172. Neil Kinnock: Trump, Thatcher, and Why Labour Lost In 1992 (Part 2)

Summary

Podcast Summary: The Rest Is Politics: Leading

Episode 172 – Neil Kinnock: Trump, Thatcher, and Why Labour Lost In 1992 (Part 2)
Date: January 26, 2026
Hosts: Alastair Campbell & Rory Stewart
Guest: Lord Neil Kinnock

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Overview

In this deeply candid and wide-ranging episode, Alastair Campbell and Rory Stewart continue their conversation with Lord Neil Kinnock — former Labour leader, European Commissioner, and key figure in British politics. They explore Kinnock’s personal encounters with Margaret Thatcher and Rupert Murdoch, his reflections on Labour’s 1992 defeat, his views on market economics versus ideology, insights on modern political challenges, and the enduring legacy of leadership and loss. The episode skillfully combines political autopsy and personal reflection, offering unique windows into the psyche of a statesman who never reached Number 10 but shaped Labour’s path profoundly.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Reflections on Margaret Thatcher (02:32 – 13:39)

• Kinnock psychoanalyzes Thatcher’s upbringing: Attributes her politics to a “dominant father” and a “chip on her shoulder” from her bourgeois background.
• Dual attitudes toward the establishment: She “hated deferring” to aristocracy, yet performed exaggerated deference to the monarchy (04:33).
  • Quote: “Margaret Thatcher...used to go through this extraordinary knee bending Hollywood performance which was amazing… It indicated a form of extraordinary, unasked for, certainly by Queen Elizabeth...deference.” (Neil Kinnock, 04:33)
• Assessment of her revolution: Recognizes her social mobility, pioneering role as the first female PM, and that she seized opportunities—a blend of “accident” and “seizing the day.”
• Blame for embracing radical monetarism and privatization: Calls Thatcher’s adoption of Friedmanite economics “utterly disastrous for our country.” (08:12)
• Reluctant praise: Credits her for supporting the Single Market, but laments Brexit’s destruction of those gains.

2. Labour’s Shifting Center & the “Thatcher Settlement” (09:11 – 17:48)

• Admission of Labour’s acceptance of some Thatcherite reforms (e.g., lower top tax rates, end of 70s nationalization), but dissects the difference between reluctant adaptation and full ideological embrace.
• Critique of privatization: “Catastrophic” in utilities and railways (09:41).
• On regulation and markets: Advocates for regulated markets — “The market only works effectively to the general benefit...if it’s regulated.” (15:00)
• Relationship to New Labour: Supported social investment, but Kinnock laments that New Labour did not “tear up the roots of the malign effects of Thatcherism.”

3. Murdoch and Media Power (19:39 – 23:35)

• Unvarnished hostility: Kinnock’s “hostility to him is unremitting.” (19:39)
• Media power as political influence: Murdoch “follows the money” and equates media ownership with political leverage.
• Labour’s engagement with Murdoch:
  • Campbell: Labour’s courting of Murdoch was shaped by witnessing the Murdoch press’s attacks on Kinnock.
  • Kinnock: Initially furious, he later understood the pragmatic need to “neutralize” Murdoch, but warned, “he will betray you. And of course eventually he did” (22:12).
  • Memorable personal anecdote (21:28): Campbell narrates Kinnock venting about Blair/Campbell’s trip to see Murdoch while making tea, kettle hovering perilously close — humour amid vitriol.

4. The Defeat of 1992: Strategy and Regrets (25:05 – 36:10)

• The Major Problem: Kinnock believed John Major’s emergence changed Labour’s election calculus. Labour struggled to decide whether to paint him as “Thatcher’s offspring” or a new, less divisive figure (25:29).
  • In retrospect, Kinnock thinks they should simply have targeted Major’s policies rather than agonizing over Thatcher’s legacy.
• Shadow Budget Blunder:
  • Kinnock wanted to disclose Labour’s fiscal plans early for maximum rebuttal; John Smith (shadow chancellor) insisted on a “shadow budget” timed after the government’s.
  • Kinnock: “I couldn’t afford to even have a private quarrel with John over that... So I kept my counsel and we went ahead... which gave us days, weeks for attempted rebuttal and explanation instead of months that I wanted.” (29:14)
  • Reflects on the catch-22 of leadership and unity: asserting authority vs. keeping the peace.
• Labour’s Policy Bind: Their key anti-poverty pledges necessarily required some tax rises—couldn’t promise “no tax rises” like later Blair/Brown or Starmer (34:02).
• Personal Devastation and Moving On:
  • Kinnock admits defeat hurt, but gratitude for family, friends, and party support prevailed. Striking contrast with Major’s experience in Tory circles.
  • “There was also, I will confess... there was a relief of not carrying that every second of every day for all those years.” (36:10)

5. Warmth for John Major vs. Thatcher (38:30 – 41:41)

• Greater warmth toward Major (“decent cove”) than Thatcher.
• Recounts Major’s offer to make Kinnock European Commissioner after 1992—an act of basic decency Kinnock respects.
• The contrast: Thatcher as damaging ideologue vs. Major as well-meaning mitigator.

6. Enduring Scars of “Thatcherism” (41:41 – 44:29)

• The real burden of leadership was the feeling of fighting for the “soul” of the country against Thatcherism. Kinnock highlights how privatization, lost social cohesion, and regional decline persist to this day as Thatcher’s legacy.
  • “The residue is still there... in our low productivity, in our separation from the rest of our continent, in social and public attitudes, in the housing crisis...” (41:41)

7. Why Labour Lost in 1992 (43:15 – 45:28)

• Two main reasons: Thatcher’s departure created the “change” the public wanted, and Kinnock himself was seen as politically stale after nearly a decade in leadership.
• Press hostility was ferocious and unrelenting—Campbell cites Alistair McAlpine’s claim that tabloid editors (English, Lloyd, McKenzie) “absolutely weaponized the press.”

8. Labour and Leadership Today (45:28 – 55:57)

• Current era described as frustrating; a "huge majority that is biscuit thin" (45:28).
• Kinnock sees public’s yearning for change as a reason for both Labour’s opportunity and populism’s rise.
• What Labour Must Do:
  1. Deliver practical achievements—“Achievement is the irreplaceable requirement… If we don’t succeed, we won’t get support, full stop.” (49:26)
  2. Expose populism’s falsehoods (i.e., Farage, Reform UK).
  3. Radically improve communication, especially on social media.
  4. Challenge media normalization of populists.
• On Trump and International Politics: Labour’s response to Trump must be pragmatic. Starmer is right to avoid antagonizing Trump, but UK should use Trump’s actions as an impetus for a closer European relationship and bolder fiscal reform.
  • “Trump is smashing it to smithereens with potentially appalling consequences... I would try to take advantage of Trump… intensifying and accelerating our efforts to make a new relationship with the European Union.” (52:55)

9. On Leadership, Loss, and Legacy (55:57 – end)

• Nelson Mandela’s greatness: "His only abnormality was his mercy and his wisdom. Extraordinary." (56:10)
• Hosts discuss the emotional toll of leadership, citing Kinnock’s tears in unbroadcast moments, and reflect on his legacy.
  • Campbell: “To have gone through what he went through and didn’t get to be prime minister... I think he has to be recognized in those terms.” (59:16)
• The cost of political defeat: Kinnock’s experience described as “visceral”, compared to a party "death."
  • “Everybody coming up to Neil saying, ‘I’m so sorry because I voted for you’, and Neil saying ‘God, if they all voted in the way they said they did, I’d have been fucking landslide by now!’” (61:57)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Thatcher’s deference to monarchy:
  “[Her curtsying] was a gymnastic performance... Hollywood... unasked for deference.”
  — Neil Kinnock, 04:33

• On privatization:
  “Privatization has been... catastrophic. Most clearly illustrated by the condition of the water and sewage industry.”
  — Neil Kinnock, 09:41

• On ideological flexibility:
  “The fundamental question is: does it work? If it doesn’t, don’t touch it. If it does, continue or innovate.”
  — Neil Kinnock, 11:00

• On dealing with Murdoch:
  “I was… slightly displeased by the idea that you are going to pay court, as I think I put it at the time, to that bastard.”
  — Neil Kinnock, 20:55

• On election strategy and 1992 defeat:
  “We never really decided... whether to represent Major as the offspring of Thatcher... or as someone adopted because he contrasted with her wretchedness. And we never really made up our minds which to do.”
  — Neil Kinnock, 25:29

• On loss, resilience, and leadership:
  “There was also, I will confess... a relief of not carrying that every second of every day for all those years.”
  — Neil Kinnock, 36:10

• On current political challenge:
  “There’s such a yearning for change in the country… and it isn’t support for the dishonesty… of Farage; it’s a yearning for an alteration in what is felt to be a real deterioration.”
  — Neil Kinnock, 45:28

• On what Labour needs now:
  “Achievement is the irreplaceable requirement. If we don’t succeed, we won’t get support, full stop.”
  — Neil Kinnock, 49:26

• On Mandela:
  “His only abnormality was his mercy and his wisdom. Extraordinary.”
  — Neil Kinnock, 56:10

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• Intro and Recap: 00:48 – 02:17
• Thatcher Analysis: 02:17 – 13:39
• Labour & Thatcherism: 13:39 – 17:48
• Murdoch & Media: 19:39 – 23:35
• 1992 Election, Shadow Budget: 25:05 – 36:10
• Personal Aftermath and Reflections: 36:10 – 45:28
• Present-day Politics, Populism, Trump: 45:28 – 55:57
• On Mandela and Emotional Legacy: 55:57 – end

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Tone & Style

• Reflective, self-deprecating, sharp, and at times emotional: Kinnock’s wit and candor shine through, especially when discussing political strategy failures or personal vulnerabilities.
• Camaraderie between hosts and guest: Longstanding friendship and shared political experience lead to honest, sometimes raw exchanges.
• Blend of biting analysis and humour: From theatrical curtsies to tea-making rants about Murdoch, the mood swings from serious to light-hearted seamlessly.

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For New Listeners

This episode is an essential listen for anyone interested in the inside story of Labour’s transformation, the personal cost of leadership, the legacy of Thatcherism, media power, and the enduring struggle for political integrity. It’s rich with personal anecdotes, sharp critique, and moments of warmth and vulnerability – all delivered in the authentic, incisive style that defines The Rest Is Politics.

Transcript

[Alistair Campbell]

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[Rory Stewart]

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[Rory Stewart]

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[Alistair Campbell]

Welcome to the Rest of Polish, leading

[Rory Stewart]

with me Alistair Campbell and with me Rory Stewart. And we're now on the second part with Lord Kinnock. So in the first part we've had this extraordinary journey of this precocious young only child from a working class background in Wales who becomes a very young MP in his late 20s, is on the left of the Labour Party, who's rebelling against the government 79 times, who actually at that period was in favor of leaving the European Union and then comes in in the early 1980s, takes over in 1983 after a catastrophic labor defeat as a leader of the Labour Party and has the job of trying to rebuild the Labour Party as a winning political machine. And he has an extraordinary problem, we learned in the last episode about the fights with militant tendency and people trying to drag Labour to the far left. You, Neil, were in this incredibly polarized environment represented by Margaret Thatcher on the right of the Tory party on the one hand, Tony Benn on the left to the Labour Party on the other. And you were trying to navigate towards what you saw as reasonable middle grounds on council house sales on Arthur Scargle and the miners strike. You go into the election in 87, you lose again and now you've got a second chance. And this is really where you get to put your print on the Labour Party and define what a new vision of Labour could be on which over to Alistair for the first question.

[Alistair Campbell]

Okay, Neil, so let's get the juices flowing right from the top. I'm going to give you two names and ask you for your reaction, your top of head thoughts about both Thatcher, Murdoch.

[Neil Kinnock]

It's going to be difficult for me to accomplish all that without defending against all the codes of broadcast decency, Margaret Thatcher was sincere, which is half the problem was, I've always thought, and I might be an exception in this thought, but I've always thought trying to lift a chip off her shoulder, I think that Margaret Thatcher really did suffer from underperforming bourgeois syndrome, that she had been brought up in a household dominated utterly by her father, who was a strict nonconformist, chapel going Conservative, Alderman conservative in instinct, in personality, in his bone marrow, not just in his politics. And he managed to implant in Margaret Thatcher a view of herself and society, of the world that produced a particular kind of politics.

[Rory Stewart]

And what was that kind of politics?

[Neil Kinnock]

Well, of the established order in her perception, in black and white, never in Technicolor was satisfactory. But under threat because of malignant forces like trade unions, apathy, colonial leaders, communists obviously, and that the United States and the monarchy, the aristocracy, the structure of British society, offered the best hope of overcoming these dreadful threats.

[Rory Stewart]

Can I come in on this? Because sometimes she actually sounded as though she didn't really like the aristocracy, didn't really like the old establishment, didn't.

[Neil Kinnock]

Yeah, she hated deferring to them, but she did. Now, I'm going to exaggerate this small instance in Buckingham palace you could see courtiers and others smiling when they observed Margaret Thatcher curtsying to the Queen. It was a gymnastic performance. It was quite extraordinary, and not just to myself and Glynis. We never curtsied or bowed and the Queen didn't give a damn. It didn't bother her at all and it didn't bother anybody else in the royal family as far as I could ever see. But Mrs. Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher, Lady Thatcher used to go through this extraordinary knee bending Hollywood performance which was amazing and it indicated a form of extraordinary, unasked for, certainly by Queen Elizabeth and certainly by Charles or any of the others. Unasked for deference. So there was this peculiar duality of her deference and respect for supreme aristocracy and irritation, almost disgust for the way in which privileged had managed to secure advantaged conditions for people who didn't have her capacities.

[Rory Stewart]

So one of the things that always interests me about her is that people portray her as a sort of defender of the establishment. But in fact she was sort of often very angry and contemptuous of civil service mandarins, of foreign office, diplomats, of ambassadors, a lot of the old structures of the British establishment she really wanted to blow up. She was quite revolutionary, which is one

[Neil Kinnock]

of her great natural talents, was to not to have to adopt the mindset or attitudes of what you could call the small rentier class, the local business people who derived their livings from the neighborhood, served the community in a variety of ways, but enjoyed the unwritten power that they could exert in that area. I mean, any number of playwrights of the last hundred years who've expressed that much better than I could. But Margaret Thatcher was authentically from that, and it was a credit to her that she traveled as far and as quickly as she did. No question at all about that. And to become the first woman Prime Minister and woman leader of the Conservative Party was an extraordinary accomplishment. Now, it involved a series of accidents, but she was there and she did seize the day. There's no question at all about that. The effect of. However, the effect of her embracing, at the instigation of Keith Joseph, the economics of Milton Friedman monetarism and of mixing that in with her general ideological outlook proved to be, and has proved to be utterly disastrous for our country.

[Alistair Campbell]

Is there anything she did that you can point to and say that was good for the long term benefit of the United Kingdom?

[Neil Kinnock]

I can't really think of it, maybe, but it didn't work out in the long term. The support that she gave to the establishment of the single market of what was then the European Community, the fact that she chose as a commissioner a man who would unobtrusively but forcefully, if that's not a confusion in terms, persuade the Commission and secure the agreement of the member states to that quite gigantic evolution of the Community that worked to the benefit of Europe and particularly the United Kingdom. But of course, it's been utterly destroyed by departure from the European Union.

[Rory Stewart]

But, Neil, there were some things that her government did which you became, I suppose, comfortable with some version of, I mean, compared to the 1970s, by the time you're running in, in 1992, she's brought taxes down from a very high level. At the top of the 1970s, there's been privatization. You weren't in favor of returning to 1970s taxation or 1970s nationalization. So you'd accepted some of her settlement, right?

[Neil Kinnock]

Yes, but to be not in favor of the restoration of Morrisonian nationalization and to be in favor of the form of privatization that Margaret Thatcher introduced are two entirely different things. Privatization has been in terms of prices, consumer service, accountability, misuse of resources, catastrophic. And it's most clearly illustrated, of course, by the condition of the water and sewage industry. And it's manifested also on the railways and whatever you wanted to do with privatization generally. I think there would be pretty Substantial

[Rory Stewart]

majority agreement and deregulation and low taxes.

[Neil Kinnock]

Yes, deregulation, fine, where the regulations are an impediment to investment, to genuine entrepreneurship, to innovation, to competition. But where you're simply removing the impediments to exploitation and excess, that's different thing altogether.

[Rory Stewart]

So you're consequently a bit more left wing than Blair. You're sounding more left wing than Blair.

[Neil Kinnock]

Well, I don't know what the left right spectrum really means in this. The question that Tony addressed quite rightly, that, that I addressed many years before, that is, does it work? I used to say, does it bloody well work? But nevertheless, the implication is entirely the same. So I'm not abandoning any form of belief, ideology, analysis, any stuff like that, but I don't think it helps a hell of a lot because the fundamental question is, does it work? If it doesn't, don't touch it. If it does continue or innovate. I mean, that's a basic rule. No, it's a rule that Margaret Thatcher might have asked herself to obey at various times, but she abandoned in her enthusiasm, unremitting and unconditional for monetarism. And of course, the application of that with the rapidity and absolutism that occurred through Jeffrey Howe as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1979, eradicated 25% of British manufacturing capacity in three or four years. Now, it was under invested. It didn't have the productivity that should have been achieved, comparable to Germany, to parts of France, to the Nordic countries, to the usa. Okay, so the weak were driven further down and out of business. But it was all done without any preparation or any compensation. And it means that all these decades later, we have huge areas of our country who feel abandoned, who are culturally and socially destroyed because of the rapid and uncompromising removal of their sustenance and indeed the source of their identity. Now, when all that occurs, and it occurs as the result of the blunt application of unrehearsed policy without preparation, then it's destructive of the, yeah, I'll use the term, the soul of the country. And a great deal of what we confront now to the disadvantage of our younger generations, which is what really matters, is deriving from that completely irresponsible application of ideology, which was misplaced and indeed unproductive.

[Alistair Campbell]

But just to get to the point that Rory was making about. So when we came in and Tony was in charge and Gordon was Chancellor, you know, and you and I have had many, many, many private conversations about that period and during that period, and you've always been wonderfully Loyal. But where? I guess the point Maury's making is you. You sort of. You did try to make. Move Labor Party to the center.

[Neil Kinnock]

Yeah, if you want to use that geographic.

[Alistair Campbell]

Okay, well, I do, but I do understand it.

[Neil Kinnock]

I don't mind you doing it. I just hope that it's not misleading.

[Alistair Campbell]

No, no.

[Neil Kinnock]

But what. I'm with the idea that there's this magical, difficulty defined thing called the center.

[Alistair Campbell]

No, no. Okay, but let's. Let's just say. Let's just accept for the sake of this argument that you moved the Labour Party and then Tony moved it further. Right. I guess what Rory's asking is whether there were times when you felt that we were moving too far. And I guess, given we're talking about Thatch here, whether you felt we accepted too much of the Thatcher settlement and should have reversed more of it.

[Rory Stewart]

If I were interviewing Tony Blair, I wouldn't have got quite such a passionate speech that I just got it out of view. I think he was more accepting of some of the market mechanisms than you were. So it'd be interesting to talk about that a bit if you felt you could do so without being disloyal.

[Neil Kinnock]

Yeah. The problem is it wasn't the market, but a failure by some people to recognize the market only works effectively to the general benefit of the capitalist system and the people if it's regulated. If you have an unregulated or you radically reduce the regulation of the market, things go wrong. And if you don't Believe me, remember 2007, 2008. So did we accept this crash in economic history?

[Alistair Campbell]

So did we accept. That is my question. Did we accept too much?

[Neil Kinnock]

No, I put it slightly differently because you. You've got the point. It is that there wasn't enough effort dedicated to tearing up the roots of the malign effects of Thatcherism. I understand why. I understand that the current was flowing in a particular direction, that there was an established order of affairs. The economy wasn't faring too badly. Growth rate of 2.4, 2.5%, which would be miraculous now, but was conventional then. And all those things going on the Tories rejected finally, after 18 years. And the fact that New labor was so manifestly, graphically different was enough to carry us forward and to achieve great things. No question about what Tony and Gordon achieved in terms of investment in health, education, combating pension of poverty. Sure, start. I mean, I had my arguments. Well, they weren't arguments. They were discussions with both of them about the private finance initiative, which I was critical of. When it Was introduced in a slightly different form under John Major and I think hadn't changed. And I actually thought the market was willing to provide resources for public sector investment without the kind of conditions that were allowed by Major and then by Tony and Gordon. But nevertheless, with those reservations I celebrated all the time, certainly in terms of domestic policy, what New labor did. But what they didn't do was to say Thatcherism implanted serious weaknesses in our economy, in our society, which will cost our country dear as the time goes on.

[Rory Stewart]

It's a very difficult question but what do you think could have been done between 97 and 2008 to avoid some of the problems that we had later?

[Neil Kinnock]

For instance, radical house program of house building still continuing to sell council houses to sitting tenants. I haven't got any problem with that, but a real focus on. On the development of the physical infrastructure, especially housing that could and should have been done. And I would have liked, as I suggest, to make changes to the. To pfi.

[Rory Stewart]

Would you have nationalized the water industry?

[Neil Kinnock]

Yes, yes, yes. But the way I would have done it at really much reduced cost is to convert the massive subsidies still naturally having to be paid to the water and sewage industry in the share purchases. So very gradually the government could have established a share of over 29% in those industries and re regulated them. Now the other thing is they would have been the. The modernization of some regulation of the financial sector without diminishing the strength of the City of London at all. In fact, I think that it might have been probable. I'm not an expert in this area by any means, but I think it would have been possible to have used the effective regulation and self regulation of. Of the City as a way of promoting further strength for the British financial system.

[Alistair Campbell]

Murdoch.

[Neil Kinnock]

Yes, well, my hostility to him is unremitting. I doubt if that is going to cause him the loss of one second of sleep, which I regret. This man, since he was young, follows the money and can see no other objective in life except that he came to understand very early on that the ownership of newspapers, of communication media automatically carried with it a degree of power of influence which could be useful and had to be used in furtherance of business interests. Now of course that made him opportunistic, which is not unusual and in some cases not particularly objectionable. But as his power and influence grew, it became very self centered, almost imperialist.

[Rory Stewart]

And how powerful were the Murdoch papers? Was it necessary for Alastair and Tony to go out and see Murdoch to get their blessing?

[Neil Kinnock]

As you may recall, Alistair I was, I put it very moderately, slightly displeased by the idea that you are going to pay court, as I think I put it at the time, to that bastard, as I think I put it at the time.

[Alistair Campbell]

And you didn't need to hold a kettle filled with boiling water. That wasn't inches of moisture.

[Neil Kinnock]

That wasn't deliberate, that was coincidental.

[Rory Stewart]

Can you talk us through this moment, Alison?

[Neil Kinnock]

I was making a cup of tea. For God's sake, give us your.

[Alistair Campbell]

Making a cup of tea while venting about the fact that we traipsed halfway around the fucking world to see that I won't say the next word. Have you ever had your head stuck inside a frame, light bulb, etc and the kettle that he was genuinely boiling to make a cup of tea, getting ever closer to my face. But we, but we survived this.

[Rory Stewart]

So you think actually they didn't need to do that.

[Alistair Campbell]

But you did. But you sort of, you know, you talked in the first episode about sometimes when you have to do political things and what have you. So what. I was partly driven by having watched what the Murdoch press did to you and I was determined that wasn't gonna happen to Tony.

[Neil Kinnock]

And as the days and weeks passed, I have to say, despite my initial fury, which because they were my friends, I was in the fortunate position of being able to tell them straight between the eyes how I felt. Which didn't come as any surprise to them. I realized that part of their reasoning was because they'd witnessed what the Murdoch press had tried to do to me and that they were going to try and at least neutralize that. And secondly, that this thesis that they put forward, that if we can't get them on side, we can try to blunt them by personal contact, I thought had common sense to it. So eventually I came to terms that I did say, and Alistair may remember this, that he will betray you. And of course eventually he did, but not for a very long time. And it, I must say that the neutrality and then support of the Murdoch media, well, I don't know how useful it was, but it certainly was better than having their antagonism in political terms, even though it was deeply offensive of course to sections of the Labour electorate, particularly those in Merseyside.

[Alistair Campbell]

Okay, Neil, Rory, quick break and then

[Neil Kinnock]

we'll back to talk more now at the Home Depot.

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[Rory Stewart]

So there was this amazing moment, 87 to 92 where it looks like you're going to turn around the Labour Party and you're going to win. In fact, the polls going into that election in 92 look like you're going to win. What was the strategy? Imagine we're in 1991. You're giving a speech to the core of the Labour Party. What is the strategy that you thought would to win that election? How were you going to win that election?

[Neil Kinnock]

Well, I had difficulty, and the difficulty started on the day that John Major became leader of the Conservative Party. I said on the night that Thatcher resigned to my people in the office, it was quite crowded. Drink and be merry tonight because tomorrow we have got an entirely different battle. Now I was anticipating the election of Michael Heseltine, which I was looking forward to, because despite his talents, which are very substantial, he was in the Conservative Party a very divisive figure and I thought we could take advantage of that. When John Major became the leader without actually being elected, it therefore presented this with a terrible problem because we didn't know and we never really decided. I don't think we give enough thought to it, which is a shame, whether to represent him as the offspring of Thatcher and Thatcher in trousers, or to represent him as someone who'd been adopted and accepted simply because he contrasted with her wretchedness. And we never really made up our minds which to do.

[Rory Stewart]

In retrospect, what do you think was the better strategy. What should you have done?

[Neil Kinnock]

Neither of those. We should have really understood what a decent, competent guy he was and simply gone after him because of the policies he disposed and supported and the way in which he brought.

[Alistair Campbell]

So that is son of Thatcher.

[Neil Kinnock]

Yes, that is kind of son of Thatcher but unquestioning supporter of Thatcher who'd opportunistically seized the crown and should be attacked as a typical politician having. And the phrase I was going to use rather shamefacedly got rid of the poll tax which was the source of so much of the Tory ailment. Now that at least would have been cogent.

[Rory Stewart]

I do think something fascinating here. You both ran against Major and I'd really like to get the contrast these approaches. So we've heard a little bit about you. 92. What was your analysis in 97 on how you should fight Major and how did that differ from the way that Neil had fought and you were fighting the same man.

[Neil Kinnock]

People knew who he was by 97. They had no idea who John Major was in 92.

[Rory Stewart]

But tell us about the 97 analysis and how you thought you could beat him and how it would be different to the way the 92 campaign was run.

[Alistair Campbell]

Well, I think partly we were more able to make it much, much more about us.

[Neil Kinnock]

Yes.

[Alistair Campbell]

Whereas I think Thatcher and Thatcherism was still the dominant factor in the debate. And I, I also think that I'm really interested in Neil's take on this. John Smith who was shadow chancellor and was seen as very safe and solid and what have you, but the shadow budget, I don't know what your view is. Labor. Labor presented a shadow budget which I think opened the door to the Tories to mount a very, very conventional anti labor attack was putting up tax to pay for different things. And I just think that against Thatcher that might have worked. I think by then Major had managed to present himself as a very different sort of political figure. He had some really good attack dogs behind him, Chris Pip in particular, and they. Absolutely. Once the shadow budget was out, I, I mean I remember in the day saying I am now really worried. So I think we maybe neutralized the Tories better. Is that fair?

[Neil Kinnock]

Yes. And as I said, the Tories under John Major were divided, but he was better known and it was at the end of 18 years. Now in 92, I mean Alice is right about the shadow budget. I'd argued from October, November of 91 that we should begin to disclose the main elements of our fiscal policy in order that we would maximize the time available for rebuttal, explanation, to try and win the argument over the common sense, economic soundness and justice of the main proposals we had, which related, for instance, as Alistair said, to combating child poverty and pension poverty, which was widespread and was fundamental and a serious, desperate problem for millions in the country. And we had policies that, without imposing excessive taxation, in fact, without making any difference at all to the overwhelming majority of the population, could provide us with the resources to deal with these priorities. And I wanted months to impart all that. John insisted, highly respected figure of considerable brilliance in many, many ways, insisted that his concept of the shadow budget, produced the day after the real budget as a rebuttal, was the way to do it. And he adopted that attitude the moment it became apparent in early October of 1991 that there wasn't going to be an election until the spring. And I couldn't afford to even have a private quarrel with John over that, because he would have been public within seconds. I simply couldn't afford to allow the idea of a serious division between the Shadow Chancellor and the leader of the party to arise. So I kept my counsel and we went ahead with the shadow budget, which then gave us days, weeks for attempted rebuttal and explanation instead of the months that I wanted.

[Rory Stewart]

Sunil, this is. I mean, this is critical then, so that it. If we were creating a sort of drama out of this, this is the moment where you lose the election. In retrospect, what could you have done to head off John Smith? Should you have asserted your authority more? Why couldn't you trust him not to keep that disagreement private? Why couldn't you grip it and.

[Neil Kinnock]

Well, I could have trusted John to keep it private, but I couldn't really contemplate the possibility that he wouldn't talk to his stuff.

[Alistair Campbell]

And it was. It was. It was kind of in the ether anyway. Yeah, it was in the ether.

[Neil Kinnock]

Yeah, it was in the ether.

[Rory Stewart]

Wouldn't it have been better just to assert your authority, say, we're putting it out now?

[Neil Kinnock]

No, that would have been sagging him, which would have been disastrous.

[Rory Stewart]

So he lost you the election in some ways?

[Neil Kinnock]

I. I'd never say that. I'd never say that. I wouldn't even say that. This issue relating to the Shadow budget was a single cause. I mean, I was part of the cause. Cause of us losing the recency of the great change we'd made and the allegation, which I knew was coming from the Tories, that our changes were opportunistic and cosmetic because we'd made them only in order to gain some votes for the election. And we were insincere. And however admirable the changes were, they demonstrated our agreement with, with the Tories and not any independent change, all that stuff.

[Alistair Campbell]

And that particularly in the context of the way the defense policy had sort of evolved and changed over time.

[Rory Stewart]

Tell us about that.

[Alistair Campbell]

Well, just to move from being a unilateral nuclear disarming party to a completely different position. It, you know, so this, this, it wasn't just one thing, but I think that was the moment I felt this election was going and I felt, Neil felt that. I remember talking to Glennis at the time.

[Rory Stewart]

But you had another alternative which was to go into the election saying there will be no tax rises at all. We're going to copy the Tories fiscal policy letter for letter.

[Neil Kinnock]

Well, in the conditions of 1991, 92, that wouldn't have been feasible by the time they got to 96. 97. And Gordon Brown gave that undertaking. He could do it.

[Rory Stewart]

Why couldn't she do it in 91?

[Neil Kinnock]

My argument with Gordon at the time was it's great. Do it for one year, don't do it for two years. I thought two years was why couldn't you do it?

[Rory Stewart]

Why couldn't you do it in 19 1? 92. Because that again is Keir Starmer's strategy, wasn't it? He went into an election essentially saying he wasn't going to raise taxes.

[Neil Kinnock]

Sure, because it had been successfully performed in 96. 97. And I don't blame here for doing much the same thing. It's unfortunately painted the labor government into a corner. But nevertheless, in lead up to election, I don't blame him at all for adopting that strategy. It wasn't really obvious to us in 91. 92 because the serious central policies of combating pensioner poverty, for instance, that we were committed to, could not have been feasible without change in taxation, specifically taking the cap off the national insurance contributions so that people did continue to pay proportionate national insurance contributions after £22,500, which was the cap amount set in the period before 92. So we couldn't simultaneously undertake to address a major problem for the whole country of pensioner poverty and say that we weren't going to raise taxes. It would have been stupid to even

[Alistair Campbell]

try the 1992 election. Even though in your bones you might, as the campaign went on, thought this is not going to happen. And I certainly felt that towards the end it was nonetheless devastating. And I remember I was, I covered the campaign with you. I was with you on election night. I was with you the next day and then we went away on. On holiday for a while as well. I just want to have you. I know you get through it, but do you ever actually get over something quite as crushing as that?

[Neil Kinnock]

I think I did. Partly because of obviously Glennis and the kids and you and Fiona and other members of my family, Colin and Barbara, my brother in law and sister in law and that very tight surrounding circle of friends and comrades. Also comrades also the huge flow of affection from the Labour movement. John Major said to me, he was kind enough to ask me to lunch the week after I stopped being leader in July 92. And he said to me, how's the party treating you? I said, with huge generosity. Some of them in mistaken kindness have even asked me to stay on, God help me. And he said, oh, that's different from my party. I would be crucified if I lost. And I said, well, okay, perhaps the Labour Party is more used to losing and as affection for its vanquished. But all that, the main thing that meant that I didn't wear the scars was my preoccupation with what was going to happen to the people who'd given me their lives in my office for the previous nine years. Most of them for nine years, all of them for more than five years. And I was so concerned about what was going to happen to them and trying to ensure that they prospered and had good futures, which they did, I'm very, very happy to say, largely by dint of their own remarkable talents. But they have. They've thrived, all of them, which is great. But I was so preoccupied with that that I didn't. I couldn't really focus on having been beaten. There's also, I will confess, as I have on previous occasions, there was a relief of not carrying that every second of every day for all those years. The weight was mitigated massively by Glynis and the family and friends like you, but it was always there and it had come gong. Oh, God, whatever.

[Alistair Campbell]

But then I think the other thing is, it's interesting listening to. I don't. Roy thinks of this, but you get the sense you can't really bring yourself to be remotely warm about Thatcher, but you actually are very warm about John Major, relatively.

[Neil Kinnock]

Yes.

[Alistair Campbell]

And, and, and of course, John, another night we were with you is when John Major phoned you up and offered you this.

[Neil Kinnock]

Yes.

[Alistair Campbell]

To become a European Commissioner. Was that. I know you talked about it and thought about it, but that was quite a big thing. For him to do it was.

[Neil Kinnock]

He was in favor, it appears, of me going when the Commission changed in 92 and the Dulo Commission had two years added to its tenure because of the way in which the new admissions to the European Union were coming and other changes being made. So the extra two years were stuck on our Commissioner, Bruce.

[Alistair Campbell]

Bruce Milania.

[Neil Kinnock]

Bruce Milan wanted to leave the Commission and wanted me to succeed him. So he let that be known. And apparently John Major agreed with him, but the Cabinet didn't, and it didn't on the understandable grounds that they'd been saying for years I couldn't run a work stall, so how were they going to support me being a United Kingdom Commissioner on the European Commission? And it was comprehensible to me. I didn't know whether the chance had gone forever. But when eventually the Commission term was ending, John Major did phone me. You happened to be there on that day? I just come back from Manchester where I'd been interviewed.

[Alistair Campbell]

Ryan Giggs.

[Neil Kinnock]

Ryan Giggs for the Standard. Yes. So it was quite a day in many ways, and a cause for celebration. But I. The. The. The thing is about John Major is he's a decent cove from a background which doesn't compare with mine, which was much more disadvantage than mine. I mean, mine wasn't disadvantaged.

[Alistair Campbell]

He would have been much stronger contender in the Angela Rayner, Bridget Phillipson off that you talked about in episode one, Rory.

[Neil Kinnock]

I mean, and in his case, it would have been true.

[Rory Stewart]

Now, Neil, just. Just to return for a second to that, that loss, I mean, what strikes me listening to you, is the burden that you were carrying from 83 to 92 was that you didn't just feel that you were trying to win a game, you were fighting for something that was existential. I mean, Thatcherism for you was you were carrying the burden. You've just described how much damage the Conservatives had done. So winning in 87 and 92 was not just a question of personality, this was your life's meaning. So it must have felt unbelievably devastating. It wasn't just a personal loss, it was a massive loss. And everything you believed in, what you believed in terms of British public, what you believed in terms of British nation, what you believed in terms of decency in politics.

[Neil Kinnock]

Yes. And the most important part was you just mentioned it. The condition of the country and the prospects for the country, which I felt had been hugely damaged, maybe irretrievably, unless the ism of Margaret Thatcher was contradicted and uprooted. I thought that John Major was likely to mitigate it, but not do any better than that. And thus it is proved. And The Labour government, 13 years of labor government did seriously mitigate the damage, but the residue is still there and it's evident in our low productivity, in our separation from the rest of our continent, in social and public attitudes, in the housing crisis, in the condition of the financial sector, in privatization is still there decades, decades later.

[Rory Stewart]

So given all that, how could you explain to yourself why people in 92 would vote again for the Conservatives? Given all that you'd seen, given all the damage that you felt they'd inflicted, given your sense of British voters, I mean, it must have been very, very difficult to understand how they could vote again for the Tories after 13 years, given all that.

[Neil Kinnock]

One reason was that Margaret Thatcher had gone and the other reason was that I hadn't gone. The fact that Margaret Thatcher had gone meant that the change that the public overwhelmingly, as the polls showed, were demanding, had occurred. And in her wake came this almost unknown, mild mannered, normal guy from a disadvantaged background who, who'd made his way right up through politics and had a reassuring presence. And that was a very substantial reason. The other reason was I'd been there far too long. I, to the public was stale. I was same old, same old. And so consequently, whatever policies we were offering, there was no additional offer, no extra 5% coming from Kinnock. Because I really do believe that shelf life has huge significance in democratic politics and I probably outlive my shelf life.

[Alistair Campbell]

Can I just say, in Neil's defense, there's also another factor which actually Alastair McAlpine, you would know. And he was a former bigwig and Conservative Party, Tory Party treasure, Tory treasurer. And he's, he said to the party staff and publicly, let's not pretend this was us winning this. The real heroes of our campaign were David English, the editor of the Daily Mail, Nicholas Lloyd, the editor of the Daily Express, Calvin McKenzie, editor of the Sun. I mean, they absolutely weaponize the, the press. And I look, I don't know whether it made that big a difference, but it's to have years of relentless, negative, non stop coverage. You pay a price for that. Which to go back to our earlier discussion, is why we were so determined to try to neutralize them. Now, I know you'll be loyal because you always are, but we haven't even got on to labor today. It's quite frustrating. Watch at the moment, frustration is the

[Neil Kinnock]

word because we've got this huge majority that is biscuit thin. Yeah, 50 miles wide and one inch deep. I know that, the public knows that, Keir Starmer knows that. But we've still got the legitimate authority of being the government of the United Kingdom elected across the whole of the country. I'm frustrated by the fact that that justifiable means of making change is not being fully used. I don't mean an authoritarian way or any bullying way, indeed, I mean with the maximum of consultation and consideration. But nevertheless, there's such a yearning for change in the country, which paradoxically, course, partly explains the support for populism, that it isn't a support for the dishonesty, a misrepresentation, the mirages of farage. It's a yearning for an alteration in what is felt to be a real deterioration in standards of living, of conduct, of world significance, all kinds of things.

[Alistair Campbell]

But do you think. Do you think there's something that has changed fundamentally between your time and the time that I was working with Tony and now that makes it much, much harder to do? Yes, I think that there must be something that we're missing, because you and I probably agree on a lot of the things that need to be done, and I think that they, in number 10, think they need to be done. But there's something different about our politics now that it's harder to do, is

[Neil Kinnock]

that it's the way in which any instinct for audacity has been discouraged, almost privited.

[Alistair Campbell]

But Trump, Trump is showing the opposite.

[Neil Kinnock]

Well, of course, Thatcher did, Tony did. Not because you want an adventurous like Trump who's a menace to the whole world, but because you want from democracy to show a perpetual freshness. Montreuil, France, who was French Prime Minister back in the 50s, significant socialist figure, said that democracy is like a bicycle, common piece, that it must go forward to stay upright, and that's the constant requirement of democracy. Now, anything that looks that it slowed down to a halt, that it hasn't got fresh initiatives to deal with, perpetual change, which is, as the name suggests, always occurring in any case, generates at best, disappointment, disillusionment, the feeling that the powerlessness of the government in these circumstances is a reflection of the powerless, the impotence that people feel themselves to cope with the constant changes.

[Alistair Campbell]

Can you see a way of this being turned around, the farage being stopped, of labour getting another majority next time?

[Neil Kinnock]

We require, I think, probably three things, one over which you haven't got any real control, but the things over which we have control, our accomplishment, the demonstration in practical terms that things are starting to work, that improvements are being secured, that Advances are being made now to some extent, of course, that always in any case takes time, especially with the government that absolutely rightly has made record commitments to the improvement modernization of public investment, which in turn will magnetize private investment, which is great, but by definition there are no instantaneous advances that come with that, but other achievements. And the government has got a wholly inadequate communication system because it's not even telling the people the good things that are very gradually painstakingly being achieved. And on top of the inadequacy in communications, many of the good things are obscured by the distractions and the mistakes that have been made which every government makes. But they've completely clouded and made the invisible some of the good things that are happening now. Achievement is the irreplaceable requirement. If we don't succeed, we won't get support, full stop. That's it. Second thing, we ought to be much more effective in our exposure of farage and populism and reform. Who they associate with, what they do, what they really think, what they've promised, the pledges that they've broken, discarded without a second thought. All that must be exposed and reported again and again and again and again simply so that people understand the massive confidence trick that is being successfully attempted so far. Now, there's nothing that illustrates that better than the stance of the reformed people in the period before the 2016 referendum vote. And it isn't that I'm remoaning, it's the reality. They told what they knew, or they must have known to be lies about immigration, about the economic prospects beyond our departure from the single market.

[Alistair Campbell]

Well, they denied it would lead the single market.

[Neil Kinnock]

Well, of course, they said in explicit terms that it would be supreme folly to leave the single market. And yet they knew, they must have known it was the absolutely unavoidable consequence of leaving the European Union, of voting to leave. The third thing that we should attempt to do without bullying or any form of oppressive behavior whatsoever, on the contrary, is to improve our communication, especially social media, radically transformationally, because we are losing the air war. I suppose the last thing this is four things though that we should try to do is to get the mainstream media to treat reform and like a normal professional political party, instead of treating them as a novelty, which is the source of these stories.

[Rory Stewart]

Okay, final thing for me, what would Prime Minister Kinnock be doing dealing with the challenge posed by Trump and Trumpism at the moment? And what would you be doing about.

[Neil Kinnock]

I've been trying to take advantage of him. I mean, I admire hugely the Patience, the tolerance being shown by Keir Starmer towards Trump. He hasn't really got an alternative because of the capricious attitude that Trump's got and the way in which he would without question conduct the most vicious form of vendetta. He's capable of doing that. And Keir Starmer can't afford to gamble and won't gamble ever with the fortunes of our country and make us the object of malevolence by Donald Trump. But I would try to take advantage of Trump, for instance, and it's not too late. Now, last April, Trump's so called Independence Day, which was an active madness in completely seeking to destroy the consensus which since 1945 gave us 30 of the best years that the world economy or our economy or the American economy ever achieved as the 30 years after the war and has been eroded, corroded since, but still exists. Trump is smashing it to smithereens with potentially appalling consequences. Now, I would have tried last April to say, look, what the President of the United States has said and is doing, which is perfectly entitled to do, means that the arithmetic and the expectations of last July have been shredded. We therefore have to adopt a different course, which means intensifying and accelerating our efforts to make a new relationship with the European Union. It means we have to change our fiscal stance and start to make a proper levy on assets while not inflicting additional charges on people who have to work for, for their living, taking advantage of the crisis inflicted by Trump in order to make changes. And I would still be seeking to do that because I think people in general recognize, certainly leaderships of various countries do, that Trump is making such changes without warning and without a second thought. Talk frankly that it alters the whole basis on which government policies have been anticipated, developed, applied, and therefore change is essential in order to sustain prosperity and security, which is the fundamental requirements of democratic governments.

[Alistair Campbell]

Listen, one of your great heroes and inspirations, Nelson Mandela, we can't get through a long, long interview without you saying what you think makes him so special.

[Neil Kinnock]

Mandela was superhuman. He felt all the natural responses to the cruelties inflicted on him, both physically and spiritually. But somehow he managed to override all that even when he was in a position of power. And he could have manifested his resentments and settled scores and paid off people that I regard to be utterly, unrestrainedly admirable, simply because he was normal, utterly normal. And his only abnormality was his mercy and his wisdom. Extraordinary.

[Alistair Campbell]

Neil, love to talk to you as ever.

[Neil Kinnock]

Same here, mate.

[Rory Stewart]

It's been a Great, great pleasure to have you. Thank you again.

[Neil Kinnock]

Thank you.

[Rory Stewart]

Bye bye. Well, Alice, thank you very, very much. And it was interesting because it's the first time I've received emails from you saying one of the tricky things is that he's such a good friend and has been such a good friend for such a long time. You're also, you've got a slightly different manner towards him than I think you do toward almost anyone else. There's a certain sort of fondness towards him and a kind of gentleness comes out of you when you're talking to

[Alistair Campbell]

Neil that you're gentleman with Tony.

[Rory Stewart]

Not the same gentleness.

[Alistair Campbell]

Jonathan?

[Rory Stewart]

No.

[Neil Kinnock]

Powell.

[Rory Stewart]

No, no, no. You're more sort of David Miliband, more cheeky with them, whereas this is sort of just gentleness. I sometimes even a sort of almost a kind of filial deference towards him which I haven't noticed with anyone else.

[Alistair Campbell]

No, I don't think that. I think that. I'll tell you what was, what was happening and if listeners and viewers are a little bit confused as to why Neil was clearly teary eyed talking about Nelson Mandela, it's just because prior to that we'd been talking about Glennis and we're not going to show that bit because he was in bits. And I just think that Neil is one of the most extraordinary guys I know. He's a very, very, he's an amazing friend. We have been through an awful lot of ups and downs and he's just. And his family are amazing. And so. No, I don't, I didn't feel I was being more deferential but if you spotted that. No. And I think it's a pity in a way that we didn't talk about Glenn's because I think you can't talk about Neil without. Doormat is now one of the most formidable political partnerships and she was a really amazing woman. I. And I also maybe I do think that I think this with Tony, but Tony went on to be prime minister and won three terms and, and what have you. I think that Neil's legacy is so bound up in what we did. And even though Tony always said, and Gordon always said, you know, speeches and talk about labor, the debt of gratitude we owe to Neil Kinnick, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. I think to have gone through what he went through and didn't get to be prime minister in the way that Wilson did and Callahan did and Tony did and Gordon did and now Keir Starmer has. I think that. I think he has to be recognized in those terms. So yeah, it's interesting you thought that

[Rory Stewart]

I sort of saw processing this but that 92 defeat, how devastating that must have been given how viscerally, Neil, you, everybody in the Labour Party felt about Thatcherism, felt about what she'd done to the country from 79 to 92. I mean you must have felt this was a kind of profound moral campaign so it must have been almost incomprehensible.

[Alistair Campbell]

Well, I'll tell you a couple of things on the way back I can remember the next morning we came back from Wales and the next day I was just doing the round of media because I was still a journalist then on College Green and there was a journalist called Peter Jenkins who was a very, very well known political commentator and I remember him, I was doing a two way thing with him with the BBC I think it was and he said I think the Labour Party has to understand that if it cannot win in these circumstances it's probably never going to win again. And I remember thinking five years later we won a landslide. But the reason I think I can remember that is that that really, really hit me I thought. Were you seriously saying this is like the death of the Labor Party? And I didn't feel it was but you could see why people were thinking that. So it was absolutely visceral. It was visceral and from a personal perspective I'll never forget this either. Fiona and I went, I think it was the next night we went around to Neil's house in Ealing and up until then there was this scaffolding outside because all the media had been hanging around just waiting for him to come back from Wales. Pictures etc etc the scaffolding was still there and all the media had gone and we went inside and I'll never forget it, Gladys was sort of making a cup of tea, Neil had his slippers on and as you may know, Rory, I don't think slippers and he was literally sort of looking at the TV listings to see what to watch on television and, and then this holiday, this little holiday we had in Devon with Gavin Davis and Sunai and I can, the first day we got there, Neil playing football with Rory, my Rory, he was then five and just thinking how do you go from that to this and, and, and process it and then going out and about. The funniest thing going out and about at that point point was everybody coming up to Neil saying I'm so sorry because I voted for you and Neil saying God, if they all voted in the way they said they did. I'd been fucking landslide by now.

[Rory Stewart]

So just finish. I mean, I thought what. What Neil said about the STP was really fascinating. And one of the things that I took from it is the sense that you can't just win in politics on the basis of exceptional individuals. In some ways, Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Shirley Williams would have seen themselves as really, really exceptional individuals. And they would have hoped that they were taking the real stars for the Labour Party over this new party and that that would be enough. And it wasn't enough in the end. Sheer organization, party history, unions, institutional memory, skillful leadership by Neil destroyed these sort of great stars, intellectual stars.

[Alistair Campbell]

So has Neil been added to your list of labor heroes with Alan Milburn and others?

[Rory Stewart]

Yeah. And people like David Blunkett, who I'm not sure he agreed with politically. No, I loved him. I thought he was so gentle and moving. I mean, I would say on record, I'm much more of a Tory than he is. I'm a bit suspicious about his views on privatization, deregulation. It all sounds very reasonable, but I imagine in practice I'm probably a bit more pro market, pro business than he is. But as a human being, I thought he was absolutely wonderful and I'm very proud that he was part of our political landscape.

[Alistair Campbell]

Excellent. See you soon.