Can diplomacy avert a US-Iran war?

Summary

The Rachman Review

Episode Title: Can diplomacy avert a US-Iran war?
Date: February 5, 2026
Host: Andrew England (filling in for Gideon Rachman)
Guest: Sanam Vakil, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House

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Episode Overview

This episode dives into the rapidly escalating tensions between the US and Iran following a catastrophic crackdown on anti-regime protests in Iran. Host Andrew England discusses with Sanam Vakil the prospects for diplomacy, the pressures facing the Iranian regime, the calculus behind US threats under President Trump, the potential for war, and the future of Iran’s government and society. The discussion provides detailed, nuanced insight into the military, diplomatic, and social dynamics at play—as well as the lived experience inside Iran.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Backdrop — US-Iran Tensions and Brutal Crackdown

• [00:18–01:53]
  • Deadly protests erupted across Iran in December over economic hardship, morphing into anti-regime unrest.
  • Iranian authorities used massive force, with thousands reportedly killed: “A 48-hour period … that will go down in the history books as one of the bloodiest clampdowns on street protests in modern times.”
  • President Trump initially threatened direct intervention to protect protestors and shifted toward a broader strategy:

    “Hopefully Iran will quickly come to the table and negotiate a fair and equitable deal. No nuclear weapons … there was Operation Midnight Hammer, a major destruction of Iran. The next attack will be far worse.” (President Trump, quoted by the host, [01:53])

2. US Military Buildup and Iran Strategy

• [02:15–03:39] Sanam Vakil:
  • Trump is exerting economic and military pressure—“not quite taking the Venezuela copy-paste model”—but encircling Iran with sanctions and outright threats.
  • The buildup of US forces signals a willingness to deploy military force, but the ultimate aim is a “comprehensive deal” rebalancing the US-Iran relationship, focusing on Iran’s nuclear activities, missiles, and regional actions.

    “He’s seeking a comprehensive deal with the Islamic Republic to alter the adversarial relationship … perhaps force Tehran to concede on its nuclear program and … beyond that on ballistic missiles and its regionally destabilizing role.” ([02:38])

3. Prospects for Diplomacy and Regional Mediation

• [03:39–05:43]
  • New US-Iran talks scheduled, first since the 12-Day War with Israel last June.
  • Diplomatic engagement by regional actors like the Gulf states and Turkey is “indicative of the desperation and the deep concern” over potential conflict spillover, with fears for oil markets, investment, and violent unrest.

    “What is really interesting is so many regional players are taking such an active role in trying to mediate. Will it lead to a deal? … The odds are slim. This is not a regime that has negotiated too many successful deals with the U.S.” ([03:56])

4. Key Sticking Points: The Nuclear File and Iranian Concessions

• [05:43–09:22]
  • Talks focus primarily on Iran’s nuclear capability. Trump demands permanent access to facilities and total surrender of enrichment capacity—a red line for Iran.
  • Iran’s recent military setbacks may provide “wiggle room,” but real concessions hinge on pressure at the top:

    “Iran can commit to not reviving its program. What the US is seeking is permanent access to Iran’s nuclear facilities and stringent inspections ... But it again comes back to … whether there is enough consensus among the system … to understand that without signing on the dotted line, Iran will be subject to a military campaign…” ([07:57])

    • Supreme Leader Khamenei, whose personal ideology centers on defiance, faces intense pressure; conceding could be existential:

    “He might well support drinking the poison chalice, but that might poison him.” ([09:22])

5. Regime Vulnerability: Internal and External Pressures

• [10:01–12:43]
  • Iran is at an "inflection point": Regional proxies weakened, air defenses battered by Israel, severe economic and resource crises, and historic levels of domestic anger.

    “There are just too many interconnected, unsustainable pressures … that really have no policy solution to them.” ([10:49])

  • Massive loss of life in protests—officially 6,000, with some verifying 17,000—marks unprecedented state violence.
  • The regime’s survival may hinge on external sanctions relief and internal reform, neither of which are forthcoming.

6. Iranian Society: Reality vs Perception

• [12:43–15:01]
  • Iranian society is highly educated, entrepreneurial, globally connected, and vibrant despite the regime:

    “The media … doesn’t capture the vibrancy and dynamism of the Iranian population … it’s a population that has doubled … many family members go into exile. They know what outside life is like … highly educated and very entrepreneurial and aspirational.” ([13:05])

  • Rural/urban inequalities fuel unrest. Economic opening could unlock Iran’s potential, but predatory governance and systemic corruption suffocate development.

7. If Diplomacy Fails: Prospects for Regime Change or Collapse

• [15:34–18:37]
  • The regime’s control mechanisms (Revolutionary Guards, Basij militia) remain strong and loyal, with institutional structures to survive a leadership decapitation or assassination.
  • Full regime collapse is improbable despite pressure; instead, a “change in the regime” rather than regime change is likely.

    “What many analysts are forecasting is not regime change, but a change in the regime.... a post Khamenei Iran was never going to mirror Khamenei’s legacy.” ([17:34])

8. Social Fragmentation and National Resilience

• [18:56–21:17]
  • Speculation about catalyzing regime change via US/Israeli strikes is fraught: Past crises saw Iranians rally around the nation, if not the regime.

    “People rallied around each other and Iran’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. … The protests we have just lived through have been incredibly fierce and ... anti Islamic Republic.” ([19:30])

  • Major risk: External military intervention might unleash ethnic and sectarian fragmentation, civil strife, mirroring Syria, Iraq, or Libya.

    “Iran is a very multiethnic society … 90 million people. … What would the risks of fragmentation, civil conflict be if there was a clear military push for regime change?” ([20:35])

9. Future of the Opposition

• [22:37–25:52]
  • There is no unified opposition inside Iran; regime has spent decades suppressing political alternatives.
  • Diaspora opposition is fragmented. Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the last Shah, enjoys some brand recognition but lacks internal grassroots organization:

    “For Reza Pahlavi to be a meaningful transition figure ... he has to establish an inclusive diaspora-based organization, and he has not yet done so.” ([24:29])

10. Outlook: More Protests Ahead

• [25:52–27:34]
  • Protests are seen as inevitable—they may become larger and more violent as underlying grievances remain unaddressed.

    “In my calculations … protests are inevitable really because the regime doesn’t have the policy tools to address the roots and grievances of the protests.” ([26:16])

  • “The fact that the protests continue to grow and become fiercer is a reflection that people are reaching boiling points.” ([27:34])

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “Drinking the poison chalice, but that might poison him.” — Sanam Vakil on Khamenei possibly conceding to the US ([09:22])
• “There are just too many interconnected, unsustainable pressures that really have no policy solution to them.” — Sanam Vakil on regime survival ([10:49])
• “What many analysts are forecasting is not regime change, but a change in the regime...” — Sanam Vakil ([17:34])
• “Two truths can be simultaneously a reality... Iranians worry US airstrikes could precipitate … fragmentation and violence that they will be paying the price for.” ([19:30])
• “For Reza Pahlavi to be a meaningful transition figure … he has to establish an inclusive diaspora-based organization, and he has not yet done so.” ([24:29])
• “Protests are inevitable really because the regime doesn’t have the policy tools to address the roots and grievances.” ([26:16])

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Essential Timestamps

| Time | Segment | |:----------: |:---------------------------------------------------------------| | 00:18-01:53 | Setting the scene: Protests, US threats, context of crisis | | 02:38-03:39 | Trump’s strategic aims, US military buildup | | 03:56-05:43 | Regional diplomatic efforts, prospects for a deal | | 07:57-09:22 | Iran’s likely concessions, Supreme Leader’s dilemma | | 10:49-12:43 | Regime vulnerability, societal pressure, survival factors | | 13:05-15:01 | The real face of Iranian society | | 15:34-16:20 | Can military action spark regime collapse? | | 17:34-18:37 | Possible regime evolution, post-Khamenei scenarios | | 19:30-21:17 | National resilience, risk of civil conflict | | 24:29-25:52 | Diaspora opposition, Reza Pahlavi’s challenges | | 26:16-27:34 | Outlook for more protests, internal unrest |

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Conclusion

Sanam Vakil argues that while the Iranian regime is under unprecedented internal and external strain, its institutional resilience remains strong; true regime collapse is unlikely in the near term. However, mounting pressures make further popular unrest inevitable, even as the regime’s ability—or willingness—to reform remains deeply limited. Diplomatic solutions would require the regime to accept humiliating concessions that cut against its founding ideology, creating a dangerous inflection point for both Iran and the broader region. The future could hold not sudden collapse, but a slow, volatile transformation with significant risk of civil conflict if a power vacuum emerges.

Transcript

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[B]

Hello and welcome to the Rackman Review. I'm Andrew England, the Middle East Editor at the Financial Times, standing in for Gideon Rachman. This week we'll be looking at the US Threat to attack Iran after the Islamic regime brutally cracked down on mass demonstrations last month. My guest is Sanaam Vakil, Director of the Middle east and North Africa Program at Chatham House in London. Her expertise spans Iranian and Gulf politics, regional security and US Foreign policy, so she's well placed to offer her insights into the latest crisis. So can diplomacy prevent a new war? If not, how would Iran fare if America followed through on its threat to attack the regime? And what prospects of a better life are there for the young Iranians who risked their lives to take to the streets? At the end of December, protests broke out in Tehran over soaring prices. The demonstrations spread quickly around the country and morphed into anti regime protests that turned violent until they were crushed in a crackdown that killed thousands of people. Demonstrators being shot at and taking cover in the city of Mashad over two weeks ago. This during a 48 hour period that will go down in the history books as one of the bloodiest clampdowns on street protests in modern times. US President Donald Trump initially threatened to take action to protect the protesters and prevent them being killed, but now he seems to have pivoted towards a bigger goal.

[A]

President Trump is ramping up his threats against Iran, the President wrote in part on Truth Social this morning. Hopefully Iran will quickly come to the table and negotiate a fair and equitable deal. No nuclear weapons. He goes on to say, as I told Iran once before, make a deal. They didn't and there was Operation Midnight Hammer, a major destruction of Iran. The next attack will be far worse.

[B]

Trump was of course referring to his decision to briefly join Israel's 12 day war against the Islamic Republic in June and bomb Iran's main nuclear facilities in preparation for another possible attack. The US has sent an aircraft carrier strike group and other military assets to the region. So I began by asking Sanem what the US Is seeking to achieve with this military buildup.

[C]

What is Trump trying to do? I think Trump is not quite taking the Venezuela copy paste model to Iran, but over the last year and clearly going into 2026, Trump is encircling Iran through economic pressure, maximum pressure, sanctions. Now he has brought this so called armada to the Middle east, clearly indicating that he's not going to shy away from using military force. And ultimately he's seeking a comprehensive deal with the Islamic Republic to alter the adversarial relationship that has dominated U S Iranian relations for 47 years now and perhaps force Tehran to concede on its nuclear program and perhaps beyond that on ballistic missiles and its regionally destabilizing role. But ultimately to rebalance with the United States and perhaps see the re entry of this US Administration into the Iranian.

[B]

Market, there is the potential for a diplomatic track. We believe there will be talks on Friday between the US and Iran, which will be the first since the 12 day war between Israel and Iran, which the US joined. Do you see any chance of success in that diplomatic channel?

[C]

I think that the regional diplomatic maneuvering over the past 10 days or so is indicative of the desperation and the deep concern of what a military conflict between the US And Iran will bring. It's really interesting that so many regional players are taking such an active role in trying to mediate. Will it lead to a deal? It really depends on the terms on the table. The United States isn't seeking a long protracted negotiation with the Islamic Republic. It's worthwhile remembering that just as the 12 day war broke out, Iran was in the midst of negotiating with the United States, entering the sixth round. So if there is a deal, it must be a quick deal and it must be one where Iran recognizes that it is the weaker partner and it has to effectively sign onto the dotted line in exchange for guarantees and sanctions relief. I think the odds are slim. This is not a regime that has negotiated too many successful deals with the U.S. in fact, it's only successfully signed onto one. But it is in the weakest position it has found itself in in 47 years. So this might be more than drinking the poison chalice. It might be a reckoning for the Islamic Republic.

[B]

As you've said, regional states have been really engaging over the last two or three weeks, speaking to both the Iranians and the Trump administration to try and avert a war. I mean, they're very worried about any conflict spilling over across their borders about Iran retaliating by hitting bases in their countries or hitting their oil and energy facilities. How do you see the role of regional players seeing very much this kind of stepped up, intensifying diplomatic push?

[C]

Yes, this is a really interesting development and it reminds me actually of that same sort of lobbying that took place in 2003, when the region was staunchly opposed to the US invasion of Iraq, raising as many flags as they could that the toppling of Saddam would alter the regional balance of power. And today, I think the region finds itself in an equally concerning moment. They're very worried that military strikes on Iran will unravel this regime and the spillover won't be contained within Iran's borders. And again, the regional balance of power will shift. Already since October 7, threat perceptions across the Middle east have changed. Gulf countries and Turkey see this expansionist, militaristic Israeli state and are worried about it more broadly. There are many regional conflicts that are just left contained but not settled. And they see another conflict with Iran as damaging their economic viability, stalling diversification, impacting oil prices, dampering foreign investment, and politicizing their populations. So, you know, against this backdrop, this marshaling of regional diplomacy is interesting because that's what President Trump wants. He wants a coalition of the willingness.

[B]

From what we understand, these talks are going to focus initially at least, on the nuclear file. Now, in the past, there were talks between the Trump administration and Iran over the nuclear file, as you mentioned. But the key sticking point was Trump's demand that Iran give up its right to enrich uranium, which Iran says it won't do. That would be surrender, and it has a right to enrich as a signatory to the non proliferation treaty. Now, after the 12 day war, there's much deeper mistrust. So what do you think Iran would be willing to give to get that quick deal with Trump? The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, is seen as someone who projects defiance and resistance, and he's the ultimate decision maker. So where do you think there could be a concession that could lead to that quick deal?

[C]

Well, the irony here is that President Trump buried Iran's nuclear program on June 22, targeting facilities at Fordo, Esfahan and Natanz. And interestingly, the Iranian leadership conceded that the program has been buried. So here I think that there is some wiggle room where Iran can commit to not reviving its program. What the United States is seeking is permanent access to Iran's nuclear facilities and a stringent inspections regime. But it probably also would like Iran to surrender the remaining centrifuges and what enrichment it still has access to. And that will be a sticking point. But it again comes back to from the Iranian side, whether there is enough consensus among the system and pressure within the system on the supreme Leader to Understand that without signing on the dotted line, Iran will be subject to a military campaign by the United States. So they really have a gun to their head.

[B]

But do you think Khamenei realizes that? Do you think there is that internal pressure on him? They seem to be showing a greater willingness to at least discuss the nuclear file than they have for some time. Does that signal that there is a realization and that Khamenei can be convinced that he should drink from the poison chalice, as Khomeini did when he signed a ceasefire with Iraq during the 1980s?

[C]

I think there is pressure in the system, on the Supreme Leader now, because across the system, I think there is clear understanding that an attack is imminent and the attack could really weaken the system and target individuals within the system, including the Supreme Leader. But for Khamenei, I think the biggest problem is that he's been at the helm of the Islamic Republic since 1989. His whole worldview is held up by defiance and resistance to the United States. So he might well support drinking the poison chalice, but that might poison him.

[B]

That takes us on to the question that a lot of people are asking is just how weak is the system? How vulnerable is the regime? We've had two years of conflict in the region since Hamas's October 7th attack on Israel. We've seen Iran's proxies in the region, which typically it would see as a part of its asymmetric warfare, front lines against Israel, against the us Et cetera, being severely weakened. We've seen Iran's air defense is severely weakened during the 12 Day War with Israel, a number of its top commanders and nuclear scientists assassinated. And now we've just seen the deadliest, most violent protest in Iran. That shows the level of anger and frustration, disillusionment among the populace in Iran towards their leadership in this theocratic system. So just how weak is the regime and how close is it to collapse?

[C]

So I've been saying that the Islamic Republic has been facing a legitimacy crisis for as long as I've been working on Iran. That's over 20 years now. And each protest produces more painful, more violent, more brutal outcomes for the Iranian people. But certainly over the past two years, we have witnessed the retrenchment of Iranian power across the region. What is abundantly clear is that Iran is defensively exposed. Israel has military dominance in the Middle east, but domestically, I think the dynamics are at a particular inflection point. Going into these protests, Iran experienced almost ground zero in terms of a water crisis. It was also facing electricity Shortages, years of economic mismanagement, corruption and sanctions have taken a huge toll with the currency collapsing repeatedly. I mean, it's just been in freefall now and prices of basic goods have risen. So it's a cost of living crisis as well. So there are just too many interconnected, unsustainable pressures that really have no policy solution to them. That's the reality. What this government needs to rehabilitate themselves, if you can imagine that prospect. Because the death toll from these protests is over 6,000 formally confirmed, 17,000 death are being independently verified. This has been an extraordinary level of state sponsored violence against its own citizens. But you know, if you want to play out what they need, they need sanctions relief, they need investment into the country from the international community to create jobs, to improve growth in the country. And maybe over time that would give them the space to rebuild relations with society.

[B]

Can you explain to people who don't understand Iran just what Iranian society is today? Because for decays we've had this characterization of the mad mullers, you know, this kind of theocratic regime. But when you are in Iran, you see a very, very different country. And I guess this is why you have such a huge gap between the aging theocratic leadership and the majority of society.

[C]

I think the media has presented a perception of Iran under aging clerical regime that doesn't capture the sort of vibrancy and dynamism of the Iranian population. This is a population that has doubled under the Islamic Republic's leadership, that has seen many family members go into exile. So they know what outside life is like. They have connectivity through social media, they're highly educated and very entrepreneurial and aspirational. And it's a society that has survived through workarounds, not because the system has empowered them or delivered on the promises of the revolution, but through their own ingenuity and instinct of survival. You have dynamic arts culture, you have a dynamic youth culture, you have plenty of startups and initiatives that unfortunately just haven't thrived because of the economic and political conditions and the predatory nature of this state. And you know, if you travel around the country, it's equally dynamic. I think what's problematic is that a lot of the towns and villages where you see these protests break out haven't benefited from economic development from resources. There are fewer jobs for young people. That's very dangerous, of course, and then people have nothing to live for. There are high degrees of suicide rates in the country as well. I think that if the Iranian economy would open up, we would see a lot of vibrancy we would see a lot of economic opportunity because Iran has human capital and it is a frontier market and there is a lot of ambition inside Iran. What would be hard to navigate are the institutions and the deep layers of corruption that have been built in through this workaround society.

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[B]

If diplomacy fails and Trump decides to strike, can that inspire regime change? Can that inspire the collapse to the regime? Or is there resilience to this system that's been in place since 1979 still, and we shouldn't forget, has a, you know, sizable ideological following. 13 million people voted for the most ideological hardline candidate in the elections last year. The the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is an incredibly strong force ideologically loyal to the system. You've got the Basij. It's hundreds of thousands of volunteers ideologically loyal to the system. Experts would say that even if Khamenei is killed, people think that's a possibility. If Trump was to strike, he could at least be targeted. Does the regime collapse? Does it stay together? How resilient would it be in the face of aggression from the U.S. well.

[C]

First of all, authoritarian regimes that are institutionalized and bureaucratized, like the Islamic Republic, can stay in power in a weakened state for quite some time, really, because they have the monopoly of violence which they continue to use. They have an upper hand and have not been afraid of using it. So there's that to weigh against the processes that are probably in place to insulate the regime should Khamenei be taken out by a US Or Israeli strike. Last summer, when there was speculation that the Israelis during the 12 Day War had their sights on him, it was conveniently released that there is a short list of names sitting with a tight circle of people so that the assembly of experts, the body that is responsible for nominating and electing the next supreme leader, can move ahead. So they do have processes in place. They do have constitutional mechanisms. But beyond that, regime collapse, I think is hard to imagine because of the coercive control. What you could see is continued erosion of influence. You could see the system focused on decentralization. And already, I think President Pezeshkian has hinted as such, giving more authority to provincial governors, preparing for war, strengthening supply lines of food and pharmaceutical products, for example. What I can imagine and what many analysts are forecasting is not regime change, but a change in the regime. This was always going to be inevitable because a post Khamenei Iran was never going to mirror Khamenei's legacy in the same way that Khamenei's Iran has looked very different from Khomeini's Iran, the first founding father of the revolution. So that changing of the guard could bring up a new individual or a new group of individuals.

[B]

But can that happen as long as Khamenei is still alive?

[C]

No. This system is beholden to Khamenei, not just ideologically and religiously, but politically beholden. And I think that while he's alive, the guards will stay unified. And the guards themselves are not a homogenous group. They're factions within the guards. So we would have to see how things evolve.

[B]

And we've seen no sign of defections. And we saw no sign of defections during the protests.

[C]

No. This is another facet and feature of, I think, the resilience of the Islamic Republic, that the elite, which is very fragmented and highly factionalized, does maintain a cohesive approach to crisis.

[B]

The other thing that people have speculated about is whether Trump would seek to hit Iran to inspire another round of mass protests to target the regime. When Israel launched its war in June last year, we saw people generally rally around the flag. Iranians are very proud nation, have a history of being against foreign intervention in their country. I wonder if that would change after the deadly protests and whether you would see that running around the flag again, given the level of state violence, or whether people would just sort of hunker down.

[C]

Well, first of all, I don't think that people rallied around the Islamic Republic's flag last summer during the 12 day war. I think people rallied around each other and Iran's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The regime then went on to instrumentalize what they saw as popular support and perhaps took it too far. And everyone thought, oh, that means Iranians are naturally supportive of the government, which is quite the opposite. And the protests that we have just lived through have been incredibly fierce and very political and very anti Islamic Republic. I think two truths can be simultaneously a reality. And I think that within the system, there is more opposition, anger, frustration directed at the Islamic Republic and more momentum to end the Islamic Republic's leadership. Simultaneous to that, I think Iranians very much worry that US Airstrikes could precipitate protests, state collapse and fragmentation and violence that they will be paying the price for.

[B]

How real is that risk? I mean, a lot of Iranians will tell you that they've seen what happened in Syria after the popular uprising in 2011 morphed into a civil war. They've looked at Iraq after 2003, the US led invasion to remove Saddam Hussein. They've looked at Libya after the popular uprisings to remove Gaddafi in 2011 turned into civil war. Iran is a very multiethnic society. You got Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, Sunnis, Shia. It's predominantly Shia, obviously, but there are many, many, many other communities. It's 90 million people. It's a huge, vast nation. What would the risks of fragmentation, civil conflict be if there was a clear military push for regime change by the Americans or the Israelis?

[C]

I think people are very worried about that. There is deep seated anger across Iran because the Islamic Republic has effectively failed to deliver security, prosperity, let alone hope and dignity. And, you know, I'm not convinced that this time round the Islamic Republic will be able to keep people off the streets. Should the United States go in and repeat what we saw last summer. Targeted strikes against Iran's leadership I think would be celebrated. And strikes against Iran's security and defense establishment and infrastructure, I think could be an opportunity to come out on the streets. But there's something to also be aware of. Iran's opposition inside Iran is certainly more organized, certainly more coordinated than ever before. But there is no clear plan of action on the street side of things either. And people will certainly be very worried and anxious about a collapse of services and functioning of the government. So, you know, that could bring more caution and that could be something that the establishment will try to exploit. They've certainly exploited those fears of Arab protests and conflict to keep people at home in the past.

[B]

It's interesting what you said about the opposition. I mean, we know there's no real organized opposition in Iran, certainly not in the way there was before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The regime is over four decades cracked down on dissent. Jail protesters, there's no political parties allowed. And the opposition in the diaspora, there's a big Iranian diaspora has also been driven by sort of toxic battles, internal battles among themselves. But what we saw during the protests is that Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last Shah, seems to have grown in prominence. And you did see people in Iran chanting his name. And it caused a lot of people to rethink his profile in all of this. Before the last protest, people were quite dismissive of him and the opposition in the diaspora in general because of the divisions. Has that changed? I mean, do you see him now as a more important player in this, or is he just a figurehead that doesn't actually have influence?

[C]

I think since the 2022 Women Life Freedom protests that were also very brutal but generated a lot of external support from the diaspora, Pahlavi came out with the most brand recognition. And since then, he's tried to build more support in the diaspora and also support from perhaps governments abroad, including from the Israeli government. And in these protests, Pahlavi, because he has that seemingly larger organizational capacity, tried to whip up support from abroad, call people out on the streets, and people responded, I think for a few reasons. First of all, he has name and brand recognition. There's nostalgia for a pre revolutionary past, you know, simmering around Iranian society. And I think Pahlavi also rode the wave of seeming US Support as well. It's important to remember that Donald Trump also said help is coming.

[B]

But do you see Trump supporting him?

[C]

So President Trump, I think, influenced by his advisers and perhaps by intelligence reports, has clearly made a call that while Reza Pahlavi is a nice guy and certainly has some degree of support, perhaps doesn't have the organization or adequate base inside the country. And I think it's important to acknowledge a few things. First of all, for Reza Pahlavi to be a meaningful transition figure, as he's laying himself out to do, he has to establish an inclusive diaspora based organization, and he has not yet done so. Diaspora groups are very fragmented, not just in terms of vision of governance and the future of Iran, but there are also personal animosities between them. They're monarchical groups that don't even work together, and they have the same vision. So those divisions need to be immediately overcome for the bigger picture. But second of all, I think what Pahlavi has not done is also build connectivity with activists and thinkers inside Iran. And that, of course, is dangerous and hard to do, but should be done because there are plenty of people inside Iran that have sacrificed themselves and have ideas and have a real view of what inclusive governance inside Iran could and should look like. And he should be working with those figures.

[B]

We've kind of seen it because we've seen cycles of protests, and they wouldn't necessarily say bigger, but they've become more extreme in their cause against the regime. You're seeing pockets of violence. We saw it in 2019. We saw it again this time. What happened to this kind of civil unrest. They've contained it now. They crushed it with, you know, lethal violence. Is the next chapter just around the corner and is it likely to be as big as violent?

[C]

Well, in my calculations, looking at Iran, I think protests are inevitable really because the regime doesn't have the policy tools to address the roots and grievances of the protests. There's no real economic off ramp to deal with the rising inflation and collapsing currency amidst the sanctions and and endemic corruption. There is no political off ramp. If this is a regime that has chosen over multiple decades to not reform and to completely discard the demands of the population, what they do do is provide subtle off ramps. I mean, before the protests broke out, there were reports of social liberalization. It's this sort of de facto tolerance granted to people. But that's not enough to deal with the acute pain and pressure of living in the Islamic Republic, which is prison like, open air prison like. And to me, it's inevitable. There will be more pressure, they will become more violent, they will become more organized and people will be taking their lives at risk. But the fact that the protests continue to grow and become fiercer is a reflection that people are reaching boiling points and are willing to to throw caution into the wind for a better life or to sacrifice themselves for a different future.

[B]

So much rests now with the regime's willingness to make concessions both to the Americans and to its own society.

[C]

Yes, I think that's quite fair.

[B]

That was Sanam Vakil, a London based expert on Iran and the Gulf region. And that's it for for this week. Gideon will be back next week, so please join us then for another edition of the Recman Review.

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