PDB Special Bulletin | Mike Baker Explains The Spy Game Behind The Iran War With Mike Slater

Summary

PDB Special Bulletin | Mike Baker Explains The Spy Game Behind The Iran War

Podcast: The President's Daily Brief
Host: The First TV
Guests: Mike Baker (former CIA Operations Officer, host) with Mike Slater
Date: March 8, 2026

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Episode Overview

In this special bulletin, Mike Baker joins Mike Slater to break down the intelligence and strategic maneuvers underpinning the opening days of the U.S.-Iran war, code-named "Operation Epic Fury." The episode delves into intelligence gathering, operational complexities, the challenges of running human sources in "denied areas" like Iran, the limitations of drawing parallels with other authoritarian regimes, and the potential paths forward for both the war effort and Iranian internal dynamics.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Complexity and Execution of Operation Epic Fury

• Intelligence Collaboration
  • The U.S. intelligence community is working closely with liaison partners—primarily the Israelis and some regional players—to gather and verify sensitive information.
  • Quote:
    • "There's very fellow side that set the table for, certainly for timing of operations...the managing all the spinning plates at the same time." (Mike Baker, 00:55)
• Military Execution
  • The military’s handling of the operation’s complexity is lauded, especially given the multi-pronged, synchronized activities required.
• Element of Surprise
  • Strikes were launched at an unexpected time (9:45 am on a Saturday), increasing their effectiveness and catching Iranian leadership off guard.
  • Quote:
    • "The benefit was also this element of surprise because the Iranian leadership likely expected any attack...to be happening at night." (Mike Baker, 03:45)

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2. The Anatomy of Intelligence Gathering

Multi-Layered Collection

• Human sources remain the gold standard for actionable intelligence, despite the immense value of signals intelligence (SIGINT), communications intercepts, satellite imagery, and drone surveillance.
• Quote:
  • "If I had to have one thing during the course of the lead up to an operation, I would want a human source, right?...Nothing replaces having somebody." (Mike Baker, 02:34)

Human Source Recruitment & Challenges

• Human sources can be anyone with access: drivers, janitorial staff, secretaries, deputies—any person who might have proximity to key leadership or operations.
• Iran (like North Korea) is a "denied area," making traditional recruitment and communication extremely difficult.
• Often, reliance on third-party or liaison intelligence is vital.
• Quote:
  • "There's a lot of parts to trying to identify and then develop a human source. ...They're hard targets." (Mike Baker, 04:30)

Communication with Human Sources

• Secure, often remote communication is established with human sources—sometimes in person, when possible, or via covert channels.
• When unavailable, agencies fall back heavily on technical means (e.g., intercepts, drone imagery).
• Quote:
  • "One of the first things you have to do with a source...is to ensure that you can maintain those communications, particularly if you've recruited a source for very specific operational actions." (Mike Baker, 07:03)

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3. Regional and Historical Context

Differences between Iran and Other Authoritarian Regimes

• The path to reform or revolution in Iran is vastly more complicated than in places like Venezuela or even Cuba, due to the lack of identifiable opposition and the government’s preparation for leadership attrition.
• Iran's populace is largely unarmed and previously endured brutal suppression during recent protests, complicating prospects for popular uprising post-strike.
• Quote:
  • "The problem we've got with Iran is they've spent a lot of time thinking about what happens if we lose three or four layers of leadership...The Iranian population that's essentially unarmed. What are they going to do and how are they going to respond in this moment?" (Mike Baker, 08:50)

The Stakes for the Region

• Iranian leadership's long-standing hostility toward Israel and the U.S. underscores the urgency and risks of U.S. involvement.
• U.S. administrations have historically avoided direct confrontation, instead opting for incremental measures—a policy that Baker criticizes as inadequate.
• Quote:
  • "We will always be kicking the can down the road, worrying about their nuclear capabilities. And that's all we've been doing...putting lipstick on a pig when it comes to Iran." (Mike Baker, 11:24)

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4. Risks, Outcomes, and the Road Ahead

What Could Go Right

• Private support from regional actors (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE, etc.) could materially bolster the operation, even if public statements are muted.
• Quote:
  • "I would love to see more involvement from the regional actors in pushing this forward." (Mike Baker, 13:08)

What Could Go Wrong

• If Iran’s leadership rapidly reconstitutes itself, it sends the message that regime change is not imminent, dampening momentum for further change.
• The risk remains that without Iranian popular uprising or continued external pressure, the U.S. will once again defer a fundamental solution.
• Quote:
  • "If it looks as if the IRGC and the leadership there have reestablished themselves quickly, then what that means is the Iranian people may think this...is not our opportunity. And if that happens, we're just kicking the can down the road." (Mike Baker, 13:56)

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Memorable Quotes

• On the Challenge of Iran:

  • "Iran’s always been a heavy lift for the US Intelligence community to gather real time, credible, verifiable information.” (Mike Baker, 02:55)

• On Public Protests and Moral Clarity:

  • "I didn't see any of those individuals out there protesting the regime of Iran, killing thousands of their own citizens...So apparently they decided ... to support...the Iranian regime, which is essentially what they're doing when they go out and, and protest this." (Mike Baker, 12:06)

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Important Timestamps

• 00:55 – Baker discusses the scope and coordination behind Operation Epic Fury
• 02:25 – Explanation of multi-layered intelligence gathering
• 04:30 – Detailed breakdown of human source recruitment
• 07:03 – How information from human sources is communicated to intelligence handlers
• 08:50 – Why Iran is not “the next Venezuela”; obstacles to regime change
• 10:51 – Baker's assessment of the president’s decision to strike
• 13:08 – What successful and unsuccessful outcomes might look like in the upcoming days

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Conclusion

This episode provides a behind-the-scenes perspective on the espionage and realpolitik shaping the early days of the U.S.-Iran conflict from a seasoned intelligence officer's viewpoint. Baker emphasizes the intricacy of both human and technical intelligence operations, the difficulty of penetrating “hard target” states like Iran, and the unpredictability of what regime change might mean in such a tightly controlled society. He ends on the note that greater regional involvement and careful watchfulness over Iran’s internal dynamics are central to the coming days.

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Transcript

[A]

Hey, Mike Baker here. I wanted to highlight a conversation that I had with my good friend Mike Slater about the war with Iran. We discussed the intelligence side of those opening days of the conflict, how information's gathered, what might be happening behind the scenes, and some of the dangers that could lie ahead. Hope you enjoy it.

[B]

Welcome back to our special War of the Worlds. Talking about Operation Epic Fury, go to the great Mike Baker. He's a former CIA officer and host of one of the top podcasts in the country, the President's Daily Brief. Mr. Baker. How do you do, sir?

[A]

I'm doing well, thanks very much, man. Good to see you.

[B]

You too. What have you found to be the most impressive aspect of Operation Epic Fury from either a military or an intel standpoint?

[A]

Well, I. Yeah, I think you just nailed both of those things, the intelligence gathering, both from the US intel community and, and also obviously working in partnership with our liaison, primarily the Israelis. Although don't discount some of the information sharing that we have with other regional players out there. So there's very fellow side that set the table for, certainly for timing of operations. And then there's just always what you kind of need to be impressed with, which is the execution by the military of an operation like this. The complexity of this is amazing. And so far, at least, you know, some 60 hours, 65 hours, whatever, we're into it at this time that we're talking, it has been an incredible display in terms of the managing all the spinning plates at the same time.

[B]

I want to talk about where it could go wrong or where it could keep going very, very right. But, and you could just speak generally, what are the. In, what's the intel operation look like to get us to, for us to finally know that 48 or whatever number of the top guys happen to be in the same location. Like, Ayatollah happens to be right there. Shoot the missile now. Like, he's there. Guys, what does that look like? Is there a mole in the inside of Iran? Is there, is it drones? Like, what does that, what could that look like?

[A]

I'll tell you what it looks like. It looks like layers of, of resources. So everything from human sources, which typically, you know, if I had to have one thing during the course of the lead up to an operation, I would want a human source, right? Signals, intercept, communications collection, the data you can get from satellite imagery, from overhead surveillance, from drones, all that is incredibly valuable. But you know what? Nothing replaces having somebody. Now, I'm not saying that we had, you know, well placed sources inside that we're able to say they are going to be meeting, as bizarre as that sounds at this stage, given how well aware they were of the potential for conflict. But it's a combination of all those, those things that you gather. And again, working in concert with our liaison partners, Iran's always been a heavy lift for the US Intelligence community to gather real time, credible, verifiable information. So we've always relied on, on liaison partners out in that region and again, you know, particularly the Israelis to assist with that. But the fact that the, the Iranian leadership were so careless and in, in deciding to have these gatherings, you know, and it wasn't just the one where Khamenei was at, that allowed them to target. And you could tell from the timing, right, because we've talked about that in the past, but the timing of this launching, these strikes. So essentially they were hitting targets roughly 9:45am Saturday morning. Tech run time is not typical. And so there was that element as well, that. Look, the benefit of this, aside from that, that operational window we had, knowing when the meetings were taking place, the benefit was also this element of surprise because the Iranian leadership likely expected any attack should it occur to be happening at night.

[B]

Just again, to go back on your CIA background, like, what types of human sources are there?

[A]

It's a whole range. You know, you look for anybody with access. So that, what could. That, that could be a driver, someone who drives the Defense Minister around. It could be someone who, the charwoman, someone who cleans the offices. It could be a secretary, it could be a deputy foreign minister. You know, you look for anybody who's got access to actionable intelligence, and then you look for reasons why you might be able to get them to cooperate in some fashion. And, you know, you obviously need to have access to them. So there's, there's, there's a lot of, there's, there's a lot of parts to trying to identify and then develop a human source. It's, it's, it's not. You know, I know this is not the statement to be obvious, but there's a lot of work involved. And when you're talking about a denied area like Iran, same problem we have in a place like North Korea. They're hard targets.

[B]

What makes them so hard? Why is Iran so tight?

[A]

Well, part of, part of it is just access. Do you have, do you have, you know, like, if you're operating in Europe, you're operating in Africa, you're operating in Latin America, you know, typically, you know, you can spot and possibly develop because you have access, the ability to actually meet or talk to or, you know, assess an individual. Right. In a place like Iran or again, North Korea or places like, it's, it's, it's a denied area in a sense. Right. You, you don't have that, that ability. So sometimes you have to do things somewhat remotely. That makes it more difficult. Sometimes you have to rely on a third party. Again, a, you know, a liaison partner who has access for whatever reason because they're able to operate in that country. So it's, you know, I always, anytime, anytime we have a success, you know, I'm always reminded of how difficult the recruitment process is for human sources.

[B]

Yes. Okay. I couldn't, I couldn't imagine. And the people who do that recruitment, I, that's insane. One more dumb civilian question to a CIA guy. Whether it was El Mencho in Mexico or Maduro in Venezuela or Ayatollah here in Iran, whoever the intel was, guy on the ground was, let's say they know that El Mencho is going to be here or Maduro is going to his compound tonight, or Ayatollah and all of his guys are right there. How do they call it in to their guy, their, their CIA guy?

[A]

Well, you have to have, know that again, without going into sources and methods. You have to imagine that if you've developed human sources and again, look, sometimes it's, it's not possible. So sometimes you are relying on technical collection. Right. On, you know, people. I think sometimes by this point in time, certainly after the global war on terror, they're familiar with things like chatter. Right. Well, you know, you're, you're, you're intercepting communications. That sometimes is what you have to depend on, along with imagery and, and other technical collection means. But if you've got a human source, then theoretically you have a way to communicate. And it may be a very remote means of communication. Again, if the environment allows for it, it's in person. But one of the first things you have to do with a source that you're developing and that you recruited is to ensure that you can maintain those communications, particularly if you've recruited a source for very specific operational actions. So you know that you're going to have a very short window of opportunity but for something. Which is why you targeted that individual or those sources in the first place.

[B]

Yes. What do we need to know about the history of Iran at all from a 30,000 foot perspective or the people of Iran or the government of Iran that is going to make this operation moving forward perhaps more difficult?

[C]

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[A]

the problem I think right now for the public is they watched what happened in Venezuela right now to some degree. We reshuffled the deck chairs. Del Rodriguez is there in charge. But we are getting cooperation. We are seeing signs and they have released political prisoners and they're apparently going to do more of that and they are moving in the right direction. You can't take Venezuela and say this is a template for Iran. It's not going to happen. Venezuela's got a history of elections and democracy. There were identifiable opposition leaders who you could, you could work with. There was an ability to, to, to map out, and hopefully it follows that map a transition. It's not the case in Iran. I mean, it's not the case in other places as well. Cuba's a good example. You know, there's no definable, no established opposition to say, okay, maybe you can come in behind this. The problem we've got with Iran is they've spent a lot of time thinking about what happens if we lose three or four layers of leadership. You know, how do we continue this? The other problem is you're talking about an Iranian population that's essentially unarmed. What are they going to do and how are they going to respond in this moment? Right. They just had thousands and thousands of their, of their citizens slaughtered by this regime during the last round of protests. Are they going to see this moment because of the death of Khamenei and a lot of the other leaders? Are they going to see that as their opportunity now to get out on the streets, to insist on a changing government, to pressure the security apparatus into saying, okay, maybe it is time to lay down our weapons or find an alternative way of running this country? These problems can be very messy and I don't think anybody should imagine that a transition in Iran is going to be quick or easy by any means.

[B]

That being said, do you think this was a good move by the President?

[A]

I think it was overdue. I think this move should have been done by previous presidents. And the reason I say that is because you will Never have. Short or mid. Long term, certainly stability and peace in that region. As long as the mullahs and the IRGC run Iraq. It's just not going to happen. Because their stated objective, which they've said many times over and over and over, is the destruction of Israel, which is why they set up their proxy network, a ring around Israel. That's their goal. Right. And when they chant death to America, well, they mean it. They have killed thousands and wounded thousands of US Soldiers over the years through the export of IED technology and resourcing proxies in Iraq and elsewhere. And we will always be kicking the can down the road, worrying about their nuclear capabilities. And that's all we've been doing. Every, every administration going back since the revolution has been doing nothing but putting lipstick on a pitt when it comes to Iran and saying somebody else could take care of this problem down the road. Right. And all those people out there protesting on the streets of the U.S. thank goodness there's not many of them. But look, I live in Idaho. We actually had a protest at Boise against this conflict, against this targeting of the Iranian regime. I didn't see any of those individuals out there protesting the regime of Iran, killing thousands of their own citizens, detaining tens of thousands of their own citizens. They were silent about that. So apparently they decided that, you know, the right side of the fences is, is to support, you know, the Iranian regime, which is essentially what they're doing when they go out and, and protest this. I get it. I get people saying, well, maybe we should have more agreement from Congress, whatever. But briefing Congress on a, on an operation like this, can you imagine the, the, the members of the House, all of them being able to keep a secret? I can't.

[B]

Got about 30 seconds. What's something you're looking forward to in the 4. 4 in the next 48 hours, maybe a week where you're like, oh, that's great news. Or maybe the flip side, too, like, oh, darn, this is not going the direction we wanted to.

[A]

Yeah. I think on the good side would be regional actors stepping in, being more forceful in their support of this effort in their own ways. Right. They're not, it's not like they're going to join. And some could be flying sorties over Iran, but a little bit more force in a private conversation. I can almost guarantee that the Saudis, Jordanians, uae, all the others would say the same thing. We would be better off here in this region without the mullahs and the irgc. But publicly, that. That's you know, that's not tenable. They're not going to say it. So I would love to see more involvement from the regional actors in pushing this forward. Something, you know, on the negative side would be if we see a quick succession in, in Iran and suddenly we've got a. A stable leadership. I don't think that's going to necessarily happen. The command and control has been really decimated, so. But I will. If, if, if it looks as if the RRGC and the leadership there have reestablished themselves quickly, then what that means is the Iranian people may think this. You know, despite the damage that's been done, this is not our opportunity. And if that happens, Gretz again, we're just kicking the can down the road.

[B]

Okay. All right, well, watch out for both those. Mike Baker, former CIA agent or officer and host of one of, literally one of the top podcasts in the entire country. Watch it, listen to it every day. The President's Daily Brief. Mike, appreciate your insight as always, brother. Thank you.

[A]

I appreciate you, Mike. Thank you.