PDB Situation Report | April 11th, 2026:CEASEFIRE IN NAME ONLY? Why the Ceasefire Is Already Failing

Summary

PDB Situation Report | April 11th, 2026: CEASEFIRE IN NAME ONLY? Why the Ceasefire Is Already Failing

Podcast: The President’s Daily Brief
Host: Mike Baker, former CIA Operations Officer
Date: April 11, 2026

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Episode Overview

This episode dives into the fragile ceasefire between the US and Iran, exposing why it is already on the brink of collapse. Host Mike Baker interviews retired Army Colonel Wesley Martin about the Middle Eastern stalemate, the strategic outlook of Iran and the West, and the internal and external implications of the current power struggle. Later, David Dowd from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies unpacks the tangled ceasefire dynamics between Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah, highlighting how international legal nuances and political realities undercut hopes for lasting peace.

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Key Discussion Points & Analysis

Segment 1: The US-Iran Ceasefire – “Ceasefire in Name Only”

Timestamps: 00:12–10:04; 12:46–26:54

• Ceasefire Fragility and Strategic Impasse

  • Mike Baker introduces the current “tenuous” ceasefire in place, noting Iran’s continued control of the Strait of Hormuz and accusations against the US for violating agreements through support of Israel against Hezbollah ([00:12]).
  • Colonel Wesley Martin assesses the state as a “stalemate in the Middle East,” with both the US/Israel and Iran believing they have superior positions and each unwilling to negotiate from a perceived position of strength ([03:12]).
  • Martin questions the sustainability of the ceasefire:

    “This ceasefire is not going to hold. And any agreement made with Iran is not going to take, because this country, since 1979, it's been the number one nation state, exporter of terrorism, international terrorism.” ([03:44])

• Iranian Leadership and Internal Dynamics

  • Discussion on the new Supreme Leader (“baby Khamenei”) and the lack of public communication, raising questions about who truly holds power ([04:31]).

• Critique of US Intelligence and Doctrine

  • Martin criticizes reliance on Western mindsets and flawed application of doctrines like the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, lamenting the lack of clear objectives and exit strategies ([08:23]).
  • He offers a vivid analogy:

    “They ought to look at the body of a mother spider like a wolf spider. If you take your shoe and you smash the wolf spider, all of a sudden all those little babies on top of its back is going to go running off in many, many directions. And that's what's happened.” ([05:35])

  • The intelligence community underestimated the IRGC’s cell structure and the pre-positioning of drones and operational plans – meaning Iranian capability persists despite targeted strikes ([16:02]).

• Proposals and Warnings for US Strategy

  • Martin advocates supporting the Iranian people and coordinating with resistance groups rather than direct military intervention, given the drone threat ([20:24]).
  • Warns repeatedly that the US tendency to "mirror" its values onto Middle Eastern actors leads to misjudgments ([14:57], [57:16]).

• Recent and Historical US Missteps

  • Martin outlines how the US has failed Iranian resistance movements in the past (e.g., 2009 protests), contending that insufficient support at key moments allowed the regime to survive and brutally suppress dissent ([23:20]).

Memorable Quotes from Colonel Wesley Martin

• On regime change illusion:

  “No, they're not. They're not dealing with a brand new regime… It's not a new regime. It's the old one that has been modified. … The same Iranian regime, but now they're going to come back with a vengeance.” ([13:30])

• On cynicism towards “victory”:

  “You've still got the Islamic Republic. …We have to wrap it up there. And I hope you'll come back…” ([25:46])

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Segment 2: Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah – Anatomy of the “Ceasefire”

Timestamps: 30:10–58:50

• Ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon – Just Words?

  • David Dowd explains the long-running nature of the Lebanon conflict, challenging the notion that a ceasefire is an actual return to peace:

    “People think a ceasefire means you go back to the status quo antebellum… but ceasefires don’t bring conflict to an end. They basically operate as a contract between two parties.” ([31:07])

  • Recaps the November 2024 ceasefire’s expectations versus reality — disarmament was not enforced, and Hezbollah consistently violated terms, as did the Lebanese government by omission ([32:00–35:30]).

• Legal and Political Details

  • Dowd details how the Lebanese government’s approach fell short, for example, “welcoming” rather than “adopting” a disarmament plan for Hezbollah ([35:50]).
  • Shifts in government rhetoric (from “disarmament” to “containment”) signaled avoidance of direct confrontation with Hezbollah; attempts to expel Iranian officials were ultimately symbolic and failed to address root causes ([37:55–39:58]).

• US and Israeli Strategies and Dilemmas

  • Netanyahu signaling willingness to negotiate is seen more as a symptom of US (and specifically President Trump’s) pressure for a solution to encompass Lebanon within the US-Iran ceasefire framework ([40:38]).
  • Dowd points out the persistent issue:

    “Every conflict, every struggle in which [Hezbollah] engage[s] is measured against this yardstick of how to negatively impact the United States. So we have an interest in the degradation of this organization...” ([41:44])

• The Ceasefire Dispute – Competing Narratives

  • Dowd explains the incoherence: the US and Israel argue Lebanon was not included in the ceasefire while Iran (and by extension, Hezbollah) insists it was, as a means to implicate the US and protect Hezbollah ([45:51–47:25]).
  • Both sides seek to proclaim victory for domestic political purposes; the White House is motivated to declare a win ahead of midterms and Iran needs to maintain its image of resistance ([46:27], [47:25]).
  • Dowd clarifies:

    “What this is… is a lull in fighting and an attempt not to negotiate under fire. …If there is an outcome at the end of these two weeks, that will be the cease fire agreement. Right now this is just an attempt not to negotiate under fire.” ([47:25])

• Broader Reflections on US Policy and Long-Term Consequences

  • Both Baker and Dowd are cynical on prospects for lasting peace:

    “They say, peace, peace, but there is no peace. And I think the word peace has been thrown around over the past year to mean something that it doesn't.” — David Dowd ([52:54])

  • Iran’s long-term autocratic strategy is contrasted with US short-termism driven by domestic election cycles ([52:54–56:43]).

  • Dowd criticizes the American tendency to idealistically “mirror” its own values onto Middle Eastern societies, consistently leading to strategic error ([57:15],[57:16]):

    “We throw our own values onto a culture and think, well, this is how they'll process this. This is how they'll react. This is what they'll want, because that's what we want. …And it doesn't work.” — Mike Baker ([57:16])

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Western misperceptions:

  “Arrogance and incompetence have a habit of riding together firmly molded on the back of the same…” — Colonel Wesley Martin, delicately pausing for family-friendly programming ([07:37])

• On Iranian regime resilience:

  “…They had a bench, a very deep bench, it seems, and they just have been moving people up. … The idea of saying we're dealing with a whole new regime… That's political framing...” — Mike Baker ([17:57])

• On conflict cycles:

  “We've been kicking the can down the road, we've been putting lipstick on a pig, we've been bandaid on a sucking chest wound. … I think there was significant optimism… that this conflict… was going to somehow create a sea change. … I think people were a little intoxicated with this idea.” — Mike Baker ([50:36])

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Timestamps for Critical Segments

• 00:12 — Ceasefire fragility, introduction of Colonel Martin
• 03:12 — Martin’s assessment: Middle East stalemate, nature of negotiations
• 05:35 — Analogy: Wolf spider, Iranian regime resilience after leadership strikes
• 08:23 — Critique of intelligence failures and missed application of doctrine
• 13:30 — Regime change illusion, generational transition in Iran
• 16:02 — Analysis: Effects of strikes on IRGC and regime resilience
• 20:24 — Martin’s proposal: Support Iranian resistance, avoid ground intervention
• 23:20 — US missed opportunities with Iranian uprisings, discussion of 2009
• 30:10 — Shift to Israel-Lebanon-Hezbollah segment, introduction of David Dowd
• 31:07 — Explanation of ceasefire legal structure; why the conflict persists
• 35:50 — Lebanese government’s partial disarmament efforts, containment vs. disarmament
• 40:38 — Netanyahu's negotiations as a product of US pressure
• 41:44 — Why Hezbollah’s operations are a US security concern
• 45:51 — Parsing the ceasefire dispute and competing narratives
• 47:25 — Ceasefire as “just a lull,” not a real agreement
• 52:54 — “They say, peace, peace, but there is no peace.” (Dowd’s skepticism)
• 56:43 — US idealism, attention span, and failure to mirror Middle Eastern realities
• 57:16 — Baker: On American tendency to project values onto others

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Summary & Takeaways

• The US-Iran ceasefire is holding in name only, with both sides maneuvering for advantage and little genuine movement toward de-escalation. The Iranian regime's internal cohesion and capacity for asymmetric retaliation are significant, and the US tendency to underestimate this stems from cultural and strategic mirroring errors.
• On Israel-Hezbollah-Lebanon: The ceasefire is viewed legally more as an unfulfilled contract than a real peace; violations are routine. Lebanese authorities lack both will and capacity to disarm Hezbollah, presenting only symbolic measures largely to appease foreign backers.
• Consensus among experts: Lasting peace remains elusive; at best, the current lull is a strategic pause, not a transformative moment. Both interviewees are skeptical about the possibility for real change without a fundamental shift in US strategy and honest acknowledgment of the region’s intractable dynamics.
• Political realities: Both the US and Iran are driven by domestic and international image concerns, making meaningful, lasting progress unlikely in the near term.

A final thought from the host:

“We do tend to want to wrap things up into a three minute sound bite and say, look, it's got a beginning, a middle and an end. … a lot of these problems don't focus, don't work that way.” ([58:50])

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For those looking to understand the current state of US-Iran (and Israel-Lebanon) relations and why hopes for ceasefire or peace are likely to disappoint, this episode offers a candid, expert-level deconstruction of the region’s strategic realities.

Transcript

[A]

Welcome to the PDB Situation report. I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world stage. And what a world stage it is. All right, let's get briefed. First up, the ceasefire between the US And Iran is barely holding, right? Well, to be true, it's barely holding since the beginning as tensions persist in the Strait of Hormuz and both sides clash over Israel's war against Hezbollah. Now retired Army Colonel Wesley Martin joins us for more on that later in the show. After some of the most intense strikes yet on Hezbollah, Prime Minister Netanyahu opens the door to talks with Lebanon. We'll get analysis from David Dowd, friend of the show and senior fellow at the foundation for Defense of Democracies. But first, today's Situation Report Spotlight. A tenuous ceasefire is now in place between the US And Iran. And I think tenuous ceasefire doesn't do justice to just how tenuous it is. But as I mentioned, it's already showing signs of strain on the ground. Tensions persist. Iran is still controlling transit through the Strait of Hormuz while accusing Washington of violating the agreement over Israel's campaign in Lebanon. That's an interpretation that the White House disputes. For more on this, I want to bring in Colonel Wesley Martin. He's the former senior anti terrorism officer for all coalition forces Iraq and co author of a terrific book. Book's title is Earn It. Life, Times and Leadership. Colonel Martin, thanks very much for joining us and welcome to the Situation report.

[B]

I appreciate it. And we have to give due credit on the the book, the eighth Sergeant Major of the Army, Julius Bill Gates, it was the story of his life. And what Bill and I did is we used it as a forum for leadership. And what the book says, Earn it and also history of the Times. So given Sergeant Major of the Army Gates due credit as well, awesome individual.

[A]

Where can people find the book?

[B]

Sir, it's on Amazon. Matter of fact, it's on my website as well. If you go to even if you go to Google and you type in col for kernel C O L space we S space Martin M A R T I N so kernel space west space Martin on Google that will pop up and my website will be the first thing you'll see the book is in the immediate upper left corner.

[A]

Nice. Well, let's if we could, let's get stuck into I suppose you've heard about this whole kerfuffle, this thing going on with Iran. If you give me a top line assessment of where you think we are right now, kind of we're a handful of days into what they're referring to as a ceasefire, although I think that's a liberal use of the word ceasefire. But. But if you could give us your assessment of where we are right now and then we'll take it from there.

[B]

My assessment, we're in a stalemate in the Middle East. They have a mindset, when I am in a position of weakness, how can I negotiate when I am in a position of strength, why should I? And that's what both sides are doing right now. Iran feels like it's in a position of strength because it's grabbed the Strait of Hormuz and it is able to launch rockets and drones in all directions. So they feel they're in a position of strength. The United States has the superior technology as well as Israel. They feel they're in a position of strength, so they're both trying to jockey from the same position. And this ceasefire is not going to hold. And any agreement made with Iran is not going to take, because this country, since 1979, it's been the number one nation state, exporter of terrorism, international terrorism. And they have two slogans. Death to America, death to Israel. And even the baby Khamenei, the new Supreme Leader, has already announced he is going to come back with massive retaliation against Israel and the United States. So that's the, that's the environment we're sitting in right now.

[A]

Yeah. It's interesting. You bring up most of the son of the former or the deceased Supreme Leader. He hasn't been seen, obviously, nor heard from since being named a successor. There have been some written statements that have been read by anchors, news anchors and others, but so far, nothing. And that, of course, leads to the question of, you know, who is in charge in Iran at this point, from your perspective? And, you know, if, if, if we're not still clear on if whoever is in charge has control over all the various elements of the country, then why would there be optimism over a potential deal?

[B]

There cannot be optimism with the country we're dealing with. Now, there's another mindset that the Western mindset that was applied that shouldn't have been, having been working so long with Iraqis and with Iranians, I understand their mindset to a great degree. When we came out, the President came out and said, we have cut off the head of the snake. That's not Middle East. They ought to look at the body of a mother spider like a wolf spider. If you take your shoe and you smash the wolf spider, all of a sudden all those little babies on top of its back is going to go running off in many, many directions. And that's what's happened. And right now the IRGC is operating off existing pre tested plans of operation on how to conduct hostile missions against the West. They already had everything in place. Like I have seen the top secret plan that the Iranian government had developed for putting it into protest. And that was exercised in January when all across the Persian regions and eventually all across Iran protests arose. And by Iran's own estimate, they machine gunned down 36,000. Amnesty in the international is putting it at more like 80,000. Iran is very good at developing plans of operations and following through on them. Their operations security program, their OPSEC program, protecting information is terrible. Otherwise I wouldn't have been able to see the thing because the National Council of Resistance of Iran was able to get a copy of it. And that is the primary resistance group to the Iranian regime and has been for decades. State Department was always just trying to appease Iran. So they declared this organization a terrorist organization, which it wasn't. And director of the FBI Louis Freeh at the time told Madeleine Albright, you're wrong, don't do that. But Madeleine Albright was going to do what Madeleine Albright was going to do. And as a result, friend of my friend is my enemy. So she thought Iran would like the United States, so their enemy is our enemy. And State Department has beat that drum for decades now. And when I was the commander of Camp Ashraf, Iraq, on my second half of my second tour, I was with the former National Liberation army element of the moshehuddini cult, which is part of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. And the biggest I saw, the biggest enemy I had there was the U.S. state Department. Because I have a saying, arrogance and incompetence have a habit of riding together firmly molded on the back of the same. And I'll leave that last word out because I know this is a family program, but I think the audience can fill in what the word is.

[A]

But

[B]

the President has an option. First off, I wish the President had gone into this paying attention to the doctrine that was initially established by Caspar Weinberger and then refined by Colin Powell. So the Weinberg of Powell Doctrine, Iran, yes, we have a vital national interest and Iran is a threat. All nonviolent options pretty much exhausted because Iran wasn't going to abide by anything anyway. But the other elements of the Weinberg Apollo Doctrine were ignored. Clear attainable objectives, a risk and cost analysis. The risk. What could Iran do with all these drones? And we've seen as a result of the drones being used by Putin against Ukraine. Those are Iranian drones for the most part. So we knew the threat was there, an exit plan strategy. And I'll get back to that in a minute. Consequences considered. That's what we're going up with right now. Then American public support and international public support. Neither of those were assault until after we got into the conflict. But going back to the plausible exit strategy, that's where we have the option of let's work with the Iranian people. Let's get them the Clojnikovsk that they need. Let's get them the materials they need. And not just the current the blue in the southeast, the Arabs in the southwest, the Azeris in the north central and the Persian people themselves. My estimate

[A]

let me actually before I pick up on that, and I want to I want to start up right where you just left off in terms of this, this potential, the scenarios for exit plans. But before we do that, I have to take a quick break. And so if you could stay right where you are, Colonel. We'll be back with more from Colonel Wesley Martin here on THE SITUATION report. So you know what I'm going to say next. Please stick around. Hey, Mike Baker here. Let me take a moment to talk about personal finances and the importance of diversifying your assets. So here's the question. Do you own physical gold? Well, in today's world with its ups and downs and general instability, and I think we can all agree we've got a bit of general instability out there, owning gold is something that everyone, anyone should consider. And here's a top tip, Acre Gold makes it simple. Acre. That's Acre. With Acre Gold, you pick a plan that fits your budget, you make monthly payments, and when you've accumulated enough, well, they ship you a beautifully designed 24 karat Swiss gold bar. Gold is up 70% year over year. And central banks, well, they're still buying it up at record levels. The reality is smart money has been moving into hard assets for a reason. And Acre Gold makes investing and owning gold easier than ever. Let me just say once you hold a physical asset like gold in your hand, you understand the difference between owning something real, something physical, as compared to investments that are just numbers on a screen. Right now, they're giving away over 18 grams of gold in their Acre declassified sweepstakes. So enter for free and subscribe to [e-mail] PDB Again, that's getacregold.com PDB

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[B]

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[A]

Welcome back to the PDB Situation report. Joining me once again is retired Army Colonel Wesley Martin. We're talking all things Iran currently and Colonel, we we finished up the previous segment and you, you were starting to talk about the various factions and, and the, the potential for how do you, how do you get out of this situation in Iran with a, and an ending that means something for the, the people of Iran. Right. Rather than just same regime. And before I get to that point, I, I am fascinated by the, the White House running with a narrative about they are now dealing with a brand new regime. What do you make of that?

[B]

No, they're not. They're not dealing with a brand new regime. What the White House accomplished when Khomeini's compound was hit and all the other attacks and the brilliant attacks, I got to give them credit for that. They opened up the promotion system and so the younger generation that was fully indoctrinated into this Islamic regime is now taking charge and they're operating off existing plans and it's going to be more brutal and more vicious than ever. So it's not a new regime. It's the old one that has been modified. For instance, at the end of World War II, President Roosevelt, in the closing days of taking down Germany, President Roosevelt died. That didn't bring an end to the United States government. President Truman stepped up to the plate and finished the war. That is basically the same thing that's happening only on a much broader scale in that the same Iranian regime, but now they're going to come back with a vengeance. And to say we're dealing with a whole new one that is again applying Western mindset to Middle east and it don't work. T. Lawrence of Arabia actually pointed that out a hundred years ago. He said don't try to think in our terms of how they do things in the Middle East.

[A]

Yeah, that, that does tend to be a standard practice for no matter who is in The White House. And it comes down to the old concept of mirroring our values onto, onto other cultures, other societies. Have you seen before? I forget. I've gotten to a certain point in my life, Colonel, where if I don't write something down and don't ask the question immediately, there is a good chance that I'll forget. But I wanted to ask you about the concept of the. The what we've done to their military capabilities. Right, and, and to what degree have you seen statistics that you consider credible? Because we've talked in a very broad sense, that we've heard from a variety of people. We've obliterated their abilities, we've completely decimated, et cetera. But in, in practical terms, how good was our information on what the Iranian regime had in terms of their let's go with their missile program? And how good is our intelligence, our data on to what degree we've degraded that program?

[B]

I do believe that we have eliminated 80% of their air defense artillery. I do believe that we've obliterated 90% of their navy and hit 90% of their factories. But what was not fully understood, and that goes back to the Weinberg Powell Doctrine, is the risk and the cost analysis and the consequences. The intelligence community did not comprehend and understand the structure of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They can operate as independent cells, and they already had an arsenal of drones spread throughout the whole country. So these individual cells, the terrorist organizations, operate anywhere between 10 and 30 member cells. The IGC is a terrorist organization. They know how to split them up. So if one cell or majority of the cells are compromised, you still got all the others that are operational. And that's what we're seeing. The intelligence community, the same intelligence community that told us Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, which he didn't. Tarek Aziz told me himself, we gave those up years ago. The intelligence community missed 9, 11. The intelligence community missed Pearl Harbor. I don't put a lot of faith in the intelligence community because they usually sit around regurgitating information and cyclic information. When I was in Iraq, General Sanchez used to stop me all the time in the hallway. What's going on? Was his favorite question, because he knew I was out there with the sergeants and the lieutenants and the captains in the field while his intelligence section were sitting in their Sensitive Compartment and Information facility, their scifi regurgitate information that was filtered from the field.

[A]

We've had military success in degrading the missile program. You know, we've targeted to some degree, further degrading their nuclear program, their leadership structure. But I, I think you're right in the sense that when we talk about the leadership structure of the IRGC and also the, the other elements of the Iranian government, it does seem we were surprised at their resilience because they already had, essentially, I think they've always planned for the need to promote from within because of the potential for those at the top to be taken out. And so they had a bench, a very deep bench, it seems, and they just have been moving people up. And again, I couldn't agree with you more. I think the idea, the narrative of saying were dealing with a whole new regime and they seem quite reasonable. You know, that's political framing, right? That's, that's being done for political purposes because we've got a midterm election because, you know, they, they realize they can't be there for, for the long term. So we've got to construct some narrative that allows us to declare victory and walk off.

[B]

I totally agree. And as I mentioned earlier, what we did is we opened up the promotion system and these people now fill in the shoes, have been fully indoctrinated into this extremist, religious, extremist theocracy, and as a result, they're going to be more dangerous. Give another example. When the Soviet Union was getting ready to collapse as a young man, I made an assessment. When it goes, the future leader will come from within that deep, indoctrinated Soviet government, and he could be the most dangerous adversary we ever had. Now we have Putin. The same thing can go for Iran. These guys that's now taken charge have come up through that extremist theocracy, and they're much smarter than the older ones, and they vowed revenge.

[A]

I know this is, I want to be mindful of the time, Colonel, and I know this is a fairly broad question, if it's even a question, but where do you think this is going in the short term? Short term being, let's say the next couple of weeks.

[B]

Next couple of weeks, everybody's going to try to, from their position of strength, say, try to get something to say I won. And that's going to be both sides. And the truth is it's a stalemate, and it's going to stay a stalemate, except it's going to get worse in the near future unless President Trump and his administration starts working with the Iranian people. We don't need troops on the ground. They will be decimated by swarms of drones, and any relief trying to go in and get them will be decimated. By swarms of drones. Work with the Iranian people. Get with the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Marion Rajavi, the leader, has put out a 10 point plan and she has stated, and one of the things is the end of Sharia law, which is the law based upon interpretation of the Koran and go back to the rule of law. The Iranian people in 1953 had a good form of government, but because Mosaddeq was going to nationalize oil, the British Petroleum got upset. And what he wanted to do is instead of being paid pennies on the dollar, be paid reasonable price so he could run the country. So first they went to the British, went to Harry Truman. He threw him out of the office. No, we don't do this. Then they reinvented it for Dwight Eisenhower and said, mosaddeq is leaning towards Stalin. Oh, we have a crisis. Let's get rid of Mosaddeq. Let's get the Shah's family back in power. So in 1953, they had a good government stripped from them. They tried in 1979, but Khameney came in, excuse me, Khomeini came in with his fundamentalist extremism and they wiped out all opposition. And right now, the Iranian government, the IRGC and the morality police are going around rounding up anybody they think may be a threat to the future of Iran in executing them. And I see the reports every day of the executions of the dissidents that's coming out of Iran again.

[A]

It is. You can be so pessimistic and cynical when it comes to, you know, the future for the Iranian people, because we've seen it time and time again, and it looks like, okay, maybe this is the moment where they'll rise up. The fact that they've been slaughtered by the thousands and thousands just recently, you know, I think the idea that somehow we were going to start this conflict and that would be the impetus for them to come back out on the streets when they've already seen what happens. And when the regime said, if you come back out on the streets, we will kill you. I guess the question then is, is, and I understand what you're saying about the various factions, you know, if you can arm the people. But past history, I think, points out that that can be very problematic.

[B]

It can be, but the United States has been a major source of the problem. In 2009, following the alleged election that got Ahmadinejad in power, the people went to the streets. Instead of throwing the people a lifeline, President Obama threw Iran a lifeline. Because he wanted the nuclear weapons deal. Then you go in all the subsequent protests and uprising and you're right, we think this is the time, this is the time, this is the time. And one of the things I've hit, the point I've hit with the resistance is you've got to coordinate your attacks with what's going on in the world. Last June I told them Israel opened the door for you, but nothing happened. This time the door has been blasted off its hinges. But unfortunately you're right. The protest in January with the mass slaughter up to 80,000 or more killed a lot of people that could have been stand up against the government. But there are still a lot of Iranian people right now that's ready to put an end. And there are resistance elements, small groups, up to 30 people throughout the country and multiply those 30100 times over. And I've talked to the resistance about building this up. I did a very detailed report of. It was an after action review of the protests in January and what's going on now. One of the things that happened five days before the Israel hit the compound of Khomeini, there was an attack by members of the moshehuddini Kolk on Khamenei's compound. Two hundred and fifty attacked that compound. A hundred of them got killed and they had to pull back. The IRGC ramped up security big time on that compound. So when Netanyahu's forces slammed the compound with at least two missiles, it wiped out a lot more irgc, which is a good thing to do. That's the best thing you can do with the irgc. But the resistance is there. But the President has got to reach out to him, he's got to work with him and he's not listen to the deep state that's going to say, oh, Madeleine Albright said they're a terrorist organization, so they are. No, yeah.

[A]

You know, I think, I think again I keep going back to the same problem. I hate being a cynic, I don't like to be a cynic. But I just, when it comes to where this is heading, I think there's the, the, the politics of this will drive the day will basically almost insist on a, on a deal of some sort. And so I, I'm concerned that that will then lead them to make some concessions to the existing Iranian regime in an effort to say, here we are, look, we've done this, we've created peace, we, we have a major military victory and that we've degraded their military and they have, there's no doubt about that. So that's fine. But you've essentially kicked this can further down the road than previous administrations have. But you've still kicked the can because you've still got the Islamic Republic. Colonel, I hate to do this because I've got another page of questions for you, but we have to wrap it up there. And I hope you'll come back when

[B]

they'll be glad to. We got a lot to talk about. I'll be glad to come back.

[A]

We have a lot to talk about, sir. Listen, Colonel Martin, thank you so much for joining us here on the PDB Situation Report. I look forward to the next conversation.

[B]

Thank you so much.

[A]

Thank you. Well, after the break. After weeks of Israeli strikes on Hezbollah, Prime Minister Netanyahu says Israel is now open to negotiations with Lebanon, with the Lebanese government. We'll have more on that with David Doubt, senior fellow at the foundation for Defense of Democracies. Stay with us. Hey, Mike Baker here with a message for dog lovers everywhere. Now, if you're like me, dogs are an important part of family life. Look, we've got two our old golden retriever, Hendricks, he's almost 14 years old, moving along. And Monty, our very cute but slightly dim witted King Charles spaniel. Now, as you probably know, when it comes to your dog food, there always seems to be a compromise, right? It's either fresh and healthy or it's easy to store and serve. Well, that's why we love Sundaes for dogs, right? With the Sundaes for Dogs brand, you get both fresh and healthy dog food that's easy to store and serve. Founded by veterinarian Dr. Tori Waxman, Sundaes is created with air dried real food made in a human food grade kitchen using the same ingredients that you'd use to cook for your family. Every bite is clean and packed with real meat, fruit and veggies. There's no weird, unpronounceable ingredients, no fillers. Compared to other brands, Sundays invests 50 times more in its ingredients for true premium quality. There's no cost cutting here. Just scoop and serve. No freezer, no thawing, no prep, no mess. Make the switch to Sundays. Go right now to sundaysfordogs.com PDB50 and get 50% off your first order. Or you can use code PDB50 at checkout. That's 50% off your first order at sundaysfordogs.com PDb50 Again, sundaysfordogs.com Pdb50 or use code PDB50 at checkout.

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[A]

Welcome back to the Situation Report. After days of intense Israeli strikes targeting Hezbollah positions in Lebanon, Prime Minister Netanyahu is now signaling a shift, perhaps. His office announced on Thursday that Israel is prepared to open direct negotiations with the Lebanese government, a move that could ease some of the pressure. Now the move comes after reports that the White House pressured Netanyahu to ease off so as not to threaten the fragile ceasefire or whatever we're calling it with Iran. For more on this, I want to bring in David Dowd. He's a senior fellow at the foundation for Defensive Democracies focused on Lebanon and Hezbollah. David, thanks very much for joining us again here on THE SITUATION report.

[C]

It's always a pleasure.

[A]

All right. There is, as we were discussing just before we started, there is a lot going on. You start. I'm not going to ask you a question. I'm going to say you start with what you think is the most important thing for people to know right now.

[C]

Well, look, I mean, first thing to know right now is that this is not the conflict in Lebanon is not a new conflict. It's the same war that started on October 8th of 2023 and it never really ended. Right. People think a ceasefire means you go back to the status quo antebellum. Right. The situation before the war. But I'll put on dual caps here. Right. My cap is a Hezbollah analyst and My cap as a lawyer, my focus was on international wallowak. And what ceasefires do is they don't bring conflict to an end. They basically operate as a contract between two parties. In this case, November 27, 2024, ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon governing the conduct of the parties for the duration of the ceasefire period. Now, Israel was supposed to stop, and I quote, offensive operations in Lebanon and Lebanon concurrently in order to secure that and maintain that was supposed to stop or sorry, it was supposed to get all attacks from its territory, including those non state actors for which it's ultimately responsible as the sovereign. And then starting, and I'm quoting again, starting with the southern Litany area, begin the disarmament of Hezbollah and then pursue that disarmament north of the litany area. And what we saw, unfortunately over the past 15 months prior to the conflict was one, and again this is a term of art, if you will, a serious violation after the next, both by Hezbollah, which again lost its right to remain armed, both as a matter of domestic Lebanese law and as a matter of international law. It was supposed to be disarmed according to the ceasefire. So I had no right to regenerate and no right to rearm under the terms that Lebanon is the sovereign. Agreed. And every attempt, the ongoing attempts by Hezbollah admitted by the organization, boasted about by the organization constituted a serious violation of the cease now that put the primary responsibility upon Lebanon to do something right to disarm Hezbollah. And what we saw was a lot of movements by the Lebanese government, some encouraging, some less so, but nothing that really went into action. We saw the Lebanese government adopt, or not even adopt, welcome the, and I'll tell you why I stress that term, welcome and contradistinction to adopt the LAF's disarmament plan on September 5th of 2025. And you know, Paul Marcos, the Lebanese Information Minister, when he gave his press statement after this, this, this, call it a decision, this, this discussion in the cabinet, he was asked repeatedly by Lebanese journalists, what does welcome mean? Why aren't you just saying you adopted it? He's like welcomed it. We welcomed it. So it seemed like they wanted to kind of have it both ways. And then in terms of implementation, Lebanon had shifted, right? A month prior, the Prime Minister had given instructions to the LAF to draw up a plan within a month's time to secure Hezbollah's total disarmament throughout the country by the end of 2025. The LAF plan that was welcomed and not adopted focused on the southernly tiny area alone by the end of 2025. So there was a shift there in the timeline and then there was a shift subsequently because Hezbollah opposition to this obviously in, in what the plan would, would entail, right? They went from disarmament, nazas sila in Arabic, right, to containment, taking hasr silati, the containment of weapons, quite literally. That's what it literally means in Arabic. So they were basically saying that we're not going to go and forcibly take Hezbollah's arms away. We're going to contain the weapons, we're going to try to seal our borders, we're going to try to secure some sites and hope, you know, these weapons will rust quicker than Hezbollah can regenerate. And then on January 8 of 2026, the LAF claimed that it had finished this job right in the southern Litany area. Turned out to not be true, right? The Israelis, Hezbollah refused, even before the conflict restarted on March 2, refused to certify that this had happened. I'm Kassim, gave a speech in February saying, on my business to say whether this happened or not. The Israelis kept striking people belonging to Hezbollah that were involved, according to the Israelis, in local regeneration efforts. So if you kind of dovetail those two claims, it looks like Hezbollah was regenerating. And then this was proven after the conflict restarted. Now why do I emphasize that this conflict restarted, right, because on March 2, why do I emphasize the continuity here? Because Israel for 15 months continued to target Hezbollah, right? These were technical violations of the ceasefire, but justifiable because of Lebanon and Hezbollah serious violations in terms of not doing what they were supposed to do on their end. If you don't do what you're supposed to do on your end and a contract, the other party is entitled to self help measures. This operates under a ceasefire. And then, you know, When Hezbollah lobs five rockets at Israel on March 2, five or six projectiles, the Israelis respond predictably to ferociously with overwhelming force. Now, you could say from a status of peacetime, that's disproportionate, but from a status of continuing the conflict that began on October 8th of 2023 and it never ended, the ceasefire never ended it, this was the proper response. Hezbollah attacked. Israel is entitled to resume the conflict at full force at that point. And now this is where we are today. And the dynamic, right, Lebanon has done a lot since then, were said a lot rather since then. March 2, they proscribe Hezbollah's military activities for the first time in Lebanon's history since Hezbollah's inception. This is a major step saying, you know, Hezbollah, your Claims of self defense, they're unjustifiable because the sovereign Beirut has said, no, not, not happening. And then they, I think a couple of days later, they order the arrest and deportation of IRGC personnel operating in Lebanon. I think, you know, at the end of the month, I'm forgetting the exact date, they order the, the Iranian ambassador designate, and I emphasize designate, because it makes a difference. He wasn't the full ambassador, so it kind of minimizes the importance of the move. They order him, they declare him Persona non grata and order him to leave Lebanon by March 29th. So, okay, March 2nd, you have this great decision. The LAF. Five days later, the Lebanese army, which is going to be tasked by the government, which has to submit to the government's decisions, right? When, when Rodolf Heikal, the LAF commander, met with Lindsey Graham and Senator Graham asked him is Hezbollah terrorist organization, he essentially declined to declare it such because his excuse, and the Lebanese kind of the Lebanese excuse was, well, Haika's not a politician. He has to submit to the government's decisions. Okay, well, when, you know, the moment of truth came, the LAF issued a statement on March 7, March 8, depending on which time zone you're in, and said, effectively, we're not doing this. LAF's priority is maintaining domestic peace and domestic stability. Right? A euphemism for we're not going to go forcibly disarm Hezbollah. We're going to continue with the dialogue.

[A]

Right?

[C]

The dialogue that the Lebanese had tried for 15 months, which Hezbollah exploited to continue rearming. Not a single IRGC official has been arrested and deported by Lebanon. Many have fled. But according to Axios, it's because they feared, you know, Israeli strikes targeting them. And again, when it comes to the Iranian ambassador designate, this was such a nothing burger because first of all, he hadn't fully assumed his role, Right? He'd never, he'd arrived on February 28th or 29th of 2026. He hadn't presented his credentials yet. So he wasn't the full ambassador yet. And that impacts the decision. This is a guy who's waiting to assume his role. And Lebanon emphasized first and secondarily, even if he had been the ambassador, the decision did not affect the operations explicitly. According to the Lebanese Foreign Ministry, it did not affect the operations of the Iranian Embassy, which helps Hezbollah, which helps undermine Lebanese sovereignty. So you're removing one guy, but you're not taking care of the problem. And according to the Lebanese Foreign Ministry, this move would have no impact on Beirut's relations with Tehran. Despite Tehran continuing to undermine Lebanese sovereignty. So that problem isn't this individual himself. The problem is this system. And yet, as you noted, he refused to leave with the support of certain Lebanese factions, not just Hezbollah, but Amal and the Lebanese parliament speaker. So when yesterday, Prime Minister Nov Salam says again, decades late, 15 months too late, that Beirut is going to be declared a demilitarized zone and the only arms to be carried in Beirut are those of the state, you have to approach it with a bit of skepticism. And you have to wonder, well, if you don't have control over your capital, right. If you can't control your capital, this is again a big statement with no impact. How the heck are we supposed to believe that you control the periphery?

[A]

Well, let me ask you this. Following that same line, Prime Minister Netanyahu came out and people made a big deal of it, splashed across the media that he said, well, you know, I'm willing to open discussions, you know, and, and start negotiating with the Lebanese government. Well, what's the point of that if, as you pointed for decades, you can go back to 1983 and how that fell apart. But you know, talk to me about, about that. If, if he's saying we're going to negotiate with the Lebanese government and yet the Lebanese government has proven time and time again that they have no ability to control or influence Hezbollah, what's the point?

[C]

Well, this is where kind of the conspiracy theories about Israel controlling America and President Trump taking orders from Prime Minister Netanyahu kind of fall apart. And the only explanation here is that President Trump told him this is what's going to happen. And we've seen time and time again that when President Trump says this is what's going to happen, the Israelis comply. And, you know, President Trump doesn't brook the kind of disagreement, let's say President Biden or President Obama did, despite the tensions in the US Israel relationship at the time. Right. The Israeli Prime Minister. I mean, there's that famous video of President or President Obama sitting, you know, cross legged with his hand on his chin as Prime Minister Netanyahu gave him a lecture on Middle Eastern history in front of a press corps that doesn't fly with President Trump. We saw how it went for President Zelensky when, when, when, you know, when there was an attempt to do that. So why is President Trump saying this? Right. It's because Iran is saying, hey, this ceasefire that you want with us with Iran, Lebanon is implicated in it. Otherwise, the United States is not implicated in an Israeli war in Lebanon. Our interests are Our interests certainly are, you know, we have a direct interest now. And this is something most Americans, I think, no reason to realize, but Hezbollah has set us, the United States, as its primary enemy. This is in every constitutional document they have. This is in every statement they say every time Israel launches a war, they primarily blame the United States 2006 war, for example. They say that Israel was hesitant and reluctant to engage in that war and America pushed them to it as part of President George W. Bush's attempt to create a new Middle East. So Israel is a tool, a forward military base. And Hezbollah says that, you know, every conflict, every struggle in which they engage is measured against this yardstick of how to negatively impact the United States. So we have an interest in the degradation of this organization because it has acted as the spearhead of Iranian regional expansionism. And Iranian regional expansionism aims to diminish our influence, all of our, not just our military presence, our ability to have influence in the region. And why does this affect us? Because this is a resource rich region, because it has critical trade routes, because we have critical allies there. So American power is shrunken in the Middle East. It will ultimately impact us here. It might not be the direct impact of, say, missiles and strikes and kind of this bombastic way of going about things, but it will impact our way of life here. And ultimately Iran and its partners, Russia, China, Venezuela, what they want to do is do this, this diminishing of American power in all of these regions so that ultimately they can dictate to us and we are no longer the world's hegemon. And you can imagine how that will affect American life at home.

[A]

And I just made a note because we got to pick this up right after going to a break. But I think the way that you've outlined this, I think is extremely helpful in terms of the explanation, the analysis that this is not just a conflict that just started up a meeting between Israel and Lebanon. Again, I love the way that you tied it into what happened with the ongoing, the previous conflict from 23 that kicked off when Hezbollah began supporting the 7 October attacks. But before we get into the next question, I think you know what's coming up. I've got to take a quick break, so if you'll stay right there, we'll have more with David Dowd here on the PDB Situation Report. So please stick around. This episode is brought to you by HBO Max. The final season of the Emmy Award winning series Hacks is now streaming. Starring Jean Smart and Hannah Einbinder.

[C]

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[A]

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[A]

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[A]

Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Joining me once again is David Doubt, the senior fellow at the foundation for Defense of Democracies. We've been talking all things Lebanon, all things Hezbollah. David, if we could, I think there's some confusion out there as to why there's confusion over what was included supposedly in this ceasefire. So you've got these different interpretations. Washington and Jerusalem saying, no, Lebanon was not part of this ceasefire. I don't really know if you can call it a ceasefire. A ceasefire usually means that you cease firing. We've got a lot of problems with this supposed two week lull. The Strait of Hormuz still not open. But let me talk about the, the interpretation here. How, how did it come down to this? You would think you've got just only a handful of people negotiating this, right. You've got messages being passed back and forth and at some point you say, yes, we've got an agreement, which is what they've been saying. We have a two week ceasefire. So how does it get so cocked up that you've got the Iranians and the Hezbollah saying, well, we're, you know, Lebanon's part of this. And you've got the other two major players saying, no, that was never included in the deal. Can you talk to us about that?

[C]

Sure. I think, let me divide this into two parts. The first is what was likely discussed in the second, why is Iran trying to inject this? Look, I, I, I like that, you know, I, I like that you, the way you described it, I'm loathe to call it a ceasefire. Again, this is my, my lawyer nerve being struck here because a ceasefire agreement means a contract. A contract entails me making an offer, consideration, you accepting it. Right. And without that acceptance, I'm just talking to myself. Right? So what we see here, I think is a scramble on the one hand of each side to declare victory for their own reasons.

[A]

Right.

[C]

President Trump has the midterm elections coming up, so he has to demonstrate that this war wasn't, was not for naught and that he achieved military, American military objectives. And Iran simultaneously has to also claim victory because its whole utility to its followers, Right. The whole message it's had for 50 years is that if you pursue this path of the Islamic Republic, then you will be able to this path of independence, this path of non alignment, neither east nor west, then you will be able to successfully stand up to the global arrogance, right, primarily represented by the United States now. And you will always emerge victorious. So if America is with, with evil Israel, right, is able to pummel you into a corner and force you to terms that starts to crack this image and your utility. So they always have to claim victory. Now both sides are scrambling and really what this is, this is, as you said, a lull in fighting and an attempt not to negotiate under fire.

[A]

Right?

[C]

And what will, what will be the outcome? If there is an outcome at the end of these two weeks, that will be the cease fire agreement and then we will have a ceasefire. Right now this is just an attempt not to negotiate under fire. Now what happened behind closed doors? I don't know, it's hard to tell. Each side is putting its offer, right, 15 points, Iran's 10 points out there, as if it is the agreement. And our 15 points did not include Lebanon. Their 10 points did include Lebanon. So what happened between closed doors? I think if, if, if, if I'm putting on my analysis cap, then they just agreed, like, let's just stop shooting for now and talk about it. So why is Iran trying to inject this? Is it because it cares about Lebanon? Absolutely not. If they cared about Lebanon, they would not have asked Hezbollah. And Hezbollah doesn't operate according to their, according to them. They do not fire, they do not fire a single rocket without a cleave sh. Without instruction from the Islamic Republic, without some kind of order coming from there. And Iran, predictably, the Israeli ferocious response was predictable. So they knew that Hezbollah was going to be endangered, as we talked about, right? Hezbollah, it's not just, you know, a tool against America, right? It is Iran's primary tool against America. Everywhere Iran has gone in the region, right, this, this attempt to clean us out of the region. Hezbollah has been there first, be it in Lebanon itself, in Yemen, in Bahrain, right, where they tried to arm the Shia opposition for a while, in Syria, obviously, where the Iranian regime thought it was existentially threatened if Assad would fall. So the loss of Hezbollah would prove a major setback for the regional project that I'm sure the Islamic Republic of Iran intends to continue pursuing at the right time, when it feels the time is suited, perhaps not immediately, if this ceasefire goes into effect. So they want to save Hezbollah, but America, the United States, despite its interest there, and this is the critical point, why are they including this? Despite our interest there, we're not implicated, unlike the war in Iran.

[A]

Right.

[C]

If Israel's fighting Iran, by definition we're implicated. Right. Look at June, right? The Israelis don't have the ability to fight this alone indefinitely, whereas in Lebanon they do. Right. They have the ability to take care of an American interest on behalf of us, which is the whole utility of the alliance, without a single American bullet ever having to be fired, without a single American soldier ever having to be implicated. So what Iran is trying to do is to try to force America to have an interest in the Lebanon ceasefire in saying, you see this Iran ceasefire that you like over here, it would be a shame if something happened to it, and that's dependent upon a concurrent ceasefire in Lebanon. So you're implicating the United States directly in the ceasefire in Lebanon to save Hezbollah, where you're saying the ceasefire that you want so badly, President Trump will fall apart unless Hezbollah is, is saved effectively, even though they may not be putting it that way. And this explains why President Trump is telling Prime Minister Netanyahu, we have reports now on this. President Trump has confirmed this. Scale it back in Lebanon and why now we're going towards this push for a ceasefire in Lebanon despite, as you said, Lebanon's historical demonstrable inability to restrain Hezbollah. And nothing seems to have changed on the ground.

[A]

Yet it is. People always wonder why I'm so cynical every time I'm engaged in conversation about some of these issues in the Middle east that have just lingered on. And it's in part because of the way you're outlining this is. It just feels like for decades now, and I'm old enough to say several decades, that all we've been doing, however you want to put it, we've been kicking the can down the road, we've been putting lipstick on a pig, we've been bandaid on a sucking chest wound. It doesn't matter how you phrase it, it's all the same. We just keep, we just keep pushing the. This away, right? And saying, and I think there was, there was significant optimism, I think, on the part of the White House and, and a lot of folks who are just tired of watching Iran destabilize that region, that this conflict that, you know, okay, well, we've got a ceasefire, perhaps, but. But the past conflict, most recent one, was going to somehow create a sea change. I think that the optimism extended to where people will rise up despite having been slaughtered by the thousands just recently. And it'll be a brand new day. You'll have a new opportunity for the people of Iran, you'll get long term stability in the region, all these things. I think people were a little intoxicated with this idea. And we're willing to look away from this long, long history of, and the reality of how complicated this, this, this is. Are you with it? And now I'm climbing off my soapbox now, but, David, are you. What do you think about this? My, my concern here with this ceasefire discussions is that as you pointed out, the White House is very keen to get out of this with what they can describe as a victory. And my concern is that they are going to make concessions to this existing Iranian regime in an effort to rush to what they can call a deal, a peace deal. And I don't see how they extricate themselves from this while the Iranians know that their possible only point of leverage is a straight up Hormuz. I know that's it. There's a question in there somewhere, David. I'll let you run with it.

[C]

Look, I mean, it always reminds me of that verse from Jeremiah. They say, peace, peace, but there is no peace. And I think the word peace has been thrown around over the past year to mean something that it doesn't. Right. Peace is not the mere cessation of hostilities for a time. And the regime has not been changed. Give me a break. At all in Iran. It has been degraded. It is perhaps, I don't know if it's been defanged, it's been set back considerably. May take years for them to recoup the losses from this campaign, but to say it's been changed is to engage in self deception while deception is a part of warfare. Warfare, self deception should not be. But you know, peace has meant quiet. But quiet while Iran exploits that quiet to continue pursuing its old objectives. And Iran's playing the long game, we think, in two year increments, maybe four year increments. Right. Presidential elections, midterm elections. They have the luxury of an autocracy. And I use that, I'm speaking facetiously here, obviously I love being in a democracy. But they have the luxury of thinking of the long game this round. Perhaps they lost in this round. Starting on October 7th. They did suffer major setbacks. So what they'll do is go quiet for a while. They'll play nice. They'll play like good boys and wait until the currents in the United States that are leaning towards isolationism, which this war and its outcomes may speed up, lead the United States, whether we have a future Democratic president or Republican president to be even more disinterested in the Middle east and then resume their activities. That's not peace. That's absolutely not peace. That's a lull. That's a temporary lull, even if that lull lasts 10 years, 20 years. So, you know, the outcomes here aren't necessarily in our favor. And I think we have a problem in the United States and it stems from our nature as a country. We're an idealistic country, we're a good country at our nature. Not to say we don't make mistakes, terrible ones at times, cruel ones at times. Right. But I think in our nature we are a country that tries to see the best in people, tries to see ourselves and other people and want like we're genuinely optimistic and maybe it's because of our youth as a country and we're kind of, you know, cutting our teeth as we, as we go along and we think that there are solutions to everything. And I can relate to this. Right. I as a person like to think that reason, you know, if I can just have a rational discussion with you, then we can resolve anything, right? No, because people are inherently irrational. People have their own objectives. And if only we would stop engaging in this willful self deception. It's not just this administration. We've done this for decades and admit, look, maybe there's no immediate solution. Maybe we haven't solved the problem. Maybe we just have, as you've said, put a band aid on it, put lipstick on a pig. Let's at least call it out for what it is. This is putting lipstick on a pig. Right? This is putting a band aid on it. Maybe we'll deal with it again. But let's, let's at least be honest with ourselves that look, this is what we achieved, this is what we could achieve and this is the remaining problem and this is how we will have to deal with it. By the way, that's how we confronted the Soviet Union, which is a, you know, an analogous but not identical creature to, to Iran. And it took us how many decades to finally emerge victorious from the Cold War. This one may last longer. Right. But at least we were honest and clear eyed about what we could achieve and what we were achieving at different increments in that long war with the Soviet Union. And now we should do the same when it comes to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

[A]

Yeah, I think you're spot on. Look, we don't, we, we don't have. Just because of the way the world has changed and kind of the way that technology has created this attention deficit disorder globally, you Know, you talk about this and you see the White House rushing to say, look, it's, you know, it's only been six weeks. You know, look how long World War II lasted. You know, War II, if we'd all had smartphones, wouldn't have lasted past the first landings on the beaches of Normandy. People would have been horrified and there would have been political pressure and we all would have stopped and gone home.

[C]

So.

[A]

And I think also you're absolutely correct when you say, and this comes from having spent the better part of 40 years overseas in some strange places, people sometimes roll their eyes when I say this, but the US regardless of what administration it is, it does tend to make decisions not for nefarious reasons. And people always like to ascribe very nefarious reasons to it. And sometimes there are. I, again, it's not, it's not a perfect system. It's human based. But there does tend to be this desire and part of that is this mirroring process. Right. We tend, and I think this is, I'm bringing this around to the Middle east and into the problems we're having out there is that we tend to mirror our values on other cultures, other societies. And no place is it more difficult for that to happen than in the Middle east where, you know, we've seen time and time again in Afghanistan, in Iraq and with Iran, wherever it may be, we, we throw our own values onto a culture and think, well, this is how they'll process this. This is how they'll react. This is what they'll want, because that's what we want. Right. And it's doesn't work. But David, as always, this has been a, you know, and I'm going to use the word delightful, a delightful conversation. Likewise. And it is, man. So listen, this, there's a lot more to discuss, but we very much appreciate your insight, your analysis on this, and I can guarantee you that we will be calling you back here very shortly to continue this conversation.

[C]

Whenever you need me, I'm here.

[A]

Excellent. Thanks so much, Matt. David Dowd of the foundation for Defense of Democracies. Great, great analysis grade set. It is so damn complicated. And we do tend to want to wrap things up into a three minute sound bite and say, look, it's got a beginning, a middle and an end. And tell you what, a lot of these problems don't focus, don't work that way. All right. That's all the time we have for this week's PDP situation Report. I know, I know, but, but, you know, be, be strong. We'll be back again next week. If you have any questions or comments, humorous anecdotes, limericks, perhaps, maybe a good dad joke, reach out to me at pdb@the first tv.com now the highlight of every week, as you may have heard before, at PDB headquarters, secret compound, which exists under a volcano, a dormant volcano, I can't tell you where because it's a secret layer, is every week we gather around the sacks of mail that you send and we select some of the questions and some of the comments and we smash them into an episode that we call Ask Me Anything. One sitting on the launch pad. And we're going to be throwing that out there very shortly. So keep your cards and letters coming. Finally, to listen to the podcast of this show ad free. You can do that. It's very simple. Just become a premium member of the President's Daily brief by visiting PDB premium.com See, I told you it was simple. I'm Mike Baker, and until next time. Well, you know the drill. Stay informed, stay safe, stay cool.

[B]

It.