PDB Situation Report | March 15th, 2025: Trump Calls Putin’s Bluff & Syria Erupts in Violence

Summary

Summary of "PDB Situation Report | March 15th, 2025: Trump Calls Putin’s Bluff & Syria Erupts in Violence"

Podcast Information:

• Title: The President's Daily Brief
• Host: Mike Baker, Former CIA Operations Officer
• Episode Release Date: March 15, 2025

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1. Ukraine-Russia Ceasefire Agreement

Overview: The episode delves into the recent developments in the Ukraine-Russia conflict, highlighting the newly agreed-upon 30-day ceasefire brokered in Saudi Arabia. This agreement marks a significant shift after prolonged tensions and stalled negotiations.

Key Points:

• Ceasefire Details: Ukraine has consented to a month-long ceasefire following high-level talks in Jeddah. Concurrently, the U.S. has resumed military aid and intelligence sharing with Kyiv.
• Russian Response: The Kremlin remains cautious, emphasizing that Russia will not rush into decisions regarding the ceasefire.

Notable Quotes:

• Mike Baker [01:10]: "Ukraine has agreed to a 30-day ceasefire with Russia following high-level negotiations in Saudi Arabia."
• Fred Flights [04:00]: "The Trump administration revoked access for President Biden to the PDB. I'm not even sure if President Biden knew he was getting the PDB at this point."

Analysis: Fred Flights discusses President Trump's strategic approach, advocating for ending the war through ceasefire negotiations rather than prolonged military engagement. He emphasizes the importance of sophisticated diplomacy to leverage Russia's position and potentially integrate Russia back into the international community.

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2. Sanctions and Economic Strategies Against Russia

Overview: The discussion shifts to the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on Russia and their broader implications, especially concerning Russia's alliances.

Key Points:

• Sanctions Impact: Significant damage has been inflicted on the Russian economy; however, Russia continues to export energy.
• Moscow-Beijing Nexus: Sanctions have inadvertently strengthened the ties between Russia and China, with China providing essential support to sustain the Russian economy.
• Future Strategies: Emphasis on breaking the Moscow-Beijing alliance and addressing the support from countries like Iran and North Korea.

Notable Quotes:

• Fred Flights [10:26]: "The sanctions have done significant damage to the Russian economy, but Russia's still able to sell its energy."
• Jevon [10:34]: "Long term, we need to break that growing nexus between Moscow and Beijing, which also includes Iran and North Korea."

Analysis: Flights critiques the current strategy, suggesting that while sanctions have weakened Russia, they have also solidified its partnerships with authoritarian regimes, presenting a complex challenge to global security.

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3. Gaza Negotiations and Hostage Crisis

Overview: The podcast addresses the escalating violence in Gaza, focusing on the recent hostage crisis involving Hamas and Israel, and the unique role President Trump has played in mediating the situation.

Key Points:

• Hostage Negotiations: Trump's leadership has facilitated the release of hostages through direct negotiations with Hamas, a move unprecedented for U.S. administrations.
• Trump’s Gaza Plan: Proposes U.S. ownership and reconstruction of Gaza, aiming to transform it into a premier tourist destination, though met with resistance from Arab nations.
• Egyptian Proposal: In response to Trump's initiative, Egypt has proposed rebuilding Gaza without relocating its population, backed by broader Arab support.

Notable Quotes:

• Jevon [18:01]: "Hamas made critical concessions just after Trump won the election, concessions it would not make to the Biden administration."
• Fred Flights [22:17]: "But that doesn't matter. The Wall Street Journal editorial board... said that Trump forced states in the region to confront their hypocrisies about Gaza."

Analysis: Flights evaluates Trump's ambitious plan, acknowledging its controversial nature but also recognizing its effectiveness in prompting regional actors to propose alternative solutions. The discussion underscores the complexity of addressing Gaza's governance and the deep-seated mistrust among involved parties.

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4. Escalating Violence in Syria

Overview: The episode examines the surge in violence within Syria, particularly targeting the Alawite minority, and the fragile state of the country's interim government.

Key Points:

• Violence Reports: At least 111 civilian deaths have been documented by the UN, with many more likely unreported. The violence is largely sectarian, prompting Alawite civilians to flee to Lebanon.
• Interim Government: Led by President Ahmed Al Shara, the government is struggling to maintain control amidst ongoing atrocities and external influences.
• Iran’s Role: Iranian support for Assad loyalists, including Hezbollah, is identified as a significant factor destabilizing Syria further.

Notable Quotes:

• Fred Flights [24:41]: "A big obstacle here is the two-state solution, which was agreed to decades ago. That's off the table for Israel."
• Jevon [31:47]: "Iran's making some progress, but it will take quite a while for Russia to conquer Ukraine, if it ever does."

Analysis: Flights highlights the internal and external challenges facing Syria, emphasizing the detrimental impact of Iranian and Hezbollah involvement. The discussion points to the precariousness of President Al Shara's regime and the potential for further fragmentation within Syria.

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5. Lebanon-Israel Border Negotiations

Overview: The podcast covers recent negotiations between Lebanon and Israel concerning border disputes, amidst the backdrop of Hezbollah's influence in Lebanon's political landscape.

Key Points:

• Negotiation Committees: Three committees have been formed to address 13 disputed border points and five Israeli retained positions in South Lebanon.
• Hezbollah’s Influence: Despite significant losses from recent conflicts, Hezbollah remains a powerful force within Lebanon, with strong support from the Shiite community.
• Iranian Control: Hezbollah's operations and strategic decisions are heavily influenced by Iran, complicating peace efforts with Israel.

Notable Quotes:

• Jevon [44:19]: "Hezbollah represents what is possibly Lebanon's largest and, and fastest growing sect, the Shiites, a significant proportion of them."
• Flights [52:44]: "Ultimately, Hezbollah is loyal to the supreme leader in Iran. This is an ideological link."

Analysis: Flights discusses the entrenched position of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics and its unwavering stance against Israel, rooted in ideological loyalty to Iran. He posits that any border agreement is unlikely to resolve the fundamental enmity between Hezbollah and Israel, suggesting that such agreements may only offer temporary relief without addressing deeper conflicts.

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Conclusion

Final Thoughts: Mike Baker wraps up the episode by emphasizing the intricate web of geopolitical tensions that define the current global landscape. From Ukraine and Russia to the volatile situations in Syria and the Middle East, the discussion underscores the challenges of achieving lasting peace amidst entrenched conflicts and powerful external influences.

Closing Quote:

• Mike Baker [59:46]: "Stand firm. Stay safe, stay cool."

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Contact and Engagement: Listeners are encouraged to submit questions, comments, or anecdotes to [e-mail] and consider becoming premium members for an ad-free experience.

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Note: This summary captures the essential discussions and insights from the episode, providing an informative overview for listeners who may not have tuned in.

Transcript

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[Fred Flights]

Welcome to the PDB Situation Report. Oh, is it that time of the week again? I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right, let's get briefed. We'll start things off with a major development in the war in Ukraine. After high level talks in Saudi Arabia, Kiev has agreed to a 30 day ceasefire. But you ask yourself, isn't there another player in this? And there is. What will Russia do? And will they agree at all to the terms of a 30 day ceasefire? We'll break it all down with Fred Flights. He's a former National Security Council chief of staff and the Vice chair of the America First Policy Institute's center for American Security. That's hard to fit on one business card. Later in the show, we turn to Syria, where a major outbreak of violence is threatening to push the country deeper into chaos. Reports of massacres are emerging as the fragile government struggles to maintain control. We'll get analysis from David Dowd, senior fellow at the foundation for Defense of Democracies. But first, today's situation report. Spotlight. Ukraine has agreed to a 30 day ceasefire with Russia following high level negotiations in Saudi Arabia. Now, the announcement came after hours of discussions in Jeddah on Tuesday, where the US Also confirmed it would immediately lift its pause on intelligence sharing with Kiev and resume military aid. Now the talks mark a significant shift in ceasefire negotiations, which had stalled, of course, after a tense exchange. I think we all saw that between the Ukrainian and US Presidents at the White House. Now attention turns to Moscow, with American and Ukrainian officials making it clear that the next move is up to Russia. The Kremlin, however, is treading carefully, saying it won't rush to a decision. You have to ask yourself, why Would they? They appear to have the upper hand on the battlefield. Currently, Russian officials are waiting to hear directly from Washington about a possible call between Presidents Trump and Putin later this week. Okay. Joining me now to break it all down is Fred Flights, former National Security Council chief of Staff and vice chair of the America First Policy Institute center for American Security. Fred, thank you very much for taking the time to join us here on THE Situation report.

[Jevon]

Good to be here. But most important, like you, I'm a former CIA officer.

[Fred Flights]

That is very, very true. And I do believe our paths crossed a handful of times, at least in the hallways. I never had the good fortune, I don't even know if you'd call it that, maybe the bad fortune of doing a headquarters tour during my time. But, yeah, it. And how you felt about your time in. I loved it. I had a wonderful career with the organization, really enjoyed it. I don't know whether they would say the same thing about me with them, but I certainly had a good time.

[Jevon]

I had a good time. There were good times. The bad times, mostly good. I wrote, I was an analyst. You were an operator. I wrote quite a few PDBs, which I wanted to be on this show. I know a lot about the pdp. I want to see it improved. It's politicized, watered down. Might be a good topic for another show.

[Fred Flights]

Yeah, you know what, that would actually be a great thing to talk about. And yeah, it's, I just saw yesterday not, not to get off track. I think we are getting off track, but not to get on track. But I just saw that, that the Trump administration revoked access for President Biden to the pdb. So, you know, I'm not even sure if President Biden knew he was getting the PDB at this point, but there you go. Anyway, sorry about that. That was, you know what, that was a low blow and I apologize. All right, let's, let's go straight into the main topic of the day, and that would be the Ukraine, Russia conflict. I'm going to let you run with this. It's a wide open playing field. Talk to me about where we are currently with this conflict.

[Jevon]

Well, we, we know that for years President Trump has been saying that the priority for the United States should be stop the killing. He believes that the previous policy of Joe Biden and the Europeans to just plow weapons into Ukraine for as long as it takes was not a sensible policy because there was no strategy for either Ukraine to win the war or to push Russia out. Ukraine was going to run out of troops. This, this had become a long term war of attrition. Ukraine was going to lose. It was immoral to keep stringing this out. But Biden didn't want to talk about.

[Fred Flights]

End of the war.

[Jevon]

He didn't want to talk about peace talks. He just wanted to attack anyone who suggested trying to end the war as being pro Putin or anti Ukraine. That's just not true. So we've seen over the last couple of weeks, Trump and his officials really twisting Zelensky's arm to get behind the approach of ending the war, getting a ceasefire, and we'll negotiate other issues later, like territory, security assistance, NATO membership, et cetera. And it was hard because I understand that Zelensky doesn't want to concede anything to Russia. Russia was the aggressor. This was a vicious, unprovoked attack. And in a perfect world, we push Russia out and put Putin on trial for war crimes. But we, we don't live in a perfect world. That isn't possible. We need to do what is possible. That's to get a ceasefire, if we can, to stop the killing and negotiate the best deal possible so Ukraine can recover, rebuild and become a robust democracy and strong economy.

[Fred Flights]

A ceasefire only works if both sides stop shooting. And so from your perspective, what is Putin's motivation given that he's got the upper hand? Given that? I mean, Trump has advised that Keev has no cards. What's Putin's motivation for stopping what appears to be forward progress on the battlefield and sitting down at the negotiating table?

[Jevon]

Russia's making some progress, but it will take quite a while for Russia to conquer Ukraine, if it ever does. It will be a very, very painful and expensive victory. Putin might be lured to agree to end the fighting with an understanding that Ukraine will be neutral. It will not be a member of NATO, and that's not even our call. That has to be voted on by NATO members with a unanimous vote. That's not going to happen. And that we will work to bring Russia back into the community of nations in good standing, bring Russia into Europe, lower sanctions on Russia with an understanding that some of Russia's revenues have to go to, to rebuild Ukraine. I think Trump is the only leader on the scene right now, maybe ever, who Putin may be able to deal with to get a fairly reasonable deal. That doesn't happen. We don't know who's going to succeed Trump. I think that sanctions on Russia will get even worse. We will give even more powerful weapons to Ukraine. This is a chance Russia to get out of it. And I don't agree with, with Putin's security concerns about Ukraine, but I think we can meet him halfway. We're not going to greet a native membership, but we're also still going to arm Ukraine to the teeth.

[Fred Flights]

I guess I'm playing devil's advocate here in terms of the, and to be fair to the White House, you know, and the State Department, they've said it's cautious optimism that anything can happen in a positive direction. But Putin's been pretty clear about his hardline demands and there's no indication that he's inclined to back off of those. And certainly not again, when I'm just trying to put myself in his position and say, okay, why, why would I, why would I stop at this point? Is it because my economy is, is, you know, heading south and, you know, I can't continue to afford this? But I guess where I'm going with this is, is again looking for leverage points that the White House may have to try to get some sort of deal that isn't essentially just giving it all away to Putin.

[Jevon]

Well, I think that probably there'll be a new order, draw along the current battle lines. Ukraine's not going to concede any territory, but it will be, it will be decided in long term negotiations. But this is going to take sophisticated diplomacy by Trump's top national security officials and by Trump to say to Putin, this is a better road for you and the Russian people. Of course, Putin could keep fighting and keep wrecking his economy and isolating his country, or he may see an opportunity with Trump to get out of this war and to set Ukraine up in a situation where it retains its freedom. But Putin can live with it on his borders. That means we're not going to agree to Ukraine being disarmed, but Ukraine will agree to be neutral. Ukraine won't be put in NATO at least for the next 10 to 25 years. We won't raise that issue. I mean, how do you twist Putin's arm? He has seen fairly invulnerable to sanctions. He'll, he'll, he'll subject his people to, you know, extreme levels of pain to maintain his policy. It's going to take personal diplomacy. And look, it's going to be tough. I don't know that we'll win this, but I think it's worth trying.

[Fred Flights]

Yeah, no, I, I don't disagree with you there at all. What, what, what's your perspective on the effectiveness of the sanctions to date?

[Jevon]

They've done significant damage to the Russian economy, but Russia's still able to sell its energy. And the problem with our strategy with Russia is that we've pushed Russia into the arms of China and, and China is by Russian energy and goods and, and probably providing funds to sustain the Russian economy. This is a huge threat to global security. Long term, we need to break that growing nexus between Moscow and Beijing, which also includes Iran and North Korea, I might add. And that's another reason why ending this war is so essential. And I don't think we should give anything to Putin other than what I just said. And I don't like the idea that Putin wouldn't be forced to give back all the territory he's taken, but I think we should still keep it on the table that someday we're going to ask Russia to return the territory, maybe after Putin leaves office.

[Fred Flights]

Yeah, I guess that was one of my next questions, which is to what degree do you think any agreement now is really just kicking the can down the road? It gives Putin a chance to, you know, in the short term, rebuild his, his economy, rearm, you know, get stockpiles back up. So are you concerned that any deal that's done now is temporary?

[Jevon]

In a sense, I think it's a concern. That's why Ukraine has to be fully armed, too, and ready to prevent any Russian invasion. And we have to have peacekeepers along the border to monitor a ceasefire. And I mean, there's a concern that there might be an agreement under the Trump administration. A future president wouldn't support it or, or maybe Putin would defer to Trump, but would invade after Trump leaves office. Steps will have to be taken to cement this deal. And I think that means bringing Russia into the community of nations and finding ways to somehow address the issues that Ukraine has of Russia. It's going to be a hard slog.

[Fred Flights]

Yeah. And he's already said, I mean, Putin's already said repeatedly that, that, you know, he will not agree to any international force, you know, any, any EU peacekeeping deployment. So he's, he's been pretty clear about what he won't accept. And, and so that's why I'm, I'm, you know, I think most of the world is, is somewhat fascinated by the idea of, okay, what, you know, what will this thing look like if it's not just acquiescing to his, his current hardline demands.

[Jevon]

Well, there's several things going on right now. The Trump administration has called for sending European and non European peacekeepers to Ukraine. Europe is talking about sending something different. They want to send a deterrence force that would use military force to enforce A ceasefire and other peace agreement. Putin is never going to agree to NATO ground troops in Ukraine that could attack Russia. That's not going to happen. Europe has to stop talking about that. But I think we can get Putin to agree to peacekeepers now. I think now, look, classic peacekeeping. Each of the parties get to decide what nations contribute to peacekeeping. I don't think Putin's gonna agree to British troops on his border, but he may agree to Irish troops, he may agree to Egyptian troops, troops from Nepal. There are many nations with experience in peacekeeping who I think would be acceptable to Ukraine and Russia. And look, this has to be negotiated.

[Fred Flights]

And what do you make of the. The much talked about and now apparently agreed upon mineral steel?

[Jevon]

I think the minerals deal is significant because it's something Trump wanted and he thinks it will be important for the US Economy. It represents the US Being paid back for our military assistance. And it was a sign of good faith by Zelensky to give this to him. I know people have said that this is some kind of a security assistance or it will shield Ukraine from invading. I'm not really putting it that way because I think this will take a long time to implement, and in the short term, it's not going to make any difference. What it does is that Zelensky is saying to Trump, I have prepared to play ball with you. You want this? Here it is.

[Fred Flights]

And correct me if I'm wrong, but if you just look at that as an economic deal, I think it's very interesting. Right. And again, setting aside this idea that it serves as a deterrent in some fashion, but just looking at the economics of it and the resources that were part of this deal, am I wrong in saying that a significant amount of those resources, the minerals, the. The oil, gas, natural resources, are currently sitting in the 20% of territory held by the Russians?

[Jevon]

Some of them are in Russian territory, but they're spread throughout Ukraine. And if they're actually there, there's more than enough rare earth minerals and energy to extract from the territory that Ukraine currently holds.

[Mike Baker]

Okay.

[Fred Flights]

All right, that's excellent. Fred, if you could sit right there. Don't go anywhere because we've got to take a quick break here from our sponsors. And you know what? Then we'll be right back with more of Fred Flights here on the Situation Report. Thanks very much.

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[Fred Flights]

Welcome back to the Situation Report. Joining me once again is Fred Flights, former National Security Council chief of staff and vice chair of the America First Policy Institute's center for American Security. Fred, thanks very much for sticking around here on the Situation report. We've been talking about Russia and Ukraine, of course, but let's, let's switch gears a little bit and let's talk about what's happening in the Middle East. Give me your assessment of the current state of play in Gaza.

[Jevon]

Well, you know, we've seen some encouraging news in Gaza, but we're far from settling this war between Hamas and Israel. I think because of Trump's election and leadership. This is why we a number of hostages were released by Hamas and I might add that Hamas made critical concessions just after Trump won the election, concessions it would not make to the Biden administration. And I think that's because of Trump's leadership and frankly, respect they have for Trump. I forget how many hostages have gotten out. We're now looking at the second phase which would mean the rest of the hostage would be released. But that also would require Israel pulling out on Gaza, which it's not prepared to do. Israel is trying to extend second phase of the peace agreement. Hamas is resisting. Trump said there's going to be severe consequences if Hamas doesn't agree. U.S. negotiators have spoken directly to Hamas, which is really unprecedented, to try to find an agreement to get the hostages out to stop the conflict. It's important to Trump to end this conflict, but not on terms that endangers Israel's security.

[Fred Flights]

Yeah, I was, I was, I was very impressed, actually, with the, the, the, the communications discipline, with their ability to hold those talks between. I think it was Adam Bowler, the hostage affairs envoy for the Trump administration at Hamas. I mean, you can argue back and forth over should we be negotiating, should we be talking directly with a terrorist organization, but, you know, this, I think we've all become accustomed to, you know, an administration being unable to keep a secret. So I thought it was pretty impressive that they were able to have these discussions outside of the camera's eye.

[Jevon]

I was surprised Hamas would meet with US Officials because of the risk that the US May use as an opportunity to find out who these people are, where they live, and maybe capture them and take them to Guantanamo, which, you know, many of our colleagues would like to do because they're terrorists living in luxury in Qatar. And I, I know people are saying we should negotiate with terrorists. Human lives are at stake here. I have no problem with this. We have to get these Hostas out while they're alive because they won't be alive for much longer.

[Fred Flights]

Yeah, I think as long as we're doing it for operationally sound purposes. And I, and, and look, I take your point, but I, I would suspect we already know where these individuals live and we've got target packages drawn up, you know, should, you know, things head south. But it is an interesting development. I think it surprised an awful lot of people. But let's look sort of the 30,000 foot level at Gaza in terms of where this could go. And I know that's a lot of speculation and a bit of a fool's game, given the history there, but talk to me about potential future governance of the enclave.

[Jevon]

Well, as you know, President Trump put out, put out an audacious plan where the US Would take ownership of Gaza and rebuild it and move the population out to other areas. And he thinks that this would make Gaza into one of the leading tourist destinations in the Mediterranean. Well, predictably, just about every Arab nation Threw a fit over this, said they're not going to cooperate. The Palestinian Gaza said they won't leave. There's been charges of ethnic cleansing and all kinds of other nonsense, and no nation wants to take them. But this proposal did succeed in forcing other nations to consider putting forward their own proposals. The Egyptians have a pretty strong proposal that they're putting forward right now that has the support of most Arab nations who would fund it. It would rebuild Gaza without ruling the population. I think Trump's proposal is ambitious, but unless we can find nations to take the people of Gaza, I'm not sure it will work. But that doesn't matter. The Wall Street Journal editorial board, it hates Trump with a passion, and it wrote an editorial, ridiculed his Gaza plan. But it also said that as much as it dislikes the plan, Trump forced states in the region to confront their hypocrisies about Gaza. They say they care about the people of Gaza, but they don't want to lift a finger to help them. And Trump really has made them realize that and to take action before he.

[Fred Flights]

Does when, when he came out with this plan. But we're going to, we're just going to move out 2.3 million or so, you know, Palestinians out of Gaza and build the Riviera. Well, yeah, I mean, it wasn't just the Arab states. A lot of people around the world were like, what is he talking about now? But the key point is exactly what you said, which, it, it forced action. It, it created a bit of chaos, a bit of uncertainty, and, and, you know, for the first time in quite some time, the Arab states had to actually, as you say, confront reality or had to have a conversation, say, we've got to have an alternative. And our, in our past, alternatives have been unworkable. So the fact that it generated that movement, I think was, was the, the point behind it. I, I don't know about you, but I, I think there's no chance in our lifetime that Egypt and Jordan accept 2.3 million Palestinians on their turf. But I am impressed with how it generated that follow on conversation.

[Jevon]

I agree with you. And Egypt and Jordan do not want Trump to be putting maximum pressure on them because they won't take these refugees. So guess what happened? Egypt came up with a plan to take the refugees. I'm sorry, not to take them, to take care of them, to keep them there to rebuild. And I don't know who or what is going to govern Gaza. I've heard discussions of Palestinian technocrats. Whoever runs Gaza, it can't be Hamas. It can't be the Palestinian Authority. Israel won't permit that. I don't think the, the Trump administration will either. But there's a discussion right now what will we do with Gaza if and when the war is over. And there really wasn't a serious discussion about that until Trump put forward his proposal.

[Fred Flights]

Yeah, I think, yeah, that's a good point. You raise, I think, the, on on the governance issue, I believe the Arab plan, the Egyptian plan, includes an interim technocrat board that would manage things until apparently they retrain the Palestinian Authority to come in and take over the governance. That's fraud with problems. So I think parts of their plan seem to some degree logical, possibly workable. But that issue I think is going to be where this all just starts to fall apart is the idea of, well, but who's in charge later?

[Jevon]

A big obstacle here is the two state solution, which was agreed to decades ago. That's off the table for Israel. It should be for the US too. I think it's off the table for the Trump administration and I've talked to Israeli officials about this. After the October 7th massacre by Hamas. In the view of Israeli officials, Palestinians cannot be trusted with their own state until they are de radicalized. That means mosques, schools, media. When you have a society that trades their population from the time they are toddlers to murder Jews and destroy the state of Israel, that society cannot be trusted with their own state. And Israel knows what will happen if there is a separate state in Gaza. Hamas will run it. It will use it as a base of operations to launch an even more deadly attack against Israel. Israel will never let this happen.

[Fred Flights]

Fred, can there ever be mid to long term peace and stability in that part of the world as long as the current Iranian regime and the IRGC are in control?

[Jevon]

I think that's a good question. I would say no. But it's also worth noting that one reason why the Middle east is so unstable now is because of Joe Biden's incredible weakness and his decision to try to appease Iran. Iran is about $100 billion richer today than it would have been if Trump had won the 2020 election because Biden didn't enforce sanctions on Iran, especially oil sanctions. And I might add, it sold most of that oil to China. This gave Iran money to spend on its nuclear program, its missile program, Hezbollah and Hamas. This Hamas attack was funded by Iran and I think it was directed by Iran. So I'm glad Trump has re implemented aggressive sanctions against Iran that I think will be much more painful than once he, he put on Iran in the first administration.

[Mike Baker]

Yeah.

[Fred Flights]

And you that's, I'm glad you mentioned China because like I talking to people sometimes I, I worry that people don't understand how interconnected things are and how nothing happens in a bubble. And so in our first segment, Fred, we were able to talk about Ukraine, Russia, the sanctions against Russia. In large part, they've been able to get past some of those sanctions with the help of China. And you know, the Iranians to the same degree have relied on China in a way to, to, to maintain some semblance of economic stability. There's a lot more here we could discuss, but I want to be mindful of your time and I really appreciate you joining us here today. Fred Flights, thank you again. America First Policy Institute, center for American Security and former CIA senior official, thanks so much for joining us today. All right. When we come back, escalating violence and reports of massacres are testing the Syrian government's fragile grip on power and it is fragile right now. David Dowd, senior fellow at the foundation for Defense of Democracies, joins us to break down the situation. Are you still quoting 30 year old movies? Have you said cool beans in the past 90 days? Do you think Discover isn't widely accepted? If this sounds like you, you're stuck in the past. Discover is accepted at 99% of places that take credit cards nationwide. And every time you make a purchase with your card, you automatically earn cash back. Welcome to the now it pays to Discover. Learn [e-mail] credit card based on the February 2024 Nielsen report.

[Mike Baker]

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[Fred Flights]

Back to the PDB Situation Report. Syria experienced its worst violence since the fall of Assad this week with reports of massacres targeting the Alawite minority. According to reports, entire families, including women and children were killed during operations carried out by government security forces. The UN has documented at least 111 civilian deaths, though the actual toll is expected to be higher. Survivors describe summary executions carried out on a sectarian basis, leading to a mass exodus of Alawite civilians seeking refuge in neighboring Lebanon. Syria's interim government, led by President Ahmed Al Sharah has vowed to investigate these atrocities, stating that no one is above the law. All right. Joining me now to provide further insight is David Doubt. He's a senior fellow at the foundation for Defense of Democracies. David, thanks very much for joining us here on THE Situation report.

[Mike Baker]

Pleasure is all mine. Thank you for having me on do.

[Fred Flights]

Well, you'll, you'll think differently after we start our conversation. You'll say, my God, why did I do this? But let's, let's start at the top level with Syria. Give me your insight into where they are currently, just how, how stable, unstable, chaotic. What's your assessment?

[Mike Baker]

Well, I described the situation in Syria as fragile, particularly new administration's control over the country. Now there have been deals yesterday to help stabilize the situation between the administration under Mohammad Al Julani, also known as Ahmad Al Shara, the new interim self appointed president of Syria, and the sdf, the, you know, colloquially known as the Kurds, but really a specific faction of the Kurds in northeast Syria. There was also talk of a similar deal in the works between the administration in Damascus and the Druze in Sueda in south and southern Syria. So what Shut out is trying to do is through peaceful means, consolidate power over the country. He's only been in power since December 8th. Really. But he still has the issue with the Alawites on the coast where he could have, he could, he could face the most challenges to consolidating power and that could threaten to unravel the rest of his control over Syria.

[Fred Flights]

With the Alawite situation, how entrenched are they? How well armed is this the Assad supporters? And what do you make of the reports coming out of there of the, the violence against the Alawites?

[Mike Baker]

Let's start with the violence. Look, every side in this conflict has the incentive to lie, to exaggerate its opponent's crimes and to minimize its own crimes. So it's hard to tell. It's been this case with Syria since the outset of the civil war. It's hard to tell what happened to whom. There have been videos that are credible of crimes against Alawites. Ahmad al Shara, the current president, has threatened retribution for this, to punish the perpetrators. There have been claims of arrests of several individuals who are involved in these crimes. Again, is this for show? Is this not? It remains to be seen. What can be said is that certain elements of the forces now, it's not just the HTS forces, but the broader coalition under Shuta, did commit crimes against minorities, particularly Alawites, and to a much lesser degree, Syrian Christians that are on the coast. The numbers have varied. I've heard somewhere between close to a thousand up to 7,000. The 7,000 doesn't necessarily seem credible to me. I would say closer to 1000 seems more credible now in terms of how armed are they? Well, they don't really need to be very armed. They don't need to be well armed right now. All they need to do is act a spoiler. Like I said, Ahmad Al Shara's rule in Syria is fragile. Fragile. It has only been in power since December 8th. It doesn't have a real army to speak of. I think estimates are somewhere between 40, 50,000. Now, there's recruitment going on, but the training takes time. From what I'm hearing, there's like 10 days of training before these guys get sent into the field. So these aren't, you know, credible fighters just yet. In terms of his army, what we've seen with the Israelis destroyed a lot of the former regime's arsenal. These guys seem to be fighting with some remnants of that arsenal, but mostly light weapons, outdated weapons. So it's not a heavy list for the Alawites who just need to act. Well, let me. Let me narrow that. Not the Alawites, the Alawites, who are still loyalists of the former Assad regime, who are probably allied with the Iranians, with Hezbollah, who are getting assistance from the Iranians, according to certain reports, to just act a spoiler, they just need to prevent Shara from consolidating his control over the area to get him into clashes and get his forces into clashes with minority communities to give off this image that he has not repented of his past as an Al Qaeda terrorist, that he still has it out for minorities, and that will not only prevent the alleviation of sanctions which he is demanding, which is necessary for him to grow his strength and consolidate power, it may lead to more sanctions, which will further weaken him. So this lack of consolidation on the coast could then, in Time gradually grow and fracture Syria.

[Fred Flights]

How credible do you think are the reports of Iranian support for the Assad loyalists?

[Mike Baker]

Look, I would assess that to have a high credibility. Iran, Hezbollah, their allies, have a high interest in preventing the consolidation of control under Ahmad Al Shara of Syria. This was a main conduit for Iran to supply Hezbollah with weapons. Hezbollah is severely damaged after the recent war with Israel. The Lebanese have, under Israeli pressure and American pressure, tightened the screws on Beirut International Airport to some degree for the entry of weapon, sorry, funds to Hezbollah. Um, so this is, this is a necessary lifeline for, For Hezbollah. Now, what does it take? What is the nature of that involvement? It could mean anything from logistics to, you know, acting in an advisory capacity to helping to spread the narrative to, you know, media warfare. Narrative warfare. It doesn't take much. Like I said, it's not a heavy lift for the Alawites, the Alawite loyalists of the former Assad regime, to prevent the consolidation of Syria. And it won't take a lot from either Iran or Hezbollah to secure their interest of preventing this consolidation by a potentially hostile actor over Syria. Again, they just need to give this image off to the world that this man remains the bloodthirsty terrorist that he was, which is, you know, look, there's a high likelihood that's true. And if that happens again, sanctions remain, which means over time he weakens and could tighten, which again would weaken him further. So there's. It takes little from them to secure this major interest.

[Fred Flights]

Well, if I'm not mistaken, this would be the first time that the Iranian regime and the IRGC would be accused of meddling. I, for one, am shocked. But. So let's look at the reports of violence. Because, look, even if it's on the low end, as you said, a thousand, and frankly, estimates of a ,thousand to a 7,000 just shows you how shaky the intel is and the credibility of reporting coming out of the area. But who would be primarily responsible for committing those, those killings, those actions against the Assad supporters?

[Mike Baker]

Well, look, it's not just the militants that were killed, the Assad supporters that were militants. It seems to be that civilians were also killed. Alawite civilians were also killed. Who's responsible? It could be elements from within hts. It could be elements from within the sna. There are also foreign jihadists that have attached themselves to Ahmed Al Shara's forces, namely Chechens and, and. And others from Central Asia, Uyghur fighters who are there for ideological purposes, who are proper jihadists. Now, the question Is, did the orders come from on high or were these rogue actors who are simply venting their frustrations at, if they were of Syrian origin, at the oppression that the Alawite sect is associated with because of its association with the Assad regime. That's not a justification, but this could be the mindset. Or are they proper jihadists who are acting on ideology? Because look, the Alawites are not properly Muslim in their eyes. If anything, they are infidels who are, have the, you know, the, the, the choice of conversion or death. And if these people are that ideological, is this their, you know, ability taking them, taking the chance to, to hit at the infant, the so called infidels? The question remains whether again, Ahmad Al Shara gave the order, if these orders came from top down. He's denying it, he's claiming there's going to be punishment. Again, it's hard to tell if this is some kind of post facto covering of one's rear end or if he genuinely, you know, if this is something that just got out of hand and he's trying to put a, put a lid on it right now.

[Fred Flights]

It leading up to the fall and the ouster of Assad. Right. The, it wasn't just this, as you pointed out, it wasn't just this one rebel faction led by Shirah. It was a band of militias, a band of groups with different agendas, different objectives. To what degree, and I know you've, you've already said that, you know, his rule, the interim president is, is fragile. But to what degree does he have any sort of control over these various factions, these various groups, including the sort of the, you know, the jihadists that are out there?

[Mike Baker]

I mean, look, HTS themselves are not, not jihadists, right? So they're all kind of a collection of jihadists. It, it really depends on how much he can get them to accept this new reality in Syria. If, and again, this is a big if, if we take him at face value that he has changed, that he wants to be the leader and president of all Syrians to usher in a new civil state in Syria. You know, the statements he's made since taking power. How, how, you know, these people signed up to fight for different reasons. How much can he get them on board with this new project called, you know, post revolutionary Syria remains a question. Like you noted, they're all there for different reasons. I think if he can offer them different incentives or maybe if he's trying to offer them different incentives to bring them in line, kind of a carrot and a stick. There was Talk, for example, of the, the foreign fighters, the Uyghurs, the Chechens, of offering them Syrian citizenship for having fought on behalf of Syria that they would lay down their arms and integrate into Syrian society. Is that something that they would accept? I don't know. Right. Would they accept the very notion of having thought what in their mind could be, it could have been a religious war now transitioning to a, you know, post revolutionary state, Revolutionary state building exercise. Again, those are question marks. I, I don't know what you could offer someone who is that much of an ideolog to say we're laying down the weapons. You know, though the holy war is over. Now we get down to the nitty gritty, you know, mundane, banal business of state building. And that state will include people that, you know, have religious beliefs that you don't like and who may be outside of the ambit of, of, of, of acceptability according to Islamic law. And that just has to be the case. So it depends on whether he can mobilize his carrots and sticks properly against these groups to get them in line.

[Fred Flights]

And how important is this agreement that really has just materialized with the SDF with, with in northeastern Syria to come into the sort of the, the early stages of the government in Damascus?

[Mike Baker]

So look, on paper, it's, it's going well. It's, it. Look, if it succeeds, it's critical because you have foreign interests, you have the Turks who have a problem with the sdf. This kind of gives Turkey less reason to intervene in Syria, at least on that angle. The sdf, while it has been allied with the United States for some time, has kind of gone back and forth between alliances with the Assad regime, kind of, you know, playing footsie, if you will, with the Iranians. So this could kind of take an excuse away from the Iranians or a foothold for the Iranians. If the Kurds or the SDF properly consolidates under Damascus control for a foothold for the Iranians taken away. The Israelis have also talked about protecting the Kurds to a lesser degree. The main focus from the Israeli side is the Druze. So this, you know, again, this prevents a lot of foreign intervention and helps critical part of this consolidation process moves forward. A critical part of this consolidation process, again with the caveat, if it holds, you know, a lot of things on paper, it doesn't mean in five years, this or two years or even less that this won't fall apart, right?

[Fred Flights]

No. And I think you've raised a very important part point which is the influence of outside actors, including the Iranian regime. And I suspect when it comes to some of the other jihadist groups that are there, they've also got outside influence and support because again, look this, it's, it's only natural. Everybody's acting in their own best interests here. We, we've got a lot more ground to cover. You mentioned Lebanon. I want to kind of shift our focus over to Lebanon and Israel. But David, we've got to take a quick break. If you'll stay right there. We will be right back with more of the SITUATION report.

[Mike Baker]

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[Fred Flights]

Welcome back to THE SITUATION report. Joining me once again is senior fellow at the foundation for Defense of Democracies, David Dowden. David, thanks for sticking around. I appreciate that very much. Of course we locked you in. We weren't going to let you out until the end of the interview. We talked briefly or you mentioned very briefly as we were discussing Syria, you mentioned Lebanon. And I'd like to kind of shift our focus at this point because there have been some recent developments between Lebanon and Israel. And if you could talk to us about that.

[Mike Baker]

As of yesterday, there are negotiation committees, I think three in total that are meant to settle outstanding issues between Lebanon, Israel, namely 13 border points along the land border. Now there's no, there's no official internationally recognized border between Lebanon, Israel. There's what's called the blue line that was delineated after the Israelis withdrew from May from Lebanon in May of 2000. And the Lebanese refused to certify that, saying that Israel continued to retain what they alleged was occupied Lebanese land in Feshuba hills and the Shaba farms and so on and so forth. After 2006, additional points were added to that. The northern part of the village of Bajar, which the Lebanese claim as their own. So a total of 13 points. They're not big points. I mean, they're probably the size. Some of these places are the size of my table. So this is part of the outstanding issues. There are also the five positions that the Israelis have retained in South Lebanon after the February 18 extended withdrawal date for the Israeli forces after the recent war between Israel and Hezbollah. So these are the issues that are meant to be deleting. Now there's talk of Norma or this, that this will be a platform for normalization, at least unnamed sources close to the Prime Minister's bureau in Israel, according to Channel 12 news. Israeli Channel 12 news has said that this will be a platform for normalization. There's been no confirmation or official denial from the Lebanese side. Al Mayadeen, which is a pro Hezbollah outlet and which has an interest in denying such things, again based on unnamed sources, said that this is absolutely false, that these, these committees would be dealing with technical issues alone rather than with more substantive issues like normalization. To me, you know, I'm, again, even though I'm skeptical of anything that comes out of a Mayadeen. Again, they don't have an interest in Israeli Lebanese normalization moving forward for obvious reasons. It would really put Hezbollah in more of a corner than it is now. But all this talk reminds me of the lead up to the October 2022 maritime border negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, where because of an off the cuff remark by former President Michelle Olen, no relation to the current president, there was all this talk that this would be the stepping stone, including Lebanon and the Abraham Accords. Then the Lebanese denied it. And as we saw, this was really just a resolution of technical matters.

[Fred Flights]

Looking at this, why would these discussions be any different than past discussions? I mean, what, what has significantly changed that would give anybody, if they have optimism, optimism that this could result in something other than what we've seen over the past decades.

[Mike Baker]

So the significant factor is the drubbing that Hezbollah took at the hands of Israel in the recent conflict. Now, Hezbollah is not the only impediment to Lebanese Israeli peace or Lebanese Israeli normal normalization, but impediment. Now Israel, as far as we know, according to the Israelis, destroyed something like 80% of Hezbollah's strategic arsenal, built something like 30% of Hezbollah's fighting force, assassinated its top military leadership, a lot of its top political leadership. The organization is significantly degraded. To deny that would be to deny fact at the same time, and here's the. But Hezbollah is not down for the count. And anyone who's telling you that would be falsifying information as well. What Hezbollah has been trying to do since the November 27, 2024 ceasefire, realizing its vulnerable state, realizing that its vulnerability could offer an opportunity for enemies domestic and foreign to finish the job. And Hezbollah does have significant number of enemies in Lebanon. It's been to one consolidated space, right, because this is the source of its strength in Lebanon. As much as we don't like Hezbollah, Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese political and social fabric because it has large Shiite support. Lebanon is built on this kind of this sectarian power sharing model. And if you are the most powerful representative of a specific sect, then you get a seat at the, at the table, at the political table. Hezbollah represents what is possibly Lebanon's largest and, and fastest growing sect, the Shiites, a significant proportion of them. According to recent polling. It was late as September of 2024, something like 85% of Lebanese Shiites support Hezbollah to some degree and for various reasons. They're not all, you know, hardcore ideologues, but they support the organization. Only 5% in that poll that was issued by Arab Barometer were shown to oppose Hezbollah.

[Fred Flights]

Now, I'm sorry to interrupt, David, but I always wonder about, about these surveys and these polls that come out of the region. I mean, and we had a number of them coming out of Gaza right, where they, they said, yeah, do you support Hamas? And I think, okay, well, why put any faith in and anything coming out of there? Because if someone knocks on your door or they are, they, they, they call you and say, do you support Hamas? You're probably going to say, yeah, it's probably, you know, there's, there's no upside here. If I say no, I don't support Hamas. And, and you can argue the same with Hezbollah there. If they're doing a survey of Shiite.

[Mike Baker]

So it's not Hezbollah doing the survey. It's an independent organization called Error Barometer. They tend to be very credible. But also, look. And this is where Hezbollah tried to address these claims in its own way after the war with Nasrallah's February 23rd funeral, which drew, according to Information International, this is an independent consultancy organization in Beirut that, you know, mapped out the square footage of the area where people had congregated for the funeral and estimated that somewhere between 650,000 thousand, at a minimum to 900,000 people came out out of a sect in Lebanon, the Shiites. That is estimated to be 1.2 million people. And that's assuming that the people that stayed home all stayed at home for reasons of opposition to Hezbollah. People can stay home for all types of different reasons, logistics. Their kid got a cold, they got a cold, they were lazy, whatever. So as far as we can tell, right, and this is what Hezbollah intended this to be. Not just an outpouring of grievance for their fallen leader, but also as a. As they said repeatedly, this was a demonstration of their continued viability in Lebanon. So because of that, whatever you want to do moving forward in Lebanon, because they demonstrate, or at least they've tried to demonstrate the retention of this base, you have to take them into consideration the same way you did prior to the war. Now, two examples of this. NOF Salam, the current prime minister of Lebanon, who was not initially endorsed by Hezbollah, but now Hezbollah is part of the government, at least, you know, indirectly in some ways. In an interview with Lebanon's state broadcaster Tela Libon about a month ago, I want to say he said that he had to take into account while forming his government, the political realities in the country and the sense of the Shiite community's feelings of being wounded by the recent war. Now, if Hezbollah has been decimated, you wouldn't take these two things into consideration. He put out a policy statement right as his government was gaining the vote of confidence in parliament. And this is kind of the division of how the government wants to operate. That said, critically, you know, Lebanon will set a national defense policy. Now, this sounds benign, probably to. To, you know, to regular ears, but this has been a Hezbollah demand, because to set a national defense policy means you have to get all the Lebanese factions at the table, which includes Hezbollah, and you have to ask them, what do we do with Hezbollah's arms? And the outcome that I think Hezbollah seeking is something like maybe state authorization of their arms or something akin to the PMF law in 2016 in Iraq, where the Hezbollah is folded into the apparatus of the state but remains its own cohesive separate entity and then it gets funding from the state. I think that's the path that Hezboll is going to take. Now again, if they've been decimated, if they've lost critical mass of support, you don't need to take that, that, that into consideration. You don't need to include that in, in your policy statement as the Prime Minister of Lebanon.

[Fred Flights]

So in your, in your opinion, in your perspective, from all the work you do studying the, the area, to what degree does the Iranian regime have control over Hezbollah? To what degree do they have input in their, their planning, their strategic thinking?

[Mike Baker]

Look, significant input. Ultimately, Hezbollah is loyal to the supreme leader in Iran. This is an ideological link. Meaning if Iranian funding and weapons were to stop, Hezbollah's loyalty would not stop. It is a matter of belief. Now does that mean while there is a hierarchy in the relationship between Iran and all of its extensions, I don't call them proxies when we talk about Hezbollah because my arm is not my proxy, it is my extension. Now there is a hierarchy. Iran sits at the top. But it is not dictate Hezbollah's actions. It takes into consideration Hezbollah's local circumstances and how it must navigate. This is why, I mean this is part of the, if you will, the genius of the Iranian model that having local organizations made up of locals who understand the local, the, the local environment, the local playing field obviates the need for say, intelligence, like a massive intelligence operation in Lebanon for top down control. Basically you're assured of Hezbollah's loyalty to you by this ideological link. So you can allow them leeway to operate as they see fit within Lebanon to suit their circumstances, to, to suit Lebanon circumstances. Because the ultimate objective here is growth. It is not just destroying Israel that is important to the Iranians, not just fighting the United States, which they consider their primary enemy ideologically. It's not the Israelis. They all say it, Hezbollah, Iran, say we are their primary enemy. But more importantly than that, if you want to destroy Israel, if you want to fight and combat the United States, you need to survive and you need to grow. You can't be this minor tiny organization. So they will allow their proxies sufficient leeway to sustain their growth and will not dictate to them necessarily in areas that could harm their growth unless there's an existential matter at hand, unless there's something that force manure comes into play. But Iran will not push Hezbollah to suicide because it's its most important regional asset.

[Fred Flights]

Right. Well, this is leverage from the ideological link. There's also obviously the leverage, as you pointed out, from the resourcing, from the money, from the munitions, the hardware, the weaponry. It does beg the question, and this will basically be the last, I guess question I want to be mindful of your time, and we're almost out of it, is that, you know, any, any longer term agreement between Lebanon and Israel by definition leaves Hezbollah in place to grow. And you have to assume that Israel understands that Hezbollah's objective, which is Iran's objective, won't change over time. And so you would argue that any agreement is just kicking the can down the road to another conflict.

[Mike Baker]

In many ways, yes. Look, I mean the idea behind the resolution of the disputed border points is to take away one of Hezbollah's excuses for maintaining its arms and its fight against Israel. But look, this kind of doesn't address the core enmity that Hezbollah has for Israel. It's not about 13 disputed border points. It was never about even the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon. Right. The Israelis withdrew from south Lebanon. Suddenly these, these disputes, you know, the Shabbat farms, which had never been mentioned before are on the table. And these, these farms were taken by Israel from the Syrians from 1967. So between 1967 and the Israeli entry into Lebanon, 1982, nothing. And then all of a sudden this becomes an issue with the maritime border dispute. Nasrallah in his post agreement speech even said that there was something like 2 square kilometers that remained outstanding that weren't resolved and that Hezbollah would continue to fight for them. The point is Hezbollah's problem with Israel is not a border point here or there. It's Israel's very existence. So long as Israel exists, Hezbollah way to continue fighting it. And so long as Lebanon does not have the will to constrain Hezbollah, to restrain Hezbollah, to disarm Hezbollah, Hezbollah will find a way to do so. Hezbollah will find some excuse and will continue its war against Israel with the knowledge that Lebanon will simply not act against it. Now, do the Lebanese suddenly have the will to put an end to Hezbollah's private arsenal once and for all? I, I don't see positive indications there's talk of that. But it seems to me that Hezbollah is, is undertaking now a tactical withdrawal. They're further trying to integrate into Lebanon. This is something they've done at every juncture, where they've been threatened or where they felt threatened, or where they felt the odd man out. Right after the end of the Lebanese civil war. In the 1990s, they suddenly joined the parliament where before that was anathema to them. After the Syrians were forced to withdraw from 2005 protector in Lebanon, they suddenly joined the government. So, and now it seems like they're trying to integrate, they're trying to push for the integration of their forces into the apparatus of Lebanese state again, integration and further integration to give them this protective cover where they can continue to grow. And Lebanon, it does not seem as willing to take the action necessary to put an end to that. So. Yes, you're absolutely right. Well, I would, whatever happens will not take away Hezbollah's ideological enmity for Israel and would leave Hezbollah intact to continue to grow and perhaps fight another day.

[Fred Flights]

I would argue and David, that, you know, it's not just the will, it's, I mean, does the Lebanese government have the ability to deal with Hezbollah? And I, you know, I've had the chance to, you know, observe and be out there and understand to some degree, you know, not an expert. You have to know your limitations. But I would argue it's a problem of both the will and their ability. Look, this has been fascinating and we've got, I got a whole list of additional questions which we're out of time right now, but what that means is you have to come back.

[Mike Baker]

David.

[Fred Flights]

Doubt the foundation for Defensive Democracies. Thank you so much for joining us here on the Situation Report. And that is all the time we have for this week's PDB Situation Report. Look, if you have any questions or comments or you got a limerick or a humorous anecdote, maybe a dad joke that you want to throw our way, please reach out to me at pdb@the first tv.com I've told you this before, but I mean, at the highlight of every week at the PDB headquarters, which of course is located under a inactive volcano out somewhere in a secret compound, is when Carl the mailman who somehow keeps finding us, drops off another sack filled to the brim with your postcards and your emails and your telegrams and your candy grams. And every month, our amazing team selects a bunch of your questions and produces one of our critically acclaimed Ask Me Anything episodes. Right, so keep those cards and letters and faxes coming. Finally, to listen to the podcast of the show ad free. You can do that. Just become a premium member of the President's Daily brief by visiting PDB premium.com I'm Mike Baker, and until next time, you know the drill. Stand formed. Stay safe, stay cool.

[Mike Baker]

Hey, I'm Mike Slater. I have a podcast called Politics by Faith. We have a very simple mission. We take the news of the day and we filter it through a biblical worldview. So here's the big story of the day. What does the Bible say about it and how can we apply it? It's amazing. There's nothing new under the sun. The Bible has something to say about everything that's going on today. So basically, we thump the Bible over.

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[Mike Baker]

I think we gotta keep MAGA going. And I think the way to take it beyond just a political victory into a true rebuilding and awakening and revival in America is to make sure that this is all grounded in biblical principles. And that's what we do on the podcast Politics by Faith. And you can subscribe to Politics by Faith wherever you're listening to the show right now.