PDB Situation Report | March 28th, 2026: The Most Dangerous Phase of the Iran War Yet & Ukrainian Forces Gain Ground Against Russia

Summary

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The President’s Daily Brief – Situation Report

Episode Date: March 28, 2026
Host: Mike Baker (Former CIA Operations Officer)
Guests:

• Steve Yates (Heritage Foundation, National Security Expert)
• George Barros (Institute for the Study of War, Director of Innovation & Open Source Tradecraft)

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Overview

This episode of The President’s Daily Brief provides an in-depth Situation Report on two major international crises:

1. The U.S., Israel, and Iran War at Its One-Month Mark: A look at military operations, risks to energy markets through the Strait of Hormuz, shifting diplomatic efforts, and the complex regional and global implications.
2. Ukraine’s Battlefield Advances Against Russia: Analysis of recent Ukrainian counteroffensives, Russian vulnerabilities, and the evolving nature of the conflict.

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1. War with Iran: Entering the Most Dangerous Phase

[00:12 – 29:56]

Key Discussion Points

• One Month of Conflict:

  • US and Israeli airstrikes continue to degrade Iran’s military infrastructure.
  • Iran retaliates with missile and drone attacks targeting Israel and Gulf neighbors.
  • Diplomacy and off-ramps are discussed in public, but military action remains intense.
  • The global focus shifts to the Strait of Hormuz – a vital choke point for global energy.

• US-Israeli Military Cooperation:

  • Steve Yates calls the operational partnership “historic,” noting seamless joint operations and their global signaling value to allies.

    “I've never seen the United States this seamlessly work in joint capacity with an ally. … If I'm an ally of the United States, I'd say I'd like to have a little bit of that Israel situation going on.” (Steve Yates, [02:12])

  • Baker: Success “depends on what your metrics are.” Operationally, the air/sea campaign is a success.

• Strait of Hormuz Risks:

  • The White House may have underestimated or been slow to coordinate with allies about the inevitability of Hormuz becoming a leverage point for Iran.

    “Perception is important… the White House has been surprised that the Strait became the focus here.” (Mike Baker, [04:26])

  • Impact on energy: Massive spike in prices, energy security concerns in Europe and Asia, global market vulnerability.

• Diplomacy and Regional Dynamics:

  • Allies like UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Japan are stepping up in maritime security efforts.
  • Administration is seeking broader burden-sharing: “Freedom of navigation…is not an America-only objective.” (Steve Yates, [06:16])
  • Importance of early coordination and “setting the table” with allies to manage escalation and crisis outcomes.

• Possible Endgames and Realities:

  • Short-term naval escort operations provide some security but are not sustainable.
  • Insurance and shipping industries remain jittery; long-term market stabilization demands more than “occupy-and-police” strategies.

    “You’ve still got the same Iranian regime…as soon as they fire off one shot, the insurance and shipping industries do the same thing, which is say, ‘nope’, and then you’ve got the same problem.” (Mike Baker, [09:33])

• Political and Strategic Calculus:

  • The US and allies need to balance degrading Iran’s military, supporting Israel, and maintaining economic/political stability at home and abroad.
  • Regime change in Iran viewed as an Israeli objective; US objective more focused on degrading capability.

• The IRGC’s Role

  • Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears to have consolidated control, overshadowing political and clerical leadership.

    “It does appear as if the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the irgc, has cemented their position at the top of the food chain…” (Mike Baker, [21:06])

  • Allies are recalibrating assumptions—Saudi detente with Iran has failed.

• Likely Outcomes and Optimistic Markers

  • Regime’s missile capabilities now acknowledged and degraded.

    “The very fact that the remnants of this regime launched two long-range missiles … proved that they had a long-range missile capability that was better than assessed …” (Steve Yates, [17:44])

  • Even if the regime endures, its capacity to disrupt energy and regional security may be significantly reduced—seen as a net positive.

    “If we are in that middle ground, Venezuela-like, where we have remnants… but is behaving…more contrite … we are net better off …” (Steve Yates, [19:08])

• Europe & Asia’s Stakes

  • Populations may be ambivalent about the conflict, but energy prices force political leaders’ hands in supporting de-escalation or action, especially if $10/gallon gas looms ([28:17]).
  • Need for a “shared operation” beyond just the U.S.

Notable Quotes

• “Tesla’s looking better every day, isn’t it?”
  — Steve Yates, on personal costs of the oil crisis ([08:26])

• “The people of Iran…deserve a better future, deserve to celebrate a Persian culture, not an Islamist theocracy.”
  — Steve Yates ([19:37])

• “I’m the first person to say the Iranian regime should be…they deserve to get their ass kicked.”
  — Mike Baker ([25:18])

Key Timestamps

• [00:32] US/Iran war recap and air campaign update
• [01:34] Introduction of Steve Yates
• [02:12] Joint US-Israel operations “historic”
• [04:26] Hormuz as leverage point, White House “surprised”
• [07:29] Need for earlier coordination with allies
• [09:33] Naval escort limitations, ongoing risks
• [12:55] Broader regional implications for Ukraine and others
• [21:06] IRGC’s growing dominance in Iran
• [24:36] Domestic US political pressures tied to fuel prices

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2. Ukraine’s Strategic Shift: Reclaiming Ground from Russia

[32:14 – 58:32]

Key Discussion Points

• Biggest Ukrainian Gains in Years:

  • In February 2026, Ukraine reclaimed more territory than Russia for the first time since 2023.

    “In February of 2026, the Ukrainians actually managed to liberate more territory of occupied Ukraine than what Russian forces managed to seize… and that’s a really big deal.” (George Barros, [33:58])

• New Phase in Warfare:

  • War is moving away from static positional lines; Ukraine is innovating with armored maneuvers and “dynamic” tactics despite pervasive drone surveillance.

    “…the Ukrainians are now experimenting and achieving ways to actually get armor to the front at the small tactical level.” (George Barros, [35:37])

• Strategic Maturation:

  • Ukrainian command is now studying Russian centers of gravity—targeting logistics and command posts, shaping battlefields over months.
  • Successful operations were less about the abrupt loss of Russian Starlink comms, more about “shaping” and exploiting vulnerabilities.

    “The Ukrainians began what we call shaping the battlefield in late 2025…strikes against logistics, strikes against command posts, targeting…vulnerabilities…” (George Barros, [38:05])

• Electronic Warfare and the Starlink Factor:

  • Russian loss of Starlink in Feb. 2026 was a “catalyst,” not the root cause of their defeat in the south.
  • Russians are scrambling to launch a sovereign Starlink equivalent, but lag far behind Western capabilities.

    “The Russians are now trying to establish their own Russian controlled sovereign Starlink alternative…They’ve got a ways to go.” (George Barros & Mike Baker, [41:23-42:26])

• Manpower Shortages and Frontline Innovation:

  • Ukrainian lines are not continuous; both sides use small, lightly-manned strongpoints, with drones and uncrewed vehicles (UGVs) offsetting gaps.

    “It’s a pointless frontline…with strongpoints interspersed…offset by drone and UGV use.” (George Barros, [47:20])

  • Russian tactics remain wasteful, with massive casualties (up to 1,000 per day):

    “The Russians…marshal between 30 to 50,000 troops per month into…massive, complex, roboticized kill zones…” (George Barros, [48:15])

• Russia’s Ability to Sustain Losses:

  • Russia can continue high casualties due to mobilization powers, economic windfalls from the Iran war’s energy impact, and regulatory changes that make quiet mobilizations easier.

    “Thanks to the war in Iran and the boon on oil…the Russian economy is making a lot of extra money.” (George Barros, [50:36]) “Putin makes bad decisions when he’s faced with political dilemmas.” (George Barros, [51:45])

• Global Interconnection:

  • Iran war’s effect on oil prices directly benefits Russia, showing the tangled web of global crises and how attempts to stabilize one region may create ripple effects elsewhere.
  • Baker notes, “It is fascinating…It’s a reason why I point out when…isolationists say…you can draw curtains around your country and you won’t be impacted by things that happen outside those curtains…” ([52:07])

• Major Near-Term Risks:

  • The most acute short-term threat: collapse of Ukraine’s energy grid under continued Russian strikes.

    “The Ukraine energy grid is in a very bad place. …Every single spare Patriot interceptor…is going to protect Americans in the CENTCOM area. …Russians are trying to exploit that vulnerability.” (George Barros, [53:51-55:12])

  • Loss of energy generation will impact Ukraine’s defense manufacturing, as 50% of munitions are now produced in-country.

• Optimism for Ukraine’s Resilience:

  • For the first time in two years, Ukrainian morale and operational outlook is on the rise, with “fortress belt” cities holding firm and lines more dynamic, not brittle.

    “This is the most optimistic I’ve been in a year and a half…we got this…The fortress belt is going to hold.” (George Barros, [56:36])

Notable Quotes

• “The war is dynamic. It’s not a stalemate.”
  — George Barros, [34:50]
• “Their level of innovation is quite low…the Russian gains…at the cost of about a thousand people killed and wounded. That’s a very bad tradeoff…”
  — George Barros, [57:24]
• “Manpower shortages…not solved, but … persistent ISR and use of drones…help offset.”
  — George Barros, [47:20]
• “Every spare Patriot interceptor…is going to protect Americans in CENTCOM…Ukraine’s no longer receiving Patriot interceptors…”
  — George Barros, [54:27]

Key Timestamps

• [32:14] Ukraine reclaims more territory than Russia for the first time since 2023
• [35:10] New phase: From stalemate to tactical dynamism
• [38:05] What underpins Ukraine’s success: “shaping” and hitting Russian weaknesses
• [41:23] Russian Starlink alternatives, major gaps remain
• [47:20] Frontline realities: strongpoints, drone/UGV compensation, manpower challenges
• [50:33] Russian casualty rates, mobilization capabilities
• [53:51] Looming energy grid crisis in Ukraine
• [56:36] Most optimistic outlook for Ukraine in more than a year

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Memorable Moments

• The mutual ribbing between Baker and Yates over “I don’t have that authority…can’t veto anything” ([01:59]) and the recurring jokes about Tesla and gas prices serve to lighten the tone amidst heavy topics.
• Baker’s frequent framing of discussions as “glass half full” or a search for pragmatic, not perfect, solutions.
• Barros's concise optimism tempered by hard data on Ukraine's battlefield situation.

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Conclusion

This episode delivers a fast-moving, candid update on two critical global security crises. In the Iran war, Baker and Yates focus on military operations, alliance management, and the strategic challenge of the Strait of Hormuz—warning of market and political impacts if the conflict endures or escalates. The Ukraine segment features Barros’s granular battlefield assessment, emphasizing a shift to operational success as Ukraine regains territory, exploits Russian vulnerabilities, and adapts to manpower constraints through technology, while warning of dangers like possible collapse of the energy grid.

Essential Takeaway

• The world is highly interconnected. War in one region swiftly impacts markets, alliances, and conflicts elsewhere—underscoring the PDB’s aim: “Stay informed, stay safe, stay cool.”

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End of Summary

Transcript

[A]

Welcome to the PDB Situation report. I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world stage.

[B]

And what a stage it is.

[A]

All right, let's get briefed. First up, the war with Iran hits

[B]

the one month mark. Time flies as US And Israeli airstrikes continue and attention shifts to the increasingly

[A]

volatile Strait of Hormuz.

[B]

We'll be joined by Steve Yates of

[A]

the Heritage foundation for more on that.

[B]

And then later in the show, after months of grinding stalemate, Ukraine pushes back in the south, taking more ground than Russia for the first time in years. We'll be joined by George Barros of

[A]

the Institute for the Study of War for those details. But first, today's Situation Report. Spotlight. Well, we're now one month into the war between the U.S. israel and Iran, and the air campaign shows no signs of slowing. US And Israeli strikes continue to target

[B]

Iran's military infrastructure and leadership, while Tehran continues to respond with missile and drone

[A]

strike attacks against Israel and its Gulf neighbors.

[B]

At the same time, there are mixed

[A]

signals of a diplomatic track, public talk of off ramps paired with continued military pressure.

[B]

And increasingly, the focus has shifted to

[A]

the Strait of Horus, where the risk

[B]

to global shipping and energy markets is becoming harder to ignore as tensions play

[A]

out along one of the world's most critical choke points.

[B]

For more on this, let me bring in Steve Yates. He's the former deputy national security adviser to the vice president and senior research

[A]

fellow at the Heritage foundation and also, might I add, a great friend of the show. Steve, great to see you again, man.

[C]

Thank you, Mike. Thanks for having me back.

[A]

Absolutely. Well, I didn't have any say in the matter, but that's always great to.

[C]

Well, thanks for not vetoing.

[A]

I don't, I don't have that authority. I, I can't veto anything. All right, Iran. Good God, where do we start?

[B]

I tell you what, where do you want to start?

[C]

Well, I mean, we are in the middle at the moment, so I think we're in one of those situations where things could break in ways that are very risky. But in many ways. I don't know how you see it, Mike, but I mean, I don't think we could have asked more of our military in terms of the major military operations. They're doing all the things that should be done. We don't live in a world of perfection, but they've had a pretty high success rate in establishing air dominance, sea dominance, signals dominance, the interaction with Israel, division of labor with Israel, I think is historic. Again, I don't know how you see it, but I've never seen the United States this seamlessly work in joint capacity with an ally. And if I'm an ally around the world, there's a lot of chatter about that these days. We hear it all the time. But if I'm an ally of the United States, I'd say I'd like to have a little bit of that Israel situation going on if I'm ever facing hardship. These guys have the technology and the US Is definitely standing with them in this. So there's some glass half full parts of this. But as I would acknowledge, I talked with a friend this morning 20 years ago, we're at the beginning of the Iraq stuff, and after major military operations, it looked pretty darn good. And we found a genius way to lose the piece for a better part of 10 years.

[A]

Yeah, that's a great way to, great way to put it. I guess it depends on what your metrics are when you're talking about defining success. Right. And I agree with you 100% from, from an operational perspective. Right. If we're talking about the military's ability to seriously degrade Iran's military capabilities, then I don't see how you don't look at this as an operational success. If you look at it, as you pointed out, there are some areas where the glasses have full, and I think we, we need to address those. Let's talk about the, the Strait of Hormuz. Let's talk about its, its importance. And let's start with this. I, I'll tell you the truth.

[B]

I've been somewhat surprised that it appears.

[A]

I'm sure that I'm, I'm wrong here,

[B]

but it does appear this way. And perception is important that the White House has been surprised that the straight became the leverage point, that the straight became the focus here.

[A]

Am I wrong? Did they draw up scenarios that said, okay, as soon as we start doing

[B]

this, the only thing the Iranian regime

[A]

can do is to create this chaos and blockade the strait because they can't

[B]

go toe to toe with the US And Israeli military.

[C]

Yeah, I can't say you're wrong, but I mean, maybe I'm a little too optimistic about this. I think they, they did know that this is a point of leverage. This is going to be a challenge. That, that geography, the waterways in the Gulf of Arabia or Persian Gulf, whatever your point of view is on that name, but that geography is confined. Of course, the Strait of Hormuz is even more confined. And then the Strait of Oman is another area. And Iran has a ton of shoreline along, along that area and some islands that are vital to the processing and flow of oil and natural gas, theirs and others. And they've been using some of those islands as choke points to check off whether people have paid the piper, whether they're permitted to go or not. I basically see a layering of this going on. The Trump administration has been very clear. They want allies to who have skin in the game to put some things on the table, that this should not be an America only kind of thing for maritime security in that area. And freedom of navigation on the high seas is not an America only kind of objective. Some of our allies, I think, get that. I think some of our older allies have some soul searching to go through to figure out what they're going to play by way of a role in the world. And they might not play much of a role in the world if they don't figure it out soon. But if you look at the uae, Saudi Arabia, Japan, they see skin in the game and they're going to step in and play some roles. And the administration, in going through this more protracted period of risk, is ensuring some of that. Does that make it genius or by accident? We don't really get to know. And historians will write it after the fact and of course they'll be right and we'll all be wrong. But for now, I do see some of those shifting tectonic plates that help shape what post major military operations would look like. America's still going to have to play a role, but it's not going to be the only role and definitely not the only financier of this. So I'd say in another two to four weeks, we should see a different reality in the movement of vessels and the Straits of Hormuz, how we get there. We have fog right now. I think we just have to acknowledge that we don't have perfect visibility. And for all we know, the administration doesn't have perfect visibility, but it's better than going in Iraq style and saying, we're going to do it all ourselves and we're going to run this show.

[A]

Yeah, no, I. But we could back that up and say then perhaps we should have set the table a little better with our key partners, our key allies, because there's a sense of, hang on a second. You know, nobody talked to us about this, right? And that straight is incredibly important. You know, you look at Europe in terms of lng, right? And what that straight means to them in terms of, you know, free passage. You look at Asia, our partners there. And so the other the flip side of that is perhaps is setting the table with better coordination right up front. Knowing again, you would think, you would think, knowing that the straight of Hormuz is going to be the issue and it's going to cause these, these sea changes in the global energy markets. I filled up my truck yesterday, Steve.

[B]

102 bucks, right?

[A]

Politic.

[C]

Tesla's looking better every day, isn't it, huh?

[A]

Yeah, exactly, exactly. Well, look, you know, politically, the White House has to solve this, right? I would argue, yes, that they, they're going to have to figure out a way to declare victory in some fashion. And I think if they. It's stated up front that the objective here is to massively degrade the military capabilities of the Iranian regime. Right. But I, I think it, to use your word, it was, it was foggy. Right. What are the objectives? So look, if they're talking about naval escorts, right, for ships, getting an international naval, you know, force in there, as the President's talked about, that's well and good, but you've still got the same regime. And they've shown amazing resiliency, unfortunately for the people of Iran. But that only lasts as long as it lasts. Right? So what are you talking about? Indefinite period of time where you've got an international naval force escorting tankers through in sort of this clumsy effort which is still going to slow things down because as soon as you stop, you've got the same Iranian regime and they can continue to harass. And as soon as they fire off one shot, the insurance and shipping industries do the same thing, which is say, nope, and then you've got the same problem.

[B]

So I guess that was a very

[A]

long winded way on my part. And I apologize for asking you what happens. How do you, how do you resolve

[B]

this from your perspective?

[C]

Well, I don't have great answers to how you resolve it, frankly, just because this is a hard and complicated. Energy markets. Global energy markets are a big important factor. People don't want to admit it. It's not only about the flow of energy and the flow of money, but whether you like it or not, that's the oxygen that allows the world to live. And so it does matter. We have in the past gone through periods of big uncertainty, high prices. During the Biden administration, we did that by policy choice. It wasn't by taking on a major challenge that was going to get resolved. In previous administration, we've also had shocks that have come about for various reasons. It's not sustainable for it to go long term. And so the administration is going to have to do some things. I think they have policies and strategies in mind that they think will begin to move things. Secretary Besant has hinted at those. The Trump administration has a perfect record of keeping their cards close to the vest. And then after things start moving, they begin to disclose and articulate. That's very frustrating for those who might be friendly on the outside that would like to understand and explain and maybe help calm some jitters that are out there. So we're dealing with a very different information environment. When I lived in The Bush administration 20 years ago, there was a lot of information that went out. The problem was that the actions on the ground didn't endure to a point of holding up that rhetoric and that vision. We have the opposite challenge now where we have less going out by way of explanation. But some facts on the ground are building somewhat of a foundation. But we're going to live with this uncertainty politically. What emerges in Iran, what kind of coalition of forces kind of mow the grass in this region so that we're not the daily maintenance manager of what's happening in the broader Middle East. We're going to have to have Saudi Arabia, uae, Israel, others that are trusted allies step in some pretty important ways. And Japan, I think, is emerging in a very different new global role. And they're good with what has happened so far. Of course, they'd like to be informed and in on the earlier conversations, but they're good for now. Prime Minister Takechi had a good summit with the president. And as long as they see some kind of de escalation coming in the, say two to four week period with some defined landing place, maybe a maintenance plan going forward. They want to see resources back in the Indo Pacific too, to make clear that there is an adventurism there that where we pay a price for what we've tried to handle, whether it's in Europe and Ukraine or this broader Middle east challenge, the Venezuela and Western Hemisphere stuff, we've got a lot of cans open at the moment.

[A]

Yeah, we absolutely do, Stephen. It's, it's very interesting and there's a lot of layers to this. Right. It's, you know, it's, it's how does this impact the Ukraine conflict? Our ability to, you know, provide support there and our allies ability to provide support there. Yeah. And so there's so much here to, to continue talking about. But first, Steve, if you know what I'm about to do, right, you got to stay right where you are. We got to take a quick break and then we'll be back with more from Steve Yates here on THE SITUATION report. So don't go away. Hey, Mike Baker here.

[B]

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[A]

Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Steve Yates joins us again, senior research fellow at the Heritage Institute. I almost couldn't pronounce Heritage. Well, Steve, I think we've almost solved the whole Iran situation in the first segment, but let's see if we've got anything left on the on the table. Here's here's a concern, I guess because we have to game these things out right? We have to think about this. And I, I appreciate what you're talking about a timeline of two to four weeks and we got more clarity, perhaps we've got more involvement from, from regional partners. You know, there have been reports that the Saudis MBS in particular has been, you know, quietly encouraging the White House to continue this effort. I think all those players out there are concerned that if we, for whatever reason, possibly political reasons and rising gas prices at the pump, we decide to declare victory and call it a day. They're left with a more hardlined regime in Iran which still has capabilities and they'll have to deal with it. And that's that. That's the reality. I think if, if we're going to be pragmatic about this, it doesn't appear as if the regime is, is looking to make any significant changes. They're not going to become more moderate perhaps, who knows, maybe we get a miracle here, but at some point will

[B]

end up dealing with them again.

[A]

And so I guess a success would be if that timeframe has been extended. Every administration's just kind of put lipstick on this pig and hope that the next administration might be able to deal with it. Maybe what we got here is a success because we now pushed it further down the road to the point where we have to deal with it again.

[C]

Yeah, well, I mean, there's a couple of ways if you want to paste markers for optimistic outcomes. I'll just, I'm not naturally an optimistic person. I'm just playing one on your program today. But, but if you're going to try to place some of these markers out there, you'd say, okay, there we were living with a scope of a threat that really was underappreciated in some ways minimized by a lot of people. But the very fact that the remnants of this regime launched two long range missiles out in the direction of Diego Garcia proved that they had a long range missile capability that was better than assessed by a lot of different services around the world and could strike targets much farther. And as you know, you don't have that kind of long range missile development capability unless there's something you want to put on that tip that is not your average boom boom device. And so that I think legitimized in a way a lot of the conversation that I think erroneously and I would say slanderously was saying that the Prime Minister of Israel was dragging President Trump by the nose into, into this effort. There is a global security problem that was percolating under the regime in Iran that was bigger and closer to doing terrible things. So the authors of October 7th in Israel, not that long ago, the, the backers of assassination campaigns in the United States and that bled out a lot of our troops in Iraq and other places closer to disastrous capabilities than we assess. So at least at that measure, that has been degraded much more profoundly than the strikes last summer could have done then generally, yes, there could be remnants of this regime that are not good, shiny, happy people going forward. And it might not be a kumbaya moment for the people of Iran who are long suffering and deserve a better future, deserve to celebrate a Persian culture, not an Islamist theocracy. All those things remain true. But if we are in that middle ground, Venezuela, like where we have remnants of a regime that is odious to our morality in some ways our strategery, but is behaving in ways that are more contrite in the coming period, we are net better off, then you do a cost benefit analysis of was that worth it? And then if it pops back up and we have to do something similar again, is that better or worse, more expensive or less expensive than taking the Iraq model or other things, or the Obama approach of I'm going to send pallets full of cash and I'm going to try to buy the threat every so many years? Those are basically the bad options that a responsible commander in chief and global power has to face. I think what we're muddling through now is better than what we've gone through in the past so far. And so I would accept this measure of risk. Don't claim perfection on anybody's part, but I think that's kind of the muddle that we have. On balance, though, if it tips the scales and the people of Iran get a better transition, that's freaking historic. And we're in a completely different Middle East. Israel, Saudi, Iraq, uae, others, we're just in a different ballgame.

[A]

Yeah, look, I don't think there's any doubt that, you know, certainly from the Israeli perspective, they consider a win to be a change in the regime. Right. That's what they, that's what they clearly have in mind. That's what they, you know, look at as a primary objective. Right. I think that was maybe secondary for the U. S. Perspective.

[C]

And a lot of Iranian Americans agree with that.

[A]

Yeah, right. If it happened, it happened. And, and, and, you know, great. But you've also got the regional players, the Saudis and others who, you know, I think would love to see the Iranian regime gone. But, you know, for the past few years, I think they tried to play nice with them, they tried the detente and now I think they realize that that doesn't work. But you still end up with this, this issue. You know, we really don't know who's in charge. It does appear as if the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the irgc, has cemented their position at the top of the food chain. It looks like Masoud possession, the president is, is marginal at best. You've got, you know, a political group there that probably is secondary to the irgc. And I would argue the clerics have probably figured out they're not running the show. Right. For, for optics, you know, they're still there. But, you know, it does appear that we end up with a scenario where the IRGC is fully in charge the security apparatus. And I don't know that, you know, that's a, that's a happy result. But to your point, you know, what if we've degraded their military capabilities significantly and they're not able to create the same level of instability in the region

[F]

for a number of years because we've

[A]

also gone after their manufacturing capabilities for munitions and other things. You know, you have to look at that and say, okay, that's as a success because they've been the primary blocker to long term peace and stability in

[B]

the region for decades.

[C]

And if we come out of this and they don't have a monopoly on security in the Arabian Gulf, as I'll call it, and then basically the ability to immediately go back and either by way of terror or coercion, try to force market to move or powers to have to back away and make concessions to them. That's a net forward progress. It's going to be very, very hard, I think, to get to a place where those that were sent into exile for 40 plus years and those who have been waiting out for all this time a different day, I think that the emotions but justifiable desires of a lot of those people are going to be hard to meet in the immediate term, even though I would greatly wish that we could get to kind of a place. But for the Saudis and others, I think we're in range of what's manageable. We're all going to have to invest and we're all going to have to be more honest about what the, what the division of labor and the work is in this region.

[A]

Yeah, I think the, when the regime comes out early on in this conflict and tells their own people that if you come out in the streets, we're going to kill you, that's some pretty powerful incentive for them not to come out in the streets because they've just seen thousands of their own slaughtered. Coming back around to the straight because I think it all, ultimately it all meets there. Right. And by there, I mean, you know, essentially what we pay for fuel at the pump. Right. Because politically it's just not tenable.

[F]

Right.

[A]

And so if the, from the White House perspective, if they're concerned about how the Republicans do in the midterm, for example, they've got to wrap this up. They've got to figure out a way to stabilize that. They've got to figure out a way to calm the insurance and shipping industries sufficiently. That means, you know, probably not long term seized and occupy operations in the straight, even though they're putting out the Marine Expeditionary units and the 82nd Airborne and we've got a lot of assets, obviously a, an occupation in some fashion. You know, I'm not saying the Iran, look, the Iranian regime. I'm the first person to say the Iranian regime should be, they deserve to get their ass kicked. Right.

[F]

Yeah.

[A]

And they should go. What I'm, I'm talking from an operational perspective here. Setting all that aside, you know, an occupation in that area is not going to calm the markets. And a naval escort operation is going to have a short term, you know, abilities to do the same to calm the markets. It's not sustainable over a long period of time. So they, they've got to cut a deal here. And by all accounts, it looks like the Iranian regime is saying, hey, look at this, we're going to come out and steal with complete control of the Strait. You know, they're, they're, one of their demands reportedly is that they're going to expect the international community to say, yes, you've got a sovereign right to control

[F]

the Strait of Hormuz.

[A]

Yeah. Maybe set up these tolls, you know, pay for safe passage.

[C]

Well, I think we've got some divisions inside the remnants of the IRGC and the Iranian regime. We have part of them that either are channeling their inner North Korean or Baghdad Bob. And there's other parts that are allegedly talking with the president, his team, I can't know who they're really talking to. The president seems to think he got a down payment on sort of earnest money that the person he's talking to or the people he's talking to could do something by getting safe passage of like 10 vessels under a Pakistan flag to move. That seemed to be a demonstration of ability. Is that enough? Hard to say, but I do think you're right. In the, in the immediate term, you've got basically a month and at the longest two months to have demonstrated that there's some downward pressure on prices, there's some de escalation feel in terms of the flow of goods. And this is an important case study for people. America does not rely on that region for our oil, but that oil and gas affects global markets and those global markets affect all of us. It affects China and they're learning that too. They are not a superpower and they are not independent. And it affects our allies, including, as I would differentiate, good allies. I don't see all allies as being just like everybody else, but our good all, they're affected too. And so there is a limited period of time. I think they're looking at those islands that are around the Hormuz. And so I would expect maybe if the first best option is whoever the President is talking to, there is some kind of a deal that actually proves to work in coming weeks. That may be a Hail Mary, it may be reasonable. I can't tell at this point. But if that isn't delivering fruit, then they're going to have to do something that fundamentally shapes the reality of, around those islands. And I, I don't want America to be the only one involved in that. I do want it to be a shared operation, at least with our Arab allies, and be able to make that a sustainable reality. But I think those, that, that's basically the fork in the road that hits us in the next two to four weeks at the very least.

[A]

Yeah, I, I think, I, I think that's a really solid assessment, Stephen. I, I think the, what we will see in Europe, from our allies there in Europe, I think they will get on board. They're, they're in an interesting situation. Right. From a, from a population perspective. Right. A lot of the folks are in Europe are not behind this idea, but what they are behind is not paying outrageous amounts of money, maybe $10 a gallon for fuel. So from a, from a political survival point of view, at some point those, those governments are going to have to say we got to get it on board. Otherwise we're just going to get, get, you know, kick to the curb here because of the economic realities. Even if the population isn't crazy about the idea of supporting the conflict, they'll be likely supportive of the idea of de escalating. Right. And creating some stability and, and certainly lower prices. So I think that will all come into play. The regional partners, you could almost argue, are far more important in this whole scenario, Steve, I tell you what, it's always a great conversation. Well, what you say is a great conversation. I'm just filling him down. I appreciate you, Mike. Yeah, listen, Steve Yates, senior research fellow at the Heritage Institute. Matt, it's always a pleasure, and I look forward to the next conversation. Take good care. Take care, man. All right. Great guy. All right. Coming up next, there are new signs that Ukraine may be regaining momentum. That's right. For the first time in quite a while. With recent gains in the south raising questions about Russia's position.

[B]

We'll be joined by George Barros, a

[A]

great friend of the show. He's with the Institute for the Study of War. He'll have his insight and assessment, which is always excellent. So stay with us.

[B]

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[A]

Welcome back to THE PDB Situation report.

[B]

With the war in Iran dominating the headlines, it's easy to forget that the

[A]

most devastating conflict in Europe since World

[B]

War II is still grinding on in

[A]

Ukraine thanks to Putin's invasion.

[B]

And there have been some notable developments over the past two months. Ukrainian forces have launched counterattacks in the

[A]

south, reclaiming more territory than Russian troops

[B]

have captured for the first time since 2023.

[A]

Now, that's a meaningful shift, obviously. And while there's been some focus on disruptions to Russian access to systems like

[B]

Starlink, the bigger story may be Ukraine's improving operational planning and execution on the battlefield. For more on this, let me bring in George Barros. He's a good friend of the show and the director of innovation and open source tradecraft at the Institute for the Study of War.

[A]

George, thanks very much for coming back on THE SITUATION report.

[F]

Hey, Mike, thanks for having me. Once again, it's always a pleasure to see you.

[A]

I appreciate that, man. Likewise. Listen, George, I was talking the other day with Konstantin and Francis, who run the Trigonometry podcast. It's a, it's a great show. And their last question for me was, what do I think should be on people's radar screen? What is something happening in the world that we're not paying enough attention to? And my response was the Ukraine conflict because we've all shifted focus. Past month, it's, it's been all Iran 24 7. If you could walk us through the the most recent important developments in the conflict.

[F]

Yeah, absolutely. So February 26th was a very interesting month for, for Ukraine, and there were some major inflections and some of the battlefield trends that we've seen there as

[A]

we study that war.

[F]

In February of 2026, the Ukrainians actually managed to liberate more territory of occupied Ukraine than what Russian forces managed to seize across the theater. And this is the first time that there's been a net positive territorial gain in favor of Ukraine since Ukraine's counter offensives in 2023. So it's been, you know, over two years since we've seen this pattern, and that's a really big deal. And I think we could Have a wonderful discussion on some of the underlying causes behind that. But the bottom line up front is that the war is maturing. I think we're on the precipice of a new phase of this war and a lot of the fundamentals are actually working in favor of Ukraine. As Ukraine has matured operational concepts, matured some capabilities, figured out how the Russians are fighting this war and finding vulnerabilities that they're exploiting. So we could, we could certainly talk about that.

[A]

But, but suffice it to say the

[F]

war is not dynamic or the war is dynamic. It's not a stalemate.

[A]

Okay, so two, two parts to my question. The first part is from your perspective, what's the most critical element that's contributed to this success recently by the Ukrainian military? And the other part is when you say it's entering a new phase, what do you mean by that? Sure.

[F]

Let me start with the second question first. What I mean is that it seems that we're starting to leave the last days of the war that was dominated by positional warfare. And after the counteroffensive of 2023, when the Ukrainians attempted a very sort of by the books, NATO style, well, minus the air component, but basically, crudely speaking, by the books, breaching of a prepared enemy defense and mechanized equipment, and that failed, we've basically been in a position of warfare where the lines change very little. It's difficult for forces to achieve mass. There's no operational breakthroughs and. And basically the lines are more or less static, crudely speaking. The Ukrainians are now experimenting and achieving ways to actually get armor to the front at the small tactical level. And they're now actually being able to achieve elements of surprise despite persistent drone overwatch at all times. So that's really interesting. And I think we're going to see more dynamic moves on the battlefield in 2026 and 2027. So that's answered the second question. For the first question, underlying causes, biggest reason is maturation. Ukrainian operational planning. I will say that the Ukrainian military has grown tremendously over the past four years of full scale war. And up until about year three, maybe three and a half, the Ukrainian forces were for the most part primarily focused on tactical level problems. You know, how do I kill the Russians that are in my brigade's immediate air responsibility when they come within 15, 20 clicks of our front lines. Right. But one of the things that has happened is that the Ukrainians through maturation of command concepts by the development of this new core echelon that sit on Top of brigades with commanding staff there. They're now thinking about critical vulnerabilities of the Russian operational machinery. They actually now are doing what we call in the US Military center of gravity of analysis and seeking to find the systems that the Russians rely on to sustain their concepts of operations, sustain their, their campaigns. And the Ukrainians are beginning to systematically study and attack those centers of gravity. And we can talk about the tactics of that and what that exactly looked like and how it manifested with these successful counter attacks in February. But, but that's really what's happening right now.

[A]

Okay. And, and so let's, let's kind of expand on that if we could. What, you know, from, again, from your perspective and what you're seeing, what are they going after primarily? Are we talking about, you know, command and control? We talk about communications facilities. What are we talking about? When you discuss this advance that they're making and their ability to be more strategic, if you want to put it that way, sure.

[F]

So the Ukrainians conducted a series of counter attacks in, in February that liberated, you know, somewhere in the ballpark of 330-400 square kilometers of terrain. And the, the what I'll tell you, let me tell you the sort of like the, the common story, the narrative that currently surrounds that, then I'll go ahead and maybe issue my own little corrective. So the story of this is largely that, you know, as you know, Elon Musk, the CEO of, of SpaceX, shut off the Russian access to Starlink on February 1st. And, and the common telling of this story is that the Ukrainians that exploited that cutoff, they went and attacked into Russian forces that were in disarray with all of their comms boogered up because of that rug pull. And the Ukrainians therefore made all these gains. And that's not quite exactly right. Well, what actually happened is that the Ukrainians began what we call shaping the battlefield in late 2025. They began conducting exactly as you said, strikes against logistics, strikes against command posts, targeting and getting the Russians to basically, you know, make some, some silly mistakes that made them vulnerable, potentially allowed the Russians to advance too far too fast with the intent of, of cutting them off at a later date. So creating kind of like a salt lick and shaping the battlefield for a protracted period before actually committing to the, the ground phase of, of the, of the operation. So the ground phase began in late January and early February, which then coincided in space and time with the SpaceX Starlink rug pull. And simultaneously, the Russians also have been throttling the messenger app telegram, which the Russian military use for command and control purposes. But that's for political reasons. And so we had sort of these degradation of command and control that sat on top of what was a planned Ukrainian undertaking which served as a sort of happy, unexpected catalyst, but nonetheless helped help it be successful. And also the Ukrainians discovered a tactic to achieve drone dominance in a very narrow sector of the front line. So within a tactical sector where they were doing these attacks, they managed to be able to have just drone tactical drone dominance with little strike FPVs. Yes, there were Russian drone crews there as well, but the Ukrainian space and time massed effects and were able to have drone dominance with a depth of 20, 30 km and made it very hard for the Russians to be able to stick their necks out. And because of that, we actually had Ukrainians using armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles up to 20km behind where the Russian lines were assessed to be, which was quite astonishing. And so it's sort of thinking about how to mask these effects in space and time after shaping the battlefield for a protracted period. The Starlink cut was a great catalyst for that as well. And it resulted with these successes that

[A]

we've seen here with that loss of connectivity with communications from the removal of Starlink. And they were essentially, correct me if I'm wrong, they were essentially piggybacking off of this, right? They had a system, they figured out how to get their hands on some terminals. And so they were essentially riding off of the Starlink capabilities that had been provided to Ukraine. But what are they doing to try to fill that gap now?

[F]

Yeah, so the Russians are now trying to establish their own Russian controlled sovereign Starlink alternative. So there's a Russian company, private space company that's now actually just last week did a launch that put into low Earth orbit, I think 16 satellites that are supposed to become the basis for a sort of sovereign Russian equivalent of Starlink for space based communications. Now what I'll say is that this is the system, you know, its efficacy is to be determined. They're not going to have global coverage for a long time. It's unclear whether they put these particular spacecraft into geosynchronous orbit to study Ukraine or if they're trying to like piecemeal and put together a global constellation the way Starlink has.

[A]

But, but it's not gonna, you know,

[F]

this is going to be a strategic long term undertaking and it's probably not going to be as good as Starlink. If I had to, if I had to wager just knowing the, the limitations on the Russian space industry and, and, and it pales in comparison to that level of excellence that the American companies have achieved in this domain.

[A]

Right. Well, and the resources that they're able to throw at something like that have to be relatively limited given their, their four years of, of their invasion into, into Ukraine and Starlink's operating thousands of these low earth satellites. So if the Russians have put up what, 16. Yeah, they've got a ways to go. I would argue, George, if you would stay right where you are, being mindful of your time. We have to take a quick break and then we'll be back with more from George Burroughs, the Institute for the Study of War right here on the Situation Report. You know what I'm about to say, right? Stick around.

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[A]

Welcome back to the PEP Situation Report. Joining us once again is George Burroughs,

[B]

Director of Innovation and Open source Tradecraft

[A]

at the Institute for the Study of War. And that is a new, if I'm not mistaken, and impressively lengthy title as Director of Innovation. If I want to take just a little a moment to ask you, what does that mean? What are you, what are you looking at right now?

[F]

So in my new role, and don't worry, I'm going to still be studying Russia and Ukraine. I've been doing that for 12 years professionally and I will continue doing that. But in my new role, what I'm looking to do is to improve our workflows and our processes. So as you know, Mike, you know when you have an intelligence workflow and you have persistent collection, analysis, synthesis, exploitation, dissemination, right? There's a whole data pipeline and infrastructure that actually supports those workflows. And so we can work with technologies like knowledge graphs, we can work with, you know, large language models to be able to import the data. And what I'm looking to do here is work with private technology companies for knowledge management solutions, make our workflows more robust and introduce more rigor and go work with some of the private space companies that are collecting phenomenal types of data, acquire it's the people, use, power it into our unclassifiable intelligence, work that,

[A]

that sort of thing and excellent. Well, congratulations on the new gig over there, but you can count on us continuing to call you for insight into the Ukraine conflict because we Always, always appreciate it. And, and speaking of the Ukraine conflict, let's turn our focus back to that. A lot has been made of the manpower discrepancy between Russia and Ukraine. If you could talk about that just a bit in context of the successes that Ukraine's been experiencing over the recent past.

[F]

Yeah. So the manpower shortages that the Ukrainians face are not yet solved insofar as, look, there are still frontline units that don't have enough people. There are still companies and battalions that are a fraction of what their doctrinal end strength are supposed to be. There are still holes in the lines, so to speak. I mean, actually when I talk about the theater in Ukraine, I don't like to use the word lines because the front is actually not a continuous series of lines. It's a pointless front line where you have sort of these strong points that are occupied by a small number of Ukrainian soldiers who will then be responsible for hundreds of meters of frontage. But then they're constantly being surrounded. Not surrounded, bypassed. Bypassed by Russian infiltrators who will then establish these non continuous contiguous strong points in front of them, behind them, to the left and right of them. And so it's sort of a, it's a pointless front line where these strong points are interspersed and they make up for that with the use of drones. So it's been very interesting and it's really not like what we think about when we think of the lines from World War I or World War II, because it's just very lightly manned on both sides. And that's an interesting characteristic of this war. Now, the persistent ISR and the use of drones, unmanned systems, not just in the air, but also for UGVs for logistics. UGVs with guns on them to shoot, to shoot people. I mean, Ukraine last fall they did their first ever combined arms assault that actually contained a UGV assault element that went and cleared terrain. So infantry could take a very interesting innovation there. It's actually helping offset the manpower shortage. But I don't want to say that the manpower and the man power shortage is solved, but I'll also say is that the Russians are really fighting this war quite stupidly because they, they continue to believe in the cult of the offensive and they continue to marshal between 30 to 50,000 troops per month into, into this, you know, massive, complex roboticized kill zone. And the casualties that they rack up are astounding and the gains that they make are very small and I would argue not worth the strategic cost.

[A]

The numbers, if, I'm sorry For interrupting Curious. The numbers sometimes seem a little bit all over the map. Right. In terms of casualties on both sides, what, from what you've seen, what are the most credible numbers?

[F]

Yeah, it ebbs and flows depending on a couple of different factors. So weather is a big, is a big part of it because actually when, when it's cloudy or rainy or foggy, the drones don't work. And so you'll actually have decreased casualties in some of those conditions. And that's also when, when Russians will try to do their offensive pushes because they know the drones aren't up. So sort of it ebs and blows. But ballpark, Russian casualties are in the neighborhood of 30, 000 per month, give or take. I know in late 2025, the Russians are trying to make all of their end of year goals before the New Year's, and the casualties were closer to, to 40 or 50,000 in that month, but the average is basically about a thousand casualties per day. That's killed and wounded. So it's about, it's about 30, but I think a little bit higher recently.

[A]

How long could they sustain that?

[F]

They can sustain it. They can sustain it for a long time. Look, the current mode of, the current mode of generating these forces is doing very bad things to the Russian economy. But thanks to the war in Iran and the boon on oil and the US decision to grant Russia some exceptions for oil export, the Russian economy is now making a lot of extra money. So that's giving them some breathing room here. But even if the money were not a living factor, which, which it is, but not decisive, the Russians maintain the option to go mobilize their population. And we, we've been collecting indicators that show that the Russians have been slowly changing their strategy for fourth generation. The previous mode used to be attracting guys with this massive payouts. Now they're starting to do rolling mobilization of reservists who signed up to be a reservist under a social contract that was I only get mobilized if there's an official declaration of war or the Russian homelands attacked in some apocalyptic way and the Russians actually modified the laws quite sneakily to NASA actually. Now we can mobilize reservists under the threshold of us officially being at war. And some of those mobilized personnel have begun deploying to training centers and that sort of thing. So that's a different way to go about these pools. But you know it's going to cause political problems for the Russians. And Putin makes bad decisions when he's faced with political dilemmas. He Constantly throughout the course of the last four years of war, makes militarily strategically questionable decisions for politically expedient answers because, you know, that's just dictator psychology.

[A]

So, yeah, yeah, it is a fascinating example, right, of how, you know, the world is, is so small and so connected. Right. When you talk about oil prices, for example, and we have the Iran conflict. Not to get off on a tangent, but I think I'm about to. But you have the, the, the Iran conflict, which, as you pointed out, has created these rising prices on the global energy markets, which basically pours more dollars into the Russian war machine. So you've got that as a consequence, and then you've got the easing of sanctions so that you can deal with the problem of supply within the global energy markets, which benefits Russia. And now you've got the easing of sanctions on Iran, of all things, in order to try to keep prices down for political reasons. It is fascinating. You've got these layers we sometimes, I think, get lost in, in the conversation about the battlefield because it is so important. But then all these other things happen. It's, it's, it's a reason why I point out when, when some folks, I've got a lot of friends who are libertarians and I get it, or isolationists and I get it, I understand it. That'd be a lovely world to live in. But I'm always fascinated by how they imagine this, that something, you know, you can draw the curtains around your country and you won't be impacted by things that happen outside of those curtains. So anyway, I'm back off the soapbox, George. What's something coming up related to this conflict that you think could in the short term have a major impact?

[F]

I'm very concerned about the Ukraine energy grid. The Ukrainians survived the winter. They survived the Russian campaign that sought to destroy the Ukraine energy grid and break it, you know, break, break the back of it and basically morselize it into a Western Ukrainian energy grid and Eastern Ukrainian energy grid. But, but this, they survived. A winner. But the fight's not over. The Ukraine energy grid is in a very bad place. I'm not going to sugarcoat it. And exactly. Connected to your previous statement, Mike. You know, now that every single spare Patriot interceptor that, that didn't exist and there was a shortage of is going, when I said rightfully going to protect Americans in the CENTCOM area, responsibility, you know, Ukraine's no longer receiving Patriot interceptors, and that's a big deal for Ukraine because it is the only system in the country that is effective at intercepting Russian ballistic missiles. And actually now what we've been seeing is ever since the operations in the Middle east kicked off and we started firing off tons of Patriots and Ukraine stopped receiving them. The Russians actually modified their, their daily strike packages against Ukraine. They now contain a larger proportion of ballistic missiles than before and more of them are getting through. And we think the Russians are trying to exploit that vulnerability, that gap, to try to get in free hits while they can. So it is not impossible that they collapse the Ukrainian energy grid in the coming months. Something I'm looking at very closely and what I'll note for you is that collapse in the Ukraine energy grid will not have an immediate effect on the front lines. It makes life terrible for the civilians, but I'm concerned with those for defense industry because Ukraine now manufactures more than 50% of its defense articles in country.

[A]

Yeah, that's not something that gets out there in the public, I think very often, but that's a fascinating statistic. Yeah.

[F]

And as you know, to have a factory, that's a very energy intensive undertaking. I visited a factory in Ukraine earlier this year actually, and they had a whole bunch of silent diesel generators to power it went when the power goes off, because it happens regularly. But if they collapse the energy grid in its entirety, I mean, this generation only gets you so far and that would be a big deal. So, so.

[A]

All right, last question, George. All right, so we have the successes that you've highlighted here for the Ukrainian military. You've got the potential for this energy crisis and you've got what, what appears to be a building spring or early summer offensive by the Russian military. This is a very soft science question. Are you optimistic or pessimistic in the short term for the Ukrainian military? This is the most optimistic I've been

[F]

in a year and a half. You know, the lines are solid, the data is pretty clear, the operational concepts are coming clear. Last year there was a whole bunch of uncertainty about what will happen if the Western or American aid to Ukraine is, is cut off. Would the Russians be able to have a breakthrough? But I'm telling you now, we looked at the data, spoken with soldiers and commanders in Ukraine, including guys that I talked to on a regular basis over the years who are usually giving me a pessimistic forecast. But as of, as of February, the mood is like, yeah, it's hard. The situation is bad because, you know, it's never great when you're, it's never rosy when you're in wartime. But they're like, we got this like we're not going to fold. The fortress belt is going to hold. The Ukrainian heavily fortified cities are the front line. Now the Russians, their, their level of innovation is quite low. They really have not been doing a whole lot much differently to try to make their gains other than brute forcing them. The Russian gains in 2025, which was a difficult year on average is only about 15 square kilometers per day for, for at the cost of about a thousand people killed and wounded. That's a very bad trade off. And now we have this trend where because of superior Ukrainian operational thinking going after the intermediate rear in a much more intelligent way, thinking about the Russian centers of gravity, we actually now starting to see the Ukrainians making gains for the first time in over two years. So again, this, I think I want to be cautiously optimistic, but this is the best the troops on the ground have felt in two and a half years and it's the best that as a person looking at the data very closely, I felt so we'll see how this continues to mature.

[A]

Great assessment, George. Burroughs Institute for the Study of War Listen man, always a great conversation and I look forward to the next one. But thank you very much for being here on the Situation report. George.

[F]

Oh, thank you so much for having me. Really appreciate it and hope you have a wonderful rest of your spring.

[A]

Well, that is all the time we have for the PDB Situation Report. If you have any questions or comments, maybe you've got a joke or a humorous anecdote you want to pass along,

[B]

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[A]

first tv.com and as always, you know what we do, right? We take the best comments and questions, we mash them all together once a month into an episode that we call Ask Me Anything. We got another one on the launch pad. It's coming out here, so let's stay tuned. That as they say, I don't know who they is, but they sometimes say stay tuned. But anyway, keep your postcards and letters coming. If you write postcards or letters to listen to the podcast, this show ad free. Just become a premium member of the

[B]

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[A]

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[B]

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