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- [00:01]
A
Hello and welcome to the Rahman Review. I'm Gideon Rahman, chief foreign affairs commentator of the Financial Times. This week's podcast is about the chances of a peace settlement in Gaza. My guest is Philip Gordon, who had the Middle east portfolio in the Obama White House and then served as National Security Adviser to Vice President Kamala Harris. President Donald Trump is insistent that his 20 point plan is the route to lasting peace in the Middle east. But many are skeptical. So can the Trump plan end the Gaza war and the broader conflict between Israel and the Palestinians? Well, we're talking about Gaza for the most part. I think we have a chance this.
- [00:49]
B
Week or next week.
- [00:50]
A
Not definitely. There's nothing definite, you know, definite about.
- [00:54]
B
War and Gaza and all of the.
- [00:56]
A
Other places that we all deal with so much. But there's a very good chance that we'll have a settlement, an agreement of some kind this week and maybe next week if not. That was Donald Trump in a relatively unbombastic moment, expressing the belief that peace in Gaza can be reached quite soon. But this is a very complicated process. It involves not just a ceasefire and the release of hostages, but then the disarmament of Hamas, the deployment of a peacekeeping force, the reconstruction of Gaza, and the beginning of a political process towards a Palestinian state. Many veterans of Middle east peacemaking are skeptical this will ever work. Phil Gordon spent many years wrestling with the Israel Palestine dossier, so I asked him what he thinks the chances are for this latest peace plan.
- [01:45]
B
If you are asking whether this 20 point peace plan will be fully implemented as drafted, which means the disarmament of Hamas, Hamas commitment to peaceful coexistence, the deployment of an Arab force, Arab technocrats who are non Hamas coming in, no Hamas role in government, directly or indirectly, development, foreign assistance and peace. No, I think the prospects for that are very, very limited. If the question, on the other hand, is a hostage deal, some elements of the plan whereby at least Israel pauses military operations for long enough for Hamas to release hostages in return for Israel releasing prisoners, then I think that's something we could imagine happening. Even that's not guaranteed, but just that and then live to negotiate. The rest would be quite an accomplishment. You know, everything here is relative. That would be nowhere near the eternal peace in the region that President Trump is talking about. But it would sure be a whole lot better than what we have seen for the past two years.
- [02:50]
A
I think what we've discovered, though in previous pauses, there was one earlier this year for almost a couple of months, is that eventually the fighting restarts and as you say, It'd be great if the hostages are released and there's a prisoner swap and all of that. But do you think that the war will restart at some point, or is there a chance that, that the killing at least stops, if not permanently, for the foreseeable future?
- [03:12]
B
Well, there's a chance. I mean, there is a decent chance that it stops temporarily. As you say, that wouldn't be the first time that's happened before. There have been partial hostage deals before and the January ceasefire actually landed for a couple of months. Something like that is quite possible. The conditions are better for that than they have been for many months. A longer term ceasefire is also imaginable. You could imagine if Israel paused enough to get the hostages out, there could be enough pressure on Israel to not resume major military operations for some time. If you're really asking, though, about full implementation and peace and a full IDF withdrawal, I think, you know, that's probably more unlikely than likely because the fundamental issue that, you know, I've been dealing with for the two years of this war, you know, in a sense longer than that, but since military operations have gone, gone on, is just fundamental and irreconcilable differences. Israel will only stop fighting and withdraw the Israeli Defense Forces from Gaza when Hamas is totally eliminated. But to do that, they would need Hamas to agree to either get out or disarm, and they're just not going to do that. And Hamas, in turn, won't stop fighting unless and until Israel further withdraws. So you have this sort of vicious circle where you can't meet both of those conditions at the same time. And I'm honestly not sure we're there yet.
- [04:35]
A
Yeah, I mean, those who are hopeful, and they include President Trump, who's never shy of taking credit for things, say, well, only Trump could do this and that the Biden White House, in which you played a central role, was too weak to put real pressure on Netanyahu. That's what Trump has done and that's why we now have a chance that this will work. What do you think of that?
- [04:55]
B
It is obviously the case that President Biden didn't manage to get this done. If we're talking about the complete thing. Trump did inherit a ceasefire, but Biden was never able to get Israel to do what would have been necessary to have a more lasting ceasefire hostage deal. But I think this narrative that Trump has been categorically different and only he not only could do this in theory, but has done it, seems to me very much premature and overstated. There was a piece in The New York Times just the other day on this about how Trump's calling the shots. They cited even a lot of Israeli journalists saying Trump's the boss and he dictates and Netanyahu follows. I mean, again, you know, let's see how this plays out. And also take a step back and think for a minute about the idea of Trump twisting Bibi's arm. This narrative, which Trump has an interest in putting out there and a lot of people who want to humiliate Netanyahu have an interest in putting out there. But since Trump has been in office, they inherit a ceasefire. Israel breaks it in March. Trump does nothing to push Netanyahu. Israel then conducts a complete siege of Gaza for more than two months, blocking all food and trying to set up some other humanitarian system that doesn't come close to working. Trump does and says almost nothing about that, which leads to mass starvation. Many more months go by. Trump does nothing about that except to say that Israel may have to finish the job while meanwhile, Israel is doing whatever it wants on the west bank with no resistance from Trump, whatever even lifts some of the sanctions that Biden had put on violent settlers in the West Bank. And then finally, now Trump does put forward a peace deal, for reasons we can talk about, but it includes essentially everything Netanyahu wanted, except for the most extreme Israeli views about annexation or settlement of Jews in Gaza. So the idea that that constitutes some new direction in US Foreign policy, where the president is willing to tell Israel what to do, seems to me very much overstated. Now, let's see. It's true that Trump now is saying this deal needs to be implemented, and by the way, I applaud him for that. I think that's necessary. We'll have to get to the point where Netanyahu does some things he wouldn't otherwise want to do. And if the US President is willing to do that, more power to him. But it sure hasn't happened yet, and it's not even clear it's going to happen.
- [07:15]
A
Do you think, though, that in a sense, a Republican president, and particularly president like Trump, has an advantage over a Democrat like Biden in that Netanyahu, if a Republican president puts pressure on him, has nowhere to go to. Whereas if it was Biden or Obama, you can always appeal to the Republicans in Congress, get the plan denounced and so on. That option just isn't there anymore?
- [07:40]
B
No, I think that's totally right. The first piece I did on leaving government, I wrote a Foreign affairs article saying just that, that Trump has opportunities, particularly in the Middle east to do things that previous Democratic presidents couldn't do. One reason for that is Israel has more margin of maneuver. If Biden had done certain things vis a vis Israel, this applies to other issues, like, you know, a nuclear deal with Iran as well, which is also related to Israel. There's no way he could have gotten it by Congress. You'd have unanimous Republican opposition. The Republicans would side with critics of Biden or whoever it might have been, and he wouldn't be able to do it politically. And Trump, on the other hand, totally controls his own party. His party is in one place now, but if Trump decides tomorrow that the criteria for this deal need to be different and Israel needs to agree with X or. Yeah, and they'll be totally with him. So his unique leverage over Israel, his unique leverage over Congress and his party and his unique role in US Politics, but like the Nixon to China thing gives him margin of maneuver that Joe Biden didn't have, Barack Obama didn't have. Now, you can still say that they, or in particular Biden should have tried to use his leverage more, but it is just objectively the case that Trump can get things done when it comes to Israel. And he did a lot of them. I mean, early in the term, he didn't do much on Israel, certainly the West Banker Gaza, but he negotiated directly with Hamas to release an American hostage, which Democratic presidents would have been nervous to do. He did a ceasefire with the Houthis that didn't cover Israel, and he, quote, unquote, got away with that. He sat down with the former terrorist leader of Syria against Israel's better judgment, and he had the margin of maneuver to do so, and Congress didn't support him. And he also sought to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran. And had he wanted to do it, ultimately, I think Israel forced his hand. And Trump ended up following Israel along and using military force. But Trump had the space to do that, too, in a way that Obama and Biden didn't. I'm not being critical of that. I welcome it. I think it gives him an opportunity to take advantage of those structural realities to get things done. And if he does, more power to him.
- [09:48]
A
You know Netanyahu very well. I mean, how do you think he will be thinking about this? In some sense, it was a slightly humbling moment for him. For example, being forced, with people taking pictures of it, to ring up the leaders of Qatar and apologize for the Israeli attack on Doha. How do you think he's going to play this?
- [10:07]
B
You're right, it was a bit Humbling for him to have to call the Qataris in the Oval Office, but he's a pragmatist in the end. It's not the first time he's apologized to an Arab or Muslim leader over things Israel has done. He had to call the King of Jordan to apologize for attempting to assassinate Hamas leader in Jordan, whatever, 25 years ago. He had to call the then Prime Minister of Turkey to apologize for Israel killing Turks on the ship, the Mavi Marmara in 2010. And then the apology was 2013. I was with Obama in a trailer and a tarmac when Bibi did that. So this is not the first time he's done what was pragmatically useful. I think the way he'll be thinking about this issue is, you know, when it comes to Netanyahu, there was two things. There's Israel security and his own politics. And, you know, people can debate which of those is more important. He would say they go hand in hand. Israel is only safe when I'm the Prime Minister. But both of those things have so far argued against a deal for him. Israel's security requires the total destruction and defeat of Hamas. And in his view, at least, we're not there yet. There's still fighters, there are still tunnels, and we have to keep going for the total destruction or at least total disarmament of Hamas. And that's what he will want to continue to pursue unless he can get it in the deal. And it does include the disarmament of Hamas. And it requires Hamas fighters, if they want to live or get an amnesty, to commit to peaceful coexistence with Israel and or leave Gaza. So you could get to the point, if this were really implemented, that that would be satisfactory for Bibi. So that's how Bibi would think about Israel's security. But he'll also be thinking about his own politics, because you could also argue that another reason he hasn't done a deal yet is his politics didn't permit it. He's in a extreme right wing coalition with parties that have always said they would leave if he did a deal that they weren't satisfied with, which is to say anything short of what he calls total victory. And he has not wanted to run that risk, which could provoke elections which if held now, he might well lose. And his trials for corruption might go ahead as well. So his politics have also argued against the deal for two years. And the question now is, are we at the point or could we get to the point where he could say both of those things are now in a position where, to his satisfaction, Israel's security is okay and the politics are okay. Last point on that, Gideon. If you assume that the politics have to be right for him to do any deal like this, and they do, he has to have an election within a year. He's not going to want to run for election with Israeli hostages still in Gaza and this unpopular war going on. At some point, he's going to have to do some sort of deal. A lot of us thought he could have done it sooner, but at some point, he's going to want to be able to say, we were viciously attacked on October 7, 2023. I stood against the world. I stood against all of this pressure. I destroyed Hamas. I got the hostages out and run on that, rather than, well, this war is still going on and the hostages are still there. So I don't know when that moment comes, but we may be getting close to it. And last thing on the deal, it gives him a lot. I mean, he has insisted all along that you have to have the total defeat of Hamas. This deal says Hamas has to decommission its weapons and offensive weapons and terror weapons and tunnels and infrastructure. And it says Hamas can have no role in governance in Gaza, directly or indirectly. He could sell that as total victory.
- [13:33]
A
Yeah. And so then let's turn to the Palestinian side. I mean, you expressed skepticism earlier that Hamas will ever really disarm. And, you know, in a sense, how would you know? They use this phrase. I wonder whether there was a Blairite influence of decommissioning, which is familiar from the Northern Ireland peace process. But it's a very different context. And again, there's also this talk of Palestinian technocrats. Who exactly are these Palestinian technocrats and where do you find them, if not in the Palestinian Authority? What do you think of that side of the equation?
- [14:04]
B
That is indeed one of the things that is hardest to square in all of this. The decommissioning, disarmament, whatever you want. Hamas will want to play a role. This goes back to the vicious circle I was talking about earlier. They would only really consider getting rid of their weapons if there was full Israeli withdrawal and some form of guarantee that the Israelis wouldn't be coming back. But Israel's condition for full withdrawal or any reassurances they're not coming back is Hamas's disarmament and replacement with Palestinian technocrats. So that just goes round and round, and we haven't come close to squaring that circle yet the way you could imagine it being done. It's not satisfactory to anyone. But we're not dealing with perfect options when it comes to the Middle east, and certainly not Gaza is a little bit like what was done with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel would like to see Hezbollah entirely and permanently and completely disarmed too. But it recognized that that really wasn't realistic without an Israeli occupation. So they signed a ceasefire that called for Hezbollah's disarmament. But in truth, every last member of Hezbollah, Lebanon is not going to be disarmed. That's the type of thing you could imagine where it is accepted in principle. Most of Hamas's military capacity has been destroyed already, but Hamas does actually step aside in its own mind. It is still a presence and a force and has military capabilities, but it allows Gaza to be governed by others. And Israel lives with that.
- [15:32]
A
So that brings us to the question of who are the others then it does there.
- [15:36]
B
The document refers to Palestinian technocrats, no Hamas, and they're vague references to the Palestinian Authority. Those technocrats don't exist outside of the Palestinian Authority. I think one of the problems with the Israeli approach so far has been the absolute refusal to accept a role for the PA in Gaza. That's been an absolute principle of Netanyahu. The pa, as its critics say, is unpopular and has real problems with corruption and is inefficient. But it also happens to be all there is to work with. And it also happens to be an organization that exists, is recognized as the legitimate authority of the Palestinians. More importantly, supports peaceful coexistence with Israel, even security cooperation with Israel. It even has a number of people in Gaza on the payroll. She's been on the payroll since the PA ruled in Gaza more than 20 years ago. That could eventually become the kernel of some sort of technocratic governance or involvement. So there would still be a ton of work to be done. But I think Israel made a mistake in ruling out any role for the pa. There are no ideal options on the table here. But if you're going to rule out Israeli occupation and going back in and running Gaza, and if you're going to rule out Hamas, which you should because of their record and their role as a terrorist group, and you're going to rule out the pa, what have you got left?
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- [17:23]
A
Meanwhile, there's also who keeps the peace? If we even get to this stage and this talk of a multinational peace force, Arab and Muslim states, is that really going to work. And are we talking Egyptians, Turks, you know, who would be acceptable to Israel and I imagine the Gulf states they'd find more palatable, but they're tiny places and they're not really used to putting their people in combat zones.
- [17:48]
B
No, exactly. And that's added to the list of those challenges that anyone trying to implement this would face. And we've looked at this in the Biden administration, who just constantly went in circles on we should maybe think about an Arab force. And then it would be so difficult. The Arabs were saying, no way, we're not going in unless certain unrealistic conditions are met. So then you rule it out. None of the Arab or Muslim countries have firmly signed up for this force. They have at various times and in different ways expressed a degree of openness to it. I think Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco have all at least been willing to entertain proposals. Usually they're so conditional, there has to be a US role. Another major condition is that the Hamas problem has to be dealt with. In other words, they are not signing up for a counterterrorism mission, you know, like the US in Fallujah and Iraq, where they're going in and fighting Hamas door to door. Nor do they want to do this together with the Israelis. Arabs are not comfortable with going on the back of a Israeli tank column and helping Israel enforce security against Hamas in Gaza. The Gulf states, as you say, don't have the ground forces or the history of doing this or arguably the political will. And they've been open to some role, but usually, again, so conditional. The Hamas problem has to be dealt with. Either Hamas is disarmed or given up its weapons or agreed to step aside. US has to be deeply involved. There has to be an alternative Palestinian governance. And they all have their own problems with the PA and its current leadership, so it can't be that. So there's so many conditions, it's hard to see how you actually get to the point where they're willing to do it. I'm all for it. We should all be for it. If this plan were implemented and all 20 things were implemented, it would be literally in everybody's interest, except perhaps Hamas, which would be a good thing. But that piece of it we can't count on. That's one of the things that makes me worried for the longer term in the notion of implementation, because you could argue that an element in the plan would just potentially positive as the reference to a pathway towards Palestinian self determination in a Palestinian state. And some have touted that as an example of Trump's sway over Netanyahu. He got them to include that in the plan. It is not a commitment to a pathway to a Palestinian state. It is simply an acknowledgment that if ever one day development in Gaza proceeded and Palestinian reform proceeded to Israel's satisfaction, that you could potentially see a pathway towards that state which is recognized as a Palestinian aspiration. But that would need to be settled too, before any Arabs go into Gaza.
- [20:25]
A
Yeah, I mean, it is interesting nonetheless, I mean, if only intellectually, that Trump has come back to a two state solution. But it strikes me that one of the depressing paradoxes of all this is that the international community now, even including Donald Trump, always comes back and says the only solution is a two state solution. But if you look at opinion polling in Israel, a majority of Israelis reject it and a majority of Palestinians reject it. So are we all just pursuing a mirage?
- [20:51]
B
Possibly. You mentioned I did this job in the Middle east for obama more than 10 years ago. And we used to say then what would we actually adopt as a policy if we concluded that a two state solution just simply wasn't possible? And that would become increasingly true over time as Israelis turned against it. Palestinians were skeptical that it would ever happen. But we kept coming back to it for the simple reason that no one could answer that question. Because if you're going to give up on a two state solution, your options are kind of limited and they're all bad. They're essentially Israeli. Either annexation or some version of apartheid where Palestinians live in enclaves or a one state solution, which would be lovely if Palestinians and Israelis could agree with equal rights within one state. But nobody thinks that that is possible either. And so the absence of alternatives to a two state solution is what kept driving us, and I think still today drives people back to some version of a Palestinian state because the alternatives to it are so bad. On your point, Gideon, about Trump coming back to it as well, one is the reason that, you know, I just said everyone comes back to it unless you're willing to either roll the dice on equal rights for all people on that territory, which is, especially in current circumstances, hard to imagine how that would work. Or if you're willing to accept some version of Palestinian enclaves or even displacement, which the Israeli extreme right wants to accept. So yeah, even Trump has come back to it in some form. And just as we said earlier, that there are certain aspects of Trump that make him better placed to get some of this done for political and other reasons in the relationship with Israel, he is also clearly desperate to have a win and to get credit for this and to get a Nobel Prize. And I don't think you have to be too cynical to suggest that's driving him. But there, too, I say great, more power to him. If that's going to lead him to do what he needs to do to at least get some of these elements done, using his leverage with the Arabs, using his leverage with Netanyahu, using his leverage over the Palestinians, then, you know, good for him. He does seem motivated because you talk about him coming back to that issue, and he did get bb, I'll acknowledge that, to put in the plan that he was ruling out annexation, displacement and settlement by Jewish Israelis. So if that motivates Trump to try to get at least some of this done, we should welcome that.
- [23:12]
A
So to conclude, I mean, even if, as seems to be the theme of our discussion, it's pretty implausible that we'll ever get all 20 points implemented. Clearly would be good if the killing stopped. Do you think at this point, the best hope is just exhaustion on both sides, that it's obviously incredibly brutal for the Palestinians, Although Hamas have seemed willing to keep fighting, indeed, eager. And even the Israelis going back into Gaza City, more casualties. That war's been going on for two years now. Do you think that that's really the best hope, is that at some point the calculus tips on both sides, that they just want to stop, at least for a while?
- [23:53]
B
Yes. But as always in the Middle east or with Gaza and Israel, there's a yes. But the problem is that one side's exhaustion and willingness to let that lead to the conditions to end the war diminishes that same feeling on the other side. And that's what we've seen from the start of this as well. Whenever Hamas senses that maybe the Israelis are tired of the war exhausted, they're taking casualties. Israel becoming a prior state, much of the eyes of the world. And so then Israel starts to think, maybe we do need to cut a deal. Then Hamas looks at the 20 conditions and says, we want a little bit more here or there. We have to keep our arms or we're not going to do peaceful coexistence. And then when they do that, the Israeli side has a reason to continue the war. And that's what we've seen. I think, you know, all of us who are in office or just observing this anywhere in 2023, the idea that this would still be going on into its third year would have been an awfully depressing notion. But that has been the case so far. And unfortunately, it's been what has doomed all of the previous ceasefire deals, at least in the longer run. And I think we're seeing under Trump now exactly what we saw under Biden when he put the deal forward in May of 24. For the first time, each side tries to avoid blame and maximize what it gets in the deal. And you never get to that steady state where both say, all right, you know what? We are more or less satisfied with that. And that's not surprising. Of course, if the Israeli condition is total victory, you're not going to get a steady state with Hamas who says, all right, we're good with that. And similarly, if Hamas is really interested in remaining in power and armed and, you know, ultimately seeing the destruction of the state of Israel, it's hard to find a steady state. So, yeah, I think it's encouraging that there are serious negotiations going on. It's good to see much of the world behind most of these principles. It's not impossible to imagine hostages getting released, which would be beautiful, and at least some temporary relief and humanitarian aid going into Gaza. But we are still a pretty long way from what Trump is calling peace in the Middle East.
- [25:59]
A
Phil, thank you very much. That was Philip Gordon of the Brookings Institution ending this edition of the Rachman Review. Thanks for listening, and please join me again next week.
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