, where Hezbollah is, in order for that axis to kind of keep working, they had to take Kusair at any cost. And so what you saw happen was, you know, this long stalemate of fighting over that city was broken by several hundred, maybe more, maybe more than 1,000 Hezbollah fighters coming across the border and coming in. So this is all about for Hezbollah, which is, you know, to remind our listeners, it's this very strange kind of hybrid militant group which resides in Lebanon, which is, you know, stronger than the Lebanese state. They had to have that town, and they have to have Assad to stay alive. And so they're now all in. In this war.

[Philip Gurevich]

And they're also very much identified as an Iranian front organization that they are sort of an Iranian proxy dedicated to.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

The destruction of Israel. Interestingly, Philip, Secretary of State John Kerry said this week that the US had come late to efforts to find a political settlement. What did he mean?

[Philip Gurevich]

Well, I can't imagine that that must have gone over terribly well with his bosses in Washington. But it's certainly true that Assad, he's never had an exit strategy. There is no exit strategy for him. His idea has been, I have to stay standing. And he heard Obama say, assad must go, what is it, a year and a half, two years ago, for the first time, and he realized nothing was going to happen that was going to be absolutely forceful. And simultaneously, you have the International Criminal Court type activities that say that he will, of course, have no way to make a real refuge anywhere. So basically, for him, it's been a last stand, and it has to end with either victory or completely being destroyed. And he has allies who are seriously committed at a level that no Western power is committed to the people who are opposing him, and that is Russia and Iran.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

And yet, Philip, this international conference on Syria that's planned for July, that involves the Russians, we know they're playing this double game here. What in the world could that possibly accomplish?

[Philip Gurevich]

I think it's, you know, always better to have international conferences where people are talking to each other just in case. But I don't think anybody has extremely high hopes for a negotiated settlement of a satisfactory kind that isn't accompanied by an overwhelming military advantage by one side or the other. I just don't see how you could.

[Dexter Filkins]

Totally cynical on the Russians part.

[Philip Gurevich]

Yeah, it's kind of like, you know, one way to keep fighting is to keep talking. You keep the talks going so that it looks like you're doing something. But from the very beginning, the story that, as you started this with, of what Obama has been saying and what he said again, next to Erdogan, he's been saying Assad must go and there must be a transition to a nebulosity, something. We don't know what he's talking about. He can never. In Libya, we took a chance. And for all the very huge problems that that war entailed, including making absolutely sure that the Russians would not want to do business with us at the UN for a long time on such things, it involved making a bet on a particular group of rebels from the get go. And here there's nobody that anybody's ever said, what we want is to get to the place where these guys are at least provisionally in power in place of Assad. And without that, it's very hard to know what we're talking about.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

So, Dexter, this gets to the heart of the piece you wrote a couple of weeks ago for the magazine about administration policy in Syria, where you really were able to kind of walk through the extremely unpleasant options that Obama faces. And doesn't he have a point about the divisions among the rebel groups and about the administration's worries that US Supplied weapons would find their way into the strongest group of all, which is the one affiliated with Al Qaeda?

[Dexter Filkins]

Yes. I mean, I think Philip put it well. And I think this is what the Obama administration and President Obama himself believe, which is, okay, we can take down the Assad regime, probably we can bring it to an end either by arming the rebels or doing airstrikes on our own or setting up a no fly zone or whatever. But then what? It's the then what that they can't really get around. Nobody can answer that question right now. That's the thing that has given them pause from the beginning. And as this war has ground down, it's now in its third year, it's only gotten more complicated. And groups like the Al Nusra Front, which are basically Al Qaeda in Iraq, they've gotten stronger and they've gotten bigger. They're doing operations all over the country. So I think if you know today in June 2013, when you look at Syria and say, what could we do? I think your options are just fewer than Ever before.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Talk a little bit about what you've seen as a reporter over the last decade or more. You've reported from all over the Middle east and have seen the Sunni Shiite splits grow far worse.

[Dexter Filkins]

I mean, I think this is really the most terrifying prospect. You really have the possibility. I mean, it's actually happening already in some ways, but you really have the possibility of a Sunni Shiite conflict stretching from the Iranian border in Iraq and moving through Iraq and through Syria and into Lebanon all the way to the Mediterranean. I mean, we've already seen that the. The civil war, which in Iraq, which more or less ended in 2008, is beginning to start up again. The Sunni Shiite war. Syria is obviously a sectarian conflict, and Hezbollah's decision to get involved in the Syrian war. Hezbollah is a Shiite group. Lebanon is a, you know, they have their own civil war, and the peace there has rested for many years on a very delicate balance of the various, you know, the Christian, Sunni, Shiite groups. All that's being upset now. So I think you're. You really face this terrifying prospect of a kind of fracture, a sectarian fracture running right across the Middle East.

[Philip Gurevich]

Philip I think that's right. And from a sort of American policy point of view, there'll be endless debates about whether we could have preempted this this way or that way or done more sooner or what. Have you all of these discussions about no good options. The then what, the then what was always about not just how to prevent a worsening of the situation in Syria, but how to avoid provoking a much, much worse thing. And it may prove that, in retrospect, that the threads have just been pulled so that this unraveling is taking place.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Philip, I also want to ask you about the broader policy implications here. Tens of thousands of people have already died in the war in Syria, and there have been horrendous massacres. Talk a little bit about that and sort of what Obama is facing now as he thinks into the future.

[Philip Gurevich]

There are conflicts that don't offer the kind of two sides that one can mediate either between or throw in on behalf of one side as the least bad option. And where we end up unable to make the case for our humanitarian idealism being a premise for military action. Then the question is, are we allowing the frustration of limited military options to kind of SAP our energy for looking for every other kind of option? I mean, are there other pressures? Are there other ways to do pressure? Are there other ways to do things diplomatically? Could we have done more with humanitarian corridors from Turkey at certain stages, can things be done that could help this refugee crisis so that fewer civilians are in the way, but basically, you've got a country that's a battlefield and that we don't have access to.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Dexter, talk about that a little bit. I want to hear your response.

[Dexter Filkins]

If you're the President of the United States and you're trying to decide whether or not to get involved here, you do the political math. I mean, the domestic political math. Intervening in these countries is always really politically risky, and the payback is very small. So, I mean, look at Rwanda, where, you know, 800,000 people were killed. The United States did nothing. President Clinton didn't suffer at all politically for not doing anything.

[Philip Gurevich]

Absolutely not.

[Dexter Filkins]

If you take the case of Libya, you know, it was a pretty successful intervention, and Obama's gotten absolutely zero credit for that. And in fact, he's heard nothing for the last eight months except about the disaster in Benghazi with Ambassador Chris Stevens being killed, the disaster he didn't prevent. It's kind of lose, lose if you're the president and you're looking at these things.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

A few days ago, Susan Rice was named Obama's national security adviser, and Samantha Power is going to replace Susan Rice as UN Ambassador if she's confirmed by the Senate. So, Dexter, what do you make of Obama's appointing Rice to replace Tom Donellan? Are we going to see many changes?

[Dexter Filkins]

I think the debate inside the White House will change for sure. I mean, you know, Tom Donilon was the author of the, you know, Obama administration's Pivot to Asia. And I think that's keeping very much with President Obama's own vision of the United States in the world and in the future, which is essentially, get out of the Middle east, let's get out of Iraq, let's get out of Afghanistan, and let's go to Asia, where economies are growing and markets are growing and people are happy and there aren't that many wars going on. That's the pivot to Asia. And Donilon was essentially instrumental in that. And he's leaving now. And in his place is Susan Rice and then taking her job, Samantha Power. And these are two women who were instrumental in persuading President Obama to intervene in Libya, by all accounts. So you're definitely going to have a different conversation going on inside the White House and at cabinet meetings. But I personally think at the end of the day, you know, it's the president's foreign policy, and I think politically, emotionally, temperamentally, in every way possible. The president does not want to involve himself in Syria. I think when he looks at Syria, he sees Iraq in 2003, and that's eight years and a trillion dollars and a lot of debt. And he doesn't want to go there.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Even now with further confirmation from the French that chemical weapons have been used and that there is the red line, as it's called, has been crossed.

[Dexter Filkins]

Well, I think you can flip that around, which is if we were to intervene and if we were to help to bring about the collapse of the Assad regime, we're going to possibly increase the chances of those chemical weapons getting loose or getting in the hands of people like the Al Nusra Front, or even increase the chances that they're used by the Assad regime. And so if you look at this in a very cynical way, one could make the case that the current situation is better to have this murderous, nearly genocidal regime in power than to have a power vacuum in chaos in Syria. I mean, I'm not sure I'd make that case, but I think Philip will.

[Philip Gurevich]

No, I would make the case that that has to be very central in the way that a policymaker is looking at it. I wrote in a comment over a year ago, I think it was that sadly to these policymakers who are making these kinds of horrendous calculations, that one has to make the cold calculations. Assad was still a force for stability in the region, in this volatile region. We heard Susan Rice, certainly during some of the debates at the Security Council, I believe it was last year, when the Russians objected to any kind of Syria resolution really exploding and calling it disgusting. And Hillary Clinton said similar things and saying the blood is on the Russians hands. America wasn't floating a policy to end the bloodshed at that point. And I felt that in some ways the Russians and the Chinese, by objecting to any kind of censure, gave us a chance to fulminate against inaction, but not to have to deal with the fact that we don't have a scenario that we prefer.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Philip, tell us a little bit more about Susan Rice's background, about her role as UN Ambassador and also her role in US Policy on Rwanda, for that matter.

[Philip Gurevich]

Well, she was in her first job in government during the Rwanda genocide and the buildup to the genocide. And she famously, according to Samantha Powers book, that's really where the research was done. And the quotes came from. They're not attributed to who said she said this but that she said, you know, we really shouldn't call it a genocide, lest that should have political repercussions for us when we go to run for the next campaigns. And we haven't done anything. You know, if we don't want to act, we shouldn't call it a genocide. And this was sort of taken as a craven political calculation and presented as such in Samantha's writings. Susan Rice has said that she doesn't remember saying exactly that, but that it's not the right position. And she has said that she's been haunted by America's very clear decision not to act. But most specifically, I believe it was in a recent New Republic profile where she said that what she really felt was lacking and that the real shame was that there had never been even a serious debate within the Clinton administration about what we might do, whether we should intervene, what the stakes were and what was happening. Even though, as we do know now, there was plenty of intelligence about it that I think has been formative for her ever since, some would say in ways that have made her sort of abrasive and aggressive and sort of a little too interventionist, certainly. On the other hand, I don't think that Obama is going to be taking instructions from her.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

And what about Samantha Power?

[Philip Gurevich]

Samantha's an interesting figure for this job because, I mean, you look at the past UN ambassadors and you have Jean Kirkpatrick, you have Richard Holbrooke. These are very seasoned diplomats often who were put into this job, who'd had major power politics experience at many different levels. She has also had a lot of government experience in the last four years she's been at the White House, and she's been obviously very much in the Council of Advisors on Foreign Policy, but she has not been a public voice. But I know that when she was working as a journalist, which is really her primary professional background, and as a kind of activist on Darfur and other things that she often stated clearly, we don't know when we talk as journalists and as activists, what it must be like to be sitting in that chair and be the decision maker. Now, she's been in those kinds of policymaking and part of that team for some years. And we will see as she emerges as a spokesperson for the administration, how her particular tone and style and approach these issues that we know from her writings merges with what it's like to be actually exercising power and representing the United States.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Dexter, any final thoughts?

[Dexter Filkins]

I would just say that the one thing that hasn't changed here, and I think that the one thing that really compels the administration to act, I mean, whether it's President Obama or Secretary of State Kerry, is the really terrifying prospect that the war in Syria is going to go on for another year or another two years? Because I think that the longer that the war in Syria goes on, the more likely it is that it spreads. It's spreading into Lebanon. It is clearly spreading into Iraq. I know the administration is terrified about the prospect that the monarchy in Jordan, and Jordan's always been this kind of island of stability in the Middle east, that that is increasingly fragile. They're terrified of that. And you can see the waves are just coming off the war in Syria. And so no matter how complicated this is or how bloody it is or how bad it is, I think that that fear that this thing is spreading across the Middle east is going to weigh on the administration to do something about it.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Okay, thank you. Both Philip Gurevich and Dexter Filkins are staff writers. This has been the political scene from the New Yorker. I'm Dorothy Wickenden.

[Philip Gurevich]

You can subscribe to this and other free New Yorker podcasts in the iTunes store. The weekly audio edition of the magazine is available at audible.com subscribers can read the magazine [e-mail] and also with multimedia extras in the tablet and iPhone editions. I'm Katie Drummond. I'm Wired's global editorial director. I'm Michael Colory, Wired's director of consumer, tech and culture.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

And I'm Lauren Good. I'm a senior correspondent at Wired. And our show, Uncanny Valley is about the people, power and influence of Silicon Valley.

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[Philip Gurevich]

Have never been more intertwined. So each week we get together to talk about a big story, often at.

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[Philip Gurevich]

Right. So whether we're talking about Trump, Coin, Doge, or Elon Musk, we will always explain how these Silicon Valley forces are affecting Washington and how they affect you. Make sure you're following Uncanny Valley in your podcast app of choice so you.

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[Dexter Filkins]

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