The View from Iran

Summary

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The Political Scene | The New Yorker

Episode: The View from Iran
Date: March 6, 2015
Host: Dorothy Wickenden
Guests: Steve Kahl (New Yorker staff writer, author of "Ghost") & Laura Secor (New Yorker contributor, Iran expert)

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Episode Overview

This episode centers on the delicate negotiations over Iran's nuclear program in early 2015. Shortly after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses the U.S. Congress, Dorothy Wickenden is joined by Steve Kahl and Laura Secor to discuss the complexities of Iran's nuclear ambitions, the political stakes in the U.S. and Iran, and the impact of Netanyahu's intervention. The episode explores shifting alliances in the Middle East amidst the rise of ISIS, Iran's internal political dynamics, and how these global events could influence U.S. politics, particularly looking ahead to the 2016 presidential campaign.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

Netanyahu’s Speech and Its Aftermath

[01:38 – 02:50]

• Netanyahu presents Iran as a unique threat due to "the marriage of militant Islam with nuclear weapons."
• President Obama rebuts, noting that Netanyahu "has not offered any kind of viable alternative that would achieve the same verifiable mechanism to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon."
• Steve Kahl (02:50): The Obama-Netanyahu personal animus obscures a legitimate policy debate. The core question: is freezing Iran's nuclear program and robust inspections a better deal than alternatives—particularly if sanctions are lifted without Iran changing its destabilizing behaviors in the region?

Iran’s Internal Politics and Rouhani vs. Khamenei

[04:11 – 07:25]

• Laura Secor (04:29): The Iranian regime is "a really lively and fractious constellation of personalities and of factions."
• President Rouhani was elected with a mandate to address Iran’s isolation—nuclear negotiations are his key instrument.
• There’s a “submerged debate” over whether Iran's interests could align with the U.S. around issues like fighting ISIS, but public discourse on this remains tightly controlled in Iran.
• Laura Secor (06:06): Khamenei is skeptical about U.S. intentions but has permitted Rouhani to try for a deal, believing it likely to fail. If Khamenei truly opposed the negotiations’ direction, "he has plenty of means at his disposal to make that not happen."
• Both guests agree the Iranian leadership is pragmatic, if not aligned with U.S. interests.

Nature and Details of the Nuclear Talks

[08:04 – 09:30]

• Steve Kahl: Talks focus on:
  • Centrifuge numbers and uranium enrichment levels
  • The scope of international inspections
  • Iran's unacknowledged military nuclear activities
  • The duration of restrictions and what comes after
• Centrifuge numbers hold symbolism for Iran's domestic audience but cause concern in Congress.

Iranian and Regional Reactions

[09:36 – 10:15]

• Laura Secor: In Iran, Netanyahu’s speech was used for political leverage:
  • Rafsanjani (a Rouhani supporter) compared Iranian hardliners to Netanyahu, sparking controversy.
  • Conservative Iranian media seized upon American divisions as a sign of opportunity.

Impact on U.S. Middle East Policy

[10:15 – 11:45]

• Steve Kahl: The rapid regional changes—rise of ISIS, collapse of Syria—mean the U.S.'s pursuit of an Iran deal is happening in a dynamic and sectarian context. U.S.'s Sunni allies are uneasy; U.S. tries to keep them engaged (e.g. Kerry traveling to Saudi Arabia).

Limits and Dangers of U.S.-Iran Cooperation

[11:45 – 13:22]

• Laura Secor: "A temporary convergence of interests over ISIS does not suggest that we have a sort of longer-term meeting of the minds or an ultimate goal in the region that would be congruent with Iran's."
• The nuclear deal is deliberately isolated from broader strategic disputes, enabling negotiations but keeping fundamental differences intact.

American Political Calculus: Clinton and 2016

[13:22 – 14:40]

• In 2008, Hillary Clinton criticized Obama for promising to negotiate with Iran. The world is far more unstable now.
• Steve Kahl: Hillary Clinton has avoided being pinned down on the Iran deal, likely to maintain flexibility for her presidential run. Republican candidates are expected to oppose the agreement.

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Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• Steve Kahl [02:50]:

  "It's true that the personal animus between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu has obscured a pretty legitimate debate about what kind of deal this is going to be and whether it's a good deal."

• Laura Secor [04:29]:

  "The Iranian regime is not a monolith. It is, if anything, a really lively and fractious constellation of personalities and of factions."

• Laura Secor [06:06]:

  "[Khamenei's] attitude has been, go ahead, try, I won't stand in your way, and it will never work."

• Steve Kahl [10:17]:

  "They've gotten trapped by their investment in this negotiation because it has reinforced their approach to ISIS, which is to basically ally with the enemies of the Sunni population where ISIS has taken root."

• Laura Secor [11:45]:

  "The fact that we have a sort of temporary convergence of interests over ISIS does not suggest that we have a sort of longer term meeting of the minds or an ultimate goal in the region that would be congruent with Iran's."

• Dorothy Wickenden [13:22]:

  "In the 2008 debates between Obama and Clinton, she mocked him when he vowed to negotiate with Iran. And as we've been discussing, the world has become wildly more unstable since then."

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Segment Timestamps

• 01:38 – Netanyahu's speech and Obama's response
• 02:50 – Framing the deal: is freezing Iran's program worth lifting sanctions?
• 04:29 – Rouhani's mandate and Iran’s internal political factions
• 06:06 – Khamenei’s skepticism and control
• 08:04 – Key issues in the nuclear negotiations
• 09:36 – Iranian reactions to Netanyahu’s U.S. speech
• 10:17 – The regional complexity of U.S. policy
• 11:45 – Limits of U.S.–Iran alignment despite ISIS
• 13:22 – Hillary Clinton’s political positioning on Iran

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Overall Tone and Style

The conversation is measured and analytical, mirroring The New Yorker’s signature calm, deeply informed, and slightly formal tone. The hosts and guests avoid sensationalism, instead offering perspective rooted in firsthand reporting and diplomatic context.

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Conclusion

The panel highlights how Iran’s domestic politics, American political realities, and regional upheavals all shape the ongoing nuclear negotiations. The episode underscores how contingent these events are on broader strategic calculations, revealing both the opportunities and the inherent limitations of potential détente with Iran.

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Transcript

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[Dorothy Wickenden]

This is the Political Scene, a weekly conversation with New Yorker writers and editors about Politics. It's Thursday, March 5th. I'm Dorothy Wickenden, executive editor of the New Yorker. On Tuesday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress about the potential nuclear deal being negotiated with Iran.

[Steve Kahl]

The greatest danger facing our world is the marriage of militant Islam with nuclear weapons.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

President Obama, who did not meet with him, had this to say in reply.

[Steve Kahl]

Prime Minister Netanyahu has not offered any kind of viable alternative that would achieve the same verifiable mechanism to prevent Iran.

[David Remnick]

From getting a nuclear weapon.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Steve Kahl and Laura Secor are here today to discuss Iran's nuclear ambitions and how Netanyahu has complicated the U S Iran negotiations. Steve When I was Listening to Netanyahu at the time, he made it sound reasonable to deny Iran any nuclear capacity in exchange for lifting sanctions. Obama has repeatedly acknowledged that Iran is a known sponsor of terrorists and insisted when he was elected that his administration would not allow Iran to build nuclear weapons. What do you say about all that?

[Steve Kahl]

Well, I mean, it's true that the personal animus between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu has obscured a pretty legitimate debate about what kind of deal this is going to be and whether it's a good deal. It's a hard question to answer because we don't know what the final agreement would be. But we understand in outline that essentially the Obama administration is saying freezing Iran's program and providing very robust international inspections so that the world is notified with at least one year's notice if Iran decides to weaponize is better than any alternative. That's essentially their case. But the other side was partly articulated by Netanyahu, which is, yes, but in exchange for what? I mean, we're not asking them to change their behavior in Syria, we're not asking them to change their behavior in Lebanon. We're not asking them to stand down from funding and arming Shia militias in Iraq that have a history of attacking the United States. And we're also rewarding them with economic relief at a time when they're under a lot of pressure. So I think that is a legitimate debate as to whether that's a deal where the upside is worth the basically the sanctioning and to some extent, the re legitimizing of the regime in Tehran.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Laurie, one of the things Netanyahu obviously did in the speech was describe Iran as militant Islam, essentially equating it with all kinds of other independent terrorist actors. What changes, if any, have you noticed since President Rouhani replaced Ahmadinejad, who really was a terrifying figure?

[Laura Secor]

Well, I think by now we all know that the Iranian regime is not a monolith. It is, if anything, a really lively and fractious constellation of personalities and of factions. And President Rouhani came into office with a very clear mandate to address Iran's isolation in the world and its relationship with outside powers, including the United States. The nuclear file is obviously the biggest piece of that, and the Rouhani administration has a great deal invested in the outcome of those negotiations, not only in the sense that they have a tremendous incentive to get those sanctions lifted, but there is also a sort of submerged debate over the question of Iran's strategic role in the world, it's alignments within the region. I think we just saw today in the New York Times, there's a story about the increasing reliance that the United States has on Iran in the battle against isis. So I think that there is a reasonable case to be made, and one heard it from some of the people around Rouhani in a kind of off the record way at the beginning of that administration, that Iran sees some common interests with the United States in the region. Now, that is not an argument that can be made very publicly in Iran. And it hasn't yet come right, really to a place where it can be publicly debated. However, the Rouhani administration, if it can come away from these negotiations with a deal that gets Iran some of what it wants without giving away the store, and that suggests that it's possible to open a dialogue with the United States, I think it does suggest a possibility for a more conciliatory policy.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Laura, how big an internal battle is there between him and the Ayatollah Khamenei?

[Laura Secor]

I think at the very beginning, we had the impression that Khamenei had all but signed on to the outreach that the Rouhani administration had begun. In terms of opening up these negotiations. Again, I think that was probably a rush to judgment. I think that what we've seen since suggests that Khamenei has taken a much more skeptical stance. I heard from one former Iranian official that Khamenei's position is essentially that he doesn't believe that it will be possible for the Iranians to conclude a deal with the United States. He doesn't believe that the United States can or will negotiate in good faith with Iran. And his attitude has been, go ahead, try, I won't stand in your way, and it will never work. Whether that's true, honestly, I'm not entirely sure, because I do think that should these negotiations be nearing a conclusion that looks like it would be a positive one for Iran? If Khamenei really didn't want that, I think he has plenty of means at his disposal to make that not happen.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

And moderates both in Israel and in the US Describe the Iranian leadership, broadly speaking, as rational as opposed to the former regime. Was that an assessment you would agree with?

[Laura Secor]

I think the Iranian regime is pragmatic. Now, that doesn't necessarily mean that its priorities and its interests align with ours, but I do think that it behaves in a way that can be rationally explained.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Now we're going to take a quick break.

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[Dorothy Wickenden]

Steve, what about the negotiations which have been underway for a year and actually need to come to a provisional agreement by the end of the month?

[Steve Kahl]

Yes, I mean, they're very active and they're focused on a number of kind of interlocking issues. One is how much infrastructure, to use Netanyahu's phrase, will Iran be allowed to retain how many centrifuges? What will be the level of uranium enrichment that will be permitted? How far will inspectors be able to reach? Iran has never really owned up to the military history of their program. And that has been something that the International Atomic Energy Administration inspectors have been pressing on for a long time. Then there are all these timeline questions. If the agreement is for 10 years, what happens at that stage? And so on. They have had this framework in place where one of the big questions is the symbolic number of centrifuges that are allowed to spin, because that has been something the Iranians see as essential to selling their deal domestically. But that number has also raised a lot of doubt, certainly in the United States Congress. I mean, if you really step back and look at this as a proliferation question, like are we really stopping Iran from getting a bomb, which was the heart of Netanyahu's speech. The problem is that if you give them this deal, you're at risk of embedding this regime by relieving it of the economic pressures that it currently faces.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

What about that, Laura? And what has been the response in Iran to Netanyahu's speech and to Obama's position?

[Laura Secor]

The response to Netanyahu's speech in Iran has been somewhat interesting. Former President Rafsanjani, who is a kind of behind the scenes patron of the Rouhani team, actually came out and compared Iran's hardliners who have been arguing vociferously against making any kind of deal, compared them to Netanyahu. This got him into some hot water in the Iranian press. At the same time, I was just looking on one of the softer conservative Iranian websites today who have seized on the American reaction against Netanyahu's speech and taken that as a positive sign. So I think it's been politically made use of over there in one way and another.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Steve, where does this leave Obama?

[Steve Kahl]

Well, in a pickle, really. I mean, the change that you mention is what's important because the negotiations started before the United States saw a reason to go back into Iraq because of ISIS and because of the collapse of Syria. And so the administration has been pursuing this deal in partnership with its most important European allies and with the support of Russia and China and others. So it's not doing this alone, but it's been chasing this nuclear deal in a rapidly changing regional context. And so to some extent, they've gotten trapped by their investment in this negotiation because it has reinforced their approach to isis, which is to basically ally with the enemies of the Sunni population where ISIS has taken root. It's a tangle even without the sort of geopolitical problems around it. I mean, it's a hard enough problem. But what's going to happen if this deal gets done is that many of the Sunni allies in the fight against ISIS are going to feel that the United States isn't really with them in the way that they would wish. That's why Kerry flew off to Saudi Arabia already, to try to keep them on side. And it's the UAE and the other Gulf states in particular that are highly sensitive to this kind of sectarian context that the nuclear negotiations have now arrived in.

[Laura Secor]

I want to say that the fact that we have a sort of temporary convergence of interests over ISIS does not suggest that we have a sort of longer term meeting of the minds or an ultimate goal in the region that would be congruent with Iran's. Iran is in a position of strength at the moment, and I think they're well aware of that. They do have the most effective fighting force on the ground in that area that's able to tackle this problem. There's good reason for this nuclear deal to have been detached from the regional issues and from the other sort of larger strategic problems that divide us from the Iranians. It's problematic on the one hand, because it does suggest that we may be cutting a deal with a country that we have deep and lasting differences with. On the other hand, it does not bind us to regional ambitions of the Iranians or to a larger strategic outlook. And I think that's part of what's made it possible to have this negotiation at this moment. The Iranians, I do believe, did see coming the crisis that has kind of engulfed the regional picture at this moment, I remember talking to people, even just as Rouhani had assumed office, who were already saying that the major issue of the day that would confront this new administration was the question of jihadis coming through Syria into Iraq. So I do think that for them, trying to maybe make a change in their position globally has something to do with a regional picture that they see emerging. I think it's probably been wise policy not to wed the nuclear negotiations to. To that question.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Steve, you know, you and I were talking a couple days ago about Hillary Clinton, and I was reminded that in the 2008 debates between Obama and Clinton, she mocked him when he vowed to negotiate with Iran. And as we've been discussing, the world has become wildly more unstable since then. What is her position on Iran now, given the rise of isis?

[Steve Kahl]

To my knowledge, she hasn't been drawn out on this in a definitive way. But it will be an issue in the campaign, certainly, if the negotiations are concluded, because the Republican nominees will all run against the deal. And then she will have to decide whether she's going to defend Obama's brief or take some kind of modified triangulating position in between. She's been, as we were talking about, as secretary. When you really look at the record she created around the hard, enduring decisions that she faced, she was very careful to position herself center. Center right for 2016. I'm not aware of positions that she took where she would have allowed opposition research to really pin her down. And so I'm sure on Iran, she'll be grateful for the distance between when she left as secretary and when her successor cut this deal because it gives her some room to kind of keep her distance from it and run against what will be ardent Republican opposition.

[Dorothy Wickenden]

Steve Kyle is a New Yorker staff writer and the author of Ghost, about the rise of Osama bin Laden. Laura Secor has reported from Iran for the New Yorker and is working on a book about Iran. This has been the Political scene from the New Yorker. This podcast is produced by Jill Debar and Alex Barron. For newyorker.com I'm Dorothy Wickenden.

[David Remnick]

Right now, we are living through some of the most tumultuous political times our country has ever known. I'm David Remnick, and each week on the New Yorker Radio Hour, I'll try to make sense of what's happening alongside politicians and thinkers like Cory Booker, Nancy Pelosi, Liz Cheney, Tim Walsh, Ketanji Brown Jackson, Newt Gingrich, Robert F. Kennedy, J.R. charlamagne, the God, and so many more. That's all on the New Yorker Radio Hour wherever you listen to podcasts.

[Steve Kahl]

From prx.