The Political Scene | The New Yorker

Episode: Philip Gourevitch and John Cassidy on Obama’s Syria options
Date: September 6, 2013
Host: Dorothy Wickenden
Guests: Philip Gourevitch, John Cassidy

Overview

This episode analyzes President Barack Obama’s controversial decision to seek congressional approval for military action in Syria, in the wake of a chemical weapons attack by the Assad regime. Host Dorothy Wickenden is joined by New Yorker staff writers Philip Gourevitch and John Cassidy to discuss Obama’s motivations, the political and diplomatic dilemmas the US faces, the limitations of international institutions like the UN, and the historical lessons (or lack thereof) from previous humanitarian crises.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Why Did Obama Seek Congressional Approval for Action in Syria?

[02:03–03:14]

• Obama’s decision was described as unexpected; he “didn’t do that when he decided to attack Libya a few years ago.”
• John Cassidy suggests the move was personal and made with little consultation, including with the vice president or Secretary of State.
• According to Cassidy, Obama was influenced by critics urging a congressional resolution before military action and by the UK’s parliamentary vote against intervention.
  • Quote (Cassidy): “He doesn't seem to have consulted the vice president or the Secretary of State before he took it. And there was a lot of internal opposition inside the White House.” [02:07]
  • Quote (Cassidy): "I think he just felt very exposed, especially after the British vote against participating in the Syria raid..." [02:29]

2. Is Obama Cornered? The “Red Line” Dilemma

[03:14–04:11]

• Philip Gourevitch argues Obama’s actions signal discomfort and hesitancy:
  • “He’s giving off all the signs of somebody who was cornered... he was unable to articulate the intended consequences in a completely concise fashion.” [02:51]
• Gourevitch highlights the problem with Obama’s “red line”: announcing a red line limits future options and forces a premature commitment to action.
  • Quote (Gourevitch): “A red line is taking an option off the table. And that option is being able to make your judgment when the time comes.” [03:41]

3. Political and Policy Traps

[04:11–07:45]

• Obama’s options are “bad,” and he appears to be acting against his own instinct, just to preserve US credibility.
• There’s a lack of clarity about objectives—questions remain unanswered about what the military action would achieve, what "degrading and deterring" means in practice, and whether it can actually be accomplished with proposed military means.
  • Quote (Cassidy): "If we're not trying to bring down Assad, and it's not just a pinprick, what is it? They talk about degrading and deterring his chemical weapons capability. What does that mean?" [05:53]
• The administration faces contradictions: preparing for war while not aiming for regime change, and justifying limited strikes while promising significance.
• Gourevitch notes that this political bind exposes Obama and US policy to vulnerabilities both domestically and internationally.

4. The Difficulty of Moral Versus Strategic Calculus

[07:45–09:09]

• Discussion of Obama’s statement that preventing mass atrocities is a “core national security interest and... moral responsibility.”
• Gourevitch asserts this is rhetorical, given limitations on US ability and will to intervene everywhere. The stated goal (preventing mass atrocities and deterring chemical weapons use) is at odds with the means proposed.
  • Quote (Gourevitch): “He also said, but we cannot do everything, we cannot prevent everything, and there will continue to be unnecessary and meaningless deaths that we cannot stop. So he maintained the kind of realism…” [08:36]
• Any meaningful action risks escalation into war, which the administration says it wants to avoid.

5. The UN’s Role and Structural Problems

[09:23–12:17]

• Gourevitch explains the Security Council is structured in a way that major powers can block action when their national interests are at stake.
• The selective use of the UN for interventions (e.g., Kosovo, Iraq) demonstrates its limitations.
  • Quote (Gourevitch): “What you have is a system that really is reserved for those places and those crises that are second tier for these major powers.” [10:43]
• UN action in Libya occurred largely because Gaddafi lacked powerful allies, unlike Assad.
• Russia and China are skeptical, especially after claiming they were deceived by NATO in Libya.

6. Are “International Norms” Meaningful Anymore?

[12:17–14:33]

• Gourevitch says the norm against chemical weapons use still holds some weight, but the justification for intervention has been diluted.
  • Quote (Gourevitch): “If one could actually take an action that was coherently directed strictly at [chemical weapons], that would be the strongest case. But that case has gotten very messy and sprawling and diluted and frankly, lost.” [12:37]
• Cassidy notes that Obama’s explicit “red line” made things worse: instead of building a diplomatic/multilateral case, the US boxed itself into military action.
  • Quote (Cassidy): “Imagine he hadn't said that...the US could have gone to the UN, put a lot of pressure on the Russians...There are multilateral ways to do this.” [13:21]

7. The Limits of Diplomacy—and Missed Opportunities

[14:33–16:46]

• Russia has leverage over Assad, but the US hasn’t maximized diplomatic pressure, especially using China as a counterweight.
• Cassidy and Gourevitch see American diplomacy as insufficient; late attempts at international consensus lack credibility since military strike has already been threatened.
  • Quote (Gourevitch about Kerry): “The one thing that John Kerry did very effectively in Congress this week was remind me certainly of why he wasn't elected in 2004…” [16:13]

8. Historical Analogies: Rwanda, Bosnia, and Syria

[16:46–18:22]

• Gourevitch discusses the risks of relying on past analogies (e.g., Rwanda, Bosnia), emphasizing the uniqueness of each conflict.
  • In some cases (Bosnia), intervention succeeded with clear outcomes and low US risk; in Rwanda, withdrawal may have made things worse.
  • In Syria, “the risk of provoking vastly worse things and getting drawn into a vastly larger war... with no ability, in fact, to articulate what we’d like the outcome to be means that I don’t see a lot of value for the moment, unfortunately, in precedent.” [17:45]

9. The Exceptional Moment: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy

[18:22–22:00]

• Cassidy predicts the week ahead will be a defining political crisis, with little apparent support in the House of Representatives for Obama’s plan, despite anticipated heavy lobbying.
• Panelists agree: while the atrocities provoke moral outrage, no clear actionable or effective course exists.
• Gourevitch: “To move into this without any clear idea of where you would like it to go is very, very reckless and backwards.” [19:57]
• Cassidy: American public opinion and political divides on Syria do not align along typical partisan lines; there's a “deep wariness, skepticism, and dissatisfaction with the case that's been made.” [21:26]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Obama (clip): "My credibility is not on the line. The international community's credibility is on the line. And America and Congress's credibility is on the line because we give lip service to the notion that these international norms are important." [01:31]
• Cassidy: “He’s really doing this, you know, against his own best judgment, it seems—his body language, his actual language, everything about him suggests he really doesn’t want to be doing this, but he feels like he has to in order to sort of preserve U.S. credibility.” [05:06]
• Gourevitch: “Imagine there is a no vote, and he doesn’t do it for that. He’s denounced the Security Council, alienated all sorts of people around the world, given Assad something to crow about, made himself domestically very vulnerable, and achieved zero.” [06:45]
• Gourevitch (on UN): "They are supposed to be, in a sense, the arbiters of a moral and legal international order... but when we wanted to go to war in Iraq and the Security Council didn't, we did it." [09:35]
• Gourevitch: “To move into this without any clear idea of where you would like it to go is very, very reckless and backwards.” [19:57]
• Cassidy: “The President clearly agrees with that instinctively, but he's now got himself in this awful situation where he's made the decision to go in there and the country at the moment doesn’t appear to be behind him, and he's got a week left to turn it around.” [21:08]

Important Timestamps

• [01:14] Start of substantive episode content
• [01:31] Obama’s remarks from Sweden (clip)
• [02:03] Cassidy on Obama’s motives for seeking congressional approval
• [03:14] Gourevitch on Obama feeling cornered by his own red line
• [05:04] Cassidy: Obama acting to preserve credibility despite personal hesitance
• [09:23] Gourevitch contextualizes the UN Security Council’s limits
• [12:17] Meaning of “international norms” and chemical weapons taboo
• [16:46] Gourevitch reflects on lessons from Rwanda, Bosnia, and the risks of historical analogy
• [18:22] Cassidy on the impending political battle in Congress
• [19:07] Gourevitch on the moral dilemma and strategic uncertainty
• [21:26] Cassidy: the Syria debate breaking typical political lines in the US

Conclusion

Both Gourevitch and Cassidy underscore the unprecedented complexity and gridlock surrounding Obama’s Syria policy in fall 2013. They characterize Obama’s choice as driven by a combination of constitutional scruples, concern for U.S. credibility, and a sense of being boxed in by past statements. The problem: neither military nor diplomatic options seem likely to achieve the U.S. administration’s stated goals without incurring major risks—of escalation abroad or political failure at home. The debate remains unconventionally bipartisan, reflecting broad public and political skepticism toward further intervention.