Podcast Summary: The Rest Is Classified (Ep 119) — "Inside Iran: Why Trump Didn’t Intervene (Ep 2)"

Main Theme & Purpose
In this episode, hosts David McCloskey (former CIA analyst and spy novelist) and Gordon Corera (veteran security correspondent) dive deep into the complexities of regime change, intelligence failures, and the unpredictable dynamics of mass protest and uprising, focusing particularly on Iran. Through historical parallels—from the 1979 Iranian Revolution to the Arab Spring—the episode seeks to illuminate why intelligence services so often fail to foresee such seismic political shifts, and what this means for understanding Iran’s present and future. The core question they grapple with: Why are revolutions so difficult to predict, and what lessons does history offer for analyzing Iran today?

Table of Contents

1. Introduction & Context
2. The 1979 Iranian Revolution: Case Study in Intelligence Failure
3. Why Didn’t Intelligence Agencies See It Coming?
4. Lessons from 1989: The Revolutions Across Eastern Europe
5. Arab Spring 2011: Unpredictability in Real Time
6. Iran Today: Scenarios, Parallels & Analytical Humility
7. Key Quotes & Timestamps
8. Conclusion

Introduction & Context

• Gordon introduces the episode’s theme, revisiting protests and crackdowns in Iran and questioning the ability of intelligence agencies to foresee revolutionary change (00:53).
• David & Gordon lay out their aim: to contextualize Iran's present within the broader history of intelligence analysis failures and successes, using examples from the 1979 Iranian revolution to 1989 and the Arab Spring (01:01–02:14).

The 1979 Iranian Revolution: Case Study in Intelligence Failure

Summary of Events & Regime Dynamics (03:51–07:57)

• David provides a “one-minute” (more like four-minute) primer on Iran's 1979 Revolution: unpopular Shah, fraying social contracts due to modernization and repression, economic downturn, oil sector strikes, and rise of Ayatollah Khomeini.
• The collapse followed a familiar cycle: mass protests, state violence, and rapid regime paralysis as the Shah, secretly terminally ill, left the country.

David (on the dynamics of 1979):
"The Shah's regime had managed this massive modernization program that had frayed a lot of its support among large numbers of Iranians... There was a cycle: mass protests, regime crackdowns, but never quite able to answer the unrest. And then Khomeini emerges with this revolutionary concept—a Shia Islamic theocracy." (04:33–06:14)

Why Didn’t Intelligence Agencies See It Coming?

The “Intelligence Failure” Debate (08:02–15:11)

• Widely seen as a failure:
  “Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation.” – CIA Analytic Division, August 1978 (08:29)
• David points out that both the CIA and the State Department’s INR underestimated the Shah’s fragility and were unaware of his illness (09:36–10:21).
• Key problem: bias and analytic anchoring (“The Shah is strong; opposition is weak”) meant warning signs were discounted. There was data in the system, but no coherent analytic framework to challenge prevailing assumptions.
• Robert Jervis’s critique: Intelligence reporting was reactive and fragmented, failing to form a methodical “pillars” analysis assessing regime stability (13:51–14:31).

Gordon:
“Isn’t that always the case with intelligence failures? The information is there, but because of political perceptions or what policymakers want, it doesn’t get to the top in the way it should. People aren’t willing to challenge established views.” (14:31)

The Limits of Predicting Revolutions

David:
“Is it even possible in revolutionary situations to anticipate the course of events?” (16:32)

Lessons from 1989: The Revolutions Across Eastern Europe

Key Insights from the Collapse of Communism (18:22–25:20)

• Gordon reflects on 1989: Western intelligence knew communism was decaying but missed the timing and scale of regime collapse.
• Bandwagon effect: Revolution in one country (e.g. Poland) sparked uprisings in others, culminating in the Berlin Wall’s fall.
• Even highly surveilled states (East Germany, Stasi) stumbled when fear “changed sides”—regimes began to fear the people more than the people feared the regime.
• Key moment: Leipzig, October 1989—security forces were ready to repress but did not, as elites dithered (22:48–23:40).

Gordon:
“There’s a great line from the time: fear changed sides. The regime started to fear the people, rather than the people fearing the regime. And that switch is hugely important.” (21:50–22:40)

• Foreign power incentives mattered: e.g., Soviet Union declining to intervene, a formative lesson for future leaders like Vladimir Putin (23:40–24:41).
• Repression can “work” to stop revolutions if it’s brutal and decisive (Hungary ’56, Prague ’68, Beijing ’89), but if it’s hesitant, protest can spread (25:20–27:27).

Arab Spring 2011: Unpredictability in Real Time

Analyst Perspective from Inside the CIA (27:43–32:49)

• David recounts firsthand experience: the Arab Spring’s “bandwagon” effect was unpredictable; careful “pillars” analysis did not allow for forecasting the exact outbreak or cascade of protest.
• He describes the analytical community’s initial belief that “it wouldn’t happen in my country”—contradicted by unfolding events (28:13–29:06).
• Watching the Egyptian protests from abroad, he observes how fear changed sides:
• Dynamic: Once citizens saw it was possible to oust a regime (e.g., Ben Ali in Tunisia), it emboldened people elsewhere.

David:
“What I thought was impossible two months ago is now possible… Everyone’s brains shift in a very short period of time. That’s the intelligence problem—and it’s why it’s impossible.” (30:26–31:18)

Iran Today: Scenarios, Parallels & Analytical Humility

Parallels with Syria—And Trump’s Caution (32:49–44:52)

• Mass protests often start from economic grievances and then escalate to regime-level demands.
• Fragmented oppositions, cycles of protest and repression, and the importance of the loyalty and cohesiveness of regime security forces all shape outcomes.
• In Syria, even after losing legitimacy, Assad’s regime survived due to unwavering coercive force and lack of elite defection.
• The mistake: outside observers confuse protests and legitimacy loss with imminent regime failure; actual collapse is rare without cracks within the coercive apparatus (37:18–39:12).
• US restraint in Iran, partly due to lessons from Libya/Syria, reflects wariness of unintended consequences ("military strikes… could lead to destabilization and chaos, as happened in Libya") (40:30–42:33).
• The more outside intervention, the longer civil conflict tends to last.

What Might Happen Next & Why It’s So Hard to See (44:52–51:55)

• The Iranian regime seems in its “death throes,” but such throes can last unpredictably long.
• There is no pathway for re-legitimizing itself via economic performance, as China once did, because of sanctions and crisis (45:26–46:18).
• Wishful thinking (“wish-casting”) among observers can cloud realistic intelligence: don’t confuse hope for prediction.
• The true state of the regime’s power lies in whether the security apparatus remains cohesive—so far, there’s little sign of cracks (49:08–49:12).

David:
“I hope things change for the Iranian people…but as an analyst, you have to be careful you don’t transpose your own desires onto the analysis.” (48:38–49:12)

• There remains a significant gap between what is known by the outside world and by those with privileged access ("the truth as reported in the press and what was seen in the intelligence picture" often did not overlap) (50:34–51:05).

Gordon:
“…ending on a note of humility is the right one about the ability to forecast these things… reasons why it’s hard to see cracks in a regime or in the elite or how the security forces are going to act.” (51:05–51:36)

Key Quotes & Timestamps

• Gordon: “Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation.” (CIA Assessment, 08:29)
• David: “There’s a fascinating cable… that identifies Khomeini as the leader of the revolution and has really insightful commentary on the extent to which Islam had become deeply embedded in the lives of a significant portion of the Iranian population…” (11:58)
• Gordon: “A great line from the time: fear changed sides. The regime started to fear the people, rather than the people fearing the regime.” (22:30)
• Gordon: “If you half-repress, it doesn’t work… you often just spur more protests…” (26:30)
• David: “Everyone’s brains shift in a very short period of time. That’s the intelligence problem—and it’s why it’s impossible.” (31:18)
• David: “There’s a tendency… to conflate a regime’s loss of legitimacy with its imminent demise. And that ignores the ability of regimes to adapt—and the criticality of the loyalty of the security apparatus.” (39:10)
• David: “I don’t see the cracks yet in the coercive apparatus. That’s the critical piece here. And I just don’t see it yet.” (49:08)
• Gordon: “Ending on a note of humility is the right one about the ability to forecast these things… a lot of people have tried… but it could come down to individual decisions.” (51:05)

Conclusion

The episode concludes with a sober recognition of just how limited analysts (and outsiders) are in foreseeing regime collapse—even with hindsight. Whether in 1979, 1989, 2011, or today, intelligence is fragmentary, analysis is prone to bias and wishful thinking, and—critically—events are shaped as much by split-second (and often hidden) decisions within the security services as by popular will. The future of Iran’s regime, they agree, remains unpredictable—not for lack of method, but because in revolutionary moments, reality can change far faster than any analytic framework can keep up.

For further insights, including first-hand interviews and ongoing analysis, listeners are encouraged to join “The Declassified Club” at The Rest Is Classified.