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PDB Situation Report | January 10th, 2026: Former CIA Caracas Chief Explains What's Next For Venezuela & Iran’s Regime On The Brink
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- [00:13]
A
Welcome to the PDB Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world stage, and it is a fascinating world stage at the moment. All right, let's get briefed. First up, less than A week ago, U.S. special Forces working alongside the CIA carried out a highly coordinated operation to remove Nicolas Maduro from and bring him to the US to face federal charges. The mission followed months of intelligence preparation, surveillance, and focused on speed and surprise and precision, avoiding a broader military confrontation. Now attention is turning to what comes next. That's the big question. The stability of Venezuela, the fate of its security services and military, and how rival powers respond to a sudden vacuum in Caracas. For insight on the operation and its implications, let me bring in Rick de la Torre, a retired CIA operations officer and, and former chief of station in Caracas. Rick, thank you very much, man, for joining us here on the Situation report.
- [01:09]
B
Good to see you, brother.
- [01:10]
A
Let's start with a really sort of 30,000 foot question. What do you make of what's happening in Venezuela?
- [01:19]
B
You like that?
- [01:19]
A
See how specific that is?
- [01:21]
B
Yeah, yeah. So much to work with there. Look, I think, I think ultimately we're certainly heading in the right direction. Right. You, as everyone knows, a lot of times we are far more ahead of the curve than policymakers are. For years we have been tracking the illicit drug sales, the criminal behavior, the human rights violations coming out of Venezuela. And it's only been recently that we've actually been able to get an administration that not only understood the issues properly, but we've also had the courage to act on it. And that's ultimately what we're seeing play out now. You know, I regret now not staying in just, you know, a year or two longer and being back in that helm. Right. You know, we tend to have that looking back fondly moment and we kind of wish we were there. But I'm really happy with the little I contributed because if you look at the special operations officers, the rest of everyone back at headquarters in the main building and all the great work that they've done and the folks while working in the field, it really warms my heart that for the first time in a long time, the people of Venezuela are going to have an opportunity to, to get their democracy back, to get, to get themselves realigned again with the rest of the world.
- [02:40]
A
Now, not, not to get into too much granular detail, but how long were you on the ground for in Caracas?
- [02:46]
B
I think on that one, on that one, my engagement in Caracas was, was, was a little unique. Right. Because by that time the embassy had been closed. So, so, so we were working in different sectors from, from, from different locations, but still overseeing and managing the operations and activities within, you know, within that country. And certainly it certainly continue to engage the Maduro regime, you know, wherever, wherever we had to, whenever we were requested by headquarters.
- [03:18]
A
Let me ask you, hey, since you brought, since you brought him up, Maduro, I mean, right, let's, yeah, let's talk about him. He's been in the news.
- [03:26]
B
Yeah.
- [03:26]
A
What is your, what is your assessment of the past week or so? I mean, I think there's clearly there was that moment Maduro's been captured, right. And I think a lot of people, their minds went to. Well, that's fantastic. Now we've got a, you know, a whole new, you know, day. It's going to be a new government. There's democracy and stability and khaza. And, and then in fairly short order, it's like, okay, now we've got Delsie Rodriguez, the vp, now she's the president, Cabello's there. We've got all the same cats. So is this more of just a reshuffling of the deck chairs or do you think this pretends an actual transition and change that means a better future for Venezuelan people, better ties with the US or how do you assess all of this?
- [04:17]
B
That's a great question. And it's one that at first it took me a little while to kind of understand it. And I spoke with some friends over at State Department. In fact, earlier today I had lunch with one of them. And I also spoke with a retired three star Marine general who just recently retired out of the southcom spaces. And the way they explained it to me, and it made sense then to me that is like, look, we just took Maduro out, right? Uh, we've got him, he's under arrest. But the situation on the ground in Venezuela hasn't really changed, right. People still need water, people still need security, Right. Things still have to move on the next day and the day after. Of course, nothing would make us happier than to have, you know, someone else in those positions. Certainly someone maybe from the Venezuelan exile community or, you know, the exile and dissident community. But the problem is that they're exile, right? You know, all the dissidents are not in Venezuela. They're outside Venezuela. And a third of the entire population of Venezuela, over 9 million of it, Venezuelans don't live in Venezuela. So what do you do? Like, you got to deal with something. So I think in this case, what they're doing is they're pinching their noses, they're dealing with Delsey in the interim capacity that they can until the situation improves and gets into something that, that could be a little bit more permanent with, you know, with the people that should be running Venezuela. So what's that going to look like from, you know, everything I heard from the administration and everything they seem to be putting out, and it makes sense to me is, you know, get the security situation under control first. Right? Once, once that's done, then let's open the doors so that the community, the exile community can start returning, start investing, start setting their things up and then, and then move into that election process. And that should be in short order. That shouldn't be a very long term kind of thing.
- [06:12]
A
So what do you think that that span of time will be?
- [06:15]
B
I think, I think if things continue to move smoothly and, and there isn't, you know, there aren't the, the kinds of setbacks that would cause some people to pause. That could be, you know, as early as three, six, nine months kind of time frame. We're still dealing with a country where, where there's still a lot of question marks regarding the institutions, their capabilities and how they do things. We're talking about a country where, you know, your, your loyalty to the corrupt regime is what got you promoted and allowed you to run these organizations. So the corruption runs deep every, I mean, it runs really deep. So just taking out a figurehead in, in a major agency or department and replacing it with someone else, is it going to move that needle forward? So, so this kind of thing makes sense as we move towards elections. And this makes sense too, right? This gets into technicalities. Maria Carino Machado was elected vice president, not president. And the reason why she couldn't run for president was because all the tricks that Maduro played so that she couldn't get on the ballot. So, so she got elected as vice president on her ticket. Well, okay, so if we put her as president now, you know this. Every critic out there, every country out there is going to turn around and they're going to say, oh, she's illegitimate, she's the puppet of the Yankee imperialists and the whole thing. She got 80% of the vote. I'm confident this time around she'll get 95% of the vote. And the remaining 5% that don't vote for her is because they didn't know how to fill out the ballot box or something. So she's going to win that. And then no one, I mean, no one, any of Our adversaries. No one out there in the political sphere can then say, well, she's somehow illegitimate. The real illegitimate was Maduro had been using the sheen of his country to run an Argo state, you know, for a number of years.
- [08:08]
A
Yeah, I have a feeling somehow that the Russian Foreign Ministry will find a way to say that she's illegitimate after winning at 95%. Yeah, really appreciate that, that, I think it's a, it's a very good kind of overview. Keeping the regime in place or the existing key players, the power brokers within that regime. I mean, yeah, I remember, you know, unfortunately, you know, sort of the Wolfowitz plan in Iraq, everything just, just completely fell to, in short order as a result. I would, I would argue in large part as a result of that. So I, I, I take that point. I think it's, it's, it's not particularly well messaged by the, the White House just yet. I think there's still some confusion out there as to what exactly is happening. So hopefully they'll, they'll, they'll take a tip from you and, and explain it better. But Rick, if you could stick around, we've got a lot more to talk about. We do have to take a quick break and then we'll be back with more from Rick De La Torre, former Cos. And Caracas, longtime experience with the CIA and also he possesses apparently a terrible golf kit. We'll be right back. Stick around for more on the situation report. Hey, Mike Baker here to tell you about a great company out there that, that every food loving person should know about. And who doesn't love food? Come on. It's called Gold Belly. Now if you're a foodie, as I mentioned, you're going to love Gold Belly. It's an amazing site that celebrates the best of the US by shipping the country's most iconic foods from legendary restaurants and chefs straight to your door. That's right. Lands right on your doorstep. I've ordered everything from ribs to brisket to lobster rolls to Chicago deep dish pizza from Gold Belly. Not to mention their desserts, which are amazing. It's incredibly easy. You just check out their site, you click on what you want and it ships fast and fresh on dry ice. No fuss, no muss. Easy peasy, as they say. Amazing foods dropped right there on your doorstep. Gold Belly brings America's food icons. We talk Philly cheesesteaks, we're talking Franklin barbecue, talking Lader macarons. You hear I pronounced macaron with a French accent. They got Joe's Casey, Reps. Lou Malnati's pizza, even wedding cakes if you're so inclined, right there at your doorstep. So whether you're looking to turn game day into an unforgettable food experience with friends or you want to impress a loved one on Valentine's Day, and who doesn't want to do that, go to goldbelly.com and get 20% off your first order with the promo code PDB. That's goldbelly.com promo code PDB for 20% off your first order. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Joining me once again is Rick de la Torre. He's the former CIA Caracas chief of station, longtime agency officer and we've been talking all things Venezuela. Rick, in outlining kind of how the White House, how the Trump administration sees this, hopefully, hopefully playing out with a move towards elections in some short order, talk to me if you could about those influences that exist in Venezuela that may not want to see that happen. And, and maybe we could start first with your assessment of, of China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, how do we deal with those elements, because they've been fairly well entrenched ever since Hugo Chavez's days, correct?
- [11:36]
C
Yeah.
- [11:37]
B
Yeah. And that is really one of the, the biggest threats that we had here in our hemisphere to our own national security. So this wasn't so much that Maduro tolerated or, or you know, or worked with say Hamas or Hezbollah. He, he rolled out the red carpet. I mean, dating back to as early as the late 90s. This is under Chavez and continued. Right. They had no problem issuing Venezuelan passports to Iranian terrorists and giving them docs that then they could use to come here. Of course now over the years, the strength of a Venezuelan passport probably doesn't get you much, but that gets you the right mindset.
- [12:20]
A
There's been a lot of now in.
- [12:21]
B
Open sources kind of reporting, which I do encourage people to read that as early Maduro would fund and invite and interact with a lot of, a lot of the far left fanatical groups here in our own country. And he would provide them with access and training and support which then spills into our own streets back here. So when it comes to China and Russia on the Russian side, I mean, can you imagine, Mike, if I would have told you 10 years ago that we would have had Spetsnots running around in our hemisphere. Right. You know, you would have said I was on drugs. Right. You would have said you're crazy. But that's exactly what we were. What was going on? You know, they were setting up communication Equipment and satellites and arm sales with the Venezuelans. And they were using this as a launching pad. Venezuela became that, like an aircraft carrier in our own hemisphere where the Chinese, the Russians and others could then export their chaos to other places. And they did that. I suspect now with Maduro in custody and as his, his friendship with the DOJ will, will grow, he'll, he'll be providing probably some really good information as to the, you know, the organizations and individuals he's provided money to, not just in Latin America, but perhaps even here in the United States.
- [13:48]
A
It will be really interesting to see to what degree he's willing to, and we may not see it, but to what degree he's willing to cooperate.
- [13:54]
B
They used to say the same thing about El Chapo, remember, you know, from, from the cartel in Mexico. And then he started singing like a bird. So, you know, and, and this may be the case with him or with his wife. The, the, the Russians were really focused on, on the military. You know, they had, they, the Martians think about this. We had Russian destroyers helping Maduro patrol the Caribbean on Carter narcotics operations. I mean, it's just, it's insane, right? It's insane. You think about that, right? So, so, so the Chinese obviously with, with all the debt that, that the Venezuelans owed the Chinese, he take all the oil out and give it to the Chinese, give it to the, that's how he paid his bills. It was with oil. And then, and then half of that oil that they'd pump out, of course they sell on the black market for themselves and they, they'd give it to, to our adversaries. So this was a, from head to toe, a complete criminal enterprise.
- [15:00]
A
You talked about the counternarcotics angle and of course this whole thing, the, the early stages of the deployment out there, the military deployment by the U.S. it was all pegged towards counternarcotics operations. Right. Obviously. And then we were targeting these various boats coming out and, and that, that made the headlines repeatedly. If you could, can you talk about this, the Cartel de la Souls? Because there's, there's some confusion I think out there, right. Some people talk about it as if it is a, it's like the, the Los Zetas or it's a Sinaloa cartel. It's a, you know, very organized structure. Other people talk about it and say, nah, it's sort of a loose arrangement, an affiliation aided and abetted by, you know, all the people within the top of the Venezuelan regime.
- [15:52]
B
Right.
- [15:53]
A
Other people say, I've had conversations where people have said oh, no, no, the cartel soldiers. That's a, that's a made up thing by the CIA to justify our actions in Venezuela. Yeah, yeah.
- [16:05]
B
So, so you. Well, I can tell you it's not a made up thing. It is as real as it gets. If you, if you look at Venezuela right along its Colombian border and, and most of you know, if you draw a line right down the middle of Venezuela from north to south, everything left, everything west of that is just Amazon jungle, right? There's nothing. You know, it's just thick, deep jungle. It's, it's places where, where, you know, regular services and law enforcement that it just doesn't exist out there. These are small tribes. Some of them don't even speak Spanish. They speak indigenous languages. You know, this, this is like real Amazon area. What started to happen in, in like the early 2000s when, when Colombia started to get really, really tough on FARC and ELN and other, other terrorists that they had, that they were dealing with, those folks that started moving across the border into Venezuela where they felt pretty safe, right? They're across the border, Guamians can't really get to them. There's, and you know, under Chavez and Maduro, you know, they're going to leave us alone. What Maduro did was he incorporated it into his defense strategy. He anticipated that if, if anybody was ever going to go after them, they'd go after him through Colombia. Because Colombia up until a couple of years ago was rather adversarial towards Venezuela and rightfully so. Right? So he, but he saw that, that all these FARC dissidents and ELN and Segundo Marketali and all these guys were there, you know, on his land. He basically made a deal with him and with them and it was, it was simple, right? The generals in those areas said, look, you, you continue to deal drugs, right? To package, you know, grow the drugs, finish it, you know, finish drugs. The pace and all that stuff would come through Colombia. They process it in Venezuela, you guys sell it. You, you know, you take it out of here. You make sure to kick back some money to us, right? To the military system, to the generals. And then the generals have to, then kick up, they've got. So this is like typical mafia, right? You know, you've got your earners, you've got your captains, you've got your foot soldiers. And that's exactly how they were running it. It said they were all wearing Venezuelan military uniforms. So that's where the cartel is. De los Solas names comes from. It's, it's the epaulettes on their uniforms as a little sun on it. Right? So, so, so you know, if you were a high ranking Venezuelan military officer and you had the, the sun as an insignia on your, on your epaulet, you know, you could join, you could be a member of this Cartel de los Olis. Celia and Nicolasito Maduro's sons were the ones who've been running and operating and managing that on the day to day, all under the blessing of Nicolas Maduro. So, so that, that's what Cartel de los Olis is. It provides the protection, the, the reach and lend to the resources and capabilities to, to, to terrorists, you know, that are in the jungles and doing what, what they need. It's, it's, it's, it's, it's also shakedown. Anybody would go out there or want something. Well, you got, you gotta, you gotta pay out. It's as corrupt as can be.
- [19:18]
A
So. Okay, now you've got here, I'm gonna play devil's advocate to the overall hoped for game plan there in Venezuela you've got all these various senior military personnel, security apparatus, people in, within the top levels of the government. They've all been for, for years now seeing some real banks, some upside to aiding and abetting the narco traffickers. They've also been engaged in all this, you know, crushing of dissent and repression, putting political prisoners in, in jail. So the idea that within three to nine months they're going to willingly give up all of that. Which also means obviously they are exposing themselves, right? The new government comes in, it's human nature. They're going to want to find out all the shenanigans that they've been getting up to. So I guess what I'm, it's not, it's a terrible question. I'm just, in fact, I don't think I've asked a question yet, Rick.
- [20:22]
B
Yeah, look, the best way to describe it is you have five families that were running Venezuela. Then you had 10 families that supported and oversaw the, you know, the big picture kind of stuff. And then from that you probably had another 50 families that profited. Everybody else was dirt or starving. And, and I don't, you know, making it from day to day. So I've heard, I've heard the, the, you know, the suggestions that somehow this is going to be similar to Afghanistan or Iraq. I reject that. That's, that was ideological. The crazier you were in those theaters, the more likely you were to get promoted. So. Oh, you believe the earth is flat or. Yeah, great, you're you're our number two guy now, right? This is different, right? These are folks that, they remember what democracy was, they remember what rule of law was. You right? Now they've got this level of corruption. The average conscript in the Venezuelan military barely gets paid. Usually they don't get paid. So sometimes they have to turn to corruption when they'd rather be back home in their villages just doing regular things, right? That they want to be with their families, they don't want to be out in the middle of the jungle. So the will to fight or the will to support this, this rough structure isn't really there. But you, like, you were correct. You have a, a hard, a human rights violating regime at the top that makes sure everyone else would fall in line. So those guys, that inner circle that, that, that inner circle around Maduro, the ones that were benefiting from this and have, you know, multi billion dollar bank accounts and foreign banks, those are the ones, of course, that, that, that are really scared and they should be, they should be very scared. But I think, I think we may be looking at three scenarios. And I shared this today with someone at State and it was. One scenario is the Diosdado Caballos and the Vladimiro Padrinos and these guys, they're going to try to get somehow to Cuba or Moscow and just put Venezuela behind them, right? Whether Cuba or Moscow wants to accept them and deal with that, that's, that's a whole other story. And I don't know, the other option too is they may want to try to mount up some sort of military resistance or strike back against Delsey right now. And I don't think this administration will allow that. That's a predator moment, if I can ever think of one. Right? And then I think those are two very viable options. A third option is that they're going to convert somehow and sing, you know, the glories of, of whatever. And I was innocent. I was only following orders. That's not going to go very far as you know. Right. You know, we've got a pretty good book on them right now. Doj, I suspect, is going through what they can and can't use and what they're going to introduce in trials. But these guys, these guys really do have blood on their hands. There's no doubt about that. They have innocent blood on their hands. A lot of them were proud of it. You know, they've been kidnapping Americans for a very long time, using them as bait to get us to a negotiation table to give them better deals that Stuff is ending now. So I'm not exactly sure what, you know, what light at the end of the tunnel these guys see for themselves. I really don't. The options are closing for them and there's going to come a time where they're going to have to face justice.
- [24:02]
A
Yeah, well. Or in a, in a desire to have some sort of relatively peaceful transition, you know, the US offers some sort of amnesty plan or an off ramp. The exile concept. I do. I am busy writing it. I'm writing a TV series about, about an assisted living facility in Moscow where Bashar Assad and Khamenei and Cabello and Padrino, they're all there.
- [24:28]
B
I love it. I love it, I love it, I love it, I love it. Yeah, they get. Yeah, and they get blood. Argue over the corn flakes and.
- [24:35]
A
And I've got a bunch more questions. I wanted to talk and get your assessment of where this leaves Cuba, but if you don't mind, I'd love to have, you know, we call you back, you come back on, because there's. This isn't happening in a bubble, meaning it's just not happening in Venezuela. What, what happens in Venezuela, I think doesn't stay in Venezuela. So I'd love to have you back on. We talk about Cuba, we talk about some other issues. That'd be great, man.
- [24:57]
B
But like the fact, the fact that, you know, which are the right questions to ask makes me feel a lot more comfortable. And that's exactly it. The huge ramifications this has, not just, not just in Venezuela, not just regionally here in our hemisphere, but globally. Now the United States commands most of the world's oil supply. You know, that's it. We now have the majority of the world's also. And what does that mean with our negotiations with Putin, for example? What does that mean with China and.
- [25:23]
A
Manufacturing and with China? Look, I'm sorry for interrupting there. You know, if you think about the White House, you know, saying, hey, we're rebooting the Monroe Doctrine, right? You know, if you talk about that and you say, well, our justification is, you know, it's a new day, we're not letting anybody play in our backyard, then I mean, to, to, to point to our next conversation, and one of the things that I'll throw at you is, you know, what is, what does that mean for China and Taiwan? Because China, you know, back in Monroe's days, China wasn't a superpower, and now they are. And now, you know, they're going to look and go, fine, you guys, okay? We won't play in your backyard, but you, we're doing the same thing out here. And then that has ramifications, perhaps for Taiwan.
- [26:03]
B
Yeah, no, I, these are, I think these are the questions that, that need to be answered and we need to be prepared for because there's going to be fallout either way. But overall, look, it's a great day for Venezuela, and I'm hoping and praying that it will be brighter and brighter every day.
- [26:21]
A
Well, I like the optimism very much. And considering your past experience, I'm impressed that you've retained some level of optimism. Mine left me after about my first decade there. So. All right, listen, Rick Deltori, former CIA, Caracas chief of station, aspiring professional golfer. Thank you very much, man, for being on the show.
- [26:43]
B
All right.
- [26:43]
A
Well, coming up next, what a great guy, by the way. Coming up next, nationwide protests in Iran enter a dangerous new phase. And it's, it's changed by the minute. Even, even as we're talking shifting from economic unrest to an open challenge to the regime's legitimacy. More on that with Ben and Ben Taliblu. And that'll come up next. Stick around. Hey, Mike Baker here. Now, I have been known in my time to enjoy an ice cold gin martini or two on a somewhat regular basis. Almost never three and hardly ever four. But here's the thing, and it is a hard truth that I hate to admit, the older I get, the more I might regret my martinis the next morning. And that's why I'm a big fan of ZBiotics pre alcohol probiotic Drink. Zebiotics Pre Alcohol Probiotic Drink. It's the world's first genetically engineered probiotic. Now, it was invented by PhD scientists to tackle rough mornings after drinking. And let me tell you something, if anybody is prone to drinking and having rough mornings, it's PhD scientists, right? Here's the deal. When you drink, alcohol gets converted into toxic byproduct in the stomach. It's a buildup of this byproduct. It's not dehydration that's to blame for sketching mornings after drinking, pre alcohol produces an enzyme that breaks that byproduct down. So just remember you, you make pre alcohol your first drink of the night. Of course, you always drink responsibly and you'll wake up the next morning feeling great. It's backed by 100% money back guarantee. Come on. So there's no risk. And subscriptions are also available. Go to zebiotics.com PDB now, you'll get 15% off your first order when you use code PDB at checkout. That's zbiotics.com PDB and use the code PDB at checkout for 15% off. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. We're now more than two weeks into nationwide demonstrations and protests across Iran and the unrest is showing no signs of slowing. What began as protests driven by economic frustration has evolved into something far more consequential. Demonstrators are no longer just demanding relief. They're openly defying the regime and challenging its legitimacy in the streets. Clashes with security forces have intensified. Arrests are mounting, and the regime has responded with a familiar game plan, a mix of force, intimidation and information blackouts. Yet despite that pressure, protests continue to spread and the tone has shifted from grievance to defiance. For more on where this is heading, let me bring in Benham Ben Talibo. He's the senior director of the foundation for Defense of Democracies, their Iran program. Benham, thank you very much for coming back on on THE SITUATION report. It's really appreciate it.
- [29:25]
C
Pleasure to be with you and happy.
- [29:27]
A
New Year and, and, and to you as well. I hope you had a great holiday season. Let's, you know, there's so much to talk about here with Iran and the, the situation on the ground appears to be changing by the minute almost. Tell us what your current assessment is of the situation and then I want to get kind of talking about, I know I said where this could be going, but you know, that's like using a Magic 8 ball or a crystal ball. So I, I want to kind of look at it in a little bit more less speculative fashion. You know, that was a terrible sentence on my part, but you can tell I haven't gotten any better at this since we last talked.
- [30:07]
C
No, no, no. I'll just say it's, it's all the analysis you're taking in, it's no sleep.
- [30:13]
A
Yeah, yeah, that's, that is true. Well, tell us, tell us where you think this is all going at least at the current moment and to what degree, from your perspective, this could result in a sea change in Iran.
- [30:29]
C
Well, I think this is important, this inflection point that we now have in the Iran protests, which have been going on for 12 days now because of where it fits the past pattern of protests and where and why it is different and actually should be up on the list of things to maintain eyes on as policymakers rather than people who just kind of passively look at things. Because make no mistake, I believe, like Henry Kissinger believes that foreign policy is not missionary work and we're not dealing with a bread riot in Uruguay. No disrespect to our friends from Uruguay. We are not dealing with authoritarian transition in the drc, for example, we are dealing with the battle between the pro American and the pro Israeli street against the anti American and the anti Israeli state in a critical region of the world six months after America and Israel historically used military force against this regime's missile and nuclear programs. So first let's look at that statement I said about the battle between the street and the state. So long as there's been an Islamic Republic, there's been protests against Islamic Republic. We have to be realistic about that. Protests are almost a feature here. But there has been a change in the pattern of protest over the past eight years. We've seen protests steadily and strongly become much more nationalist and reject the political basis for the protests in 1999 and 2009, which was political, meaning the population came out because they had a grievance between one faction. You know, they came out in 1999 because of reformist newspaper was canceled. They came out in 2009 because a reformist presidential candidate had an election stolen from him. But in the decade between 99 and 2009, but much more importantly 2009 to 2017, the population moved away from reform due to the failures of the state and has embraced wholesale political revolution. So every single non political trigger we've seen in Iran that touched off the 2017-2018-2019-2021, then 2022-23 Women Life Freedom Protest was brought to you by an exclusively non political trigger. Meaning it was an economic issue, a social issue, an environmental issue that touched off these nationwide demonstrations. But what sustained them, even if for a brief period of time, was that different populations came together because they realized the thesis is not that the policy is the problem, but that the regime is the problem. And that's where this protest fits the past pattern of eight years of anti regime protests. It is a stridently anti regime protest that when you put it together and you connect the images and you see the timeline, you see the video, what this can be properly situated in is a story of Iran's national uprising or otherwise, as I like to say, the battle between the street and the state in Iran, that's 1, 2 is where this could be heading and making sense of why this is different. There are a lot more X factors here that, you know, the red lights should be going off for policymakers. X factor number one is that it shows the resilience of the street So a lot of people, particularly after the Women Life Freedom protests were so violently repressed in 2022, 2023, and there was a commensurate chemical attacks against young Iranian schoolgirls in 2023, thought that the street wouldn't really be able to muster up the strength in an unarmed fashion to rise up against this regime. This disproves that thesis.
- [34:14]
A
Next.
- [34:15]
C
Particularly post 12 day war, there was a whole host of people in D.C. saying that given how historic the use of force by Israel and America were against Iran, that this is an uncharted territory, this is an unknown experience for the Iranian population. And there they were correct. But where they were incorrect was to take that to an illogical conclusion and say that this would actually unite the street behind the state, create a rally around the flag effect. And if you're looking at any of the videos just coming out of Iranian social media over the past week, you see actually protesting Iranians burning the regime's flag, taking down the regime's flag, bragging about having cleared areas of flag poles.
- [34:57]
A
Have you seen the footage, on occasion of the toppling of statues of Qasem Soleimani?
- [35:03]
C
This is historic. And again, this is why I think I hate to again make a policy pitch out of a fight that is first and foremost the Iranian people's fight. But again, I live and work in dc. What can I do if something is going to affect the American national interest, it's going to affect me and let alone the fact that I'm an Iranian American, first generation, proud. And that is a population that since 2009 has been saying, not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life, only for Iran and a population that is taking down statues of the regime's chief terrorist, who had American blood on his hands, who had allied in coalition and Arab and Israeli and neighboring country blood on his hands. We should not be indifferent to that fight, particularly when it's the regime that erects the statue and it's the population that takes that statue down. And at this unique period of time, we are in the sixth year anniversary of, of a previous American president, Donald Trump 1.0, not having been indifferent to that fight, because in January 2020, Trump killed Qasem Soleimani by a drone strike in Iraq. So six years ago and also in January 2020, Donald Trump had the most liked tweet in the history of Persian language, Twitter. He tweeted in Farsi standing with Iranian protesters. So fast forward now, six years later, the street is again coming out against the state. Donald Trump is again threatening is Actually now more vigorously threatening the regime than ever before, saying, if you kill protesters, I'm going to come after you. The X factor now is what would Trump do?
- [36:35]
A
Yeah, it's one thing to post that in social media. Right. And fire that across the bow, but have you seen or heard anything that indicates that there would be some because they've already been killing protesters. It depends on who you talk to, but the count is, you know, somewhere over three dozen. Have you heard anything or seen anything that indicates possible involvement or intervention by the US or would you advise policymakers against that?
- [37:04]
C
I would advise policymakers to be involved, but to different levels. You know, the President of United States first and foremost should be doing, and probably can easily be doing the thing that he's excellent at, which is be the master of the bully pulpit. You know, really targeting Tehran with words, first and foremost. Second is, I would say, replicate the Venezuela model. I'm working with a colleague who is actually trained in financial economics right now finalizing an op ed about replicating the Venezuela model with Iran. Not with respect to Maduro, but with respect to taking the tankers. Take the tankers. Trump in term 1.0 was immensely successful with maximum pressure in term 2.0. The Treasury Department brought back those sanctions and the Treasury Secretary has said that the permissible level for Iran to sell oil at is 100,000 barrels per day. The regime for the past three months has been selling 2 million barrels per day. So that's the money that funds the missiles, the nuclear program, and most acutely right now, the repression apparatus fighting back against the Iranian people.
- [38:06]
A
Yeah, the idea of seizing Iranian tankers and then the potential, I can imagine the, like the pushback in Washington would be. Well, look, that's, you know, they've gamed this out, meaning the Iranian regime has gamed out what that would mean. And first thing they'd probably do is try to shut down the Strait of Hormuz.
- [38:27]
C
No doubt there is risk involved, but let me tell you this. President Biden actually took quite a few Iranian tankers. It's not well reported, but it is true. There are elements of DHS where this is their job. You know, they lended a supporting hand to helping bring in foreign tankers that under. That, under asset forfeiture and seizure laws could do this legally to take in the cargo, to impound it, and to add whatever dollar value the cargo is, usually oil to the U.S. treasury. So there are laws to have all of this stuff be above the board anyway. But this is absolutely, this is consistent with the Defense of the national interest. This is a sanctioned country with sanctioned vessels selling a sanctioned commodity to another sanctioned entity. It should be pretty easy. And if the regime post 12 Day War feels bold enough to try to start something up in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, well, I'm reminded again of the multiple times President Trump even fought with his own DOD in term 1.0. And the phrase shoot them out of the water when it came to those fast attack craft that the regime have comes to mind.
- [39:39]
A
Yeah, Ben, number of questions to follow up with you on, but we do have to take a quick break, so if you'll stay right where you are. We'll be back with more from Benham, the head of the Iran program for the foundation for Defensive Democracies. And if you're not watching what's happening in Iran, it could well be potentially a historic moment. So that's why we're talking about it. We want to put it on your radar if you're not already paying attention. We'll be back with more of the situation report. Stick around. Hey, Mike Baker here. Now, if you're like me, right, the holidays, which have just passed, well, they hit pretty hard. You know what I'm talking about. All the travel, rich food, lack of exercise, sat on the sofa a lot, let me tell you. So starting off the new year, my plan is to focus on my health and BUBS naturals. Collagen peptides is a key weapon in that battle. Here's the thing. Collagen levels drop after your mid twenties. It's sad but true. Leading to stiff joints, slower recovery, even thinning hair and nails. Nobody wants that. BUBS restores those levels with clean, grass fed collagen. Your joints, well, they won't ache as much. Your recovery, it's much faster and so what's not to like? So live better and longer and kick 20, 26 off the right way. Bubs is running a huge new year new you sale. Plus get this, for a limited time only, PDB listeners are getting 20% off at Bubs Naturals by using code PDB at checkout. Just head to Bubs. That's b u b s bubsnaturals.com and use code PDB and you're all set. And after your purchase, well, they'll ask you where you heard about them. Do me a favor, tell them the PDB sent you. Welcome back to the PDB situation report. Let me bring back my guest, Senior fellow at the foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Ben. Ben Tablo. We've been talking all things Iran. Benham, if you could give us your assessment of, in a nutshell, I always love that. Can you solve the world's problems in about a 3 1/2 minute segment? Give us your assessment of the drivers of this protest, what sparked it. And then I know this is, it's related, but we're taking a real left turn here. I want to talk about what may come in next. Right. Just let's play that game. The regime falls, the mullahs, the irgc, somehow the street protests hold. The people actually can be looking at a brand new day and a better future. But what does that look like? Who are the competing factions that would come in to try to fill that vacuum to govern Iran?
- [42:21]
C
Well, that last question is a seminar and perhaps several volumes worth of writing on frank condense. But just to a footnote to the first part, because I think we touched on that. 2025 was not a good year if you were a government official in the Islamic Republic of Iran. No doubt they lost the 12 day war. They failed to successfully negotiate with President Trump. And throughout that time, regardless of the status of negotiations, regardless of the status of, of their conflict with Israel, regardless of the status of the nuclear program, the economy and the environment took a massive hit. This was due to structural problems, structural problems, choices made years ago by regime officials, path dependency, corruption, mismanagement, you know, preferential hiring graphed on a scale you could only imagine helped produce the political decisions that created a catastrophic environmental and economic crisis throughout 2025. That cascaded. That was some of the proximate causes. The most, most, most proximate cause that got you to the tipping point of December 28, 2025 protests was the rial, the national currency, hitting a historic high. But so it translates to low exchange rate against the US Dollar on the free market, because Iran has several different exchange rates. But on the free market, like what it's actually worth 1.43 million riyals to the US dollar. So protests began in Iran's bazaar where merchants shuttered their shops and protested. And within a day there was a contagion effect. And why there was such a contagion effect because the past boom and bust cycle of eight years of protests where social issues, environmental issues, religious issues, economic issues all merged into one. And the population, again, despite the different geography and demography, sense that the political leadership is the problem. The distinct political choices made in Tehran is the problem. Harnessed their anger and their dissent and their rage even against the regime. That could be a good album rage against the regime, particularly if you're, if, you know, you have the backdrop, as you know, the burning of the Islamic Republic flag and the erecting of the pre 79 national flag, which there are images already on social media from earlier today showing this stuff. You know, when I talk to, you know, friends in the Iranian diaspora, first generation, second generation Iranian Americans, obviously they share the same kind of emotional and empathetic and sympathetic grievances and want the best for the Iranian people. But what I always tell them is someone who, again, I'm a similar background, but trying to keep my analyst hat on here at the moment and be realistic is it's not just about the regime falling, it's the manner in which the regime falls. Because there's three roads ahead here. There's evolution, devolution and revolution. And these three things can be linear or non linear. And they can come at you without a crisis, like without a protest. Or they can come at you because the regime is trying to engineer or manage change, trying to give you a facelift. That's the evolution model where if the deep state, the security state, tries to buy off the protesters, not just with $7 or $217, depending on the sources that you're looking at, but tries to say, okay, let's play musical chairs with the political elite. Khamenei is 86. Maybe there's some kind of a coup against him by the IRGC and security forces. I think that's unlikely. But think about this. They replicate the Egypt model where the army sacrifices the police and more importantly Mubarak, and then brings in their own. I don't think that's inherently impossible, but I just don't think that is the most possible at the moment, given the synergy between the deep state and the clerical institutions in Iran and the ideational synergy between militarism and Islamism in the Islamic Republic. So it's not easy for an armed person coming from the IRGC to trade Islamism for nationalism. As with respect, some of my friends and colleagues and other analysts and experts in this town make it seem like they do. There's a social context there. Second is that the population wouldn't, wouldn't necessarily be receptive to it. I actually think that if you're looking at the slogans on the streets, so many of them more recently have been chanting in favor of even the exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, who, by the way, the reason today and tomorrow are so important in the many days of Iran's national uprising. It's the first time ever that you've actually had sustained demonstrations and at such a scale instigated. Not instigated, but called for from abroad. Everyone always said the guy has no support. Turns out he's got the deepest base of support, more than anybody we've ever seen. And then these people are running around trying to translate Trump for us. No, we have to be honest about the level of support he has. Yes, there is still empirical issues, but even if you're going to take a screenshot, this is a sea change that tells you about the resolve of the Iranian people to not settle for less and then B, about their preferences. So if the regime thinks it can do a facelift, the ideational preferences of society seeking nationalism instead of Islamism is not going to let the regime do a facelift. And that gets to devolution or evolution. Perhaps in the middle of this, there might be an Israeli strike. Perhaps in the middle of this, Donald Trump gets involved. The manner in which they get involved. And if you're going to keep your eyes on something beside the street, I would say keep your eyes on the security forces. There's already been allegations, unconfirmed, that just like you always hear in past protests, that you don't hear Persian by some of the security forces, you hear Arabic. Maybe the regime is bringing in some of their proxies. If this is true, what this tells you, the light that should be going off is, is that the government in Iran may not be able to fully count on Iranian security forces to repel Iranian protesters at this scale.
- [48:15]
A
It's a little bit like, apologies for interrupting there. Maduro bringing in Cuban intel and security personnel as his close in protection. That of course didn't work out so well for him. Exactly.
- [48:30]
C
But so suffice to say, there are all these models and we can only theorize that a revolution is never a controlled thing. But to put this back into context, we have been seeing fits and starts of a national uprising. This is now sustained 12 days. I don't think it's going to be giving up anytime soon. But keep your eyes on that security forces, that's the X factor to see if they shoot, if they defect. I mentioned the Crown Prince also before because he's also talked about a transition plan and also a defection strategy. We'll have to see how that looks in practice.
- [48:58]
A
But.
- [48:59]
C
But these are things that no one else in the opposition has been talking about. So I think it's critical to see how they play out now that the rubber is hitting the road.
- [49:07]
A
What about me? K. National Resistance Council. You know, I mean, how. I guess what I'm wondering is, again, let's play that game. The regime falls. I'm not saying it will, but if it, if it does in some fashion, you have to look at what's the transition and how, how do outside players who have worked for years and years and years to affect some sort of change, how do they all play well together if they do?
- [49:37]
C
Well, the great part of your question there is the assumption at the end that if they do, no doubt the NDK doesn't really play well with anyone else that's not their own. Which is why, you know, one of the uniting things both about Iranians inside and outside, is that a strong dislike, and I'm using that word very mildly, of the MEK as well as any Western politician, that because they need to redo their bathroom or redo their kitchen or redo their roofing, goes to these conferences that are sponsored by an organization that has killed Americans in the past, as they did in the 70s in Iran, that actually helped bring about this satanic regime, the Islamic Republic, by participating in the 1979 revolution, being a foreign terrorist designated organization, and then who knows where their financial resources come from, but nonetheless, now being such a divisive political force. So I actually think that if you're talking about outside, outside, outside, these are the most outside, most fringe and perhaps least relevant to everything that we're seeing and hearing with respect to Iran today. And I wouldn't add more than that, but suffice to say that I don't think they'll be playing a role in the transition.
- [50:43]
A
Well, Benham, you know, as always, we get to sort of the end of our time in the conversation, and I'm left with a number of additional questions that we didn't have time for. I do hope that what we're seeing is an actual change for the betterment, for the future of the Iranian people. I worry that we put our own hopes and dreams into something like this when we're watching it from outside. And there's been all these years of protests, as you've well pointed out, and, you know, but our tendency is still to be hopeful and think, okay, well, this is it, this is the one. And, and so I really appreciate you coming on and, and talking about, you know, where we are right now, what it might mean for the future. And I just made a note here that says call Benham to get him back on the show shortly so I can get to the rest of these questions.
- [51:42]
C
Al, it's Always a pleasure. Such a pleasure to see you virtually, hopefully one day in person. And yes, let's hope. But let's also be realistic, but let's also accurately reflect the Iranian people's hope. 12 days and counting. I don't know if I could do it unarmed against a regime like this, so lethally armed. So kudos to them.
- [51:58]
A
No, it's creates courage right there. That's what we're all watching. Benham Ben Taliblu, thanks so much. Really appreciate your time and we'll be talking to you again very, very soon. Appreciate it.
- [52:09]
C
Take care.
- [52:10]
A
Senior fellow at the foundation for the Defense of Democracies runs their Iran program and a very busy man at this time. Well, that is speaking of time, all the time we have for this edition of the PDB Situation Report. If you have any questions or comments right, you know what to do. Reach out to me at PDB@the first tv.com we do love getting the mailbag dropped off by Carl the Mailman. I don't know how he finds our secret lair, but he does. And then going through all your questions and your comments and compiling them into a monthly episode of Ask Me Anything. You know, within reason to listen to the podcast ad free. Well, you can do that. It's very simple. Just become a premium member of the President's Daily brief by visiting PDB premium.com see how simple that is? Well, there you go. I'm Mike Baker. Until next time, stay informed, stay safe, stay cool.
- [53:09]
B
Foreign.
- [53:17]
D
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