PDB Situation Report | May 17th, 2025: Iran’s Secret Weapons Lab Revealed & Russia’s Battlefield Recovery

Summary

Summary of "PDB Situation Report | May 17th, 2025: Iran’s Secret Weapons Lab Revealed & Russia’s Battlefield Recovery"

Podcast Information:

• Title: The President's Daily Brief
• Host: Mike Baker (Former CIA Operations Officer)
• Description: Daily podcasts mimicking the highly classified briefings received by the President of the United States, focusing on pressing national issues.
• Release Date: May 17, 2025

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1. Introduction

In the May 17th, 2025 episode of "The President's Daily Brief," host Mike Baker delves into two critical international security concerns: the exposure of Iran’s covert nuclear weapons facility and the resilience of Russian military efforts in Ukraine. Featuring insights from Alireza Jafarzadeh of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and George Barros from the Institute for the Study of War, this episode provides a comprehensive analysis of these evolving geopolitical landscapes.

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2. Iran’s Secret Weapons Lab

Discovery and Significance

The episode begins with alarming revelations about Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons development site in Semnan Province, a location previously unknown to international observers. Alireza Jafarzadeh explains the strategic disguise of the facility:

“The compound spans nearly 2,500 acres and has operated for over a decade under the guise of a chemical company called Diba Energy Siba.” (05:03)

Operational Details

Jafarzadeh elaborates on the site's true purpose:

“The facility's real purpose is the extraction of tritium, a radioactive material used to enhance nuclear weapons with no real legitimate civilian use.” (05:03)

The site, labeled internally as the "Rainbow Site," has been meticulously hidden behind petrochemical operations, safeguarded by extensive radar and air defense systems to evade detection.

Historical Context and Credibility

Drawing parallels with past exposures, Jafarzadeh highlights the NCRI's track record in unveiling Iran's nuclear activities:

“This is the same movement that exposed the nuclear site in Natanz and Iraq in August of 2002, which triggered the IAEA inspections of Iranian nuclear sites for the first time.” (03:44)

Challenges in Verification

Jafarzadeh critiques the limitations of the IAEA inspection regime, emphasizing that certain military sites remain off-limits, allowing Iran to advance its weaponization program undetected:

“The whole monitoring system has major flaws, especially in dealing with a regime that is built on deception.” (08:16)

Impact on Negotiations

The timing of the report coincides with sensitive nuclear negotiations between the Trump administration and Tehran. Jafarzadeh warns that Iran may be using these negotiations to buy time and circumvent stringent demands to dismantle their nuclear capabilities:

“They are only interested in a peaceful nuclear energy. But the reality is... they continue to violate it.” (19:55)

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3. Russia’s Battlefield Recovery in Ukraine

Current Military Assessment

Shifting focus to Ukraine, George Barros presents a nuanced view of Russia's military status. Despite sustaining heavy casualties, Russia appears capable of replenishing its forces and may even be expanding its military presence:

“Russian forces are absorbing significant losses in exchange for limited gains, but still managing to maintain momentum through steady recruitment.” (30:56)

Recruitment Strategies

Barros details Russia's aggressive recruitment tactics, including substantial financial incentives aimed at voluntary enlistment:

“They are employing some very clever tactics to try to maximize the number of recruits that they can get.” (34:28)

However, he cautions that such strategies are unsustainable in the long term, especially given Russia's strained economy:

“This is not looking particularly financially feasible, especially as we watch the damage this is doing to the Russian economy.” (33:47)

Casualty Estimates and Replenishment

The discussion includes estimates of Russian casualties and their ability to replenish forces. Baker mentions that while official numbers from President Putin claim up to 60,000 monthly recruits, actual Ukrainian intelligence suggests lower but still significant figures:

“Ukrainian intelligence confirms that Russia is adding 8,000 to 9,000 new troops per month, enough to offset losses and expand troop numbers on the front.” (30:56)

Tactical Innovations and Drone Warfare

A significant portion of the episode is dedicated to the evolving role of drone technology in the conflict. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are adapting to the pervasive threat of drones, leading to innovative battlefield tactics:

“This is changing a lot of things about warfare.” (53:48)

Russian Adaptations

Russia is experimenting with motorcycle platoons to enhance mobility and reduce drone vulnerability:

“They’re trying to use vehicles that enable less protection but more speed to carry a fewer number of people, but in a dispersed manner.” (53:48)

Ukrainian Technological Advancements

Ukraine is advancing autonomous drone interceptors, minimizing the need for human pilots and increasing operational efficiency:

“They are working decisively to try to get to the point where you have drone on, you know, basically autonomous drone on drone warfare.” (44:35)

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4. Conclusion

The episode wraps up by underscoring the critical nature of addressing Iran's nuclear ambitions while acknowledging the resilience and tactical adaptability of Russian forces in Ukraine. The insights provided by Jafarzadeh and Barros highlight the complex interplay of military strategy, technological innovation, and geopolitical maneuvering shaping these conflicts.

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Notable Quotes

• Alireza Jafarzadeh on the NCRI’s Credibility:
  “They have proven to be credible over the past two, three decades.” (05:13)

• Jafarzadeh on Iran’s Deception Tactics:
  “There’s no way you can really, actually monitor this whole situation.” (10:57)

• George Barros on Russian Recruitment Sustainability:
  “This is not looking particularly financially feasible.” (33:47)

• Mike Baker on the Evolution of Warfare:
  “This is changing a lot of things about warfare.” (53:48)

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Key Takeaways

1. Iran’s Covert Operations: Iran's establishment of a secret nuclear weapons facility under the guise of a chemical company signifies a significant breach of international nuclear agreements and underscores the regime's commitment to weaponization.

2. Limitations of International Oversight: The case highlights the shortcomings of the IAEA inspection regime in effectively monitoring and verifying Iran's nuclear activities, especially concerning military sites.

3. Russia’s Military Resilience: Despite heavy losses, Russia continues to replenish its forces in Ukraine through aggressive recruitment strategies, though these may not be sustainable in the long term due to economic constraints.

4. Technological Innovation in Warfare: The pervasive use of drones is fundamentally altering modern warfare tactics, prompting both Russian and Ukrainian forces to innovate rapidly to maintain operational effectiveness.

5. Geopolitical Implications: The developments in Iran and Ukraine have profound implications for global security, necessitating vigilant and informed policy responses from the international community.

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Further Information

For more insights and detailed analyses, listeners are encouraged to reach out to the PDB team at [e-mail] and subscribe to "The President's Daily Brief" for additional premium content.

Transcript

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[Mike Slater]

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[George Barros]

Welcome to the PDB Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right, let's get briefed. We'll start things off with a troubling new report out of Iran. A previously undisclosed nuclear weapons development site. Who would have thought? And a covert missile production program hidden behind the facade of oil and petrochemical infrastructure. Now, Alireza Jafarzadeh from the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the organization that helped expose this site, will join us to break it down later in the show, news from the battlefield in Ukraine. A new assessment suggests that Russian forces, though battered, are still managing to replace their losses and may even be growing in strength. George Burroughs, friend of the show, and he's from the Institute for the Study of War. He'll join us with the latest. And George, by the way, just got back from Ukraine, so he'll have some interesting observations. But first, today's situation report. Spotlight. A new report is raising alarms about Iran's nuclear ambitions. An Iranian opposition group says it has uncovered a previously unknown nuclear weapons facility deep in Semnan Province that's far from the regime's established nuclear sites, known internally as the Rainbow Site. Well, doesn't that sound cheery? The compound spans nearly 2,500 acres and, and has operated for over a decade under the COVID of a chemical company called Diba Energy Siba. According to sources inside Iran, the facility's real purpose is the extraction of tritium. That's a radioactive material used to enhance nuclear weapons with no real legitimate civilian use. Now, the timing of this report is significant as it comes as the Trump administration engages in sensitive nuclear negotiations with Tehran. Joining us now is Alireza Jafarzadeh. He's the deputy director of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the ncri. His organization helped to expose this facility. Ali Raza, thank you very much for joining us here on the Situation Report.

[Alireza Jafarzadeh]

Thank you so much, Mike. Always a pleasure to be on your Situation Report.

[George Barros]

I appreciate you saying that. Well, let's get stuck into it. Let's talk first of all about this newly identified facility inside Iran. How did your organization spot this? How did. How did this come about?

[Alireza Jafarzadeh]

Well, this information came from the network inside Iran of the main Iranian opposition movement, known as the mek, which has a very large presence all over the country. They are very good in terms of the track record. This is the same movement that exposed the nuclear site in Natanz and Iraq in August of 2002, which triggered the IAEA inspections of Iranian nuclear sites for the first time. And then there were a host of other nuclear sites, experts, facilities, programs that this movement has exposed. The reason they're able to do it consistently is that they are all over the country. They are the movement for change in Iran. They have to monitor the activities of the Iranian regime, both for their own protection, but also in order to bring about change in the country. And that's why this new information came from their sources. It took a while for them to process it, to go over the details, making sure that everything that they're putting out is accurate. And that's why they were ready to release it. And that's when we had the press conference just last week here in Washington releasing that information.

[George Barros]

Okay, so in your estimation, then, the sources that are providing information on this newly discovered facility, those sources are credible?

[Alireza Jafarzadeh]

Absolutely. They have proven to be credible over the past two, three decades. Interestingly, the information that released shows that the Iran regime has been working on building a new nuclear site. That was unknown until we made the revelation. Now, the organization behind building this site is a entity known as Sapand spnd, which is the entity that is run by the Minister of Defense, controlled by the Revolutionary Guards, and their sole task is to develop nuclear weapons. This is the organization that is the new form, new shape of the original organization that was part of what they called Ahmad Plan. We exposed this organization back in July of 2011, and three years later, the State Department in 2014 designated this entity. And now everyone knows about it. Now they order. The structure of this facility was started back in 2009 and originated by, overseen by a person known as Mohsin Fakhezadeh, who is known also as the father of the Iran regime's nuclear weapons program. He was behind a lot of the other sites and he's the one that was assassinated in October 2020, actually not too far from this site. Now, the site was completed by 2013 and has been operational ever since. There are three facilities. We had the details of those sites and we said that this whole place is controlled by sapant. But also we showed how they place it a very unusual way, guarded and protected by radar system, by air defense system. And while in order to keep it secret, they portrayed this as a site that is related to like, you know, a paint factory. I'm not aware of any paint factory that would have this level of hiding and camouflage.

[George Barros]

Yeah, no, I think that's a really interesting point that you raised. Look, if it was. If the, if the operation started and construction took whatever four years or so, and it's been operating, it's been functioning since 2013. Let's talk about that a little bit. How were they able to do this and keep it off of the. The radar? Because, of course, you know, theoretically, the 2015 nuclear agreement, you know, part of that pushing that across the table was I remember Secretary Kerry and others talking about how. Well, the good thing about this is we have verification, right? And we have the inspection process. So talk to me about how were they able to keep this facility off the radar screen?

[Alireza Jafarzadeh]

Well, you know, first of all, the sites that were agreed to be monitored were all of them secret sites, until most of them actually we revealed them. You know, the site in Natanz, the heavy weather facility in Iraq, a number of other facilities that the IA was going and taking samples, inspecting. The regime kept them secret. So basically as part of the agreement was basically whatever they already knew and they, they hid the this site. But even the sites that we exposed, that primarily deals with weaponization, part of the program, not just enrichment that would give them the fissile material, but you need to turn that into a warhead, a weapon. And we, you know, exclude several of those sites that were never inspected by the IAEA because the regime said this is a military site and military sites are off limits. You can only come to this civilian thing. And that was a huge flaw in the inspections regime that was put in place. We raised the flag at the time and you can see the outcome. But also even the sites that they were enriching, the regime went their own way. They shut down some of the monitoring cameras to for the sites that the IA was inspecting. They even violated their commitment that for instance, that they would limit the enrichment to 3.67%, which is supposedly the peaceful level. But they just went their own way and they enriched way over 60%, which is just a screwdriver's turn away from getting the weapons grade material. Some of the sites that were underground, like in Fardo, near Kumar, under the mountains, they were supposed to feed no hexa uranium, hexafluid at all. But that's where they were enriching uranium to very high, you know, high grade. So that's why, I mean, you know, the whole monitoring system has major flaws, especially in dealing with a regime that is built on deception, that is built on dragging and playing games with others. We also showed in our revelation that the regime had created a number of front companies to cover the whole thing. And one of these front companies, for instance, we showed that it's basically run by IRGC brigadier generals, all of whom are involved in the proliferation activities. And they were using this front company to go through the other front companies to get access, to get material, to get, you know, activities.

[George Barros]

For any of our viewers who are out there considering setting up front companies, you probably ought to be a little smarter than that. If you set up a front company and the people running that front company or IRGC officers known for their involvement in proliferation, and you could probably argue that's not the best backstop cover there. What was the primary function of this facility which again according to any two reports that we've seen, had the odd name of the Rainbow site. But what was the primary function?

[Alireza Jafarzadeh]

The primary function actually they said on the surface that is all about the oil and petrochemical facilities. They're just doing some chemical activities there. These are like benign looking things. But in fact that's a new way, new camouflage to actually operate doing nuclear research. Nuclear activities related to the development of nuclear warheads. The reason we know that what they're doing there is not what they're announcing or they're telling their locals, is that Sepand, which is the organization whose job only is to work on the nuclear weapons program, has been heavily involved. Just two days ago, the US government again designated a number of experts that are associated with, with the patent specifically working on detonation, which is another aspect that we exposed back in December of 2024. So, you know, there's a whole host of activities, sites and operations by the Iran regime that the IAEA cannot keep up with them. They, you know, the way the whole thing is structured is built. There's no way you can really, actually monitor this whole situation. And that's why we're calling for the dismantlement of all of these sites, saying the entire nuclear program of the regime is all about the weapons. It has nothing to do with nuclear energy. Anything related to this must be shut down.

[George Barros]

I take your point. I just don't think that, you know, in the real world that's going to happen. I don't think we're going to get to that, that point. But you're absolutely right. Look, if, if what you're saying is we're, we're making a deal based on trust but verify and yet there's no transparency in the inspection process, then you can't verify. Then you don't have a, you don't have an agreement that means anything. Ali Raza, There are a lot more questions here on my list of questions for Ali Raisa, but if you could stay right where we are. Right where you are. We have a break that we have to go to and then we'll be right back with a situation report. Thanks very much for sticking around, struggling with sleepless nights and exhausting days. Well, I hope not because that'd be miserable. But Beam, in case you are, beam was founded in America and run by people who value hard work, integrity and delivering results. Beam's Dream Powder is a healthy nighttime blend packed with science backed ingredients shown to improve sleep so you can wake up ready to take on the day. Look, I, I use Beam. It's not only delicious, but it actually, it works really well. Dream is made with a powerful blend of all natural ingredients. Reishi, magnesium, L theanine, apigenin and melatonin. And I, I believe I pronounced all of those big words correctly. It's designed to help you fall asleep, stay asleep and wake up feeling amazing. And unlike other sleep aids, well, there's no next day grogginess. And who needs next day grogginess? Beam is giving my listeners the ultimate patriot discount of up to 40% off. That's 4, 0, 40 off. Try their Dream powder and get up to 40 off. For a limited time, go to shopbeam.com mike that's M I K E. That's shopbeam.com mike and use code mike for up to 40% off sleep better, wake up stronger and show up ready for for your family, your work and your country. This episode is brought to you by Enterprise Mobility. From fleet management to flexible truck rentals to technology solutions, Enterprise Mobility helps businesses find the right mobility solutions so they can find new opportunities. Because if your business is on the road, they want to make sure it's on the road to success. Enterprise Mobility moving you moves the world. Find your road@enterprise mobility.com welcome back to the Situation Report. Joining me once again is Alireza Jafarzadeh, the deputy director of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Alireza, thanks very much for sticking around. We were talking about this, this newly exposed site, the rainbow site in in Iran that your organization helped to expose. I want to shift a little bit now and get your perspective on the status of the negotiations, of the discussions that are taking place between the Trump administration and the Iranian regime. What do you make of it?

[Alireza Jafarzadeh]

Well, first of all, the two sides are coming to a negotiating table, even though the Iran regime has been there many times before. Back in 2003, right after we had made the revelation about Natanz. At that time, it was the EU3, Britain, France and Germany who were involved in the negotiations with the Iranian regime. And then back in 2015, that negotiations that led to 2015 JCPOA, the US was part of, you know, a group of others, what they called five plus one. And now it's the US Negotiating. But the difference is that, first of all, the regime is in a very weak position. This is not the same negotiating table as before. They have lost much of their clout in the region. Their biggest ally, Assad, is gone. Their militia groups, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and a whole host of others that have been badly shattered. The regime is facing a lot of opposition inside the country by the people, by the organized resistance, by the same movement that actually exposed these nuclear sites, the MEK that they won't change. And that's why the regime is in a much weaker position. But what they want to do, they want to keep their nuclear weapons program at any cost. The negotiations give them something. It gives them the opportunity to avoid, you know, backlash, to avoid confrontation, to buy time in order to be able to run the clock. Why that clock is important to snap back all the previous UN Security Council resolutions and the sanctions that come with it that will expire. So you have a very small window of opportunity for the US to enforce it, on the regime and for the regime to escape it. So what they're doing, they're saying, okay, let's sit down and let's talk. And you know, just buying week by week of time and making, making it the other side to believe that the regime doesn't want to develop nuclear weapons. They're only interested in a peaceful nuclear energy. But the reality is that, you know, it's like, been there, done that. This is the regime that said exactly the same thing. Actually. The JCPO itself, as much flaws as it had in it, was all about the, supposedly the peaceful energy, that they could only enrich uranium to 3.67%. And look what they're doing. They went way beyond their promising. They made a number of promises that they will not replace the centrifuges with the more advanced, more faster ones. They did. They promised not to enrich uranium under the mountains. They did. They promised to comply with the IAEA inspections. They rejected that. So, you know, they say three strikes, you're out. I don't know how many strikes we're talking about right now when it comes to the Iranian regime. That's why the, the, the, the, the rules has to be different. When the President said that no enrichment, under no circumstances, that should be the goal, and in order to have no enrichment, you would not talk about, you know, percentages. We're talking about shutting down all of those nuclear sites. That has been our position. That is the stated goal of the US Administration. Various negotiators have talked about it, including the President himself, including the Secretary of state, and including Mr. Witkoff. But the regime is playing games. They just had an interview with somebody who was close to Khamenei who says, oh, you know, we can have a peaceful thing. We will make a promise of not developing nuclear weapons. I mean, this is the promise the regime made, you know, 20 some years ago, and they continue to violate it.

[George Barros]

Given the, Given their past behavior, meaning the Iranian regime and their tendency to not adhere to, you know, supposed agreements, why would anyone think that we come up with an agreement that says you're not going to enrich uranium, you're only going to pursue peace, why would anybody think that any of that would be different now? And if, if that's the case, if you approach it from a very cynical perspective, based on, you know, history, based on evidence of their behavior in the past, then, you know, without that, what's, what's the alternative? You know, so, I mean, we can be pursuing these discussions. Dialog is always good. We should be, you Know, we keep those communications channels open for sure. But if you're a pragmatic individual, you should possibly look at this and go, they're not going to adhere to any agreement, so why am I pursuing, you know, some sort of negotiation, you know, to say that they're going to. And if you're not going to do that, then what's the alternative?

[Alireza Jafarzadeh]

Well, the alternative is that, first of all, you definitely want to emphasize, I keep your position that there should be no enrichment capability on the part of the Iran regime and understand that the other side is weaker. This is not 2015. It's not 2023. And third, this regime, because they're so desperate, the one thing that would really move them, the one thing that would get them more worried is that is their existential threat. You know, the, the possibility to be overthrown. They're aware of it. They know the population is not on their side. They know. And, and I think the whole world would understand that the real ultimate resolution of this issue, which is ending the nuclear threat of Iran, is ending the rule of the clerics. That's, of course, a responsibility of the people of Iran and the organized resistance, but that's also a leverage. Unless the mullahs feel that, you know, the outside world is not going to just look at the ruling mullahs as the only partner in Iran. They will look at the people of Iran.

[Mike Slater]

They.

[Alireza Jafarzadeh]

They will look at the organized resistance. They will look at those who actually expose these nuclear sites for years and decades, those who are behind the uprisings in Iran, who are acting as engine for change. That's the real partner for the outside world, whether it's the United States or Europe. That's where you really need to invest. You need to open up. You need to explore that opportunity. You need to emphasize publicly that the people of Iran have the right to confront the Revolutionary Guards, have the right to overthrow the repressive rulers. That's when you get the ayatollahs to comply and to act based on that. Otherwise, they will continue dragging this issue.

[George Barros]

Okay, yeah, no, I think you're. I think your point is sound. I would, if I'm playing devil's advocate here, I would push back on the, on the idea that there would be a popular uprising only because I think that a lot of the international community has been hoping for internal change for quite some time. And, and I think you're right. I, again, I take your point that when there have been protests, when there has been unrest internally, then I think the international community has done a Terrible job of. Of getting behind it, of supporting it. Right. Not militarily, but, you know, being forceful in their. In their, you know, other ways of supporting those. That unrest that takes place. So what's your perception, or I guess, what's your opinion of the Trump administration's current actions in terms of their. Their discussions, their. Their rounds of talks with the Iranian regime?

[Alireza Jafarzadeh]

Well, one thing I want to say is that they definitely need to stick to what they have said in the beginning. The stated goal is to prevent the Iranian regime from obtaining nuclear weapons. And in order to achieve that, the enrichment program must be entirely shut down. It's very possible. It's very doable, only if you stick to it. And the second point is that who thought just a week before Assad went down, just this past December in Syria, you know, he seemed to be very invincible. He didn't have really, you know, those levels of uprisings in. In the preceding, you know, four or five years seemed to be quiet. And suddenly the whole thing went down because the balance of power in the region had shifted against the regime and against their proxies. And that's a new reality in Iran. You know, there have been several rounds of uprisings in Iran. Of course, the regime tried to crush them, but every time they did it, it came back, you know, months later or a year later, only stronger, more focused on regime change, lasted longer, and people have totally given up on the ballot box in Iran. That's an exclusive society you have in Iran. And the main foundation for those uprisings were actually the economic situation. And the economy in Iran is just totally in shambles. Things have gotten worse than two years ago when you had those, you know, major uprisings continuing. And then you have the organized resistance, organized opposition, who want an end to the rule of the mullahs. And so that's, you know, that's where you want to really, the real ally are those people who have been revolting against the regime. That's where you want to count on. They're not asking for boots on the ground. They're not asking for even appropriation of money. All they're saying is just recognize our right to end the route of the clerics now.

[George Barros]

And that's. We're running out of time here. But I guess in short order, the fact that their economy is reportedly a mess as a result of sanctions and also as a result of them diverting a good deal of their available money to their weapons programs, that would seem to be an impetus for the regime to sit down and figure out some way to get sanctions relief. Do you see this resulting? And I guess what I'm looking for is your perspective on do you think that we're actually heading towards an agreement, some type of deal?

[Alireza Jafarzadeh]

I don't know exactly what's really going on at the negotiating table. When I hear what the mullahs are saying, it's very obvious to me that they're just basically try to keep the negotiations alive and also drag it because every day that passes there, they have expired like one more day in order to get to the, you know, to the October deadline. But also they're, you know, they're avoiding any kind of major confrontation by the outside world against them. That's, that's a plus for them. But there is a limit to that. And I think that's, that needs to be understood that, you know, you cannot drag this issue forever. This is, you know, people are going, their patience going to run out. There is a deadline that the president of the United States has said. There is also a deadline at the US Security Council and the exclusive situation in the country, people in Iran are aware of it. You know, we're not a poor country. Iran has the second largest oil and gas reserves combined in the world, has a very educated population, a large population of 85 million, yet 80% of the people live below the poverty line. What's the problem? The money goes to the Revolutionary Guards, to the corruption, to the, you know, the clerics, is spent on the nuclear weapons program. $2 trillion has been spent on the nuclear weapons program of the regime, which is twice as much as the cost of the eight years of Iran Iraq War. So this is huge. And people are aware of it. People are putting, holding the regime accountable for the dilemma that they are facing. So the regime is not in a favorable situation at all. That needs to be exploited, that needs to be understood by the United States and the rest of the world. This is a time that you need to stick with your position, push hard for it. You will get it.

[George Barros]

Alireza, as always, it's fascinating to get your insight and have a chance to walk through these, these topics with you. Natalie Raises Jeffersadeh of the National Council of the Resistance of Resistance of Iran. I hope next time we pick up the phone and give you a call, you'll, you'll show back up on THE Situation REPORT because I think it's always beneficial to get your insight. Thank you again very much for your time. Coming up next, Russia's military may be taking a beating in Ukraine, but despite heavy losses, new analysis suggests that Moscow is still successfully replenishing its forces. That's amazing. And possibly expanding them. George Barros from the Institute for the Study of War joins us to break all that down. Stay with us. It is Ryan Seacrest here. There was a recent social media trend which consisted of flying on a plane with no music, no movies, no entertainment. But a better trend would be going to chumbacasino.com it's like having a mini.

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[George Barros]

Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Now, despite sustaining heavy casualties, Russia appears to be replacing its battlefield losses and even growing its force presence in Ukraine. A new assessment from the Institute for the Study of War finds that Russian forces are absorbing significant losses in exchange for limited gains, but still managing to maintain momentum through steady recruitment. President Putin claims that up to 60,000 volunteers are joining the military each month, though that figure is likely inflated. What do you mean? The Russian military might not be telling the truth. Even so, Ukrainian intelligence confirms that Russia is adding 8,000 to 9,000 new troops per month, enough to offset losses and expand troop numbers on the front. Now, much of that growth comes from rapidly deployed, minimally trained recruits used in high casualty assaults to grind forward and pressure Ukraine during potential negotiations, otherwise known as cannon fodder. Joining us now for more on this is George Barros. He's the Russian team leader at the Institute for the Study of War. George, it's very good to see you again.

[Mike Slater]

Hey, Mike, thanks for having me.

[George Barros]

Of course, man, of course. Well, let's, let's kick it off by talking about this issue related to personnel troop levels. What's your understanding of, of where the Russian military is currently in terms of replenishing the the numbers that they're losing on the field?

[Mike Slater]

Currently, the Russians seem to be able to maintain a volunteer recruitment campaign that is able to meet and probably exceed the current casualty rate that the Russian forces are suffering in the theater. Let us remind the listener that the Ukrainians impose about 35,000 mutualties killed and wounded per month and the Russians have consistently been able to recruit up to that level. But we got some data points recently that suggest and give us a nice sense of what the current Russia recruitment level is. So Vladimir Putin just last week mentioned that the Russians recruit about up to 60,000 troops per month. I don't have any independent confirmation of that concrete integer, but it's consistent with the other data that we've seen. The Ukrainians have provided their accounts for the casualties aggregated over the course of a year, which roughly equates to a number similar to that. We know that in previous months, about six months ago, the Russians were recruiting closer to 35 to 45,000 per month, about a one to one for their replacement. But then of course, in his Senate testimony a few weeks ago, the commander of America, nucom, General Cavoli, mentioned that the Russians were reconstituting and generating forces at a faster rate than what most Western analysts had expected. So this higher number is sort of consistent with those various different factors. But I want to make a very clear point here. The Russians in our assessment, are not going to be able to recruit 60,000 guys per month indefinitely. The Russians are employing some very clever tactics to try to maximize the number of recruits that they can get. And they're, they're doing things like putting forward these insane, very expensive one time recruitment bonuses. The current being about 35 to $40,000 a pop just for your signup. And oftentimes what they'll do is they'll employ them with these temporary surges. So you're only eligible to get that sign up bonus if you sign up say between, you know, May 16th and May 27th, they'll put it up there for like a week. And so if you sign up during this time, then you can take advantage of that juicy deal. And look, you can, you can certainly try to squeeze the juice that way. But in terms of a sustainable training pipeline, a sustainable force generation pipeline that can do this for many years on end, this is not looking particularly financially feasible, especially as we watch the damage this is doing to the Russian economy and their sovereign wealth fund.

[George Barros]

Now first of all, well done you for using the phrase concrete integer. That's the very first time that's been uttered on the situation report. And while you were talking, I was busy looking up what it meant and I realized you were just referencing a number. So yeah, let's I, kudos to you. But then I want to talk about the, in relation to the numbers that we're talking about in terms of replenishing those troops, 60,000 or so, any sense of whether we're talking about recruits or are there also conscripts? I mean, how many of these folks are volunteering and how many are being encouraged to volunteer.

[Mike Slater]

Sure, sure. These are, they're all being encouraged to volunteer, that's for sure. But, but they're not conscripts. So in the Russian military there is a mandatory military service, a lottery for, you know, it begins when you're of 18 and you are liable to be conscripted and serve for up to a year. Conscripts by Russian law cannot fight in Russian wars outside of Russian territory. And the Russians have made legal amendments to that, have that include the parts of Ukraine that they've annexed that the Russians legally define as Russia. So Congress can't fight in Ukraine. And this is a big red line for the Kremlin. In a few instances, scandalous instances where conscripts were sent to go fight in Ukraine that resulted in some major blowback in some major instances and Putin had to find fall guys that he threw under the bus for that and families were compensated and all of that. So conscripts don't fight in Ukraine. The Russians in their own legal classification, they have a class of service member that they call volunteers. And these are volunteers that are going to go fight in Ukraine. Now the way that the Russians try to get the volunteers are multifold. Number one, they'll offer you tremendous financial incentives to go and volunteer. And that's the way that that works. But what they'll also do is they'll recruit from the conscript class. So for example, say you're an 18 to 25 year old Russian man and you're wrapping up your one year compulsory service because you're a conscript. Well, what the recruiters will do is they will go to you and they will say, hey, you really want to sign this volunteer? You want to now change your status and change it from being conscript to volunteer so you can go fight. And we're going to give you all this money and we're going to promise this, that and the other thing and try to make it look really good for you and then that's how they get you. There are also instances where sometimes the conscripts are pressured or they'll go after Russians that have debts, the remittances. They'll go after criminals too. A popular tactic now to get out of, you know, debts or student loans or be able to absolve yourself of a criminal record is go volunteer in Ukraine. You know, you're having problems with the law. Well, you want to go to that court hearing, you could go volunteer to fight. And so these are the various different ways that they get to that number.

[George Barros]

Okay, what's your understanding of the level of training. I mean, if we're talking again, if we, if we take that number as, as a baseline at this stage anyway, 60,000 or so a month. What type of training are these new recruits receiving before they're kicked out the door and out to Ukraine?

[Mike Slater]

Yeah, for the, so it depends on the type of unit that they go to. So specialists get specialist training. So if you're going to be a drone operator or a radioman or an electronic warfare engineer, you will get more specialized training. And typically those are specialized conscripts that will be recruited for specialist roles. And those are really the very creme de la creme, special sort of things. Now the vast majority of the so called unwashed masses that just get sort of funneled into light infantry, frontal assault, suicide squad sort stuff, they'll be lucky if they get up to a month of training. And when you watch the combat footage of when they go and fight and how they're deployed tactically, I mean, they are wasted at scale. I was just in Ukraine last week and I got a data point from a senior Ukrainian officer who told me that Ukrainian forces conducted 5,000 FPV quadcopter drone strike missions just in the course of one day. And those were missions that were being flown against individual infantrymen, against vehicles, against tanks, that sort of thing. So those guys are basically given a rifle and maybe some basic, you know, team or if they're lucky, platoon level training. And then at that point they're, they're basically just sent off.

[George Barros]

Okay, what, what do you, at this stage of the game? Because the numbers have always been difficult to, to, you know, pull out and have any confidence in them in terms of fatalities, casualties on both sides. But you know, have you heard a number at this stage that you feel is somewhat credible when we're talking about casualties on the Russian side? Again, let's, let's look at the whole war in total and then if you've heard any numbers that make sense in terms of monthly losses, sure.

[Mike Slater]

So it's ebb and flowed in terms of the monthly losses, depending on the tempo and the different phases of the war. The current, my current running assessment is that the Russians suffer about 35 to 45,000 casualties killed or wounded per day or a part of me per month. So it's roughly a casualty rate of about, you know, a thousand to, depending, you know, 1200 or 1500 guys a day in terms of, over the entire scope of the war. If I remember correctly, the most high confidence assessments that we've gotten from the US Intelligence community and the British Ministry of Defense are. The casualties are somewhere in the range of 600,000 to maybe 900,000. I believe that's the rough and casualty count by recall. But I want to be very clear, I don't think anyone actually knows. I'm confident that the Russian government doesn't know. I'm less sanguine about US intelligence estimates as well because at the end of the day, in order to count the casualties, you actually have to physically control the territory. And even then it's a, it's actually very difficult to do. So these are always going to be ballpark estimates.

[George Barros]

Yeah. And, and from the US side and from the British military when, when they come out with their statistics, you know, can you talk just top line, how are they pulling those numbers out? What I mean, I assume it's a combination of open source, of liaison with, with Ukrainian elements and, and you know, just gathering whatever intel they can.

[Mike Slater]

I think that's about right. There's a combat footage, there's, you know, classified documents that one can collect for the table of contents of organization of Russian units when they go get wrecked. How many times have, you know, Russian units been reconstituted? You know, we know what the doctrinal end strength of what a Russian battalion should be, what a Russian brigade should be. And so when you see a unit have been sent back to a training ground or been reconstituted or filled with replacement a certain number of times, that gives you a sense for how many casualties has been taken. But there's also great repositories of Russian publicly available information that can be exploited as well. There are Russian legal documents, for example, that have to do with things like wills. So you can count the number of wills that have been processed. There are cemeteries that exist that have had additional annexes build onto them. There are entirely brand new military cemeteries that have been established since 2022, which you can see from space. You can also look at the number of obituaries that are posted online. The, the, the British BDC's Russian service has an excellent, I mean truly excellent research, investigative research program where they look and they scour the Russian language, social media, Internet to look for obituaries of service members posted by friends and family. And last I checked, if I recall correctly, they have identified at least 90,000 plus inferior obituaries. Now for this is a sliver of the number of full casualties because not everyone gets it a written obituary. But it's another data point that you can use to confirm to build towards.

[George Barros]

The full picture okay, so it's really an all source effort. But still, as you pointed out, those numbers on both sides, Ukrainian and Russian casualties, losses in the course of this three year effort, you have to take it with a grain of salt. Listen, George, I, I, I want to talk to you about your recent trip. You just returned from Ukraine. I'd like to, to get your impressions from that trip and also would like to talk to you about the negotiations, if you can even call them that, that were theoretically going to take place in Turkey. And at one point there was some thought that it would be direct talks between Putin and Zelensky. But first we have to take a quick break. All right, so if you wouldn't mind, George, if you'd stay right where you are. We'll be right back with George Barros and the situation Report. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Joining me once again is the Russian team leader at the Institute for the Study of War, George Barros. George, thank you for sticking around. Now you just got back from Ukraine. Talk to me about that trip.

[Mike Slater]

Yeah, thank you. So it was a very quick trip. Just spent a couple days in Kyiv with some, some meetings, some officials, some military officials, some, some war fighters. And it was great. My first trip in Ukraine this year and got to go meet with some very interesting war fighters that are innovating, changing the nature of contemporary land warfare. And I was also able to pick up a couple data points for the current, the challenges that both sides are facing and get us sort of a bit of a tactical picture for what the fight is like.

[George Barros]

What was your key takeaway from this, this trip that you took?

[Mike Slater]

Sure. Neither side can conduct operational maneuver. Both sides are completely preoccupied with tactical and sub tactical problems at the front. I mean, it is pretty much how do you manage to move a squad, 10 guys, how do you move a platoon, you know, 20 to 50 guys and get them from point A on a battlefield, 800 meters or 1200 meters, point B? That has become incredibly difficult because the Russians and the Ukrainians within about a, you know, maybe 15 to 20 kilometer distance from the zero line, it is incredibly difficult to maneuver because the drone game that both sides are bringing up there is so aggressive, basically anything that has a signature larger than a vehicle gets schwacked immediately. And it's resulting with some very interesting technological and tactical adaptations to try to overcome it.

[George Barros]

Talk to me about what those innovations look like.

[Mike Slater]

Sure. So both sides are trying to figure out how to be able to restore tactical maneuver, restore operational maneuver. So on the Russian side, for example, they're experimenting now with new types of specialized units. So these drones can fly very fast and they hit stuff. So the Russians for the most part have greatly reduced their use of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles for basic infantry maneuver, as one would expect them to do. By the, by the Russian and Soviet textbook, they're now using motorcycles and they're actually building out a tactical doctrine for motorcycle platoons, motorcycle battalions, or how many motorcycles should be in an infantry battalion, for example. And there's a coherent table of equipment for how many ATVs, how many buggies, how many motorcycles should these tactical units have? And the concept of operations is this, Mike, because a armored personnel carrier has a big signature and it moves relatively slowly. The drone, it's an easy target for a drone. But if you could put a guy in a motorcycle, put two guys on a motorcycle, and they can blitz a line very quickly, if they can simply get to a flintage or a field fortification, like a traffic trench or something, then there's about a 50, 50 chance that those Russian infantrymen can take the trench. And so what they're doing now is they're trying to use vehicles that enable less protection but more speed to carry a fewer number of people, but in a dispersed manner. That is the Russian tactical innovation, which is interesting. Mixed success rate, but it's the bleeding edge. And then for the Ukrainian side, for their own tactical innovations, they are currently working on how to have machine vision for drones, how to have it so that you no longer need to have a physical pilot that will take out the enemy vehicles and enemy targets. They're working to develop drones that are trained on AI models that they can identify. Hey, this is what an enemy tank looks like, this is what an enemy vehicle looks like. And then have a drone in the terminal phase take out the enemy object. This already actually exists in part for drones in air defense. This is not just land warfare. The Ukrainians are using quadcopter drone interceptors with light payloads to intercept Iranian shahed drones that the Russians used to strike across Ukraine every night. And they've gotten to it by putting specialized sensors on these drones. They're able to have the drones partially lock on to the Iranian one way attack drones. And then a FPV drone pilot being assisted by an automated radar will help guide the drone interceptor to take out the drone. And so that's very interesting because you're now in a place where you can take out an Iranian drone with a relatively cheap Ukrainian drone, as opposed to a very expensive shoulder launch missile like an Eagle or a Stinger or an even more expensive Patriot interceptor. So that's really fascinating. And it seems to me that they've not yet gotten to the point where they can completely remove the human operator from the drone, but they're working deciduously to try to get to the point where you have drone on, you know, basically autonomous drone on drone warfare where there is no human pilot involved in the terminal phase.

[George Barros]

Okay, this is going to sound like a stupid question, but what is the key impetus for taking the human out of that scenario?

[Mike Slater]

Pilots are a huge rate determiner. So to have a skilled FPV drone pilot is, is a determinant of how many missions can you fly, what's your sortie rate, how many targets can you engage at a particular time? And the Russians are actually going out of their way now to try to target and kill skilled Ukrainian drone FPV drone pilots. So pilots is a big enabler. And if you no longer need a pilot to be able to do your missions, then that removes one of the caps for your ability to fly the drones, number one. Number two, electronic warfare.

[George Barros]

Let me step in if I could. I'm sorry for interrupting. I'm just, I'm really curious about this. So are we taking the human out of the go no go equation on targeting?

[Mike Slater]

Partially. So for example, what you might do is you might fly your drone to an area where it's going to be saturated with just enemy targets and then at that point the need to discriminate will be minimized. And so that way it's basically just going to say, hey drone, I'm going to take you to a place where anything that you can see is going to be enemy target. And now at this point, go ahead and do it yourself. At which point, yeah, you would not have a human in the operator loop for the go no go.

[George Barros]

There's, there's some, there's some questions there that I think we could, we could spend some time talking about in terms of it being able to discern in that environment between civilian and military. Again, yes, if you're the front lines, theoretically you're statistically likely to be hitting military targets, but not with 100% surety.

[Mike Slater]

That's correct. And there's a big concern about practice side, at least among the Ukrainians because you know, a lot of the kit that the Russians use, the Ukrainians use too, like he's Deputy 2 battle tanks, for example. So if you train a drone to recognize and do object classification on, hey, here's what a T72 main battle tank looks like. Well, is that a Russian T72 or is that a Ukrainian T72? Right, but, but I think the concept of operations here is hey, if you drive the drone deep enough into the enemy controlled territory, say 10 to 15 kilometers away and then to the place where you can have a geofence and say hey, we don't have any friendly T72 operating in the vicinity here. So as soon as the drone therefore sees anything that looks like a T72, you take it out. And that's the concept. Now the Russians have an interesting and different way of going about this. Whereas the Ukrainian response to electronic warfare jamming is hey, just have the drones do it autonomously. The Russian response has been a little bit lower tech but not necessarily less effective. They are using fiber optic drones. So they've now developed these specialized drones that have schooled up on the rear, you know, 10 or 15 kilometers worth of physical fiber optic cable that has a hard line to the pilot. And so what these drones can do is they can just fly unimpedited, unimpeded by electronic warfare systems and unimpeded by other radio interference. And they're just hard line, you know, like a, like a TOW guided missile straight to whatever kind of target they're working at. And so these are some of the tactical innovations that the sides are implementing.

[George Barros]

That is really fascinating. Now as far as manufacturing, right? I mean is this a homegrown industry? Let's look at Ukraine first. Are they you know, designing and manufacturing for the most part internally there in Ukraine or are they relying on outside providers?

[Mike Slater]

They rely on outside for probiotors for components. So the Chinese basically have a monopoly on the high end electronic electrical rotors that go into quadcopters.

[George Barros]

Basically.

[Mike Slater]

No other countries make them the good ones. I mean there's a bunch of countries that make them, but apparently they're not. The quality control is quite poor. And so interestingly the Russians and the Ukrainians defense industrial base are really overexposed on China or those rotors.

[George Barros]

You know what life sometimes just turns around and, and presents you with a, you know, a reality which is like, correct me if I'm wrong, the Russian military, you know, they, their war machine couldn't have gotten this far down the road. Three years of conflict in their invasion of Ukraine without support from the Chinese. Right. I mean that's, that's, I, I don't know you what your opinion is on that and we should talk about it. But, but at the same time Ukrainians, depending on the Chinese for key components for their rose. You look at that and you think that that is a pure example of how the Chinese regime, you know, plays both sides of the equation.

[Mike Slater]

Oh, absolutely, Yeah. I mean, they stand a benefit too. And it makes me really scared as well, because this is a capability that the US is going to need too. And American industry doesn't have the capacity to build hundreds of thousands of drone rotors, you know, at a competitive price. So it's a huge problem. And if there's any smart, you know, VCs out there that want to build a factory for something, I mean, drone, you know, these are drone components that are made primarily at first in their inception for like, you know, hobbyist aviation purposes, but now they have a great dual use in military applications. And this is a drone. These drones, Mike, they're inflicting about 60% of the casualties right now on the Ukrainian side, or again, I'm sorry, for the Ukrainians against the Russians. I mean, this is not just a capability among many. This has actually become the main, like the main thing that puts Russians in the dirt, which is incredible. And yes.

[George Barros]

Is it fair to say, is it fair to say that the three years of conflict between Russia and Ukraine for Putin's war, that the drones have changed concepts of battle and battle space as a result of what they've been doing with drones and learning and studying and understanding how the drone can change that, that space?

[Mike Slater]

Absolutely. Tactical doctrine for how to do platoon, you know, mechanized assault, battalion size mechanized assault. That doesn't work anymore because as soon as you get towards the line of the, you know, you leave your line of departure and you start heading towards the enemy positions, you start getting engaged before you're even within 5 kilometers of the zero line, 100 accurate. And, and not just for combat forces too. It's changing I, you know, concepts for how to do logistics. The Ukrainians have UGVs, unmanned ground vehicles that are hauling medicine and hauling ammunition and fuel. The Russians use them for casualty evacuation. So in the path where you might have a logistics, you know, logistics platoon or a logistics company that'd be trucking all kinds of stuff with a physical driver, you know, putting. Exposing himself to risks, the Ukrainians have, have in some regards, minimized that because now they'll have robots that are hauling the stuff to the frontline fighting forces. So, yeah, it's changing a lot of things about warfare.

[George Barros]

Yeah.

[Mike Slater]

And.

[George Barros]

And you know what? And it's been for some time, right. I mean, I don't want to make it sound as if suddenly you know, drones came on the scene as a result of what's happening in Ukraine and obviously during the global war on terror. You know, drones played a very important role. But I think it's, it's certainly been accelerated and there have been a lot of people watching. Right. I mean, I think that North Koreans have been studying the use of drones. Certainly the Iranians and really everyone, Israelis, the Chinese regime, of course, all fascinated with what, what this means for a future conflict. George, there's so much more we can talk about. We haven't even touched upon sort of the non negotiations that, you know, theoretically we're going to take place in Turkey. That's not happening. That direct contest or meeting between Putin and Zelensky. That's, that's not going to happen. It's going to be some low level discussions. But I wanted to talk to you about that. It's just that we are out of time and all that means is that you've got to come back when we call you the next time. Thank you very much. And again, that's George Boros of the Institute for the Study of War. As always, we very much appreciate his insight, his experience. He just came back from Ukraine with some really interesting observations. Now that's all the time we have for this week's PDB situation report. If you have any questions or comments, if you want to send those our way, all you got to do is reach out to us at [e-mail] it's really very simple. And what we do is, is we select all the best. Right? The entire PDB team meets usually once every two weeks. We call that bi weekly. We take the best questions and comments, we mush them all together into an episode that we call Ask Me Anything. So we're in the process of developing one of those again. But go ahead and send your comments and your questions into pdb@the first tv.com and other than that, well, to listen to the podcast of the show ad free, which you can of course do, just become a premium member of the President's Daily Brief by simply visiting PDB premium.com I told you it was simple. I'm Mike Baker and until next time. Well, you know the drill. Stay informed, stay safe, stay cool.