The Realignment – Episode #559

Title: Saagar Enjeti: What's Next for America and Iran?
Date: June 25, 2025
Host: Marshall Kosloff
Guest: Saagar Enjeti

Overview

In this deep-dive episode, Marshall and Saagar explore the current state of U.S., Iran, and Israeli tensions, situating recent events within a broader historical context of Middle East interventions. They draw on analogies from past U.S. and Israeli military actions, interrogate the logic of intervention and nuclear nonproliferation, and reflect on the influence (and limits) of alt-media in U.S. policy circles. Both hosts candidly assess if anything truly new is happening—or if history is repeating itself with different actors and technologies. Their perspective is sharpened by skepticism of quick hot takes and campaign rhetoric around anti-interventionism.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Analogies to Past U.S. and Israeli Interventions (00:00–06:00)

Marshall frames the discussion by listing five historical interventions for comparison: Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, Desert Storm (1991), Desert Fox (1998), the 2003 Iraq invasion, and the Libya intervention.
Saagar urges caution against quick analogies: The outcomes of these events only become clear with time, and "one of the worst things about social media is... declaring finality" (01:45). Libya’s 2011 intervention, as an example, stretched on for months—contrary to the “quick win” narrative.
Marshall suggests Trump officials want the current Iran situation to resemble the “clean” 1981 Israeli strike—decisive, with lasting effect and little regional fallout. But the lesson of history, as both note, is that destroying infrastructure rarely resolves deeper, regional antagonisms.

2. The Cycle of Conflict: Regime Change Logic & Strategic Failure (06:00–11:00)

Saagar traces the logic from tactical strikes to regime change: “Zoomers, that’s how we got to regime change.” (06:03)
He emphasizes that underlying issues—the regime’s ambitions, regional rivalries—are not resolved by strikes. Declaring victory at this stage is “preposterous.”
Strategic neocon arguments about Iran using negotiations to delay action and build its capacity are more relevant now than ever: “If you’re Iran and you trust the United States, I’m sorry, you’re just, you’re literally an idiot.” (08:12)
Recent Iranian crackdowns, the regime’s resilience, and the seriousness of its nuclear ambitions reinforce the limits of military intervention. Israeli “mow the lawn” thinking portends “continued action because...Iran’s regional ambitions...remain completely.” (10:30)

3. Nuclear Deterrence Logic: North Korea, Libya, Ukraine (11:00–23:14)

Marshall highlights how North Korea’s nuclear status halted regime-change notions: once they had the bomb “no one is talking about” invasion (11:39).
Libya’s disarmament led to disastrous consequences after the West’s intervention—a warning for any regime considering giving up nuclear ambitions.
The anti-interventionist case shouldn’t overlook the real threat countries like Iran and Libya have posed; but the U.S. often swings from overreaction to threat inflation (“We completely misunderstood the nature of the threat [from Iraq]...and acted way 100 billion times more in reaction to that threat.” —Marshall, 15:45).
The “nuclear umbrella” of the U.S. prevented mass proliferation post-1945. “If Russia had been able to win...the clear lesson...would have been holy crap. Ukraine’s also another country that gave up their nuclear capability.” (Marshall, 20:12)

4. The Collapse (or Limits) of Nonproliferation (16:31–26:38)

Saagar: Kim Jong Il and the North Korean regime epitomize how nuclear capability guarantees security against regime change. “His primary theory of victory was nuclearization at all costs...That’s basically worked.” (16:31)
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is increasingly seen as ineffective—“...the death of non-proliferation itself as a means of peace.” (18:00)
Israel’s undeclared nuclear status, and the inability to enforce nonproliferation on all actors, underscores the realpolitik: “Might is really the only thing that picks. Right.” (23:14)
U.S. calculation against striking North Korea in the late 1990s (risk of Seoul’s destruction) contrasts with the more limited dangers of recent Middle East strikes. “Clinton was like, yeah, I’m not doing that.” (25:51)

5. Did the Strikes 'Work'? Is Iranian Nuclear Progress Delayed? (26:38–31:11)

There have been successful instances (e.g., Israeli strikes in Iraq 1981, Syria 2007), but the Iranian case is far less clear given secrecy, infrastructure, and resilience.
The most rational path for Iran, post-strike, appears to be pursuing nuclear weapons as credible deterrents, learning from North Korea’s model (28:09).
Saagar: “I genuinely do not see how you could preserve the regime...and not go for a nuke. I just don’t see it.” (28:56)
Trump’s policy is contradictory: after the military strike, he reportedly signals openness to Chinese purchase of Iranian oil—a sanctions relief long sought by Tehran, potentially buying them time. “If you think about it from the neocon point of view...Now you just gave them a multi-billion dollar...gift.” (29:39)

6. Regime Change Rhetoric & the Limits of Decisive Action (31:11–33:38)

Marshall & Saagar discuss the siren song of regime change; the “logic” never accounts for U.S. capacity, interests, and the unpredictable aftermath, leading Saagar to call the operation “a colossal mistake by the Trump administration.” (33:04)
Trump—and many others—are dishonestly declaring “obliteration” or “the end” of Iran’s nuclear weapons program when that is “factually incorrect” according to all serious analysts.

7. Campaign Rhetoric vs. Governing Reality: The Myth of the 'Anti-Interventionist President' (33:38–44:11)

Presidents often campaign as anti-interventionists (Bush, Obama, Trump) but face circumstances in office that push toward military action.
The anti-interventionist label is misleading; policymakers should be forced to clarify what they would have done in specific scenarios: “I just don’t like the word anti-intervention. I don’t like the word anti-war...We’ve never actually had a president that when they’re handed events outside their control...didn’t act.” (38:03)
The Iraq War and similar examples are no longer controversial to denounce, but that doesn’t reveal anything about a candidate’s future actions or wisdom.
Saagar: “If you actually think about Trump’s breakout moment...on Iraq versus Jeb Bush...that’s really important.” (39:32)
Election outcomes often hinge on only small parts of the electorate for whom these questions matter (“It’s about the margin of victory for Donald Trump in Michigan...influenced by the so-called anti-war rhetoric.” —Saagar, 41:14)

8. Media Influence: Alt-Media, Cable, and the Real Sources of Power (44:11–61:58)

Marshall contends that despite the “death of the mainstream media” narrative, when it comes to actual policy influence, “tens of millions of views on X and YouTube doesn’t mean anything when people in positions of power still focus their attention on legacy media.” (44:23)
Saagar explains that DC remains obsessed with cable news and legacy outlets: “In the White House, in every single room, there is a television...with all four of the cable networks.” (47:12)
Alternative media are often “pop culture phenomena,” with far less relevance at the actual policy level, though they can sometimes serve as trade journals or influence niche segments (48:14–49:56).
To truly influence policy, it’s better to write for legacy outlets read by decision-makers (e.g. NYT op-eds) than to chase viral alt-media clips; YouTube is “entertainment,” while podcasts can have more dual use since politicians and staffers listen to them (55:47–57:40).
Saagar gives two personal anecdotes: his own show was referenced at a Republican conference meeting; a less-viewed episode with Rich Colby on Taiwan got passed around Capitol Hill—showing influence is not about size of audience, but audience composition (52:29–55:47).

9. Lessons for Alternative Media: Influence Requires Adapting to Elite Consumption (58:40–61:58)

Traditional op-eds and legacy appearances remain the best bets for swaying the most powerful—even as generational shifts may eventually alter this dynamic.
Building a new, truly influential media company for elites is “very, very difficult” (61:26). CPMs (ad rates) on YouTube and digital platforms make it economically unfeasible for single individuals—“No one person can do it. It would take a vision of a company.” (61:26)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

“One of the worst things about social media is declaring finality...I like first drafts of history. What I really don’t like is the declaration of victory.”
— Saagar, 01:45

“You could make the anti-interventionist case without acting as if Iran is this neutral country...Iran killed hundreds of American troops...after we invaded [Iraq] in 2003. Once again, we chose to be there, but this is just a reality.”
— Marshall, 13:34

“Kim Jong Il...remains literally the only member of the axis of evil who has not been completely...destroyed by the United States. His primary theory of victory was nuclearization at all costs...That’s basically worked.”
— Saagar, 16:31

“The ultimate lesson of all of this is...it’s all bullshit. Might is really the only thing that picks. Right.”
— Saagar, 23:16

“I genuinely do not see how you could preserve the regime...and not go for a nuke. I just don’t see it.”
— Saagar, 28:56

“He wants to say that it’s not true. So he gets his 13 day war box check and he can just move on. But sorry, man, that’s just not how this stuff works.”
— Saagar, 33:24

“We’ve never actually had a president who, when they are handed events outside their control, or complicated situations...didn’t act.”
— Marshall, 38:05

“Tens of millions of views on X and YouTube doesn’t mean anything when people in positions of power still focus their attention on legacy media.”
— Marshall, 44:23

“The way to actually influence the debate is to contact the people I know at The New York Times and write an op-ed about why Trump shouldn’t do this...It would have a thousand times more impact than any monologue I could do...”
— Saagar, 51:30

Timestamps for Important Segments

00:00–06:00 – Framing the Iran situation via five modern interventions.
06:00–11:00 – The logic from tactical strikes to open-ended regime change.
11:00–23:14 – Nuclear examples: North Korea, Libya, Ukraine, proliferation logic.
23:14–26:38 – Israel’s nuclear status, nonproliferation collapse.
26:38–31:11 – Did the strikes ‘work’? Why Iran rationally presses on.
31:11–33:38 – Regime change rhetoric and the limits of military action.
33:38–44:11 – Why ‘anti-interventionist’ presidents always intervene; campaign rhetoric vs. governing.
44:11–61:58 – Alt-media and legacy media: What influences power? Can outsiders break through?
58:40–61:58 – Lessons and limits for alternative media.

Tone & Delivery

The episode is frank, occasionally sardonic, and skeptical of both simplistic “anti-war” rhetoric and triumphant claims of interventionist success. Marshall and Saagar blend historical depth with realpolitik, always pushing for humility and nuance over hot takes and binary conclusions. Their insider knowledge of both political media and DC policy circles is presented with a practical, sometimes biting sense of realism.

The Realignment – Episode #559

Title: Saagar Enjeti: What's Next for America and Iran?
Date: June 25, 2025
Host: Marshall Kosloff
Guest: Saagar Enjeti

Overview

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Analogies to Past U.S. and Israeli Interventions (00:00–06:00)

Marshall frames the discussion by listing five historical interventions for comparison: Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, Desert Storm (1991), Desert Fox (1998), the 2003 Iraq invasion, and the Libya intervention.
Saagar urges caution against quick analogies: The outcomes of these events only become clear with time, and "one of the worst things about social media is... declaring finality" (01:45). Libya’s 2011 intervention, as an example, stretched on for months—contrary to the “quick win” narrative.
Marshall suggests Trump officials want the current Iran situation to resemble the “clean” 1981 Israeli strike—decisive, with lasting effect and little regional fallout. But the lesson of history, as both note, is that destroying infrastructure rarely resolves deeper, regional antagonisms.

2. The Cycle of Conflict: Regime Change Logic & Strategic Failure (06:00–11:00)

Saagar traces the logic from tactical strikes to regime change: “Zoomers, that’s how we got to regime change.” (06:03)
He emphasizes that underlying issues—the regime’s ambitions, regional rivalries—are not resolved by strikes. Declaring victory at this stage is “preposterous.”
Strategic neocon arguments about Iran using negotiations to delay action and build its capacity are more relevant now than ever: “If you’re Iran and you trust the United States, I’m sorry, you’re just, you’re literally an idiot.” (08:12)
Recent Iranian crackdowns, the regime’s resilience, and the seriousness of its nuclear ambitions reinforce the limits of military intervention. Israeli “mow the lawn” thinking portends “continued action because...Iran’s regional ambitions...remain completely.” (10:30)

3. Nuclear Deterrence Logic: North Korea, Libya, Ukraine (11:00–23:14)

Marshall highlights how North Korea’s nuclear status halted regime-change notions: once they had the bomb “no one is talking about” invasion (11:39).
Libya’s disarmament led to disastrous consequences after the West’s intervention—a warning for any regime considering giving up nuclear ambitions.
The anti-interventionist case shouldn’t overlook the real threat countries like Iran and Libya have posed; but the U.S. often swings from overreaction to threat inflation (“We completely misunderstood the nature of the threat [from Iraq]...and acted way 100 billion times more in reaction to that threat.” —Marshall, 15:45).
The “nuclear umbrella” of the U.S. prevented mass proliferation post-1945. “If Russia had been able to win...the clear lesson...would have been holy crap. Ukraine’s also another country that gave up their nuclear capability.” (Marshall, 20:12)

4. The Collapse (or Limits) of Nonproliferation (16:31–26:38)

Saagar: Kim Jong Il and the North Korean regime epitomize how nuclear capability guarantees security against regime change. “His primary theory of victory was nuclearization at all costs...That’s basically worked.” (16:31)
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is increasingly seen as ineffective—“...the death of non-proliferation itself as a means of peace.” (18:00)
Israel’s undeclared nuclear status, and the inability to enforce nonproliferation on all actors, underscores the realpolitik: “Might is really the only thing that picks. Right.” (23:14)
U.S. calculation against striking North Korea in the late 1990s (risk of Seoul’s destruction) contrasts with the more limited dangers of recent Middle East strikes. “Clinton was like, yeah, I’m not doing that.” (25:51)

5. Did the Strikes 'Work'? Is Iranian Nuclear Progress Delayed? (26:38–31:11)

There have been successful instances (e.g., Israeli strikes in Iraq 1981, Syria 2007), but the Iranian case is far less clear given secrecy, infrastructure, and resilience.
The most rational path for Iran, post-strike, appears to be pursuing nuclear weapons as credible deterrents, learning from North Korea’s model (28:09).
Saagar: “I genuinely do not see how you could preserve the regime...and not go for a nuke. I just don’t see it.” (28:56)
Trump’s policy is contradictory: after the military strike, he reportedly signals openness to Chinese purchase of Iranian oil—a sanctions relief long sought by Tehran, potentially buying them time. “If you think about it from the neocon point of view...Now you just gave them a multi-billion dollar...gift.” (29:39)

6. Regime Change Rhetoric & the Limits of Decisive Action (31:11–33:38)

Marshall & Saagar discuss the siren song of regime change; the “logic” never accounts for U.S. capacity, interests, and the unpredictable aftermath, leading Saagar to call the operation “a colossal mistake by the Trump administration.” (33:04)
Trump—and many others—are dishonestly declaring “obliteration” or “the end” of Iran’s nuclear weapons program when that is “factually incorrect” according to all serious analysts.

7. Campaign Rhetoric vs. Governing Reality: The Myth of the 'Anti-Interventionist President' (33:38–44:11)

Presidents often campaign as anti-interventionists (Bush, Obama, Trump) but face circumstances in office that push toward military action.
The anti-interventionist label is misleading; policymakers should be forced to clarify what they would have done in specific scenarios: “I just don’t like the word anti-intervention. I don’t like the word anti-war...We’ve never actually had a president that when they’re handed events outside their control...didn’t act.” (38:03)
The Iraq War and similar examples are no longer controversial to denounce, but that doesn’t reveal anything about a candidate’s future actions or wisdom.
Saagar: “If you actually think about Trump’s breakout moment...on Iraq versus Jeb Bush...that’s really important.” (39:32)
Election outcomes often hinge on only small parts of the electorate for whom these questions matter (“It’s about the margin of victory for Donald Trump in Michigan...influenced by the so-called anti-war rhetoric.” —Saagar, 41:14)

8. Media Influence: Alt-Media, Cable, and the Real Sources of Power (44:11–61:58)

Marshall contends that despite the “death of the mainstream media” narrative, when it comes to actual policy influence, “tens of millions of views on X and YouTube doesn’t mean anything when people in positions of power still focus their attention on legacy media.” (44:23)
Saagar explains that DC remains obsessed with cable news and legacy outlets: “In the White House, in every single room, there is a television...with all four of the cable networks.” (47:12)
Alternative media are often “pop culture phenomena,” with far less relevance at the actual policy level, though they can sometimes serve as trade journals or influence niche segments (48:14–49:56).
To truly influence policy, it’s better to write for legacy outlets read by decision-makers (e.g. NYT op-eds) than to chase viral alt-media clips; YouTube is “entertainment,” while podcasts can have more dual use since politicians and staffers listen to them (55:47–57:40).
Saagar gives two personal anecdotes: his own show was referenced at a Republican conference meeting; a less-viewed episode with Rich Colby on Taiwan got passed around Capitol Hill—showing influence is not about size of audience, but audience composition (52:29–55:47).

9. Lessons for Alternative Media: Influence Requires Adapting to Elite Consumption (58:40–61:58)

Traditional op-eds and legacy appearances remain the best bets for swaying the most powerful—even as generational shifts may eventually alter this dynamic.
Building a new, truly influential media company for elites is “very, very difficult” (61:26). CPMs (ad rates) on YouTube and digital platforms make it economically unfeasible for single individuals—“No one person can do it. It would take a vision of a company.” (61:26)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

“One of the worst things about social media is declaring finality...I like first drafts of history. What I really don’t like is the declaration of victory.”
— Saagar, 01:45

“You could make the anti-interventionist case without acting as if Iran is this neutral country...Iran killed hundreds of American troops...after we invaded [Iraq] in 2003. Once again, we chose to be there, but this is just a reality.”
— Marshall, 13:34

“Kim Jong Il...remains literally the only member of the axis of evil who has not been completely...destroyed by the United States. His primary theory of victory was nuclearization at all costs...That’s basically worked.”
— Saagar, 16:31

“The ultimate lesson of all of this is...it’s all bullshit. Might is really the only thing that picks. Right.”
— Saagar, 23:16

“I genuinely do not see how you could preserve the regime...and not go for a nuke. I just don’t see it.”
— Saagar, 28:56

“He wants to say that it’s not true. So he gets his 13 day war box check and he can just move on. But sorry, man, that’s just not how this stuff works.”
— Saagar, 33:24

“We’ve never actually had a president who, when they are handed events outside their control, or complicated situations...didn’t act.”
— Marshall, 38:05

“Tens of millions of views on X and YouTube doesn’t mean anything when people in positions of power still focus their attention on legacy media.”
— Marshall, 44:23

“The way to actually influence the debate is to contact the people I know at The New York Times and write an op-ed about why Trump shouldn’t do this...It would have a thousand times more impact than any monologue I could do...”
— Saagar, 51:30

Timestamps for Important Segments

00:00–06:00 – Framing the Iran situation via five modern interventions.
06:00–11:00 – The logic from tactical strikes to open-ended regime change.
11:00–23:14 – Nuclear examples: North Korea, Libya, Ukraine, proliferation logic.
23:14–26:38 – Israel’s nuclear status, nonproliferation collapse.
26:38–31:11 – Did the strikes ‘work’? Why Iran rationally presses on.
31:11–33:38 – Regime change rhetoric and the limits of military action.
33:38–44:11 – Why ‘anti-interventionist’ presidents always intervene; campaign rhetoric vs. governing.
44:11–61:58 – Alt-media and legacy media: What influences power? Can outsiders break through?
58:40–61:58 – Lessons and limits for alternative media.

wavePod

559 | Saagar Enjeti: What's Next for America and Iran?

Summary

The Realignment – Episode #559

Overview

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Analogies to Past U.S. and Israeli Interventions (00:00–06:00)

2. The Cycle of Conflict: Regime Change Logic & Strategic Failure (06:00–11:00)

3. Nuclear Deterrence Logic: North Korea, Libya, Ukraine (11:00–23:14)

4. The Collapse (or Limits) of Nonproliferation (16:31–26:38)

5. Did the Strikes 'Work'? Is Iranian Nuclear Progress Delayed? (26:38–31:11)

6. Regime Change Rhetoric & the Limits of Decisive Action (31:11–33:38)

7. Campaign Rhetoric vs. Governing Reality: The Myth of the 'Anti-Interventionist President' (33:38–44:11)

8. Media Influence: Alt-Media, Cable, and the Real Sources of Power (44:11–61:58)

9. Lessons for Alternative Media: Influence Requires Adapting to Elite Consumption (58:40–61:58)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

Timestamps for Important Segments

Tone & Delivery

Further Reading / Topics Mentioned

Summary

The Realignment – Episode #559

Overview

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Analogies to Past U.S. and Israeli Interventions (00:00–06:00)

2. The Cycle of Conflict: Regime Change Logic & Strategic Failure (06:00–11:00)

3. Nuclear Deterrence Logic: North Korea, Libya, Ukraine (11:00–23:14)

4. The Collapse (or Limits) of Nonproliferation (16:31–26:38)

5. Did the Strikes 'Work'? Is Iranian Nuclear Progress Delayed? (26:38–31:11)

6. Regime Change Rhetoric & the Limits of Decisive Action (31:11–33:38)

7. Campaign Rhetoric vs. Governing Reality: The Myth of the 'Anti-Interventionist President' (33:38–44:11)

8. Media Influence: Alt-Media, Cable, and the Real Sources of Power (44:11–61:58)

9. Lessons for Alternative Media: Influence Requires Adapting to Elite Consumption (58:40–61:58)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

Timestamps for Important Segments

Tone & Delivery

Further Reading / Topics Mentioned