Neil Ferguson (11:41)
Well, I think this was never intended in Venezuela to be regimental change in the sense that there was regime change in Iraq in 2003 and President Trump very deliberately said the other day, we aren't gonna make the mistake they made then of entirely dismantling the regime and then seeing the country descend into chaos, a chaos that the US owned. This is regime alteration. So it's an alteration. Obviously it's meet the new boss more or less the same as the old boss. Cause it's in effect Maduro's deputy. But, but the alteration is she doesn't report to Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin and the Cubans anymore, she reports to President Trump. And she better report the right things or she too could have a one way ticket to a New York courthouse. So I think that's an important change. But it's not to be confused with regime change where the Americans say, and now you're going to hold elections and people we really like are going to win them and then we have a stock market we'd like to liberalize, et cetera. I mean, those days are long gone. And I think the Trump administration rather prides itself on not having an idealistic vision but being entirely realistic. Stephen Miller was boasting about this the other day. We're the ultimate realists. And insofar as it takes Venezuela out of the Chinese camp and makes it essentially part of the Western sphere of American influence, that is an important alteration. What happens next? Well, I think the issue of the oil is mainly about denying it to China because part of the way that the world has worked lately is that the sanctions get imposed on bad actors and the Chinese essentially evade the sanctions and then get the oil at a discount. They're doing this with the Russians. They've done it with the Iranians for years. And I think part of the game here is to end that. So it's not a meaningless change that's happened. It's disappointing if, like my friend Ricardo Huisman, like all my Venezuelan friends, pretty much, you. You really wanted to see the Chavistas gone and the opposition, the Democratic opposition in power. We may get there, but I think it was never going to happen in a hurry. After the bad experiences of Iraq. Could Iraq be the wrong analogy? Yeah. Not perfect. So what else could be said? When Trump's National Security Strategy was published in November, was it, or was it early December? Everybody was very preoccupied with what it said about Europe. I said, that's not the interesting thing. The interesting thing is the Trump Corollary, because the Trump Corollary was this allusion to the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, Theodore Roosevelt, I should say, which said, not only is the Monroe Doctrine true, that Europeans can't interfere in the Western Hemisphere and Latin America and the Caribbean, but also we, the United States, reserve the rise to change governments we don't like in this part of the world. So we're back to that world. And to go to your movie analogy, the movies back then never turned out that, well, the United States intervened and let's see, Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, Mexico. I'm sure I'm missing Dominican Republic. And it, you know, often ended up with, well, he may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch. Or it ended up with the revolution. Think Cuba, and then you're really looking at a mess. Can that be the story here? I think that's the downside risk for the Trump administration, that if they repeat the history of American interventions post 1904, then you either end up having a nasty regime that you kind of own, or you end up with another revolution against it. I think it'll be hard to avoid that because Venezuela has been very deeply and seriously damaged by the Chavistas. It will take a while to repair, if indeed it can be repaired. Part 2 Look, the standard view in this part of the world is alliances have been absolutely crucial. The reason the United States won the Cold War was its alliances. And many American secretaries of state have said this. It's almost a standard form for administrations up until this one. And what distinguished President Trump in both his first and second term is his disdain for allies and his view that they are essentially on the take, that they take advantage of the United States, and he set out to change that. Now, before you say this is terrible and crazy and, you know, we all should prepare for the end of civilization, bear in mind that for 50 years, American presidents have said to the Europeans, hey, you know what? You guys really don't pay like enough, considering that you're as rich as we are, pretty much. Why is it that we bear 60 or more percent of the cost of NATO? The first president to get the Europeans to act, to commit to a significant increase in their defense spending is President Trump. And that commitment that happened last year, I think was important, but it hasn't really translated into much meaningful rearmament so far. Even in Germany, which has certainly voted the means, they've passed very significant fiscal measures. But rearmament is going to at a snail's pace and certainly not fast enough to meaningfully alter the situation in Ukraine. So I think part of what we're seeing here is more pressure on the Europeans to make them think, gee, the Americans might really check out a NATO. They might really do that. We really need to get serious now. I don't think that President Trump will one day announce, I'm done with NATO, or for that matter, go to war with Denmark. This is all classic Trump bluff. The goal is to force the Europeans to take seriously their own own rhetoric. Scott for the last 10 years, I've heard European leaders here and elsewhere talk about strategic autonomy and how important it is that Europe should become a real superpower, but it was all talk. Macron was especially good at giving these speeches. But did the French defence spending meaningfully rise? No. So I think part of what we're seeing here is a deliberate and conscious effort to provoke the Europeans into, into getting real about defense spending and rearmament and really taking ownership of the crisis in Eastern Europe that began when Russia invaded or fully invaded Ukraine. So I'm not so sure that the goal here is to dismantle the alliances any more than it is to dismantle the alliances that the US has in Asia with Japan or with South Korea. Those countries, of course, didn't like having tariffs imposed on them and it made them very nervous. But it's not like the US is about to tear up its defense alliances in Asia, especially when China poses an obvious threat to those countries. The truth is that America's allies don't have a better option. Mark Carney may think that he can go to China and make nice with Xi Jinping and this will somehow impress Donald Trump, but I don't think it does, because is Canada really going to join the Chinese Greater East Asian Co Prosperity Zone. What would that actually imply? Would it really be in Canada's interests to have Chinese Communist Party surveillance of their tech stack? I'm thinking no. So the truth is the United States can can really treat its allies in an almost abusive way, knowing that they don't have anywhere else to go, and that in the final analysis, if it makes them step up and make a bigger effort, particularly a bigger military effort, then it's probably worth trolling them at Davos for a week.