Scott Galloway (8:07)

Let me propose another potential upside. I find I'm naturally a pessimist, so I always try to ask myself what could go right? 90 million people, incredible scientists, universities, sitting on top of the second largest natural reserves of gas, third largest reserves of oil, has been kind of punching below its weight class for a couple decades now. Maybe doesn't become pro west, becomes west neutral and decides that the organizing principle isn't death to Israel or death to America, and becomes a great trading partner for Europe and the west. And this incredible culture of Persia is unlocked again. And we end up with kind of the. The peace and prosperity that we've all envisioned for the Middle East. Is that a pipe dream?

Fareed Zakaria (8:55)

It's not a pipe dream. And the conditions you described inside the country are 100% right. I mean, I've been to Iran. I'm always struck by how pro Iranian people are. Now. I have to be careful. Mostly they only let you go around Tehran, and rural areas are more pro regime. Older people are more conservative, more religious. So the way I would put it is that's why I said the principal upside is regime collapse. You need a regime collapse for your scenario to unfold. Because these guys are gonna, you know, they are hardline, very repressive, and they can stick it out. They've got the guns and they're willing to kill as they showed. So in order for your dream to come true, we need to see some cracks in the regime. You need to see some, maybe parts of the armies distance themselves from parts of the clerical establishment. That's typically the kind of thing that you see when you begin to see regimes fall. But if that were to happen to play out, to spin out the what can go right scenario. Look, Iran is one of the great trading nations of the world. It has always been very pragmatic in its foreign policy. Historically, Iran had relations with Israel, you know, under the Shah. In fact, the Iranian. The Tehran's water system was built by Israeli engineers. And if one of the reasons they're. They're running out of water, the president of Iran has talked about maybe having to move the capital from Tehran because they're in such bad shape. And part of the problem is they can't get the Israelis to come in and help them fix it, because they're the ones who would probably be the best experts at this. So there is a tradition of Persian trading practicality that could absolutely come to be. But I would caution it's a very tough regime. They are very institutionalized. And I don't want to discount entirely there is a Shia religious element within Iran that is real. I give you a simple example. Look next door at Iraq, where they have free elections. The Shia population, a large part of the population, votes for parties that are religious and political, often led by mullahs like Muqtad Al Sadr. So there is within the Shia tradition, a conflation of religious and political authority. It's very alien to those of us in the West. It's also very alien, by the way, to all the people who I met in Tehran who are like urban liberals who very much espouse the kind of vision of Iran that you described. But there is another Iran out there in the rural areas, and just a matter of humility. We don't know enough about it. But as I said, they tend to seem to be a little More religious, a little more conservative, a little older. And when you look at Iraq, you see that even free elections, you end up with a lot of religious and religio political authority being given votes.

Scott Galloway (12:11)

I've heard a theme across sort of right leaning media figures, mostly podcasters, that this has all been orchestrated by Netanyahu and Israel. To what extent do you think Israel's influence played or didn't play a role in this?

Fareed Zakaria (12:27)

I think the kind of way they put it I really dislike because it's a kind of as if there is this nefarious Israeli, you know, kind of a grip on American foreign policy and it's raising all kinds of anti Semitic tropes that I think are both terrible and wrong. And, you know, I think people should really be careful not to do that kind of thing. I think in this case, remember, the United States has been, you know, opposed to the Iranian government since its founding. You know, the Iranians took Americans hostages. The Iranians have tried to attack Americans in various places all over the world. This is a very adversarial relationship the United States has had with Iran. I think it's fair to say that Bibi Netanyahu has personally a lot of influence with Donald Trump. And Trump is a man very swayed by personalities, by people. And he likes Bibi and he likes listening to him, and he likes the idea of doing things with him. And I think Bibi Netanyahu sold him a dream that you can be the guy who liberates Iran. Every other president has had to tolerate them. You can be the guy who liberates them. And Trump is, I think, amenable to that kind of idea. I think he sees himself as a man of destiny, a person who's going to do big things, particularly when dealing with countries like Venezuela or Iran or Cuba. You know, you can see it like he wants to bring them to heel. So I think Bibi Netanyahu convinced him that there was a great moment of opportunity. Iran would never be weaker. The forces are arrayed in the right position. So I think that's the way to think of it, and I think that is accurate. But I think the whole idea that the United States is doing Israel's bidding misses the fact that the United States has been in, you know, existential opposition to the Islamic Republic. And the Islamic Republic has been, of course, in deep existential and violent opposition to the United States for 47 years.

Scott Galloway (14:43)

You brought up something really interesting, and you were one of the first people to point this out, that this huge strategic blunder of attacking Civilian infrastructure and residential properties in different Gulf states. I think they've attack 9 or 10.

Fareed Zakaria (15:00)

I think their rationale, the Iranians rationale is we are going to sow instability throughout the region. You want a war, it's not going to be confined to Iran. We are going to make it so that Saudi oil facilities are damaged, the Qatar natural gas facilities are damaged, Straits of Hormuz, the shipping starts slowing to a crawl. The problem is they don't actually have the firepower to pull that off. So what they've ended up doing are pinprick attacks that militarily have very little significance. The facilities are gonna be repaired in a few days, if not a few weeks. But the political effect has been to take all the Gulf states that were neutral. Many of them had said, you can't use our bus facilities. Some of them had said, you can't even use our airspace. Now all the Gulf states are all in and they're telling the United States and Israel privately go for it. In fact, some of them even want to participate to show the Iranians that you can't do this kind of thing to their territory. So I think it was a big miscalculation, as I've said from the start. But their rationale, I suppose was, look, we've gotta hit somewhere. Hitting American naval ships is impossible. They're very well protected, so this is where we can go. But they didn't think through the fact that this has had a political boomerang effect on them.

Scott Galloway (16:31)

So say that the Trump administration isn't able to affect regime change. It feels as if. Well, let me put forward the hypothesis that the Trump administration, maybe a bit naively, was hoping that the boots on the ground would be sandals or sneakers on the ground. That the Iranian public would rise up and catalyze the actual regime change with cloud cover from American military attacks. Does that seem like a reasonable hypothesis?

Fareed Zakaria (16:58)

It seems like that was what they were hoping. And look, you can always get lucky. And if they keep at this and they continue to pummel the regime, who knows? All I can say is historically that has. You know, I can't think of a case where that has happened. It's tough, right? Cause these guys still have machine guns. They're not gonna be able to get rid of those. And they'll use them. They've used them in the past.

Scott Galloway (17:23)

We'll be right back.

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John Finer (18:26)

What are the main takeaways of the foreign policy section from Donald Trump's State of the Union address?

Jake Sullivan (18:32)

I do think they've made a decision to elevate domestic issues as we head towards the midterms. We'll see if that sticks because he keeps getting drawn back to the foreign policy issues.

John Finer (18:42)

I'm John Finer.

Jake Sullivan (18:43)

And I'm Jake Sullivan and we're the hosts of the Long Game, a weekly national security podcast.

John Finer (18:48)

This week we'll react to President Trump's State of the Union address, the situation with Iran and the eruption of violence involving cartels in Mexico.

Jake Sullivan (18:57)

The episode's out now. Search for and follow the Long Game wherever you get your podcasts.

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Scott Galloway (19:49)

I've described these military operations as a Bond film. The openings are always amazing. Bond films always nail the opening. And then we go on to see all right, is it Kosovo or Kuwait that it ends really well, that it's a great Bond film, or is it Iraq or Afghanistan? And you know, it's it's the second ending that is always sort of a Bit unpredictable. I have been struck at what, from my perspective, seems like really poor, inconsistent messaging around. I think it was the Powell Doctrine of always have objectives. Don't go into something unless there are specific objectives that once you accomplish, you can declare victory and leave. What are your thoughts so far on the stated, or lack thereof, stated objectives from the Trump administration?

Fareed Zakaria (20:34)

Yeah, this is their biggest mistake. They don't have clear objectives. To the extent they have one, it's a very hard one to achieve, which is regime change. And it's very hard, short of that, to understand what they would define as success. They should have laid out a series of, you know, this is what we would like to degrade Iran's ballistic missile capability so that it no longer threatens its neighbors. We want to degrade Iran's navy. And so that it no longer poses a threat to the safe flow of oil in and out of the Straits of Hormuz. We want to degrade Iran's command and control so that they can no longer run these militias around the Middle East. Those would have been goals that you could understand, frankly. They could kind of define success because a lot of the information would be classified. But by defining success by something very large and very public, we can all see. Right. And it's hard to say that they've achieved that goal because the regime has not fallen. And again, they may get lucky, but so far the regime has not fallen.

Scott Galloway (21:46)

Do you think one strategy for success might be saying, all right, we're going to neuter them militarily, kinetically, politically, economically? And it sounds to me, tell me, if you agree with this, that the only thing standing between the Middle east and relative stability right now is Iran. It seems like in kind of under their breath, if you will, the majority of the Gulf states have sort of made peace with Israel. So if, in fact, if the Trump administration was able to accomplish. All right, it used to be a tiger, now it's a comatose tiger and poses no threat to anybody. Even without regime change, couldn't they just sort of declare victory and leave? Potentially, we'd have a much more stable Middle East.

Fareed Zakaria (22:29)

Yes, I think that that's true. I think it's important to remember Iran is a destabilizing factor. It has been supporting these militias. It has been in many ways trying to intimidate. I've always thought its nuclear program was designed to intimidate more than to use that. They always wanted to be one step before nuclear weapons as a way of saying we could have these. And they are a kind of very brutal repressive millenarian regime. Remember, this is the only military innovation that Iran has produced is a drone, the name of which is shahid, which is used by the Russians in Ukraine. And a shahid means martyr. So even their drones they call martyrs, right. There's a kind of cult of martyrdom about it, which is we're willing to pay these prices. And you're right, nobody else in the Middle east is like that. And that's very big transformation. It's only 20 years ago that the Saudis used to host telethons for Palestinian terrorists whom they called Palestinian martyrs. The middle of the year, the Gulf Arabs have been totally transformed. Egypt has been transformed. Turkey is still kind of a complex power. But yeah, in general, you would have a much more stable, predictable Middle east if you didn't have this particular regime in Iran. And maybe you will find that what ends up happening, Scott, this is another kind of what could go right scenario, that is that the regime survives, but in a form that it essentially becomes more of a military dictatorship than a theological military dictatorship. And as a result of that, it is more practical and maybe it's a little bit more open at home, but most importantly, it is much less meddlesome abroad. It realizes that that game is

Scott Galloway (24:29)

it's hard to think of a nation that has fallen further, faster in terms of its power or the power it can exert domestically, regionally and internationally than Iran. And there are ramifications not only within the country and in the Middle east, but beyond that. My understanding is 80% of the oil from Iran was going to China. They obviously have proxies all over the they were allies with Russia. You mentioned Ukraine, that they were supplying drones for Russia in their war against Ukraine. How do you think the collapse or the defanging, if you will, of Iran affects nations outside of the Middle East?

Fareed Zakaria (25:08)

They haven't had a large footprint outside the Middle east, but they did have this one fairly close connection with Russia. The Russians now make the drones themselves effectively. The Iranians have kind of licensed the technology to Russia. But look, I think it's a blow to that whole idea of a kind of Russia, China, Iran, North Korea axis. And these guys are bad actors. And to the extent that they get taken down a notch, it is a kind of blow to that axis of instability and the anti Western axis that it represents. The challenge is the way that Trump has done it without going to the UN without using any kind of invocation of broader principles, international law, without using any of America's traditional allies, without even consulting Congress which of course Trump wants, because Trump hates anything that constrains him. Anything that involves relying on the IAEA inspectors or a UN Security Council resolution, or consulting with the British and the French, all that. For Trump, these are constraints on his power. Those would have given a lot greater legitimacy to this. That would have created more of a kind of rule based sense of like, Iran is the one that's outside of the rules, they're the ones violating things. Right now we have done this in a fairly ad hoc way that is outside of most accepted rules and such. And I wish that it would have been easy to do that because Iran is a rogue regime. It has been acting in ways that are violations of all kinds of international norms and laws, and it wouldn't have been difficult to do that. But I think that there's a core kind of Jacksonian element to Donald Trump's foreign policy, which is about I get to decide everything on my own. We get to act unilaterally. We're never gonna be constrained by any anybody else.

Scott Galloway (27:18)

Let's talk about allies, because I never thought I would see. Well, Australia and Canada have weighed in with what I'd call not full throated support, but support. I was really shocked though, to see Prime Minister Starmer offer what I thought is just really reluctant, conditioned, hesitant support. Like, we'll let you use our air base, but be clear, it's only for defensive purposes. Talk about where we have received and where we have not received support and what it says about the Trump administration and America's place in the world right now.

Fareed Zakaria (27:49)

So first let's talk about this issue of building legitimacy. I think the countries in Europe, which care a lot about that, which care a lot about, does this seem to uphold a rules based international system? Is this within some kind of broader principles that we can understand and support? They're the ones who have been the most, you know, who've had the greatest degree of reluctance and as you put it exactly right, Keir Starmers, you know, tortured, pained, quasi support. And remember, all these countries, for the most part, with the exception of the French, supported the Iraq war because Bush did go to the un, he did get resolutions, he did go to Congress, he did frame it in larger terms. He did assemble a coalition of 40 countries that went to Iraq. People sometimes think of, remember it as unilateral American action. It wasn't. So that's that group. What's very interesting to watch among the global south is you have a whole bunch of countries that have condemned it instinctively because it's might Makes right it's the United States acting unilaterally in violation of international law and such. But then there's a whole bunch of countries that have not quite done that. For example, very interestingly, India, India has not done that because there's very close relations with the Gulf states. It has a very good relationship, particularly under this prime minister, with Israel. And in a sense, India is looking to its economic equities as an emerging economic powerhouse and saying, we want, we want close relations with Israel for technological reasons. We want close relations with Gulf states because we need the oil and we want to have the capital, access to the capital. And so what you're seeing in India is a very interesting phenomenon where India has denounced Iran's response to the attacks on Iran, but has essentially tried to stay out of the, you know, it has neither celebrated nor condemned the American Israeli attacks on Iran, at least the last I saw. And that, I think reflects a very interesting kind of rise of realpolitik amongst some of these emerging powers that are saying to themselves, where are our equities here? And what they're saying is the countries of the future are the Gulf states, Israel, Iran is a country of the past.

Scott Galloway (30:33)

Let's bring it back or let's come home. Domestically, it strikes me that this has caught Democrats flat footed. And while they voice what I think is really legitimate concerning opposition to the fact that Congress wasn't consulted on this, I mean, at this point, the Congress feels more like the Duma under the Trump administration. But at the same time, I personally think Trump and Rubio come across as leaders right now. I think that this could potentially be, arguably, if things go right, the kind of geopolitical unlock of the century. And Democrats have to walk a fine line between saying, okay, we're supposed to have co equal branches of government and the American people pretty much across both parties, obviously much more so on the Democratic side than the Republican side. Do not want this war and especially do not want boots on the ground. But talk a little bit about how this has affected politics in the US and if you can just even in the context looking forward to 26 and 28, it feels like everything's been kind of thrown up in the air right now and we don't know where it's going to land.

Fareed Zakaria (31:45)

Yeah, I agree with that. It's moving very fast, so it'd be hard and a lot depends on where things go. Yeah, I think what the Democrats should do is have a principled opposition to the idea that the President of the United States can act in an almost authoritarian fashion. I mean, look at it right now. He's ordered boats to be shot out of the Caribbean. He's ordered essentially an invasion of Venezuela and the capture of the head of state. He's ordered this attack on two attacks now on Iran, none of which has there been any congressional involvement. And remember, the Constitution vests with Congress the power to declare war. So they should have, I think, a strong sense of opposition to that. They should have a strong sense of opposition to not doing it with some sense of the broader principles of international law in the UN and things like that. But they should be clear. Iran is an enemy of the United States. It has done very bad things to the United States. They were one of the principal sponsors of the militias that killed Americans in Iraq by the dozens. And that it would be a very good thing if Iran's wings were clipped, if its power was degraded. And it would be a very good thing if the Iranian regime was transformed into something more pluralistic, democratic and representative and reflective of the will of the Iranian people. I don't think that's such a hard position to explain to people. I think most people would be able to understand it that, like, you know, you're gonna have an adversary. You can agree that the adversary is bad, but you also don't think the president should be a dictator in the way he wields power.

Scott Galloway (33:43)

We'll be right back after a quick you. We're back with more from Fareed Zakaria. I used to think that our entry into Iraq was the geopolitical first ballot hall of fame screw up of the century. And now I'm beginning to think that, and there's some bias here, so open to pushback that the new winner is October 7th, that if you had told Sinwar Sadat Khomeini that they, you're all going to be dead in three years and your institutions are going to be so dramatically weakened that, I mean, we used to call around the superpower of the Middle East. Everyone was scared to death of Hezbollah, supposedly the sleeping military giant. Hamas was always a threat. All of these things, you know, Assad is playing video games in Moscow. Everyone else that we know their names is dead. And these organizations are either eliminated or incredibly neutered. Will October 7th go down as arguably the biggest geopolitical disaster of its sponsors of this century?

Fareed Zakaria (34:56)

I think it's probably one of the biggest miscalculations that any group has made. I mean, Hamas, when people say this was all Hamas wanted, this because if we draw attention to the Palestinian Cause I think this is nonsense. I mean, this resulted in the essential elimination of Hamas as a fighting force and even as a political entity. I mean, it is now a faint shadow of an organization with absolutely no capacity. Hezbollah has been largely defanged. The Syrian regime collapsed in no small part because of all this. And now Iran has been neutered. Look, I've been writing for a while and saying Israel is the superpower of the Middle East. I've been saying it for a while. What October 7 did was it unlocked the restraints on Israel. Israel decided that it no longer was willing to, you know, to stay on the back foot and react on a point by point, pinprick by pinprick basis, that it was gonna go all out. That it felt, you know, Bibi and Netanyahu felt, probably correctly reading the Israeli public, that this was the moment he could lean as far forward as he wanted and he would be fine. And there was a changed geopolitical reality, which was that the Gulf states were no longer in existential opposition to Israel. In fact, as you say, were kind of in a tacit alliance with Israel against Iran. And so all those things come together. October 7th allows the unlock and Israel goes for it. And the Gulf Arabs silently cheer on. That's the big story. And the Israeli military has become, as I said, the superpower of the Middle East. Its capacities here have been extraordinary. What's also extraordinary, by the way, is the intelligence to know where these people are. And I think that is a really untold story. That is really extraordinary. Iran has been penetrated in so many different ways. Its nuclear establishment, its military establishment, even some parts, this is the least, even some parts of its clerical establishment.

Scott Galloway (37:16)

Talk about how this impacts Russia and China.

Fareed Zakaria (37:19)

For the Russians, I think the most important impact is there was an ongoing military relationship. And one wonders whether it has much of an impact there. The short term effect, of course, is good for the Russians because the price of oil goes up and Russia needs that. For the Chinese, I think it's more complicated. The Chinese were getting Iranian oil, as you pointed out, and they were getting a good deal because of Iran's isolation. They were able to get it highly discounted. But there is a fundamental difference between what I think are the core interests of China and the core interests of Russia. And this, this is sort of a broader issue. It even relates to our relations with Russia and China. Russia is a rogue state. It likes instability. It wants to destroy the rules based international order. Why? Because fundamentally it is in opposition to that order. It believes that that order has been largely expanded and created on the back of the collapse of the Soviet Union. And it is a commodities and oil strike superpower, which means instability is good for it. Right? Instability means the price of oil goes up, the price of gas goes up, often the price of other commodities go up, and that's all good for it. China is very different. China is a country that needs integrated global markets, that needs trade, that needs a free flow of capital, free flow of goods. So China should want an Iran that is the kind you were describing, a great trading nation with whom they could do business. And maybe they're not as hostile to the west as they are now, but they would be neutral and they might look favorably on the Chinese. You could imagine an alliance between a very different Iran and China just based on their economic interests. But Russia is a rogue regime that wants instability. I think this is one of the big, larger geopolitical realities we should be trying to exploit, which is that China does not benefit from a world in chaos. And we should be trying to make that case to them much more carefully and strongly. Russia does. And Russia is, at the end of the day, a very tough country to do business with because they have this fundamental interest which is opposed to the way America wants. They don't want a stable Europe. They don't want trading prosperous relations with Europe because that means they become smaller and smaller and less and less important. Russia's strength derives from its ability to cause chaos, to be a rogue state, to use its nuclear umbrella to intimidate countries, to use its hybrid warfare to undermine democracies. China is different. China is growing strong because of an integrated global economy, and that's a big difference. And we should try and drive a wedge between those two countries.

Scott Galloway (40:23)

It strikes me that if we're still talking about Iran and we're still flying sorties over to Iran and there's still this kind of video footage and there's in any war, there's going to be an X factor. American servicemen and women are going to be killed. Our allies are going to take hits. If this is still going on in October, it strikes me that it's probably bad for the Trump administration and Republicans running for reelection or election. One, do you agree with that? And two, if you were advising the Trump administration around kind of an ideal messaging and strategy for an off ramp before then, what do you think? All right, Fareed, outline what you think the objectives are and probably the most, the optimal off ramp that recognizes that America does not support boots on the ground and that if this goes on much Longer than, say, three or six months. The term forever. War is going to be in every campaign ad of every Democrat come November.

Fareed Zakaria (41:19)

Yeah. So first, I agree with you. I think, look, let's remember foreign policy, by and large, does not usually play much of a role in American elections. Remember Bush Sr. The victor of the Cold War, presided over the collapse of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, then wins the Gulf War on almost technically perfect terms, had a 91% approval rating, and then lost the election to Bill Clinton. So foreign affairs often does not have as big an impact as we would think it would. But I agree with you. If it feels like this is going on and meandering and they haven't been able to find a way to get out, what it does is very important, which is, for the first time, you could imagine it dividing Trump's base, because Trump's base does involve a lot of people who think that the United States should not be spending time worrying about any of these countries out there. And if you listen to the Tucker Carlson's of the world and the Ann Coulters of the world, and there are more and more of them, that voice is real. So that's, I think, the principal danger for the Republicans and the Democrats will do exactly what you described. I think what. Look, what I would do if I were them is start setting out a series of goals about Iran not being able to threaten its neighbors, so discord, fund militias and itemize the things that have been destroyed and saying we have now achieved, we believe, a 70% reduction in Iran's offensive military capacity and a 50% destruction of its military industrial complex. List the factory, the things that have been destroyed, and say, we now regard this operation as successful. I would do that. Look, the United States has started every war the United States has started since World War II. Started with great enthusiasm. And then with the exception of the first Gulf War, it has been very hard to figure out how to end them. What is the point at which you can declare victory and go home? And the lesson, I think, is the sooner you can do it, the better. Have some identifiable markers that you can say you achieved, point to them, they are real, and get out.

Scott Galloway (44:00)

I can't help but feel irrationally optimistic here. And a lot of this is. It's anecdotal. I went to UCLA and I just hung out a lot and got to know a lot of Iranians. And it struck me that more than any immigrants I'd met, including Canadians, people from India, I felt like Iranians were more American than many Americans, I know a love of capitalism, education, science, a super sort of merchant culture, like in a good way. I just felt. They felt like they just slipstreamed into American culture. And I wonder if. And my understanding is that actually in Iran there's actually a huge population next generation that's less theocratic, less anti west, doesn't buy into this organizing principle of death to America, death to Israel. With that type of resources sitting beneath education, unbelievable culture, and this potentially being the kind of the last remnant of hostility and chaos in the Middle east, it feels like Europe could be an enormous winner as a trading partner. It's just as hard as I try. And there's always an X factor with war. I feel like this could be. We could be on the precipice of something, something really wonderful for the Middle east and for the world. Prove me wrong.

Fareed Zakaria (45:33)

Well, first of all, the Iranian diaspora, you're 100% right, is amazing. I mean, they are not only all the things you said, they are amazingly capitalistic. And they love America, they love democracy, even the ones that are in Europe, they love Western democracy. They're very civilized, they have high levels, not just of education, but they're very cultural, they're very culturally aware. I think they're also, they have a real desire for their country to once again be the kind of player it was in the world. Remember, Iran is probably one of the oldest countries in the world with continuous. If you ask yourself what country in the world was around 5,000 years ago, roughly the same geography, roughly the same cities and things, Iran and Egypt are probably the two oldest places you can think of. And so there's this extraordinary tradition that the Iranian diaspora does absolutely represent. And I mean, I'm always struck by a lot of the emails and texts I get from Iranians anytime some of this issue comes up and the passion with which they engage is amazing. As I said to you, that's the goal. My question is, how do we get there? And to get there, this regime has to collapse. And that's the difficulty. How do you get a highly authoritarian, repressive regime with a lot of guns and 47 years to dig itself into power, to collapse easily? Not easily, but. But all of a sudden. And I haven't seen the signs of that yet. And when I say that, I know that a lot of people in the Iranian diaspora don't like it, but what I'm just trying to do is to be honest and look at the world as it is, not the way I would like it to be. I would love to see a secular Iran that was playing the kind of role that you're describing in the world. All I'm saying is to get there, this Islamic regime needs to collapse or be toppled.

Scott Galloway (47:57)

Fried Zakaria is a journalist, author and political commentator. Fried, I meant what I said. I can't admit. Are you aware probably the most in demand commentator in the world right now? Very much appreciate your time.

Fareed Zakaria (48:08)

Always such a pleasure. Thank you. Scott Foreign.

Scott Galloway (48:19)

This episode was produced by Jennifer Sanchez and Laura Gennar. Cami Reek is our social producer, Bianca Rosario Ramirez is our video editor and Drew Burroughs is our technical director. Thank you for listening to the Prop G pod from propg Media.

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