The Russian Activist Maria Pevchikh on the Fate of Alexey Navalny
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This is the political scene and I'm David Remnant. A couple of weeks ago on the program, I was talking about the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine, along with the historian Stephen Kotkin, and he said something that really struck me, that Vladimir Putin is destroying both countries, Ukraine and Russia. The horrifying campaign against Ukraine began a year ago, but for quite a long time Putin had been dismantling Russia's civil society and with it its international reputation and really its long term economic prospects. One of the darkest moments along this path came in 2020 with the poisoning, the attempted murder of Alexei Navalny. Navalny is a prominent dissident and opposition leader, and he and a team of investigators illustrated in startling detail the corruption of Putin himself and his circle of aides and oligarchs. For his efforts, Navalny was poisoned with a nerve agent called Novichuk, which was almost certainly done by the fsb, the security services. He survived the attack and he's now being held in a Russian penal colony. If Russia has a future after this disastrous time, Alexei Navalny may well be pivotal to it. One of his closest colleagues is Maria Pekk. Pevcik helps to run his Anti Corruption foundation and she's the head of investigations and media. She also served as an executive producer of the documentary called Navalny, which is nominated for an Academy Award. So, Maria, as anyone who has seen the documentary film, Navalny knows you are a very close comrade in arms with Alexei Navalny. You're an investigator, you speak to the public, you're an advisor. I'd like to begin simply by asking. You were a sociology student at Moscow State University. You were working in what you once described as the most boring job in the world, both in Moscow and London, for a tobacco company. How did you meet Navalny, and why did you decide to join an enterprise like this, which is part journalistic, part activist, part political?
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Well, I studied politics at London School of Economics. So from very early Putin's years, from his first term, it was very, very visible to me that something is going awfully wrong. So I was looking for an outlet. I was looking for some sort of force that I could join and help this force along the way to move forward. And Navalny seemed like a great option who is most likely to be able to deliver change.
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So what did Navalny represent to you in terms of political ideology or opportunity?
C
Navalny represented a real person in politics. It was so new and so fresh back in the day, because we were brainwashed. From as long as I can remember myself, we were brainwashed as a university and school levels that there is no politics. You shouldn't be involved. Your vote doesn't change anything. You are not deciding anything. Leave this for the big guys or another one. Politics is dirty. The only way to be political, you can be some sort of political strategist and make big money out of political campaigns. So political participation back then wasn't cool. It was great and cool to be apolitical. People were almost bragging about it.
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But that was also. But politics depended on. In other words, that's what Putin depended on. The deal of society was, you can pursue this new, shining possible prosperity, at least if you were lucky enough to be in Moscow, St. Petersburg and a few other places, and not in the provinces. But stay the hell out of politics. And if you entered politics, trouble will come your way, as so many journalists and budding politicians discover, to their peril.
C
Correct. And then there was Navalny, who was young, who was so good at putting complex things in simple words. The way that he wrote about corruption, about financial crimes. Now, this is a rather boring topic, isn't it? But the way that he was phrasing things. The way that he was framing that debate was so attractive, he could interest anybody in the topic, which. Which normally isn't really interesting, but Navalny's charisma, Navalny's conviction, and just his ability to organize people around him, that definitely worked its magic. And we saw it on a larger scale just two years later in 2013, when he ran for a mayor of Moscow. So essentially what worked for me back in 2011 was displayed on a larger scale in 2013 when we saw thousands, thousands and thousands of Muscovites, like, leaving their day jobs, good day jobs, to go and stand in front of a Navalny branded poster that said, vote for Navalny as a mayor of Moscow. Those guys had, I don't know, they worked and built big international consulting firms and investment banks. But in the evening, they would show up at our headquarters and sort out leaflets, like, in four separate piles, like, that would be their assignment. And they would spend their evening volunteering with the most basic tasks at our headquarters.
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And the regime was tolerating this. There was still some allowance for dissent, at least for a while.
C
Correct. But I think that what infuriated Putin and what eventually led Putin to the decision to kill Navalny is the fact that whatever Navalny did, being investigations or political activity or like running a campaign, that it works and it attracted an audience that Putin assumed was his. Navalny's weight has changed a lot in 2017, when he started touring around Russia for campaigning to be allowed to run for the presidential elections in 2018. And this was when the biggest myth about Navalny was busted. That Navalny is for Moscowites, that Navalny is for this middle class, upper middle class guys, well off people from St. Petersburg, Moscow. And then Navalny started traveling the country organizing those rallies in, I don't know, 80, 90 different cities and tiny little towns. Sometimes we. We would only be allowed to have this rally organized, like on the outskirts, like, literally in the middle of a forest, next to cemetery. And people still showed up. And whoever is responsible for internal politics in Kremlin, they realized shit. Even the people who we thought are the core Putin voters, they like Navalny. They show up, they go. In the middle of the winter when it's minus 35 degrees, they go just to listen to the guys speaking from the stage.
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At what point did Navalny and your team get the sense that they would no longer be tolerated and Navalny's life was in danger?
C
Every time when I heard Navalny giving an interview, I was sat right outside his office. And I could overhear many journalists coming in and out. And I don't think there was one interview where he wasn't asked, how come you're still alive? How come they still haven't killed you? And I clearly still remember Navalny's face rolling his eyes, saying like, guys, I don't know, I'm tired of this question. Stop asking. I don't know why I'm still, I'm still alive and why they haven't tried to assassinate me. I don't know why they have decided to do this when they did it in August 2020, 2020. We know from our investigation together with Balinga that they started planning this when Navalny started to travel Russia for the presidential campaign. So this is when the surveillance started. This is when the FSB operatives together with the chemists and doctors started to follow Navalny. Did they. Have they tried to do something before? Have they tried to poison him earlier? Maybe. Maybe it just didn't work.
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I have to say, and I hope I don't mean this in any way derogatory, the attempt on Navalny's life. It brought to mind in an almost perverse way, a James Bond movie where you're watching the movie and instead of shooting James Bond very simply, they do things like dip him slowly into a pool of piranhas or something just for the sake of the movie, obviously, why go to all this crazy trouble of, you know, poisoning his underwear or it's like. It's not like anybody was going to be deceived on who was behind this killing.
C
Well, the plan was that they poison Navalny, he gets on the plane, the flight is rather long from Tomsk to Moscow, around five hours, probably more. That would be enough for him to pass out. And if the plane didn't do an emergency landing, he would have been dead like in next 45 minutes to an hour, forever and ever. This would have remained a mysterious death they've had. By the time Navalny collapsed and where by the time he was hospitalized in Omski, they already had ready like a pre made theory of what has happened. They were starting to say every state owned channel, every state owned newspaper, they would say, oh, Navalny drank a lot the night before, Navalny partied a lot a night before. Alcohol, drugs, you name it. And within hours of the poisoning, they had a theory that it's either Navalny's health or it was me who poisoned him. And that was a big alternative plot as well. Hugely promoted by the.
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Tell me about that. What was the story about you trying to Poison Navalny.
C
That's actually now when the whole alcohol and drugs thing didn't really check out at all and nobody really believed it. Now, according to the Russian propaganda, the main, the main theory that they share for the Russian audience is that I poison him. I have a very clear association with the foreign states. I lived in the UK for most of my life and nobody really knew what I'm doing, who I am. I was there on the trip. And also, as Belen Cat found out recently, the group of FSB operatives and the poisoners, they have separately followed me on the days when they didn't follow Navalny. I found pictures of myself from surveillance taken on the morning when I left Moscow to go to the airport to fly to Siberia. They were following me and not other members of our team. In the beginning of the trip, they weren't following Navalny, but they were following me. Their cell data shows that they showed up at my hotel two days before the poisoning.
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So he gets to Germany and viewers will see this in the really remarkable documentary film Navalny. And he recovers, physically recovers, which is not easy, and then decides, and there seems to be no question about it, to return to Moscow. And I want to hear the calculation of returning to Moscow. He had to know that his arrest upon arrival was almost a sure thing. So talk to me about that discussion of returning to Moscow.
C
There was never a discussion. There was never process of choosing and, you know, waiting scenarios and, you know, deliberating on that. One of the first things that Navalny said when he woke up from coma is that he is going home. He is Russian politician. He has built his career and he gained his popularity by telling people that they shouldn't be afraid. How hypocritical would that be? If you ask people to be brave, to be courageous, and then yourself, you make not the most courageous choice. Right. So our only deliberations were around the topics of how to run the foundation, the Anti Corruption foundation, without Navalny. We spent days and days discussing every scenario in case, I don't know what happens if he's under house arrest? What happens if he is in prison for a couple of years? What happens if he's in prison forever? What happens if he gets killed? What happens if, if nothing happens, If Navalny is just free and goes peacefully and home directly from the airport, was.
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The most likely scenario was that he would land at the airport and be arrested?
C
Yes, it was most likely, yes. It wasn't for sure, though.
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I'm surprised from time to time, talking to people who are well connected to him, that he's able somehow, from a prison colony, to communicate to the world through Twitter that there are fairly reliable reports on the condition of that he's in and the conditions in which he lives. Tell me how that works.
C
Navalny is currently being investigated. Well, actually, no, he's already in the process, in the legal process of the next court case. So that legal status allows him to see and communicate with his lawyers who, you know, can meet him and discuss anything from the defense strategy to the content of the actual case. So his lawyers are able to visit him regularly. And this is how we know how well he's doing. We know his general, you know, state of health, which is what we know whether he's.
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What's his state of health?
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Well, it's not good. He has been poisoned by a nerve agent, by a chemical weapon. The consequences of such poisoning are not known. Not many people survived the long term.
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Consequences of the Nova Juk.
C
Yes, because your entire system, your entire nerve system just shuts down completely and entirely. And then thanks to the German doctors, they managed to restart it. He managed to come back to a sort of, you know, a decent state of health. He was exercising, he was doing his daily walks and all of that. But no, nobody knows what, how this actually affects a person long term. On top of this, I'm not sure how it's whether it's related to Novage drug poisoning, but perhaps because it's only started after that, Navalny started to have severe back problems. Severe to, to an extent that at some point during the first months of his imprisonment, he stopped being able to walk.
B
Do you think Putin wants him to die in jail and the sooner the better?
C
Oh, I think Putin wants him to suffer a lot first and then die in prison. Of course he wants that.
B
In your late at night when you're thinking about this, do you imagine for him that end or the opposite, the end, the resolution of Nelson Mandela, who's released into the light and comes into political.
C
It took him a couple of years to be released. So no, I'm not dreaming about Nelson Mandela scenario either. It took them a little bit too long.
B
What do you think? You've been very accurate in some of your predictions over the period of time that we've been talking about. How do you see this playing out?
C
I try to convince myself just not to think through the scenario of Navalny being poisoned and killed in whatever way in prison. I think this is a self defense mechanism. I'll be honest, David. I've lived through him dying in front of me once and I didn't like that experience at all. And I don't want to come back to it. I know exactly how it felt. I remember these days during his poisoning very vividly. And this were the scariest days of my life by far. So I don't see much point. And you know, just sitting there dwelling and looking into darkness and say, like, oh, what would I do when he gets killed? What would I do? Can he be killed tomorrow? Yes. For what I know he might be dead right now. We don't have a way of finding out until the next morning. But this is not how I operate. I like to operate under different assumptions. I genuinely think it is possible to get him out.
B
How do you see that happening? Considering the war in Ukraine, the mobilization of society, the militarization of Russian society, what possible motive would there be, I hate to say it, for Putin to make that decision.
C
All of this can play both at an advantage and a disadvantage for Navalny. The situation is so chaotic specifically because of the war as the likelihood of Navalny being released when the war ends high. I think it's almost certain, I'm almost certain as well, that any next president after Putin, even if it's the worst one you can imagine, even if it's Prigozhin from the Wagner group, I'm sure that the next president would release Navalny. I'm sure that, that they release because it's a symbolic, it's an easy win. You know, it could be a condition, a release, a mass release of political prisoners could be a condition for lifting some sanctions, could be a part of any sort of, you know, peace talks and reparation talks and all of that process, post war process that is inevitable. There are many, many scenarios, Maria.
B
In Soviet times there were a whole tribe of people in Moscow, but beyond, who eventually became known as the people of the 60s. Shesti Diyatniki and they played an odd game. You know, they were both in the establishment and also saw themselves as, you know, children of the secret speech by Nikita Khrushchev and the post, post Stalin era and hoping for reform. Think of them what you will. They became the pillars of a top down revolution. What's happened now is a lot of people, hundreds of thousands of people who are in many ways the best and the brightest have left the country. You've lived in the UK a long time and the exile now has been enormous. And these are people who were the potential liberal forces and intelligentsia of not only Moscow but many other places. First of all, will they return. And how do you feel about people that in your mind, have compromised on the margins of their activity?
C
Well, there are two separate questions with regards to those people who left. I feel, you know, like, in the long term, I feel sad that they left because I'm being realistic. I understand that not all of them will come back. Even when Russia is free of Putin and when Russia is in its post war period, I think some of them will, probably most of them will return. But we will lose a good 20% of brightest, smartest people who have managed to quickly, you know, restart their lives abroad, find new jobs, start new businesses, and, you know, just start their life from scratch. I'm being realistic, yes. They probably won't return. I will be personally convincing them, I will be asking them, and I will be trying to make them return home and contribute to building the beautiful Russia of the future. Right. But so I understand that perhaps I'm not convincing enough and some people will choose their new life. And as for the second part of your question, the people who compromised, I tried not to judge. I would be too rude or just too judgmental here. I'm sure that you can guess what I actually think about compromising with Putin's power, about being ignorant, about closing their eyes to the facts, to what was happening to us, to the opposition, and just, you know, continuing to, like, run your theater or cultural center or something like that, or radio station. Yeah. All I'm saying here is that let's now all gather and draw a very simple conclusion. This strategy didn't work. They've lost the radio stations, the TV channels, and whatever they were trying to save, they. They lost. And along the way, they've lost the integrity and the honesty.
B
And I hate to go from the extremely serious to the seemingly banal. Your film is up for an award, an Oscar, I think it may well win. I'd like to see it win, quite frankly.
C
Me too. Me too.
B
And there will be a moment with the biggest audience imaginable. With a couple of minutes, you thank your agent, you know, the usual thing. What do you want the world to know in the broadest sense?
C
From day one of Navalny's imprisonment, my main job, alongside investigations, is to climb on the highest mountain and scream and shout from the mountaintop, navalny. Navalny. Free Navalny. That's literally the most important thing I can do. That's my way of trying to save his life. The Dolby Theater stage in Los Angeles, the venue where the Oscars are being held, that is the stage that the entire world will be watching during that evening. And it really doesn't matter whether you get to say something from the actual stage holding the little golden man or off the stage during the press conference. The attention is still there. And it is literally my job to grab that attention and to point it not at myself but at Navalny.
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Maria Pechyk is a Russian activist and investigator. She's an executive producer of the documentary Navalny about the jailed opposition leader, which is nominated for an Academy Award and it's streaming right now on hbo. Max.
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From. PRX.
The Political Scene | The New Yorker
Host: David Remnick
Guest: Maria Pevchikh, head of investigations and media for the Anti-Corruption Foundation and executive producer of the Oscar-nominated documentary Navalny
Date: March 6, 2023
This episode of The Political Scene features David Remnick interviewing Maria Pevchikh, a close ally of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny. The conversation delves into the evolution of Navalny’s public persona, the regime’s repressive response to his anti-corruption work, the events surrounding his poisoning, Pevchikh’s own involvement, and her perspective on Russia’s future and the opposition’s prospects. The interview also touches upon the emotional and political costs of resistance both inside and outside of Russia, as well as the global visibility brought by the documentary Navalny.
Early Awareness & Search for Change (03:37)
Political Apathy and the Appeal of Navalny (04:16–05:35)
Navalny’s Early Impact and Movement Growth (05:35–07:13)
Regime Tolerance and the Turning Point (07:13–08:54)
Escalation of Threats & Surveillance (09:08–10:14)
Russian state’s elaborate plan to kill Navalny via poisoning, followed by quick dissemination of disinformation.
Pevchikh was herself targeted as a possible scapegoat by authorities.
Remnick (10:14):
“It brought to mind, in an almost perverse way, a James Bond movie... why go to all this crazy trouble?”
Pevchikh (10:48):
“The plan was... enough for him to pass out... This would have remained a mysterious death... Within hours of the poisoning, they had a theory that it’s either Navalny’s health or it was me who poisoned him.”
Stays in contact and relays information through his lawyers.
Suffers long-term effects from nerve agent poisoning, including severe back problems.
Quote (Pevchikh, 16:44):
“Your entire nerve system just shuts down completely and entirely... Nobody knows how this actually affects a person long term.”
Prolonged Suffering and Uncertainty (17:31–18:16)
Pevchikh is convinced Putin wants him to suffer in prison before dying.
Quote (Pevchikh, 17:37):
“Oh, I think Putin wants him to suffer a lot first and then die in prison. Of course he wants that.”
Emotional Reality of the Opposition (18:16–19:36)
Chaotic wartime conditions could either help or hurt Navalny’s chances for release.
Any post-Putin government, “even if it’s the worst you can imagine,” would likely free Navalny as a symbolic gesture or bargaining chip.
Quote (Pevchikh, 19:52):
“It could be a condition, a release, a mass release of political prisoners... peace talks and reparation talks.”
On Navalny’s unique appeal:
“The way that he was phrasing things... was so attractive, he could interest anybody in the topic, which normally isn’t really interesting.”
— Maria Pevchikh (03:53–04:16)
On the risk and randomness of assassination attempts:
“How come you’re still alive?... I don’t know why they have decided to do this when they did it in August 2020.”
— Maria Pevchikh (09:08–09:55)
On the regime's attempts to smear her:
“According to the Russian propaganda, the main theory that they share... is that I poisoned him.”
— Maria Pevchikh (12:10–13:15)
On Navalny’s decision to return:
“If you ask people to be brave... and then yourself, you make not the most courageous choice. Right.”
— Maria Pevchikh (13:53)
On the consequences of nerve agent attack:
“Nobody knows what, how this... affects a person long term.”
— Maria Pevchikh (16:44)
On emotionally coping with Navalny’s plight:
“I’ve lived through him dying in front of me once and I didn’t like that experience at all. And I don’t want to come back to it.”
— Maria Pevchikh (18:16)
On the potential release of Navalny:
“Any next president after Putin... would release Navalny. It could be a condition... for lifting some sanctions.”
— Maria Pevchikh (19:52)
On the diaspora’s loss and the failure of compromise:
“Let’s now all gather and draw a very simple conclusion. This strategy didn’t work. They’ve lost the radio stations, the TV channels... they've lost the integrity and the honesty.”
— Maria Pevchikh (24:17)
On her public mission:
“It is literally my job to grab that attention and to point it not at myself but at Navalny.”
— Maria Pevchikh (25:38)
This conversation illuminates the high personal and societal stakes in Russia’s current political crisis, the human drive behind activist resistance, and the importance of international visibility for political prisoners like Navalny.