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The Realignment
559 | Saagar Enjeti: What's Next for America and Iran?
01:02:05
Back from paternity leave, Saagar Enjeti returns to The Realignment. Marshall and Saagar discuss the aftermath of U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iran's nuclear program, how the operation compares to previous interventions, why the non-interventionist MAGA faction lost to interventionists, why alternative media's policy influence relative to its popularity was overstated, and the future of nuclear non-proliferation.
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- [00:00]
A
Marshall and Sagar here, welcome back to the realignment. This is a big episode because a lot of folks been writing in asking for us to do a real deep dive on everything with the Iran, the United States and of course Israel. But they also wanted the broader perspective that you and I specialize in. This is also the realignments return to YouTube. Me coming back from my extended paternity leave from posting on the platform. But also Sagar, you are recently back from paternity leave. So at some point we'll have to do a culture only dad's episode for the two of us now that we are fathers.
- [00:37]
B
I like it.
- [00:38]
A
Yeah, but we are going to go into the things that we do not like, that being international conflict. So as I was putting together this show, I wanted to ask you a first question, which is what does this situation feel like? I've got five different examples that listeners may or may not be aware of and can really ground our thoughts. So number one, 1981 Israel launches airstrikes on Iraq's nuclear reactor during the Iran Iraq War. 2, 1991 Desert Storm 3, the Desert Fox operation where the US struck the remnants of the Iraqi weapons programs because they were violating the post desert war sanctions policy. Four, 2003, we invade Iraq. Five, we intervene in the Libyan civil war. So maybe this is like of those situations. But to situate listeners, how should they think about these examples?
- [01:35]
B
See, it's I'm having a really tough time because we have the retrospective and we're just living through it because I actually see a scenario where all of those are possible and that's what I really encourage people to do. One of the worst things about social media is about declaring finality and really like encouraging people to draw not just an instant take. Because I actually don't have any problem with instant takes. I like first drafts of history. What I really don't like is the declaration of Victory. And in all of those scenarios, what we should have learned. And actually many of the ones that you just outlined, they stack on top of each other. So I mean people know that I really love the First World War. My favorite books on the First World War, they don't start in 1914. They start. It honestly depends. Some of them start in 1876, some of them start in 1900. Some of them go all the way back to the Treaty of Western Failure. Right? And then we can go and we can cherry pick like from various different turning points. My only point is that, you know, people who are asking for an analogy of where we are Right now. And I think it's probably worth saying you and I are recording the day that the ceasefire has effectively gone into place, but we have no way of knowing the reality of this ceasefire and all of those things. And I actually listed out, I put a tweet out a couple of days ago where I was like, hey, like just so everybody knows, like Middle Eastern intervention, it takes a while to know whether it's gone well or not. Like, you know, the shortest timeline that I could think in terms of post Iraq, a Middle east intervention where we could definitively be like oh man, like things have really gone to that was Libya. It took, I mean Marshall, do you remember Libya lasting seven months? I honestly don't. I, I truly like it when you ask me. I'm like, yeah, we started bombing and Gaddaf. I went back and I was going through the timeline. I'm like man, that took a while. Like that was a long ass US military operation. So I just had. I really don't think we can draw a fulsome conclusion. And we could say it could turn out like any of those situations. You really won't know without the fulsome nature of time. And I know that's a cop out, but I mean that's just reality when we're looking at these things.
- [03:54]
A
Yeah. And I think the way that we could reframe the question then is what of these five scenarios does the Trump administration want this to look like? Yeah, I would say they want this to look like 1981 when the Israelis struck the Iraqi nuclear program set it back permanently. Now we didn't realize how set it back it was. And obviously part of what goes wrong in terms of these stacking up on each other, like you said, was that we did not realize the degree to which when you combined in 1991 the Desert Storm war with the airstrike on their nuclear program, you really see that they had no capacity to do this moving forward. So not realizing that is one of the crucial intelligence and political failures of the 21st century. And I'm going to make a more of a certain bet that even in the year 2099 our great grandkids will think and learn about that type of issue. But for 1981 being the case, the Trump administration almost said Bush administration, which gets into a topic we'll get into, they want this to be 1981 because 1981 happens. It's risky, it's daring and the program's knocked out. There isn't a broader regional conflict. Iraq effectively takes it lying down. They obviously are in the middle of the Iran Iraq war. So they had other things going on beyond just starting a war of Israel. But it was a singular event that we could conceive it as such. The critical problem here, and this is why, to your point, this all stacks up, is 1990, 1981, then we have 91, then we have Desert Fox, then we have the Iraq war. The underlying issue driving all those interventions was the fact that Iraq was a regional serious power that had incredibly dangerous and negative relations with the other countries in the region. So Iraq was a aggressive power. They invade Kuwait, they're fighting a war of Iran, they're launching Scud missiles at Israel. In 1991 during Desert Storm, the whole region broadly agreed that Iraq was a problem problem. So what we could take from the 1981 example is they did damage and severely set back the nuclear program, but they did not resolve the underlying issue. Hence, the next 20 years are all about continued intervention. So.
- [06:00]
B
Can we pause there for a second?
- [06:02]
A
Yeah, let's do that.
- [06:03]
B
So, Zoomers, that's how we got to regime change. And do you see how logical that case that you just made was? Look, we did this and we did this, and it's just been a problem. From 1981 onwards, Saddam is the source of our. And so I think that's a very good point. And part of the reason why saying that this is a victory is preposterous. Like, and this is. I've never felt myself sympathizing or almost reiterating neoconservative talking points, because if you look at the current situation, again, we can only analyze from where we are right now. If you look at the current situation where the United States, by its own. By its own admission, used diplomatic negotiations as a ruse for Israeli military action, you have the United States military, which took out at least some Iranian nuclear facilities. The United States government, our vice president, has admitted on camera that we did not remove their uranium stockpile. We also have the regime in power. Now, the neoconservative talking point. Since the jcpoa, the Iranian nuclear deal under President Obama has been what the Iranians use negotiations as a stalling tactic to produce more ballistic missiles to enrich their economy, strengthen regime, and secretly pursue a nuclear weapon. I would argue all four of those have never actually been more relevant than the very day that you and I are talking under the preservation of the Iranian regime, under a cataclysmic event for the Iranian security doctrine, under a scenario where if you're Iran and you trust the United States, like, I'm sorry, you're just, you're literally an idiot. Like, I, I, I really, I have. You deserve to be killed by Mossad. Is at this point, if, if you're trusting the US government for, in its negotiation power. And I look at all of this and I think that the strategic options, which have been narrow, again, if I'm putting myself in the head of an IRGC general, my strategic option is, yeah, oh, yeah, we'll talk all day long. We have a ceasefire now with Israel. By the way, Israel almost did us a favor by showing the number of mod agents that we have. We have to dramatically restrict command and control, redo, rebuild our entire operation from bottom to top. I don't know if you saw this. The Iranian parliament actually passed a law which expanded the espionage hunting powers of the IRGC just yesterday of the IRGC and others. So they're going to, I mean, the regime is about to crack down probably harder than ever before. And of course they're going to use that against dissidents as well. And every serious arms control person who I follow, and these people are not partisan. I follow them for a decade. I genuinely trust their judgment. I follow them on dprk, on Iran and others, again, nonpartisan, are like, yeah, they've got about three to five years and they could get to a bomb just with generally what is available to them in terms of the amount of rich uranium, the secret facilities. They've already paused their agreement with the iaea. I genuinely look at the situation and I think it is exactly like you were saying. I would just put it as one of those check marks within the box of what eventually winds up in O3. This is going to be called cope, and that's fine. But, you know, I just know enough to reiterate the same thing that you just said, which is at the heart of it. The Saddam regime was like the nexus of all of those things. I think the Iranian regime, its nuclear ambitions remain both intact. And frankly, from their point of view, it's never been more rational than to continue on the path to what ostensibly led to this military action in the first place. And there's a lot of out there about, oh, we destroyed, obliterated the program and this, this and that. But I mean, look, ask the Israelis, like, they're, frankly, one thing I appreciate about Israel is they're actually very honest. And they're like, yeah, no, they're like, you know, Bibi says we accomplished the war aims and all that, but the real serious analysts are like, guys, like this is just another step. Like now they're contemplating future strategy should they continue to, quote, mow the lawn in Iran. You know, all of that just means continued action because at the heart of it, Iran's regional ambitions, the Iranian regime itself juxtaposed versus Israel its own ambitions for basically to be the rival power to Saudi Arabia, who they've strategically calculated they can deal with. They need Iran to be taken out of the picture. So all of the underlying stuff remains completely. Will the ceasefire last five years? Honestly, maybe it's theoretically possible, you know, under the Trump administration. But again, I just think we're exactly like somewhere within that timeline where I think it's pretty easy to have made a case in 81, hey, we've solved the Iraqi nuclear question forever. And we can just look back after 20 years later and just be like, obviously that was preposterous.
- [11:01]
A
Well, to be fair, we actually did over the course of that, but yeah, solve the Iraqi nuclear program issue. We just made some really bad decisions in 2003. Well, there are two dates that I didn't mention that need to come up in this timeline we set up here. So 2004, that is when North Korea develops a nuclear weapons program. North Korea is listed among the axis of evil in the famous speech that George W. Bush gave after 9 11. And the obvious takeaway, if you are North Korean, this speaks to like the incentives for nuclear proliferation. That's something that people really have to think about. They get a nuclear weapon no one is talking about.
- [11:39]
B
So I have a good tip.
- [11:40]
A
And to be fair, there never was a world where the United States was going to invade North Korea. The fact that Seoul is so close, the fact that North Korea has such a strong military meant that that wasn't quite on the table. In the same way there was no, there was never going to be an equivalent of the Iraq war for North Korea, but just from a pure regime, an elite class security perspective. The nuclear weapon, which they don't even have to threaten to use, just having it is so huge. And then number two, the other, and I don't actually know the actual date for this, so can look this up, but Libya, famously after 2003, gives up their weapons program because a message has been sent because Libya was a terrorist state. Like this is where we all should, I think anti intervention, this should be clearer about this reality. Iran is a hostile actor relative to like the United States and the broader west for over 40 to 50 years. This is just like an unironically true reality. The same thing Is true of Libya. Libya was a terrorist state that engaged in all sorts of violence, in my.
- [12:39]
B
Opinion, more than Iran. I'll say it just because, as you know, Gaddafi, I mean, Gaddafi's government literally blew up an airplane. Okay. Like it wasn't some Taliban, like, oh, they let bin Laden stay here. He was like, hey, build a bomb and blow. What was it? Pan Am 103. They literally blew up an airplane. And then, yeah, over the. Over Lockerbie, I think it was in Scotland. They also literally hosted like terrorist training camps in the desert sponsored and protected by Gaddafi. And not like terror, like Hezbollah camps. That. It's complicated. Okay, can we at least, whether you agree it's a regional thing, like people who literally wanted to go to the United States and kill Americans on American soil. Like it was almost like a 911 style wet dream, but in the 1980s, which also explains a lot of the Reagan administration's actions at that time. So, yeah, continue.
- [13:35]
A
And the thing is, and this is why you could make the anti interventionist case without sort of acting as if Iran is this like neutral country or this country void. Well, because, well, I will say, like, if you just like observe and we'll get into like how the alternate media kind of fell down a trap here, I think very clearly there are a lot of people who are shocked to see how influential they are. Part of what drives their lack of influence is like a real lack of serious engagement with the sort of history. And the dynamics are really relevant here. And once again, it should be noted, Iran, I think from a pure like body count perspective, Iran killed hundreds of American troops, soldiers, Marines, airmen, et cetera, in Iraq during the Iraqi civil war. After we invaded the country 2003, once again, we chose to be there, but this is just like a reality. They funded Hamas, they funded Hezbollah. These are not like neutral, chill countries. In the same way that Iraq in 2003 was not a good country, was a very bad country. It was a country that was a regional threat. The prime issue then was not that we identified Iraq, Iraq as an enemy of the United States. It was that we overestimated. Well, more than overestimated. We completely misunderstood the nature of the threat that they did pose or could POS. And then acted way 100 billion times more in reaction to that threat. Because at the end of the day, like the doves were correct. When it came to Iraq 2003, a lot of these people were people who served in the George H.W. bush administration. This is Brent Scowcroft. Their idea was look after 1991. Iraq was in a box. They were completely cut off from any possible aid and any allies. There was no Soviet Union to back them and supply them. China wasn't a relevant player. So they were just like in a box on their own. And you could use desert Fox style 1998 operations to launch an airstrike every few years if they ever get to be outside of that box. That was a. This is actually one of my biggest frustrations with like the Bush administration folks who said we had to invade Iraq. You know, Don Rumseau talked about, he's like, well what are we supposed to do? Like we have to, we have to do something. We cannot maintain the status quo.
- [15:45]
B
And it's like, actually it's kind of.
- [15:46]
A
Like the status quo is working. If every few years we launch some F16s and they blow some stuff up, they, they hit some radars, they hit some weapons program style things, that's fine. There was no American risk of life. This is pretty straightforward. They had no serious air force that actually was sustainable. So once again, that's the problem. I only bring up the need to recognize that Iran is an adversary of the United States because you're seeing some people when they're trying to articulate how a Kamala Harris administration would have behaved differently than the Trump administration. They're citing Kamala going on the road and referring to Iran as an adversary of the United States. You can identify a country as an adversary and not do what we did over this past weekend. And that's like a really critical thing that people like colloquially should understand.
- [16:32]
B
Yeah. 100. I do want to return to your non proliferation point because I've texted a couple of friends and I saved this to. For to talk about. Here is Kim Jong Il, one of the most vindicated men in all of history. Kim Jong Il. I, I'm, I mean, look, it sounds crazy to say he remains literally the only member of the axis of evil who has not been completely defense traded or destroyed by the United States. His primary theory of victory was nuclearization at all costs continued by the Kim regime under Kim Jong Un would effectively deter all intervention. He understood also that proliferation of Western style technology and the intermingling of culture would eventually be used as a vector of attack against his regime and technologically to undermine him and also to be used as a potential like sleeper cell, as we could see from the pager attack, right, against Israel and Hezbollah and now the deletion of WhatsApp by the Iranian regime and all of this. And I was really, I was like wow. I mean look this again, this is not an endorsement, it's strategic empathy. He's right. Like the Kim regime literally just never believed in all of these promises of non proliferation and in sanctions relief and the intertwinement. They were like, no, we're going for the bomb at all costs. Not only going for the bomb, we are going to, we're, we will, you know, build an ICBM capable of hitting the continental United States. And from that point forward the message is do not fuck with us. And that's basically worked. I mean Kim Jong Il died of natural causes at home in his bed. You can't say that for a lot of these people. The Ayatollah came what, inches from being assassinated just now. I don't think it's ever made more sense for an adversary of the west or a regional power, like with India and Pakistan to simply just sprint. Actually India is a very interesting case. Remember the United States heavily pushed back against the Indian nuclear program in the 19th to the point where India both, not only played both sides, but in the 70s, I wouldn't describe it necessarily as a Soviet outlay, but you know, it was getting pretty close there and this is part of the reason why. And then similarly with the Pakistani nuclear deterrent. So it's one of those where I actually think the NPT has probably, I mean look, you know, 100 years from now, if the real turning point, if you ask me, I don't even think it'll really be about Iran. I think it will really be about the death of the npt, the death of non plural, non proliferation itself as a like means of peace. And that the destruction of that norm eventually just led to a lot of 40th or 50th order consequences. And you know, maybe saying it's today is not really fair because I had the opportunity to speak with some people who were actually in the room with Kim Jong Un and the North Korean team and they just, they were like, guys, you just have to denuclearize. And Kim himself would be like, yeah, how'd that work out for Gaddafi? He's like, we don't believe you and we never will. He's like, this is the policy of this country. We will meet with you on equal terms. We are both now nuclear armed great powers. That's it. Get with the program or fuck off. And we have not been able to square that circle because it's not square able in my opinion.
- [20:01]
A
And at this point, this is part of where you and I disagree on Ukraine, where like the Sort of different perspective we hold on Europe come from. Part of the reason why I, aside from like the moral questions, part of the reason why I supported once again, not boots on the ground, no, no fly zone. I think I'm a moderate. Ukraine hawk is a fair way to identify myself. Part of the reason why I thought it was so critical for us to continue to back Ukraine and back Ukraine the way we did, especially in 2022 and 2023, is that I think the clear lesson, if Russia had been able to win and beat the Ukrainians to the maximalist degree they wanted to, would have been holy crap. Ukraine's also another country that gave up their nuclear capability. Yes, we should note they did not have access to their nuclear weapons because these were left over from the Soviet Union. But the point is the story that would be told here from a regime and not just a dictatorship and not just from the perspective of countries that are sort of against the west and the United States broadly, which is basically be if you do not have a nuclear deterrent or the backing of a nuclear power to some degree, you are basically leaving yourself open. And I think in the worst case scenario, not in every single scenario we run in the worst case scenario scenario where we are seen as abandoning our nuclear umbrella in the Indo Pacific, in Europe, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, if we are not making clear that we support these countries, this would lead to further nuclear proliferation. So we're going to have some disagreements on Ukraine and all these different issues. But I think folks should really understand that so much of my worldview when it comes to the U.S. staying in NATO, the U.S. retaining its defense commitments in these different regions stems from the fact that part of the reason why we just did not see mass proliferation. Now, there could be a different answer to how you and this is why we intellectually humble and admit this, there could be a different answer to how we don't have Poland getting a nuke and then the Baltics rushing to get a nuke and then Finland gets a nuke and then we see other, other, other, other countries getting a nuke, Japan getting a nuke, South Korea getting a nuke. There could be an other answer that isn't just us retaining our post1945 posture, but I just think the post1945 approach has worked and I think people are a little too cavalier about dismissing the maintenance of it.
- [22:14]
B
I don't disagree. I mean, my counter would just be is I think that the nuclear umbrella is such a precious thing that you should only be extended to those of which I think is in the critical interest. And I just don't think, I mean Ukraine literally did not qualify for that. Okay, Budapest memorandum, folks who want to comment at me, not the same thing as an actual treaty ratified by the United States Senate. I mean, the Budapest memorandum is basically, I don't even know if I want to get into this. It's, I would say it's as enforceable as George Schultz or whatever telling Putin, don't worry, we're never going to expand NATO. It's like, guys, that's the statement of one administration. It's not the same thing as a U.S. treaty ratified by the U.S. senate. So yeah, that would be my response is Ukraine literally didn't qualify for the nuclear umbrella correctly. In my opinion, never should, never will. And that's, look, it's more about husbanding resources. But honestly, I think this situation might be more dangerous. And for the NPT folks who are.
- [23:15]
A
Out there, the MPT is by the.
- [23:16]
B
Way, the Non Proliferation Treaty which governs all nuclear arms states except for one, which is the one that launches campaign against Iran. I'm referring to Israel, which is a nuclear non compliant state, non NPT member and has never declared its nuclear weapons program. And actually I unironically think that that element in particular is a very, very strong one because the ultimate lesson of all of this is the npat, the iae, it's all bullshit. Might is really the only thing that picks. Right. And whether you're on the side of the United States or not, I think in a sense this might actually have been inevitable literally over the long run. I mean, it hasn't even been 100 years since the development of the nuclear bomb. But it was a noble effort by the administrator, by the United States over several years, specifically during the Cold War, to try to contain it. But in an increasingly, I wouldn't say multipolar per se, but in one in which the United States is not the only unipolar moment in which the US is the preeminent world power. It's especially just almost something that's going to happen, especially without bipolarity. The Soviet Union also wanting to constrain its area of interest from developing nuclear weapons. But yeah, so look, we could say it's whether it's Ukraine, whether it's here. I do think it's a turning point. I just again, whether it's Iran or not, I have no idea, frankly. They've humiliated themselves. There's just no getting around it. I mean, you can't look at the current situation and say that their security doctrine has not been a complete and total failure, but other countries would do well, you know, if you're an adversary, to look at Iran and then look at North Korea and what would you say? I'm going North Korean way. And the point. And do what the North Koreans did. The North Koreans, you know, it's, it's worth considering. The United States considered doing to North Korea what we ostensibly just did to Iran in I think it was 98. There was a serious discussion by the Clinton administration. They were like, look, there's one reactor, there's one test facility. What we should do is we should go in there and we should bomb it. And by the way, not a crazy case because it's a little bit different than Iran. Iran is actually much more sophisticated nuclear program. They have a lot more area and other. But you know, Marshall, you and I both know the reason they didn't do that because the North Koreans also had a credible conventional military deterrent where they were like, oh yeah, you can do that. We will level Seoul in 45 minutes to do it.
- [25:50]
A
They have artillery.
- [25:51]
B
Yeah, exactly. They're like, we have enough conventional artillery and more sarin gas, I think, than anyone on the planet. So we'll just go chemical and artillery and we'll destroy one of the world's great cities and one of the key US allies in the region. And Clinton was like, yeah, I'm not doing that. And you know, I, I think I wrote a piece a decade ago being like, yeah, if you were ever going to do it, it should have been then. But you know, sitting out here 10 years later and really thinking about it, I think he made the right call. I mean, I just don't think it would have been worth like the unleashing of, of the leveling of Seoul and you know, basically like horrific use of chemical and biologic weapons. I could be wrong. North Koreans could be bluffing. Just like the Iranians talk a big game and none of it really exists. But, but you know, this is kind of brings us back to the current.
- [26:38]
A
Situation thing that I want to bring up here. And this is where this gets really difficult. So part of the way that we have prevented the spread of, you know, nuclear weapons isn't just the non proliferation treaties, is not just the inspections. It has been, in certain cases it has been worth going for it. So we should know once again, like the Iraqi strikes on the. Sorry, the Israeli strikes on the Iraqi reactor in 81 did severely damage and set back their program. Eventually leading to its end after 1991. It should also be noted that during the George W. Bush administration, during the second term, Israel struck the Syrian facility that was also working on this, I think, with the help of North Korea. So I think what makes North Korea such a problem? What made certain people, A. Q. Khan was the Pakistani scientist who did this. There are, with additional players entering the nuclear club, people who really work to lead that spread. So I think we have to be really sort of. But this is the key thing. The difference between the Iraqi 81 case and then the 2000 Syrian cases. They actually did it. And the question now is, did this actually do it in a way that seriously prevents the program? And I think as we see what happened to Syria in the 2010s, I think it's a good thing that that program was conventionally set back because it was doable. And you can prove it was doable in a way that these people are right to be wary of. In the Iranian situation.
- [28:09]
B
Yeah, look, we can, you know, talk in circles all day long. I just think it's fascinating to really. I mean, again, for me, and maybe I am giving. I don't know, I really struggle with this. You know, Iran is simultaneously a terrorist actor, a theocracy. It's irrational. We're told it's going to nuke New York, and then, I mean, they can only fire 14 ballistic missiles and they coordinate it with Qatar and with Israel. I'm like, I don't know. I see a lot more rationality behind the regime's decision making post Soleimani and post US Strike than we're led to believe. And what that kind of means to me is if you combine nationalism with some level of rationality, and yes, we can, you know, impute some theocratic or whatever element on top of this. It just points in one direction. Like, I. I just don't. I genuinely do not see how you could preserve the regime, which I think is important to them. I'm assuming there's no other reason why they wouldn't have done the ceasefire and not go for a nuke. I just don't see it. I honestly don't. I could, again, I could be totally wrong. The West. I mean, this is the irony, and again, why I almost sympathize with the neocons. Like, Trump's schizophrenia almost enables both to be possible. So did you see today that Trump said that he's gonna lift sanctions on Chinese oil being. Or China buying oil from Iran? I mean, that is like. Yeah. So, I mean, let's Think about this. Iran's nuclear facilities get struck, but they get to keep their uranium, they sign a ceasefire, they make Trump feel good and quote, respected or whatever and they just got the sanctions relief that they've been asking for for a decade. I mean again, if you think about it from the neocon point of view, you're like, wait, so he didn't get all the uranium, the regime is still in power and now they have time to regroup and now you just gave them like a multi billion dollar per year gift of which again, if you look at North Korea, what did Kim do? Kim basically said the we will spend like 100% of our GDP, sacrifice people to a famine if we have to, as long as we get this icbm. And he did it. I mean I, I, the, the strategic logic of it has just never made more sense to me, especially with North Korea as again the only example of the axis of evil at this point, which stands to this day and which is completely able to do whatever it wants. It sent troops to Ukraine, it's provided weapons, it's deepened its relationship with Russia and we can't even say, oh we're going to sanction. It's one of the most sanctioned countries on the planet. They just don't care. So like yeah, if I were the Iranians, like you know, my option is simple at this point. So in a sense the interventionists and the non interventionists, I think we both kind of agree, at least the smart ones on where this thing is headed. It's only a question.
- [31:11]
A
This is why you're waking now, this is why you're not doing this on purpose. But there is a certain segment of the audience in the broader sort of foreign policy class. It's like, you're right Sagar, that's why we need regime change.
- [31:22]
B
No, no, no, listen guys, I sympathize with you, this is my point. I, I, I honestly truly sympathize at this point. And this is why I'm so angry at all of you who backed this mission and are out there saying, quote, trust the plan is guys, I thought we had a different way. I actually did think it was theoretically possible. You can disagree with me. If you guys would like to pursue the Steve Witkoff style deal and a JCPOA 2.0 which had more, more enforcement and you know, some more like where America trump elements to it which would make sure that we don't have to do this. But when Trump green yellow lit the strike, I think it was inevitable. Like that's my, my Point is, is that the off ramp was prior to this military operation and instead you guys thought it wasn't. And I get it. I mean, I don't really agree with you. But now I think we're just going to have a nuclear Iran. It could be three years from now, it could be five years from now, it could be a decade from now. But it will be a situation just like Iraq, which will pose the similar questions. Now, what I would say now is at this point, as we have all learned from the lessons of Iraq, is like you just said, Marshall. Oh, it's very, you know, look, the strategic logic of regime change against Saddam makes a lot of sense, but what we never factor in is the capacity of the United States is whether it's really in our national interests and to what the 40th or 50th order consequences of that all will be. That's part of the reason why I think this operation was just such a colossal mistake by the Trump administration. But, you know, look, time will tell and in, in the interim, they're going to be going around. I mean, I just, I know that it's politics, but like words matter. Saying that something is obliterated, like that is supposed to mean something, and it's just, it's just literally factually incorrect to say that their uranium or to say that their nuclear weapons program is dead for all time. That's what Trump is literally saying. I'm like, it's just not true. And they know it's not true. The Israelis know it's not true. All of us know it's not true. He wants to say that it's not true. So he gets his 13 day war, 12 day war box check and he can just move on. But sorry, man, I mean, that's just not how this stuff works.
- [33:39]
A
So let's talk about a couple tweets I put out that I'd love to get your thoughts on. We've talked about this privately. So the number one thing, and this is something I'm just really fascinated by and this is something I frankly like warned anti interventionists about. So in the 20th 1st century, we've had three specific presidencies. George W. Bush, Barack Obama, to a certain degree, Joe Biden, and now Trump. Actually, let's just take out Joe Biden for a second because Joe Biden didn't run an anti interventionist sense. But you had W. Bush, Obama and now Trump too, that have explicitly campaigned against the foreign policy interventions and mistakes by their predecessors then. And I think they genuinely meant what they said when they said it. W. Bush was asked about the interventions in the former Yugoslavia on the campaign trail. And he said, those weren't good ideas. I wouldn't have done them. That's not what America's job is to do. But that wasn't a great idea. You also had Haiti, you had Somalia. But Black Hawk down, he was writing against that. Condoleezza Rice wrote a big foreign affairs article back then you'd have like the chief foreign policy strategist write the big essay. And the big essay turned George W. Bush's instinct into an actual sort of perspective on it. Then 911 happens and then we are advancing democracy. We're intervening in Iraq, Afghanistan, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Waging a global war on terror. Obama. Obama campaigns in 2003. He wasn't campaigning, but he gave the big speech where he said, I'm not against all wars. I'm just against dumb wars. He really campaigns against the war in Iraq. He's skeptical of the surge. Pulls us out of Iraq 2011. But very quickly, we are literally back in Iraq in a certain capacity and we're waging a broader war on terror against ISIS. Now you have President Trump in 2024. He doesn't actually say explicitly that he's an anti war, anti interventionist president, but the campaign is definitely putting out pro peace merchandising. They're coalitioning anti interventionist.
- [35:49]
B
Can we just say you're not exaggerating? They literally put out a graphic that said the pro peace ticket just.
- [35:55]
A
And you know, Trump there. And they then coalition with Tulsi Gabbard. They give her the Director of National Intelligence job. There's a lot of presumption that this is a anti interventionist campaign. Obviously now Trump is intervening. And my just quick thing that I'll throw it to you is just that I've always not liked the way than anti interventionists. I think a lot of this, like, because people are really confused about this, like genuinely like.
- [36:21]
B
So I got.
- [36:21]
A
I'm sure you did. We got so many, like texts, emails, et cetera, just from our friends who don't really follow politics saying like, I don't really get it. Trump was the anti war guy. Trump was the anti intervention guy. Why is he doing this? I think the same thing is true of a lot of like, anti war, anti interventionist Democrats during Obama's tenure. He said we were leaving Iraq. Why are we doing all this stuff now? Why is he talking about bombing Syria after the Arab Spring? Same thing is true of certain people. On the right during the George W. Bush presidency. And I think the way that anti interventionists campaign is both unhelpful and leads to this confusion. Because at the end of the day I think we'd be best served by talking about specific interventions and why we. Let me put it this way. Let's say I'm interviewing a presidential candidate in 2028. I would ask them what would you have done on 912 this situation happened. It's on your plate. How do you respond? Like what's your mentality? Another great question. Okay, you don't personally want a regime change. Iran, no one would say that. But the question to ask Kamala Harris and Donald Trump in October was let's say Israel is about to launch a strike and claims that if they can't get the strike done the way they're trying to do it because they don't have the technology, they don't have the bombs, they don't have the B2 bombers, it's going to rain unfinished and Iran is going to sprint even harder. What do you do in that situation? I just don't like the word anti intervention. I don't like the word anti war because at the end of the day we've never actually had a president that when they are handed events outside their control or complicated situations. I mean, dude, actually now I think about it, Woodrow Wilson ran as an anti war, anti interventionist candidate. He said he was the person that.
- [38:03]
B
Gave us out of war.
- [38:05]
A
We've just never. The same thing is true of FDR in the 1940s. Like we've never actually had a president who's like, I'm the pro war person. Events happen. And I just think this is a case where if we had a more sophisticated conversation about these issues and didn't let candidates actually just say to themselves don't worry, I'm not going to do that thing my predecessor did. That misses the point and leads to the confusion because no one and push back. If I'm just sort of like getting overly. I do not think there is actually a president, even AOC president. AOC would believe in intervention in some specific case. I just don't buy that there is no situation whatsoever when you have one of the most powerful militaries in the world where or where we are attacked where you would not literally do anything. Therefore don't just give them that out.
- [38:52]
B
I don't disagree with you. I told. I mean look, this is more like the public and all of that because the public usually wants to re litigate the past and not think about stuff for the future. This is part. I don't know, this is a much.
- [39:03]
A
Bigger journalist in the audience, and this is. We're shouting this out to them then, too. Seriously.
- [39:06]
B
I mean, yeah, you guys should have that. Look, really, what you should ask is about specific circumstances. So when JD Runs for president and I interview him, I'm going to be like, so what would you. So I'm gonna. I'll be like, Mr. Mr. Vice President. When Kamala Harris ran for president, one of the things that your campaign heavily criticized her for was the inability to say anything she would have done differently from Joe Biden. So what would you have done differently from Donald J. Trump in a foreign policy situation? That's a very tricky question for him to answer.
- [39:32]
A
Question.
- [39:32]
B
I'm giving it away for free. But, yeah, I mean that. But I'm gonna ask him that whenever I interview him, whenever he's running for president. And if he just gives me some bullshit answer, I'm just gonna be like, yeah, dude, you know, I mean, I think that will come off so smarmy and slimy. And that's why also, look, if you actually think about Trump's breakout moment on the stage on Iraq versus Jeb Bush, it actually genuinely was this question. People should go back and should watch it. It. Because it was a battle between George W. Or Jeb Bush and Trump, and not necessarily in policy specifics, but about the execution of the Iraq war. And part of the reason why it connected so hard was people were like, yes, absolutely. That's exactly what I want. I want to hear somebody say it was a colossal mistake, and I never would have done it in the way that George W. Bush did. That's really important. So that is an encouragement for the audience. It also, though, is about voters as well, who need to educate themselves on how they think about this. But broadly, my number one lesson from all of this, because I think it rings true of Obama and Trump and Bush. Bush ran as the anti war president. The voters backed him no matter what. Obama ran as the anti war president. Voters backed him no matter what.
- [40:47]
A
When they engaged in intervention.
- [40:49]
B
Yeah. When they engaged in Libya, Sierra, whatever, you know, drone warfare, etc. Trump ran as the anti war president. MAGA is like, besides themselves and loving the strikes on Iran. So actually, guys, this is actually just not a political question. I think it's purely just a game. And I. Not, I don't mean it as a game, but, like, this is just an elites question. This is genuinely just a question for foreign policy elites. And it's one about influence, it's about judgment, it's about like thinking. It's about how do we have prudence in, in a capacity. Because at a certain point the voters just could believe whatever they want to believe. And I really firmly, you know, think that going back, especially in modern history, but honestly, even, you know, if we look at the past, like we said, Woodrow Wilson kept us out of war, enters the war in 1917, it was overwhelmingly popular. FDR campaigns in 1940s keeping us out of World War II, went to the war one year, eight months or whatever after his election, that or after his second or his fourth inauguration or whatever. I think inaugurated in March, enter in December. So six months, maybe seven. But my point is just that it's actually just about circumstances and it's around the people who are around them. And so, you know, that's another real lesson for me is that because I get really annoyed about this whole MAGA base conversation and I'm like, yeah, guys, like, it's actually not about the MAGA base and it's actually a really stupid point is to say that the MAGA base is fractured. There's actually a MAGA pollster, a guy named Rich Barris, who I've been shouting out a lot, and he's like, guys, this isn't a question of the MAGA base. It's about the margin of victory for Donald Trump in the state of Michigan and the number of people there who are probably influenced by the so called, like anti war rhetoric. It's not that it's a super majority and it never will be. It's a question about how it appeals to like certain parts, smaller parts, let's say, of the electorate. I think it would be extremely stupid to deny that there was not like a maha, more libertarian, skeptical of foreign intervention, part of the Donald Trump electorate, which again, considering the fact that he only won the popular vote by 1%, seems pretty important to me. I mean, that's one of those where, if you look at it electorally, I can make that case, but not talking about the base. And that's just something that's really annoyed.
- [43:14]
A
Me and something that's really important to note here. And this is where, when you're interviewing JD this is something that I think a lot of people failed to do, which is, and I'll bring this to the China issue too, of Liberation Day. I don't like when people give politicians too much credit for acknowledging something that's obvious. So when Trump in 2015 said on stage the Iraq war is A disaster and was a bad idea. That was a controversial statement within the gop that genuinely represents in a weird way how he repudiated the pre Trump status quo that was actually not popular. If people want someone was brave enough to stand up. Same thing was true when he said actually we should defend Social Security and entitlement spending. I like it, Our voters like it. Prove me I'm that I'm wrong. And he wasn't wrong on that. But in the year of our Lord 2025, 2024, saying the Iraq war was a disaster and was bad is just no longer controversial.
- [44:12]
B
Yeah, it's horrible.
- [44:12]
A
There are straight up 10 people who will still eve in private defend the Iraq war and they will be passed away in the next 10 years. I'm like, literally not even kidding. I'm speaking very, very, very specific people. So JD I was very unhappy with his, with his appearance. When he was asked, you know, why is this intervention different? He just said, well, you know, the presidents back 20 years ago, they were dumb. And it's like the Iraq War was like, by the way, I could totally see a President Trump in the year 2000 doing the Iraq War. By the way, I can very specifically see the set of actions leading in that direction anyways, so we should just know that. But I just don't like when we just give over credit for just saying I'm anti interventionist candidate. The Iraq war is a disaster. We stay in Afghanistan too long and then we just take that as if it's a statement of deep, deep meaning when it's just not. Same thing is true when a lot of people who are defending the stupidest, the stupider defenses of Liberation Day. If the terrorists I saw people would say in very flowery language, 25 years ago, our elite sold the American people out when they admitted, I'm like, okay, we get it. Literally, you could write a foreign affairs article, sort of the, the height of the establishment saying we got China trade policy questions wrong. That is no longer controversial. It doesn't mean anything. What should we actually do going forward? And it can't just be premised on dunking on people who have been out of power for decades and aren't making choices now. So I think the same thing applies to the anti interventionist people. And to your point, that's why I love your question for JD and for frankly, any other candidate. I hope your staff are listening. I know some of you are because it's a very, very, very, very tough question. So for the last section here, I want to talk about people like when we do media analysis. Let's talk about the reporting on how basically the alternate media where a lot of the anti interventionist right is really paid much of their attention, have all the bigger personalities, they were basically ignored. I had a tweet about this, I'll put it in the show notes and my take on it was quote, in terms of my take on the phenomenon of the alternate media not influencing the Trump decision making process was quote, the whole death of the mainstream media narrative was always weakest when it comes to Washington. Tens of millions of views on X and YouTube doesn't mean anything when people in positions of power still focus their attention on legacy media. This was in response to reporting that many Trump advisors who were on the more anti directionist side bit worried that Trump was no longer getting the views of Tucker because Tucker's not on Fox anymore, he's on Twitter, he's on YouTube. So I'd love to hear your take on this in this final section.
- [46:49]
B
I've always said this and I think I'm one of the more humble. I'm sure my haters will love that one. But humble people, whenever it comes to the description of independent media, I have always acknowledged that it is much more of a pop culture phenomenon and it is not one that applies in any way to the positions of power. And this is where, I don't know, there are certain things that you just actually have to be here to know and if or have worked here to know and to understand the obsession like with cable news, not only I'm not even talking about Donald J. Trump, I'm talking about a very institutional level and the way that politics actually works. And for them it's a central and a closed loop environment. In fact, actually recently some more mainstream people were asking me some advice on a podcast and they're like, who do you think we should have as our first guests? And I was like basically nobody who would traditionally be doctor do well on cable. So a do well on cable is like a three minute segment where somebody says something kind of spicy, let's say a lawmaker, somebody like John Kennedy, the senator from Louisiana. I would be willing to bet about 75 of our audience did not even know who that person was. Everybody in D.C. knows him as Mr. Soundbite because you could have him two to three thing and he'll say something folksy like that dog doesn't piss the right way. And everyone's like oh hahaha, look at John Kennedy on cnn. And everybody just kind of moves on and he's making a point about a bill which is not, frankly, all that important, you know, to the broader electorate. And that's something where it is, though, important for all the Capitol Hill staffers and congressmen who are watching that segment at the time. So, look, it's like a trade publication. That's how you think of. Should think of the mainstream media. The mainstream media is a formerly very popular, organized organ which used to straddle the halls of power and information to the broader electorate. It still does to a limited extent for people who are older, but the latter, like, power side, is just simply like, I don't even know how you could get away from it. I was thinking about it and I was like, what would a true non mainstream media White House look like? It would be so. I don't. People probably don't even know this. In the White House, in every single room, there is a television. Every room, I'm not kidding, which is split into four different screens, which has all four of the cable networks. Depending on whether a Democrat or Republican is in power, it'll either be Bloomberg or it'll be Fox Business, and it has Bloomberg and. Or Fox Business, Fox News, MSNBC and CNN all playing together and all the staff. I mean, think about it. If you were at your desk and that was in, wouldn't you watch it? That would be something that you would take into account whether you think it is or not. And then you add on Donald Trump, an old man who is obsessed with cable news. And I mean, the most revealing thing that he did was his dunk against Tucker Carlson when they were like, what do you think about? He's like, oh, he should say, if he's so great, he should go out there and get himself a TV network. And you're like, wait, but you just appeared on the Bus and Boys podcast while you're running for president and talked about how awful the mainstream media was. I thought you didn't care about a television network. It's like, look, I knew this was all fake because I've literally interviewed Trump and I know how Washington works. But I do think it was a rude awakening for a lot of posters, in particular, people who are on Twitter and probably deluded themselves, you know, into their level of influence. And it's like, yeah, guys getting invited to Mar a Lago. Like, turns out, like, you were used and they don't give a shit about you. Like, they truly do not give a single fuck about what you say. They will happily use you to spread their press releases and to cultivate you in like a ballroom where there's 200 of you. And Trump shows up and he's like, look at these guys. All my killers. We love them. He does not care or think about you for more than one second, even though you're slavishly devoted to him. The smart people actually know that. But, yeah, so it's, it is a, it is a very important case study in, you know, what you, your role. I'll even tell you on a personal level. So, like, there's stuff I talk about on Breaking Points, which I know is just like not all that relevant, you know, to the Washington conversation. Most of the time that I am tweeting it is because I want to influence the Washington convo. Because I also know that secondary to the, quote, mainstream media is Twitter and like elite level discourse. I have never posted a single tweet with the hope that it'll go viral. Role or like, influence. I don't know, like pop culture. If I want to do that, I'm gonna stick to YouTube, I'm gonna stick to Instagram, But I know the purpose of the platform and the purpose of the discourse. Very often I'll put tweets out which I don't even think are particularly like, going to go viral. But I only do it simply, literally to influence the public conversation. So I'm, I'm just giving you a very operational view. For example, if I wanted to really influence the Trump administration, let's say this whole, whole Iran situation was continuing to happen, the way to get the most views would be to do a monologue on my show. The way to actually influence the debate is I would contact the people I know at the New York Times and I would write an op ed about why Trump shouldn't do this. That op ed would get probably 1,1000 the amount of views that my monologue would, and it would have about a 1,000 times more impact then it would have an overall policy. And people should understand that, you know, if you're, if you're trying to look at the way that the game all works.
- [52:29]
A
And for my last bit, because I really like how we're kind of opening the kimono for people in terms of how this actually works. And I'm not, I don't want this part of the segment to come off as like, we're arrogant and we're bragging. We really know how things are. Like we worked and work in D.C. and a bit of cope that I saw from a bunch of people in my quote, tweets saying, like, because you Know what's funny, Sagar? People used to argue against this pov. Like when I, when I gave my tweet about how like, sorry, dude, mainstream media dying, doesn't matter what. And when you say, you said two years ago people would always just like, dunk, but this was just so obviously true over the past six months that it's been revealed to be like, okay, people are now accepting it, but now, now what people are saying is, quote, well, it's only because of the boomers. And once the boomers die off, then legacy TV is going to go away. These legacy figures, these more suited up, these more traditional, these like wonkier, nerdy people are going to matter less because they're less compelling, they're less entertaining, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And the pushback I want to offer that crowd of people is that they are correctly, there is a specific format which is on its deathbed. That format being the cable news subscriber driven television station. But a quick anecdote that really, really matters here to give people who want to Learn more about D.C. a perspective on this, I did an episode with Ridge Colby. Third day or so of the invasion of Iraq and it was called Is Taiwan Next? It was about the actual implications of the invasion for what it would mean for an invasion of Taiwan. The episode didn't do incredible, got sub like 10,000 views. Whatever, whatever. But the actual episode though, I heard on the ground of Grapevine was passed around most of the serious foreign policy Hill offices. So even in a world where there isn't a cable news TV station that's going to promote Jake Tapper and Anderson Cooper and all these different people, people in our audience have to understand that media and conversation and television serves a specific purpose for people. That is what you were talking about. At the end of the day, in a world without CNN or msnbc, it is going to be true that there's going to be some big creator who's going to be way bigger than me, way bigger than you. But at the end of the day, because you and I put out products when we want to that actually serve that Hill audience, that decision maker audience, guess what? Like, if I wanted to, I could shop around that anecdote for the realignment and make a bunch of money off of it. I'm not interested in doing that. I don't want to turning this into like a Hill donor, a Hill service TV show, awful. But like, that's a business model and some company is going to figure it out. Another example, like I Heard two years ago. It's funny, considering my politics have moved to the left. Kellyanne Conway shouted out the realignment as a show that Republicans need to listen to at the Senate Republican conference meeting two years ago. I could get one of my buddies in these Hill offices to give me that on the record. I could sell that to some major sponsors. I got a bunch of big senator follows afterwards. I got a bunch of staffers who followed, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. A business model would be, I'm taking. And then guess what, I take some investment. I make this like, higher quality. I'd hire an editor, we'd have a.
- [55:48]
B
Booker, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
- [55:49]
A
That would look a little closer to traditional media than the sort of like gonzo, you know, journo. Not really like more entertaining style. It would get more views than my product. But my product, if I did this, and someone will probably do this, would still influence the conversation more. So people need to do it. You really helped me understand that at a core level, YouTube is entertainment and everything is underneath that sometimes it could have real impact. But understanding how this actually intersects with people who need this information to do their jobs, like, sorry, like Tim Pool isn't helpful. People doing the jobs. Like that is kind of his problem. And that's why he's not going to influence the actual, like, Iran policy debate. Same thing is true of like, Theo Vaughn. There's just like, not Theo Vaughn and Austin. There's a danger for Theo Vaughn. There's a danger that, like alternative media people will just be used by politicians who just want to like, dress down and act chill and act like there's something different. So people should be really aware of how these things actually play out.
- [56:47]
B
Yeah, 100 agree basically with all of that. And also that business model you described already exists called Punchbowl. It's a multi bill. It's a multi million dollar business in terms of just reporting news. Look, it's trade publication. All right. What is the audience for Bloomberg tv? I don't like less than a million. Right. What's the impact of why Bloomberg is the most successful media company on Earth? Because it's attached to the. The Bloomberg terminal should tell you something, guys. But yeah, like, look, it's not sexy. A lot of people don't want to hear it. But you know, if people who are listening to this who are not in politics and you work in a trade, just think about stuff like trade journal, like if you want to influence the H Vac industry, you should go and find the H Vac, you know, the private equity whatever publication that, that like, highlights analysts. Break this stuff down and you should write a really good piece for it. And people will be like, wow. And by the way, you could probably make millions of dollars doing what I just described. Like, you know, in terms of whatever particular niche that you're into, that is the benefit of the Internet. So that's one of the things that people, People really need to learn. I will say with YouTube, look, it's not just all entertainment. It can be dual use. There are oftentimes when things like Breakthrough, I would say primarily it is a product where it's a little bit more of a passive consumption. And it's for people who are spread, who are not working in the business, as opposed to. As opposed to like the New York Times or any of that. Interestingly enough, podcast is much more dual use in my experience, because people who are busy in particular don't have time to watch stuff, but they do like to listen to things when they're in their car. Just in the same way that people like to listen to podcasts while they're being entertained. And that I have found to be a little bit more, or at least semi impactful if you do it right. So there you go.
- [58:40]
A
So last question for you. How in the. What lessons should alternative media learn from not being relevant?
- [58:49]
B
Yeah. Do what I just described. I mean, Steve Bannon, I think he's a hero for what he said in the last week. I think literally beyond his going to go meet with Donald Trump, like, one of the best things that he could have done was to literally write a New York Times again. I know this stuff sounds crazy, but he should have put it on the record in a mainstream media organization that boomer Donald Trump, who literally does not even have a computer, let me reiterate, that does not have a computer and reads things by hand that are printed out for him in front. Could instead of, like, think about the alternative. Somebody has to text Trump a link, link, you know, to Twitter, which he probably doesn't even have on his phone because of the security stuff that's on both the vice president and the president's phone, or maybe they have a couple of different phones. You'd have to open up that link and you'd have to physically watch the clip. Or, and this is most likely based on what I've heard, is that one of his aides has to pull it up on their phone and then has to show it to Trump and he has to watch it like that. What's more impactful that or something you could read or. I mean, I would have said he should have gone on Fox, but he's literally banned because of his war on Rupert Murdoch. But yeah, like that's what I would have done. You could look and this is the thing, the Washington Post, New York Times and all these other people, they have all asked me to write op eds. I basically just say no because outside of war, there's basically, there's almost nothing I care about that I would want to influence the public discussion. Maybe gambling. Yeah, if anybody ever asked me to do a gambling op ed, I would probably do it. That's like basically about it because again, those are actually purely like legislative functions. But yeah, that's what I would have done if I was them. I wouldn't have just used my sole platform. I would have tried to, you know, reach Trump where he is at. Not just Trump, the decision makers where they are at. I will say I do think some of this is changing. Some of it will change actually generationally. But a certain element of this will always be the same.
- [60:40]
A
No, for sure. And I think the, the thing to figure out that no one's really answered. So people have answered this on a maybe like news basis. But like, what does it look like to take? Because also to your point, like breaking points is like opinion. It's not like news reporting to the same degree. So like, who's going to figure out that? Because like breaking points and this is like the real credit thing. Breaking points does get a lot breaking point. I mean this seriously. Breaking points is watched by serious people and gets used. So what does the version of breaking points that leans a little because you and Chris just aren't interested in doing this.
- [61:13]
B
That.
- [61:13]
A
But this is the problem. This is like. And then you're the young turks and you take a $20 million investment. But this is just the, the actual take is that like nothing is inevitable and this is just so hard to do that people shouldn't think this is just around the corner. That's the actual.
- [61:26]
B
No one person can do it. It would take a vision of a company. Do you really have to fill out the economics? The economics of this is very, very difficult. In order to really, you know, build it into kind of what you're describing, I think eventually somebody will crack it. But it's tough. It's. I, I don't see it yet. The. Something in the CPMs on YouTube would have to dramatically change before we see something really go in that type of direction. And I don't see that happening anytime soon based on what I've seen on the back end.
- [61:58]
A
There we go. Perfect place to leave it. Sagaris has been great. Thanks for joining me on the realignment.
- [62:04]
B
Thank you.