The President’s Inbox

Episode: A New U.S. Grand Strategy: The Case for a Realist Foreign Policy

Host: Jim Lindsay (Council on Foreign Relations)

Guest: Stephen Walt (Harvard Kennedy School)

Date: August 26, 2025

Episode Overview

This episode explores the case for a realist foreign policy as a new U.S. grand strategy. Host Jim Lindsay speaks with Stephen Walt, a leading realist scholar and professor at Harvard, about the premises of realism, its differences from liberal internationalism, its critiques of past and current U.S. foreign policy, and prescriptions for America’s future approach in a world marked by renewed power competition—especially with China as a peer rival.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. What is Realism?

[02:30]

• Stephen Walt: Realism sees the international system as anarchic—lacking central authority—and thus states must fend for themselves.
  • States prioritize security and prosperity, relying on their own capabilities.
  • Hard power (military, economic might) is important, but military force should be used with caution due to unpredictable consequences.
  • Realism is inherently skeptical about spreading ideals via force and large-scale social engineering abroad.
  • Quote: “Realists tend to have a rather bleak view of the world, that it’s a world of some suspicion, danger occasionally punctuated by open warfare.” [03:15]

2. Realism vs. Liberal Internationalism

[04:06]

• Liberal internationalists (like John Ikenberry) believe:
  • Democracies are more peaceful (Democratic Peace Theory).
  • Economic interdependence deters conflict.
  • International institutions can constrain even powerful states.
  • Spreading democracy, commerce, and building institutions will produce peace.
• Walt’s critique:

  • Some truth in these ideas, but effects are weak or overstated.

  • Democracies aren’t necessarily peaceful; interdependence hasn’t prevented major conflicts; institutions are tools of powerful states, not checks on them.

  • Quote: “Institutions are very important as tools... They couldn’t stop Putin from going into Ukraine. They couldn’t stop the United States from going into Iraq.” [06:33]

  • Behavior of the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War was remarkably similar despite different political systems. [06:53]

3. What Guidance Does Realism Offer Policymakers?

[07:18]

• Realism provides tendencies and principles, not specific answers for every situation.
  • Focus: world is competitive, trust scarce, aim to improve relative power.
  • Allies are important—more friends, fewer enemies.
  • Military force is unpredictable; use only for vital interests, caution especially in unfamiliar or non-vital regions.
  • Example: Most realists opposed the Iraq War.
  • Maintaining favorable balance of power in key regions is a core U.S. interest.
  • Quote: “[Y]ou want to try and keep your enemies isolated and divided… having powerful friends is a good thing.” [09:37]

4. Critique of U.S. Foreign Policy (Post-Cold War)

[12:21]

• U.S. pursued "liberal hegemony": using American power to expand the liberal order globally.
  • Sought to democratize, globalize, and extend institutions like NATO.
  • Realists saw this as overly optimistic, threatening to non-liberal states (e.g., China, Russia).
  • Resulted in costly, failed interventions and economic turmoil (hyper-globalization, 2008 crisis).
  • Bipartisan consensus maintained this approach despite failures.
  • Quote: “Saying that we wanted to make the entire world a bunch of liberal democracies was going to be threatening to any country that wasn’t a liberal democracy.” [13:26]

5. Critique of Trump’s "America First"

[15:17]

• Trump adopted a crude realism (world is competitive, allies should do more, globalization went too far) but lacked coherence and strategic vision.
  • Contradictory: pressing allies to spend on defense while harming their economies with tariffs.
  • Alienated potential allies; damaged U.S. science/technology base (vital for power).
  • Real realism seeks more friends, fewer enemies, long-term strategic advantage.
  • Quote: “No serious realist would want to... pick fights with Canada or Denmark or Australia...” [17:44]

6. Prescriptions for a Realist Grand Strategy

[19:07]

• Offshore Balancing (per Walt & John Mearsheimer, [19:43]):
  • U.S. should focus on preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in key areas (Europe, Asia, Middle East).
  • Encourage Europe to take primary responsibility for its defense; only intervene if the balance of power collapses.
  • Main focus should shift to Asia—contain China, build regional balancing coalitions.
  • Greatly reduce military involvement in the Middle East; return to pre-1991 practice of shifting support as balance requires.
  • Remain engaged economically and diplomatically everywhere; withdraw troops selectively and gradually, especially from Europe.
  • Quote: “Offshore balancing means the United States… has to make sure that no hostile power… does [dominate key regions].” [19:44]

7. Application to Taiwan & Regional Strategy

[24:25]

• Maintain "strategic ambiguity" on Taiwan; oppose unification by force, support Taiwan's capacity for self-defense, but don’t guarantee independence or antagonize China directly.
  • Quote: “…any political unification should be voluntary on both parties… If Taiwan wants to reunify with China, then we have no objection to that. But if it is going to be compelled… we would oppose that.” [24:40]

8. Offshore Balancing vs. Isolationism

[25:34]

• Offshore balancing is not isolationism; it calls for diplomatic and economic engagement and a strong military capable of intervening in crucial areas, particularly Asia.
  • Reductions in forces would be gradual and targeted, not abrupt withdrawal.
  • Quote: “Offshore balancing is not isolationism in any way.” [26:18]

9. Defense Spending & Technological Change

[27:09], [28:53]

• Walt argues offshore balancing could lead to significant but not drastic defense savings (would not “cut it in half”).
• On new technology (e.g., AI, drones): It won’t make realism obsolete, but it’s a strategic challenge. U.S. must wisely manage costly legacy platforms (e.g., aircraft carriers) versus new-tech investments.
  • U.S. advantage has been adapting to technological change; must continue and refocus on peer competition with China.
  • Quote: “AI is not going to make realism obsolete… Technological developments are changing the nature of strategies, and raises challenging problems...” [28:53]

10. Realism and Economic Policy

[33:00]

• Realism isn’t a theory of trade policy, but implies U.S. should avoid overdependence on any one supplier or country.
  • Endorse friend-shoring, diversify supply chains, and avoid policies that push allies away.
  • Trumpian protectionism is not real realism; threats and erratic behavior drive allies to distance themselves.
  • Quote: “In an uncertain world, you do not want to be overly dependent on any single source of supply... robust supply chains are a good thing…” [33:10]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Liberal Theory Limits:
  “Not all that well supported… The actual behavior of the two countries [US & USSR] was remarkably similar, even though they were very, very different polities.” (Walt, [07:02])

• On U.S. Blunders:
  “We ended up occupying and owning countries where we had no idea how to build democracy. And we did that at great cost to ourselves and to these countries as well.” (Walt, [13:55])

• On Trump’s Contradictions:
  “Why anyone would want to pick fights with Canada or Denmark or Australia... is just beyond me if your long-term goal was to improve America’s relative power position.” (Walt, [17:44])

• On Europe’s Defense:
  “Europe has what, three to four times more people than Russia does… Europe has the wherewithal to deal with potential threat from Russia.” (Walt, [21:45])

• On the Opportunity Cost of Forever Wars:
  “Large chunks of the defense establishment were figuring out how to try and beat Afghan insurgents instead of focusing on long term competition with a peer competitor that was rising very rapidly.” (Walt, [31:50])

Key Timestamps

• 02:30: Walt defines realism and its fundamental assumptions.
• 04:06: Differences between realism and liberal internationalism.
• 07:18: Practical guidance realism offers to policymakers.
• 12:21: Critique of post–Cold War U.S. grand strategy.
• 15:17: Evaluation of Trump’s “America First” through a realist lens.
• 19:07: Walt’s prescription: “offshore balancing”; introduction and explanation.
• 24:25: Applying offshore balancing to the Taiwan question.
• 25:34: Offshore balancing contrasted with isolationism.
• 27:09: Discussion of potential defense savings under offshore balancing.
• 28:53: Impact of new technologies (AI) on realist strategy.
• 33:00: Realism’s implications for foreign economic policy and supply chains.

Summary Table

| Topic | Walt’s Realist Perspective | |-------|---------------------------| | What is realism? | States act in a self-help system, prioritize security, cautious about use of military, skeptical of ideological crusades. | | Critique of liberal theories | Democratic peace and economic interdependence are overrated; institutions can’t constrain great powers. | | U.S. foreign policy critique | Post–Cold War “liberal hegemony” was naive, costly, and provoked rivals. | | Trump’s approach | Shared realism’s instincts but lacked strategic coherence, alienated friends, and harmed U.S. long-term interests. | | Recommended strategy | Offshore balancing: focus on Asia, let Europe defend itself, reduce Middle East entanglements, keep tech/science edge. | | On Taiwan | Maintain strategic ambiguity; support defense but don’t guarantee independence. | | On spending/technology | Gradual reduction in defense spending possible; rigorous adaptation to technological change crucial. | | On economic policy | Diversify partners/supplies, avoid economic coercion of allies. |

Final Thoughts

Stephen Walt proposes that a durable, pragmatic U.S. grand strategy should return to the realist logic of offshore balancing: emphasize maintaining favorable balances of power in key regions, reduce overextension, prioritize Asia, and restore U.S. resources and technological leadership. Idealistic overreach and contradictory “America First” policies have backfired; only a clear-eyed, interest-driven realism can provide the strategic clarity and restraint that current challenges demand.