The Rachman Review

Episode: What chance for Trump’s Gaza peace plan?
Date: October 9, 2025
Host: Gideon Rachman (A)
Guest: Philip Gordon (B), Brookings Institution, former White House advisor on the Middle East

Overview

This episode examines the prospects for President Donald Trump’s proposed 20-point peace plan for Gaza and the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Gideon Rachman is joined by Philip Gordon, an experienced U.S. policymaker and adviser on the Middle East, to dissect the plan’s feasibility, key sticking points, and whether any meaningful progress is likely. The conversation critically evaluates the assumptions behind the Trump plan and discusses both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives, regional complications, and the international context.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Trump Plan: Structure and Skepticism

• Trump’s plan aims to deliver "lasting peace," with steps including a ceasefire, hostage and prisoner swaps, disarmament of Hamas, peacekeeping deployments, Gaza’s reconstruction, and a political process toward a Palestinian state.

• Philip Gordon is skeptical the plan will be fully implemented, arguing that, at best, a partial deal—like a temporary ceasefire and hostage exchange—is more feasible.

  • Quote: “If you are asking whether this 20 point peace plan will be fully implemented as drafted… No, I think the prospects for that are very, very limited.” (01:45)

• Hostage exchanges and temporary pauses:

  • Ceasefires have previously only lasted “for a couple of months” before fighting resumed (02:49).
  • “The fundamental issue… is just fundamental and irreconcilable differences. Israel will only stop fighting … when Hamas is totally eliminated. But to do that, they would need Hamas to agree to either get out or disarm, and they’re just not going to do that.” (03:11)

2. Trump vs. Biden: Who Can Apply Pressure?

• The Trump administration is said to have more leverage over Netanyahu because his Republican control leaves Israel ‘nowhere to go’ (07:15).

  • Gordon agrees that a Republican, especially Trump, has “unique leverage,” but cautions this is overstated—Trump’s actions have mostly supported Israeli policy (“Trump does and says almost nothing,” 04:55), and real pressure on Netanyahu is yet to be seen (“more power to him… but it sure hasn’t happened yet,” 06:22).

  • Quote: “Trump can get things done when it comes to Israel… If he does, more power to him.” (09:38)

  • Trump’s actions are compared to Nixon’s opening with China: “His unique leverage over Israel, his unique leverage over Congress and his party and his unique role in US Politics … gives him margin of maneuver that Joe Biden didn’t have.” (08:10)

  • Motivations: Trump is seen as motivated in part by a desire for recognition, possibly even a Nobel Prize (“he is also clearly desperate to have a win and to get credit for this,” 22:10).

3. Israeli Leadership and Domestic Politics

• Netanyahu’s Position:

  • Gordon describes Netanyahu as a pragmatist, “not the first time he’s apologized” to Arab leaders for Israeli actions (10:06).

  • Netanyahu’s two key considerations: “There’s Israel security and his own politics… both argued against a deal for him.” (11:48)

  • His coalition politics discourage compromise; if he’s not seen as achieving “total victory,” his coalition might collapse, risking elections and his legal exposure.

  • Quote: “He has to have an election within a year. He’s not going to want to run… with Israeli hostages still in Gaza and this unpopular war going on. At some point, he’s going to have to do some sort of deal.” (12:44)

• The plan’s requirements (Hamas’ disarmament, no role in governance) could provide a “total victory” narrative for Netanyahu, should he want to embrace an agreement.

4. Palestinian Side and “Technocratic Governance”

• Disarmament and Role in Government:

  • Gordon is highly skeptical that Hamas will fully disarm, describing a “vicious circle” where “Hamas will only really consider getting rid of their weapons if there was full Israeli withdrawal,” while Israel’s condition for withdrawal is Hamas' disarmament (14:04).

  • The model is compared to Hezbollah in Lebanon: de jure disarmament but de facto continued presence (14:54).

• Who are the Technocrats?

  • The so-called “Palestinian technocrats” mentioned in the plan, outside the PA, “don’t exist.” (15:36)
  • The Palestinian Authority (PA) is deeply problematic (corrupt, unpopular), but is the only real organizational option; “if you’re going to rule out Israeli occupation … Hamas … and PA, what have you got left?” (16:38)

5. Peacekeepers and Regional Actors

• Arab and Multinational Force:

  • No firm Arab or Muslim commitment to a peacekeeping force; interest is always conditional on prior resolution of “the Hamas problem” and often requires a U.S. role (17:48).

  • Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco have vaguely entertained it, but always qualify involvement: “They are not signing up for a counterterrorism mission… Nor do they want to do this together with the Israelis.” (18:02)

  • Gulf states lack capacity or will to participate.

  • Quote: “There are so many conditions, it’s hard to see how you actually get to the point where they’re willing to do it.” (19:28)

• Pathway to Palestinian State:

  • Trump is credited by some with putting a “pathway to a Palestinian state” back in the language, but it’s non-committal—“simply an acknowledgment” of an aspiration, not a guarantee (20:02).

6. The “Two State Solution” Paradox

• Despite repeated international calls for a two-state solution—including by Trump—the idea is rejected by majorities on both sides (20:25).

  • Policymakers keep returning to it because “the alternatives… are so bad”—either permanent occupation, apartheid-like enclaves, or a single state, which neither side supports.

  • Quote: “The absence of alternatives to a two state solution is what kept driving us, and I think still today drives people back to some version of a Palestinian state because the alternatives to it are so bad.” (21:00)

7. Prospects for Real Change

• Best Hope May Be Exhaustion:

  • Neither side appears close to embracing a deal; Gordon suggests sheer exhaustion might eventually bring temporary pauses, “at least for a while” (23:53).

  • Yet, even exhaustion is not enough—if one side thinks the other is weak, it is emboldened to hold out for more (“one side’s exhaustion… diminishes that same feeling on the other side.” 23:53).

  • Quote: “Each side tries to avoid blame and maximize what it gets in the deal. And you never get to that steady state where both say, all right, you know what? We are more or less satisfied with that.” (25:00)

• Modest Expectations:

  • Gordon sees some grounds for hope: serious negotiations, international support, possible humanitarian aid and hostage releases.
  • But full peace remains distant: “We are still a pretty long way from what Trump is calling peace in the Middle East.” (25:54)

Notable Quotes & Segments

• “If you are asking whether this 20 point peace plan will be fully implemented as drafted… No, I think the prospects for that are very, very limited.”
  — Philip Gordon, (01:45)

• “The fundamental issue… is just fundamental and irreconcilable differences. Israel will only stop fighting … when Hamas is totally eliminated. But to do that, they would need Hamas to agree to either get out or disarm, and they’re just not going to do that.”
  — Philip Gordon, (03:11)

• “Trump can get things done when it comes to Israel… If he does, more power to him.”
  — Philip Gordon, (09:38)

• “He has to have an election within a year. He’s not going to want to run… with Israeli hostages still in Gaza and this unpopular war going on. At some point, he’s going to have to do some sort of deal.”
  — Philip Gordon, (12:44)

• “There are so many conditions, it’s hard to see how you actually get to the point where they’re willing to do it.”
  — Philip Gordon, (19:28)

• “The absence of alternatives to a two state solution is what kept driving us, and I think still today drives people back to some version of a Palestinian state because the alternatives to it are so bad.”
  — Philip Gordon, (21:00)

• “Each side tries to avoid blame and maximize what it gets in the deal. And you never get to that steady state where both say, all right, you know what? We are more or less satisfied with that.”
  — Philip Gordon, (25:00)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• [01:45]–[03:11] — Gordon’s assessment of the likelihood and limitations of the Trump plan
• [04:55]–[06:22] — Comparisons of Trump and Biden’s leverage over Israel
• [07:15]–[09:48] — Republican leverage and the “Nixon-to-China” analogy
• [10:06]–[12:44] — Netanyahu’s dual motivations: security and politics
• [13:33]–[15:36] — Obstacles to Palestinian disarmament and governance
• [17:48]–[20:25] — Feasibility and limitations of an Arab/Muslim peacekeeping force
• [20:25]–[22:10] — The two-state solution as the only option left standing
• [23:53]–[25:58] — The role of exhaustion and cyclical failures in ceasefire talks

Takeaway

The episode is a clear-eyed, realistic assessment of Trump’s Gaza plan: partial progress (pauses, hostages swaps) is possible, but major breakthroughs—true peace and a Palestinian state—remain extremely unlikely due to deep, structural mistrust, political constraints on all sides, and mismatches between ambitious diplomatic frameworks and ground realities. Trump’s political room to maneuver may help, but the region’s vicious cycles appear set to continue.

End of Summary