The Iranian Airstrikes and America First Foreign Policy

Summary

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Podcast Summary: Radio Free Hillsdale Hour

Episode: The Iranian Airstrikes and America First Foreign Policy
Date: November 14, 2025
Host: Scott Bertram
Guests: Dr. Mark Moyer, Dr. Jason Gerke, Dr. Tom Connor

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Episode Overview

This special episode, timed with Veterans Day, explores pivotal moments and questions in U.S. military history and foreign policy. Three segments address:

• The legacy and lessons of the Vietnam War
• America First foreign policy in the context of the Iranian airstrikes
• The significance of the Luxembourg American Cemetery

Conversations hinge on how America defines and carries out its military and strategic roles in the world, the implications for allies and adversaries, and the values that guide remembrance and sacrifice.

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Segment 1: The Vietnam War at 50 – Causes and Consequences

Guest: Dr. Mark Moyer (William P. Harris Chair of Military History, Hillsdale College)
Key Segment: [01:42]–[13:50]

Key Discussion Points

• Responsibility for the Fall of South Vietnam

  • Dr. Moyer attributes primary responsibility to Congress for withdrawing funding, though notes Nixon and Kissinger's roles, particularly Kissinger's eagerness to make diplomatic concessions ([02:10]).
  • "Primary responsibility goes to Congress because they are the ones who were consistently cutting funding... At the end, we were at a place where it looked like South Vietnam could persist with continued funding and they decided to cut it off." — Mark Moyer [02:10]
  • The Watergate scandal undermined political support and trust, compounding these decisions.

• The 1973 Peace Deal and US Withdrawal

  • Dr. Moyer argues Kissinger’s compromises went further than necessary given America’s negotiating position.
  • "Oftentimes [diplomats are] just so desperate for some sort of great deal, and you end up giving away too much." — Mark Moyer [03:32]

• Military Performance and the Role of Aid

  • South Vietnamese forces were capable but dependent on American supplies. The lack of fuel, ammunition, and bombs was decisive ([04:39]).

• Politics and Motivations

  • While opposition to the war predated Watergate, partisan motivations and trust issues after Cambodia bombings added to the withdrawal's momentum ([05:27]).

• Revisionist Perspectives

  • Dr. Moyer references a recent conference at Hillsdale featuring revisionist historians who consider the war a "noble cause" but mishandled. Videos are available via the Hillsdale College Freedom Library ([07:02]).

• Cultural Misunderstandings

  • Dr. Moyer critiques the American removal of South Vietnam’s first president, driven by misunderstanding both local context and enemy manipulation.
  • "This was actually being supported by the Communists...but they're trying to make it look like this is some kind of grassroots opposition." — Mark Moyer [08:40]

• Misjudging Friends and Enemies

  • American policymakers have repeatedly erred by assuming foreigners share U.S. values, with cautionary parallels drawn to Iraq and Afghanistan ([10:09]).

• Aftereffects of Abandonment

  • U.S. withdrawal in Vietnam encouraged communist expansion elsewhere, enabled by Soviet and Cuban support ([11:04]).

• Foreign Policy Durability

  • Moyer notes that policy achievements are vulnerable to the vagaries of domestic American politics, using Afghanistan as a recent parallel.
  • He suggests finding ways to create situations or provide assets that cannot easily be undone by subsequent administrations—such as arming allies sufficiently to ensure their autonomy ([12:20]).
  • "When you think about these deals, you do have to factor in what might happen if the other party comes in, is this sustainable?" — Mark Moyer [12:20]

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Segment 2: America First, The Iran Strike, and Current U.S. Strategy

Guest: Dr. Jason Gerke (Assistant Professor of History, Associate Director of the Center for Military History and Strategy, Hillsdale College)
Key Segment: [16:24]–[34:22]

Key Discussion Points

• Myth of America First as Isolationism

  • Dr. Gerke stresses that "America First" is often mischaracterized as isolationist, but in practice, it signals selective engagement focused on concrete national interests ([16:55]):
    • “There can be the idea that America first means that the United States should simply withdraw from its role in the world...I don’t actually think a lot of people hold that view.” — Jason Gerke [16:55]

• Principled Interest-Based Policy

  • Vice President Vance’s Naval Academy speech outlines a doctrine where the U.S. military is used for limited, tangible goals, avoiding open-ended nation-building. This reflects lessons many draw from the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
    • "Current administration...will use American military power towards military combat-oriented ends. They'll use them to defend tangible, identifiable, and...limited military interests rather than...for some kind of transformative work." — Jason Gerke [18:09]

• Reassertion of the Nation-State

  • America First emphasizes bilateral relationships and state sovereignty over global coalitions, moving away from a leadership role based on idealistic value exportation.
  • Raises questions for traditional NATO allies about U.S. reliability and predicts a more realist approach ([19:53]).

• The Iran Strike’s Consistency

  • Dr. Gerke argues the recent strike against Iran’s nuclear program fits the administration’s pattern: precise, goal-defined interventions, not blanket disengagement or limitless involvement.
    • "This president...has shown a willingness to use combat power in specific situations to bring about specific or stated ends...there's a clear limitation to the extension of American power." — Jason Gerke [22:20]

• Capable vs. Cultural Allies

  • The administration seeks alliances that tangibly enhance U.S. military power, pressing Europe to meet defense spending and readiness targets.
    • “If you have alliances that can't contribute tangible military, economic and personnel resources...you don't have alliances so much as you have obligations.” — Jason Gerke [24:14]

• Strategic Unpredictability

  • Unpredictability is a double-edged sword, deterring opponents but unsettling friends ([26:20]):
    • "Unpredictability can force a global community to pay more attention...it can also scare your friends." — Jason Gerke [26:20]

• Iran, China, and Regional Strategy

  • Weakening Iran's strategic capabilities may free U.S. resources for the Indo-Pacific and encourage regional partners to shoulder more responsibility.
  • "Arguably, decisively handling...the enduring Iranian threat...creates a context in which the U.S. is free to focus on what is the more decisive long term situation [China]." — Jason Gerke [27:37]

• Measuring Success Post-Strike

  • Key benchmarks: lasting reduction in Iran's nuclear threat, no major destabilization or regime collapse, ensuring U.S. and ally commercial interests remain unthreatened ([30:04]).

• Defining Success for America First

  • Dr. Gerke envisions a future with no major wars with China, continued safe global commerce, a secure and sober U.S. military posture, and avoidance of both overextension and retreat ([32:11]):
    • "It looks like a world in which U.S. Forces are properly funded, trained, disciplined and prepared...and does not involve the kind of permanent efforts that ultimately undermine the unity of the country." — Jason Gerke [32:11]

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Segment 3: Luxembourg American Cemetery – Remembrance and Meaning

Guest: Dr. Tom Connor (Professor Emeritus, Hillsdale College; author of "War and the Story of the American Battle Monuments Commission")
Key Segment: [36:29]–[46:57]

Key Discussion Points

• Setting the Scene: Luxembourg

  • Luxembourg is a small, affluent country between Belgium, France, and Germany, and a founding NATO and EU member ([37:24]).

• Significance of the Cemetery

  • The American cemetery is dominated by a chapel and contains over 5,000 burials, many from the Battle of the Bulge.
  • "When one comes in from the parking area, that is the first thing...the chapel...is the centerpiece...one can take in that entire panorama." — Tom Connor [38:07]

• Battle of the Bulge

  • A surprise German offensive in December 1944, leading to severe American and German losses, remembered as one of the most brutal U.S. battles ([41:25]).

• Eisenhower’s Dedication

  • Highlighting the collaborative legacy of these cemeteries, Dr. Connor reads Eisenhower’s words:
    • “These died that people might live in freedom and peace. Now they rest forever in the soil of the friendly country which so many of them helped to free from the invader.” [42:30]

• General Patton’s Resting Place

  • Patton is buried in Luxembourg, honoring his wish to lie with his troops whom he helped liberate Luxembourg ([44:01]).

• Commemorative Responsibilities

  • The land for the cemetery was granted by Luxembourg for this purpose but remains Luxembourgish soil, with security and management shared between the U.S. and host country, reflecting ongoing gratitude and cooperation ([45:20]).

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Notable Quotes & Timestamps

• "Primary responsibility goes to Congress because they are the ones who were consistently cutting funding..." — Mark Moyer [02:10]
• "I’m inclined to agree...he gave too much...we were in a position of strength...he was just so desperate." — Mark Moyer on Kissinger [03:32]
• "We thought that these people would embrace democracy and would fight for it. And we invest very heavily in these countries...and turned out not to work as we had hoped." — Mark Moyer [10:21]
• “There are very few people who say, hello, I'm an interventionist…” — Jason Gerke [16:55]
• "The current administration...will use American military power towards military combat-oriented ends....for limited military interests rather than...for some kind of transformative work." — Jason Gerke [18:09]
• "If you have alliances that...can't contribute tangible...resources...you don't have alliances so much as...obligations." — Jason Gerke [24:14]
• "Unpredictability can force a global community to pay more attention...it can also scare your friends." — Jason Gerke [26:20]
• “I join you in paying proud tribute to the men who sleep in the Luxembourg cemetery...These died that people might live in freedom and peace.” — Dwight Eisenhower (read by Tom Connor) [42:30]
• "Because Patton's Third Army had a lot to do with the liberation of Luxembourg...he wanted to rest forever with his troops." — Tom Connor [44:01]

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Episode Takeaways

• The episode offers a connected view of American military history, from the lesson-laden legacy of Vietnam, through the doctrinal debates shaping current foreign policy, to the solemn practice of remembrance.
• Both Dr. Moyer and Dr. Gerke advocate for realistic appraisals of both allies and adversaries, lessons learned painfully in Vietnam and Afghanistan and now guiding America First strategies.
• Commemoration, as discussed by Dr. Connor, underscores the ongoing bonds between liberator and liberated, and the enduring meaning of military sacrifice.

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For further research or to view referenced essays and events:

• Dr. Mark Moyer’s essay: Washington Examiner
• Dr. Jason Gerke’s essay: Real Clear Defense Article
• Hillsdale College Freedom Library: Search for videos and events on Vietnam War revisionism.

(This summary omits ad breaks, intros, and outros per instructions.)

Transcript

[Mark Moyer]

From the historic campus of Hillsdale College.

[Scott Bertram]

In Hillsdale, Michigan, where the good, the true and the beautiful are taught, nurtured and honored.

[Mark Moyer]

This is the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour.

[Scott Bertram]

Bringing the activity and education of the college to listeners across the country, even.

[Jason Gerke]

People who are arguably wrongly accused of being isolationists. Most agree that we, in fact, live in a world that involves global travel, communication, international relationship, foreign exchange. Those are all goods that I think most Americans enjoy and want to see continue. They want to see them continue in a way that is economically feasible, secure, safe and good.

[Scott Bertram]

This is your host, Scott Bertram. Welcome to the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour, part of the Hillsdale College Podcast network. That was Dr. Jason Gerke, assistant professor of history at Hillsdale College. We'll talk in depth with him later on about his recent essay, america, the Iran Strike and current US Strategy. Also joining us in this week of Veterans Day, Dr. Mark Moyer, chair of military history here at Hillsdale College. We talk more about the Vietnam War at 50. And Dr. Tom Cotter, professor emeritus of history at Hillsdale. He'll take us on a tour of Luxembourg American Cemetery. First, we're joined by Dr. Mark Boyer. He is William P. Harris, chair of military history here at Hillsdale College. Also the author of a pair of books on Vietnam, Triumph Forsaken, Triumph Regained. A third is on the way. You can find his website, markmoyer.com Mark, thanks so much for joining us.

[Mark Moyer]

Great to be with you again, Scott.

[Scott Bertram]

Talking about 50 years since the end of the Vietnam War. The U.S. pulled out in the fall of Saigon, in fact. And you wrote a piece for The Washington Examiner, 50 years on remembering the fall of Saigon. Looking back five decades later now, who would you identify as most responsible for the fall of South Vietnam? Congress, White House, someone else? Who's most responsible?

[Mark Moyer]

Yes, that's an excellent question and a complicated one and something I'm actually in the middle of researching. But I think the primary responsibility goes to Congress because they are the ones who were consistently cutting funding. And ultimately at the end, we were at a place where it looked like South Vietnam could persist with continued funding and they decided that they were going to cut it off. Now there is some responsibility also for Nixon and Kissinger. I think Kissinger more so than Nixon because Kissinger was, I think, over eager to try to pull out quickly and make concessions because he viewed himself as being this great statesman who achieved this opening with China and the Soviet Union, but wasn't really able to actually get the cooperation from China and the Soviet Union that he had hoped for But I think even without their mistakes, it's ultimately Congress pulling the plug. Now, of course, that's also somewhat related to Watergate, which is Nixon's fault as well, because that contributes to this decline in support.

[Scott Bertram]

Kissinger made a deal in 1973, pulled out U.S. troops, let North Vietnamese troops stay. Knowing what we knew at that time was that. Was that a reasonable compromise?

[Mark Moyer]

You know, a lot of people think he gave too much, and I'm. I'm inclined to agree with that position because for a long time that was a part of the US Negotiating position that we were going to insist that there be mutual withdrawal of troops. And a lot of his critics, people who worked with him, thought he had just given that away. And we were in a position of strength when this deal's being negotiated because we'd just undertaken the Christmas bombing and we could have extracted more. But he was just so desperate. And of course, this is something we see again and again with diplomats, is oftentimes they're just so desperate for some sort of great deal, and, you know, he ends up winning the Nobel Peace Prize, but, you know, you end up giving away too much.

[Scott Bertram]

Yeah. You say in this essay at the Washington examiner that South Vietnam's military was performing well even after the US Left. Do you think they could have held on if Congress hadn't cut off aid, as you mentioned earlier, was the collapse more about money, funding and supplies than the fighting ability of the South Vietnamese troops?

[Mark Moyer]

Yeah, I do think they could have hung on and they fought off this big offensive in 1972 without American ground forces. Now, there was American air power there at the time, but you don't just defeat 14 enemy divisions with air power. And they were also building their own air power. And I think the North Vietnamese were testing them at end of 1974 to see, you know, what kind of response would happen if they undertook a new offensive. And you have a combination of, you know, Nixon had promised to come to their aid, but he couldn't because of Watergate. He's gone. And then also you have this cut in US Support. The South Vietnamese don't have fuel or ammunition or bombs or the things they need to maintain their defense.

[Scott Bertram]

Do you think that American politicians and Democrats certainly, too, turned against South Vietnam partly to hurt President Nixon? What's Nixon's sort of his role in the calculus of what happened?

[Mark Moyer]

Yeah, I do think that plays a role, especially among some of the moderates who end up turning against the funding for the war. Now, the left and liberals were already opposed to the war and trying to get out long before Watergate. So it would be too simple to say this was simply because of Watergate. And, you know, some of them were already opposed to the war in 1968. And, you know, number of them actually kind of kept quiet because they were in LBJ's party. And then once Nixon comes in, they some of them become more vocal. But there is this strong opposition that that is building now. There's also a part of the problem for Nixon is also is that in 1973, it comes to light that he had misled Congress about the bombing of Cambodia. And so there's also some trust issues there.

[Scott Bertram]

Marc Boyer with us. He is William P. Harris, chair of Military history here at Hillsdale College, talking about his essay 50 Years Remembering the Fall of Saigon and should mention that just recently here on campus we had a gathering some lectures about this topic and you can find them at the Freedom Library. If you search Hillsdale College Freedom Library, you'll see the videos who spoke at the conference.

[Mark Moyer]

Yes, we had a lot of the leading historians of what you might call revisionist school of the history of the Vietnam War, which views this in, I think, essentially the same terms as Ronald Reagan, that this was a noble cause, that we actually had good reasons to fight, but we fought the war the wrong way. So we started off with James Wilbanks, who's taught it for many years at the Army Command Staff College, has written quite a few books, actually fought in the war, including at the Battle of an Loc in 1972. We had Jay Veith, who has written the best book on the fall of Saigon called Black April. We had John Del Vecchio, who is one of the leading novelists of the war but was also a veteran. He wrote the 13th Valley and carry Me Home and For the Sake of All Living Things. And then we had a panel with several people, including Professor Bill McClay of Hillsdale and Andrew Finlayson, another veteran. We had the author of the Politically Incorrect Guide to the Vietnam War, Phil Jennings. I also spoke there and gave gave a talk as well. But as you said, it was a great event all day event in and people can see it now online.

[Scott Bertram]

Yep. Search Hillsdale College Freedom Library. You'll see that pop up and can see all the videos from that conference. The United States helped remove South Vietnam's first president based partly on reporting from journalists like David Halberstam. As you point out in this essay at the examiner. Was that a mistake that was driven somewhat by cultural misunderstanding?

[Mark Moyer]

Yes, it was very much driven by Cultural misunderstanding. What you had was internal opposition to the South Vietnamese government. And one thing Americans, many of them didn't understand at the time, that this was actually being supported by the Communists, who are mortal enemies. But they're trying to make it look like this is some kind of grassroots opposition. And so that's part of the misunderstanding. And then partly, too, the Americans thought that you should not interfere with these kind of demonstrations against the government, no matter how flagrant they are. But clearly, in the Vietnamese context, just about everyone recognized that at some point the government cannot simply tolerate these massive insults and challenges to its authority. And so they do break up the demonstration. Now, they're not gunning down people. This is in Tiananmen Square. But in fact, the South Vietnamese generals actually support this. But some Americans think, well, this is not how you would do things in America. We don't like this. And then we, to make matters even worse, we end up actually supporting a coup by the generals who backed this idea because we got wrong. At least some people didn't understand who was supporting this. It was really a terrible debacle. And really, I think the most important mistake of the war, because I think the war, I mean, we maybe don't ever have American troops going into Vietnam if Diem is not overthrown.

[Scott Bertram]

You suggest to the essay, too, that Americans often can misjudge foreign allies and enemies because we assume everyone thinks like us. What are the risks of that kind of thinking?

[Mark Moyer]

Yeah, well, it results in bad policies, and we've seen it again in Iraq and Afghanistan. We thought that these people would embrace democracy and would fight for it. And we invest very heavily in these countries and their governments and turned out not to work as we had hoped. And part of what's great about America is we have these universal ideals and those ideas have spread to other countries, which is in general a positive thing. But reality is they haven't spread to some places. And if we try to just assume they have, we're going to find ourselves making more mistakes and getting into more trouble.

[Scott Bertram]

You also argue that abandoning Vietnam encouraged the Soviet Union to spread communism elsewhere. Were those revolutions likely to happen anyway, or do you really see them as a direct result of our actions?

[Mark Moyer]

Well, in many of the cases in the post the late 70s, there have been communist rebellions going on in these places, but a lot of them don't have the strength on their own to make a difference. And so they need weapons, they need advisors. When you have Cuban advisors and Soviet advisors going all over the place in the late 70s, and of course, even in Vietnam, there never would have been a serious threat to US Interests if China and the Soviet Union hadn't been sending in huge amounts of aid. So they were really key enablers in most of these places.

[Scott Bertram]

Finally, in this essay at the Washington examiner, you say that peace deals are only workable if they're protected from US Political changes, that there's some guarantee that they'll actually be carried out. Is that possible? Given our politics, our democracy, how can any one president make sure the next one doesn't undo those foreign policy achievements?

[Mark Moyer]

Yeah, well, there is. And certainly in our system of government, you're always going to have changes in parties. And so we've unfortunately seen that our country's been fickle. And I think we've saw that again in Afghanistan, where you saw the Biden administration precipitously ending this long period of involvement. There are some things that may even be beyond your control. But I think when you think about these deals, you do have to factor in what might happen if the other party comes in, is this sustainable? And if you think they're not going to sustain it, maybe you make a different choice or maybe you try to make changes to the situation that, you know, can't be rolled back. You know. So one example currently you could argue, how are we going to have an enduring policy in Ukraine? Maybe we give them a lot more weaponry, maybe even nuclear weapons, so that even if the next administration is not as supportive, they've already got these assets that will ensure they can protect themselves.

[Scott Bertram]

Marc Boyer is William P. Harris Chair of Military history here at Hillsdale College, also the author of Triumph Forsaken and Triumph Regained. You can read this essay at the Washington Examiner's website, 50 years on remembering the Fall of Saigon. And mark's website is markmoyer.com Mark, thanks so much for joining us here on the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour.

[Mark Moyer]

Thanks for having me, Scott.

[Scott Bertram]

Up next, Dr. Jason Gerke from Hillsdale's history department talks about his recent essay on America first, the Iran strike and current US Strategy. I'm Scott Bertram. This is the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour. You know the Robertson family from the hit TV show Duck Dynasty. Now Hillsdale College offers you the unique opportunity to learn alongside the Robertsons as they dive deep into Hillsdale's online course, the Genesis Story. Every Friday on the Unashamed podcast, the Robertsons will share their insights and perspectives, learning from Hillsdale professor of English Justin Jackson. Take a trip down south to Louisiana for this one of a kind learning experience we call Unashamed Academy, visit unashamedforhillsdale.com and enroll today. That's Unashamed. F O R hillsdale.com to experience the Genesis story of Alongside the Robertsons.

[Larry Arne]

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[Scott Bertram]

Welcome back to the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour. I'm Scott Bertrand. Be sure to check out the Hillsdale College Podcast Network at Podcast Hillsdale. Edu for older episodes of this program, plus other great Hillsdale College audio. We're joined by Dr. Jason Gerke. He is assistant professor of history here at Hillsdale College, also associate director of the center for Military history and strategy. Dr. Girke, thanks for joining us.

[Jason Gerke]

Thanks so much for having me. Scott.

[Scott Bertram]

Talking today about an essay you wrote over at Real Clear Defense. It's titled America the Iran strike and current U.S. strategy. You open the essay by saying that the critics of foreign policy of President Trump equate America first with isolationism. Why do you think that misconception persists? How do you distinguish America first in that policy from perhaps isolationism or traditional interventionism?

[Jason Gerke]

Yeah, Scott, thanks. That's a really important question. We have to start really by defining terms. So the terms isolationism and interventionism, those are mainly terms that people use to describe the positions they dislike. There are very few people who say, hello, I'm an interventionist, for example. But those ideas really go back arguably to the early 20th century, when there was resistance to America's involvement in World War II. And the term America first came in part to critique that intervention or that involvement. And you can see how these terms can become changed around here. But there can be the idea then that America first means that the United States should simply withdraw from its role in the world, not have any kind of international or diplomatic relationships, should somehow take safe haven behind 3,500 miles of ocean and plan that it will somehow be fine. I don't actually think a lot of people hold that view, and I don't think it's consistent with the kind of policy we're seeing presently from the administration or frankly articulated by the Vice President in some of his major public statements.

[Scott Bertram]

Vice President Vance's Naval Academy address looms large in your essay. What do you see as the key principles that he laid out and how do they transfer into actual policy choices?

[Jason Gerke]

Yeah, I think Vice President's Naval Academy address has been, is a really important statement and maybe one that was underplayed even in the media at the time. If you read that address, you see the Vice President referring again and again to something like a principled interest based foreign policy. The point he's making to the grads is that the current administration, and hopefully future administrations in his view, will use American military power towards military combat oriented ends. They'll use them to defend tangible, identifiable. And I think the key thought here is limited military interests rather than use the military as an instrument for some kind of transformative work. In that address, it seems fair to say that you hear the Vice President echoing what have been for many, and this is still a contested question, but nonetheless for many, the lesson of the recent war in Afghanistan and arguably of the Vietnam War, namely that when the US Military is drawn into lengthy nation building operations that becomes bogged down. We turn into a quagmire and see something like the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. Whether or not that's the right lesson to learn from Afghanistan is still very much a debate. It's ongoing in the literature, but nonetheless, I think the administration is taking that lesson and attempting to signal a difference.

[Scott Bertram]

Dr. Jason Gerke is with us. His essay over at realcleardefense.com, america, the Iran strike and current US strategy. You talk about the reassertion of the nation state as the primary actor in geopolitics. Why is that so central to America First? And how might it change the way the US Deals with both allies and rivals?

[Jason Gerke]

Yeah, well, I think that's an implication of the language you see in the Naval Academy address as well as some of the moves the administration has made. What am I drawing a distinction with? There? Again, by one account, as the leader of a large coalition of alliances the United States presumptively has worked through and in the interest of that broad coalition or alliance, as opposed to working either with individual countries or working unilaterally, although often it has done things that look effectively unilateral or again, not interacting with powers globally that for whatever reason have been identified as rogue or adversarial. It seems to me that we've seen in both Administrations under the current president, a willingness to act on our own discretion, irrespective of criticism, particularly from Europe, I think, and secondly, even to engage with countries, say like Iran or to some extent Saudi Arabia, with whom the United States has had a long relationship towards limited in particular policies. So the implication there is. Well, there's a couple of questions. On the one hand, the question is, does this mean that the United States is in fact withdrawing from its identity in the 20th century, in the post World War II, Cold War era, as the leader of the NATO European alliance, and to some extent then ceding itself its independence or autonomy to that coalition built body of interest? That's one thing. The other question is, does this mean that the United States is moving away from a kind of foreign policy which aims explicitly to secure or extend American values? If you begin to use the language of realism, and to some extent the Naval Academy address does that as well, it raises questions about how both our NATO allies, our European partners, but also countries around the world, should predict or expect US Actions.

[Scott Bertram]

Let's talk about the Iran strike, this attempt to disable or destroy the nuclear program in that country. Some would say it's a, it's a break from restraint. You say it's consistent with the administration's record. Can you walk us through why you see it fitting into this America first framework?

[Jason Gerke]

Again, by one account, if America first means withdrawing from the 20th century, or what some see as the 20th century tendency to become involved in wars around the world, from Truman to the Vietnam War to again to Afghanistan, arguably, if America first means withdrawing military action globally in order to shift American focus, American interest, American resources, then, then something like the Iran strike, something like the strike against the Houthis, looks like the opposite of that. It looks like sending US Personnel, weapons and equipment into foreign places. On the other hand, this president in both administrations has shown a willingness to use combat power in specific situations to bring about specific or stated ends. There are some who criticize that as well, some who say, well, that action is really using American power to beat up those people who, you know, can't retaliate in really significant ways. There's always some other voice in the conversation. Nonetheless, you see from perhaps what listeners will remember best from the Soleimani strike, for example, up until even this most recent strike, a consistent pattern of making a claim, making a threat, acting on that threat if the outcome that's desired is not, if you don't get the response that the President is looking for. So in that sense you have on the one hand a clear limitation to the extension of American power. And on the other hand, I don't think we've ever heard a statement from the administration that suggests that American military power is off the table as an instrument of foreign policy.

[Scott Bertram]

You write in the piece that the administration wants capable rather than merely cultural allies. How might we think about what makes an ally capable and perhaps which nations fit that description today?

[Jason Gerke]

Yeah, well, what I was getting at there is the point of diplomatic and military alliances is that they extend your global power. They augment what you can do on your own and provide critical resources. If you have alliances that in fact can't contribute tangible military, economic and personnel resources to some critical effort, then you don't have alliances so much as you have obligations. A famous case of this, arguably, is Hannibal on the Italian peninsula in the third century in the Punicorus. So I think there's a real effort to. In fact, this is an uncontested point, but there's a strong effort on the part of the administration to move our European allies, in particular, the NATO alliance in particular, to in fact be ready and capable of fielding lethal, formidable combat forces. That involves increasing their commitments to defense spending, increasing the size of their militaries, increasing their combat readiness. The distinction there, then, between capable and cultural is for me simply that broadly, we have economic relationships with the European Union and with the countries that are in NATO. We've had a kind of public, even moral, voice since the end of World War II. But if it comes to the point that adversaries think that that's mainly all talk, then that alliance is a paper tiger. It seems fair to describe the administration's efforts as attempting to rejuvenate that, even if through tough love, or at least tough rhetoric in a number of places.

[Scott Bertram]

Talking with Dr. Jason Gerke, Assistant professor of history here at Hillsdale, also author of the [e-mail], america first, the Iran strike, and current US strategy. There is a sense sometimes of unpredictability in American actions. Is that a feature? Are there features that we gain from that unpredictability?

[Jason Gerke]

Like always, it's a debated point. Arguably, yes. If you're. If you're unpredictable, then your adversary can't presume that his own actions are safe, can't presume that he knows exactly what you're going to do. Unpredictability can force a global community to pay more attention on the one hand, and can open up your range of options for different kinds of action. So that's helpful. Potentially, it can Also scare your friends. I was looking for a nicer word than scare, but it can raise questions. And I think we have seen European allies to some extent raising these questions. But does this new look, if you call it that way, does this mean that the US is with us or not? Can we in fact no longer rely upon this sort of bedrock US ally relationship? By definition, unpredictable will provoke some of those questions. And the long term effects of any given policy really depend on its execution over time.

[Scott Bertram]

Let's return to the Iran strike for a bit. You connect in this piece the Iran strike to a larger strategic goal of deterring China. How does weakening Iran in this way support the US in that region?

[Jason Gerke]

Right. Well, it may or may not. That should be fair. But if you look at the consistent public statements of the administration, and really this is now across administrations for the last, say, decade, there's a recognition of something called the return to great power competition and a recognition that the People's Republic of China is sometimes you'll hear it called our pacing threat. Which is to say if there's a true near peer rival, the defense policy, defense intellectual community uniformly regards that as China. One of the concerns that you see then is the nation's readiness to deter or meet China in conflict. And that is really a question of resources and focus. It is very difficult to manage a conflict on the continent of Europe, a conflict in the Middle east, we still had it going. A conflict in Afghanistan, the global counterterrorism threat that remains concern on the high seas, and our our long term policy of strategic ambiguity with Taiwan and thus also China, so potentially decisively handling the endure. Well since 1979, the enduring Iranian threat of nuclear power, of closing the Strait of Hormuz. Settling the situation in the Middle east, particularly with the Iran threat, arguably creates a context in which the United States is free to focus on what is the more decisive long term situation. Of course that depends on the ultimate outcome of the Iran strike. But there does seem something consistent from a strategic level here. On the one hand, pushing the Europeans to be able to handle Europe, helping to set conditions that allow effectively Israel to police the Middle east and thus allowing freeing US Forces to be focused on the kind of long term investment and force transformation that is necessary to compete with China in the Indo Pacific.

[Scott Bertram]

In the time leading up to the strike in Iran, we heard some predictions, if you do this, Iran will do X, Russia will do Y, China will do this. It seems many of those predictions have not come true in these months since the strike. What else might we look for in the coming months to judge whether this strike advanced the strategic goals of the country.

[Jason Gerke]

I guess there are a few things. One will be the ongoing assessment of the degree to which the strikes were successful. Certainly we know to some extent they were successful, but there was at the time, and there will continue to be an argument about whether or not there are other enrichment facilities or other stockpiles of nuclear material. I'm not sure we actually know the answer to that question. But one major measure will be the degree to which Iran's ability to threaten the world with a nuclear weapon or nearly having a nuclear weapon is no longer an effective instrument of, of their course of policy. That'll be a major thing. It was the primary objective of the strike. And removing the possibility of a nuclear Iran, at least for some range of time, is of strategic value. There was talk, I think, at the time, mainly hopeful and perhaps misguided, of hope for regime change in Iran as a result. I don't think we've seen that, and I think we have enough experience now to know that regime change is always be careful what you wish for. Regime change brings its own kinds of problems, whether you're talking about Syria or you're talking about Iraq or Afghanistan. So I'm not certain that if we were to see a regime change scenario that I don't think anyone thinks that's happening now, if that would be a good or not. But in the longer term, then, the inability of the regime in Iran to threaten US and allied commercial interests, the inability of them to threaten nuclear strike, whether it's against the United States or near allies, those are the kinds of things that will, that will indicate in the longer term if there's been an enduring effect from that event.

[Scott Bertram]

Let's close with this with Dr. Jason Gerke from Hillsdale's History Department. This essay over@realclear defense.com as we sort of synthesize this for an America first foreign policy that we outlined earlier, what does success look like for that kind of foreign policy 10 or 20 years from now?

[Jason Gerke]

10 or 20 years from now? I think it looks like a major military conflict with China over Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait does not happen. It looks like the security of commercial shipping interests, no fear of commercial vessels being destroyed or raided or hijacked. It looks like an end to the war in Ukraine, which preserves innocent life and leads to the continuation of a stable order of friendship in that part of the world. It looks like a world in which US Forces are properly funded, trained, disciplined and prepared to execute actions that are in the interest of the United States and its allies, and on the other hand, does not involve the kind of permanent efforts that ultimately undermine the unity of the country behind its own military actions or SAP its domestic and economic resources. So in that sense, I'd point out that the soul of the kind of limited or particular use of military power that I think the administration is signaling is nonetheless also does not involve a definition of success that involves the country simply withdrawn entirely from the world. I think most agree, even people who are arguably wrongly accused of being isolationists, most agree that we in fact live in a world that involves global travel, communication, international relationship, foreign exchange. Those are all goods that I think most Americans enjoy and want to see continue. They want to see them continue in a way that is economically feasible, secure, safe and good.

[Scott Bertram]

Dr. Jason Gerke is Assistant professor of History at Hillsdale College, also Associate Director of the center for Military History and Strategy. You can read his [e-mail], america, the Iran Strike and Current U.S. strategy. Dr. Gurke, thanks for joining us here on the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour.

[Jason Gerke]

God, thanks so much for having me.

[Scott Bertram]

Up next, Dr. Tom Connor, Professor Emeritus of history here at Hillsdale College, will take us on a tour of Luxembourg American Cemetery. I'm Scott Bertram. This is the Radio Free Hillsdale Power. You know the Robertson family from the hit TV show Duck Dynasty. Now Hillsdale College offers you the unique opportunity to learn alongside the Robertsons as they dive deep into Hillsdale's online course, the Genesis Story. Every Friday on the Unashamed podcast, the Robertsons will share their insights and perspectives, learning from Hillsdale professor of English Justin Jackson. Take a trip down south to Louisiana for this one of a kind learning experience we call Unashamed Academy. Visit unashamedforhillsdale.com and enroll today. That's Unashamed. F O R hillsdale.com to experience the Genesis Store story alongside the Robertsons.

[Larry Arne]

Great books, great people, great ideas. Learning about these things is critical to being a well educated human being and we can help with the Hillsdale Dialogues. Each week, Hillsdale College President Larry Arne joins radio veteran Hugh Hewitt to discuss topics of enduring relevance. And from time to time, they also talk about current events, but always with an eye toward more fundamental truths. And they want you to tune in to a conversation like no other. The Hillsdale Dialogues are posted every Monday on the Hillsdale College Podcast Network at podcast hillsdale.edu. that's podcast hillsdale Edu or listen via Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube or wherever you find your audio.

[Scott Bertram]

Welcome back to the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour. I'm Scott Bertram. Be sure to check us out on X. Follow for updated show and guest information. We're Hillsdale Radio and the podcast Network. We're joined by Dr. Tom Connor, former professor of history at Hillsdale College and now professor emeritus, also author of War and the Story of the American battle monuments commission. Dr. Connor, thanks for joining us.

[Tom Cotter]

Thanks for having me, Scott.

[Scott Bertram]

Been spending this series taking a look at a number of the American cemeteries in Europe and some of the stories that can be found in War and Remembrance telling them here. We tackle Luxembourg American cemetery today. Before really get into it, tell people where Luxembourg is. It's not one of the more prominent European countries. It's smaller than most. Where's Luxembourg?

[Tom Cotter]

Yeah, indeed. It is a very small country. It's kind of nestled in between Belgium and France and Germany. And Holland is very close too. So it's a grand duchy. The head of state is either a grand duke or a grand duchess and it's got a parliamentary system as well as one of the charter members of NATO and also the European Union. So it's a significant country for being as small as it is. It's one of the most affluent countries in Europe to this day as well.

[Scott Bertram]

So if you visit Luxembourg American Cemetery, you would probably first see this very impressive memorial chapel, very detailed. What would you see there?

[Tom Cotter]

Yes, when one comes in from the parking area, that is the first thing the chapel rests. It's centerpiece of of a relatively open area that is above in elevation, the actual graves area. But the chapel's more than 50ft high and it's got a very prominent sculpture, the angel of Death, angel of Mercy. And that actually is on the facade that faces the graves area. And there are panels explaining a little bit about the cemetery and the other cemeteries that can be seen in Europe and around the world. But then the graves area opens up. There are over 5,000 burials in that cemetery. And from that landing in front of the chapel, one can take in that entire panorama.

[Scott Bertram]

Many buried here at Luxembourg lost their lives in the Battle of the Bulge, which I think just last year recently was the civety fifth anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge. Briefly go on on this for a while. The significance of the Battle of the Bulge.

[Tom Cotter]

Well, it's known as the Battle of the Bulge to Americans because what happened was in the middle of December 1944. Those who know the timeline of World War II in Europe know that that's just six months before VE Day. Before the war was wrapped up. But the Germans. Adolf Hitler read that it was a desperation move on his part, but he launched a counterattack from essentially the other side of the German border through the Ardennes forest. And his troops were aiming at the very important port of Antwerp up in Belgium. And if the Germans had actually gotten there, they would have driven a wedge between the British forces, who were farther north, and the Americans, who were farther south. The front was moving from west to east toward Germany. And Dwight Eisenhower, of course, was the supreme commander. His concept was to advance upon Germany in a unified front. And what the Germans were trying to do was drive a wedge between them. All the Germans were able to produce was a bulge. They never got all the way to Antwerp, but they produced a bulge because initially, due to weather largely, and surprise as well, they caught the Americans back on their heels. And for the first week or so of the battle, the Germans pretty much had their way. But when the weather cleared. The movie Patton tells this story really quite well and quite accurately. When the weather cleared and Patton moved troops up from about 50 or 60 miles south in a most amazing winter march, the Americans and the British eventually began hammering away at this bulge. And it took them six weeks to restore the line to what it had been. And in the meantime, the Germans had lost about a quarter of their available strength in the west, which they could never replace. And the Americans had suffered the second bloodiest battle in American history.

[Scott Bertram]

And not that any part of the war or any war is to be envied, but this in particular, this was brutal fighting in this battle. Yeah.

[Tom Cotter]

Yes, absolutely. Largely because we were surprised we didn't have winter gear for our troops. We were just throwing troops at those of you of your listeners who know the story of Easy Company, Band of Brothers. They were airborne troops, but they were available, so they were thrown into that battle. But they didn't have heavy equipment, they didn't have heavy winter gear, and it was brutally cold, and the terrain was very rugged, and the Germans were in fighting spirit. So, no, it was a pretty awful place to be.

[Scott Bertram]

Dr. Tom Connor with us here on the radio Free Hills Dillauer talking about Luxembourg American Cemetery. There's a quote from Eisenhower featured here about the sacrifice of military members. What is that quote?

[Tom Cotter]

I think I might have it here. Ike sent a message to. I don't know whether it's the same thing, Scott, but this was a standout quote from Eisenhower that I found. The cemetery was dedicated on the 4th of July, 1960. Dwight Eisenhower is in the White House then. But he did not travel to the dedication, but he said this. He said, I join you in paying proud tribute to the men who sleep in the Luxembourg cemetery, our comrades in arms in the crusade against tyranny. These died that people might live in freedom and peace. Now they rest forever in the soil of the friendly country which so many of them helped to free from the invader. I thought there are a number of points in that quote that really encapsulate what the American effort in World War II was all about. And also one of the principles behind the ongoing act of commemoration that the American Battle Monuments Commission wages, namely that the cemeteries are located in friendly countries. And every day that passes, one is reminded of the collaboration, the ongoing friendship between the United States and the host countries, most of which the American forces, of course, liberated during the Second World War.

[Scott Bertram]

Now, General Patton is buried here at Luxembourg American Cemetery.

[Tom Cotter]

Why?

[Scott Bertram]

Why Luxembourg?

[Tom Cotter]

Because Patton's Third army had a lot to do with the liberation of Luxembourg. In fact, it's credited by the historians and also by the citizens of Luxembourg themselves. Patton's Third army was their liberators, and Patton died. It's really interesting. It was 22 December 1944 that Patton launched his his strike at one of the bases of the bulge that the Germans had created with their attack. And a year later, he died on that same day, died from a broken neck that he'd experienced in a traffic accident collision in Germany. He was buried in the cemetery on Christmas Eve 1945, and to be buried there answered his wish to lie with his troops. If anything happened to him, he said he wanted to rest forever with his troops.

[Scott Bertram]

Dr. Tom Connor, somewhat of a more general question, but you had alluded to this, how the American Battle Monuments Commission is able to run these cemeteries at these various countries. It's a cooperation. So the American Battle Monuments Commission ends up the caretakers, but it's not American soil, right?

[Tom Cotter]

That's correct, Scott. And it's interesting in the particular story behind the Luxembourg cemetery, the government of Luxembourg, reflecting the gratitude that the people of Luxembourg felt toward the Americans for being their liberators, offered a grant of the ground which the cemetery currently occupies to the American government as an outright gift. But we turned it down as such, because the actual status, the ground is that the government of Luxembourg has ceded that ground to us for the express purpose of maintaining a military cemetery. But the soil, the ground is not considered American soil. And that was the desire of our government because we did not want to have to deal with the principle of extraterritoriality we didn't want asylum seekers coming to cemeteries, you know, seeking eventual repatriation or movement to the United States. And we also didn't want to have unique responsibility for security. So securing these grounds is a cooperative effort, actually, between local officials and the Americans.

[Scott Bertram]

Dr. Tom Kotter, professor emeritus at Hillsdale College and author of War and the Story of the American battle monuments commission. Dr. Connor, thanks for joining us here on the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour.

[Tom Cotter]

Pleasure, Scott. Thank you.

[Scott Bertram]

That will wrap up this edition of the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour. Our thanks to Dr. Mark Moyer, William P. Harris, chair of military history here at Hillsdale Dr. Jason Gerke, Assistant professor of history at Hillsdale, and and Dr. Tom Connor, professor emeritus of history at Hillsdale College, on this Veterans Day themed episode of the program. Remember, you can hear new episodes every week on this station. You also can find extended versions of some of our interviews or listen anytime to the podcast. Find it at Podcast Hillsdale Edu or wherever you get your audio. Until next week, I'm Steve Scott Bertram, and this has been the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour.

[Larry Arne]

Sam.