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- [00:03]
A
Hello, and welcome to the Rachman Review. I'm Gideon Rahman, chief foreign affairs commentator of the Financial Times. This week's podcast is about the Ukraine war and the Trump peace plan. My guest is Sir Lawrence Friedman, Emeritus professor of War Studies at King's College, London. The Trump administration's peace plan for Ukraine was greeted with deep suspicion in Europe. But what are the alternatives?
- [00:31]
B
Almost 100 days into this presidency, the President has dedicated a tremendous amount of time and energy to this, and we think we brought the sides closer than they've been in a very long time, but we're not there yet, and it needs to start happening.
- [00:43]
A
That was Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, expressing his frustration that America's efforts to bring the Ukraine war to a swift conclusion have not come to fruition. Russia, Ukraine, the European Union and other actors all have their own ideas about what should happen now. So I began my conversation with Lawrence Friedman by talking about Trump's proposed peace plan, which has been pushed forward by his special envoy, Steve Wycoff. What did he make of it?
- [01:12]
C
Well, first, there are a number of versions of this plan doing the rounds. It's not quite clear what the settled version is. The basic thing is Ukraine is expected to accept, at least de facto, that the Russians have what they have and then they're not going to get it back in the near future, and that they're not going to be members of NATO. And both of those conditions are clearly problematic for Ukraine, but they're not new and they're not surprising. And really, as soon as Zelenskyy accepted a comprehensive ceasefire, which he did in March, then that implied accepting that, for the moment, they're not going to get their territory back. So while a lot of the focus has been on that, I'm not sure it's the biggest feature of what's happening. What's important, it seems to me, is what's not there, which is all the other Russian demands. The Americans are not expecting the disarmament of Ukraine. They seem to be allowing some sort of security assurances and European presence in Ukraine to guarantee a ceasefire. They're not expecting to hand over those bits of Ukraine that the Ukrainians still hold, that the Russians insist to theirs. So while it's frustrating for the Ukrainians, especially this idea that the US might recognize the annexation of Crimea, but not apparently anything else, it's really frustrating for Russia, too. It's not what they want, which is why it all may be coming to an end.
- [02:52]
A
Interesting. So you have a slightly more positive spin on it. Than say, many in Brussels, where it's been rejected as a sort of surrender plan for Ukraine. But I see what you mean about essentially accepting reality and some of the realities that are Zelensky has tacitly accepted already. But I guess the big shifts that I picked up that people were objecting to was firstly the de jure, the legal recognition of the annexation of Crimea, but also the sense that all sanctions on Russia would be lifted and that Russia would be swiftly kind of reincorporated into the global trading system, which I think people find quite hard to swallow.
- [03:30]
C
Yeah, I mean, look, first, it's important to say that having to accept the occupation is not great for Ukraine. It effectively means they're denied their main objective, which is to liberate their own territory. There's a difference between de facto and de jure. And there was a belief that the Americans were expecting the Ukrainians to accept the annexation of Crimea, and that does not seem to be the case. And the Ukrainians won't. I mean, they can cope with some sort of reality, but they can't cope with forever ruling out the return of lost territory. On the sanctions point, whatever the Americans say, as we saw when the Russians were demanding some sanctions relief on the Black Sea, the Americans can't deliver this without the Europeans. The American role in sanctions is important, but the European role is more important. So this is again, part of the Russian frustration is there are limits on how far Trump can deliver either the Ukrainians or his allies. So I don't know whether this is optimistic because I don't see any peace deal. And I think the Ukrainians would quite like a ceasefire, actually, as well as the Russians. I just don't see it as being as one sided as others who just see this as sort of Trump doing Putin's bidding. This is not what Putin want. I mean, you just have to look back at the negotiations that took place March, April 22, which barely touched on territorial issues. They were all about neutrality and the ability to arm Ukrainian sovereignty and so on. Trump is not giving the Russians what they want there. My view is that Trump and Witkoff are both real estate guys and they think land is all important. I don't think they actually have ever understood why these other issues are that important to Putin.
- [05:27]
A
And what about the argument that, well, if America walks away, and if walking away means that they stop supplying Ukraine with crucial intelligence and perhaps also curtail weapons shipments, that they would then effectively deliver a victory to Russia because Ukraine can't keep going without American support. Or can Europe Fill the gap.
- [05:56]
C
So that's why a lot of these negotiations have essentially been a blame game with both Zelensky and Putin in their different ways, trying to do their best to ensure that the other side is blamed in Zelenskyy's case, in the hope not only that more sanctions might be put on Russia, but at least he'll be spared. Complete U.S. cutoff. Now, I'm not still, we don't know. I mean, the latest comments by Trump on Zelenskyy are unusually positive, but we know he blows hot and cold. But for the, for the moment, the meeting in the Vatican appears to have calmed relations. What that will mean in practice is hard to say because it's very hard at the moment, especially given the financial headwinds that we face, to imagine that there's going to be another supplemental of the sort we had last year passed by the US Congress that is going to deliver massive more equipment to Ukraine. So in that sense, I mean, the Ukrainians probably already discounted quite a lot of support. But there are other areas of which intelligence sharing is by far the most important, where it does matter to Ukraine. I think the Ukrainians will carry on fighting come what may, and I think the Europeans will do what they can. But, you know, the Ukrainians over the past year have done better than many expected in holding the Russians off. You have to recognize that Ukraine now produces most of its own ammunition and so on. It produces all its drones and so on. It's less dependent than before. But for the heavy end stuff, and certainly for intelligence, it does need the U.S. yeah.
- [07:41]
A
I mean, I was struck when I was in Kiev on the anniversary of the outbreak of the war, so six weeks or so ago that there was more confidence on the Ukrainian side that they could hold the Russians off partly because of drone warfare. To what extent, you know, has this war changed our understanding of how war is fought now and is going to be fought in the future? And has it shifted the balance towards the defending side because drones are so effective at sort of blunting attacks?
- [08:14]
C
Well, well, clause of its WHO professors of war studies are obliged to quote said centuries ago that defense is the stronger form of warfare, and it has always been. So it should be easier to defend than attack because you know your own terrain, you should know the routes the enemy is likely to take. Now you can get caught by surprise. So the great offensives tend to come early on in a war or a point where the defender just hasn't been properly prepared. But really, since the autumn of 2022, there haven't been very many successful offensives. Not on the Ukrainian side, not on the Russian side. Possibly the Kursk offensive, which did catch the Russians by surprise, but that was a limited achievement that has now been negated. So it is very hard and has always been very hard. Now, drones and so on mean that the battlefield is very transparent. So it's hard to move substantial forces around without these being noticed. And that makes offensives even harder. And certainly if you look at the current Russian offensives and they've sort of resumed after a bit of a lull, they're not desperately impressive. They're taking place with motorbikes and buggies. It's tough for the Ukrainians, but they've developed tactics to cope. And in different settings where one force completely outnumbers another and there's overwhelming superiority, the defense won't be able to cope. Or in maritime settings, say in the Indo Pacific region, again, it could look different again, but in a land war between armies that are prepared for each other, it's tough for the offence.
- [10:04]
A
Yeah. And another characteristic of this war is that although it has this high tech element, the drones and so on, in other respects, suddenly the very high death toll and the relatively fixed lines after, as you say, Autumn 2022 feels almost like the First World War. These massive death tolls for small gains of land.
- [10:25]
C
Yes. I mean, it's not unusual in wars, but it's been quite striking this one that you almost have different layers all at the same time. You have stuff that you could trace back, artillery and so on, trace back to the 19th century, trenches from the First World War, a bit of armor from the second, and then all this digital artificial intelligence stuff that the Ukrainians presume the Russians do to help with their targeting or to help with their defensive operations. So you have mixtures and the smart stuff is also very expensive. So both sides have had to limit how much of that they can use. So you have different forms of warfare coexisting side by side.
- [11:08]
A
What have we learned about nuclear warfare? Because again, in the first year the Russians made more or less explicit threats that they might use nuclear weapons and that did, I think, deter the Americans about what kinds of things they would give to Ukraine because they did take those threats seriously. Have we learned anything new about nuclear deterrence from this war?
- [11:32]
C
Well, I'd argue that the events have unfolded almost exactly as the theory would have told you, that NATO has not joined in the war directly, fighting side by side with Ukrainians and the Russians haven't attacked directly NATO country. I think The Biden administration overthought the nuclear risks. I think Putin was always very clear that if NATO did join in the war in principle, that risked nuclear war because it would be an existential threat to Russia. If you're at war with NATO, I think all the stuff other than that about which weapons would be supplied to Ukraine, what you could do with those weapons, other countries joining NATO and so on, the Russians were not going to go to nuclear war over those things. And so it proved. So I think it made the Biden administration more cautious than it need be. It's easy for me to say that I wasn't a responsible official, but I thought that at the time. And I think many Russians feel that they undermine the credibility of their own deterrent by making so many menacing sounding threats that they could never really follow up. And then watching the weapons being deployed to Ukraine, Finland and Sweden joining the alliance targets in Russia increasingly being attacked. And Gutena had to find other things to do to show his displeasure.
- [13:06]
A
You've just come back from Washington and we were talking earlier about the Witkoff Trump approach to all of this. Did you come away with the impression that the Americans have a single coherent approach? Because there seem to be just below the surface tensions still between the more isolationist wing who just want to get out of this war and others who do still take the idea of a Russian threat seriously and still take NATO seriously.
- [13:34]
C
Oh, yeah. I think the administration is divided. I mean, you've got the situation where you've got Witkoff, who's supposed to be producing deals with everybody so far succeeding with none. It's obviously Trump's preferred envoy. You've got Kellogg, who was the original Keith Kellogg, who was the original envoy who's considered by the Russians to be too sympathetic. So he still talks to the Ukrainians and, and the Russians don't like him, and Witkoff talks to the Russians and the Ukrainians don't like him. You've got Rubio, who ought to be Secretary of State in doing all these things and is still present, but doesn't seem to be calling the shots. And Mike Waltz, who, with Rubio, I think was of the view that you have to stand up a bit to Russia, but the main issue is China, about which I don't think Trump cares as much as they do, at least not on the military side. So I think the administration's all over the place. And it's also one of the problems it's got is it's just understaffed. You just don't have the People, the expertise around these negotiations are difficult. Even if you've got a very clear idea about what you're trying to achieve, it's difficult. For example, you have the Jeddah meeting in March where both the Russians and Ukrainians had sent teams of the sort of people you would expect to be in these teams, not at the very highest level, but sufficiently experienced and connected to be able to speak for their respective governments. And you assume that something would be set up with technical people, officials from the US Working with the two teams to produce something. That would be one way of doing it. But nothing seems to have followed up from this there. So I think it's pretty chaotic, to be honest. And in a situation where people are nervous about speaking their mind, I mean, officials are nervous about speaking their mind and contradicting their masters. I just don't think you're. You're getting a very efficient process, which is why so much of it seems so haphazard.
- [15:39]
A
And I suppose maybe the logical consequence of that is that the Americans will get frustrated, as Rubio expressed that frustration, and may just be tempted to walk away because their dreams of being able to come in and make peace in a day, as Trump promised, or even in a month or two months just are not going to work out.
- [15:58]
C
Yeah, and that's what they're sort of setting themselves up for. Trump just talked about in a couple more weeks and so on. I mean, I always thought this was going to be very difficult because the two positions are pretty incompatible. And as we've discussed, I think the question is, what do the Americans do next? And in particular, do they stick with Ukraine to a degree, or do they increase pressure? Or in addition, do they still say, well, we're still here, we're still prepared to talk, but you've got to make up your mind. Again, I think this is a problem for both sides. The Ukrainians certainly are tired and would like some respite, but for Putin, it's also a problem. You know, first, he's not making that much progress on the battlefield, despite what media commentators regularly say. I mean, they've gained, at enormous, enormous cost, about 1% extra Ukrainian territory since late 23. And the progress is even slower in recent months. The economy's in danger because of the oil price, which is one result of the Trump economic chaos is that the oil price is now at a level that in the past Russians have flagged as being dangerous for their economy. It may recover the oil price, but that's a worry for Putin, and he's never going to get a better chance. It's hard to see any other president or any other interlocutor being in a better position to deliver what he wants, what he's failed to achieve by his invasion of Ukraine. So I think you'll probably see over the next couple of weeks, some efforts to try to keep this show on the road. But I just think it's difficult for the Russians to accept the territory alone. I think they need a disarmed, subjugated Ukraine, and I don't think Trump can deliver that. I don't think Trump can expects to deliver that. So that's the fundamental problem you've got with any peace process. And it's been the problem since the start of the war. And I don't at the moment see how you're going to get around that.
- [18:12]
A
And finally, you've written a very interesting essay for Foreign affairs on forever wars, which is a phrase one hears a lot from the Trump people who say, you know, America's fought too many forever wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and so on, and we don't want another one. But do you think that Russia is now the country that's stuck in potentially a forever war, a war that it began thinking they could win quickly, and now, you know, we're into whatever it is, the three years and counting.
- [18:41]
C
It's not forever. It's not as long as they spent in Afghanistan and as the Western countries spent in Afghanistan, for example, or even in Iraq. But it's gone on a long time and it been fought at a greater intensity than those wars, at an enormous cost, the human cost, social cost, economic cost to Ukraine as well as to Russia. And it's not clear how they ended. I don't think they've got a reliable theory of victory, which is why, if they could make a Trump process work, they probably would quite like to. My assumption has been up to now is that it's easier for Putin to stick with the war than to end it, because so long as he can keep it going, they find the recruits, they can fund it. You avoid the reckoning that comes when you're trying to explain what actually this war was for. What have you achieved by which would happen as soon as there was a ceasefire and you haven't actually got the subjugation of Ukraine, and you've gained about 10% more Ukrainian territory than you had in February 22nd? And what territory you've gained is absolutely ruined because of the war. So I think the economic issue in particular should weigh heavily on the Kremlin and might make them worry about whether they can keep on going. But at the moment they don't have an obvious route out, which allows Putin to say this was worth it, and I'm not sure he'll ever get that. So we're left with the dilemma we've had since February 22nd. Putin started this war, only he can end it, because the Ukrainians will keep on fighting while they're still under pressure. So what's going to change his mind? Possibly the economy, possibly evidence that this is a forever war, and he's stuck with it for the indefinite future. That's the only reason why I thought that maybe Trump might extract something from this process.
- [20:50]
A
That was Sir Lawrence Friedman ending this edition of the Rachman Review. Thanks for listening, and please join me again next week.
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