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PDB Situation Report | February 7th, 2026: First U.S.–Iran Kinetic Clash & Xi Tightens His Grip
01:05:09
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A
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B
Welcome to the PDP Situation report. I'm Mike Baker and your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right, let's get briefed. First up, the US Downs an Iranian drone in international waters. It's the first direct kinetic encounter of a new and potentially dangerous phase with Tehran. We'll be joined by retired Rear Admiral Mike Stoudeman for more on that later in the show. China's military is facing fresh upheaval as Xi Jinping expands his purge of senior officers, tightening control amid growing concerns inside the People's Liberation army, the pla. Jan Yekalik, senior editor of the Epoch Times, stops by to give us insight into what's happening at the highest levels of power in Beijing. But first, today's Situation Report. Spotlight. This week, US Forces shot down an Iranian drone after it approached a U.S. aircraft carrier operating in international waters. According to U.S. central Command. The drone's intent was unclear, but its flight path and behavior were aggressive enough to trigger a defensive response. No damage was reported, but the message was US Forces will protect the fleet. The incident comes amid heightened regional tensions, of course, with US Naval assets operating in crowded, contested waterways where miscalculation can escalate fast. It also raises questions about how Iran tests limits without crossing red lines. For more on this, I want to bring in retired Rear Admiral Mike Stoudeman, former commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence. He's also the author of the book Might of the Forging Leaders of Iron Integrity. Sir, thank you very much for taking the time here on the situation report.
- [02:20]
C
Hey, Mike, good seeing you again. Can't wait for your hard questions.
- [02:24]
B
Well, stand by. I'm sure I'll come up with one or two. But first, you know what, before we even do any of that, tell me about the book a little bit if you could, you know, can you give the viewers a quick summary of what it's about and why you wrote it?
- [02:41]
C
Well, I retired two and a half years ago. I was very passionate about leadership. I Thought we had failings at the national level. It doesn't matter as politics or business or, you know, anything else. And I felt like I should throw in my voice and provide some tried and true methods for leading. It's not that hard if you study it and you actually do what you should do, being brilliant in the basics on leadership. And so I wrote stories that described how to work on yourself. The second section kind of talks about your team and how to build, you know, teams that are up to the job of doing the heavy lifting, which is kind of making change and dealing with big stuff, big challenges, you know, later on. So anyway, those are the, the elements of the book. And I tell short, short stories with, you know, quick takeaways to make sure that people can read it fast because their time's precious and they deserve somebody to boil it down for.
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B
Did you find it tough writing a book, if I could ask?
- [03:43]
C
As an intelligence officer, I couldn't tell my best stories. Right. I had to tell the ones that were. That's why I get the. I found them, I thought to highlight what I wanted to highlight, but I ended up taking a lot of verbiage out of the book to make room for more story and last sort of lecturing on leadership principles. I boiled those down to key takeaways. I really tried to make it something that somebody could read and be a page turner. They could get through it and they can get back to, you know, the business of their, of their lives.
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D
Yeah.
- [04:20]
B
Well, I honestly, I gotta tell you something, as the father of three teenage boys, I find storytelling is much better at enforcing ideas than. Than lecturing. It just seems how best. How people respond. But I would encourage everybody listening to you go out and check out the book might of the chain. So, sir, let's start when we're talking about Iran. I'm fascinated by this question. Maybe I'm beating a dead horse. But when President Trump said help is on its way in the thick of it, when the protesters were out there being shot, being detained at this stage of the game, now that they've regained control, the Iranian regime, I mean, what do you imagine President Trump meant by that? I know that's speculation, but what do you think help means at this stage?
- [05:17]
C
Well, that was always vague from the get go. I think there's a natural emotional response to want to do something and to weigh in and suggest that there's a hammer coming, to be able to moderate the behavior there. And so I think that's a natural reaction. Not only, you know, the shock, but the disgust, what was happening with the Iranians murdering their own people. And so trying to weigh in, trying to suggest that perhaps there's a threat that could be coming as a way to change the, you know, ongoing massacres, I think was sort of a natural thing. Now look, you don't have that many tools in the toolkit when it comes to changing Iran's domestic situation. If you're not, you know, in there with your own capability, then you're essentially in a standoff mode. So what do you have in standoff and how much is that actually going to change things? Those are all matters for national security policymakers to debate. And I'm sure they had those debates in the National Security Council as they figured out their option set a part.
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B
Of it is the emotive side of things, right? And you have to separate that out from real politics and sort of the way the world actually works as opposed to how you'd like it to work. But it seems like we've been watching, and I'm sure you've been watching what's been going on in Iran for decades and there's a familiar cycle to it. And it just seems like the international community, maybe because they are limited, obviously, and there's not an ability to respond in a meaningful way, but it seems like the response from the international community anytime that there's an uprising has always been feckless or just non existent. And it felt in the moment, I think, that this could have been different.
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C
I think that all leaders need to be very cautious with regard to either overrating your agency in making change in faraway places or to do so in an incurring way or overusing any one instrument to try to get your way. I frankly believe we're overusing our economic and our military instruments today at the detriment of the diplomatic and informational ones. I think we're out of balance with regard to how we use power. But power has its limits and we've learned that in the Middle east wars. So we ought to come at this with a little more humility and strategic patience. But when you do have a crisis like we saw, certainly you want to start throwing some levers pretty quick. And as we've seen sort of the military presence as it grew there in the Middle east, sort of the goal set has changed from, you know, don't hurt Iranians to now let me do ultra maximum pressure to start re, you know, negotiating a nuclear agreement of some sort.
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B
If I could ask, maybe this isn't a fair question, but if you were sitting at the big desk in the Oval Office. What would you do in this situation?
- [08:29]
C
Well, I do think that the window of opportunity is open for us to try to get Iran back into some kind of negotiated settlement regarding what's becoming sort of the wild, wild west with their nuclear, you know, program. So, look, they're. They're not affected by the sanctions to the degree necessary to have them change from what is an active program of ensuring that they continue to enrich. And this only goes in one dangerous direction. And so the question is, you know, how do we get them back to the table? This is the time to do it when they're at their weakest. And can we hammer out something that gets us to a modus within Dave doesn't create another world crisis in the making. Right. That affects all nations. So Iran's proxies are weakened domestically, economically, they're in a very bad way with the collapse of the real. And the legitimacy, clearly, of the theocracy, you know, is in deep question. And many people resent what the security forces have just done. So in order to prevent more pain or more punishment coming to Iran, both internally and externally, I think the Iranians are willing to talk. So I do think there's an opening. We'll see what happens when Muscat Aman starting tomorrow with Kushner and Woodkoff and company. But I suspect the Iranians might be willing to. To settle for something. I wouldn't expect them to add in, you know, negotiations that, that touch on their proxy support elements throughout the Middle east or the ballistic missile program. I think they're going to want to keep it confined to the nuclear program and try to hammer out something that will essentially take the. The dagger away from their heart. And that's exactly what Trump's trying to show them right now, as a dagger that's headed toward a vital organ.
- [10:40]
B
Yeah, I mean, it seems as if they are setting up some pretty narrow guardrails or trying to anyway, and in a sense, trying to kind of lead the discussion about where these talks will go, which seems an odd position for, you know, for the US if the US Allows them to say, no, we're only talking about our nuclear program, unless we're just so desperate to want to talk about that were to back off of potential military strikes. But there have been some reports. Again, the problem with Iran intelligence, you know, this far better than anyone, is it's tough to assess the credibility of it and the credibility of the sources. But there does seem to be some concern within the regime itself. That they are on the edge and that perhaps the concern is military strikes from the US could, you know, upend the regime at that point. But that's a big if. And, you know, it's easy to say that from outside.
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D
Right.
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B
It has to come internally. And, you know, those people have been killed by the thousands and detained by the tens of thousands. So.
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C
Yeah, Mike, I kind of agree with your thinking here. No, I was just going to add that, you know, I think you.
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D
I.
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C
Think we would be hopeful to wish that perhaps the security forces are at a tipping point and that things are going to collapse around, but that's their choice. If the theocracy, the government, the irgc, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the base, their militia, they all have vested interest in maintaining their power and interests there, and they do, then you're not going to see major cracks that you can exploit. And so what are your. You're going to bomb them to submission or into regime change, even if you take out the top dog? We've learned through Libya and other Iraq and other places that that doesn't necessarily affect the kind of regime change you want or create stability and get that country on a course where they can be constructively rebuilding their economies and contributing to the international community. In fact, the opposite is, is what we've learned is that when you, when you head into the decapitation zone, you can end up with a situation that could be far worse and the suffering for the people can be greater. So we have to be very cautious about, you know, what we could actually accomplish with sort of standoff attacks.
- [13:13]
B
Yeah, I want to, I want to pick up on that and then also talk about what some of the other regional players may be doing or thinking in terms of the military buildup out there and their concerns over potential direct conflict. But first, Admiral, we have to take a quick break. So if you could stay right where you are. Don't leave. We'll be back with more from Admiral Mike Studeman right here on the Situation Report. Don't go anywhere. Thanks. Hey, Mike Baker here. Now, let me ask all the dudes out there a question, if I still may use the word dudes. Have you got to a point in your life where you're still hitting the gym? Good for you. You're still doing the same workouts. You're still keeping up a good D. But now, you know what? It doesn't seem to be working. You know what I'm talking about? The same workouts feel harder. You don't have the same energy. You're not seeing the same results. Well, let me tell you something. You're not alone. For me, I decided to do something about it. And after some research, it was clearer. Look, most men start losing testosterone around the age of 30. And the older we get, the less effective we are at utilizing what testosterone is produced. But you can do something about it. And that's where Mars Men comes in. Now, Mars Men helps free up usable testosterone and increases energy recovery and strength, all naturally. No needles, no synthetics. Look, Mars Men is made in the USA with eight natural clinically dosed ingredients including Tonkat Ali, vitamin D, zinc boron and more. It's all third party tested plus a 90 day money back guarantee, so there's no risk. And listen to this. Over 91% of users report higher energy. That sounds pretty good. Look, for a limited time, PDB listeners get 50% off for life, plus free shipping and three free gifts@ Mengotomars.com seriously, it's a perfect way to kick off the New year strong. That's mengotomars.com for 50% off and three free gifts at checkout. And after you purchase, well, they'll ask you where you heard about them. Do me a favor, tell them the PDB sent you. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Joining me once again is retired Rear Admiral Mike Studeman, former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Sir, thanks very much for sticking me around here on the situation Report. We've been talking about Iran. I was hoping to focus a little bit more on the actual deployment, the buildup of assets out there in the region. And as part of that, I think one of the fascinating elements of this is what the regional players, the Saudis, uae, Jordanians, others are thinking, saying, doing what conversations they may be having with the White House. What's your assessment of how they are processing all of this?
- [16:01]
C
Well, okay, we'll talk about the buildup. I mean, at this point in time, it's not an easy exact comparison, but still, the naval presence isn't even as large as the Caribbean Sea deployments there. And so we have about a dozen, maybe 13, you know, ships, a different kind of mix and about 150 aircraft and you know, close to 15 to 20,000 additional players in the Caribbean. Southcom's never seen that many forces in its theater before. And you're talking about the Lincoln Strike Group coming over. So they have three destroyers with. There may be additional subsurface assets that, you know, obviously we can't talk about or we, or, and I don't specifically know but you have a combination of SSNs, attack submarines with land attack capability along with SSGNs, which, I mean, they have 154 tubes that they can fire out Tomahawks. So you got a large capability there with a naval presence. But we need to maybe calibrate our language a little bit. Armada, that's a word designed to exaggerate for effect with the. You're not talking 1588 with 130 ships storming the English Channel to go after England or anything, but designed to strike fear to the hearts of your opponents. Right? And maybe a negotiating tactic. That's the way to think about it. At the same time, there's a substantial amount of effort, which is normally how we set a theater if we think there are going to be some strikes or counter strikes. Defensive posture requires a whole set of things, right? And so you find we move air defense equipment around. Patriots, they have Thads, we move aircraft forward. You have F15 strike Eagles that went into Jordan that can shoot down some of these one way. Drone attack drones could come in, or cruise missiles. And you have a number of surveillance aircraft, you know, that move around. We put jammers over there, some growlers, E18 Golf, have moved over. And so we're setting the theater for any sets of options that we may want to exercise. And it just sort of makes prudent sense. I think the count is maybe about eight destroyers that are there in total. If you take a look at a couple of destroyers that are in the Arabian Gulf area, Strait of Hormuz Zone, the carrier strike group, the Lankan, that's near to the Gulf of Aden right now, the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, I think you get a gathering of probably 8 of our advanced ships, destroyers that have not just the strike capability, not just the air defense, but also the ballistic missile defense components to be able to shield our bases or the Israelis or whomever might be subject to retaliation.
- [18:59]
B
How do you assess the Iranian military's strength right now, their ability after the 12 day war, their ability to retaliate in a meaningful way?
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C
They have options and they should not be underestimated. And so, look, their air defenses may be weak, and they try to fill some gaps in the coverage. Where there used to be Russian advanced S300 SAM types, they filled it in with some of their own indigenously built SAM systems. They also went on a crash course to Reno. Not just reconstitute, but expand their ballistic missile, cruise missile and drone inventory. So it's hard to know the exact numbers there, but they got plenty of Iron and steel that they could shower with all these different families of systems from the drone types, ones that are combat air vehicles, to cruise missiles, anti ship ballistic missiles, to the regular ballistic missile types that go all the way up, you know, into the higher ranges. So that's there. And Israel would be very concerned given how much they had to reduce their stocks in defending Israel in the 12 day war and before, in, in 2024.
- [20:16]
B
From a, from a capabilities position. There's been some talk about the Iranians effort to perhaps in a retaliation to overwhelm the defenses of say an aircraft carrier with a drone swarm. Is that something realistic, do you think?
- [20:38]
C
Well, the Iranians have planned their capabilities around that with more thought to if those naval forces were closer to the Iranian coast and littoral Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf, you know, the Gulf of Oman area further south on the approaches. And so, I mean, the Iranians have built up both symmetrical and asymmetric capabilities. They have thought through what swarm looks like to overwhelm our defenses. And you saw a small taste of that when you had that US flagged US crewed merchant ship that was almost boarded, say for the intervention of our destroyer and air force aircraft. And so the Orions aren't hesitant to use those forces at a minimum for harassment. Some of it's signaling. But they have been practicing for many years now and actually doing operations to seize ships or to hurt them with drone attacks or helicopter kind of assault forces placing limpet mines on things. And so they're good at it and we need to be cautious. The closer you range into Iran, you're getting into the thick of the threat envelopes. And so it's a smart thing to make sure that you, you know, maintain, you know, your distance as appropriate until you do a specific operation. And then you might sort of dive in for a surge operation to be able to deliver munitions and do so in a way that's sort of a smart in and out process. And we showed that during midnight, you know, here.
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B
Yeah. What about the Saudis and other key regional players out there? Do you think it's a case of. Because, look, I mean, you know, privately, I suspect a number of them would say, yeah, we'd be happy to see the Iranian regime gone. But the reality is that they're worried, as you talked about earlier, you know, what happens at that point, you know, what are you opening the door up to? And so perhaps that, that fear of the unknown or the instability outweighs their perhaps desire to see a change there in Iran.
- [23:05]
C
Yeah, first of all, I think you're right. Your assumption going into this is that, you know, changing the regime because it's not just one personality changing the regime and its full architecture is probably a bridge way too far right. A full on collapse of Iran is not in anybody's interest in the region. Right. And they know that, that if things get, you know, a lot worse than you have a lot of ripple effects and instability, that can be very destabilizing for many of those countries. Right. Including an exodus of people, but implosions left and right. And so they're very concerned. They do not, they made clear they don't want to have US forces doing offensive strikes from their homeland, from their territory. So they're trying to signal very clearly that they understand the US Military presence, but they are not in favor of abetting any kind of actions here that might attempt to do something against Iran. I think they'd be okay with sort of offshore limited strikes maybe for pressuring, but anything more severe, I think the cost would go up significantly in terms of regional support. And I think they want to see these negotiations farewell. I think they know in their heart of hearts that they're going to have to abide by some kind of agreement where sanctions relief is a component of it to enable the Iranian economy to stabilize here. What form that takes, you know, to be debated and negotiated. But there are some proposals that make sense. I think that the region has probably looked at the Russian proposal to essentially put in escrow, like any uranium that, that Iran has enriched, you know, to 60%, essentially hold it as a third party holder, may be kind of the best, one of the best solutions out there because you have this, you know, dilemma here about, you know, the US Demands for zero enrichment. The Iranians, I don't think we'll go any less than 20% enrichment for medical purposes and others. So you have these strong points here. I think the region is probably going to push the United States to find a reasonable compromise here. Get a win, but don't let things spiral out of control and certainly don't let Iran completely unravel.
- [25:40]
B
Yeah, yeah. I think you've highlighted with everything that you've been pointing out, I mean, you've highlighted hopefully to our viewers just how complex this is because again, going back sort of the emotive side of things, you can't watch a murderous regime kill thousands and thousands of their own citizens, detain tens of thousands of others and not feel as if something's got to be done. But the reality then sets in right I mean, obviously the, the regime is now willing to sit at the table, I think, because, you know, self preservation. And they see that as, as the most likely way to maintain control if they can get some sort of negotiated agreement. Whether they honor that or not, I don't know. This hasn't been their track record in the past, but ultimately, and maybe it's just because I'm cynical, having dealt with this over all these years, is that ultimately it just feels like you're putting lipstick on a pig, right? And this problem is going to resurface. We won't have the ability to really monitor and control. We'll agree to an agreement just to get that agreement. I know I'm sounding really negative here, sir, but. And then it's the issue of their proxies again, you know that. So that's the conundrum. You're never going to have long term stability and peace in the Middle East, I don't think, as long as this existing regime continues to exist. But the problem is without an internal organized opposition that's able to push back in a meaningful way against the mullahs and the irgc, I just don't see how that happens. So it's, it's enormously frustrating. I know there's not a question in there, sir, but I just thought I'd bang on about it for a little bit.
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C
It's worth talking about though, because you know, this idea of transformation and expectation management is a key consideration for policymakers. I mean, do you think neocons were right when they thought that they were going to let democracy bloom in the Middle east and we got, you know, 20 years of GWAD and what, $7 trillion later and a lot of American lives and a lot of suffering in the Middle east and what do we have to show for it? And so sometimes, even though it's not ideal, it's not optimum, it's not what you would want to see. You can't let your wishful thinking affect your pragmatic realism, the realpolitik of the world and understand that you can't rush history and that some societies are not ready or may never be ready for the type of governance or type of arrangements that would make them essentially a responsible stakeholder in the community of nations, right? And so you have to, I think, look at things very clear eyed and what can you get? And in this case you can create another lever of influence, which is to say that if you get a nuclear deal of some sort, right, that stabilizes the current crisis and you have some form of sanctions relief, which is a carrot that you can always pull back if the behavior worsens again or reconstitutes by way of proxies, as you pointed out, then you still have influence. And so if it's the art of gaining more influence and getting yourself advantaged to shape things in the future, even on the margins, you're still shaping things in a better way. You never want to be out of options. We're out of levers, that's for sure.
- [29:29]
B
Right. Yeah, no, that's, that's very well said, sir. Well, I've got, I've got another couple pages of questions, but what I don't have is time. And I really appreciate you spending your time with us here on the Situation Report, sir. I hope that when we give you a shout in the, in the future, you'll. You'll pick up the phone and agree to come back on anytime. Mike.
- [29:51]
C
You talk about all the relevant issues and you ask the penetrating questions. These things will be unpacked for decades, probably without resolution. So managing it event by event, this may be the best that we can, we can do. But I appreciate your focus on this and helping people understand kind of the details.
- [30:10]
B
Absolutely, sir. Listen, thank you very much, Rear Admiral Mike Stoudeman again for joining us, providing your insight. Thank you very, very much. And check out his book. I'm serious about that might of the Chain.
- [30:20]
C
Okay.
- [30:21]
B
It's been out for about a year and a half, but it's an excellent read on leadership. And it's, it's, it really is outstanding. I encourage you highly to go out and get yourself a copy of it. All right. Coming up next, China's military leadership is being reshaped in real time as Xi Jinping presses ahead with a sweeping purge inside the ranks. What? Another purge? Yes. We'll be joined by Jan Ye Kaleka. He's the senior editor of the Epoch Times to break down what's happening at the highest levels of power under Xi Jinping. Stay with us. Hey, Mike Baker here with an important tip for home safety. Look, if you own a handgun, this message is for you. Handgun owners know that often your weapon storage options likely fall into two frustrating categories. Locked away and out of reach, or unsecured and vulnerable. You know what I mean? Particularly if you got family around the house. Right? Neither is acceptable. And that's where Stopbox comes in. Stopbox USA solved this with Stopbox Pro. It's a mechanical keyless safe that offers fast, secure access without batteries or keys. Its push button locking system ensures reliability. When every second counts, the Stopbox Pro drastically reduces response time while keeping your firearm protected and stored securely. With StopBox USA, you no longer have to choose between security and readiness. The Stopbox Pro delivers both efficiently, reliably and without compromise. For a limited time, our PDB listeners get 15% off at stopbox when you use the Code Baker at checkout. That's B A K E R just like it sounds. Head to stopboxusa.com and use code BAKER for 15% off your entire order. And after you purchase, well, they'll ask you what you heard about them. Tell them the PDB sent you.
- [32:06]
E
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- [32:35]
B
Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. China's military is undergoing a major shakeup as Xi Jinping expands his ongoing purge of senior officers across the People's Liberation army, the pla. Over the past year, top commanders tied to China's missile forces and procurement systems have been removed, sidelined or quietly disappeared from public view. You don't want to be quietly disappeared in China. Officially, Beijing frames this as an anti corruption drive. Of course they do, but the pattern suggests something deeper. Xi consolidated control over the armed forces ahead of potential crises involving Taiwan, the South China Sea and beyond. Internal distrust at the top raises serious questions about readiness, morale and command reliability inside China's military. Now, to help us understand what's really driving this purge, I want to bring in Jan Yekalik. He's the senior editor of the Epoch Times. Jan, thank you very much for joining us here on the Situation report.
- [33:34]
D
Thrilled to be here, Mike, again.
- [33:37]
B
And you know what? I think I correctly pronounced your last name. So I'm done here. I have accomplished my job.
- [33:45]
D
I think you're one percentile on it. It's pretty good.
- [33:50]
C
Excellent.
- [33:50]
B
Well, thank you again for taking the time with us. Let's start from the kind of the 30,000 foot level. What's your assessment of what's been happening recently? We've been referring to it as a purge. Obviously it was a top, you know, uniform military officer in the PLA that that has now been shown the door. But. But give us your assessment of what's been going on there.
- [34:14]
D
Well, this is a once in a, you know, at least a decade, possibly once in a generation event for the Chinese Communist Party. And let me explain why. Okay? Last year we had a situation where there was a series of changes. A lot of. A number of people were purged, A number of people were put under investigation. And what was happening was it was actually the military taking back control of some of the power that Xi Jinping had amassed. Okay? And this is, you know, Xi Jinping is taking all these steps over the last few years to make himself the paramount, the kingpin, the one sort of central pole, basically taking on Mao's role back in the day. Right? This says, this hasn't happened in a very long time in the ccp. But the, the military last year took back quite a bit of power. And this was, this was a significant. We reported on this at the Epoch Times a lot. What we saw here now is basically Xi's counterattack, okay? And it's, it's, it's absolutely fascinating because Zhang Yusha, he is someone who, you know, first of all, he is the top military leader, basically aside from Xi Jinping himself, okay, who's technically on top. But Xi doesn't have any military experience, right? And these last two guys that were just purged, including Zhang, these were the last two people who actually have this serious combat experience. They've actually fought in wars. They know how the military works. Okay? So now you have, out of the seven people that were on the Central Military Commission, there's only two left, and one of them is Xi, and none of them have military experience.
- [35:55]
B
If I could interrupt you, John. I mean, it's fascinating because if you think about what you said was there were what, seven members of this military commission, which essentially is the management board, right, for the military. But now you've got two remaining. Do they intend to name, I would assume, additional personnel to backfill to replace the ones who have been moved out.
- [36:19]
D
This plays out in different ways. Sometimes they actually change the composition that, change the number that are going to be on there. Sometimes they try to fill them. It's not clear where it's going to go. This is very fresh information and frankly, you know, and some people disagree with this, but there's frankly a lot of questions within the military itself about what is going on because, you know, the chain of command has been broken. And this is, this is something, you know, in the way that these, the Communist Party is, wherever they function in the world work, they kind of function a bit like the mafia Right. They're extremely hierarchical. There's like the head don, they lay out. There's written rules, but then there's the key rules are the unwritten rules. Okay. And in this situation, what's happened, and this is a number of our analysts have really highlighted this, is that some of these unwritten rules, like how you actually decide who's going to be in charge, right. There's a bunch of this kind of machination that usually happens. And this is all ahead of the Congress that's upcoming right now, have been broken.
- [37:23]
B
So.
- [37:23]
D
So with these unwritten rules broken, everyone's thinking to themselves, wait a sec. Now my loyalties, you know, Zhang Yu Shai. Zhang Yu Sha was one of Xi Jinping's closest guys for the longest time. They've had over the last while some kind of public spats. Okay. And these has to do with how to deal with Taiwan. Right. Jang, you. Sha's position, I mean, this is a little bit oversimplified, is that, you know, we're not really in a position where we can do something there. That's. That's the intelligence that we've been getting. Whereas she, you know, possibly is interested in trying to use this, you know, she just a little bit about Taiwan. Right. If you're in the Chinese military, you're taught that it is your right. It is. It is part of your right and duty to take Taiwan at some point. It's like a central piece of, I guess, indoctrination or ideological propaganda around the military itself, right? So this is there. And Xi is really looking to kind of create a legacy for himself, show himself as this leader that's at the level of someone like Mao or Deng Xiaoping, okay. Because there really hasn't been one of that stature. And, you know, Taiwan is one of these things that could show that he is. Except that how is he going to do it? Because he actually doesn't know how to use the military. So. So it's just a very unstable, strange situation to be in that I don't think has actually happened under the Chinese Communist Party before.
- [38:49]
B
But it's fascinating if you think about, I mean, what you said about legacy. Right? So, because. Because the question is always, you know, how. How strong is Xi's grip on power? You know, you know, does he have the. The backing of the party and more importantly of the. Of the military, but also what's the timeline on Taiwan? So if you assume that he looks at it and thinks of Taiwan as this is his. This is his legacy, right. He's not Walking off into the sunset, you would, you could argue until he, you know, affects this reunification as he would imagine it to be. So it is, I mean, it is fascinating. But I guess my question, and I am getting to my question, Jan, is with the purges that take place within the military and with Xi assuming more and more power, you would have to imagine, and I'm asking you for your perspective on this, you have to imagine that that creates a lot of discontent within the senior and even mid level ranks who see their opportunities to rise up, kind of is shoved to the side, Right. Because Xi is claiming more and more power. He's got a very tight group, it appears, of who he really trusts. What's your perspective of the military's attitude towards Xi at this point?
- [40:16]
D
Well, I'll just slightly reiterate something I mentioned, which is kind of a shocking situation, right? Like you have your loyalties in these is again going back to the mafia analogy, right? You have your loyalties, you have the people with whom you share power and you trust. Right? What the message that she has sent to everybody, especially the military right now, is that those alliances mean nothing. That those alliances, that it doesn't matter how close you are to me, like Zhang Yu Shah, right, for example, it doesn't matter. You are actually, you can be purged just as hard as somebody who is on the other faction, very overtly of the other faction. I mean, this has even been described by some analysts as an actual coup, even though technically Xi is actually in charge, but a bit of a coup against the military.
- [41:08]
B
What do you think about Xi's grip on power? I've talked to some China analysts who believe it's actually not this kung fu grip like, you know, was portrayed on occasion, that it's actually relatively shaky. Where do you stand on that?
- [41:24]
D
I, I believe that it's shaky. Okay. But at the same time, I think she has shown, you know, substantive resolve in kind of achieving this absolute power. You know, I, I, I was not expecting that he would be able to pull off something like this, purging some of the most powerful people in the military. And it's not entirely clear exactly where his power base is, but it's clear that it's holding because otherwise you would have again, some kind of counter coup or something happening. We don't know the exact machinations. These of course things are a state secret. We just know that a lot of people that are in positions of power are one, being purged and two, feel like they're on incredibly shaky ground. I find it Difficult to predict in this situation how shaky he really is. But the thing that I can say is that the pla, and by the way, the People's Liberation army is not the army. People often don't realize this is not the army of the country of China. It is the army of the Chinese Communist Party. It's the party's army. Right, the, the People's Liberation army ability to enact power, ability to, to do what it's supposed to do as a military, which by the way, part in part is a very inward facing role, because the thing that they're the most scared of is their own people. There's a whole, of course, there's a whole security apparatus that's specifically focused on this. But the PLA is also to some extent that the power, the overall ability of that structure to function effectively has been lessened considerably. And I think this creates kind of a very unstable situation because, you know, we don't know, like, is she going, does she have, you know, does he have this megalomaniac type visions? You know, has he purged the people that were saying, no, we can't do Taiwan because we know we can't because of our military reality. But he goes for it anyway.
- [43:34]
B
You don't put much stock in his constant fallback, which is all these, these purges are a result of my anti corruption drive.
- [43:43]
D
No, this is pure politics. I mean, they're all, they're all corrupt. Okay, this is, this is, that's the kind of, that's the kind of funny part, right? If you're in these roles, you have had to do some serious damage to your fellow man to get to these places. Okay, so, and everyone has a dossier and everybody else. This is how communist systems work. And so the moment you get purged, the dossier is there, ready to show the evidence. Right, but the reason you're being purged is not corruption. It's, it's because you were, you know, inconvenient to the person who actually manages to wield the power at that moment.
- [44:20]
B
But isn't there a danger that if you, if you go through enough of these purges, I mean, Xi Jinping, I mean, if he goes through enough of these that you've created a sort of a mass on the outside now that's got its own abilities and its own force, or is that just, is that just sort of a western view of things and in reality there's such strict control that that sort of thing just wouldn't happen?
- [44:44]
D
There's a number of things happening in China as we speak. I actually completely agree with you that there's obviously a whole lot of people that are asking a lot of questions about whether Xi's the right guy, that still, that still aren't positions of power or are these, you know, multi billionaire super elites that, you know, don't want to lose the, you know, incredible gains they've been able to kind of graft off of the, off of the backs of the Chinese people and America for that matter, you know, I might mention. So, so again, it's not, it's not clear to me right now how he's holding it together, but clearly a number of these big families are backing him at the moment. I do think it's a time of instability like we haven't seen internally. And it's unclear how it, how that, how it will actually play out. And so there's this. You're talking about this mass forming, right? Let me talk a little bit about civil society, okay? Because the thing that distinguishes communist societies from authoritarian states, okay, is that. And it's a totalitarian structure that destroys all semblance of civil society. This is one of the reasons why communist societies don't liberalize. They have to kind of crash and then maybe liberalize once the kind of Communist Party is out of power. So this creates this weird situation where there's a specific direct attack on society. But all this bubbling the places where change can happen. The things that, for example, de Tocqueville, when he came to America and wrote Democracy in America, notice and found the most amazing thing about America was these, you know, people just kind of getting together, seeing a problem and getting it done, fixing it. Right. That doesn't happen in this society. It all has to come from the top. But back in 2000, if you might remember, 1999, 2000, the Chinese Communist Party, the party started persecuting a group called Falun Gong. You might, you might recall this. Yeah, these are people practicing ruthless compassion tolerance. 70 to 100 million of people were doing, doing it. Actually, the thing that's really interesting, a lot of individual agency among these people. This was one of the things that, that the Communist Party really didn't like. Well, what they did was, in effect, by creating this persecution, they created what I would describe as the largest civil disobedience movement possibly in the world that exists today. You have, you know, tens of millions of people going around China educating their fellow man about the horrors of communism. Okay. And why, if you, if you've ever been part of any element of the party before, you should actually quit it because it's not good for you to be a part of it. And so this is, this is actually happening as we speak. And hundreds of millions of people have kind of taken this step to either quit the Young Pioneers, these kind of youth groups that they were once part of, or, or the actual Communist Party. And, and so they're people that have kind of put it behind them. Right. And some of these people are these high level officials too. So that's also another unknown. It's unclear how much of an effect this whole quitting the CCP movement has had, what kind of effect. But tens of millions of people, or, sorry, hundreds of millions of people actually done this process. And it is the equivalent of a kind of a civil society that might actually try to foster meaningful, positive change that involves a bit more freedom at the very least.
- [48:11]
B
Of course, the party has the guns. There is that. Jan, if you could stay right where you are. I've got a lot more questions for you, but we do have to take a quick break and then we'll be back with more from Jan Yekelik of the Epoch Times right here on the Situation Report. So you know what I'm going to say next, right? I'm going to say stick around. Welcome back to the BDB Situation Report. And joining me once again is Jan Yekheilic, the senior editor of the Epoch Times. We've been talking China and been talking about Xi Jinping's purge, latest purge in China. We've been talking about the, the pla, People's Liberation army, which is usually explained there. Yan is a bit of a misnomer considering it's the army for the Party. But I've been a little bit remiss because I meant to start out by asking you about your book, which is coming out in March, and the title of that book is Kill to Order. And I'd like if you could just kind of tell our viewers what it's all about, where they can get it when it comes out.
- [49:16]
D
This is something I've been studying for 20 years. And it's really only these days, in the last few years that I think our public social consciousness in America and free society is kind of ready to accept the level of atrocity which is kill to order. And let me explain to you what it is. So you kind of need to do this kind of. It's a type of organ trafficking. Okay. A type of, we call it forced organ harvesting. Okay. And it's not your run of the mill black market operation, okay. That you kind of hear about these urban legends and so forth. These black markets operate in many different countries, including, like in Mexico and India and so forth. This is a whole different level. You need a kind of state actor to be driving it. You need someone with a lot of power, okay? You need a body that can push mass propaganda into a population to dehumanize a group of people, okay? And you need to be able to incarcerate a huge group of people, say a million, okay, maybe two. It's unclear again, how many, but a very large one. So what you. Once you do that. This is what the Chinese Communist Party did back in 1999, 2000 to the Falun Gong. They put. They dehumanized them using propaganda similar, actually to what we saw in the 30s in Germany, what the Germans did against the Jews. And then they incarcerated millions of them, okay? And then what they started doing is blood typing them, tissue typing them, organ scanning them, okay? And now here in America, someone like me, let's say, I have a pretty serious card condition, and I've been waiting for years because in an ethical system, we have a situation where someone needs to have an accident and they need to be, you know, basically really almost dead, not. Not likely to come back. And they have to match me in different ways. Size, you know, basically blood type, tissue type, things like that in China, because this database has already been created of all these things. There's a political prisoner, a prisoner of conscience, okay, Typically, which started with the Falun Gong that's ready to be killed to order If I pay 200 grand and I can come in two weeks and get that transplant scheduled. And this is happening to the tune of the best estimates. We have something like 60 to 90,000 transplants a year since the mid 2000s. So this is large scale, this is industrial. It's a crime against humanity. And, you know, really not anyone has done much about it over the years. Although the last few years there's been a shift.
- [51:52]
B
John, that's. That's remarkable. So the book comes out in March. It's called Kill the Order. And you go to killtoworder.com to check it out and find out where you can get your copy. John, thank you very much for. For catching us up to speed on that. But going back to. To Xi Jinping and the Chinese regime and take a little bit of a left turn here in our conversation with what happened in Venezuela and the events in Iran, what's your assessment about how the Communist Party, Xi Jinping, how do they. How are they watching that? How Are they assessing what's happening?
- [52:30]
D
This is actually connected in a way with what I would, what I just talked to you about, okay? Because what I argue in the big part of this book that I just wrote is about how you can use this forced organ harvesting system to actually understand how things work in Communist China, okay? And frankly, in communist systems more broadly. The reason you can have these kinds of atrocities, okay, is because they use a form of thinking, right, when it comes to, say, health, which is called utilitarian bioethics. But it's kind of utilitarianism where the Communist Party is always in the absolute top position. The survival of the party, the supremacy of the party is the paramount good in their particular logic. So now I'm going to answer your question, right? So this is why you can have an atrocity where the super elites in China get access to unlimited organs from the population. The way that Communist China is watching Venezuela and now possibly Cuba, Iran, all these scenarios, right, where the Trump administration is, you know, basically, basically saying that we, we don't really like what you're doing, right? And it's like it's actually infringing upon, especially in North America or in North America, looking with this sort of new initiation, what's being called the Dunro Doctrine, right, where America is sort of shoring up focus on the region of north and South America, on the Americas, is that they're asking themselves, is the U.S. what is the U.S. going to do to us? Right? And because the U.S. has already done something that's, I think, incredibly powerful, which is enforce these new tariff regimes, right? And I was actually at the White House at the time when we, I think it was called Liberation Day, right back in the day when those tariffs were put in. And, you know, a lot of those, the tariffs, and there's a lot of debate about how they played out, but a lot of them were really about stopping China from basically dumping goods, manipulating currency and dumping goods into the American market. And because this, basically, it's this, the CCP has been using its export ability, its ability to produce, by the way, created through a lot of, you know, American investment, the ability to produce all sorts of these goods for exorcism as wielding it as a weapon and basically getting a lot of wealth out of the rest of the world, especially the United States. The United States has said, no, we're going to stop this bad behavior, right? Because this is something that is way more in the interest of the Chinese than it is US. And similarly, this is what America has done with Venezuela where they said, look, you know, we gave you lots of chances, Maduro, we gave you lots of chances to kind of change how you're doing things and stop, you know, basically, you know, creating problems for America. But since you've decided that you're just going to keep this up, this bad behavior, we're going to have to remove you. Right. And I mean, I don't know how it's going to play out in Iran. Exactly right. But you know, the president has indicated that he's not going to tolerate, you know, too much more mass killing. And that's, Iran is a very interesting situation because it's a population where they really aren't in, they, they really aren't interested in having this regime in power.
- [56:00]
B
How impactful is Maduro's removal? And, and, and potentially, look, I think, I think we'll see a shift, a change in the, in the Cuban regime well before we see any change in, in Iran.
- [56:13]
C
Right.
- [56:14]
B
If I had to guess, I think, and as disappointing it will be to all those protesters dead and detained, I think the definition of help when the White House said help is on its way is probably negotiations and maybe some memos. But I suspect because there's more of a connected line between Venezuela, what happened there, what may happen there, and the Cuban regime. But how impactful, if we just talk about development there in Latin America and the Caribbean, how impactful is that on the Chinese regime?
- [56:52]
D
I think it's massively impactful because the U.S. has sort of, the U.S. there is some precedent for the U.S. doing this sort of thing, but not with a country like Venezuela, which has kind of been kind of a weird darling of the, of the, let's call it the, the really radical left wing people in America. So the US has basically said, you know, we're ready to do this kind of, you know, surgical insertion and actually it's, you know, remove a bad actor that's hurting us and we're just going to do that. And I think that creates a lot of what you would call unpredictability. It shows that the Trump administration is ready to do things which were just simply completely off the table in the past. I think that's how it will be perceived, even though I do think there were examples where this has happened, but not in the limelight, not in this high profile way, and not, by the way, in a way where this is a, this is like a massive enabler regime of communist China. Right. I just might add that was that the leader was removed from. It's going to be hard for them to fix it, because this is a, you know, the borders in that region don't matter so much. There's, you know, basically terrorist organizations, narco cartels, all sorts of stuff operating there and how to, you know, keep it all. It's a failed state. It's hard to fix. That's not as simple as removing a person. But the Chinese and other knows that the US Is ready to do stuff, stuff like this. And I think that's a, that is a bit of a game changer in my view.
- [58:36]
B
Yeah, I, I agree with you 100%, Jan. I mean, I think, you know, there's, there's a lot to be said for unpredictability. Right. And I think the, the, the fact that, that Trump. Look, a lot of people dislike Trump because the chaos, right. They view it, everything is, ah, it's chaotic and, and sometimes it is. Right. But you have to set all of that aside and I think you have to set aside the, you know, okay, do you personally like Trump or not? I don't, I don't really care one.
- [59:02]
D
Way or the other.
- [59:02]
B
I'm more of a policy person and how it impacts US national security concerns. And there is something to be said for keeping the Chinese regime on its back foot or any hostile, you know, government on its back foot because they're just not sure how to read what could happen next. Right. And you could argue that, you know, we have had administrations, the Biden administration being one, where it was very predictable. They knew what they were getting, they knew how he was going to react. He had, what, 50 years in foreign policy, so there was never a surprise. And it emboldened them to do things because they could predict what would happen. And I think that the benefit of sort of someone who upends the norm is that you do keep people off balance. And I think that can be a very helpful thing at times in the world of foreign policy and national security concerns. Jan, I tell you, this has been fascinating. I really appreciate you joining the Situation Report, taking your time. I would encourage everybody to go to killedtoorder.com, check out Jan's new book and figure out how to get a copy of it and then read it. Right. Remember that. That's always important. I have a policy that says every time I get a new book, I have to read that book before I can get another book. So anyway, but listen, thank you, John Yakaylik from the E Book Times. It really, really appreciate your insight, your expertise, and I hope you'll come back next time we give you a shout.
- [60:29]
D
I look forward to it. And I'm sending you a book.
- [60:32]
B
What a great guy. I encourage you, seriously, go out and get that book right you got. It's, it's from what I've heard and from what Jan's description, gaining some insight into the nature of the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping, I think it's well worth it because you know, they are it, right? You know, you talk about what's your foreign policy concern over the next 5, 10, 15 years? It's China. All right. That's all the time we have for this week's PDB situation report. I know. Don't be so sad because we will be back next weekend. If you have any questions or comments, maybe you got a humorous anecdote, maybe you got a limerick. If people still do those, reach out to me at pdb@the firsttv.com you know what we do every month, Our amazing team. We even include our interns in this process. They select a bunch of your questions and and we produce one of our almost award winning, soon to be, I assume critically acclaimed or will be critically acclaimed, ask me anything episodes. And finally to listen to the podcast of this show ad free. You can do that and it's very, very simple. Just become a premium member of the President's Daily brief by visiting PDB premium.com I'm Mike Baker. Until next time. You know the drill. Stay informed, stay safe, stay cool. It.