A (3:05)

HP understands that approximately 4 in 10 UK businesses have reported cyber breaches in the past 12 months alone. That's why HP business laptops, desktops and workstations bought directly on HP Store or are secure straight out of the box with their endpoint security.

B (3:22)

No more stressing about dodgy emails or unexplained pop ups. HP's independently verified Wolff Pro Security works alongside your existing security tools to protect your business users and reputation from malware and evolving cyber threats. With your first click, you don't need

A (3:40)

an alias or a secret hideout to stay safe, just WolffPro security working tirelessly to protect your hard work. It's security that's built in, not bolted on.

B (3:50)

Find out more about how HP can protect your business@hp.com Classified podcast listeners benefit from a 10% discount on all business PCs, printers and accessories using the code TRIC10. Terms and conditions apply.

D (4:09)

Starting a business can seem like a daunting task unless you have a partner like Shopify. They have the tools you need to start and grow your business. From designing a website to marketing, to selling and beyond, Shopify can help with everything you need. There's a reason millions of companies like Mattel, Heinz and Allbirds continue to trust and use them. With Shopify on your side, turn your big business idea into sign up for your $1 per month trial@shopify.com specialoffer

B (4:38)

yeah, and Arush, you set this up a bit at the end of the last episode. The idea that this was a new regime which was intrinsically opposed to the United States and to capitalism and to the west because of its very nature. But also I think what's important is it seeks to export its revolution, doesn't it? That's one of the core proponents of the 1979 revolution, is that it wants to spread the revolution internationally and beyond its borders.

C (5:10)

Yes. So the Islamic Republic is, you know, militant and revolutionary from the beginning, opposed to capitalism, opposed to communism, and it does want to export it. Although what does this exporting actually means and how do you do that? While being a state that is a member of the community of nations and a member of the United nations, this becomes a contradiction that the Islamic Republic has to deal with in its entire life. And in fact, I would say this, that it's important to remember these dualities of the Islamic Republic. Islamic Republic is never a simple story. It's because from the very beginning, it's really driven by a lot of Internal disagreements, like, you know, are we following Iranian national interest or not? Especially diplomats who have, you know, a lot of them have actually come from the Shah's regime. But even the new diplomats, they come to adopt some visions of Iran, Iranian national interest. Is our economy more socialist or more capitalist? Because what is Islamic economy doesn't mean anything. And also, why are we having such a beef with the United States, or should we have this beef or should we work with it? So in reality, none of this turns out to be so neat. In the 1980s, of course, Iran, the first country that attacks Iran in 1980, it's Saddam Hussein's Iraq. And that's not a US ally, it's kind of a Soviet ally, but it's also kind of anti communist of its own. So in many ways, Saddam says Iraq was more similar to Iran than many other regimes in the world. But it attacks it and Iran has to defend itself for a few years. The war goes on for eight years because Iran really pursue it, even after kicking Iraqis out of Iranian territory. And Iran, do you think, sells arms to Iran? Secretly, of course, in this period, Israel and the United States, this becomes the Iran Contra affair. So I guess what I'm trying to say is that this regime is very noxious from the very beginning to its neighbors and to the world because it wants to spread Khomeinism and its revolution. And there are a lot of internal fights. Let me just say, for example, that there are elements of the regime who immediately they try to organize a queen, Bahrain, they try to destabilize the Saudi regiment. And the system sort of reins them in. Actually, the system reins them in, but it does pursue other forms of durable transnational activity.

A (7:26)

And I guess this kind of conversion of a potentially amenable, downtrodden Shia community and a geopolitical opening which occurs through the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, is that these new sort of intelligence organizations, security organizations of the Islamic Republic, step into that chaos in Lebanon and begin to create or kind of stitch these Shia groups together into what will eventually become Hezbollah.

C (7:59)

Absolutely. And that kind of even predates the invasion. Iranian Shia revolutionaries have helped organize the Lebanese Shia and the 1970s, they helped fund Amalgamate, which is a Shia party. But Hezbollah comes to be after the Iranian revolution by the initiative of what is called the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, this militia that is founded in 1979 to guard the revolution and different Lebanese Shia groups. So some who are supporters of the Dava Party, which is a Shia party founded in Iraq, some who are more Sort of clerical. Some actually have some links to the Palestinian movement. And all of these are open to all sorts of different divisions because Lebanon has been in a Civil War since 1975. Right. In this civil war, Shia and the Palestinians are not really on the same side necessarily. Anyways, not to get bogged down to too much detail, but Hezbollah, Hezbollah really is the jewel in the crown of Iran's, what later becomes known as Iran's axis of resistance. And you can say it's Iran's transactional activity because it sort of hits the right spot because it's a party that really comes to represent the Lebanese Shia for a period after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It's fighting an active invasion. So it has the legitimacy of a national resistance movement. It's a very, it's a success story, basically. And Iran does it because Iranians have this authority amongst the Shia. They're seen as, you know, the big Shia country and who has just led a successful Islamic revolution. So they know what they're talking about. So, so they're looked up to. And Hezbollah builds itself up during the 1980s and it starts a new, of course, chapter in Iranian American enmity by a dramatic attack on the U.S. marines.

B (9:41)

Yeah, we should say, I mean, that really is one of the kind of defining events for the 80s, isn't it, the attacks on the US embassy in the US Marine barracks in Beirut by Hezbollah, where you've got these suicide truck bombs effectively killing, I mean, hundreds of American servicemen. I mean, it's incredibly deadly, isn't it, David?

A (10:00)

So In April of 83, a suicide bomber, Hezbollah suicide bomber drives a truck packed with explosives into the US embassy in Beirut that kills 63 people. And then just six months later or so in October of 83, another truck bomb is driven into the Marine barracks at Beirut Airport. And of course the US said that's a whole separate story of why the US has gotten involved in Lebanon. And 241American servicemen were killed. It's actually the deadliest day for the US Marines since the battle of Iwo Jima against the Japanese in the Second World War. So to take this back to some of the justifications for the, for Operation Epic Fury, I mean this, this period is sort of front and center because we have, we have Iranian backed, supported, directed, financed, armed Hezbollah terrorists who are killing, killing American servicemen and women and civilians at the, at the embassy in Beirut. So I think a lot of the enmity can be traced back not just to what's going on in Iran, but Of course, to the way the Iranians have kind of exported this revolutionary brand of anti American Shia Islam into Lebanon.

C (11:07)

And Hezbollah does several actions against the U.S. they, they arrest and severely torture and kill. Yeah, the station chief of, of, of the CIA in Beirut and they take hostage tons of people, Europeans and Americans. And Iran openly uses these hostages in negotiations with Americans. And of course President Reagan's withdraws from Lebanon Right. In response to the bombing. That's part of this story. I should also say here that my good friend and someone who I've always looked up to, Kim Ratas, has a beautiful new book from what I understand coming on about the 80s. And yeah, Kim has an excellent book called Black Wave about the region post 1979.

A (11:51)

But her it's an exceptional book.

C (11:52)

I think it really is an exceptional book. I agree with you 100%. And her new book, I think it's gonna be very illuminating for a lot of us as well. Looking to Lebanon in the 80s and you know, all that is happening there,

B (12:04)

obviously a lot of that is directed against Israel and that's where Hezbollah's main activity is in Lebanon. I mean it is this idea that it's intrinsic to Iran, that it wants ISRA Israel wiped off the map. Is that actually an accurate reflection of the policy or is it kind of bluster? Is it talk? How should we understand that position?

C (12:27)

Well, it's a fascinating point to talk about. The Islamic Republic sets itself the cause of destroying Israel from early on and it's very clear what it means. It means that Israel shouldn't be there. It's a legitimate colonial entity usurping Muslim lands and it shouldn't be there. And they really do believe this a belief that is common across, you know, much of the global left at the time and now, but they take it seriously. And anyways, so this is the ethus of the Islamic Republic. Now it definitely goes toward it. It first of all commits to it to diplomatically. I opposes a two state solution and repeatedly states supports armed militias who will take armed action against Israel. In fact, since the 1980s, the only state in the world that really takes action against Israel is Iran. The only state who actually fires bullets at Israel is Iran a state? I, you know, I don't call the Houthis because they're not an official state. Right. So there are a couple of complications though. First of all, they're not as stupid. They know that Israel is a nuclear armed state. They know it's not a goal that they can achieve immediately, but it's nevertheless a goal that they follow and as I said, they arm all these groups about it, they take actions against it, they have these positions. Secondly, like everything else in the Islamic Republic, this is not uncontested. And from early on and certainly later from the 90s, elements inside the Islamic Republic say, look, this is silly. We are sacrificing all we have on this quest to destroy Israel. We should give this up and we should be like other countries say, accept the two state solution. Effectively. If the Palestinians come to an agreement with Israelis, Iran won't be more Catholic than the Pope and would accept it. They've come to say that. So it is true. But it has these two, two caveats, if you will.

A (14:30)

Well, and you know, certainly in the the 80s and 90s, I think you could characterize it as a period of kind of freewheeling, almost revolutionary adventurism on the part of the Iranians to some degree. I accept the point that there's, there are constraints, but you know, there's, there's the support for Hezbollah, which turns kind of over this period as you get into the 2000s from a kind of proxy into maybe more of a partner as Hezbollah becomes more established in Lebanon, particularly when the Israelis withdraw in 2000. And on the terrorism side, though, it's fascinating to me that, I mean, you have these pretty significant attacks that occur, like for example, Khobar Towers bombing in Tehran, Saudi Arabia in 1996. 19 U.S. air Force personnel are killed. That's done with Iranian sort of direction and patronage through Saudi Hezbollah. There's bombings of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, a Jewish community center there in 1994. Kind of the same script of the Iranians directing this, funding it, supporting it. That was done, you know, those attacks in South America done by, done by Hezbollah. But as you get to 9 11, I think this, it's interesting because it's

C (15:47)

maybe

A (15:50)

one of the only times in this history where you could say there was potentially a different. Is there a path forward here for the US and Iran to go on a different, you know, have a different kind of relationship? Because some of the openings that the Iranians suggested were there were quite fascinating to look back on.

B (16:05)

Yeah, I did a bit of reporting actually around this time of 9 11, and because the two sides actually kind of cooperated a bit over Afghanistan, didn't they?

C (16:13)

A lot more than a bit, yeah.

B (16:15)

The 911 attacks. Yeah. Directed by Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, where they're being sheltered by the Taliban. And actually both the US And Iran have an interest in getting rid of the Taliban and changing the regime there. So there's a really interesting period, isn't there, where there are openings, there's a bit of talks, there's some sign that perhaps there's the possibility of rapprochement. And then Iran is labeled part of the axis of evil. Because I think my recollection of looking at it was that there were hard liners on both sides in Washington and in Tehran who are basically like, we do not want to move closer. We do not want to see that happen.

C (16:52)

Yes, definitely. So the factional politics on both sides are important to understand. So in Iran, there are many who from the 90s on want to push for Iran to become a normal state, basically to establish relations with the US to just become more normalist. And these are not the people who are doing Buenos Aires. They're not the people who are doing the bombing in Dahran, Saudi Arabia, which is a very fascinating episode generally because there's also this fight over Saudi Arabia. Is Saudi Arabia our neighbor or is it a illegitimate kingdom we need to overthrow or something in between? There are different fights about this, but in terms of 2001 and 9 11. So following 9 11, US and Iran work very closely in Afghanistan. I mean, they have the same goal. They want to overthrow Taliban. Iran has an important role in the Bonn conference, which helps sort of bring about establish a government in Afghanistan that could follow. And the access of evil speech leaves not only Iranians by surprise, this is a state of the union by President Bush in January 2002. It doesn't only leave Iranians by surprise. It leaves U.S. diplomats who were conducting the talks and working closely with Iran, basically military collaboration. In surprise, there's a story that, you know, Qasem Soleimani and his people show up to talk to the Americans and they have brought a map. You know, they're saying, oh, this is all the bases of Taliban. And the US side sort of can't believe it that they've come to offer so much. And at some point they're like, oh, well, can we like copy this map? They're like, no, no, this is your copy. Like, we made it for you. And they, you know, and they. And they give it. So there was really close collaboration going on. And the axis of evil speech doesn't immediately put an end to it, but it makes it clear that obviously that's not a direction. And look, the Bush administration really flirts with the idea that has been tempting ever since before and since of maybe we can just get rid of these guys. Maybe Instead of trying to figure out who's the little nicer Mulan and stuff, maybe we can just get rid of these guys. Yeah. And of course, they were on their high horse after Iraq and they also. It's in this period. It's in this period that they reject the Goldie man letter. This is a very important document.

B (19:13)

Yeah, let's. Let's set this up because we have the Axis of evil speech. Then March 2003, Iraq, which is, of course Iran's longtime adversary, is removed from power, which I guess, you know, the Iranians are pretty happy about. But equally they can see the language in Washington, which is first Baghdad and then Tehran. You know, a lot of the kind of hardcore neocons are saying, they used

C (19:35)

to say, boys go to Iraq, real men go to Iran. I mean, that was the.

B (19:39)

Yeah, that was the language. Yeah, I do remember that. And so at that point, the Iranians reach out, don't they, in that period and basically offer to. There are back channel contacts to say, let's do a deal. We can find some way of accommodating your worries and your demands.

C (19:55)

This is the Goldie man letter. So they send it to, through the Swiss ambassador to Iran, Tim Goldman, and Swiss was the protector of US interest in Iran. Right. And. Yeah, and they basically offer to normalize ties with the US they offered to give up on this anti Israel line, basically, that effectively adopt a more twisted position and. Yeah, and give up the Al Qaeda members who were in Iran.

B (20:19)

And the US Isn't interested, is it?

C (20:20)

No. US Rejects that, basically. The US Rejects it. Yeah, the US Rejects it. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

A (20:28)

When was it sent? What, what year?

C (20:30)

I think it's 2003.

B (20:32)

2000.

C (20:32)

I think it's right after the invasion.

A (20:34)

It's.

C (20:34)

It's.

B (20:35)

Yeah.

C (20:35)

May 2003. I was going to say May 2003.

B (20:38)

Yeah.

C (20:39)

They freak out. Yeah, they freak out. I mean, they think, oh, wow. I mean, I was a young boy in Iran. I remember that. Right. The idea was the US Came to Afghanistan, it came to Iraq. It's just, you know, it took over the whole region. And there was a sense that you were surrounded by the US and they freak out. So they give that letter and the US Says no, because they think they can overthrow the government in Iran.

A (21:03)

Well, and I think this Iraq moment is an important one because it frames so much of the geopolitical story to come, which is from the Iranian standpoint, it's like massive opportunity, but also massive risk. Right. On the risk side, the US has just knocked out Saddam and the Taliban. And it's done so relatively quickly, as seen from 2003, 2004. And to your point, the Americans are rejecting any sort of outreach from Iran, and maybe we're next. But the, the promise or sort of the opportunity side of this is that Washington has also knocked out the two other big boys on either literally on, on your, on your eastern border and your western border. And so you, as the Iranians, now have, I think, more space to sort of explore your neighborhood and expand your interests and influence regionally because the big boy, Saddam in particular, has been, has been knocked out. And I think this, this Iraq experience really sets a new kind of collision course for the US And Iran because we never square this fundamental dilemma, which is if Washington is trying to build a stable and more representative system of governance in Iraq, it has to include factions, Shia parties that are going to be in relationship with or under the influence of Iran.

C (22:33)

Right, yeah.

A (22:34)

So it has to do that. And yet at the same time, the US is trying to resist all manner of Iranian influence in Iraq, and those two things are, are sort of working directly in contradiction to one another throughout the entirety of the US Occupation.

C (22:49)

That's right, yeah. No, you put it very well. This is a contradiction that they have to deal with.

B (22:54)

And I mean, it's worth saying as well that the Iranians, and particularly the Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah, the Quds Force, also get very involved in supporting groups fighting the Americans in Iran.

C (23:07)

Exactly.

B (23:07)

This is another important moment. And I mean, it's something which Americans, I understand why Americans get incredibly angry about, about this, because their view is the Iranians were supplying the weapons and the training and giving the expertise to kill American troops. But from the Iranian point of view, you can absolutely see the logic, which is you've got a country which has moved in next door to you and which is threatening to attack you next. You want to bog it down and to cause as many problems for it to stop it thinking it can take you next. So there is a kind of dark logic to that position as well, but which claims, I think, many American lives.

C (23:44)

Yes, it claims many American lives. And the Iranians helped build themselves in Iraq like that. So they, you know, this is Qassem Soleimani's life achievement, if you will. Right. So he's the head of the Quds Force from 1998. He's appointed as the head of the Quds Force, or the Jerusalem Force, as it's called, which is basically the external operations wings of the Revolutionary Guards and the Quds Force that it's called Jerusalem Force because of course, the ultimate goal is liberation of Jerusalem. The Ghost Force helps run Hezbollah in Lebanon. Its first guy, by the way, first leader of the Quds Force before Ghassem Soleimani is a guy called Ahmad Vahili, who is today the head of the irgc. He was, after the US just killed the last head. Ahmed Wahidi was appointed as head and you know, he helped Hezbollah in the 80s. Again, a kind of tough guy, to use Trumpian language. So Qasem Soleimani is appointed in 1988. He's kind of led, he's been Iran's drug czar, effectively fighting the drugs in the, in the late 80s and 90s. And he's helped the anti Taliban forces in Afghanistan before that. And now in the late 90s, in 1988, he's appointed as the head of the Horse Force. And Iraq is going to be one of five years of the job. You know, he has this assignment effectively of leading the Shia forces in Iraq and he makes it his life's work and is able to build personal relationship with the Shia militias. And Iran is really able to use it precisely two things to effectively dominate Iraq. First, the democratic system, because actually it's a pretty good system for foreigners to use sometimes because you know, you can. All you need is to get people to vote for your candidates. Right. And the sectarian civil war that ends up happening between Shias and Sunnis and Iran helps. Iran is both responding to it and helps exacerbate it. Right. So out of this quagmire, Iran comes to control and have a tight relationship with tons of Shia militias in Iraq. And this becomes Iraq becomes a central theater of Iranian American confrontation.

A (25:55)

And Qasem Soleimani is, is it fair to say that he's the architect of that strategy or is he?

C (26:01)

No, he's definitely architect of that strategy in Iraq 100%. Yes. So he, he, you know, especially on the military side, I mean, Khamenei is the mastermind also, but Soleimani is the one who, who actually does it.

A (26:14)

And I would say the, you know, just to round out the point on sort of, you know, again, bring this back to kind of the central exam question of the series, which is why the US and Iran at such odds? And what does the secret history tell us about that? On the Iraq point, you know, the Iranians are probably responsible for 1 in 6 US combat fatalities in Iraq. So when you look at the Pentagon, they put out numbers in 2019 and tied back 603 deaths of US personnel in Iraq to attacks conducted by Iranian backed militants. And a huge part of this was not all of it, but a huge part of it were these things called EFPs or explosively formed penetrators, which essentially weird kind of mixture of it's an extremely cheap way to conduct attacks, but you also need state production capacity to build these kind of metal tubes. And I should say listeners to our podcast will appreciate this that Gordon has edited out all of my detail on EFPs. It was a classic, classic Gordon Carrera fashion. But essentially what it is is it's like a, it's like a metal tube that sends a cannon almost like this charge, an explosively formed charge, and it shoots it out essentially into vehicles in a very sort of directed way very quickly. And these were devastating against these kind of mine resistant ambush protected vehicles that the US was using in Iraq to counter the threat from improvised explosive devices. The Iranians supplied a lot of the sort of piping, the fabricated piping that militants used and it led to 600 US personnel deaths in Iraq. So you know that when I talk to colleagues of mine who worked the Iraq issue and the Iran issue, you know, after the Iraq war, this is one of the more visceral kind of charges against the Iranians that still gets people extremely, with I think, good reason, extremely furious.

B (28:16)

Yeah, I think it's really interesting because it does in a way the hostage crisis was for a previous generation what happened in Iraq, particularly I think for US military and intelligence for the new generation. But there was also another vector for tension between the US and Iran, which was Iran's nuclear program. So let's take a break and then when we'll come back, we'll have a look at that and bring it right up to Epic Fury today. Well, welcome back. We're looking at that growing tension between the US and Iran. And another aspect of it was the nuclear program. I mean, there'd been a nuclear power program back to the Shah's days. And I think after the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini was initially kind of resistant to the idea of nuclear weapons. The work of the devil. But of course you then have the war with Iraq. The question about whether Iraq is, is developing weapons of mass destruction, as you call them, chemical weapons, but also nuclear. And so Iran is, is looking, you know, to build quite quietly the capacity for the, for the bomb. And then in 2002 it get, it goes public, doesn't it, because the Natanz program is exposed to the world by an Iranian opposition group. And Then you have from that period onwards, the growth of the tension. I mean, really, the story of the start of the story, which takes us up today, which is what is going to be done about Iran's plans for a bomb? Can it be slowed down? Can it be stopped? Can it be contained? Is it something the world could live with? And clearly, Israel feels like it can't, even though it's a nuclear state. Arash, I guess on the bomb itself, maybe we should just briefly explain. They haven't raced for a bomb itself, have they? They've raced for the potential to have a bomb, but quite consistently through this period. Why is that so important?

C (30:12)

Well, Iran tries. Tries a nuclear program like many other states do. And it looks like by the US estimates, by 2003, it stops all weapons work. Before 2003, it had sort of toyed with that, but after that, it insists on its nuclear program. And this is really one of the follies of Khamenei, again, the supreme leader of Iran. There's this terrible mistake that the Iranian regime obviously makes, which is that they neither dart toward a bomb, which they haven't really done weapons work since 2003. Had they done it, you could say, okay, fair to complete. Now, Iran has nuclear weapons, no deal with it, but nor do they give it up fully enough to stave off all the sanctions and all this pressure that's on them. So, yes, Iran does sign a nuclear deal with the US and a group of five other countries in 2015. And yes, it is the Iran signs this deal in 2015, it's the US under President Trump, that leaves it in 2018. But Iran had ample opportunities to go back to a deal. It had this under the Biden administration. It had it under in the rest of Trump's first term and even in Trump's second term. And they never really do this. So because Khamenei, it's very fascinating, Khamenei is very worried. He does not want Iran to become normalized with the U.S. and so Khamenei's very genius tactical move was declared a few years ago that around 2019, I think he formalizes it, which says Iran will not negotiate and there won't be a war. Right. So he refuses to negotiate with the US but there won't be a war either. Of course, Iran both negotiated and there was a war, and finally he was killed in that war. So it's a folly of Iran and the way Iran sinks all his resources into his nuclear program. Nuclear program becomes the locus of its problems with the World, tons of sanctions by us, by European countries and others on Iran because of its desire to. Because of its nuclear program. But as. Had he given. Had he given it all up? I mean, you know, there was nothing that Iran could gain by this nuclear program that was as important as. As all the sanctions and all the pressure Iran faces.

B (32:27)

Did he see it as leverage? I mean, was that what it was? Or is it intrinsic to the regime we must be allowed to develop nuclear power stroke, nuclear weapons?

C (32:35)

No, I think he saw it as defiance.

B (32:38)

Defiance.

C (32:38)

So it has defiance. And look, the point about the Islamic Republic is it does not want to integrate into the regional and global order. It wants to be this defiant fortress, Right? So Ayatollah Khomeini, when he. In 1988, when he accepts the ceasefire of the rock, which was seen as given up on this quest to overthrow Saddam and march to Jerusalem and all that, right, what does he do Right after he does a couple of crazy things just to remind the world that he's still got it. In the Valentine's Day of 1989, February 14, 1989, he does the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, just out of the blue. This is British author who's written this book. No one's talking about this book in Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei hasn't read it, but he says puts a fatwa in his head, which follows Mr. Rushdie all his life and as you know, led to. Finally led to an attack on him in the U.S. yeah. In which he almost lost his life. Chatako in New York. But so anyways, the point is that why does. It's. I think the Rushdie fatwa is very important in understanding Islamic Republic. Why does Ayatollah Khomeini give the fatwa? Like, what estate policy is achieved by this? The policy of showing to the world that Iran is defiant and that it won't play by your rules. So the nuclear. So it's not about the nukes, it's not about the fatwa, it's not about the Holocaust denial. Why does Ayatollah Khamenei keep doing the Holocaust denial? I mean, it doesn't help anybody. What it does help is to show that Iran will not play by rules a genuine revolutionary, defiant state.

B (34:21)

Yeah, so it's interesting. So it goes back to your point that it's intrinsic to the regime, this defiance and this confrontational attitude.

C (34:28)

No, I don't really. I don't like the word intrinsic, usually, because it. Because it can suggest that it cannot change, but.

B (34:35)

Right.

C (34:35)

And I do think it can.

B (34:36)

It's a choice.

C (34:37)

It's a choice.

B (34:38)

Yeah. It's a choice by the leaders. It's a choice by the excessive leaders.

C (34:41)

Exactly.

B (34:41)

To pursue that policy.

C (34:43)

And the choice contested by many is a choice contested by many in the regime. They just lose the power. So people like Hassan Rouhani, the former president, I mean, he clearly doesn't like this choice, but he loses the internal power battle to Khamenei.

A (34:57)

And I think it's worth, you know, as we just are sort of bringing this thing forward in time and getting closer to the start of epic fury. I mean, you know, there's this kind of this defiance, this policy, this choice of defiance of resistance. You know, I kind of see this period around the end of the nuclear deal. So when Trump. When Trump essentially unilaterally walks away from it in 2018 is kind of the high watermark of this strategy. I'm curious what you think of this take Arash. But if you look at the kind of 2018, 2019 period, when you look regionally, you look at Iran has stabilized Bashar al Assad, seemingly stabilized Bashar al Assad in Syria. So they have. Their Syrian ally, Hezbollah is looking pretty strong after the 2006 war with the Israelis, where they've kind of claimed victory. Iranian influence is growing in Iraq. There's a Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut land quarter that's opened up. Qassem Soleimani has kind of overseen this architecture of building up these partners and proxies all throughout the region. Again, another point where Trump and the advisors around him have kind of labeled the Iranian regional position as a menace. And then at home, it seems at that point in time, like this strategy of kind of not quite giving on the nuclear program, but also using it as leverage with the US with the international community, as paying some dividends for Khamenei and the people around him. And then it starts to tip. And I think we see a period starting, and I kind of mark the turning point as the actual the assassination of Ghassim Soleimani, which takes place in January of 2020. But around that period of time, it's essentially, it begins a string of, I would say, losses and setbacks for the regime externally and internally that more or less bring us up to the point where we're at today.

B (37:04)

And Arash, I mean, Soleimani is killed by a US Drone strike. Under President Trump, this huge figure. You've talked about his importance. It's fascinating, though. There wasn't much of a response from Iran, was there? I've always found that a little bit odd. Why that? What does that tell us?

C (37:23)

It's a very excellent question. And we're talking six years later. It's because Ayatollah Khamenei has a contradiction, which is that he wants to keep on defiance. He wants to keep on death to America. But he knows he doesn't want a war. He doesn't want a war. He knows a direct confrontation with the US Will be suicidal for him. Right? He understands that. So he does this or he does what? Islamic Republic has made an art play here and there, right? Attack Argentina when you can. Do terror operations that can't be claimed back to you. Build these little militias in different countries that you surround the US And Israel with, but without getting into direct confrontation. Build a nuclear weapon, but build a nuclear program, but not a nuclear weapon. Basically tease your way around these things, right? And President Trump obviously doesn't like that, right? He doesn't play by those rules. So he, you know, he killed Soleimani, which went against everything that they had thought possible. And Khamenei blinks effectively. He attacks Ain Al Assad in Iraq. They also down the Iranian. Down a Ukrainian airliner, which is an episode of its own. Many people believe they did it on purpose in order to effectively prevent a war. I mean, there are some sort of strange theories there, but the fact of the matter is the IRGC shoot down a Ukrainian airliner and killed all, everybody in it. Now, they said it was by mistake, of course, but a lot of people don't believe that anyways. But the point is, look, basically this strategy unravels and it unravels from that day. You're like, okay, you can't get to just shout death to America for 40 years. What are you going to do about it now?

B (39:11)

Their bluff is called.

C (39:12)

Their bluff is called by Trump. So, you know, by the. In the first term and then in the second term.

B (39:17)

But it's interesting because I think of October 7, 2023, and the attack on Israel by Hamas is another big turning point, because that is the point at which Israel's risk calculus changes about what it's willing to tolerate in the region and what it's willing to do and how aggressive it's willing to be. And of course, one of the things it does as well as going into Gaza is it goes after Hezbollah and it goes after very hard and kills the leadership of Hezbollah, the great Iranian proxy. This is all the beginning of what is leading us up to today, isn't it? Is partly Israel shifting its position 100%.

C (39:56)

I mean this is very clearly a post October 7th world. I mean it's clear that that is a very important turning point because in response to October 7th, which is this big calamity in Israel, it kills hundreds more than a thousand Israeli civilians. It's a huge shock to Israel. And Israel starts a devastating war on Gaza. But it also starts going after the axis of resistance, dismantling it one by one. So effectively degrades Hezbollah. And degrading of Hezbollah also helps with the fall of Assad regime. The Assad regime is of course attacked by the Syrian revolutionaries and the credit belongs to them by bringing it down. But of course, you know, Israel's degrading of Hezbollah has helped and I believe Iran was not consulted on October 7th. I don't think they knew it was happening. Khamenei would have never approved such a thing I think because he's, you know, he's much more risk averse. So. Yeah, but what follows is that Israel helps decimate the axis of resistance. But actually look, we have to think about the fall of the axis in several ways. Inside Lebanon and Iraq there's also rising Shia constituencies that are unhappy with this system. They're unhappy that their interest is not represented by a sort of cliques linked to Tehran, their whole political system. Iraq and Lebanon are not fun places to live as a result of this. Basically the political system is unresponsive to citizens demands. The state is ineffective and divided. So there's in 2019 there are important mass movements in Iraq and in Lebanon against, against the sectarian system in these countries which is again effectively against Iran's rule. This is very important, often forgotten actually in 2019 in Iraq this really leads to the appointment of the first non Islamist prime minister of Iraq since 2003. And that's Mustafa Qazmi, a guy who wants to hew Iraq closer to Saudi Arabia, to Jordan, to Egypt, to Arab countries and not to Iran. And I would say Iraq has never gone back basically under Kazmi's successor, Muhammad Shia Sudani, even though there's a long history of how Sudani came to be and he was basically considered to be a pro Iran candidate compared to the previous, compared to Kazmi and compared to the fact that Moktad Al Sadr, this Shia cleric who really came out against Iran had tried to organize a government that he had tried to organize a government that was more explicitly anti Iran. But even Sudani continues the path of Qadhimi. So you have this development in Iraq, you have the degrading of Hezbollah. You have the most important fall of the Assad regime in Syria. So Iran effectively sees the fall of its axis. And of course, you also have repeated Israeli attacks on Iran, which are massive intelligence failure on part of the regime.

B (42:47)

Israelis, which show the weakness.

C (42:49)

Yes, Israelis steal the Iranian nuclear archives, all of it. They literally, with two guys on a motorbike, they put the entire nuclear archives on the back of two motorbikes and storm out of Iran. They kill Fakhrizadeh, who's really the father of Iranian nuclear program, and they kill him in his very safe compound outside Tehran. They kill Ismail Haniy at the head of Hamas as he's visiting Iran, which is a huge humiliation, of course, in his. In, in. In Lebanon. By hitting Hezbollah, they also kill Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah. So all of this really degrades Iran and leaves, you know, leaves it much more defenseless when it comes to the

A (43:31)

current war, which I think really does bring us up to, to Epic Fury. I mean, where, where we are today, I think rash. I mean, this is the. I, I threatened in the first episode that I was going to do this, that I'm going to, I'm going to, I'm going to follow through on my, my threat, which is to look you in the eye and ask you where do you think this is headed? And maybe I'll break it into maybe two questions. I think the first is, you know, of all of the different reasons that have been given for Epic Fury, what do you think is the most compelling? Why. Why are the US And Israel doing this right now?

C (44:10)

Oh, I think that, that one's. That wasn't easy to answer. I think, I think it's not about the nuclear weapons. I think it's not about Iran's missiles. I think it's not about, you know, the proxies. It is about regime change. I mean, they wanted to get rid of the Islamic Republic. They believe Islamic Republic is a. Torn on their side since 1979. And they want to finally do something with it, finally do something that has evaded every president since President Carter. I think that's how Trump looks at it, and that's how Israelis look at it. They think we are on a roll. We hit all over the axis. Let's go to what people used to call the head of the snake. Right. And they thought this is possible because there was also a massive domestic movement against, against the regime and that had battered it, come up time and time against it. Of course, it appears very foolish to me as as a sort of goal, because how are you going to achieve it? What's the plan exactly here? What do you think is going to happen? Maybe we'll know in a few months that I was wrong and they had a plan. Unless, unfortunately, I think for many Israelis and even many in the Israeli regime, in the Israeli government, and maybe perhaps some in the U.S. they don't mind, they don't, they don't want a democracy in Iran or sort of the transition to see something else. And Iran that is degraded, disintegrated, weak and therefore not a threat is also acceptable. I think it's very clear the Israelis don't mind that. And some in the US Might also. The president has unfortunately and alarmingly, for example, said that maybe the map of Iran will probably not look the same after. Although you also can't, you know, the statements he makes off the cuff to the press are, it's not always clear their expression of a state policy, let's say. Anyways, so I think they wanted to do this and I think the president, I think President Trump, I think he loved what happened in Venezuela, the Venezuela stell transition. It's a very neat thing when you look at it from his goals. He went in, he took the president out. They had probably behind the scene, worked with this other person from insider, Jean Dulce Rodriguez, who came out and said, great, we'll work with the US Everything is great now. And, you know, we'll sell oil and basically we're friends now. I mean, it's remarkable that they established diplomatic relations already two months later. Right. And I think President Trump loved that and he thought, well, great, I can do that. And I think the thinking was, well, if you kill Ayatollah Khamenei, surely the next leader is going to be like, well, I don't want to be killed, so I'll play ball with the U.S. and of course, it's going to be much more complicated in the case of Iran. And that's, you know, that's why things are not looking great for the US war effort at the moment.

B (46:54)

They've willed the end, which is getting rid of the regime, but not the means to get there. But I also think this point about the history and the hostility is interesting, isn't it? Because Trump himself, I think, did some interviews around 1980 about the hostage crisis, saying, why don't we just attack them? I can't believe they've taken our people hostage. He is someone, because of his age, who's lived through this history of enmity between the two countries, including back to the hostage crisis. And therefore, I think, would love his legacy to be. I'm the one who dealt with the Iranian problem in a way none of these previous presidents did. So I think the history, and that's why he references the history kind of that we've been talking about defines him and what he wants. But as you said, that doesn't mean he's going to get it.

C (47:33)

I mean, I think any US President, I think anybody who was becoming US President, US has this presidential cult, right? It's very important. Like, you know, presidents are very defined. They're defined by their achievements. You have isopresidential cult because, I mean, it's not necessarily the same in other systems, right, that everything is attributed to the president. They're defined by their achievements and their failures. So every president, I think, will have a bucket list of things like, what are the things I can do to like to put my place in history? And of course, I think Iran has been one of it since President Clinton at least, right? Like, you know, what if I am the person who can solve this Persian puzzle, you know, who can solve the Iranian problem, basically? So I think it's a temptation for any president, I think anybody who wants to become president. I mean, a temptation for them. Of course, it's. And, you know, it was for President Obama, obviously, and he has spent so much diplomatic effort to. So much effort. It's kind of crazy if you remember how much of the effort that the US Government went to the Iranian file during the Obama administration, much less, for example, went to the Israeli Palestinian file, which the U.S. which he also tried to crack. So, yes, I think it's not surprising at all that someone like President Trump would want to solve it. And he's been rather obsessed with it since his first term. But can I also say there's a consistency to President Trump that he's always basically his whole. Since his first term, he said, look, I don't care who is in charge of Iran. I don't care if it's democracy or not. All I want is that they play by these, you know, they play by these rules and they stop these things against the US don't have a nuclear weapon and all that. So he was ready to negotiate in the first term. They didn't negotiate with him in the second term. He negotiated and he waged the war at the same time. And now here we are. And I think he's now come to the conclusion that, okay, no, actually I'm convinced by the Israelis we can and must get rid of the regime. But I think in his mind, getting on the regime can still mean, as I said, that Venezuela is still transition if each power passes to someone else inside the regime.

A (49:42)

Yeah. Arash, last question. To close out this, I think this series, we've been obviously talking about the history of the conflict, the secret conflict between the US And Iran. Do you see a scenario, a plausible scenario at the end of epic fury that leads to a better relationship between the US And Iran?

C (50:06)

The short answer is yes. I was opposed to this war and I am opposed to it for the huge civilian casualties and lack of a clear plan and many other reasons to be skeptical of this war. But of course, all my life I've believed that it is possible for Iran and America to reconciliate. They're kind of my two countries. So I would love to see that personally as well. But I also just on a pure cold headed, analytical person, I do believe it's possible because I believe Iran has no other choice. Even though now Ayatollah Khamenei is killed. He's replaced by his son who is injured and nowhere to be seen. So we are in this situation in which the Revolutionary Guards are kind of running the country. The new supreme leader is nowhere to be seen. It appears that they are on a roll, that they feel like they've really resisted against America so far. And frankly, if the war right now, things don't look so bad. March 11 from the perspective of the Islamic Republic in a way, because they can say, you killed our leader, you destroyed all of these things, but we stayed in power. We had orderly succession and it's you who are kind of freaking out and blinking first and wanting to leave because survival is victory. Exactly. Exactly. And the U.S. has a democratic system, which means that when oil prices go up, the president gets worried. You know, there's a domestic sort of scene here. None of that, you know, Iran doesn't have to, the Iranian leadership doesn't have to worry about that. The Iranian, the guards are going on TV every day saying we're going to shoot anyone who comes to the streets. Very openly saying it. By the way, they're not even coaching. The head of the Iranian police went on TV and said, if you come on the streets, we'll shoot you. That's almost like a direct quote. Right? So that's, that's what Iran does. Right? President Trump can't say that. So he has to still win elections. So. Well, he doesn't have to win, but his party has to win elections. Hopefully he doesn't have to win elections anymore, but let's see anyways. But the point is that so survival is victory. So they're on their high horse there. But I think ultimately they realize that they need to come to some sort of an understanding with the US that they need to end this long enmity with the US in order to because on the day after of this war, Iran would be a ruined place economically ruined, in a terrible condition. I think the kind of leaders that will be able to come to power and hold power in Iran won't be the kind of crazy extremists who don't want to do anything with the US I think they'll end up having enough of pragmatic elements in there who will, who will go toward establishing ties with the U.S. so I think in five years from now, Iran and the United States will have diplomatic relationship. I'm not sure it would be Islamic Republic, which is in Iran. I'm not sure who will be the leader in Iran. But I think resumption of diplomatic ties between Iran and the US Is something that will happen in the next few years.

B (53:17)

Well, Arash, thank you so much. I think that's a good place to bring to end this series looking at how we got where we are. Thank you so much for joining us. The two books by Arash, Our Shadow Commander and what Iranians Want, both essential reading now. And of course, if you are a club member, you can hear more because we've got a special Q and A with Arash for members of the Classified Club can join@therestisclassified.com but thank you very much, Arash, and thank you all for joining us. We'll see you next time.

A (53:47)

We'll see you next time.