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Episode Summary: The Options and Obligations in the Fight against ISIS

Date: May 22, 2015
Host: Dorothy Wickenden
Guests: Dexter Filkins (staff writer), Nicholas Schmidle (staff writer)

Overview

In this episode, Dorothy Wickenden convenes New Yorker staff writers Dexter Filkins and Nicholas Schmidle for a candid discussion about U.S. strategy, global obligations, and political realities in the fight against ISIS. The conversation unfolds in the wake of ISIS’s capture of Ramadi in Iraq and Palmyra in Syria and amidst heavy criticism of the Obama administration’s approach. The episode probes the effectiveness of military interventions, assesses the legacy of past decisions in Iraq and Syria, and contemplates what viable options—if any—exist for countering ISIS and radical extremism in the Middle East.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Obama Administration Under Fire

• The fall of Ramadi and Palmyra ignites criticism, particularly from figures like John Boehner and Adam Schiff, questioning the effectiveness of U.S. policy and strategy.
• John Boehner’s critique: “We know that hope is not a strategy. The President's plan isn't working. It's time for him to come up with a real overarching strategy to defeat [ISIS].” (02:11)

2. The Limits of U.S. Options

• Territorial Gains & “The Caliphate”: ISIS controls significant territory from Damascus to near Baghdad.
• Filkins on alternatives: “It's easy to criticize the president because of what's happening, but what's the alternative? … Is Mr. Boehner suggesting ... we put troops on the ground? … Without troops, the US is limited to airstrikes and whatever exists of the Iraqi army and the Shiite militias—and that's a horrible mess. And so, good luck.” (02:58)

3. The Problem of Artificial States

• Borders of Iraq and Syria are seen as lacking in internal coherence, a legacy of post-WWI colonial arrangements.
• Filkins: “These states…particularly Iraq and Syria, they're artificial states ... There's always been a hope that people would set aside their loyalties like ethnicity and sect ... and that hasn't happened. ... Can these states be saved? And if they can't, then what next?” (03:55)

4. Iraqi Political Realities and Sectarian Division

• On Prime Minister Haydar al Abadi: Inherited a deeply polarized country from Maliki, who had “radicalized and alienated the Sunni minority.”
• Filkins: “[Abadi] is starting from such a deep hole because…Maliki…really, really radicalized and alienated the Sunni minority. I don't know how you get them back.” (05:16)

5. Training and Collapse of Iraqi Military

• U.S. investment in building the Iraqi army largely failed, as troops disintegrated during ISIS’s advance.
• Filkins: “We built an enormous Iraqi army and trained it ... That army…disintegrated. They ran away ... We're going to rebuild that?” (06:28)

6. Special Operations: Tactics vs. Strategy

• Delta Force Raid in Syria: The killing of Abu Sayyaf (ISIS’s “Emir of oil and gas”) is highlighted as a tactical win, but its broader impact is questioned.
• Schmidle: “This is a major accomplishment...but it’s also a testament to JSOC's growing strength…in that region.” (07:14)
• Filkins counters: “So they went into Syria and they whacked this guy. ... He's already been replaced, no doubt. ... If you look back to the Iraq war...the tide was turned against Al Qaeda...It was part of a much broader effort…to bring [Sunnis] in…None of that right now is going on in Syria. ... They're not going to shoot their way to victory in Syria.” (08:39-09:08)

7. The Broader Lessons of Special Ops and the Killing of Bin Laden

• The Bin Laden raid is compared for its intelligence windfall, but Schmidle stresses the difference in stakes and context.
• Schmidle: “I think they're just very different raids...there was no question that going into Pakistan was going to be worth the risk.” (11:13)
• Filkins: “Osama was running a global jihad and he was very, very busy...the reason why the administration did this is ... there's been suggestions Osama was just sitting around and not doing anything. ... I think entirely the opposite was actually true.” (11:39)

8. The “Boots on the Ground” Debate

• Lack of “forward air controllers” on the ground means U.S. airpower is limited due to the risk of civilian casualties.
• The much-anticipated effort to retake Mosul is thrown into doubt following ISIS victories.
  (12:45)

9. The Political Blame Game: Bush, ISIS, and Historical Roots

• Jeb Bush’s remarks in Reno, “ISIS didn’t exist when my brother was president,” are fact-checked.
• Filkins: “There is some truth to that. In 2011 … ISIS … were decimated…Two things happened: Maliki … alienating the entire Sunni population. ... And … the uprisings in Syria. ... That just opened the door for ISIS.” (13:48)
• A memorable moment as a student confronts Jeb Bush: “Your brother created ISIS.”
  Filkins: “It sort of stops you because, you know it’s not true, but it sort of sounds true. ... The Bush administration decided to disband the Iraqi army. So you had suddenly overnight, 250,000 young men with military training who were humiliated and angry. And some of those guys are helping to run ISIS today.” (14:54)

10. Existential Threats & Europe’s Concern

• CIA veteran Robert Grenier’s take: ISIS does not pose an existential threat to the U.S.; the solution is neither ground troops nor isolationism.
• Schmidle: “There are no good options here...certainly it hasn’t worked in Yemen...the one in Yemen has backfired in a significant way, too.” (16:05)
• Filkins on foreign fighters: “...the Europeans who are fighting with them…all have passports...They’re going to come home unless they’re killed...That’s what keeps people awake at night.” (16:37)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Dexter Filkins on American limits:
  “The United States is limited to airstrikes and whatever exists of the Iraqi army and the Shiite militias—and that’s a horrible mess. And so, good luck.” (02:58)

• Dexter Filkins on the viability of Iraq and Syria as states:
  “These states…they're artificial states…Can these states be saved? And if they can't, then what next?” (03:55)

• On the difficulty of rebuilding trust with Sunnis:
  “I don't know how you get them back. … They kind of did it… by 2011, but then it got away. And I don't know how you reel that back in.” (05:16)

• Filkins on the collapse of the Iraqi army:
  “There were photos that you can see on the web of Iraqi soldiers running from ISIS in their underwear. … We're going to rebuild that?” (06:28)

• Dexter Filkins on ‘decapitation’ tactics:
  “They're not going to shoot their way to victory in Syria.” (09:08)

• Schmidle on policy dilemmas:
  “There are no good options here in a significant way ... Are they accomplishing any strategic goals that the administration has set out? Hard to say.” (16:05)

• Filkins on foreign fighters and the risk to the West:
  “That’s what keeps people awake at night who are trying to defend Europe and the United States, that all these guys are going to come home one day.” (16:37)

• Memorable interactive segment:
  Filkins, on a student’s confrontation of Jeb Bush: “It sort of stops you because, you know it's not true, but it sort of sounds true. ... The single most catastrophic decision of the entire war, the Bush administration decided to disband the Iraqi army…And some of those guys are helping to run ISIS today.” (14:54)

Timestamps for Important Segments

• 01:48 — Start of main podcast content
• 02:11 — John Boehner’s public criticism
• 02:58 — Filkins assesses the military situation and U.S. options
• 03:55 — The artificiality of state borders in Iraq and Syria
• 05:16 — On Haider al Abadi and Iraq’s political woes
• 06:28 — Problems with Iraqi army training and collapse
• 07:14 — Special ops raid against Abu Sayyaf: details and debate
• 08:39 — Strategic skepticism of targeting leadership (“decapitation”)
• 10:52 — Bin Laden raid and intelligence aftermath
• 12:45 — The “boots on the ground” debate and Mosul campaign
• 13:48 — Jeb Bush, ISIS, and the legacy of the Iraq War
• 14:54 — Disbanding the Iraqi army and consequences
• 16:05 — Robert Grenier’s warning and lack of “good options”
• 16:37 — The threat of returning European fighters

Conclusion

This episode presents a sobering, in-depth assessment of institutional, historical, and political entanglements that have shaped the battle against ISIS. Filkins and Schmidle argue that neither airpower nor high-profile special operations can substitute for a comprehensive strategy rooted in political reconciliation and regional stability—a solution made elusive by sectarian strife and flawed state architectures. The discussion closes with the acknowledgment that the U.S. faces a true strategic bind, and that the threats posed by ISIS, including the specter of returning foreign fighters, will persist into the foreseeable future.